Contemporary urban leadership: Fragmented coalitions, external agenda setting, and the power over place

Contemporary urban leadership

Fragmented coalitions, external agenda setting, and the power over place

Samuel T. Bassett

January 10, 2014

Southern Political Science Association 2014 Conference, New Orleans

ABSTRACT:

Despite a decline in sustained urban governing coalitions, cities remain

very capable of building large scale infrastructure. With regimes on the

decline, an emerging class of experts works with remaining power brokers

to build projects in the name of economic revitalization. Experts enjoy a

privileged political position in local agenda setting. This power comes

from several sources, including the bounded rationality of local leaders,

the ad hoc nature of local coalitions in an era of eroded leadership, and

the lack of countervailing experts providing alternate frames. This

argument serves as a theoretical response to Stone’s 2013 APSA paper

using evidence from the Oklahoma City metropolitan area and CBSAs

with one million residents.

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The urban politics section is in the midst of a paradigm crisis. At APSA’s 2013 meeting, the

patriarch of regime theory called for a “reframing of what it means to govern the contemporary

American city.”1 Stone recognized that recent economic restructuring undermined key

ingredients of urban regimes, leading to piecemeal governance replacing regimes’ long-ranged

agendas. Stone’s presentation met immediate shock, with anxious audience members

questioning whether the section will maintain a coherent “research tradition.” As regime

literature follows machines into the graduate syllabus, we have arrived at a perfect opportunity to

reevaluate local politics in the postindustrial city.

Economic restructuring removed several key players in local politics. First, regimes

often relied on urban economic champions – local CEOs, newspaper peddlers, and other actors

associated with growth machines.2 Over the past two decades, multinational corporations have

emerged by annexing of local and regional businesses. Mid-level corporate managers replaced

the deeply-rooted powerbrokers that provided regimes the capacity to establish and pursue

elaborate development agendas. These new actors often prioritize ascending the corporate ladder

over their temporary community, removing critical long-term actors and undermining regime

longevity.3 Second, the federal government has retreated from urban policy, removing resources

available for regimes to distribute. Instead of providing subsidies for renewal and transportation

programs, the federal government remains largely absent from urban governance. Neither

political party appears willing to support federal subsidies in American cities; for example,

during the Arsenal of Democracy’s financial woes, a prominent Republican argued to “Let

Detroit Go Bankrupt” while the Democratic President remained sidelined while the Motor City

filed Chapter 9.4 Without local champions or federal funding, regimes and the ability to

implement long-term agendas appear to be on the rapid decline.

Cities face new challenges in the economic shuffle. Basic tenets of economic growth in

previous years – encouraging manufacturing through subsidies and services – are no longer

effective long-term strategies. Instead of demanding convenient land deals, business giants seek

to command and control parts of the global economy from specialized centers that house

technology and technocrats. As a result, cities have turned to attracting highly skilled workers

who serve as magnets for mobile firms. Instead of competing over capital, cities compete over

capital magnets: highly skilled, dynamic laborers.

Urban leaders often have little idea as how to attract these workers; therefore they turn to

consultants. Consultants promote amenities and quality of life infrastructure as cities’ primary

tools to attract these workers, seemingly regardless of the urban context. Unfortunately for

cities, experts are political actors and pursue their own agendas. These experts are key players in

the postindustrial, post-regime local politics. A supra-city network of experts has emerged and

evolved into relative consensus behind several canon projects. This network consists of a

coalition of niche industries. Each group uses expertise to manipulate the specific standards of

its infrastructure, inducing billions of public expenditures. Underskilled and uncoordinated

urban leaders rely on consultants’ analyses, allowing expertise to enjoy a privileged political

position and effectively set the infrastructure agenda.

The following engages a theoretical argument for examining an emerging the political

role network of consultants plays as political actor in postindustrial urban America. The bulk of

the work develops the theory. Later discussion includes evidence from Oklahoma City and cities

with over one million residents.5

The Postindustrial City

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As the postindustrial economy emerged, the city endured several structural changes. Previously

sticky capital became footloose, plunging the industrial city’s economic security into chaos.

Cities responded with two prominent schools of entrepreneurial thought: first, market based

strategies which focus on bargaining with capital through incentives; second, amenity-led growth

strategies which focus on attracting less mobile resources businesses find profitable to lure

businesses, such as high value human capital. Increasing mobility and instability rendered the

former into short-term plans. The latter formula matured into a dominant long-term approach for

urban competition.

Urban Competition in the Global Economy

The rise of the postindustrial city has forced cities to evolve, developing a new crop of

infrastructure designed to attract twenty-first century capital. Unlike yesteryear’s economic

security predicated on blue-collar muscle, contemporary cities build their base around the white-

collar information and service sectors. Today, urban elites attempt to cultivate or capture a cadre

of dynamic workers. Florida labels highly educated, flexible workers as the creative class the

engine for the postindustrial economy.6 Cities go to great lengths to appease these workers,

carving residential and leisure enclaves for highly productive laborers. Similar to geographically

footloose private capital, Florida notes that the creative class is increasingly mobile. Creative

capital outmigration can reduce productivity for cities, reducing the economic viability of a

community. Attracting high value-added workers can increase workforce productivity,

reinforcing a competitive advantage for businesses considering relocation to the region.

Infrastructure plays a critical role in determining a city’s image for both labor and capital.

Theoretically, infrastructure can foster districts where creative workers choose to live, work, and

play. Quality of life attracts the creative class – and subsequently capital. As the creative class

clusters around amenities, a correlation between infrastructure and economic status has emerged.

Leaders face an implicit choice: either present a slate of amenities standard to their peers or risk

falling behind. Failure to keep up in the amenities arms race may soil the city’s image, pushing

firms and residents to other communities. As a result, cities are perpetually keeping up with the

proverbial Joneses.

Urban political leadership plays a crucial role in rallying the resources required to

develop public infrastructure required to attract creative capital. Large-scale programs can be

understood as a collective action problem. Olson7 outlines the collective action problem, where

free riders inadvertently undermine efforts to provide and maintain public goods. Although

anyone may benefit from a public good, it is rarely cost-effective for an individual to foot the

entire bill when much of the benefit spills over to others. Olson’s collective action problem

applies to infrastructure, where free riders undermine efforts to provide and maintain expensive

public goods.8 Walker

9 notes that society can overcome the collective action problem with help

from a patron, a large actor that foots the bill despite free riders – often to gain some profit. With

the retreat of the federal government, municipalities are the only available patron for

infrastructure projects.

Yesteryear’s Urban Coalition

Urban specialists have focused primarily on the relationship between political entrepreneurs and

resourceholders. Despite easily visible differences in structure, the several prominent

governance theories share one key similarity: coordination among urban elites.10

Judd and

Parkinson devise the concept of coherent leadership, a group of “elites representing a city [with]

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the capacity to speak with a coherent voice because the political process facilitates bargaining,

negotiation, and agreement among a broad range of political and social groups elites representing

a city [with] the capacity to speak with a coherent voice [for] a broad range of political and social

groups.”11

Under the most recent paradigm, scholars have theorized sustained regimes as

political and economic elites governing through informal networks.12

Coherent leadership is

tenuous, as significant disagreement can fracture the political alignment. If political discord

emerges among political entrepreneurs, then gridlock can paralyze the city’s ability to implement

infrastructure. If there is a countervailing force among resourceholders, then a dissenting

coalition can stymie the agenda.

Coherent leadership enables cities to patronize infrastructure projects. Public sector

investment is often the only viable solution for overcoming collective action difficulties, because

only the state can coercively leverage necessary resources from potential free riders to

implement infrastructure. These investments require a cohesive leadership, where resource

holders enable political entrepreneurs to use their power over the state apparatus and build

infrastructure.

Globalization has accelerated the demise of regimes of a stable cohort of political and

economic elites that governed through informal networks. Hanson, et al,13

note the systematic

replacement of local CEOs with middle-management. Similarly, Strom14

finds that social

leaders have replaced these cornerstone members at the head of local organizations that

champion urban growth. New governing coalitions often include organizations that possess

insufficient power to leverage public and private resources required to pursue a comprehensive

infrastructure program. Without coherent leadership at the local helm, a city’s domestic

capability to leverage resources toward a sustained, long-term agenda will flounder. As

leadership became less coherent and economic development projects become more complex,

expertise rose as an essential component in developing infrastructure.

The Rise of the External Expert

In recent decades, an increasingly complex political economy has fostered a network of experts

that influence government. Judd and Laslo argue that as urban governance becomes more

complex, local leadership increasingly relies on the growing cadre of technocrats. Even small

municipalities maintain a cadre of specialists, ranging from a city planner to a city attorney to

various specialists that lead departments. A given municipality may have the technical expertise

to revamp a sanitation system, but cities invariably solicit private architects and engineers when

tackling large scale programs like constructing a large stadium.

These experts influence how cities understand their position, develop the list of policy

options available to leaders, and guide the local infrastructure agenda. Extending Simon’s

argument that political leaders are constrained by their limited understanding of the world,15

cities need experts to help guide policymakers to policy solutions. For example, although

relatively simple programs can improve a city’s property tax base by boosting land values (e.g.

bike paths16

and golf courses17

), revenue-oriented city leaders may overlook these programs due

to simple ignorance. Cities value technocrats due to their perceived ability to improve the local

image or fiscal situation. Experts that garner successful reputations can make the case for ideas,

programs, and infrastructure improvements. In other words, experts can serve as a conduit for

policy diffusion. Over the last decade, an expert consensus congealed around Florida’s creative

class.

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Intellectual Hegemony

In 2002, Richard Florida seized the debate over urban revitalization, arguing that attracting

members of the somewhat mobile “creative class” is the paramount strategy available for cities.

The argument is relatively simple: cities with more single, highly educated workers will present

a competitive advantage: greater labor productivity. Theoretically, footloose capital will locate

wherever these workers live to enjoy a more fruitful work force. Under this logic, if cities want

to attract capital in the creative economy, then communities must attract creative workers by

manufacturing a high quality of life, flush with public amenities. Some industries have hijacked

the “quality of life” paradigm for private gain, converting self-proclaimed expertise into a “build

our projects” message. Dissenting efforts rarely succeed against the claims citing the prevailing

paradigm, an established network of self-identified experts, and the pressure to secure fleeting

resources.

Examining expertise in terms of coalitions and countervailing forces provides a valuable

lens to this intellectual hegemony. McFarland18

highlights the role of countervailing forces in

diminishing the power held by dominant groups. Once a dominant coalition collects excessive

rents from public resources, a counter-mobilization often balances the unequal influence limiting

future concessions. In Washington, think tanks and other policy wonks provide interest groups

their greatest currency: expert information conveniently agreeing with their arguments. No such

intellectual balance exists in local governance. Local coalitions are unable to either gather or

maintain the resources necessary to provide opposition research; as a result, a sustained, external,

advocacy coalition is able to frame the debate into advantageous terms. Although political

entrepreneurs and resourceholders may face countervailing forces, experts often claim hegemony

over a given policy niche.

Policy Niches and the Standard Package of Amenities

Through decades of expert influence and strategy convergence, a standard package of amenities

has emerged across cities. A city’s trophy case of amenities can be compared to other cities of

similar stature. This work asserts that for any given city, there is a common a group of public

infrastructure among cities of similar status. This standard package of amenities can be used as

shorthand to estimate a city’s place in a larger system of cities; elite cities will feature additional

amenities compared to their smaller counterparts.

Professional sports is perhaps the most salient example. Cities can be roughly organized

by status based on local sports franchises. Global cities house two teams in the same sport,

second-tier cities house major league franchises, regional cities have minor league affiliates, and

so on for the rest of the country. High profile sporting events also recognize significance;

hosting the World Cup Final or the Summer Olympics is an international nod to communities.

Atlanta, Beijing and Rio have garnered global attention due to their respective Games. Athletics

exhibitions require custom venues, ranging from indoor arenas to outdoor stadiums. Modern

sports palaces are considered cost prohibitive, requiring public subsidy.1 As a result, cities

seeking the status associated with the big leagues must invest big bucks.

The presence and proliferation of leisure spaces serve as another proxy for local status.

Leisure bubbles provide constructed spaces for visitors to interpret the city.19

Nearly every city

has some form of Oklahoma City’s Bricktown, San Diego’s Gaslight District, Baltimore’s

1 Horrow, Rick and Karla Swatek. 2011. Beyond the Scoreboard: An Insider’s Guide to the

Business of Sport. Human Kinetics.

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Harbor Walk, or Boston’s Faneuil Hall. In each of these cases, public resources flooded districts

to incite growth. Publicly funded convention centers, sports palaces, and tourist attractions line

these districts, lubricating the visitor’s journey through the city’s presentation. These

infrastructure hodgepodges contain the key parts of the communities’ trophy case.

Not all leisure districts are overwhelmed by public investment. The rise of Bohemian

enclaves reflects the presence of a healthy cadre of creative workers.20

In many cases, these

neighborhoods featured unused, non-ranch style architecture at bargain basement prices. As

millennials sought to self-actualize despite dire economic conditions, they found respite in

building seemingly unique communities. Nearly every case city echoes Oklahoma City’s

fledgling Plaza District, Cleveland’s Ohio City, Chicago’s Wicker Park, or Brooklyn’s

Williamsburg. Cities guide this investment by augmenting infrastructure. Consultants have

carved careers advising cities about how to attract creative capital following simple advice:

walkability, tolerance, and creating venues for public expression.21

These efforts are often not as

flagrant as their mainstream commercial counterparts; however, cities often make quiet

infrastructure investments to buoy these neighborhoods, ranging from bike routes to exclusive

public schools.22

Different interests have captured access to the larger canon of urban revitalization. Each

policy niche reinforces the larger goals found in the urban revitalization paradigm while enjoying

cover from dissent. Groups rarely argue against each other’s projects, as all interests claim to be

part of a larger cause: fostering an urban renaissance through publicly-subsidized amenities.

How experts influence the local agenda

Experts have the power to set the agenda by articulating standards to urban decision makers.

Local leaders exist in a world bounded by their knowledge.23

Local leaders rarely comprehend

the larger context in which they govern. As a result, they must rely on experts for advice.

Experts function as a liaison between intellectually bounded local elite and the expected

standards for amenities. Urban leaders face an implicit choice: keep up with the expert-

prescribed infrastructure or risk losing opportunities for external investment due to an inferior

image.

Inter-local advocacy coalitions can emerge to manipulate standards, directly impacting

local governance. Industry associations, private firms, consultants, and planners articulate

standards to local leadership. Groups that lobby for infrastructure across cities function in a

similar manner as issue networks and advocacy coalitions, enjoying stability, status, and pooled

resources.24

The resulting cohesion creates the opportunity to develop and claim expertise on

issues, which allows the external group to frame the local infrastructure debate. As a result,

established experts enjoy a privileged position when setting the local agenda. If opposing forces

emerge from other leadership sectors, the debate is often framed in the terms designed by an

external group of experts. Among many others, Baumgartner, et al,25

provide evidence that

proper framing can lead to policy success. The disjoint nature of postindustrial urban leadership

elevates the position for reputable experts, providing experts the opportunity to seize the agenda.

By reinterpreting what is fashionable, experts are able to continually manipulate the local

agenda. In many cases, consultants engineer (and reengineer) standards for personal and

professional gain. The resulting projects often appear to disproportionately profit groups outside

of the city, ranging from exit options to heavily subsidized professional sports clubs or a

nationwide convention space glut. City leaders find themselves constrained by these external

demands; failing to meet the contemporary standards could place their communities in a

6

disadvantageous position. As metropolitan areas increase their stature, the relative cost to keep

up increases, creating a rat race among second-tier cities with aspirations of blossoming into

major metropolises.

Identifying the Standard Package of Amenities: Evidence from Oklahoma City

Contemporary cities develop amenities to boost their image through a trophy case of

infrastructure. Sports palaces, convention space, leisure districts, attempts at residential

gentrification, green spaces, mass transit, reconfigured local education, and other infrastructure

all serve as tangible proxies for the urban quality of life. It is difficult to imagine a regional city

without a downtown convention space, a smaller stadium, and a niche entertainment district.

Similarly, it is difficult to imagine a global city without a mass transit system beyond simple

busses, a place to play, and a grand arena. Communities that desire to hold their place or

advance their position within the urban hierarchy must invest in the standard package of

amenities found in similar communities. From an alternate perspective, infrastructure serves as a

status gatekeeper between the perception of major and minor cities. What infrastructure a city

(can) choose to maintain indicates its place in the urban hierarchy.

Oklahoma City is not an “everyman” city; however, it is a reasonable bellwether for

postindustrial urban revitalization. Dedicating over $2 billion to civic improvements, Oklahoma

City invested in infrastructure that indicates major city status: arenas, stadiums, cultural

amenities, riverfront districts, parks, entertainment districts, tourism districts, mass transit,

education facilities, and convention centers. Voting data, survey research, and coalition analysis

results reveals that relatively unique ad hoc political alliances appear to push each referendum

through. A common ethos guides the programs: amenities aimed at securing highly productive

workers. Using broad themes common to other cities’ revitalization movements, including

“quality of life”, “walkability” and a laserlike focus on specific districts, Oklahoma City’s

investments are an archetype portfolio for secondary city revitalization. These investments are

designed to transform Oklahoma City from a major minor city into a minor major city.

Oklahoma City’s revitalization portfolio involves several, seemingly disjointed projects

under the same political brand: the Metropolitan Area Projects. Table 1 shows a distribution of

these expenditures. Public education infrastructure, convention space, a professional sports

palace, and outdoor attractions in the Bricktown district stand at the top of the list. More recent

additions – a downtown park and streetcar system – aim to expand the leisure district.

<TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE>

Consultant Driven Revitalization: Building Bricktown

Oklahoma City Mayor Ron Norick realized that he needed to do something drastic to wright a

sinking ship. The 1980s oil bust caused the local economy to implode, annihilating the staple

industry, erasing a decade of prosperity, and vaporizing thousands of jobs. One-half of oil

employment dissipated, construction ground to a halt, and nearly one-fifth of financial sector

employment evaporated.26

United Airlines rubbed salt into Oklahoma City’s wounds by

rebuffing a lucrative subsidy to develop an air maintenance facility. An executive broke the

news to the mayor, explaining “We couldn’t imagine our people living in Oklahoma City.”27

Norick quietly visited Indianapolis to better understand United Airlines’ rejection. A

quick drive around downtown revealed readily apparent differences. As Norick recalls,

Indianapolis was “a live city, I mean there’s people on the streets, and there were restaurants and

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hotels and a Convention facility and all this stuff. It got to be a quality of life issue if you were

the CEO of United Airlines and you wanted to have your people work in Oklahoma City or

Indianapolis, it was a hands-down decision.”28

When Norick returned, he found an aging minor

league baseball park, a tired convention center with an undersized arena, and barely enough

revenue to fund the government. Norick realized that a vibrant downtown was critical to

assuring quality of life and an economic future. Unfortunately, as a former councilman

lamented, “Downtown is dead, and we helped kill it.”29

Norick organized a group of local businessmen and social leaders to brainstorm a

revitalization plan. Local business leaders agreed that downtown was the key battleground, but

did not know what to build. Nearly every group in Oklahoma City had a pet project, whether it

was the Chamber of Commerce pushing for a water feature near downtown to artists wanting to

retrofit performance halls to agricultural interests wanting to expand the fairgrounds. Oklahoma

City was a mess, and the leadership did not know which projects to prioritize… so they called in

a consultant.

Surveying the political scene and local economic base, consultants advised local leaders

to propose a slate of projects on a single ballot initiative. The oil bust left a wake of partially

considered policy options on the table. City leaders consulted with local engineers to provide

rough estimates for potential costs for these projects. With rough costs adding to $300M, leaders

turned to raising resources for the “Metropolitan Area Projects” (MAPs). Voters had recently

approved sales taxes for the police department, fire department, city zoo, and the star-crossed

United Airlines maintenance facility. Leaders proposed a temporary, single-cent sales tax to

fund nine projects: a new major-league class arena, a new minor-league ballpark, updating the

convention center, a water feature connecting the central business district and the river, a series

of dams to improve the river waterfront, expanding the fairground meeting spaces, overhauling

the civic center music hall, a new downtown library, and rubber-tire trolleys to transport visitors.

Leaders applied the parliamentary tactic of logrolling to a popular referendum, believing that a

legislative sausage referendum could pass. Campaign consultants and the mayor stumped for the

MAPs referendum in late 1993. The issue passed, and Oklahoma City turned to building a big

league city.

A Larger Pattern: Consulting to Convergence

In each chapter of Oklahoma City’s revitalization, local leaders initiate new programs by calling

a consultant. Other communities follow a similar development pattern as cities coevolve towards

a standard package of amenities. In the postindustrial era, the hallmark of this process is a “place

to play”, a downtown district with visitor-attracting, leisure-oriented infrastructure.30

When Oklahoma City approached an overcrowded, dilapidated education system,

municipal leaders turned to consultants to devise a master plan for infrastructure investments.

These consultants outlined a basic plan: first, build enough brick-and-mortar classrooms to house

all students;31

second, outfit these classrooms with state-of-the-art technology; third, build

amenities32

(e.g. stadia, gymnasiums, technology, and additional arts classrooms). The

OCMAPs Trust followed this plan to the letter. After completing these projects, OCMAPs

contacted an educational consulting task force to run a charter school aimed at “encouraging

families to move to downtown Oklahoma City.”33

Figure 1 highlights districts with recent

infrastructure investments in Oklahoma City and a new elementary school’s borders. The

gerrymandered enrollment zone appears intent on providing access to areas targeted for

gentrification.

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<FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE>

When Oklahoma City received an opportunity to attract a National Basketball

Association franchise, the city raised revenue and then called experts to retrofit a five-year-old

arena. As per the 1993 referendum’s wording, Oklahoma City asked a prominent arena firm to

build “an indoor sports/convention facility meeting not less than National Hockey League (NHL)

or National Basketball Association (NBA) standards”.34

The MAPs arena hosted the displaced

New Orleans Hornets for two seasons. Upon their departure, local businessmen purchased a

majority share of the Seattle Supersonics. Under the “Big League City” referendum, Oklahoma

City voters offered to retrofit the generic center into a customized sports palace for the inbound

Thunder.

As Oklahoma City plans to build a new convention center, the municipality appears to

follow the exact specifications provided by consultants. Oklahoma City’s new grand plan

involves extending the downtown “core” to the North Canadian River’s “shore.” Core to Shore

features a large park and downtown convention center, as advised by the Urban Land Institute

and other consultants.35

The Oklahoma City Chamber of Commerce commissioned a study

concerning the viability of the aging Myriad Convention Center (built in the 1970s, refurbished

in 2000). Consulting firm convention Sports and Leisure recommended a new meeting space of

approximately 235,000 square feet of usable space. Oklahoma City’s new convention center

plans stem from this flurry of recommendations, calling for a 235,000 square feet hall

cattycorner to an extant 163,000 square feet convention hall.

In nearly every instance, Oklahoma City’s leaders called upon outside consultants to

guide their decision making. Instead of relying on the city’s cadre of professional expertise,

leaders asked for external help. The lack of faith in local professionals is startling; instead of

asking educators to provide a master plan for refurbishing classroom infrastructure, using in-

house engineers to design an arena, or local city planners to develop a convention center business

plan – local leaders consistently called upon professional planning mercenaries to help make a

plan. Reliance on external expertise opens cities to foreign interests, creating a wide host of

implications on city governance. When compounded with the idea that external actors interpret

the standard package of amenities to cities, it is possible that the urban infrastructure agenda does

not primarily serve the local benefit.

Implications of Outside Expertise

Reliance on outside expertise opens the local agenda to foreign benefit. By claiming to assist

cities pursue the creative class oriented, amenity-led-growth paradigm, an advocacy coalition can

assimilate pet projects into the larger standard package of amenities. In doing so, policy niches

are able to gain access to the local agenda. The number of specialty firms for a given issue is

strikingly small, with only a small handful of experts advising cities about each given program.

This small cluster of experts encourages cohesion to each type of project. Unsurprisingly,

emerging micro-level groupthink fits within a larger narrative while encouraging macro-level

boons.

Surplus Arenas as an Exit Option?

Nationwide, cities use public funds to build multipurpose arenas. Professional sports promise to

provide thousands of visitors to a district; it is easy to imagine economic revitalization with this

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influx of tourist dollars.36

Table 2 displays a list of arenas, their construction dates, and the most

recent renovations or expansions. Since 1990, 44 out of the 50 cases have paid the lion’s share

of either building or retrofitting arenas. Of the remaining six, four (Baltimore, Birmingham,

Richmond, and Sacramento) maintain serious discussions of building new indoor sports palaces.

<TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE>

Increased sports franchise mobility has both reinforced and reaped rewards from this

trend. Since 1990 alone, the big four sports leagues have added twenty-three expansion teams

and have moved fifteen existing franchises.37

Instead of relying on massive metropolises, pro

sports integrated smaller markets. Smaller markets in regions outside of the industrial belt

attracted teams. Smaller cities like Seattle and San Diego became big league baseball cities

while professional baseball homesteaded on the west coast. Indianapolis and San Antonio rose

as reliable basketball markets. By the end of the 1980s, professional hockey migrated south

littering teams across the sunbelt from Miami to Phoenix. Frequent franchise movement

bolstered hope for similarly sized cities to gain major league status. “If Memphis and Salt Lake

City are successful markets, then why not larger markets like Birmingham or Louisville?”

became a legitimate question for leaders in minor league cities.

As regional cities add arenas, they provide an exit-option for established major league

markets. Kansas City’s Sprint Center and Louisvilles’ KFC Yum! Center are two empty arenas,

waiting for a professional team. With these viable alternatives available, sports franchises are

able to extract more lucrative subsidies from local governments.38

During the late 2000s, Seattle

failed to comply with Supersonics ownership’s demands to update KeyArena. The team

relocated to Oklahoma City. More recently, Seattle’s threat of replacing KeyArena served as

additional leverage for the NBA Kings franchise if Sacramento did not commit millions to a new

sports palace.39

Sacramento currently plans to build a publicly funded downtown, multipurpose

arena to replace the privately owned ARCO arena. In effect, Sacramento must spend $250M in

order to keep their major-league status – partially due to the potential exit options across the

county.40

Table 2 reveals a trend where recent renovations influence team placement; the oldest

and longest-untouched arenas are least likely to house a major league franchise.

The Convention Space Glut

Convention centers are an attraction that encourages visitors. When asked how to increase

upper-income residential development, multiple consulting groups advised Oklahoma City to

invest in a larger convention center (a visitor-centric project) adjacent to a large park. Both of

these projects alluded to convention centers as a method to increase the local quality of life and

anchor residential development. This synthesis with the amenities revitalization theme

resonated, helping add a convention center to the local agenda.

Convention space has proliferated in recent decades. Between 1970 through 1995,

Heywood Sanders notes a 350% increase in convention space.41

Table 3 reveals that the “great

space race” continued, with a rapid flurry of convention center development at the turn of the

millennium. Sanders argues that cities often respond to sunny forecasts for meetings industry.

When consultants promise extremely high payoffs– potentially doubling the number of tourists

to a district – cities optimistically expand their convention centers. 42

The magnitude of some of

these remodels is breathtaking; for example, Chicago’s McCormick Place has increased its

exhibition space by over 1,000,000 square feet since 1990.

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<TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE>

Debate rages about the trajectory of the convention industry. Consensus agrees that

expansion space is rapidly growing and that competition to land high-profile meetings intensifies

as more cities invest in larger convention halls. Sanders provides evidence that the convention

industry is declining, while Tradeshow Week provided a response to Sanders’ Brookings study,

providing data that the industry is growing slowly. Assuming the meetings industry is either

growing slowly or shrinking, convention space is rapidly expanding, and some convention space

meets demand, then the oversupply of exhibition space grows. Nonetheless, industry experts

continue to recommend larger meetings spaces, encouraging a glut.

Benefits that arise from a convention space glut mirror the exit-option discussion above.

Meetings organizers have several options for hosting a large convention. This diversity of

choices allows for renters to enjoy lower prices, but undercuts the potential profitability of a

given convention center. Further, the intense competition among cities creates a rat race among

convention centers – failing to provide the newest upgrade to the standard package of meetings

amenities can inhibit a city’s ability to attract visitors. Recent commentary43

notes that if larger

cities have a difficult time keeping up with increasing costs, then regional cities’ smaller budgets

face a nearly impossible task.

External Winners

These two snapshots reveal a larger trend, consultant advice sometimes benefits outside interests.

This may not be intentional; however, the structure of an insulated policy network functioning

underneath a larger paradigm provides the foundation for intellectual inbreeding. Within the

standard package of amenities context and the groupthink that convention centers improve the

local quality of life, the advice seems practical. However, advice to build a new convention

center (practically adjacent to an existing meeting space) in order to induce residential

development seems odd upon first glance. Evidence remains mixed about arena and meetings

hall impact on the city; however, it appears that the industry represented by a small group of

niche consultants prospers.

Gains Despite Losses: Bricktown’s Prosperity and the Power over Place

Cities do not necessarily lose by following consultants’ guidance. How cities geographically

distribute the placement of consultant-proposed infrastructure determines their efficacy. Most

analyses studying stadiums and convention centers suffer from a too many variables and too few

cases. Specific combinations and geographic distribution of infrastructure can lead to drastically

different results. Oklahoma City reveals an interesting recipe for revitalization: anchors and

walkability.

Attractions can serve anchors for economic revitalization, if situated in a location to

succeed. Local leaders have the ability to distribute large-scale infrastructure and to zone

adjacent land. When organized in concert, these ingredients can synthesize into a profitable

entertainment district. Oklahoma City’s Bricktown44

provides an excellent example for analysis.

Figure 2 displays the Bricktown District. The Myriad Convention Center and Chesapeake

Energy Arena are highlighted anchors to the west, while the pedestrian-friendly Canal is in the

center near the ballpark. Most early development clustered near the anchors. The city

subsidized a theme department store on the eastern end of Bricktown. A cinema and department

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store receive highlights to the east, as they are private anchors institutions.45

Later development

has filled in the spaces among these new eastern anchors. Only nominal commerce occurs

beyond the department store or along less-walkable thoroughfares found to the north. In short,

development centers on anchors and spreads along walkable spaces.46

Analyses yield similar

patterns in other cities, which are available upon request.

Cities may have less power over the agenda, but they retain the ability to geographically

distribute externally inspired projects. Strategic placement can produce economic spillovers.

Conversely, disjointed distributions can lead to inefficiently and undeveloped districts – wasting

the potential gains promised by large scale infrastructure. Just as cities a century ago planned

for manufacturing agglomerations, contemporary communities attempt to leverage leisure sector

agglomerations.

Reprising Governance in the Postindustrial City

Postindustrial urban governance introduces a new key actor: the external expert. Formerly

important actors have practically disappeared: first, the federal government continues to retreat

from urban policy; second, local CEOs evaporated with the rise of multinational firms. Although

regimes predicated on these two actors may still exist, they are increasingly uncommon.

Understanding the local agenda requires looking beyond local actors. Cities of similar size

appear to converge around a standard package of amenities. Expanding the analysis to include

outside actors explains this contiguity and reveals the increasing role of consultants. These new

actors are self-interested and help shape the local agenda.

As coherent leadership declines and dependence on expertise increases, it appears that

consultant influence will continue to escalate in postindustrial city agenda setting. Consultant

influence stems from three sources: the local leaderships’ bounded rationality, the difference

between short-lived local coalitions and sustained advocacy coalitions for specific projects, and

the lack of countervailing experts. As cities evolved into the postindustrial era, easy access to

skilled, stable local leadership diminished. Complex challenges proliferated, creating a demand

for expertise outside of a city’s leaders and bureaucrats. The resulting constellation of

consultants framed their issues behind a single message: quality of life. Without sustained

checks, several infrastructure programs became part of a standard package of amenities – all

claiming to enhance the local quality of life. The actors claiming part of this paradigm enjoy a

privileged position in setting the local agenda.

Cynics may scoff, asking “What power is left for the locals?” The menu for urban

revitalization appears to be pre-programmed, especially when asking external experts. Assuming

that cities must keep up with standard infrastructure or potentially fall behind, locals assert

marginal power over the infrastructure agenda. Nonetheless, cities maintain a surprising amount

of autonomy over the geographic distribution of these projects. This power over place is critical

for capturing gains promised by consultants.

Decisions over where to place anchor institutions, where to allocate resources to improve

walkability, and basic zoning choices all fall in the hands of local leaders. As a result, local

leaders maintain the authority over key ingredients that fuel revitalization. Consultants may add

externally-motivated sparks to the agenda, but local leaders can fan the flames of revitalization

with their existing power over place. In an era of economic tumult and instable local coalitions,

cities maintain significant power over their future. Whether local leadership has the capacity to

harness the power over place and extract positives from external actors’ projects will decide the

fate of many regional cities.

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Postindustrial governance includes a key new actor: the outside expert. An extended

network of policy niches have gathered underneath the guise of improving the local quality of

life. Experts under this umbrella articulate the standards for expensive public infrastructure to

policymakers, helping guide the local agenda in the wake of declining urban leadership.

Although locals retain the power over place, actors outside of the city enjoy a privileged position

when setting the agenda.

Figure 1: Rex Elementary Enrollment Boundaries

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14

15

Figure 2: Bricktown District, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma

1 Stone, Clarence N. 2013. “The Empowerment Puzzle: In Pursuit of a New Dimension in Governing the City.”

American Political Science Association 2013 Annual Meeting, Chicago. http://bit.ly/19sd7Cb 2 2 See Logan and Molotch for discussion of discussion of growth machines. See Mossberger and Stoker for discussion of

actors related to regimes.

Logan, John R. and Harvey Luskin Molotch. 1987. Urban Fortunes: The Political Economy of Place. University of

California Press. Mossberger, Karen and Gerry Stoker. 2001. “The evolution of urban regime theory: the challenge of conceptualization.”

Urban Affairs Review. (36) 810-835. 3 Judd, Dennis R. and David Laslo. “The Regime Moment: The Brief but Storied Career of Urban Regimes in American

Cities.” American Urban Politics in a Global Age. Seventh Edition. Paul Kantor and Dennis R. Judd, eds. Pearson. Strom, Elizabeth. 2008. “Rethinking the Politics of Downtown Development” Journal of Urban Affairs (30) 37-61 4 Romney, Mitt. 2008. “Let Detroit Go Bankrupt.” New York Times. http://nyti.ms/1ijYR0Y

5 This study uses the central city of Core Based Statistical Areas with over 1,000,000 residents estimated in 2012.

6 Florida, Richard. 2002. The Rise of the Creative Class: And How it’s transforming work, leisure, community and

everyday life. New York: Perseus Book Group. 7 Olson, Macur. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Harvard University

Press. 8 Large-scale urban infrastructure fits this archetype perfectly; throughout history costs have been far too high for an

individual or corporation to single-handedly fund capital projects. (See discussion on railway links in Sbragia.

Occasionally, the private sector will attempt to develop smaller programs (e.g. private hotels with extensive meeting

16

spaces instead of public convention centers), but major infrastructure is nearly always public. See Beito et al for a discussion on private infrastructure production.

Sbragia, Alberta M. 1996. Debt Wish: Entrepreneurial Cities, U.S. Federalism, and Economic Development. University of Pittsburgh Press. )

Beito, David T., Peter Gordon and Alexander Tabarrok, eds. 2002. The Voluntary City. Ann Arbor: University of

Michigan Press. 9 Walker, Jack L. 1991. Mobilizing Interest Groups in America: Patrons, Professions, and Social Movements. Michigan

University Press. 10

Machines, reform monopolies, regimes, corporatist governance, pluralist politics, and multiple-elitism provide the

potential for coherent leadership. Although varying the political structure may affect policy outcomes, a machine may be just as effective as a regime at pursuing a policy agenda. 11

Judd, Dennis R. and Michael Parkinson. 1990. Leadership and urban regeneration: Cities in North America and Europe. Sage Publications. 22 12

Stone, Clarence N. 1989. Regime Politics: Governing Atlanta, 1946-1988. University of Kansas Press. Elkin, Stephen L. 1987. City and Regime in the American Republic. University of Chicago Press.

Mossberger, Karen and Gerry Stoker. 2001. “The evolution of urban regime theory: the challenge of conceptualization.” Urban Affairs Review (36) 810-835. 13

Hanson, Royce, Hal Wolman, David Connoly, and Katherine Pearson. “Corporate Citizenship and Urban Problem Solving: The Changing Civic Role of Business Leaders in American Cities.” Brookings. 14

Strom, Elizabeth. 2008. “Rethinking the Politics of Downtown Development” Journal of Urban Affairs 30(1): 37-61 15

Simon, Herbert. 1957. Models of Man. Wiley. 16

Racca David P. and Amardeep Dhanju. 2006. “Property Value/Desirability Effects of Bike Paths Adjacent to Residential Areas.” http://bit.ly/z3QJro 17

Owusu-Edusei Kwame and Molly Espey. “Does Proximity to a Golf Course Matter?” Clemson University Working Paper 012203. http://bit.ly/166NbIZ 18

McFarland, Andrew S. 2004. Neopluralism. University of Kansas Press. 19

Judd, Dennis R. and Susan S. Fainstein. 1999. The Tourist City. Yale University Press. 20

See Clark, Florida for discussion of Bohemian districts. Clark, Terry Nichols. 2011. The City as an Entertainment Machine. Lexington Books. 21

See Duany, Plater-Zyberk, and Speck, Speck for discussion on walkability. See Florida for discussion on tolerance and the creative class. See Clark for discussion on public expression and the creative class.

Duany, Andres, Elizabeth Plater-Zyberl, and Jeff Speck. 2000. Suburban Nation. North Point Press. Speck, Jeff. 2013. Walkable City: How Downtown Can Save America, One Step at a Time. North Point Press.

Clark, Terry Nichols. 2014. Can Tocqueville Karaoke? Global Contrasts of Citizen Participation, the Arts and

Development. Emerald Group Publishing Limited. 22

These investments are often relatively small in scope. Restriping streets to include bike paths or closing blocks to create

pedestrian malls can foster face-to-face interactions and potentially attract members of the creative class. Similarly, establishing exclusive public schools can help retain highly productive workers once they have children. More

information about exclusive elementary and secondary schools is available upon request. 23

Simon, Herbert. 1957. Models of Man. Wiley. 24

See Sabatier for advocacy coalitions; Heclo for policy networks. Heclo, Hugh. 1978. “Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment.” The New American Political System. Anthony

King, ed. American Enterprise Institute. Sabatier, Paul A. and Hank C. Jenkins-Smith. 1993. Policy Change and Learning: An Advocacy Coalition

Approach. Boulder: Westview Press. 25

Baumgartner, Frank R., Jeffrey M. Berry, Marie Hojnaki, David C. Kimball, and Beth L. Leech. 2010. Lobbying and

Policy Change: Who Wins, Who Loses, and Why. University of Chicago Press. 26

Bureau of Economic Analysis. “Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages.” http://1.usa.gov/V2I4oL 27

Attributed to United Airlines management, quoted by Mick Cornett http://bit.ly/V4F4Fn 28

Voices of Oklahoma. “Ron Norick: Mayor During the Oklahoma City Bombing.” http://bit.ly/1c9Vgdz 29

Councilman, IG Purser; quoted in Lackmeyer and Money Lackmeyer, Steve and Jack Money. 2010. OKC: Second Time Around. Full Circle Press. 30

Judd, Dennis R. 2002. Infrastructure of Play: Building the Tourist City. ME Sharpe. 31

State law created an education infrastructure crisis in Oklahoma City. Prompted by A Nation at Risk, Oklahoma’s

legislature passed a comprehensive reform to the state’s education system in 1990 with an income tax increase to offset increased state expenditures. Fiscal populists resisted the bill, sending the issue to the ballot. After the statewide

referendum approved the funding, schools budgets’ expanded. Through the 1990s, several districts applied the additional resources to the workforce, simultaneously reducing class sizes and rewarding increased teacher credentials.

17

Unfortunately, the legislature did not provide additional funds to build new classrooms. Districts could not keep up with infrastructure on their own due to existing within a fiscal straitjacket. In order to house the new teachers, many schools

acquired “portable classrooms”, a moniker for trailers. By 2000, trailer parks huddled behind many schools throughout the state. When trying to solve the problem of Oklahoma’s lagging education system, state leaders subsidized education

personnel until leaving districts an infrastructure shortage to solve. 32

Other work outlines how certain firms are able to add their products into standard package of amenities, specifically within public education. The gist of this process includes recasting salesmen as consultants, initially subsidizing their

products in prominent and well-recognized spaces, suggesting that correlation with success indicates causation, and justifying their recast position as consultants with this correlation-causation argument. More information is available upon

request. 33

Oklahoma City is planning a downtown elementary charter school encompassing a jurisdiction conveniently designed to

include three gentrifying districts; board leadership includes local business elites and a former mayor. The stated goal of the school is to with a stated goal of “encouraging families to move to downtown Oklahoma City”. http://bit.ly/1dGIGoG 34

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, Municipal Code. Chapter 52 §23.b.7 35

The City of Oklahoma City chartered Economic & Planning Systems in Denver to draft a market analysis. Subsequent

planning consultants have provided commentary on the program, ranging from Jeff Speck in a walkability analysis to park architects.

City of Oklahoma City Public Works Department. 2009. “Park Concept Plan.” http://bit.ly/1dbYKkc Economic & Planning Systems. 2007. “Core to Shore Market Analysis: Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.”

http://bit.ly/1abU9KH Speck, Jeff. 2009. “Oklahoma City: downtown walkability analysis and recommendation plan.”

http://bit.ly/1dGJ7PM 36

See both Rosentraub works for this narrative.

Rosentraub, Mark S. 1997. Major League Losers: The Real Cost of Sports And Who’s Paying For It. Basic Books. Rosentraub, Mark S. 2009. Major League Winners: Using Sports and Cultural Centers as Tools for Economic

Development. CRC Press. 37

The National Basketball Association has relocated five teams and added two franchises; the National Hockey League

has relocated five teams and added nine franchises; the National Football League has relocated four teams and added five franchises, and Major League Baseball has moved one team and added four franchises. These shifts do not account for

intra-MSA moves, like the NBA and NHL’s Brooklyn franchises recent move from New Jersey and Nassau, respectively. 38

This logic follows a similar pattern to the central-city-subruban exit-option argument in Williamson.

Williamson, Thad. 2010. Sprawl, Justice, and Citizenship: The Civic Costs of the American Way of Life. Oxford University Press. 39

Condotta, Bob. 2013. “Chris Hansen, Seattle city officials negotiating on KeyArena improvements.” Seattle Times.

http://bit.ly/1bt0gd2 40

News 10. 2013. “The estimate cost of the new Sacramento arena, and other Sacramento Kings numbers.”

http://on.news10.net/19sfmFw 41

Sanders, Heywood T. 1997. “If We Build It, Will They Come? And Other Questions About the Proposed Boston

Convention Center.” Pioneer Institute for Public Policy Research White Paper 1. 42

Sanders, Heywood. 2005. “Space Available: The Realities of Convention Centers as Economic Development

Strategy.” Brookings. http://bit.ly/1c8Sb0O 43

Erickson, Amanda. 2012. “Is It Time to Stop Building Convention Centers?” Atlantic Cities. http://bit.ly/19meG22

Tradeshow Week. 2009. “Heywood Sanders’ ‘Space Available’ Report Review & Analysis: Focused on Convention & Tradeshow Industry Growth 2005 to 2008.” http://bit.ly/18NKpet 44

Analysis of other cities is available upon request. 45

Oklahoma City developed a department store space for Bass Pro Shops. The store functions as an “anchor.” 46

Bricktown’s pattern parallels suburban shopping malls, where nearly every store entrance faces central space. In the stereotypical shopping mall, department stores anchor each end of a comfortable, walkable space lined by small stores.

Convention centers, arenas, stadiums, and other attractions anchor tourist districts like their department store counterparts.