Jane’s Page 1 of 12 Jane's Navy International In for the long haul: Australia looks to bridge the submarine gap [Content preview – Subscribe to IHS Jane’s Navy International for full article] New maintenance practice, improved stakeholder relationships and an extensive obsolescence mitigation programme are central to improving the operational sustainability of the Royal Australian Navy's Collins-class submarines. Meanwhile, policymakers are becoming increasingly aware of the likely need for a service life extension programme. Julian Kerr reports Royal Australian Navy (RAN) Collins-class submarines HMAS Rankin (foreground), HMAS Waller (centre), and HMAS Collins transiting in formation through Gage Roads, Cockburn Sound, Western Australia. After availability problems in recent times, the RAN disclosed recently that it has three Collins boats at sea. (Australian Department of Defence) 1394008 If Australia is to avoid a gap in its submarine capability, extending the service life of the Royal Australian Navy's (RAN's) six-strong Collins-class fleet into the 2030s now appears to be more a necessity than a choice.
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Jane’s
Page 1 of 12
Jane's Navy International
In for the long haul: Australia looks to bridge the submarine gap
[Content preview – Subscribe to IHS Jane’s Navy International for full article]
New maintenance practice, improved stakeholder relationships and an extensive obsolescence
mitigation programme are central to improving the operational sustainability of the Royal Australian
Navy's Collins-class submarines. Meanwhile, policymakers are becoming increasingly aware of the
likely need for a service life extension programme. Julian Kerr reports
Royal Australian Navy (RAN) Collins-class submarines HMAS Rankin (foreground), HMAS Waller
(centre), and HMAS Collins transiting in formation through Gage Roads, Cockburn Sound, Western
Australia. After availability problems in recent times, the RAN disclosed recently that it has three
Collins boats at sea. (Australian Department of Defence)
1394008
If Australia is to avoid a gap in its submarine capability, extending the service life of the Royal
Australian Navy's (RAN's) six-strong Collins-class fleet into the 2030s now appears to be more a
necessity than a choice.
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This situation has come to pass following a government decision to bypass more readily available
military off-the-shelf (MOTS) submarines as possible replacements for the conventionally powered
Collins boats. Instead, the focus for Project SEA 1000 - the acquisition activity set up to specify and
procure a Future Submarine class - is now on either an evolution of the Collins baseline or a
completely new design.
Although this decision was taken by the previous Labor administration, the move is unlikely to be
reversed by the Liberal-National Party government elected in September 2013, given general
agreement that European MOTS options lack the range, endurance, and capability sets required by
Australia's geographic position, including an area of interest for submarine operations that extends
into north Asia.
The extent of the RAN's operational interest was highlighted in October when the navy's director
general submarine capability, Commodore Peter Scott, disclosed that the three submarines
operational at that time were all deployed more than 2,000 n miles from their home port of HMAS
Stirling in Western Australia.
Continued technical problems have dogged the six Collins boats since their commissioning between
July 1996 and March 2003. These problems have impacted on credibility, as well as availability. The
last of class was accepted into service 41 months late, and work to bring the fleet up to desired
standards of reliability and performance continues today.
Meanwhile, sustainment costs, which have risen steadily, are currently running at about AUD600
million (USD565 million) per year. This includes obsolescence management, but not the acquisition
of new capability.
Since the class was designed with a theoretical platform life of 28 years, progressive retirement
should notionally take place between 2024 and 2031. However, pursuing the option of a new design
would be unlikely to produce the first of the 12 follow-on conventionally powered submarines
envisaged in the 2009 Defence White Paper until about 2030, according to sources close to Project
SEA 1000. The lead boat of an evolved design could be ready around 2028, but both dates are
somewhat optimistically predicated on government approval to proceed being received in 2015.
[Continued in full version…]
Benchmark
Coles suggested that target availability for a six-submarine fleet should be set at two boats
deployable 100% of the time, three submarines available 90% of the time, and four submarines
ready 50% of the time.
Central to achieving this benchmark - an objective that was attainable by 2016, according to Coles -
was changing the existing usage cycle of eight years in-service (including an intermediate docking)
and a three-year full-cycle docking (FCD), to one of 10 years of in-service operations (including an
intermediate docking) followed by a two-year FCD, with only one submarine at a time undergoing
this major refit.
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Not only would the new cycle increase availability, but it would also automatically add two years of
service life per boat.
A Collins-class submarine undergoing maintenance at the government-owned submarine build and
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support company ASC facility in Adelaide. (Australian Department of Defence)
1448723
In 2002-2003, a Collins FCD was expected to involve 3,500 maintenance tasks and consume 400,000
work hours. By 2004-2005, this had grown to 4,129 tasks plus 1,251 emergent items. In 2012
government-owned submarine build and support company ASC reported that FCDs were typically
taking one million work hours, although this had been cut to 900,000 for the most recent boat, and
the target for 2016 is understood to be 800,000.
By comparison, according to the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), a typical European
conventional submarine undergoes a 10- to 12-month FCD every eight years that entails fewer than
200,000 work hours.
Planning for the challenging new usage cycle is now proceeding in tandem with the assumption that
an extension of service will be necessary for some if not all of the fleet.
The viability of such an extension was confirmed by a Service Life Evaluation Programme (SLEP)
study carried out in 2011 by representatives from the RAN, the Defence Materiel Organisation
(DMO), and the Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO). The study utilised the same
methodology used by the US Navy (USN) in evaluating the potential service life of its Ohio-class
ballistic missile submarines.
A year later, then-defence minister Stephen Smith disclosed that the SLEP study had shown there
was no single technical issue that would fundamentally prevent Collins-class submarines from
achieving their theoretical platform life or a service life extension of one operating cycle. Based on
the commissioning dates of the submarines, this would provide an indicative service life for the fleet
ranging from 2031 to 2038.
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Collins-class submarine availability 2012-2035: notional Collins life extension. (Australian Strategic
Policy Institute)
1448737
Programme sources confirm Gould's wide experience with the United Kingdom's Queen Elizabeth-
class aircraft carrier, Daring-class Type 45 destroyer, and Astute-class nuclear-powered submarine
programmes has proved ideal in enabling him to quickly get to grips with the shortcomings revealed
by the Coles report. A further advantage is his independence from any vested interest in the
programme, aside from a desire for it to succeed.
[Continued in full version…]
Culture change
Eighteen months into his new role, Gould heads a restructured, re-energised sustainment
programme that is well on its way to meeting early availability and capability targets established in
the ISSC.
Progress includes an outbreak of peace between the four partners in the what is known as the
Submarine Enterprise - the Department of Finance, DMO, RAN, and industry - whose relationship
was characterised in the Coles report as "highly-charged, difficult, and often hostile."
"They're not throwing bricks across the wall," Gould told IHS Jane's . "They're focused on the
outcomes that are required. If there's a problem, we sit down, go through the options, and fix it."
Gould attributed the overall turnaround in effectiveness in part to the demanding but realistic
benchmarks adopted from the Coles report, in part to the discipline and incentives contained in the
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new ISSC, and in part to improvements in workforce management and the introduction of new
engineering techniques.
"Collins was competently designed and crewed," Gould observed. "The fundamental problem has
been that a properly designed, organised, and constructed maintenance regime was not put in place
from the start and reliability, obsolescence, and capability insertion was not managed."
Planning for the first two-year FCD, scheduled to begin in 2016, was now near completion and work
was under way on formulating the one-year intermediate docking that will form part of the new 10-
year usage cycle.
In the meantime, overruns on planned docking periods had been significantly reduced, and the first
maintenance activity to be undertaken completely under the ISSC had been finished early, while
unplanned repairs on HMAS Sheean , hit by a merchant ship while alongside in Western Australia,
were carried out within a maintenance period that was still completed ahead of schedule.
Improvements in the availability of spares - always an issue when dealing with ageing or unique
systems - had boosted workforce productivity and made a major contribution to reaching interim
targets. "People are going on board with a work sheet, the right instructions, the right bits and
pieces," Gould said. "It didn't always happen before and your schedule immediately starts to flag,
but we're now hitting something like 95% effectiveness."
Acquisition of spares had been turned over almost entirely to ASC, itself a cultural change, although
the DMO remained responsible for ensuring the availability of spares when needed. Sourcing of
many spares had been an ongoing problem for both ASC and DMO, dealt with in some cases by
substitutes, sometimes by purchasing kits that included the relevant parts and sometimes (as in the
case of diesel engine components) by remanufacturing.
According to Gould, the ISSC had also provided ASC with more authority, particularly in relation to
engineering judgments, as part of contract incentives linking availability and payment. "Instead of
having a sequential process where they have to make a case to undertake certain engineering
operations, they now have delegated authority up to certain levels to just get on with it," he said.
[Continued in full version…]
First cut
Linked to the drive for improved processes and schedules was the recent decision to cut into the
pressure hull of HMAS Collins to allow main machinery to be removed and worked on ashore,
increasing efficiency, according to Gould, by 400% or more.
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Lead boat HMAS Collins. In 2016 the submarine is scheduled to begin its full-cycle docking refit
period. (IHS)
0574970
Described by ASC managing director Stephen Ludlam as a key enabler towards achieving two-year
FCDs, the hull cut in September saw the first of the submarine's three diesel engines winched
through the space created just aft of the fin. All three diesels will be removed, overhauled, and used
in HMAS Farncomb , which will begin an FCD in mid-2014. Collins will receive Farncomb 's
overhauled diesels during its own FCD starting in 2016.
Prior to that, Collins will remain at ASC, facilitating test procedures and the seeding of a pool of
rotables - items that are removed from boats during maintenance periods and refurbished, while
buying time to create a larger pool of rotables to support the single FCD stream being initiated with
Collins .
There have been reliability challenges with the Swedish-made 18-cylinder Hedemora diesel engines,
but Gould said experience in rebuilding their major components had seen a significant improvement
in performance. However, now that the engines could be taken from the hull relatively easily,
replacing them with a different diesel would be "no big deal".
The Hedemoras' flywheel was removed early in the Collins' life to save weight and improve
connectivity to the main generators, an action subsequently blamed for excessive motor vibration at
certain speeds. The flywheels are now being progressively returned to the engines, together with a
newly developed governor that will ensure the diesels operate at their optimum temperature and
running speed.
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The next radical move, probably in 2014, will see a circumferential cut made at the aft end of Collins
, allowing the main electric motor to be removed for shoreside maintenance and providing greatly
improved access to the corrosion-prone bilges.
HMAS Farncomb in dock at AMC Henderson, Western Australia. For the immediate future, the
Henderson yard will host future intermediate docking refits for Collins-class boats. (Australian
Department of Defence)
1394330
Other issues to address include agreement on the scope of future intermediate dockings (to be
carried out at ASC's facility at Henderson in Western Australia rather than at its main facility in
Adelaide), obtaining and sharing usage data more efficiently, and improving the quality of the
associated IT systems.
"There's always a trade-off to be made between how much maintenance you do with the boat out of
the water or alongside and not available for the user, and how much you decide to fix while the boat
is at sea," Gould said. "Do you lose more time by fixing it alongside or docking? Do you lose more
time by just fixing it when it breaks?
"That takes a lot of judgment and a lot of experience. I think we're getting there. We understand
how to meet schedule, but do we know that in meeting schedule we're failing to resolve some
bigger issues that might arise later?"
[Continued in full version…]
Resolving obsolescence
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Obsolescence management is currently focused via Project SEA 1439 Phase 3.1 on remediating the
well-regarded Integrated Submarine Control Management and Monitoring System (ISCMMS). This
was developed by Saab in the 1980s to control, manage, and monitor essential functions such as
manoeuvring, power, and life support.
Replacements for ageing ISCMMS components, such as special processor cards and boards, will be
engineered by ASC working with Saab, and the existing software function will be ported to the new
components. Approval for development and installation on one Collins submarine at a cost of
around AUD65 million was announced in June 2013, with installation in the other five to be
considered in 2017.
Delivering improved warfighting capability to ensure the Collins' continuing effectiveness against
potential adversaries largely centres on rolling enhancements to existing systems, although the
projected upgrade of the Collins-class sonar suite under SEA 1439 Phase 6 refers delphically to a
programme of replacement and/or improvement.
The sonar upgrade is likely to include all aspects of the system, from the outboard sonar arrays
through to the inboard display consoles and associated processing, at a cost estimated in the 2012
Defence Capability Plan (DCP) of AUD1 billion to AUD2 billion.
Approval of the sonar upgrade is officially anticipated between 2014 and 2016, with initial operating
capability (IOC) envisaged somewhere between 2017 and 2022. Whether this timetable will be
adhered to at a time of financial stringency is, however, open to question.
The DCP states that replacement systems are likely to be based on similar and proven systems
currently in service with other navies, making technology from the Thales Sonar 2076 fully
integrated search-and-attack submarine sonar system equipping the United Kingdom's Astute class
an obvious contender.
However, US security requirements currently prevent full integration of the Collins' AN/BYG-1
tactical and weapon control system and the Thales sonar arrays. This obstacle could favour a US
solution for the Phase 6 sonar requirement, most likely drawing on Lockheed Martin's ARCI (Acoustic
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