Contested Environment Healthcare as a Cyber- · Healthcare as a Cyber-Contested Environment National Cyber Summit 2019 Lightning Round Presentation Jeremy B. Blevins, CISSP, CEH Cybersecurity

Healthcare as a Cyber-Contested Environment

National Cyber Summit 2019 Lightning Round Presentation

Jeremy B. Blevins, CISSP, CEHCybersecurity Analyst5 June 2019

• Experience• 20+ years Information Technology• 10+ years Cybersecurity• 6 years Army National Guard (Radio/COMSEC Repair)

• Education• Bachelor of Business Administration (Faulkner University)• Master of Science in Management (Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University)• Master of Professional Studies in Cyber Policy Risk Analysis (Utica College)

• Certifications• Security+, CompTIA Advanced Security Practitioner (CompTIA)• Certified Ethical Hacker (EC Council)• Certified Information Systems Security Professional (ISC2)

• Affiliations• Calhoun Community College: Adjunct Instructor• InfraGard Huntsville Members Alliance: President• North Alabama Chapter Information Systems Security Association: Senior Member

Jeremy B. Blevins

• Cyber is a Contested Domain of Warfare• The Military Health System• Healthcare is a Cyber-Contested Environment• Defend Healthcare Systems• Summary

Agenda

Caveat Emptor: This presentation is given from a defense-centric perspective, but wholly applicable to non-defense health systems.

“For decades the United States has enjoyed uncontested or dominant

superiority in every operating domain. We could generally deploy our forces

when we wanted, assemble them where we wanted, and operate how we wanted. Today, every domain is contested—air,

land, sea, space, and cyberspace.”-2018 National Defense Strategyhttps://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf

2006-2009

Operation Olympic Games (Flame, STUXNET) initiatedCompromise leading to Operation Buckshot Yankee discoveredDoD ban on use of USB flash drivesUS Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) established

2010-2014

STUXNET first reportedOperation Buckshot Yankee publicly acknowledgedRecognition of Cyber as a Domain of Warfare

2015-2016

OPM breach discoveredLaptop containing names, SSNs of 134,386 current and former sailors compromised

2017-Present

Wikileaks releases CIA hacking toolsShadow Brokers release NSA hacking toolsDoD travel records compromisedUSCYBERCOM becomes a Combatant Command

Gains and Losses on the Cyber Battlefront

NOTE: Most Cyber “wins” are likely classified

“We can’t operate with the mindset that everything has to be

about keeping them out”-Rich Barger, CIO, ThreatConnect

https://www.wired.com/2016/10/inside-cyberattack-shocked-us-government/https://www.csoonline.com/article/2130877/the-biggest-data-breaches-of-the-21st-century.htmlOPM• Personal information of 22 million current and former

federal employees compromised

• Each of those people have to list contact information for family & references as part of their SF86 application

“There is hardly a military mission that doesn’t incorporate cyber capabilities, and that is both a great strength of the U.S. military and a possible weakness.”

-Maj. Gen. Charles L. Moore Jr. (USAF)

https://dod.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/810009/us-militarys-cyber-capabilities-provide-strength-challenges-official-says/

This Includes the Military Health System

Military Health System

https://www.health.mil/About-MHShttps://www.health.mil/About-MHS/MHS-Elements

Ø1.4 Million Active Duty

Ø331,000 Reserve Components

Ø9.4 Million Active Duty, Military Retirees & Families

https://www.health.mil/About-MHS

54 Hospitals

377 Medical Clinics

270 Dental

Facilities

https://taskandpurpose.com/10-medical-advancements-from-the-iraq-and-afghanistan-wars

Advanced Prosthetics

Identifying & Treating Traumatic Brain Injury

Regenerative Medicine

Medical Devices

AdvancesPost-GWOT

Both Healthcare Systems and Medical Devices are Potential Targets for Cyber

Attacks

This Photo by Unknown Author is licensed under CC BY-ND

MHS GENESIS [Health Record System] is not survivable in a cyber-contested environment.

JITC and the SPAWAR Red Team successfully executed three cybersecurity attacks

against the system as an insider, near-sider, and outsider.

- https://www.dote.osd.mil/pub/reports/FY2018/pdf/dod/2018dhmsm.pdf

https://fcw.com/articles/2019/02/04/mhs-genesis-cyber-probe.aspx

Researchers in Belgium and the UK have demonstrated

that it’s possible to transmit life-threatening (if not fatal)

signals to implanted medical devices such as pacemakers,

defibrillators, and insulin pumps.

https://hbr.org/2017/05/medical-systems-hacks-are-scary-but-medical-device-hacks-could-be-even-worse

That’s pretty bad!We must defend healthcare systems.

• Device manufacturers must harden devices and provide updates for the full lifecycle

• Healthcare systems must be secured like other critical assets• The Risk Management Framework must be applied• Trained Cyber professionals must be staffed

How Do We Defend Healthcare Systems?

• All DoD medical facilities are being migrated to the DHA Medical Community of Interest (Med-COI) network enclave

• Naval Information Warfare Center (NIWC) serves as the Cyber Security Service Provider (CSSP) for DHA

• Systems and medical devices are being secured in accordance with RMF

What are we doing about it NOW?

• 2014 - Sentar Awarded Over $31 Million in Multiple Task Orders Under SPAWARSYSCEN Atlantic ICO Preferred Pillar Contract

• 2016 - Sentar to Provide Information Assurance, Cyber Security (IA/CS) And Cyber Services Under Sentar’s SPAWAR Prime Contract

• 2018 - Sentar Awarded Fedhealthit Innovation Award Winner for its Work on the Defense Health Agency (DHA) Mitigation and Remediation Support (MARS) Team

• 2019 - Sentar Proudly Announces it has been Selected by FedHealthIT as an Innovation Award Winner for its Work on hhe Defense Health Agency (DHA) Cybersecurity Operations Center (CYOC)

Sentar is on the forefront of this effort

• We must recognize that healthcare is a cyber-contested environment• We must have trained Cyber professionals in place to defend• We must win because of the kinetic, real-world impact of failing

Summary