CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism - Annual Report (2013)

7/29/2019 CONTEST: The United Kingdoms Strategy for Countering Terrorism - Annual Report (2013)

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CONTESTThe United Kingdoms

Strategy or

Countering Terrorism

Annual Report

Cm 8583


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CONTESTThe United Kingdoms Strategy

or Countering Terrorism

Annual Report

Presented to Parliamentby the Secretary o State or the Home Department

by Command o Her Majesty

March 2013

Cm 8583 16.00


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Home Oce2 Marsham Street

London SW1P 4DFPublication date: March 2013

Crown copyright 2013

You may re-use this inormation (excludinglogos) ree o charge in any ormat ormedium, under the terms o the OpenGovernment Licence. To view this licence,visit http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-government-licence/ or e-mail: [email protected].

Where we have identied any third partycopyright inormation you will need to obtainpermission rom the copyright holdersconcerned.

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homeoce.gsi.gov.ukThis publication is available or download atwww.ocial-documents.gov.uk and rom ourwebsite at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications

ISBN: 9780101858328

Printed in the UK by The Stationery OceLimited on behal o the Controller o HerMajestys Stationery Oce

ID 2548100 03/13 28307 19585Printed on paper containing 75% recycledbre content minimum.


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Contents

The United Kingdoms Strategy for CounteringTerrorism

Annual Report

Foreword 5

Part 1 Introduction 7

The Threat rom Terrorism 8

London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Security 11

Part 2 Our response 13

Pursue 13

Prevent 21

Protect 24

Prepare 31


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4 CONTEST The United Kingdoms Strategy or Countering Terrorism Annual Report


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Foreword by the Home Secretary 5

Foreword by the Home Secretary

As Home Secretary, I am reminded every day about the threat we ace rom terrorism, andthe vital importance o our counter-terrorism work.

In July 2011, I published the UKs revised counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST. This progressreport comes at the end o an extraordinary period or the agencies and organisationsinvolved in counter-terrorism in the UK and overseas. The Olympic Games will beremembered as a spectacular sporting event, and this is the greatest tribute we can payto the military and police ocers, agency sta, civil servants and volunteers who deliveredthe largest peacetime security operation in this countrys history. The security o the Gamesdepended on the counter-terrorism capabilities which we have developed as part o our

broader strategy. It was testimony to the success o CONTEST.

There have been no successul terrorist attacks in Great Britain during this period and seriousattempted attacks have been oiled. We are taking the necessary steps to ensure that we cancontinue to detect, investigate, prosecute and otherwise disrupt terrorist threats. We are notonly maintaining but enhancing counter-terrorism policing capabilities against the backgroundo the most ambitious reorm o policing or a generation. We have strengthened protectivesecurity arrangements at the border. And we have signicantly improved the capability o theemergency services to work together to deal with a terrorist incident.

But there is no room or complacency. As the Director General o the Security Service saidlast year, the UK has aced the prospect o a terrorist attack on the scale o 7/7 on averageonce a year since 9/11. The threat rom terrorism is changing but remains substantial. Thisis refected in the number o people arrested and convicted or terrorism-related oences.Furthermore, as the Prime Minister has said, we ace a generational battle to deeat ouradversaries and their ideologies.


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Staying ahead o the developing threat will not be easy. We must secure legislative changesthat preserve our ability to disrupt terrorist activity and deal with those responsible. We mustcontinue to strengthen our approach to border security. And we must continue to challengeextremist and terrorist ideologies and the people who promote them. I am condent that thestrategy will continue to provide a basis or this work.

Theresa May MPHome Secretary


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Part 1: Introduction 7

PART 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 In October 2010, the Governmentpublished a new National Security Strategywhich identied terrorism as one o the ourhighest risks which we ace. The strategycommitted to giving top priority to counteringthe threat rom terrorism at home andoverseas.

1.2 The Strategic Deence and SecurityReview (SDSR, October 2010) stated thatthe Government would maintain, and insome areas enhance, the UKs counter-

terrorism capabilities. Refecting the CoalitionProgramme or Government, the SDSR alsocommitted to:

a review o our most sensitive andcontroversial counter-terrorism powersand, consistent with protecting the public,a correction in avour o liberty;

a reorm o the counter-radicalisationworkstream o CONTEST;

urther capabilities in policing to deal witha terrorist rearms attack;

new measures to reduce thevulnerability o the UK to terrorist use ounconventional materials; and

the introduction o a programme topreserve the ability o the security,intelligence and law enorcementagencies to obtain communications dataand to intercept communications within

the appropriate legal ramework.

1.3 In July 2011, the Government publishedthe third version o the United Kingdomscounter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST. Thestrategy set out the threat we ace and ourpriorities or dealing with it through to 2015,refecting the National Security Strategy, theSDSR and our wider Coalition Programme orGovernment. The strategy is supported by asignicant work programme, involving everypart o the UK counter-terrorism communityand many international partners.

1.4 In 2011 the Government committedto produce an annual report on CONTEST.

This report (prepared by the Oce orSecurity and Counter Terrorism in theHome Oce, responsible or co-ordinatingCONTEST) covers the period rom July2011 to December 2012, to enable inclusiono security work or the Olympic Games.More detailed documents about aspects oCONTEST can be ound atwww.gov.uk/government/publications.

1.5 This report does not cover domesticterrorism in Northern Ireland, responsibilityor which lies with the Secretary o State orNorthern Ireland. Many o the policies andprogrammes or tackling terrorism in thelonger term are devolved to the NorthernIreland Executive. For that reason, CONTESTdoes not extend to dealing with terrorism inNorthern Ireland but many o the issues dealtwith in the strategy and the principles it sets

out are relevant to the threats we ace there.


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The Threat rom Terrorism

1.6 Ater a very rapid increase between2003 and 2008, the number o terroristattacks around the world has levelled o,and casualties rom terrorism have marginallydeclined. But the global threat rom terrorismremains high. In 2011 (the latest year or whichstatistics are available), over 10,000 terrorist

attacks occurred in some 70 countries,causing almost 45,000 casualties and over12,500 atalities. About three quarters othose attacks occurred in the Near East andSouth Asia; attacks in Arica and the WesternHemisphere were at a ve-year high.

1.7 Pakistan and the tribal areas alongthe Aghan border remain o the highestimportance to our national security. Althoughdepleted in numbers and capability, Al Qaida

continues to operate rom this region and stillhas the capability to conduct terrorist attacksin the UK and other countries. People romthis country continue to travel to this area to

join Al Qaida and receive Al Qaida training.

1.8 During the period covered by thisreport, Al Qaida aliates around the worldhave become a greater threat in their ownright, collaborating more closely with eachother and taking advantage o regionalinstability and the breakdown o law and order:

In Yemen, despite a partially successulcounter-terrorism campaign by theGovernment, Al Qaida in the ArabianPeninsula (AQAP) continues to pose asignicant threat both to the UK andto UK interests in the region. AQAPpropaganda has continued to encourageacts o lone terrorism in and against theWest. In April 2012, AQAP attempted athird attack on a civilian aircrat, ollowing

earlier unsuccessul operations inDecember 2009 and October 2010;

Across North Arica there has beena sharp increase in terrorist activity

conducted by Al Qaida in the Maghreb(AQM) and smaller, like-mindedassociated organisations. AQ-relatedgroups are now stronger in Libya, Egyptand Tunisia than ever beore and havegreater reedom o movement. The attackon the gas installation at In Amenas in

Algeria in January 2013 demonstratestheir current capability and intent. AQM

has kidnapped and ransomed westernhostages, securing signicant unds orurther operational activity;

AQM has moved south into Mali andprovides practical support to the Nigerianmilitant Islamist group, Boko Haram anda splinter organisation, Ansaru. BokoHaram has conducted almost dailyattacks in Nigeria during this period,causing large numbers o atalities;

Ansaru has a more international agendaand has kidnapped and murderedwestern (including British) hostages; and

In Somalia, progress has been made bythe Somali Government in containingthe threat posed by Al Shabaab. Butthis is ragile: Al Shabaab is still capableo mounting attacks throughout thecountry, collaborates with other terroristorganisations and aspires to attacktargets in the region, including UK

interests.

1.9 The uprising in Syria, beginning in early2011, has involved many organisations withdierent political views and tactics; some areconnected with and supported by Al Qaidain Iraq. These terrorist groups conductedover 600 attacks in 2012 and, like othersassociated with Al Qaida, continue to attractrecruits rom this country and elsewhere in

Europe. There are now hundreds o oreignghters rom Europe in Syria. As and whenUK residents return here there is a risk thatthey may carry out attacks using the skills thatthey have developed overseas.


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1.10 Kidnapping or ransom has becomean increasingly common terrorist tactic duringthis period. Over 150 oreign nationals havebeen kidnapped by Islamist terrorist groupssince 2008 (at least 13 o whom were Britishnationals). But numbers kidnapped in 2012(almost 50) were more than double thosein 2010. In many cases ransoms have beenpaid, and we conservatively estimate that AQ

aliates and other extremist groups (suchas the Abu Sayya Group in the Philippinesand the Taliban and Pakistan Taliban) havecollected at least 60 million USD in oreignnational ransom payments since 2008.

1.11 The terrorist threats we ace are nowmore diverse than beore, dispersed acrossa wider geographical area, and oten incountries without eective governance. Thisposes signicant challenges to our nationalsecurity and to the security and intelligenceagencies and departments working oncounter-terrorism: operating in these areasis dicult and dangerous, requires verysignicant resources and is complicated andat times made impossible by the breakdowno governance and law and order.

1.12 Since the publication o CONTESTin July 2011, the threat to the UK rominternational terrorism (which is set by theJoint Terrorism Analysis Centre) has remained

at SUBSTANTIAL, meaning that the threat oa terrorist attack remains a strong possibilityand may occur without warning.

1.13 In the twelve months to 30 September2012, there were 245 terrorism-related arrestsin Great Britain: 45 people were charged withterrorism-related oences and 18 convicted;a urther 25 people were awaiting trial as at18 January 2013. Some notable cases are setout below:

In December 2010, twelve people werearrested in connection with a plot toconduct terrorist attacks in the UK. Ninewere charged with terrorism oences. All

pleaded guilty shortly beore their trial andin February 2012 they were sentenced toterms o imprisonment ranging rom 5 to21 years. Potential targets o the groupincluded diplomatic premises, the LondonStock Exchange and named individuals.Others involved in this plot had plannedto take part in and und terrorist trainingoverseas with a view to carrying out

terrorist acts in the uture; In August 2011, a married couple were

charged with the preparation o terroristacts and possessing inormation likelyto be useul to a person committing orpreparing an act o terror. They were bothconvicted in July 2012. Their likely targetswere in Manchester;

Between September and November2011, twelve people were arrested by

West Midlands Police on suspicion o thecommission, preparation or instigationo acts o terrorism in the UK. The trial othree o the deendants commenced inOctober 2012 and ended on 21 February2013 when they were all ound guilty oall charges, including planning attacksintended to cause mass casualties incrowded places. Sentencing is scheduledor April 2013. Two urther trials o otherdeendants will begin later this year;

In April 2012, our people were charged inconnection with planning terrorist attacksin the UK and are due to stand trial in

April 2013. They are suspected o havinglinks to terrorists in Pakistan. On 1 March2013, all pleaded guilty to the chargeagainst them;

In July 2012, six people were chargedwith preparing acts o terrorism. They aresuspected o plotting an attack in West

Yorkshire on an English Deence Leaguedemonstration. Their trial is scheduled tobegin in April 2013;


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Key Achievements

There were no successul terrorist attacks in Great Britain during this period. A numbero serious attempted attacks were oiled and signicant arrests have been made. Thesecurity o the 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games was maintained. All this refects thevery strong capabilities o the security and intelligence agencies and the police.

We have made progress with all our commitments in the SDSR and CONTEST. We haveimplemented the ndings o a major review o counter-terrorism powers and legislation.

We have removed powers that were unnecessary, disproportionate and ineective. Wehave introduced new legislation, the Justice and Security Bill, that will provide morerigorous oversight o the activities o our security and intelligence agencies and betterprotect secret material rom open disclosure in civil proceedings in this country. And wehave published drat legislation to maintain vital police and agency capabilities regardingcommunications data.

We have begun to implement a new strategy to prevent people rom becoming terroristsor supporting terrorism. We regard this as vital, particularly given a trend towards home-grown terrorism in this country and elsewhere in Europe. We have taken a much strongerposition on extremism, which not only undermines integration and is inconsistent with ourBritish values, but can draw people into terrorist activity.

We have made signicant changes to roles and responsibilities at the border. We haveseparated the Border Force rom the UK Border Agency and are setting up a BorderPolicing Command as part o the new National Crime Agency. These changes will helpus to protect the border and detect cross-border crime, including terrorism. We havecontinued to adapt other aspects o our protective security to deal with the developingthreats we ace. We have made signicant changes to aspects o our aviation securityregime. We have agreed new EU-wide measures to restrict the sale o explosiveprecursors.

We have developed our capability to deal with terrorist attacks that use rearms.Recognising the need or a rapid and co-ordinated response to any terrorist attack we

are taking orward a programme to ensure that our emergency services are able to worktogether more eectively at the scene o a terrorist incident.

Our counter-terrorism strategy needs to be fexible in response to the changing terroristthreat. This is refected in this report. With close allies and multilateral organisations wewill build our collective capabilities to deal with new international terrorist threats. Wewill support countries most aected by terrorism and, where necessary, strengthengovernance and sponsor judicial reorm. We will seek international consensus on dealingwith the growing threat o terrorist kidnapping. We shall continue to develop our Preventwork in the light o the challenge rom domestic radicalisation and home-grown terrorism.We will respond to challenges presented by new technology by providing urther

capabilities or the police and agencies.We have worked with the Northern Ireland Oce and the authorities in Northern Ireland toensure that we benet rom each others experiences, and provide what support we canto assist their eorts to counter the threat rom terrorism in Northern Ireland.


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In July 2012, three people were arrestedin London and charged with preparingacts o terrorism. They were suspected otravelling to Pakistan or terrorist trainingand travelling abroad to commit acts oterrorism. On 15 March 2013, all threepleaded guilty to the single charge acedby them. Sentencing will ollow; and

In October 2012, two people were

arrested at Heathrow Airport; one wascharged with terrorism-related oenceswhile the other was released withoutcharge. In November 2012, anotherperson was arrested at Heathrow andlater charged with the same terrorism-related oences. A urther person wasarrested and charged in January 2013with preparation o terrorist acts. All arealleged to have been involved in thekidnap in 2012 o a British journalist andhis colleague in Syria and are due to acetrial in June 2013.

1.14 Over the period covered by thisreport there have been 33 terrorist attacksin Northern Ireland. 246 people have beenarrested and 88 charged. The latest guresare reported by the Police Service oNorthern Ireland and can be ound on theirwebsite at www.psni.police.uk/directory/

updates/updates_statistics.htm.1.15 We judge that the terrorist threat tothe UK rom ar right extremism is low incomparison to the threat rom internationalterrorism. NDEU data shows that in 2012there were ve arrests under terrorismlegislation in relation to ar right wing activity.We continue to monitor or any indications oincreased activity rom ar right groups.

London 2012 Saety and

Security Programme

1.16 The London 2012 Olympic andParalympic Games was the largest sportingevent in UK history. From the Olympic TorchRelay in May to the athletes parade on 10September, the Games involved 14,700athletes rom 205 countries at over 30

competition venues in London and across theUK; more than 10 million spectators attendedOlympic events.

1.17 Protecting the Games required thelargest ever peacetime security operationin this country. Up to 14,500 police ocersand 18,000 armed orces personnel weredeployed on Games security duties.

About one million accreditation applicationbackground checks were completed or

Games Family Members, workers, volunteers,athletes, journalists and ocials: a signicantnumber were reused or national securityreasons. Nearly 6 million people arrived atHeathrow alone during July and August2012. In 2010 the Government announcedthat it expected to deliver the programmeor additional policing and wider Gamessecurity or 475 million, although up to600 million remained available i required.Separately, 553 million was provided tothe London Organising Committee o theOlympic and Paralympic Games (LOCOG) orvenue security, including inrastructure andpersonnel. In December 2012 the outturnor policing and wider Games security costswas estimated at 455 million. In February2013 the estimated outturn or venue securitywas reduced to 451 million, refecting thesettlement reached between LOCOG and theprivate security company, G4S. Final gures

will be published later this year.


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1.18 The Games time venue securityoperation was the responsibility o LOCOGworking to Government requirements andwith Government advice. G4S, contractedby LOCOG, was unable to deliver theagreed levels o Games venue guards andthe planned military contribution to venuesecurity rose accordingly, to a peak o12,200 personnel. The Home Aairs Select

Committee conducted an inquiry into venueguarding in September 2012 and concludedthat contingency plans put in place by theHome Oce, LOCOG, the military and thepolice had unctioned well. G4S is paying alladditional costs arising rom additional militaryand police deployments.

1.19 The Government is committed to thesuccessul delivery o the 2014 GlasgowCommonwealth Games. Lessons rom the2012 security programme have been sharedwith Glasgow and the authorities in Brazilor the Rio de Janeiro 2016 Olympic andParalympic Games.


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Part 2: Our Response 13

PART 2: OUR RESPONSE

2.1 The CONTEST strategy covers allorms o terrorism and continues to be basedaround our workstreams:

Pursue: to stop terrorist attacks;

Prevent: to stop people becomingterrorists or supporting terrorism;

Protect: to strengthen our protectionagainst a terrorist attack; and

Prepare: to mitigate the impact o aterrorist attack.

PURSUE

2.2 The Pursue strand o CONTESTaims to disrupt and stop terrorist attacks,wherever possible by prosecuting those whoare engaged in terrorism-related activity. Thenumbers o people arrested or and chargedwith terrorism-related activity (paragraph 1.13above) refect the competence and capability

o the organisations responsible or thiswork. The police and intelligence agencies allwork to common objectives, use the samestandards and have access to the sameinormation. Continuous improvement in thecapabilities o the police and Security Service,close co-operation between them, dedicatedCounter-Terrorism Units and budgets, andthe integration o our work in this country andoverseas are all critical to our success.

2.3 The Government has made majorchanges to policing in this country duringthe period covered by this report. ANational Crime Agency (NCA) has been

established and, subject to the passage othe Governments Crime and Courts Bill, willbe ully operational by the end o 2013. TheNCA will lead our work on serious, organisedand complex crime, including cyber crimeand border security. No decision has beenmade on whether the NCA should have acounter-terrorism role in the uture; this will beconsidered when the NCA is up and running.In the meantime, the NCA and the policecounter-terrorism network in England and

Wales will collaborate on issues o commoninterest including nancial crime, bordersecurity, work in prisons, orensics, specialisttechnical capabilities and corporate supportunctions.

2.4 The Police Reorm and SocialResponsibility Act 2011 abolished policeauthorities or police orces in England andWales, and introduced directly elected Policeand Crime Commissioners (PCCs) in theirstead. PCCs will ensure that the policingneeds o their communities are met aseectively as possible, bringing communitiescloser to the police, and building condencein the criminal justice system. A new StrategicPolicing Requirement (SPR) coveringEngland and Wales sets out the policingcapabilities required to meet national threats,including counter-terrorism. In holding theChie Constable and their orce to accountor policing in their area, Police and Crime

Commissioners must have regard to thestandards set out in the SPR.


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2.5 Our programme in CONTEST 2011 setout to:

Continue to assess our counter-terrorismpowers and ensure they are both eectiveand proportionate;

Improve our ability to prosecute anddeport people or terrorist-relatedoences;

Increase our capabilities to detect,investigate and disrupt terrorist threats;

Ensure that judicial proceedings in thiscountry can better handle sensitive andsecret material to serve the interests oboth justice and national security; and

Work urther with other countries andmultilateral organisations to enable us tobetter tackle the terrorist threats we aceoverseas.

COUNTER-TERRORISM AND

SECURITY POWERS

2.6 The Government review o counter-terrorism powers was published in January2011 and made signicant changes acrosscounter-terrorism legislation.

Terrorism Prevention and InvestigationMeasures (TPIMs)

2.7 In December 2011, Control Orderswere abolished and replaced with TerrorismPrevention and Investigation Measures(TPIMs). The purpose o TPIMs is to reducethe risk rom people believed to be engagedin terrorism-related activity whom we areunable to prosecute or deport. The TPIMspackage includes: specic measures torestrict terrorism-related activities, which aremore proportionate than those provided or

by Control Orders; and additional resourcesor the police and Security Service tomaximise the opportunities to put terroristson trial in an open court. Eight people weresubject to a TPIM as o 28 February 2013.

2.8 On 26 December 2012 a person ona TPIM absconded. The Home Secretaryannounced a review o this incident in astatement to Parliament on 8 January 2013.

2.9 The Government has been clear that,in exceptional circumstances, more stringentpowers may be needed to protect the public.Drat emergency legislation or enhanced

TPIMs has been prepared and subjected

to pre-legislative scrutiny in case suchexceptional circumstances should arise.

Pre-Charge Detention

2.10 The review o counter-terrorism powerspublished in January 2011 recommendedthat the limit on pre-charge detention orterrorist suspects should be reduced rom28 to 14 days. This change was introducedthrough the Protection o Freedoms Act2012, which received Royal Assent on

1 May. The Government believes that the14 day limit strikes the right balance betweensaeguarding national security and protectingindividual rights: in practice, in the year ending30 June 2012, only three o the 52 peoplearrested under section 41 o the Terrorism Act2000 in Great Britain were held in pre-chargedetention or more than seven days and theywere all subsequently charged within the14 day limit.

2.11 The Government recognises that, inrare cases, a longer period o pre-chargedetention may be required. For this reason,drat ast-track legislation to temporarilyincrease pre-charge detention to a maximumo 28 days has been published and subjectedto pre-legislative scrutiny.

Proscription

2.12 There were three amendments to thelist o banned terrorist organisations in the

reporting period. The Indian Mujahideen andAnsaru (suspected o the killing o Britishhostages in Nigeria in March 2012 and March2013) were proscribed in July and November2012 respectively; and, in December 2011,


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Muslims Against Crusades was proscribedas an alias o an organisation in this countryalready proscribed under other names,including Al Muhajiroun and Al Ghurabaa.

Terrorism Stop and Search Powers

2.13 The review o counter-terrorism powersrecommended signicant changes to thestop and search powers provided by the

Terrorism Act 2000 in light o concerns abouttheir necessity and proportionality. Thesechanges were implemented through theProtection o Freedoms Act 2012 and cameinto orce on 10 July 2012. The Act repealedthe powers (commonly known as Section44) in the 2000 Act, which had enabled thepolice to stop and search people and vehicleswithout suspicion and replaced them withmore limited powers. The new powers (undersection 47A o the Terrorism Act 2000) enable

the police to stop and search people andvehicles with no suspicion only in exceptionalcircumstances, where a senior police ocerreasonably suspects that an act o terrorismwill take place and where the powers areconsidered necessary to prevent such an act.

2.14 There has been no use o the new stopand search powers under section 47A o the

Terrorism Act 2000 in Great Britain. A totalo 679 people were stopped and searched

under section 43 o the Terrorism Act 2000by the Metropolitan Police Service in the yearending 30 June 2012, down rom 1,283 in theprevious 12 months. The Police Service oNorthern Ireland publishes statistics on use ostop and search powers in that jurisdiction.

Stop and Search at Borders

2.15 Powers contained in Schedule 7 tothe Terrorism Act 2000 enable the policeto stop, search, and question people at the

border and at ports. These are importantpowers to keep the UK sae, but there havebeen concerns they can operate unairly. Inline with the Governments commitment to

counter-terrorism powers which are botheective and proportionate, the Governmenthas completed a review o the operationo Schedule 7 and a public consultationon proposals to amend how the powersmight operate in uture. Responses to thatconsultation, which ended in December2012, are being considered and proposals toamend the legislation will be brought orward

at the earliest opportunity.

PROSECUTION AND

DEPORTATION

Intercept as Evidence

2.16 The lawul interception ocommunications plays a critical role inprotecting the British public. At present,intercept material (i.e. the records o the

content o telephone calls, emails etc) isused very eectively as intelligence, whichregularly acilitates an investigation, but not asevidence in court. In some other countries,oten with dierent legal systems, interceptmaterial is evidential. The Government iscommitted to trying to nd a practical wayto allow the use o intercept as evidence,where a legally viable model can be oundand the intelligence value o intercept materialis not adversely aected.

2.17 The current review into the potentialuse o intercept as evidence in courtproceedings is being overseen by anindependent cross-party Privy Council Group,chaired by Sir John Chilcot. Its purpose is toaddress the likely balance o advantage andthe cost and risk o a legally viable model orusing intercept as evidence.

Deportation of Foreign Nationals Engagedin Terrorism

2.18 The Coalition Programme orGovernment committed to urther workto better enable the deportation o oreignnationals who pose a threat to our security.


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The Government remains committed tostrengthening the UKs ability to deportoreign national terrorists in a manner whichis consistent with our legal and humanrights obligations.

2.19 Domestic courts and the EuropeanCourt o Human Rights have agreed thatthe approach o using bilateral diplomaticassurances to protect the saety and human

rights o people being deported on nationalsecurity grounds is sound. The Governmentis seeking to extend the range o countrieswhich may provide bilateral assurances to uso saety on return, prioritising those with themost nationals engaged in terrorism-relatedactivity in the UK or judged the most likelyto do so. We now have bilateral agreementsin place with Algeria, Jordan, Ethiopia,Lebanon and Morocco and have discussedthe scope or agreements with a number o

other countries.

2.20 For much o this period the speciccase o Abu Qatada has attracted signicantattention as it progresses through the courts.In November 2012, the Special Immigration

Appeals Commission (SIAC) allowed AbuQatadas latest appeal against deportationto Jordan. On 11 March, the Court o Appealheard the Governments appeal againstthis decision. As at 18 March, the Court o

Appeals judgment had not yet been handeddown. We continue to work to achieve AbuQatadas lawul deportation, both throughthe courts and by working with the JordanianGovernment to overcome the remaining legalissue raised by SIAC. On 21 December 2012,we deported another Jordanian national onnational security grounds under the bilateralagreement we have in place with Jordan.

2.21 Responding to the diculties that the

Government has aced in cases such as thato Abu Qatada, the Government is workingon reorms to reduce delays and strengthenour ability to deport oreign nationals who

pose a threat to national security. We arealready tightening the legislation on theright to an in-country appeal or nationalsecurity deportations and are exploring othermeasures to expedite such cases through thecourts and to restrict the provision o legal aid.

MAINTAINING AND IMPROVING

OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES

Communications Data

2.22 Communications data (CD) is a termused to reer to data about a communicationor the use o communications services.CD can help identiy who has made acommunication, when, where and how.CD is distinguished rom the content oa communication and, unlike the contento communications obtained through

interception, can be used as evidence incourt. CD is o considerable value to lawenorcement agencies in the investigation oall kinds o serious crime, including terrorism.

2.23 CD is presently retained by thecommunications industry or their owncommercial reasons (e.g. in order to bill theircustomers). With the necessary approvalsthe police and the intelligence agenciescan access CD where it can acilitate a

specic investigation. But new internet-basedcommunications do not always generateCD and some CD is no longer retained orbusiness reasons. CD is thereore not alwaysavailable when needed by public authoritiesto help in the investigation o crime.Legislation is necessary to ensure that CDcontinues to be available to law enorcementagencies in the uture, as it has been in thepast.

2.24 Drat legislation on CD was publishedon 14 June 2012 and has been scrutinisedby a Joint Committee o both Houses whopublished their report on 11 December2012 and by the Intelligence and Security


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Committee who published a summary otheir report on the same day. The HomeOce considered the Joint Committeesrecommendations careully and acceptedthe substance o them all. The Bill has beenredrated and will be introduced at the earliestopportunity. The proposed legislation willput in place the necessary regulations andsaeguards to ensure that our response to

this technological challenge is compatiblewith the Governments approach toinormation storage and civil liberties.

Terrorist Finance

2.25 Terrorists need money to travel, train,radicalise, und attacks and establish supportnetworks. Funds raised in this country arebeing used to support terrorist-related activityboth here and overseas.

2.26 We are particularly concerned by the

diversion o unds collected or charities inthe UK or terrorist and extremist purposes.We have signicantly increased support tothe Charity Commissions work in this area,which will enable better advice to charitiesand urther investigations where thereis evidence that charities have behavedimproperly or been exploited. We havesponsored a campaign to provide communityguidance on Saer Giving.

2.27 Funds raised in this country maymove overseas through the Money ServiceBusiness (MSB) sector. As the regulator, HMRevenue and Customs (HMRC) is workingto reduce the vulnerability o the MSB sectorand increase its compliance with regulations.HMRCs regulatory powers have beenstrengthened to better ensure that unt orimproper individuals cannot control MSBs.

2.28 Overseas, donors in the Gul and in

East Arica provide signicant unding orsome terrorist groups. The UK has played anactive part in the eorts o the multinationalFinancial Action Task Force (FATF) to

strengthen work against terrorist nancingand money laundering.

2.29 Kidnapping or ransom continues tosupport terrorist activity, notably in Northand West Arica (paragraph 1.10 above).

The Government is concerned at the verysignicant amount o revenue raised by AlQaida through ransom payments. In the UK,we work to ensure that British citizens and

companies have access to the latest traveladvice, including advice about kidnap risks,so they can plan their travel accordingly.Internationally, the Government is workingwith partners to reduce the risk o kidnappingas a means o terrorist nancing; we planurther activity in this area during ourPresidency o the G8.

THE PROTECTION OF SENSITIVE

INFORMATION IN JUDICIALPROCEEDINGS

Justice and Security Bill

2.30 Over the past ew years therehas been an increase in civil litigation inconnection with counter-terrorist operationalactivity. The number o cases is small butthe issues they raise are disproportionatelysignicant. These claims oten involve

allegations o Government involvement invery serious wrong-doing in connection withcounter-terrorist operations around the world.Resolution o many o these cases requiresaccess to sensitive intelligence, derived romthe security and intelligence agencies and ourintelligence allies.

2.31 At present, the only way or theGovernment to protect highly sensitivenational security material rom disclosure in

civil litigation is by claiming Public InterestImmunity (PII) to exclude the material romthe case or to seek to settle the claim. I aGovernment claim or PII is successul, thatmaterial will be excluded rom the court


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proceedings entirely. I a claim or PII isunsuccessul, the Government must eitherdisclose material that would damage thenational security o the UK, or build its casewithout relying on that material, or seek tosettle the case to avoid such disclosure whichcould potentially put the lives and saetyo intelligence ocers and their sources atrisk: this can mean paying signicant sums

o public money to people whose case thecourts have not upheld. The Justice andSecurity Bill, introduced in the House oLords in May 2012, addresses this problemby providing or closed material proceduresin the small number o civil cases involvingrelevant national security material which theCourts recognise is too sensitive to disclose.

2.32 The Justice and Security Bill also limitsa legal mechanism which has become knownas the Norwich Pharmacal jurisdiction.

This provides or a claimant who is involvedin litigation anywhere in the world to seekdisclosure o relevant inormation rom a thirdparty in Great Britain. Applied in the contexto national security, or which it was neverintended, Norwich Pharmacal has been usedto seek access to sensitive material, includingthat shared in condence by our allies. Thisundermines the principles o condentialityand trust on which international intelligence-

sharing arrangements are based and candamage these critical relationships. The Billthereore proposes that Norwich Pharmacalshould not be available or inormation heldby, originating rom, or relating to, the securityand intelligence services, or inormationcertied by the Secretary o State asinormation which ought not to be disclosedas it would be contrary to the public interest.

2.33 The Bill also seeks to extend the

Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC)sremit by granting it additional investigativepowers and resources and bringing it closerto Parliament. It would also extend the remito the Intelligence Services Commissioner.

The Bill has now completed its initial stagesin both the House o Lords and House oCommons. It will transer back to the Houseo Lords in late March or Lords Considerationo Commons Amendments.

INTERNATIONAL

COLLABORATION AND

CAPACITY BUILDING2.34 Successul counter-terrorism workrequires very close international co-ordination and collaboration and this hasbeen a hallmark o CONTEST over thepast ew years. Much o this collaborationis operational, managed by the securityand intelligence agencies and police withcounterparts overseas, with the specicintention o disrupting terrorist attacks. Some

is policy driven and aims to use internationalcollaboration to deliver CONTEST in the UK.

2.35 A signicant amount o work isdirected to building capacity in othercountries across all parts o CONTEST orexample, improving the capability o securityorces, protective security, crisis managementand counter-radicalisation. Successulaction against Al Qaida in Pakistan and

Aghanistan has been accompanied by thedispersal and diversication o the terroristthreat, notably into Arica and the MiddleEast. At the same time, political change inthese areas has led to signicant changeand sometimes disruption to countries legaland security structures. The need to buildcapacity in countries which are vital to ourown national security is thereore urgent. Oparticular importance is work to ensure thatcountries legal systems and security agencycapabilities and practices allow or eective

co-operation. As the Foreign Secretary setout in a speech on 14 February 2013, the UKis seeking to build justice and human rightspartnerships with countries where there is


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both a threat to the UKs security and a needto develop their law enorcement and criminal

justice systems.

2.36 Some capacity building is multilateral.The new Global Counter-Terrorism Forum(GCTF), or example, established by the USand Turkey in September 2011, brings statestogether to work on areas such as the ruleo law and border management. The UK and

the United Arab Emirates chair a workinggroup which shares best practice on Prevent.

Through the EU important progress hasbeen made improving aviation cargo security.EU counter terrorist strategies or Pakistan,the Horn o Arica and the Sahel have beenagreed.

2.37 Bilaterally, the UK has a wide rangeo such capacity building projects in prioritycountries, co-ordinated with development

programmes run by DID. In Aghanistanwe maintain a major programme to supportthe Aghan National Army and are building

Aghan investigation, arrest and prosecutioncapabilities. The UK has begun another majorprogramme to support the Government oPakistan in reorming the CT legal process,rom crime scene management and evidencecollection through to prosecutor trainingand changes to legislation. This programmeis now co-ordinated with many other

international donors and has been supportedby EU unding.

FORWARD LOOK

2.38 We will continue to ensure that thepolice, and the security and intelligenceagencies have the necessary powers andcapabilities to stop terrorist attacks in thiscountry. That requires continued investmentand innovation. We will seek closercollaboration between agencies and police

working on counter-terrorism and organisedcrime, ensuring that resources and methodsare shared as eectively and eciently aspossible.

2.39 Given the way the terrorist threatis changing we will need to develop evenurther our collaborative work with countriesoverseas and with multilateral organisations.We will continue to respect human rights andpromote the rule o law, which we regard

as the oundation or successul counter-terrorism work in this country and overseas.We need to ensure the closest possibleco-ordination between our work on nationalsecurity and our international developmentprogrammes: good governance and povertyreduction are an essential oundation orbetter security in many o the countries whereterrorists are most active at present.

2.40 Pakistan and Yemen remain veryhigh priorities or our overseas counter-terrorism work. In the coming year wewill need to ensure that eective counter-terrorism capabilities remain in Aghanistanater the drawdown o International Security

Assistance Force (ISAF) orces in 2014. Wewill also need to respond to the growingthreat to our interests in North and West

Arica.


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Engagement with and support for our Security Industry

A strong and competitive UK security industry is vital to our national security and inparticular to the success o CONTEST in this country and overseas.

The February 2012 Deence and Security White Paper, National Security throughTechnology, noted the contribution o the industry to developing and sustaining keysecurity capabilities, as well as contributing to export-led growth and a balancedeconomy. A well-regulated trade in security products can support our strategic

relationships around the world and enhance the counter-terrorism capability o our allies.The White Paper also recognised that exports can reduce the costs o programmes tothe UK and improve the long-term viability o our own suppliers.

The global security market is worth 384bn. It grew by more than 5 per cent in 2010/11and is predicted to continue growing strongly out to 2015. In 2011, the global securityexport market was worth 62bn. UK exports were valued at 2.6bn, a market share o4 per cent. This contrasts to the deence export market where the UK averages a20 per cent share.

The UK security industry has a strong reputation, not least because the UK has acedsignicant terrorist threats or a number o years and the industry is a key supplier toGovernment and the police. London 2012 has urther enhanced the reputation o the UKGovernment and industry working in partnership.

In the White Paper the Government committed to increasing support or our securityindustry, recognising that responsibilities in this area have historically been dispersedacross Government. The Home Oce has now been given the task o co-ordinatingthis eort in close conjunction with the Foreign and Commonwealth Oce, UK Tradeand Investment (UKTI) and others. We want to see our security industry supporting ourCONTEST work in the UK and overseas and operating in tandem with Government.


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PREVENT

2.41 Preventing people rom becomingterrorists or supporting terrorism is animportant part o our counter-terrorismstrategy and has been the subject o growinginternational interest and collaboration. TheGovernment introduced a new Preventstrategy in June 2011 ater an extensive

period o consultation.2.42 In common with CONTEST as a whole,the new strategy covers all orms o terrorism(with the exception o domestic terrorismin Northern Ireland), including rom the arright. It also deals with non-violent extremismand extremist groups which, sometimesdeliberately, can draw people into terrorist-related activity. But the allocation o resourceswill be proportionate to the threats we ace.

At present the greatest threat to the UK asa whole is rom Al Qaida and the violentIslamist ideology associated with it. Thestrategy draws a clear distinction betweenPreventand work in support o integration;responsibilities have been realigned betweenthe Home Oce and the Department orCommunities and Local Government inEngland, respectively.

2.43 The strategy also rearmed theGovernment commitment in the CoalitionProgramme or Government to deny publicunds, including Preventunding, to any groupthat has recently espoused or incited violenceor hatred or undermined British values.

2.44 The revised Preventstrategy seeks to:

Respond to the ideological challengeo terrorism and aspects o extremism,and the threat we ace rom those whopromote these views;

Provide practical help to prevent peoplerom being drawn into terrorism andensure that they are given appropriateadvice and support; and

Work with a wide range o sectors(including education, criminal justice, aith,charities, the internet and health) wherethere are risks o radicalisation or whichsupport our counter-radicalisation work.

2.45 Local Authorities are vital to all aspectsoPrevent. We now have a network o co-ordinators in priority Local Authority areaswho support Prevent programmes and

co-ordinate with community organisations,agencies and Departments. We regard localexpertise and accountability as essentialto the programme. Local Authorities areincreasingly merging Preventinto otheraspects o their work (e.g. child protection)and we strongly support this: authorities havebegun to develop a new range o community-based projects in conjunction with the Oceor Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT)

in the Home Oce. Over 80 projects wereapproved in 2012. Local Authorities workclosely with dedicated Preventpolice teams,neighbourhood police and wider counter-terrorism policing.

CHALLENGING TERRORIST

IDEOLOGY

2.46 We continue to believe that ideologicalchallenge is the core o our Preventwork.We need to reute the claims made byextremist and terrorist organisations andtheir propagandists here and overseas. Inparticular, we must challenge views promotedby extremist Islamists and the ar right. Wealso need to be condent about and assertiveo our own values. As the Prime Ministermade clear in his Munich speech in 2011, agenuinely liberal countrybelieves in certainvalues and actively promotes them. Freedom

o speech, reedom o worship, democracy,the rule o law, equal rights regardless o race,sex and sexuality.


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2.47 Since publication o the Preventstrategy, we have signicantly improvedour understanding o the people andorganisations who are most heavily engagedin radicalisation in the UK and overseas.We have worked closely on this with otherconcerned Governments and shared ourwork widely across Departments here. Wehave identied structured, co-ordinated, and

well unded networks o Islamist extremistsin this country whose messages are divisive,anti democratic, anti western, intolerant oother aiths and liestyles and highly critical opeople who do not ollow their interpretationo Islam. We have seen how ar right groupshave developed an Islamophobic and whitesupremacist ideology, which is also antidemocratic, intolerant and conducive toviolence. We know these extreme Islamistand ar right organisations eed o one

another and try to create enmity, suspicionand hatred between our communities.

2.48 In the UK, the Security Service andpolice can take action against people andgroups who are engaged in radicalisation. Wehave proscribed several groups who condoneterrorist activity. We have provided advice toLocal Authorities and institutions about thethreats rom extremism and the statutorypowers available to them or challenging

extremist speakers. We continue to sharewith Local Authorities the Counter-TerrorismLocal Prole (CTLP), a summary o availableinormation about terrorism and extremism ina specic area.

2.49 We have also continued to und aspecialist police unit that assesses internetcontent against the criteria set out in ourterrorism legislation and collaborates withindustry to remove illegal content rom theinternet i it is hosted in this country. Over4,000 URLs which breach UK terrorismlegislation have been taken down by the unitsince it was established in 2010. We havealso worked with industry to share unlawul

websites which can then be included incommercial ltering products.

2.50 We have supported community-basedcampaigns that rebut terrorist and extremistpropaganda and oer alternative views to ourmost vulnerable target audiences. We haveworked with digital communications expertsto help teen civil society groups exploit thepotential o the internet.

2.51 We have also worked closely withother countries where apologists or terrorismand extremism are most active and whereterrorist and extremist propaganda canhave a direct impact on communities here.We have made increasing use o powersavailable to the Home Secretary to excludepeople rom this country who are engaged inextremist activity.

SUPPORTING VULNERABLEPEOPLE

2.52 We have made progress in meetingthe commitments in the Preventstrategyto support people who are vulnerable toradicalisation. We have extended Channel,a multi-agency programme to identiy andsupport people who are at risk, acrossEngland and Wales. The standards or thissaeguarding programme are set nationally bythe Oce or Security and Counter-Terrorismin the Home Oce. But each Channel projectis run and managed by local agencies,including the Local Authority and the police.Between January 2007 and December2012, almost 2,500 reerrals were made toChannel, generally by the police and statutoryorganisations. Over 500 people have receivedsupport. In April 2012, we introduced asystem or assessing the vulnerability o

people who have been reerred to Channel,which will in uture make it possible toaccurately evaluate its impact.


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2.53 Channel relies on the engagemento trained rontline proessionals andcommunities. We continue to und anextensive education programme tomake people more aware o the risks oradicalisation and how the risks might beaddressed.

2.54 We continue to attach particularimportance to Preventwork in prisons where

there is a signicant risk o radicalising activityby terrorist oenders or other prisoners.Working with the police, the NationalOender Management Service (NOMS) hasmade more widely available programmesthat help prisoners disengage rom terrorismand extremism. Pilots o new interventions tochallenge Al Qaida related ideologies haveshown promise.

SUPPORTING SECTORS ANDINSTITUTIONS

2.55 We have continued to support sectorsand institutions that may be targeted byradicalisers or which have an important roleto play in challenging terrorism and violentextremism:

The Department or Education (DE)has implemented rigorous checks on

proposed Free Schools; strengthenedIndependent School Standards andpublished new Teachers Standardswhich set out conduct required andclearly state that teachers actions shouldnot undermine undamental Britishvalues. Osted has also updated itsinspection rameworks, setting out howinspectors should make judgementsagainst the revised Independent SchoolStandards. Regulatory action could be

taken where these standards are notmet. We encourage schools to engagewith local Preventnetworks and to makeuse o their material, and projects in

Preventpriority areas support teachers todiscuss and challenge extremism in theclassroom;

For Higher and Further Education wecontinue to support work by the NationalUnion o Students to provide guidanceon the risks associated with extremistspeakers and by Universities UK toshare best practice with university sta,

including putting in place a network o co-ordinators to advise Higher and FurtherEducation institutions about counteringextremism;

We remain concerned about thepotential abuse o charities by extremistorganisations, both to raise unds(including or use overseas, seeparagraphs 2.25-2.27 above) and todistribute propaganda. We have provided

additional unding or the CharityCommission to deal with these issuesand help the public understand how togive saely to charitable causes;

We continue to work with the aith sector,which we recognise has a unique roleto play in engaging with young peopleat risk o radicalisation and addressingclaims made in the name o religion byapologists or violence; and

We continue to see connections betweenradicalisation and health issues. Weprovide Preventtraining to NHS ront-line workers. From 1 April organisationsin England who receive NHS undingor healthcare services will need todemonstrate that they refect Preventintheir policies and procedures.


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FORWARD LOOK

2.56 We will continue to implement therevised Preventstrategy. We want to seemore progress across all the main areas owork but notably on the internet, with keysectors and in our Preventpriority areas:

We will continue our work with the policeto tackle online material which breaches

UK terrorism legislation. We will increasecollaboration with industry and continuesharing unlawul websites or inclusionin commercial ltering products; wewant to see more work done to ensurethe communications industry is awareo extremist material circulating on theircommunications services and is activelyassessing that material against their owncodes o practice to determine whether it

should be removed; We want to see more websites

established to reute claims made byterrorist and extremist organisations.Wherever possible these websites shouldbe created and sustained by communitiesand not by Government;

In prisons, we will increase the capabilityo prison sta and practitioners to identiyand address extremism and work with

terrorist oenders and those vulnerable toradicalisation;

We will do urther work to understandrisks in organisations oering religiouseducation, to raise standards osaeguarding and challenge the use odivisive material that undermines mutualrespect and tolerance o other aiths;

We want to see tangible results romnew Local Authority Preventprojects,

including, in particular, projects orvulnerable people and support oramilies; and

We will look to Preventco-ordinatorsin universities and colleges to workwith the National Union o Studentsand Universities UK more eectively tochallenge extremist speakers on campus,and to increase awareness o Channel.

PROTECT

2.57 The purpose o this part o CONTESTis to strengthen our protective security inorder to reduce our vulnerability to a terroristattack in the UK or against our interestsoverseas. We aim to:

Strengthen UK border security;

Reduce the vulnerability o the transportnetwork;

Increase the resilience o the UKsinrastructure; and

Improve protective security or crowdedplaces.

STRENGTHENING THE UK

BORDER

2.58 In the past year we have madeimportant changes to roles andresponsibilities at the border. We haveseparated the Border Force rom the

UK Border Agency, recognising the verysignicant dierences in their responsibilitiesand required capabilities. The Border Forceis now primarily responsible or the protectiono the physical border; the Border Agency isresponsible or visas and migration issues. Anew Border Policing Command (BPC) will bepart o the National Crime Agency and willco-ordinate the investigation o border-relatedcrime. The BPC will work very closely with thecounter-terrorism police.

2.59 Our border security depends onhaving accurate data regarding people whoare intending to travel to this country, notablyby air. We now obtain Advanced Passenger


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Inormation (API) or all fights originatingrom or terminating outside the EU: APIis the biographical inormation containedon a passport name, date and place obirth, nationality and document number transmitted by the airline to Border Force inadvance o travel. The Government remainscommitted to obtaining passenger data onfights to the UK rom within the EU and is

engaging with EU Member States and theirnational Data Protection Authorities to allowAPI collected by EU airlines to be providedto us.

2.60 Passenger Name Records (PNR), datarecorded when a travel booking is made(such as telephone numbers and meanso payment), provide valuable additionalinormation about people entering and leavingthis country. The proposed EU PassengerName Record (PNR) Directive, supported by

the Council o Ministers, is currently with theEuropean Parliament or consideration. TheDirective would provide a basis or thecollection, storage and use o PNR byMember States to combat serious crimeand immigration oences. The Governmentremains committed to working with MemberStates, the Commission, and the EuropeanParliament to secure a Directive that willprovide or the acquisition o PNR data on

targeted fights between Member States andon fights to and rom Member States romoutside the EU.

2.61 The rollout o biometric residencepermits to all non-European Economic Area(non-EEA) nationals seeking to stay in the UKor more than six months is now complete. Aspart o the application process a digital acialimage is recorded along with ngerprints,which are checked against immigration andpolice databases. Successul applicantsreceive a secure, biometrically-linkedresidence permit. Overseas, ngerprints arerecorded and searched against the samedatabases or all applications rom non-

EEA nationals applying to visit or stay in theUK. Work to ully implement a biometricwatchlist continues.

Cyclamen

2.62 We have completed the majorprogramme or the installation o equipmentto detect and deter the illicit importation oradiological and nuclear material (known asCyclamen). Fixed installations are supportedby mobile radiation detection units that canbe deployed to any location nationally and insupport o police operations. We will continueto invest in maintaining and developing thiscapability to keep abreast o changes at theborder and improvements in technology.

TRANSPORT SECURITY

Aviation Security

2.63 Terrorist groups continue to targetcivilian aircrat and have tried to do so on atleast three recent occasions: in December2009, October 2010 and April 2012. We arealso aware that some terrorist groups haveacquired surace to air missiles as a result othe breakdown o law and order in parts oNorth Arica. Aviation security is a high prioritypart o our protective security programme.

2.64 We have accelerated the deployment

o new airport security scanners, which giveus the best chance o detecting the threatrom non-metallic improvised explosives:ollowing a risk based assessment theseare now operational in all terminals at majorUK airports. Overseas, our regional aviationsecurity liaison ocers work with localaviation ocials to increase aviation securitycapacity. This has included, or example,the provision o explosive trace detectionequipment and associated training.

2.65 We have implemented no fyarrangements in line with our commitment tostrengthen pre-departure checks and prevent


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people who pose a terrorist threat rom fyingto or rom the UK. The Security and TravelBans Authority to Carry Scheme, introducedthrough secondary legislation in July 2012,requires airlines providing us with API to seekauthority to carry to the UK some namedoreign nationals who we judge to pose aspecic high threat.

2.66 Over the past year we have introduced

measures to improve the security o cargoentering the UK. The UK was at the oreronto work to establish a new EU Inbound CargoRegime which came into eect in early 2012and requires all airlines around the world toscreen cargo to EU standards beore beingloaded onto an aircrat destined or theEU. High risk cargo is subject to additionalsecurity screening pre-departure. We regardthis regime as a major step orward andcontinue to work closely with the EuropeanCommission and other member states on itsimplementation.

Rail Security

2.67 We increased emergency servicecommunication capacity at key LondonUnderground stations ahead o the OlympicGames and rom February 2012 armedBritish Transport Police (BTP) patrols wereintroduced across the rail and London

Underground network to be deployed inline with operational requirements. Over thepast year, the Department or Transport hascontinued installing measures to improvesecurity at the highest risk mainline railwaystations and has published guidance onstation design.


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Science and Technology in Support of Counter-Terrorism

Our CONTEST science and technology (S&T) programme has contributed to work acrossCONTEST and preparations or the London 2012 Games. The programme improves ourcounter-terrorism capabilities by developing and applying new technologies, and inormsour decision-making by providing better evidence. S & T is co-ordinated and undedrom OSCT, and involves other Government research bodies, industry, academia andinternational partners.

Ongoing priorities include:

Developing our ability to characterise, detect and protect against the eect o dierenthome-made explosives, including screening technology and detection at a distance.We opened a Homemade Explosives Facility (HME) and Centre o Excellence in June2012 to undertake this specialist work;

Further improving our capability to detect radiological and nuclear devices andmaterials;

Improving our ability to detect a biological or chemical attack, treat victims anddecontaminate the aected areas;

Supporting the emergency service response to complex incidents, including throughtechnology, training and exercising;

Strengthening border and aviation security, including through better use o data toidentiy threats and more eective screening technology;

Better identication o terrorist threats and activity, through work with our security andintelligence agencies; and

Reviewing the eectiveness o Olympic site security procedures to inorm guidanceor securing large public events in uture.


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PROTECTION AND RESILIENCE

OF UK INFRASTRUCTURE

Critical National Infrastructure (CNI)

2.68 The UKs essential services orcommunications, energy, emergencyservices, nance, ood, government, health,transport and water are collectively termed

critical national inrastructure (CNI). In2012, we introduced improved perormancereporting or CNI to determine security gaps,and Government Departments and Devolved

Administrations continue to work closely withCNI operators to deal with any signicantvulnerabilities, supported by the Centreor the Protection o National Inrastructure(CPNI). Upgrading physical security at keyenergy sites is expected to be completed by2017. CPNI continues to publish protective

security advice and help set national andinternational standards that acilitate goodsecurity practice. CPNI products are availableon their website at www.cpni.gov.uk.

Protection of the Civil Nuclear Industryand Hazardous Materials

2.69 We have kept nuclear security policyand regulation under constant review. TheOce or Nuclear Regulation (ONR) issuednew, classied security guidance to the civil

nuclear industry in October 2012.

2.70 We have also continued to make itharder or terrorists to acquire chemical,biological, radiological and explosivessubstances:

CPNI and the police network o Counter-Terrorism Security Advisers (who arededicated to protective security work)have assessed security measures atthe UKs most dangerous chemicalsites and advised site operators aboutopportunities or improvement.

We have secured agreement on EU-wideregulation to restrict sale o substancesthat can be used as explosivesprecursors, such as hydrogen peroxide.We will implement the regulation in theUK by September 2014. The agreementwill make it more dicult or terroriststo exploit lower standards in otherEuropean countries.

On the rare occasions when we haveidentied the unlawul sale o chemicalsthat could be used to make explosivesand chemical agents, we have workedwith enorcement authorities, includingtrading standards, to stop it. This hasrecently included a national recall o someproducts that are now prohibited.

In October 2012, a new list o controlledbiological agents under Part 7 o the Anti-

terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001came into eect. The Act aims to ensurethat dangerous pathogens and toxinsthat are required in important medicaland scientic research are used andheld securely.

CROWDED PLACES

2.71 Improvements to protective security

at high risk crowded places, such as sportsstadia, pubs, nightclubs and bars, visitorattractions and commercial centres, havecontinued. Police Counter-Terrorism Security

Advisers continue to advise businesses onthe terrorist threat and measures they shouldtake and online guidance has also beenupdated. Since April 2012, measures havebeen taken to improve security at about20 per cent o priority sites e.g. throughhostile vehicle barriers or laminated glass.


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FORWARD LOOK

2.72 The reorganisation o security andintelligence agency and police work at theborder is not yet complete. It will be vitalto ensure that the new Border PolicingCommand works eectively alongside theBorder Force, the UK Border Agency andthose co-ordinating counter-terrorism policing

to maintain our security. We will continue toprioritise improvement to aviation and cargosecurity, recognising that this must be aglobal eort where multilateral organisationsand agreements have an important role toplay. We remain concerned about the usemade by terrorists o new technologies andwant to continue to invest in our own scienceand technology programmes to ensure wehave adequate counter measures in place.


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Applying the Lessons from the London Bombings on 7 July 2005

In June 2011, we responded to the recommendations o the Coroner ollowing the inquestinto the London bombings o July 2005.

We published another report in May 2012 in which we set out what we had doneto address the Coroners recommendations and observations. In it, we reported onprogress made by the Security Service to improve:

inormation technology systems and processes, in particular how photographs are

shared with key partners and are shown to sources; and arrangements or the prioritisation o operational targets, the recording o those

decisions, and the development o better tools to record the progress o aninvestigation.

We also undertook to ensure that emergency services and other key partners work moreeectively and eciently together when responding to an emergency, including through:

a Government co-ordinated review o emergency service training outside London;

the development o joint operating principles, training and exercising; and

a national interoperability programme, led by the emergency services and with theHome Secretarys oversight, to deliver a better joint response to any major incident.

The Coroner raised concerns about the bombers being able to purchase and storehydrogen peroxide to build their explosive devices. We have since taken measures to:

reduce the risks posed by hydrogen peroxide-based explosives, includingundertaking awareness raising campaigns with retailers and suppliers;

test technology automatically to identiy suspicious transactions;

consider how inhibitors can be used in commercial products containing explosiveprecursors to prevent their use in the manuacture o homemade explosives; and

pursue eective and legally binding regulation throughout the EU on the marketingand use o explosives precursors.

The Government and emergency responders have also acted on the Coronersrecommendation to review emergency medical care arrangements, o the type providedby London Air Ambulance and Medical Emergency Response Incident Teams (MERIT).


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PREPARE

2.73 The purpose o our Prepare work is toreduce the impact o a terrorist attack wherethe attack cannot be prevented. In CONTEST,we set out our objectives:

to continue to build capabilities torespond to and recover rom a widerange o terrorist and other civil

emergencies;

to improve preparedness or thehighest impact risks in the National Risk

Assessment;

to improve the ability o the emergencyservices to work together during aterrorist attack; and

to improve communications andinormation sharing or terrorist attacks.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE AND

RECOVERY CAPABILITIES

2.74 The Government and local serviceshave continued to implement the NationalResilience Capabilities Programme (NRCP)which builds the capabilities needed torespond to the most likely disruptive incidents(both natural and malicious):

The capability o the National HealthService (NHS) to respond to an incidentinvolving signicant numbers o casualtieshas been improved. More emergencyresponse teams are available in Englandand Wales to rescue and treat casualtieswithin hazardous areas;

The review o the legislation or Prepare,the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, hasbeen concluded by the Cabinet Oce.

This Act was assessed as t or purposeollowing public consultations and minorchanges were made to regulationsaround co-operation and inormation

sharing. Where necessary, we haveamended the supporting statutory andnon-statutory guidance on emergencypreparedness and response to refectlessons learned rom incidents; and

The Cabinet Oce, with the EmergencyPlanning Society and the BusinessContinuity Institute, has published aBusiness Continuity for Dummies guide,

providing accessible and practical adviceto support small and medium-sizedbusinesses to improve their securityand business continuity planning againstall risks.

Responding to a Firearms Attack

2.75 We remain concerned at the trend orterrorists to use rearms as part o an attack.

This kind o incident requires a very dierent

response rom an attack using an improvisedexplosive device. The police must be ableto act quickly i necessary with militaryassistance. The emergency services alsoneed to be able to reach and treat casualties,possibly even while the attack is stillunderway. A cross-Government programmehas developed a specialist joint response toa rearms attack, involving the police, re andambulance services. Small specialist teamshave been ormed in high priority areas. The

emergency services have developed guidanceor all control room and rontline sta toidentiy and respond to the initial stages o apossible terrorist rearms attack.

RESPONDING TO

UNCONVENTIONAL TERRORIST

ATTACKS

2.76 We have continued to invest in our

capability to deal with the highest impactterrorist attacks set out in the National Risk

Assessment, which involve a biological agent,radiological material or a nuclear device.


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We have prioritised measures that would belikely to have the greatest impact in savinglives and would, where possible, improve ourpreparedness or other types o emergencies.Over the period covered in this report:

Lessons rom preparations or theOlympic Games have inormed the widerprogramme o planning or high impactbiological attacks.

We have increased the stocks o medicalsupplies and put in place better plans toimprove the speed and coverage o thehealth response to a large-scale terroristattack using biological agents.

We have improved our capability toundertake police orensic analysis onevidence that has been contaminatedby chemical, biological, radiologicalor nuclear (CBRN) material. Last year

we opened the Radiological Nuclearand Explosive Conventional Forensic

Analysis Centre at the Atomic WeaponsEstablishment which provides worldleading technical support in these areas.

We are in the nal stages o completinga three-year programme to ensure thateective plans are in place to respondto a CBRN incident in a major city ortransport hub. We are nalising a two-

year programme which will signicantlyincrease the lie-saving capabilities o theemergency services in the immediateatermath o a CBRN incident. We willimplement this programme across the UKthroughout 2013.

EMERGENCY SERVICES

INTEROPERABILITY

2.77 To save lives in the event o a terroristattack, the emergency services need toprovide a rapid, fexible and joint response.

Although our emergency services are already

among the best in the world, there is morewe can do to make sure that the handlingo any incident is as joined-up as possible.

At the Governments request, in autumn2012 the police, re and ambulance serviceslaunched the Joint Emergency ServicesInteroperability Programme to improve theimmediate emergency response to anymajor or complex incident. The projects

will ensure that the three services have adetailed understanding o each others rolesand responsibilities at an incident scene, thatthey have clear guidance on how to worktogether where appropriate, that they shareinormation quickly and eectively, and thatthey can make rapid decisions supportedby a joint assessment o risk. All o thiswill be supported by a greater emphasison joint training and exercising at all levelso command.

BETTER COMMUNICATIONS

AND INFORMATION SHARING

DURING A TERRORIST ATTACK

2.78 A terrorist attack may damagecommunications inrastructure. Inthe atermath o a terrorist attackthere can be capacity constraints oncommunications networks.

2.79 We have updated plans to help ensurethe public are better inormed and advised inthe event o a catastrophic emergency. Wehave run a trial to test how emergency alertscould be sent to the public during a crisis byassessing how the Environment Agencysfood-alerting system could be used to alertthe public about other risks, including terroristrisks.

2.80 We are continuing to ocus onimproving the multi-agency use o theAirwave digital radio system to enable bettercommunication during a major incident.In collaboration with the Department or


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Transport, London Underground Limitedand the British Transport Police weincreased Airwave radio capacity at priorityLondon Underground stations beore theOlympic Games. We are also improving theMobile Telecommunications Privileged

Access Scheme, which provides speciedemergency responders with a higherlikelihood o staying connected to mobile

telecommunications networks in the evento extreme network congestion. We havecompleted the roll-out o, and exercised, theHigh Integrity Telecommunications System,which provides a highly resilient and securenetwork across the UK, including into centralgovernment crisis management centres anduses military communications satellites toprovide a separate network to those usedday-to-day.

FORWARD LOOK

2.81 The Joint Emergency ServicesInteroperability Programme is a high priorityor us. We will continue to train rontline stato prepare or a high impact or wide areaemergency and continue to improve how weprovide inormation and advice to the publicin the event o a catastrophic emergency.


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Devolved Administrations

Scotland

Responsibility or counter-terrorism preparedness is devolved. However, the ScottishGovernment and responders work very closely with UK partners to ensure that theycan oer mutual aid to other areas in the UK i required. Post-Olympics, the ocus is onplanning or a sae and secure 2014 Commonwealth Games and working with the HomeOce on the Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Programme (JESIP). The ScottishGovernment continues to ocus on the implications or Prepare work o the inception o a

single Scottish Police Service and a single Scottish Fire Service rom April 2013.In Scotland, signicant resources were devoted to preparation or the Olympic Games.Delivery oPreventin Scotland has progressed in line with Association o Chie PoliceOcers in Scotland (ACPOS) and Scottish Government delivery plans and has ocused onpartnership working and raising awareness in priority sectors and institutions. For Protectin March 2011, the Scottish Government published Secure and Resilient A StrategicFramework or Critical National Inrastructure (CNI) in Scotland. Over the past 12 months theScottish Government Critical Inrastructure Resilience Unit has completed a detailed analysiso assets against the CPNI criticality scale within each o the devolved sectors in Scotland,together with the urther development o comprehensive Sector Resilience Assessments.Work has also started on a cyber security programme: a Cyber Group under the authority

o the Scottish Government has been established to oversee and co-ordinate the delivery othe cyber security work programme across all sectors in Scotland.

Wales

Within Wales a strategic group has been established, regularly bringing together keystakeholders with a ocus on the aims o CONTEST. The CONTEST Board Wales is jointlychaired by the police and Welsh Government and has developed a set o priorities to driveorward the strategy in Wales.

Under Prevent, proactive initiatives to challenge extreme narratives have been developedand adopted in some urban areas and eorts are underway to implement the Channel

reerral processes in Cardi with the rest o Wales. A revised Counter-Terrorism LocalProle (CTLP) has been produced to support local partnership work in tackling extremismin communities. The CTLP outlines the threat and vulnerability rom terrorism-relatedactivity in a local area and is used to engage public sector organisations in Wales.

APreventCo-ordinator has also been appointed or Cardi. Under Protect, the WelshGovernment is working closely with the Wales Extremism and Counter-Terrorist Unitand local government to mitigate the risks to crowded places. The Prepare element oCONTEST is linked closely to the work being taken orward on civil contingencies in Wales,particularly in respect o risk assessment and training and exercising.

Northern Ireland

The Secretary o State or Northern Ireland has responsibility or Northern Ireland relatedterrorism (NIRT) within Northern Ireland. The Home Secretary has responsibility or otherterrorist threats, in particular Al Qaida related terrorism. The Northern Ireland Executiveis responsible or co-ordinating wider consequence management and recovery issuesassociated with a terrorist attack.


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CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism - Annual Report (2013)

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