CONSTITUTIONAL LAWCHAPTER IV THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE
PROVISION
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
NOTE: Applicable provisions of the Human Security
Act/Anti-Terrorism Law, Republic Act No. 9372, Approved on March 6,
2007 and effective on July 15, 2007 (This Law shall be
automatically suspended one (1) month before and two (2) months
after the holding of any election)
Sec. 18. Period of detention without judicial warrant of
arrest.- The provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code,
notwithstanding, any police or law enforcement personnel, who,
having been duly authorized in writing by the Anti-Terrorism
Council has taken custody of a person charged with or suspected of
the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit
terrorism shall, WITHOUT INCURRING ANY CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR DELAY
IN THE DELIVERY OF DETAINED PERSONS TO THE PROPER JUDICIAL
AUTHORITIES, DELIVER SAID CHARGED OR SUSPECTED PERSON TO THE PROPER
JUDICIAL AUTHORITY WITHIN A PERIOD OF THREE (3) DAYS counted from
the moment said charged or suspected person has been apprehended or
arrested, detained, and taken into custody by the said police, or
law enforcement personnel: Provided, That the arrest of those
suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit
terrorism must result from the surveillance under Section 7 and
examination of bank deposits under Section 27 pf this Act.
The police or law enforcement personnel concerned shall, before
detaining the person suspected of the crime of terrorism, present
him or her before any judge at the latters residence or office
nearest the place where the arrest took place at any time of the
day or night. It shall be the duty of the judge, among other
things, to ascertain the identity of the police or law enforcement
personnel and the person or persons they have arrested and
presented before him or her, to inquire of them the reasons why
they have arrested the person and determine by questioning and
personal observation whether or not the subject has been subjected
to any physical, moral or psychological torture by whom and why.
The judge shall then submit a written report of what he/she had
observed when the subject was brought before him to the proper
court that has jurisdiction over the case of the person thus
arrested.
The judge shall forthwith submit his report within 3 calendar
days from the time the suspect was brought to his/her residence or
office.
Immediately after taking custody of a person charged with or
suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit
terrorism, the police or law enforcement personnel shall notify in
writing the judge of the court nearest the place of apprehension or
arrest; provided, That where the arrest is made during Saturdays,
Sundays, holidays or after office hours, the written notice shall
be served at the residence of the judge nearest the place where the
accused was arrested. The penalty of 10 years and 1 day to 12 years
imprisonment shall be imposed upon the police or law enforcement
personnel who fails to notify any judge as provided in the
preceding paragraph.
Section 19. Period of Detention in the event of an actual or
imminent terrorist attack.- In the vent of an actual or imminent
terrorist attack,, suspects may not be detained for more than three
days without the written approval of a municipal, city, provincial
or regional official of a Human Rights Commission, or judge of the
municipal, regional trial court, the Sandiganbayan or a justice of
the Court of Appeals nearest the place of arrest. If the arrest is
made during Saturdays, Sundays or holidays, or after office hours,
the arresting police of law enforcement personnel shall bring the
person thus arrested to the residence of any of the officials
mentioned above that is nearest the place where the accused was
arrested. The approval in writing of any of the said officials
shall be secured by the police or law enforcement personnel
concerned within five days after the date of the detention of the
persons concerned; Provided, however, That within three days after
the detention the suspects whose connection with the terror attack
or threat is not established, shall be released immediately.
Section 26 provides that persons who have been charged with
terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorismeven if they have been
granted bail because evidence of guilt is not strongcan be:
Detained under house arrest;Restricted from traveling;
and/orProhibited from using any cellular phones, computers, or
other means of communications with people outside their
residence.Section 39. Seizure and Sequestration.- The deposits and
their outstanding balances, placements, trust accounts, assets, and
records in any bank or financial institution, moneys, businesses,
transportation and communication equipment, supplies and other
implements, and property of whatever kind and nature belonging:
To any person charged with or suspected of the crime of
terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism;to a judicially
declared and outlawed terrorist organization or group of persons;to
a member of such judicially declared and outlawed organization,
association or group of persons,-shall be seized, sequestered, and
frozen in order to prevent their use, transfer or conveyance for
purposes that are inimical to the safety and security of the people
or injurious to the interest of the State.
The accused or suspect may withdraw such sums as are reasonably
needed by his family including the services of his counsel and his
familys medical needs upon approval of the court. He or she may
also use any of his property that is under seizure or sequestration
or frozen because of his/her indictment as a terrorist upon
permission of the court for any legitimate reason.
Section 40. The seized, sequestered and frozen bank
depositsshall be deemed property held in trust by the bank or
financial institution and that their use or disposition while the
case is pending shall be subject to the approval of the court
before which the case or cases are pending.
Section 41. If the person suspected as terrorist is acquitted
after arraignment or his case dismissed before his arraignment by a
competent court, the seizureshall be lifted by the investigating
body or the competent court and restored to him without delay. The
filing of an appeal or motion for reconsideration shall not stay
the release of said funds from seizure, sequestration and
freezing.
If convicted, said seized, sequestered and frozen assets shall
automatically forfeited in favor of the government.
Requisites of a valid search warrant
Read:
a. Essentials of a valid search warrant,145 SCRA 739
b. Validity of a search warrant and the admissibility of
evidence obtained in violation thereof.
c. The place to be searched as indicated in the warrant is
controlling
PEOPLE VS. CA, 291 SCRA 400Narvasa, CJ
In applying for a search warrant, the police officers had in
their mind the first four (4) separate apartment units at the rear
of ABIGAIL VARIETY STORE in Quezon City to be the subject of their
search. The same was not, however, what the Judge who issued the
warrant had in mind, AND WAS NOT WHAT WAS ULTIMATELY DESCRIBED IN
THE SEARCH WARRANT. As such, any evidence obtained from the place
searched which is different from that indicated in the search
warrant is inadmissible in evidence for any purpose and in any
proceeding.
This is so because it is neither licit nor fair to allow police
officers to search a place different from that stated in the
warrant on the claim that the place actually searchedalthough not
that specified in the search warrantis exactly what they had in
view when they applied for the warrant and had demarcated in their
supporting evidence. WHAT IS MATERIAL IN DETERMINING THE VALIDITY
OF A SEARCH IS THE PLACE STATED IN THE WARRANT ITSELF, NOT WHAT THE
APPLICANTS HAD IN THEIR THOUGHTS, OR HAD REPRESENTED IN THE PROOFS
THEY SUBMITTED TO THE COURT ISSUING THE WARRANT. As such, it was
not just a case of obvious typographical error, but a clear case of
a search of a place different from that clearly and without
ambiguity identified in the search warrant.
NOTE: Very Important: Where a search warrant is issued by one
court and the criminal action base don the results of the search is
afterwards commenced in another court, IT IS NOT THE RULE THAT A
MOTION TO QUASH THE WARRANT (or to retrieve the things seized) MAY
BE FILED ONLY IN THE ISSUING COURTSUCH A MOTION MAY BE FILED FOR
THE FIRST TIME IN EITHER THE ISSUING COURT OR THAT IN WHICH THE
CRIMINAL PROCEEDING IS PENDING.
d. Validity of a warrantless search and seizure as a result of
an informers tip. Note the two (2) conflicting decisions of the
Supreme Court.
PEOPLE VS. ARUTA, 288 SCRA 626
On December 13, 1988, P/Lt. Abello of the Olongapo PNP was
tipped off by an informer that Aling Rosa would be arriving from
Baguio City the following day with a large volume of marijuana. As
a result of the tip, the policemen waited for a Victory Bus from
Baguio City near the PNB Olongapo, near Rizal Ave. When the accused
got off, she was pointed to by the informer. She was carrying a
traveling bag at that time. She was not acting suspiciously. She
was arrested without a warrant.
The bag allegedly contained 8.5 kilos of marijuana. After trial,
she was convicted and imposed a penalty of life imprisonment.
Issue:
Whether or not the marijuana allegedly taken from the accused is
admissible in evidence.
Held:
Warrantless search is allowed in the following instances:
1. customs searches;
2. searches of moving vehicle;
3. seizure of evidence in plain view;
4. consented searches;
5. search incidental to a lawful arrest; and
6. stop and frisk measures.
The above exceptions to the requirement of a search warrant,
however, should not become unbridled licenses for law enforcement
officers to trample upon the conditionally guaranteed and more
fundamental right of persons against unreasonable search and
seizures. The essential requisite of probable cause must still be
satisfied before a warrantless search and seizure can be lawfully
conducted. In order that the information received by the police
officers may be sufficient to be the basis of probable cause, it
must be based on reasonable ground of suspicion or belief a crime
has been committed or is about to be committed.
The marijuana obtained as a result of a warrantless search is
inadmissible as evidence for the following reasons:
a. the policemen had sufficient time to apply for a search
warrant but they failed to do so;
b. the accused was not acting suspiciously;
c. the accuseds identity was previously ascertained so applying
for a warrant should have been easy;
d. the accused in this case was searched while innocently
crossing a street
Consequently, there was no legal basis for the police to effect
a warrantless search of the accuseds bag, there being no probable
cause and the accuseds not having been legally arrested. The arrest
was made only after the accused was pointed to by the informant at
a time when she was not doing anything suspicious. The arresting
officers do not have personal knowledge that the accused was
committing a crime at that time.
Since there was no valid warrantless arrest, it logically
follows that the subsequent search is similarly illegal, it being
not incidental to a lawful arrest. This is so because if a search
is first undertaken, and an arrest effected based on the evidence
produced by the search, both such search and arrest would be
unlawful, for being contrary to law.
This case is similar tot he case of PEOPLE VS. AMINNUDIN, and
PEOPLE VS. ENCINADA.
PEOPLE VS. MONTILLA, 284 SCRA 703
On June 19, 1994, at about 2 p.m., SPO1 Talingting and SPO1
Clarin of the Dasmarinas, Cavite PNP were informed by an INFORMER
that a drug courier would be arriving in Barangay Salitran,
Dasmarinas, Cavite, from Baguio City, with an undetermined amount
of marijuana. The informer likewise informed them that he could
recognize said person.
At about 4 in the morning of June 20, 1994, the appellant was
arrested by the above-named police officers while alighting from a
passenger jeepney near a waiting shed in Salitran, Dasmarinas,
Cavite, upon being pointed to by the informer. The policemen
recovered 28 kilos of dried marijuana leaves. The arrest was
without warrant.
The trial court convicted the appellant for transporting
marijuana based on the testimonies of the Above-named police
officers without presenting the alleged informer.
Issue:
Was the warrantless arrest valid?
Held:
The accused claims that the warrantless search and seizure is
illegal because the alleged information was received by the police
on June 19, 1994 and therefore, they could have applied for a
search warrant. The said contention is without merit considering
that the information given by the informer is too sketchy and not
detailed enough for the obtention of the corresponding arrest or
search warrant. While there is indication that the informer knows
the courier, the records do not show that he knew his name. On bare
information, the police could not have secured a warrant from a
judge.
Furthermore, warrantless search is allowed in the following
instances:
1. customs searches;
2. searches of moving vehicle;
3. seizure of evidence in plain view;
4. consented searches;
5. search incidental to a lawful arrest; and
6. stop and frisk measures.
Since the accused was arrested for transporting marijuana, the
subsequent search on his person is justified. An arresting officer
has the right to validly search and seize from the offender (1)
dangerous weapons; and (2) those that may be used as proof of the
commission of the offense.
In the case at bar, upon being pointed to by the informer as the
drug courier, the policemen requested the accused to open and show
them the contents of his bag and the cartoon he was carrying and he
voluntarily opened the same and upon cursory inspection, it was
found out that it contains marijuana. Hence the arrest.
The accused insists that it is normal for a person traveling
with a bag and cartoon which should not elicit the slightest
suspicion that he was committing a crime. In short, there was no
probable cause for these policemen to think that he was committing
a crime.
The said contention was considered without merit by the Supreme
Court considering the fact that he consented to the search as well
as the fact that the informer was a reliable one who had supplied
similar information to the police in the past which proved
positive.
(NOTE: The SC held that the non-presentation of the informer
does not affect the case for the prosecution because he is not even
the best witness. He is merely a corroborative witness to the
arresting officers. )
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
To say that reliable tips from informers constitute probable
cause for a warrantless arrest or search IS A DANGEROUS PRECEDENT
AND PLACES IN GREAT JEOPARDY THE DOCTRINES LAID DOWN IN MANY
DECISIONS MADE BY THIS COURT. (PEOPLE VS. BURGOS, 144 SCRA 1;
PEOPLE VS. AMINNUDIN, 163 SCRA 402; PEOPLE VS. ENCINADA, October 2,
1997; PEOPLE VS. MENGOTE, 220 SCRA).
The case is similar to the case of People vs. Encimada where the
appellant was searched without a warrant while disembarking from a
ship on the strength of a tip from an informer received by the
police the previous afternoon that the appellant would be
transporting prohibited drugs. The search yielded a plastic package
containing marijuana. On Appeal, the SC reversed the decision of
conviction and held that Encinada did not manifest any suspicious
behavior that would necessarily and reasonably invite the attention
of the police.
ELI LUI, ET AL. VS. MATILLANO, May 27, 2004Right against
unreasonable searches and seizures; Mission Order does not
authorize an illegal search. Waiver of the right against an
unreasonable search and seizure.
In search of the allegedly missing amount of P45,000.00 owned by
the employer, the residence of a relative of the suspect was
forcibly open by the authorities by kicking the kitchen door to
gain entry into the house. Thereafter, they confiscated different
personal properties therein which were allegedly part of those
stolen from the employer. They were in possession of a mission
order but later on claimed that the owner of the house gave his
consent to the warrantless search. Are the things admissible in
evidence? Can they be sued for damages as a result of the said
warrantless search and seizure?
Held:
The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a
personal right which may be waived expressly or impliedly. BUT A
WAIVER BY IMPLICATION CANNOT BE PRESUMED. There must be clear and
convincing evidence of an actual intention to relinquish the right.
There must be proof of the following:
a. that the right exists;
b. that the person involved had knowledge, either constructive
or actual, of the existence of said right;
c. that the said person had an actual intention to relinquish
the right.
Finally, the waiver must be made voluntarily, knowingly and
intelligently in order that the said is to be valid.
The search was therefore held illegal and the members of the
searching party held liable for damages in accordance with the
doctrine laid down in Lim vs. Ponce de Leon and MHP Garments vs.
CA.
e. General or roving warrants
Read:
1. Stonehill vs. Diokno,June 19,1967
Concepcion, C.J.
The petitioners are questioning the validity of a total of 42
search warrants issued on different dates against them and the
corporations in which they are officers, directing the peace
officer to search the persons above-named and/or the premises of
their offices, warehouses and to seize and take possession of the
following personal property, to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence,
receipts, ledgers, journals, typewriters and other documents or
papers showing all business transactions including disbursement
receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements
since they are the subject of the offense of violating the
CENTRAL BANK LAWS, TARIFF AND CUSTOMS LAWS, INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
AND THE REVISED PENAL CODE.
The petitioners claim that the search warrants are void being
violative of the Constitutional provision on search and seizure on
the ground that:
a. The search warrants did not particularly describe the
documents, books and things to be seized;
b. cash money not mentioned in the warrant were actually
seized;
c. The warrants were issued to fish evidence in the deportation
cases against them;
d. the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner;
e. the things seized were not delivered to the court to be
disposed of in a manner provided for by law.
Issue:
Were the searches and seizures made in the offices and
residences of the petitioners valid?
a. As to the searches made on their offices, they could not
question the same in their personal capacities because the
corporations have a personality separate and distinct with its
officers. An objection to an unlawful search and seizure IS PURELY
PERSONAL AND CANNOT BE AVAILED OF BY THIRD PARTIES. CONSEQUENTLY,
THE PETITIONERS MAY NOT VALIDLY OBJECT TO THE USE IN EVIDENCE
AGAINST THEM OF THE DOCUMENTS, PAPERS AND THINGS SEIZED FROM THE
OFFICES AND PREMISES OF THE CORPORATIONS, TO WHOM THE SEIZED
EFFECTS BELONG, AND MAY NOT BE INVOKED BY THE CORPORATE OFFICERS IN
PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THEM IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY.
b. As to the documents seized in the residences of the
petitioners, the same may not be used in evidence against them
because the warrants issued were in the nature of a general warrant
for failure to comply with the constitutional requirement that:
1. that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision;
and
2. that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be
seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in the
contested warrants. They were issued upon applications stating that
the natural and juridical persons therein named had committed a
violation of Central bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal
revenue Code and Revised Penal Code. IN OTHER WORDS, NO SPECIFIC
OFFENSE HAD BEEN ALLEGED IN SAID APPLICATIONS. THE AVERMENTS
THEREOF WITH RESPECT TO THE OFFENSE COMMITTED WERE ABSTRACT. AS A
CONSEQUENCE, IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE JUDGE WHO ISSUED THE
WARRANTS TO HAVE FOUND THE EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE, FOR THE
SAME PRESUPPOSES THE INTRODUCTION OF COMPETENT PROOF THAT THE PARTY
AGAINST WHOM IT IS SOUGHT HAS PERFORMED PARTICULAR ACTS, OR
COMMITTED SPECIFIC OMISSIONS, VIOLATING A GIVEN PROVISION OF OUR
CRIMINAL LAWS.
2. Bache vs. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823
3. Secretary vs. Marcos, 76 SCRA 301
4. Castro vs. Pabalan, April 30,l976
5. Asian Surety vs. Herrera, 54 SCRA 312 (A search warrant for
estafa, falsification, tax evasion and insurance fraud is a general
warrant and therefore not valid)
6. Collector vs. Villaluz, June 18,1976
7. Viduya vs. Verdiago, 73 SCRA 553
8. Dizon vs. Castro, April 12, 1985
9. People vs. Veloso, 48 Phil. 169
1. TAMBASEN VS. PEOPLE, July 14, 1995; PEOPLE VS. CA, 216 SCRA
101. A SCATTER-SHOT WARRANT is a search warrant issued for more
than one specific offense like one for estafa, robbery, theft and
qualified theft)
f. Define probable cause. Who determines probable cause?
a. ROBERTS VS. CA, 254 SCRA 307
b. DE LOS SANTOS VS. MONTESA, 247 SCRA 85
VICENTE LIM,SR. AND MAYOR SUSANA LIM
VS.HON. N. FELIX (G.R. NO. 99054-57)
EN BANC
GUTIERREZ, JR. J.
Facts:
Petitioners are suspects of the slaying of congressman Moises
Espinosa, Sr. and three of his security escorts and the wounding of
another. They were initially charged, with three others, with the
crime of multiple murder with frustrated murder. After conducting a
preliminary investigation, a warrant of arrest was issued on July
31, 1989. Bail was fixed at P200,000.
On September 22, 1989, Fiscal Alfane, designated to review the
case, issued a Resolution affirming the finding of a prima facie
case against the petitioners but ruled that a case of Murder for
each of the killing of the four victims and a physical injuries
case for inflicting gunshot wound on the survivor be filled instead
against the suspects. Thereafter, four separate informations to
that effect were filed with the RTC of Masbate with no bail
recommended.
On November 21, 1989, a motion for change of venue, filed by the
petitioners was granted by the SC. It ordered that the case may be
transferred from the RTC of Masbate to the RTC of Makati.
Petitioners then moved that another hearing ba conducted to
determine if there really exists a prima facie case against them in
the light of documents showing recantations of some witnesses in
the preliminary investigation. They likewise filed a motion to
order the transmittal of initial records of the preliminary
investigation conducted by the municipal judge of Barsaga of
Masbate. These motions were however denied by the court because the
prosecution had declared the existence of probable cause,
informations were complete in form in substance , and there was no
defect on its face. Hence it found it just and proper to rely on
the prosecutors certification in each information.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without
bail by simply relying on the prosecutions certification and
recommendation that a probable cause exists?
Held:
1. The judge committed a grave abuse of discretion.
In the case of Placer vs. Villanueva, the sc ruled that a judge
may rely upon the fiscals certification of the existence of a
probable cause and on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest.
However, the certification does not bind the judge to come out with
the warrant of arrest. This decision interpreted the search and
seizure provision of the 1973 Constitution. Under this provision,
the judge must satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause
before issuing a warrant of order of arrest. If on the face of
information, the judge finds no probable cause, he may disregard
the fiscals certification and require the submission of the
affidavits of witness to aid him at arriving at a conclusion as to
the existence of a probable cause. This has been the rule since U.S
vs. Ocampo and Amarga vs. Abbas.
2. In the case of Soliven vs. Makasiar, decided under the 1987
Constitution, the Court noted that the addition of the word
personally after the word determined and the deletion of the grant
of authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to other
respondent officers as to may be authorized by law does not require
the judge to personally examine the complainant and his witness in
his determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant
of arrest.What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and
personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of
the existence of probable cause. Following established doctrine and
procedures, he shall:
(1) personally evaluate the reports and the supporting documents
submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause
and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest;
(2) If on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may
disregard the fiscals report and require the submission of
supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a
conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.
3. The case of People vs. Honorable Enrique B. Inting reiterates
the following doctrines:
(1) The determination of probable cause is a function of the
judge. It is not for the Provincial Fiscal or Prosecutor nor for
the Election Supervisor to ascertain. Only the judge alone makes
this detemination.
(2) The preliminary inquiry made by the prosecutor does not bind
the judge. It merely assist him to make the determination of
probable cause. The judge does not have to follow what the
prosecutors present to him. By itself, the prosecutors
certification of probable cause is ineffectual. It is the report,
the affidavits, the transcripts of stenographic notes, and all
other supporting documents behind the prosecutors certification
which are material in assisting the judge to make his
determination.
(3) Preliminary inquiry should be distinguished from the
preliminary investigation proper. While the former seeks to
determine probable cause for the issuance of warrant of arrest, the
latter ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or
be released.
4. 4. In the case of Castillo vs. Villaluz, the court ruled that
judges of RTC no longer have authority to conduct preliminary
investigations: This authority was removed from them by the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure, effective on January 1, 1985.
5. In the present case, the respondent judge relies solely on
the certification of the prosecutor. Considering that all the
records of the investigation are in Masbate, he has not personally
determined the existence of probable cause. The determination was
made by the provincial prosecutor. The constitutional requirement
had not been satisfied.
The records of the preliminary investigation conducted by the
Municipal Court of Masbate and reviewed by the respondent Fiscal
were still in Masbate when the respondent Fiscal issued the warrant
of arrest against the petitioners. There was no basis for the
respondent judge to make his personal determination regarding the
existence of probable cause from the issuance of warrant of arrest
as mandated by the Constitution. He could not have possibly known
what has transpired in Masbate as he had nothing but a
certification. Although the judge does not have to personally
examine the complainant and his witnesses (for the prosecutor can
perform the same functions as commissioner for taking of evidence)
there should be a report and necessary documents supporting the
Fiscals bare certification. All of these should be before the
judge.
1. Amarga vs. Abbas, 98 Phil. 739
1-a. 20th Century Fox vs. CA, 164 SCRA 655
1-b. Quintero vs. NBI, 162 SCRA 467
1-c. The Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force vs. CA, GR
No. 83578, March 16, 1989
SOLIVEN VS. MAKASIAR, 167 SCRA 393
The word personally after the word determined does not
necessarily mean that the judge should examine the complainant and
his witnesses personally before issuing the search warrant or
warrant of arrest but the exclusive responsibility on the part of
said judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause.
As such, there is no need to examine the complainant and his
witnesses face to face. It is sufficient if the judge is convinced
of the existence of probable cause upon reading the affidavits or
deposition of the complainant and his witnesses.
1-e. Pendon vs. CA, Nov. 16, 1990
1-f. P. vs. Inting, July 25, 1990
1-g. Umil vs. Ramos, et al., July 9, 1990 with the Resolution of
the Motion for Reconsideration in November, 1991
1-h. Paderanga vs. Drilon, April 19, 1991
2. Department of Health vs. Sy Chi Siong, Inc., GR No. 85289,
February 20, 1989
2-a. P. vs. Villanueva, 110 SCRA 465
2-b. Placer vs. Villanueva, 126 SCRA 463 (Only a judge has the
power to determine probable insofar as the issuance of a warrant of
arrest is concerned)
3. Tolentino vs. Villaluz,July 27,1987
4. Cruz vs. Gatan, 74 SCRA 226
5. Olaes vs. P., 155 SCRA 486
1. Geronimo vs. Ramos, 136 SCRA 435
7.JUAN PONCE ENRILE VS. JUDGE JAIME SALAZAR, ET AL., G.R.NO.
92163, June 5, 1990
Due process; right to bail; warrant of arrest
(Note: This might be useful also in your Criminal Law)
Narvasa, J.
On February 27, 1990, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested by
law enforcement officers led by NBI Director Alfredo Lim on the
strength of a warrant of arrest issued by the respondent judge,
HON. JAIME SALAZAR, Regional trial Court, Branch 103, Quezon City
in Criminal Case No. 90-10941. The warrant was issued on an
information signed and filed earlier in the day by Senior State
Prosecutor AURELIO TRAMPE charging Senator Enrile, the spouses
Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan with the crime
of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder allegedly
committed during the period of the failed coup attempt from
November 29 to December 10, 1990. Senator Enrile was taken to and
held overnight at the NBI Headquarters on Taft Ave., Manila,
WITHOUT BAIL, NONE HAVING BEEN RECOMMENDED IN THE INFORMATION AND
NONE FIXED IN THE WARRANT OF ARREST.
On February 28, 1990, petitioner through counsel filed a
petition for Habeas Corpus alleging that he was deprived of his
constitutional rights in being, or having been:
a. held to answer for a criminal offense which does not exist in
the statute books;
b. charged with a criminal offense in an information for which
no complaint was initially filed or preliminary investigation was
conducted, hence, he was denied due process;
c. denied the right to bail; and
d. arrested or detained on the strength of warrant issued
without the judge who issued it first having personally determined
the existence of probable cause.
HELD:
The parties oral and written arguments presented the following
options:
1. Abandon the Hernandez Doctrine and adopt the dissenting
opinion of Justice Montemayor that rebellion cannot absorb more
serious crimes;
2. Hold Hernandez Doctrine applicable only to offenses committed
in furtherance, or as necessary means for the commission, of
rebellion, BUT NOT TO ACTS COMMITTED IN THE COURSE OF A REBELLION
WHICH ALSO CONSTITUTE COMMON CRIMES OF GRAVE OR LESS GRAVE
CHARACTER;
3. Maintain Hernandez Doctrine as applying to make rebellion
absorb all other offenses committed in its course, whether or not
necessary to its commission or in furtherance thereof.
1. On the first option, 11 justices voted AGAINST abandoning
Hernandez. Two members felt that the doctrine should be
re-examined. In view of the majority, THE RULING REMAINS GOOD LAW,
ITS SUBSTANTIVE AND LEGAL BASES HAVE WITHSTOOD ALL SUBSEQUENT
CHALLENGES AND NO NEW ONES ARE PRESENTED HERE PERSUASIVE ENOUGH TO
WARRANT A COMPLETE REVERSAL. This is so because of the fact that
the incumbent President (exercising legislative powers under the
1986 Freedom Constitution) repealed PD No. 942 which added a new
provision of the Revised Penal Code, particularly Art. 142-A which
sought to nullify if not repealed the Hernandez Doctrine. In thus
acting, the President in effect by legislative fiat reinstated the
Hernandez as a binding doctrine with the effect of law. The Court
can do no less than accord it the same recognition, absent any
sufficiently powerful reason against so doing.
2. On the second option, the Supreme Court was unanimous in
voting to reject the same though four justices believe that the
arguments in support thereof is not entirely devoid of merit.
3. With the rejection of the first two options, the Hernandez
Doctrine remains a binding doctrine operating to prohibit the
complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on the
occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to its commission or
as unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion.
On the issues raised by the petitioner:
a. By a vote of 11-3, the Court ruled that the information filed
against the petitioner does in fact charge an offense despite the
objectionable phrasing that would complex rebellion with murder and
multiple frustrated murder, that indictment is to be read as
charging SIMPLE REBELLION. The petitioners contention that he was
charged with a crime that does not exist in the statute books,
WHILE TECHNICALLY CORRECT SO FAR AS THE COURT RULED THAT REBELLION
MAY NOT BE COMPLEXED WITH OTHER OFFENSES COMMITTED ON THE OCCASION
THEREOF, MUST THEREFORE BE DISMISSED AS A MERE FLIGHT OF RHETORIC.
Read in the context of Hernandez, the information does indeed
charge the petitioner with a crime defined and punished by the
Revised Penal Code: SIMPLE REBELLION.
b. Was the petitioner charged without a complaint having been
initially filed and/or preliminary investigation conducted? The
record shows that a complaint for simple rebellion against
petitioner was filed by the NBI Director and that based on the
strength of said complaint a preliminary investigation was
conducted by the respondent prosecutors culminating in the filing
of the questioned information. THERE IS NOTHING INHERENTLY
IRREGULAR OR CONTRARY TO LAW IN FILING AGAINST A RESPONDENT AN
INDUCTMENT FOR AN OFFENSE DIFFERENT FROM WHAT IS CHARGED IN THE
INITIATORY COMPLAINT, IF WARRANTED BY THE EVIDENCE DEVELOPED DURING
THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION.
c. The petitioner claims that the warrant issued is void because
it was issued barely one hour and twenty minutes after the case was
raffled to the respondent judge which could hardly gave him
sufficient time to personally go over the voluminous records of the
preliminary investigation. Also, the petitioner claims that the
respondent judge issued the warrant for his arrest without first
personally determining the existence of probable cause by examining
under oath or affirmation the complainant and his witnesses, in
violation of Art. III, Section 2, of the Constitution. This Court
has already ruled that it is not unavoidable duty of the judge to
make such a personal examination, it being sufficient that he
follows established procedure by PERSONALLY EVALUATING THE REPORT
AND THE SUPPORTING DOCUMENT SUBMITTED BY THE PROSECUTOR. MEREBY
BECAUSE SAID RESPONDENT JUDGE HAD WHAT SOME MIGHT CONSIDER ONLY A
RELATIVELY BRIEF PERIOD WITHIN WHICH TO COMPLY WITH THAT DUTY ,
GIVES NO REASON TO ASSUME THAT HE HAD NOT, OR COULD NOT HAVE, SO
COMPLIED; NOR DOES THAT SINGLE CIRCUMSTANCE SUFFICE TO OVERCOME THE
LEGAL PRESUMPTION THAT OFFICIAL DUTY HAS BEEN REGULARLY
PERFORMED.
d. Petitioner also claims that he is denied of his
constitutional right to bail. In the light of the Courts
affirmation of Hernandez as applicable to petitioners case, and of
the logical and necessary corollary that the information against
him should be considered as charging only the crime of simple
rebellion which is bailable before conviction, THAT MUST NOW BE
ACCEPTED AS A CORRECT PROPOSITION.
NOTES:
This might be useful also in your Remedial Law.
Was a petition for Habeas Corpus before the Supreme Court the
appropriate vehicle for asserting a right to bail or vindicating
its denial?
The Supreme Court held that the criminal case before the
respondent judge is the normal venue for invoking the petitioners
right to have provisional liberty pending trial and judgment. The
correct course was for the petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction
by filing a petition to be admitted to bail, claiming a right to
bail per se or by reason of the weakness of the evidence against
him. ONLY AFTER THAT REMEDY WAS DENIED BY THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD
THE REVIEW JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT BE INVOKED, AND EVEN
THEN, NOT WITHOUT FIRST APPLYING TO THE COURT OF APPEALS IF
APPROPRIATE RELIEF WAS ALSO AVAILABLE THERE.
Even assuming that the petitioners premise that the information
charges a non-existent crime would not excuse or justify his
improper choice of remedies. Under either hypothesis, the obvious
recourse would have been a motion to quash brought in the criminal
action before the respondent judge.
g. Warrantless searches and seizureswhen valid or not. Is
Operation Kapkap valid?
Read:
PEOPLE VS. MENGOTE, G.R. No. 87059, June, 1992, 210 scra 174
Warrantless search and seizure
Cruz, J.
Facts:
1. On August 8, 1987, the Western Police District received a
telephone call from an informer that there were three
suspicious-looking persons at the corner of Juan Luna and North Bay
Blvd., in Tondo, Manila;
2. When the surveilance team arrived therein, they saw the
accused looking from side to side and holding his abdomen. They
approched these persons and identified themselves as policement
that is why they tried to ran away because of the other lawmen,
they were unable to escape;
3. After their arrest, a .38 cal. Smith and Wessor revolver was
confiscated from the accused and several days later, an information
for violation of PD 1866 was filed against him;
4. After trial, Mengote was convicted of having violated PD 1866
and was sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua based on the alleged
gun as the principal evidence. Hence this automatic appeal.
Issue:
Was there a valid warrantless search and seizure?
Held:
There is no question that evidence obtained as a result of an
illegal search or seizure is inadmissible in any proceeding for any
purpose. That is the absolute prohibition of Article III, Section 3
[2], of the Constitution. This is the celebrated exclusionary rule
based on the justification given by Justice Learned Hand that only
in case the prosecution, which itself controls the seizing
officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong will the
wrong be repressed.
Section 5, Article 113 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.- A peace officer or
private person may, without warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped
from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
x x x
We have carefully examined the wording of this Rule and cannot
see how we we can agree with the prosecution.
Par. (c) of Section 5 is obviously inapplicable as Mengote was
not an escapee from a penal institution when he was arrested. We
therefore confine ourselves to determining the lawfulness of his
arrest under either Par. (a) or Par. (b) of this Section.
Par. (a) requires that the person be arrested (1) after he has
committed or while he is actually committing or is at least
attempting to commit an offense, (2) in the presence of the
arresting officer.
These requirements have not been established in the case at bar.
At the time of the arrest in question, the accused-appellant was
merely looking from side to side and holding his abdomen, according
to the arresting officers themselves. There was apparently no
offense that had just been committed or was being actually
committed or at least being attempted by Mengote in thie
presence.
The Solicitor General submits that the actual existence of an
offense was not necessary as long as Mengotes acts created a
reasonable suspicion on the part of the arresting officers and
induced in them the belief that an offense had been committed and
that accused-appellant had committed it. The question is, What
offense? What offense could possibly have been suggested by a
person looking from side to side and holding his abdomen and in
aplace not exactly forsaken.
These are certainly not sinister acts. And the setting of the
arrest made them less so, if at all. It might have been different
if Mengote had been apprehended at an unholy hour and in a place
where he had no reason to be, like a darkened alley at 3 oclock in
the morning. But he was arrested at 11:30 in the morning and in a
crowded street shortly after alighting from a passenger jeep with
his companion.He was not skulking in the shadows but walking in the
clear light of day. There was nothing clandestine about his being
on that street at that busy hour in the blaze of the noonday
sun.
On the other hand, there could have been a number of reasons,
all of them innoent, why hiseyes were darting from side to sideand
he was holding his abdomen. If they excited suspicion in the minds
of the arresting officers, as the prosecution suggests, it has
nevertheless not been shown what their suspicion was all about.
x x x
The case before us is different because there was nothing to
support the arresting officers suspicion other than Mengotes
darting eyes and his hand on his abdomen. By no stretch of the
imagination could it have been inferred from these acts that an
offense had just been committed, or was actually being committed,
or was at least being attempted in their presence.
This is similar to PEOPLE vs. AMMINUIDIN, 163 SCRA 402 where the
Court held that a warrantless arrest of the accused was
unconstitutional. This was effected while he was coming down the
vessel, to all appearances no less innocent than the other
disembarking passengers. He had not committed nor was actually
committing or attempting to commit an offense in the presence of
the arresting officers. He was not even acting suspiciously. In
short, there was no probable cause that, as the prosecution
incorrectly suggested, dispensed with the constitutional
requirement of a warrant.
Par. (b) is no less applicable because its no less stringent
requirements have also not been satisfied. Theprosecution has not
shown that at the time of Mengotes arrest an offense had in fact
been committed and that the arresting officers had personal
knowldge of facts indicating that Mengote had committed it. All
they had was hearsay information from the telephone caller, and
about a crime that had yet to bem committed.
x x x
Before these events, the peace officers had no knowledge even of
Mengotes identity, let alone the fact that he was involved in the
robbery of Danganans house.
In the landmark case of People vs. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1, this
Court declared:
Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person
who has just committed, is committing, or is about to commit an
offense must have personalknowledge of that fact. The offense must
also be committed in his presence or within his view. (SAYO vs.
CHIEF OF POLICE, 80 Phil. 859).
x x x
In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b), however, it is
not enough that there is reasonable ground to believe that the
person to be arrested has committed a crime. A crime must in fact
or actually have been committed first. That a crime has actually
been committed is an essential precondition. It is not enough to
suspect that a crime may have been committed. The fact of the
commission of the offense must be undisputed. The test of
reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the
perpetrator..
This doctrine was affirmed in Alih vs. Castro, 151 SCRA 279,
thus:
If the arrest was made under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules
of Court in connection with a crime about to be committed, being
committed, or just committed, what was that crime? There is no
allegation in the record of such a falsification. Parenthetically,
it may be observed that under the Revised Rule 113, Section 5(b),
the officer making the arrest must have personal knowledge of the
ground therefor as stressed in the recent case of People vs.
Burgos.
It would be a sad day, indeed, if any person could be summarily
arrested and searched just because he is holding his abdomen, even
if it be possibly because of a stomach-ache, or if a peace officer
could clamp handcuffs on any person with a shifty look on suspicion
that he may have committed a criminal act is actually committing or
attempting it. This simply cannot be done in a free society. This
is not a police state where order is exalted over liberty or,
worse, personal malice on the part ofthe arresting officer may be
justified in the name of security.
x x x
The court feels that if the peace officers had been more mindful
of the provisions of the Bill of Rights, the prosecution of the
accused-appellant might have succeeded. As it happened, they
allowed their over zealousness to get the better of them, resulting
in their disregard of the requirements of a valid search and
seizure that rendered inadmissible the evidence they had invalidly
seized.
This should be a lesson to other peace officers. Their
impulsiveness may be the very cause of the acquittal of persons who
deserve to be convicted, escaping the clutches of the law, because,
ironically enough, it has not been observed by those who are
supposed to enforce it.
When illegal arrest is deemed waived.
Warrantless arrest; no personal knowledge of the arresting
officer
PEOPLE VS. GALVEZ, 355 SCRA 246
Mendoza, J.
The policeman arrested the accused-appellant on the basis solely
of what Reynaldo Castro had told him and not because he saw the
accused-appellant commit the crime charged against him. Indeed, the
prosecution admitted that there was no warrant of arrest issued
against accused-appellant when the latter was taken into custody.
Considering that the accused-appellant was not committing a crime
at the time he was arrested nor did the arresting officer have any
personal knowledge of facts indicating that accused-appellant
committed a crime, his arrest without a warrant cannot be
justified.
However, by entering a plea of not guilty during the
arraignment, the accused-appellant waived his right to raise the
issue of illegality of his arrest. IT IS NOW SETTLED THAT OBJECTION
TO A WARRANT OF ARREST OR THE PROCEDURE BY WHICH A COURT ACQUIRES
JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF AN ACCUSED MUST BE MADE BEFORE HE
ENTERS HIS PLEA, OTHERWISE, THE OBJECTION IS DEEMED WAIVED. THE
FACT THAT THE ARREST WAS ILLEGAL DOES NOT RENDER THE SUBSEQUENT
PROCEEDINGS VOID AND DEPRIVE THE STATE OF ITS RIGHT TO CONVICT THE
GUILTY WHEN ALL THE FACTS POINT TO THE CULPABILITY OF THE
ACCUSED.
g-1. Warrantless Search and seizure by a private person. (Valid
since the constitutional provision is not applicable to him; when
it is not valid)
Read:
1. PEOPLE VS. MENDOZA, 301 SCRA 66
Warrantless searches and seizures by private individuals
2. SILAHIS INTERNATIONAL HOTEL, INC. VS. ROGELIO SOLUTA, ET AL.,
482 SCRA 660
Carpio-Morales, J.
The petitioner suspects that the respondents who are officers of
the Silahis International Hotel Union were using the Union Office
located inside the hotel in the sale or use of marijuana, dollar
smuggling, and prostitution. They arrived at the said conclusion
through surveillance.
In the morning of January 11, 1988, while the respondent union
officer was opening the Union Office, security officers of the
plaintiff entered the union office despite objections thereto by
forcibly opening the same. Once inside the union office they
started to make searches which resulted in the confiscation of a
plastic bag of marijuana. An information for violation of the
dangerous drugs act was filed against the respondent before the RTC
of Manila which acquitted them on the ground that the search
conducted was illegal since it was warrantless and without consent
by the respondents.
After their acquittal, the respondents filed a case for
Malicious Prosecution against the petitioner for violation of Art.
32 of the Civil Code. After trial, the Regional Trial Court held
that petitioners are liable for damages as a result of an illegal
search. The same was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Issue:
Whether the warrantless search conducted by the petitioners
(private individual and corporation) on the union office of the
private respondents is valid.
Held:
The search is not valid and they are civilly liable under Art.
32 of the Civil Code. The fact that the union office is part of the
hotel owned by the petitioners does not justify the warrantless
search. The alleged reports that the said union office is being
used by the union officers for illegal activities does not justify
their acts of barging into the said office without the consent of
the union officers and without a search warrant. If indeed there
was surveillance made, then they should have applied for a search
warrant.
The ruling in People vs. Andre Marti is not applicable here
because in Marti, a criminal case, the issue was whether an act of
a private individual, allegedly in violation of ones constitutional
rights may be invoked against the State. In other words, the issue
in Marti is whether the evidence obtained by a private person
acting in his private capacity without the participation of the
State, is admissible.
3. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ANDRE MARTI
G.R. NO. 81561, January 18, 1991
Warrantless Search and seizure
by a private person
Bidin, J.
FACTS:
Andre Marti and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes went to
Manila Packaging and Export Forwarders to send four (4) packages to
Zurich, Switzerland. Anita Reyes, owner of the place (no relation
to Shirley), received said goods and asked if she could examine and
inspect it. Marti refused. However later, following standard
operating procedure, Job Reyes, co-owner and husband of Anita
opened the boxes for final inspection, before delivering it to the
Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts.
Upon opening, a peculiar odor emanated from the box that was
supposed to contain gloves. Upon further perusal, he felt and saw a
dried leaves inside the box. Job Reyes then brought samples to the
NBI, he told them that the boxes to be shipped were still in his
office. In the presence of the NBI agents, Reyes opened the box and
discovered that the odor came from the fact that the dried leaves
were actually those of the marijuana flowering tops.
Two other boxes,marked as containing books and tabacalera
cigars; also revealed bricks or case-like marijuana leaves and
dried marijuana leaves respectively.
Marti was later invited by the NBI to shed light on the
attempted shipment of the dried leaves. Thereafter an information
was filed against the appellant for violating RA 6425 or the
Dangerous Drugs Act. The Special Criminal Court of Manila convicted
accused Marti of violating sec.21(b) of said RA.
ISSUES:
1. Did the search conducted by a private person, violate
accuseds right against unreasonable searches seizures and invocable
against the state?
2. Was the evidence procured from the search admissible?
Held:
1. No, constitutional protection on search and seizure is
imposable only against the state and not to private persons.
Since Art. III,2 of the 1987 constitution is almost verbatim
from the United States constitution, the SC may consider US Fed. SC
cases as likewise doctrinal in this jurisdiction. Hence, in US
cases, the constitutional provision against unreasomable searches
and seizure was intended as a restraint upon the activities of the
sovereign authority and NOT intended against private persons. If a
search was initiated by a private person the provision does not
apply since it only proscribes government action. This view is
supported by the deliberations by the 1986 Constitutional
Commission.
In short, the protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures cannot be extended to acts comitted by private individuals
so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful
intrusion.
Case at bar will show that it was Job Reyes` initiative that
perpetrated the search. He opened the packages and took the samples
to NBI. All the NBI agents did was to observe and look in plain
sight. This did not convert it to a search as contemplated by the
constitution.
2. Yes, since the search was valid, the evidence from therein is
admissible evidence.
Art.III [2], on the admissibility of evidence in violation of
the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, likewise
applies only to the government and its agencies and not to private
persons.
(U.S. cases cited: Burdeau v. McDowell (256 us 465 [1921], state
v. Bryan (457 p 2d 661 [1968], Walker v. state (429 s.w 2d 121
[1969]), Barnes v. us (373 F 2d 517 [1967]), Chadwick v. state (329
sw 2d 135).
VALID WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND SEIZURE:
1. Search made incidental to a valid arrest
a. Moreno vs. Ago Chi, 12 Phil. 439
b. PEOPLE VS. ANG CHUN KIT, 251 SCRA 660
c. PEOPLE VS. LUA, 256 SCRA 539
d. PEOPLE VS. Figueroa, 248 SCRA 679
e. NOLASCO VS. PANO, 139 SCRA 541 (A search incidental to a
valid arrest must be done at the place where the accused is
arrested. As such, if accused was arrested while inside a jeepney,
there is no valid search incidental to a valid arrest if she will
be brought to her residence and thereafter search the said
place)
f. ESPANO VS. CA, 288 SCRA 588 (If the accused was arrested in
the street during a buy-bust operation, the search of his house
nearby is not a valid search incidental to a valid arrest)
PEOPLE VS. GO, 354 SCRA 338Where the gun tucked in a persons
waist is plainly visible to the police, no search warrant is
necessary and in the absence of any license for said firearm, he
may be arrested at once as he is in effect committing a crime in
the presence of the police officers. No warrant is necessary in
such a situation, it being one of the recognized exceptions under
the Rules.
As a consequence of the accuseds valid warrantless arrest inside
the nightclub, he may be lawfully searched for dangerous weapons or
anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an
offense, without a search warrant in accordance with Section 12,
Rule 126. This is a valid search incidental to a lawful arrest.
In fact, the subsequent discovery in his car which was parked in
a distant place from where the illegal possession of firearm was
committed [after he requested that he will bring his car to the
Police Station after his warrantless arrest) , of a drug
paraphernalia and shabu, CANNOT BE SAID TO HAVE BEEN MADE DURING AN
ILLEGAL SEARCH. As such, the items do not fall under the
exclusionary rule and the unlicensed firearms, drug paraphernalia
and the shabu, can be used as evidence against the accused.
2. Search of moving vehicles
a. Carrol vs. US, 267 US 132
b. PEOPLE VS. LO HO WING, et al.
(G. R. No. 88017) January 21, 1991
c. MUSTANG LUMBER VS. CA, 257 SCRA 430
d. PEOPLE VS. CFI, 101 SCRA 86
e. PEOPLE VS. MALMSTEDT198 SCRA 401
f. PEOPLE VS. LO HO WING, 193 SCRA 122
FACTS:
In July 1987, the Special Operations Group of the CIS received a
tip from one of its informers about an organized group engaged in
importation of illegal drugs and smuggling of contraband items. To
infiltrate the crime syndicate, they recruited confidential men and
deep penetration agents under OPLAN SHARON 887. One such agent was
Reynaldo Tia (the dicharged/accused). As an agent, he submitted
regular reports of undercover activities of suspected syndicates.
CAPTAIN PALMERA, head of oplan sharon 887, in turned informed the
Dan
gerous Drugs Board of Tias activities.
Tia was introduced to his co-accused Lim Cheng Huat by another
agent named George. Lim wanted a male travelling companion for his
business trips abroad. Tia offered his services and was hired by
Lim. Later, Tia was introduced to Peter Lo (alias of
accused/appellant Lo Ho Wing), the later turning out to be Tias
intended companion.
Appellant Lo Ho Wing and Tia left for Hongkong on October 4,
1987. Tia telephoned Capt. Palmera that they would return to the
Philippines on October 6. From Hongkong, the two proceeded to
Guangzhou in mainland China. There, appeallant Lo Ho Wing bought
six (6) cans of tea.Tia saw these 6 bags when they were opened for
examination. That evening, they went to Lo Ho Wings room and he saw
two other men with him. One was fixing the tea bags, while the
other was burning a substance on a piece of aluminum foil using a
lighter. Appellant Lo Ho Wing joined the second man and sniffed the
smoke emitted by the burning substance. When Tia asked Lo Ho Wing
what cargo they would bring to Manila, the latter replied that they
would be bringing Chinese drugs.
The next day en route to Manila, customs examiners inspected the
bags containing the tin cans of tea. Since the bags were not
closely examined, appellant Lo Ho Wing and Tia were cleared. In
Manila, They were met by Lim Cheng Huat. Appelant Lo Ho Wing and
Tia boarded a taxi from the airport and loaded their luggage in the
taxis compartment. Lim Cheng Huat followed them in another
taxi.
Meamwhile, a team composed by Capt. Palmera positioned
themselves in strategic areas around the airport. The CIS men who
first saw Lo Ho and Tia followed them. Along Imelda Avenue, the CIS
car overtook the taxi ridden by Lo Ho Wing and Tia , forcing the
taxi driver to stop his vehicle. The CIS team asked the taxi driver
to open the baggage compartment. The CIS team asked permission to
search their luggage.
A tin can of tea was taken out of the compartment. Sgt. Cayabyab
of the CIS pried the lid open and pressed it in the middle to pull
out the contents. Crystalline white powder resmbling crushed alum
came out. Suspecting the crystalline powder to be a dangerous drug,
he had the three travelling bags opened for inspection. All the
bags threshed out a total of six tin cans. Tia and appellant were
taken to the CIS headquarters for questioning. Meanwhile, the
second taxi carrying Lim Cheng Huat sped in attempt to escape.
However, they were later captured.
Samples from the bag tested positive for metamphetamine. The
three suspects were indicted for violating Art. III, sec.15 of the
Dangerous Drug Act. Appellant Lo Ho Wing and Lim Cheng Huat were
sentenced to suffer life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P25,000
each. Reynaldo Tia was discharged as a state witness. The trial
court gave full credence to the testimonies of government agents
since the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duties were in their favor.
ISSUES:
1. Was the warrantless search valid?
2. Are the effects taken admissible as evidence?
HELD:
1. This is a case of search on a moving vehicle which is one of
the well-known exceptions to the valid warrantless search and
seizure. To stilol get a search warrant from a judge would allow
the accused go scot-free.
2. Since the search and seizure are valid, the evidence obtained
is admissible as evidence in any proceeding.
3. Seizure of goods concealed to avoid duties/taxes (Valid)
a. Papa vs. Mago, 22 SCRA 857
b. Pacis vs. Pamaran, 56 SCRA 16
c. HIZON VS. CA, 265 SCRA 517
d. PEOPLE VS. QUE, 265 SCRA 721
4. Seize of evidence in plain view
a. Harris vs. US, 390 US 234
b. PEOPLE VS. DAMASO, 212 SCRA 547
c. PEOPLE VS. VELOSO, 252 SCRA 135
d. PEOPLE VS. LESANGIN, 252 SCRA 213
5. When there is waiver of right or gives his consent;
a. De Garcia vs. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689
b. Lopez vs. Commissioner, 65 SCRA 336
c. PEOPLE VS. DAMASO, 212 SCRA (In order that there is a valid
waiver to a warrantless search, the waiver or consent should be
given by the person affected, not just anybody. Example: The
landlady could not give a valid consent to the search of a room
occupied by a tenant. Said tenant himself should give the consent
in order to be valid. The doctrine in Lopez vs. Commissioner to the
effect that it could be given by any occupant of a hotel room being
rented by the respondent is deemed abandoned)
d. VEROY VS. LAYAGUE, 210 SCRA 97. (If the owner of the house
allowed the policemen to enter his house because they are searching
for rebel soldiers but when inside the house, they instead seized
an unlicensed firearm, there is no consent to a warrantless
search)
6. STOP AND FRISK.
a. People vs. Mengote, June, 1992
b. PEOPLE VS. POSADAS, 188 SCRA 288
c. MANALILI VS. PEOPLE, October 9, 1997. (The policemen saw
several suspicious looking men at dawn who ran when they went near
them. As the policemen ran after them, an unlicensed firearm was
confiscated. The search is valid)
d. MALACAT VS. CA, 283 SCRA 159. (Mere suspicions not sufficient
to validate warrantless arrest)
6. EDDIE GUAZON, ET AL. VS. MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, ET AL.,
GR NO. 80508, January 30, 1990
Warrantless searches;
zonings and saturation drives
Section 17, Art. VII of the Constitution
Gutierrez, Jr., J.
Facts:
This is a petition for Prohibition with preliminary injunction
to prohibit military and police officers from conducting Areal
target zonings or saturation drive in Metro Manila particularly in
places where they suspect that the subversives are hiding. The 41
petitioners claim that the saturation drives conducted by the
military is in violation of their human rights because with no
specific target house in mind, in the dead of the night or early
morning hours, police and military officers without any search
warrant cordon an area of more than one residence and sometimes the
whole barangay. Most of them are in civilian clothes and w/o
nameplates or identification cards; that the raiders rudely rouse
residents from their sleep by banging on the walls and windows of
their homes, shouting, kicking their doors open (destroying some)
and ordering the residents to come out; the residents are herded
like cows at the point of high powered guns, ordered to strip down
to their briefs and examined for tattoo marks; that while
examination of the bodies of the men are being conducted, the other
military men conduct search and seizures to each and every house
without civilian witnesses from the neighbors; some victims
complained that their money and other valuables were lost as a
result of these illegal operations.
The respondents claim that they have legal authority to conduct
saturation drives under Art. VII, Sec. 17 of the Constitution which
provides:
The respondents would want to justify said military operation on
the following constitutional provisions:
The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all the armed
forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may
call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion
x x x x x x
The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws are
faithfully executed.
Held:
There can be no question that under ordinary circumstances, the
police action of the nature described by the petitioners would be
illegal and blatantly violative of the Bill of Rights. If the
military wants to flush out subversive and criminal elements, the
same must be consistent with the constitutional and statutory
rights of the people. However, nowhere in the Constitution can we
see a provision which prohibits the Chief Executive from ordering
the military to stop unabated criminality, rising lawlessness and
alarming communist activities. However, all police actions are
governed by the limitations of the Bill of Rights. The government
cannot adopt the same reprehensible methods of authoritarian
systems both of the right and of the left. This is so because Art.
III, Section 3 of the Constitution is very clear as explained in
Roan vs. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687 and Century Fox vs. Court of
Appeals, 164 SCRA 655. Also, it must be pointed out that police
actions should not be characterized by methods that offend ones
sense of justice (Rochin vs. California, 342 US 165).
The Court believes it highly probable that some violations were
actually committed. But the remedy is not to stop all police
actions, including the essential and legitimate ones. A show of
force is sometimes necessary as long as the rights of people are
protected and not violated. However, the remedy of the petitioners
is not an original action for prohibition since not one victim
complains and not one violator is properly charged. It is basically
for the executive department and the trial courts. The problem is
appropriate for the Commission of Human Rights.
The petition was therefore remanded to the Regional Trial Courts
of Manila, Malabon and Pasay City where the petitioners may present
evidence supporting their allegations so that the erring parties
may be pinpointed and prosecuted. In the meantime, the acts
violative of human rights alleged by the petitioners as committed
during the police actions are ENJOINED until such time as permanent
rules to govern such actions are promulgated.
********************
Cruz, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ. , Dissenting
The ruling of the majority that the petitioners are not proper
parties is a specious pretext for inaction. We have held that
technical objections may be brushed aside where there are
constitutional questions that must be met (RODRIGUEZ VS. GELLA, 92
PHIL. 603; TOLENTINO VS. COMELEC, 41 SCRA 702; PHILCONSA VS.
JIMENEZ, 65 SCRA 479; EDU VS. ERICTA, 35 SCRA 481; GONZALES VS.
COMELEC, 27 SCRA 835; LAGUNZAD VS. CA, 154 SCRA 199; DEMETRIA VS.
ALBA,148 SCRA 208). Lozada was in fact an aberration.
Where liberty is involved, every person is a proper party even
if he may not be directly injured. Each of us has a duty to protect
liberty and that alone makes him a proper party. It is not only the
owner of a burning house who has the right to call the firemen.
Section 2, Art. III of the constitution is very clear:
Unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
whatever purpose is prohibited.
Saturation drives are NOT AMONG THE ACCEPTED INSTANCES WHEN A
SEARCH OR AN ARREST MAY BE MADE WITHOUT A WARRANT. THEY COME UNDER
THE CONCEPT OF THE FISHING EXPEDITIONS STIGMATIZED BY LAW AND
DOCTRINE X X X I submit that this court should instead
categorically and emphatically that these saturation drives are
violative of human rights and individual liberty and should be
stopped immediately. While they may be allowed in the actual
theater of military operations against the insurgents, the Court
should also make it clear that Metro Manila is not such a
battleground.
7. IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ROBERTO
UMIL, ROLANDO DURAL and RENATO VILLANUEVA. MANOLITA UMIL and
NICANOR DURAL, FELICITAS SESE VS. FIDEL RAMOS, ET AL. and companion
cases, G.R. No. 81567, July 9, 1990 (An NPA may be arrested without
warrant while sleeping or being treated in a hospital because his
being a communist rebel is a continuing crime)
h. If the judge finds that theres probable cause, must he issue
a warrant of arrest as a matter of course? See the
distinctions.
Read:
1. SAmulde vs. Salvani, September 26, 1988 (No because a warrant
is issued in order to have jurisdiction of the court over the
person of an accused and to assure the court of his presence
whenever his case is called in court. As such, if the court
believes that the presence of the accused could be had even without
a warrant of arrest, then he may not issue said warrant. Note: This
case involves a minor offense)
2. GOZO VS. TAC-AN, 300 SCRA 265. If the offense committed is a
serious one like that obtaining in this case for murder, the Judge
must issue a warrant of arrest after determining the existence of
probable cause)
i. Searching questions
Read:
DR. NEMESIO PRUDENTE VS. THE HON. EXECUTIVE JUDGE ABELARDO M.
DAYRIT, RTC 33, Manila & People of the Philippines, GR No.
82870, December 14, 1989 (En Banc)
Search and seizure; requirements/requisites of a valid search
warrant; searching questions
Padilla, J.
This is a petition to annul and set aside the Order of
respondent Judge DENYING the motion of the petitioner to quash
Search Warrant No. 87-14 as well as its Order denying the
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
Facts:
1. On October 31, 1987, P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw, Chief of the
Intelligence Special Action Division (ISAD) of the Western Police
District (WPD) filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 33, presided by the respondent Judge, an application for the
issuance of a Search Warrant for violation of PD 1866 against the
petitioner;
2. In his application for search warrant, P/Major Dimagmaliw
alleged that:
1. That he has been informed and has good and sufficient reasons
to believe that NEMESIO PRUDENTE who may be found at the
Polytechnic University of the Philippines x x x has in his control
or possession firearms, explosives, hand grenades and ammunition
intended to be used as the means of committing an offense x x
x;
2. That the undersigned has verified the report and found it to
be a fact x x x .
In support of said application, P/Lt. Florencio Angeles executed
a Deposition of Witness dated October 31, 1987 .
3. On November 1, 1987, a Sunday and All Saints Day, the search
warrant was enforced by some 200 WPD operatives led by Col. Edgar
Dula Torre and Major Maganto;
4. On November 2, 1987, Ricardo Abando, a member of the
searching team executed an affidavit alleging that he found in the
drawer of a cabinet inside the wash room of Dr. Prudentes office a
bulging brown envelope with three live fragmentation hand grenades
separately with old newspapers;
5. On November 6, 1987, the petitioner moved to quash the search
warrant on the grounds that:
a. the complainants lone witness, Lt. Angeles had no personal
knowledge of the facts which formed the basis for the issuance of
the search warrant;
b. the examination of said witness was not in the form of
searching questions and answers;
c. the search warrant was a general warrant, for the reason that
it did not particularly describe the place to be searched and that
it failed to charge one specific offense; and
d. the warrant was issued in violation of Circular No. 19 of the
Supreme Court in that the complainant failed to allege that the
issuance of the search warrant on a Saturday was urgent.
6. On March 9, 1986, the respondent judge denied the motion to
quash and on April 20, 1988, the same judge denied petitioners
motion for reconsideration. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Was the Search Warrant issued by the respondent judge valid? Was
there probable cause?
Held:
a. For a valid search warrant to issue, there must be probable
cause, which is to be determined by the judge, after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized. The probable cause must be
in connection with one specific offense and the judge must, before
issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching
questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, on facts personally known to them
and attach to the record their sworn statements together with any
affidavits submitted.
The probable cause for a valid search warrant, has been defined
as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed, and that the objects sought in connection with the
offense are in the place sought to be searched. (Quintero vs. NBI,
June 23, 1988). This probable cause must be shown to be within the
personal knowledge of the complainant or the witnesses he may
produce and not based on mere hearsay. (P. VS. SY JUCO, 64 PHIL.
667; ALVAREZ VS. CFI, 64 PHIL. 33; US VS. ADDISON, 28 PHIL.
566).
In his affidavit, Major Dimagmaliw declared that he has been
informed that Nemesio Prudente has in his control and possession
the firearms and explosivees described therein, and that he has
verified the report and found it to be a fact. On the other hand,
Lt. Angeles declared that as a result of continuous surveillance
for several days, they gathered informations from verified sources
that the holders of said firearms and explosives are not licensed t
possess them. It is clear from the foregoing that the applicant and
his witness HAD NO PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE FACTS AND
CIRCUMSTANCES which became the basis for issuing the questioned
search warrant, but acquired knowledge thereof only through
information from other sources or persons.
Despite the fact that Major Dimagmaliw stated in his affidavit
that he verified the information he had earlier received and found
it to be a fact, YET THERE IS NOTHING IN THE RECORD TO SHOW OR
INDICATE HOW AND WHEN SAID APPLICANT VERIFIED THE EARLIER
INFORMATION ACQUIRED BY HIM AS TO JUSTIFY HIS CONCLUSION. He might
have clarified this point if there had been searching questions and
answers, but there were none. In fact, the records yield no
questions and answers, whether searching or not, vis-a-vis the said
applicant.
In ALVAREZ VS. CFI, 64 PHIL. 33, it was held that the following
test must be complied with in an application for search warrant or
in a supporting deposition based on personal knowledge or not-
The true test of sufficiency of a deposition or affidavit to
warrant issuance of a search warrant is whether it was drawn in a
manner that perjury could be charged thereon and the affiant be
held liable for damage caused. The oath required must refer to the
truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant
of a search warrant and/or his witnesses, not of the facts merely
reported by a person whom one considers to be reliable.
Tested by the above standards, the allegation of the witness,
Lt. Angeles, do not come up to the level of facts based on his
personal knowledge so much so that he cannot be held liable for
perjury for such allegations in causing the issuance of the
questioned search warrant.
Besides, respondent judge did not take the deposition of the
applicant as required by the Rules of Court. As held in Roan vs.
Gonzales, 145 SCRA 694, mere affidavits of the complainant and his
witnesses are thus insufficient. The examining judge has to take
the depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce and attach them to the record.
b. There was also no searching questions asked by the respondent
judge because as shown by the record, his questions were too brief
and short and did not examine the complainant and his witnesses in
the form of searching questions and answers. On the contrary, the
questions asked were leading as they called for a simple yes or no
answer. As held in Quintero vs. NBI, June 23, 1988, the questions
propounded are not sufficiently searching to establish probable
cause. Asking of leading questions to the deponent in an
application for search warrant and conducting of examination in a
general manner would not satisfy the requirements for the issuance
of a valid search warrant.
The Court avails of this decision to reiterate the strict
requirements for determination of probable cause in the valid
issuance of a search warrant as enunciated in earlier cases. True,
this requirements are stringent but the purpose is to assure that
the constitutional right of the individual against unreasonable
search and seizure shall remain both meaningful and effective.
c. The rule is, that a description of a place to be searched is
sufficient if the officer with the warrant can with reasonable
effort ascertain and identify the place intended (P VS. VELOSO, 48
PHIL. 180). In the case at bar, the warrant described the place to
be searched as the premises of the PUP, more particularly the
offices of the Department of Science and Tactics as well as the
Office of the President, Nemesio Prudente.
There is also no violation of the one specific offense
requirement considering that the application for a search warrant
explicitly described the offense: illegal possession of firearms
and ammunitions under PD 1866.
d. CIRCULAR NO. 19 OF THE SUPREME COURT merely provides for a
guideline, departure from which would not necessarily affect the
validity of the search warrant provided the constitutional
requirements are complied with.
a. HUBERT WEBB VS. DE LEON, 247 SCRA 650
Read also:
1. Alvarez vs. CFI, 64 Phil. 33 (When the applicant is basing
his knowledge from an informant, the same is not valid)
2. Luna vs. Plaza, 26 SCRA 313
3. De Mulata vs. Irizari, 62 SCRA 210
4. Marinas vs. Siochi, 104 SCRA 423
5. Roan vs. Gonzales, 145 687
6. Mata vs. Bayona, 128 SCRA 388 (Depositions of the applicants
and witnesses should be attached to the record of the case)
7. Corro vs. Lising, 137 SCRA 541
8. Nolasco vs Pano, 147 SCRA 509
9. Burgos vs. Chief of Staff, 133 SCRA 800
10. P. vs. Burgos, September 14,1986
11. P. vs. Aminnudin Y Ahni, July 6,1988
12. Ponsica vs. Ignalaga, July 31,1987 (When the statements in
the affidavits of witnesses are mere generalities, mere conclusions
of law, and not positive statements of particular acts, the warrant
is not valid)
13. Aberca vs. Ver, April 15,1988
2. Panganiban vs. Cesar, 159 SCRA 599
3. PENDON VS. CA, November 16, 1990. (When the questions asked
to the applicant for a search warrant was pre-typed, the same is
not valid since there could have been no searching questions)
j. Warrantless searches and seizureswhen valid or not.
Read:
1. RICARDO VALMONTE VS. GEN RENATO DE VILLA, GR No. 83988,
September 29, 1989
Warrantless searches and seizures;
validity of checkpoints
Padilla, J.
Facts:
1. On January 20, 1987, the National Capital Region District
Command (NCRDC) was activated with the mission of conducting
security operations within its area of responsibility for the
purpose of maintaining peace and order. As part of its duty to
maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in
various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
Petitioners claim that because of these checkpoints, the
residents of Valenzuela, MM are worried of being harassed and of
their safety being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and
whimsical disposition of the military authorities manning the
checkpoints considering that their cars and vehicles are being
subjected to regular searches and check-ups, especially at night or
dawn, without the benefit of a search warrant and/or court
order.
2. On July 9, 1988 at dawn, the apprehensions of the residents
of Valenzuela increased because Benjamin Parpon, the supply officer
of the Municipality of Valenzuela was gunned down in cold blood by
the military men manning the checkpoints for ignoring or refusing
to submit himself to the checkpoint and for continuing to speed off
inspite of several warning shots fired in the air.
Issue:
Whether or not the existence of said checkpoints as well as the
periodic searches and seizures made by the military authorities
without search warrant valid?
Held:
Petitioners concern for their safety and apprehension at being
harassed by the military manning the checkpoints are not sufficient
grounds to declare the checkpoints as per se illegal.
Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are
reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be
determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to
the facts of each case.
Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain
of a vacant vehicle which is parked on a public fair grounds
(People vs. Case, 190 MW 289), or simply looks into a vehicle
(State vs. Gaina, 97 SE 62), or flashes a light therein (Rowland
vs. Commonwealth, 259 SW 33), these do not constitute unreasonable
search.
The setting up of checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila may be
considered as security measure to effectively maintain peace and
order and to thwart plots to destabilize the government. In this
connection, the Court may take judicial notice of the shift to
urban centers and their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so
clearly reflected in the increased killings in cities of police and
military men by NPAs sparrow units, not to mention the abundance of
unlicensed firearms.
BETWEEN THE INHERENT RIGHT OF THE STATE TO PROTECT ITS EXISTENCE
AND PROMOTE PUBLIC WELFARE AND AN INDIVIDUALS RIGHT AGAINST A
WARRANTLESS SEARCH WHICH IS HOWEVER REASONABLY CONDUCTED, THE
FORMER SHALL PREVAIL.
True, the manning of these checkpoints by the military is
susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform, in the same manner that
all governmental power is susceptible to abuse. BUT , AT THE COST
OF OCCASIONAL INCONVENIENCE, DISCOMFORT AND EVEN IRRITATION TO THE
CITIZEN, THE CHECKPOINTS DURING THESE ABNORMAL TIMES ARE PART OF
THE PRICE WE PAY FOR AN ORDERLY SOCIETY AND PEACEFUL COMMUNITY.
Finally, it must be emphasized that on July 17, 1988, the
military checkpoints in Metro Manila were temporarily lifted and a
review and refinement of the rules in the conduct of the police and
military manning the checkpoints upon order of the NCRDC Chief.
Cruz and Sarmiento, JJ., dissenting:
The bland declaration by the majority that individual rights
must yield to the demands of national security ignores the fact
that the Bill of Rights was intended precisely to limit the
authority of the State even if asserted on the ground of national
security.
RESOLUTION ON THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, JUNE 15, 1990
Very Important:
The Supreme Court in its Resolution of the Motion for
Reconsideration dated 15 June, 1990, held that military and police
checkpoints are not illegal as these measures to protect the
government and safeguards the lives of the people. The checkpoints
are legal as where the survival of the organized government is on
the balance, or where the lives and safety of the people are in
grave peril. However, the Supreme Court held further that the
military officers manning the checkpoints may conduct VISUAL SEARCH
ONLY, NOT BODILY SEARCH.
Read also the RESOLUTION ON THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION dated
JUNE 15, 1990, 185 SCRA 665
Read also:
1-a. Rizal Alih vs. Gen. Castro, June 23,1987
1-b. P s. Cendana, October 17, 1990
1-c. P. vs. Castiller, August 6, 1990
1-d. P. vs. Olaes, July 30, 1990
2. Papa vs. Mago, 22 SCRA 857
3. Roldan vs. Arca, 65 SCRA 336
4. P. vs. CFI, 101 SCRA 86
5. Pacis vs. Pamaran, 56 SCRA 16
6. Lopez vs. Commisioner, 65 SCRA 336
7. P vs. Cruz, 165 SCRA 135
8. Nolasco vs. Pano, 147 SCRA 509 & 139 SCRA 152
9. P vs. Claudio, 160 SCRA 646 (There is a valid warrantless
search if a NARCOM officer arrests the person who owns a bag which
contains marijuana which he found out when he smelled the same.
Here , there is a probable cause since he was personal knowledge
due to his expertise on drugs)
2. PEOPLE VS. DEL ROSARIO, July 10, 1994. (After the informant
was given by the police the amount of P100.00, he went to buy
marijuana from the accused then return to the police headquarters
with said article. Thereafter, the policemen went to arrest the
accused without warrant. The arrest is not valid since it does not
fall under Section 5 Rule 113)
Likewise, after securing a search warrant authorizing the
seizure of shabu and its paraphernalia and instead, an unlicensed
firearm was seized instead, said gun is inadmissible in
evidence.
k. May a non-judicial officer issue a warrant of arrest?
(NO)
Read:
1. Harvey vs. Miriam Defensor-Santiago, June 26,1988
2. Moreno vs. Vivo, 20 SCRA 562
3. Lim vs. Ponce de Leon, 66 SCRA 299
4. HORTENCIA SALAZAR VS. HON TOMAS ACHACOSO, G.R. NO. 81510,
March 14, 1990 (En banc)
5. Presidential Anti_Dollar Salting Task Force vs. CA, March 16,
1989
l. Properties subject to seizure
Read:
1. Sec. 2, Rule 126,1985 Rules on Crimial Procedure, as
amended
2. ESPANO VS. CA, 288 SCRA 558
m. Warrantless searches and arrests
Read:
1. P. vs. Bati, August 27, 1990
1-a. Manuel et al., vs. Judge Tirso Velasco, GR No. 84666,
February 9, 1989
1-b. Garcia-Padilla vs. Enrile,121 SCRA 47 & 137 SCRA
647
1-c. P. vs. Maspil, Jr., August 20, 1990 (Compare with P. vs.
Aminnudin, July 6, 1988, supra)
1-d. Posadas vs. CA, Aug. 2, 1990
1-e. P. vs. De la Cruz
1-f. P. vs. ortiz, Dec. 3, 1990
1-g. Rolito Go vs. CA, Feb. 11, 1992
1-h. People vs. Mati, January 18, 1991
2. Morales vs. Ponce Enrile, 121 SCRA 538
2-a. P vs. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1
2-b. People vs. de la Cruz, 184 SCRA 416
2-c. Gatchalian vs. Board, May 31, 1991
2-d. People vs. Sucro, March 18, 1991
2-e. PEOPLE VS. SOLAYAO, 262 SCRA 255
2-f. PEOPLE VS. CUISON, 256 SCRA 325
2-g. PEOPLE VS. DAMASO, 212 SCRA 547
2-h. OPOSADAS VS. CA, 258 SCRA 188
2-i. PEOPLE VS. JUATAN, 260 SCRA 532 (Buy-bust operation)
3. Sec. 6, Rule 113, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as
amended
n. Effect posting bail or entering a plea during the
arraignment, if the arrest was illegal. (The alleged illegality of
the arrest is deemed waived upon posting of the bond by the
accused)
PEOPLE VS. GALVEZ, 355 SCRA 246
Mendoza, J.
The policeman arrested the accused-appellant on the basis solely
of what Reynaldo Castro had told him and not bec