Constitutional Law 1

Subject: Constitutional LawTopic: The Concept of the StateTitle: Province of North Cotabato vs. RepublicCitation: G.R. No. 183591, October 14, 2008

Facts:

On 8 August 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP), represented by the GRP Peace Panel and the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (PAPP), and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign the Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) aspect of the previous GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

The MOA-AD included, among others, a stipulation that creates the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE), to which the GRP grants the authority and jurisdiction over the ancestral domain and ancestral lands of the Bangsamoro which defined as the present geographic area of the ARMM constituted by Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Basilan, and Marawi City, as well as the municipalities of Lanao del Norte which voted for inclusion in the ARMM in the 2001 plebiscite.

The BJE is then granted the power to build, develop, and maintain its own institutions. The MOA-AD also described the relationship of the GRP and the BJE as “associative,” characterized by shared authority and responsibility. It further provides that its provisions requiring “amendments to the existing legal framework” shall take effect upon signing of a Comprehensive Compact.

Before the signing, however, the Province of North Cotabato sought to compel the respondents to disclose and furnish it with complete and official copies of the MOA-AD, as well as to hold a public consultation thereon, invoking its right to information on matters of public concern. A subsequent petition sought to have the City of Zamboanga excluded from the BJE. The Court then issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on 4 August 2008, directing the public respondents and their agents to cease and desist from formally signing the MOA-AD.

Issue:

Whether or not, the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) is unconstitutional.

Ruling:

Yes, the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) is unconstitutional. The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE), are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associative entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence.

MOA-AD between the BJE and the government is associative in nature. An associative state arrangement has usually been used as a transitional device of former colonies on their way to full independence. The provision in the Memorandum of Agreement indicate, among other things that the parties aimed to vest the BJE the status of an associative state. The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution where it implies power that go beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional government.

Wherefore, respondents’ motion to dismiss is denied. The main and intervening petitions are given due course and hereby granted.

The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 is declared contrary to law and the Constitution.

Subject: Constitutional LawTopic: The Concept of the StateTitle: Co Kim Chan vs. Valdez Tan KehCitation: G.R. No. L-313, December 20, 1946Facts:

In a petition for mandamus, the petitioner prayed that the respondent judge continue to hear a civil case which was initiated during the regime of the so-called Republic of the Philippines established during the Japanese military occupation in the island. The respondent judge refuse to hear the case on the ground of the Proclamation order issued by Gen. MacArthur where in it validates and nullify all the judicial proceeding and orders issued during the Japanese occupancy and orders that the court has no more jurisdiction to hear the case pending.

Issue:

Whether or not the judicial acts and proceedings of the court established during the Japanese occupation were good and valid and will remain the same even after the reoccupation of the US government.

Ruling:

Yes, the judicial acts and proceedings of the court established during the Japanese occupation were good and valid and will remain the same even after the reoccupation of the United States government. It is a legal truism in political and international law that all the acts and proceeding of the legislative, executive and judicial department of a defection government are good and valid.

The municipal law of the conquered territory continues in force during the occupation. That what occurred or was done in respect of such matter under the authority of the laws of these local de facto governments should not be disregarded or held to be invalid merely because those governments were organized in hostility to the union established by the national constitution.

Subject: Constitutional Law ITopic: The Concept of the StateTitle of the Case: Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Monte de PiedadCitation: G.R. No. 9959, December 13, 1916

Facts:

On June 3, 1863, an earthquake occurred in the Philippines. The Spanish donated $400,000 for the victims and was received by the Treasury. After utilizing the money for the victims, $80, 000 was left untouched. It was then invested to the Monte de Piedad Bank which also invested it in jewelleries’. But later on when the Philippine government tried to withdraw the $80, 000, the bank cannot produce the amount.

Later on, the bank argued that the Philippine government is not he affected party therefore has no right to withdraw the amount moreover filed a complaint. They also added that the Philippine government is not the beneficiary of the money therefore they should not decide what should be done of the money..

Issue:

Whether or not, the government is competent enough to file a complaint against the respondent bank.

Ruling:

Yes, the government is competent enough to institute action against the Monte de Piedad. Its competency is based on the doctrine of Parens Patriae, meaning, the State is guardian of the rights of the people.

Therefore, the government being the protector of the rights of the people has the “inherent” supreme power to enforce laws that will promote the public interest. Hence, as parents of the people, the government has the right to take back the money intended for the people.

Subject: Constitutional Law ITopic: The Concept of the StateTitle of the Case: Soriano vs. LaguardiaCitation: G.R. No. 164785, April 29, 2009

Facts:

An order was issued by the MTRCB suspending the show of Soriano “Ang Dating Daan” on the ground that the latter uttered indecent language on national television which is offensive to the public. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on the matter questioning the validity of the order of the MTRCB. He contended that the order is issued in violation of his freedom of, speech and expression as it partakes of the nature of subsequent punishment curtailing the same. Further petitioner harp on the primacy of his freedoms, referring particularly to his religious belief over the right and duties of the state as Parens Patriae.

Issue:

Whether or not, the order issued by the MRTCB is valid.

Ruling:

Yes, the order issued by the MRTCB is valid. The court reiterates the rule that the exercise of religious freedom can be regulated by the State when it will bring about the clear and present danger of some substantive evil which the State is duty bound to prevent, for example, serious detriment to the more overriding interest of public health, public morals and public welfare.

Petitioner’s offensive and obscene language uttered in a television without doubt was easily accessible to children. His statement could have exposed children to a language that is unacceptable. As such the State has a compelling interest in extending social protection to minors against all forms of neglects, exploitation, and immorality which may pollute innocent mind.

The state is mandated to support parents in the rearing the youth for civic efficiency and development of moral character. The welfare of the children and the state mandate to protect and care for them, as Parens Patriae, constitute substantial and compelling government interest in regulating petitioners utterance in TV broadcast in PD 1986.

Subject: Constitutional Law ITopic: The Concept of the StateTitle of the Case: Laurel vs. MisaCitation: 77 Phil. 856

Facts:

The accused was charged with treason. During the Japanese occupation, the accused adhered to the enemy by giving the latter aid and comfort. He claims that he cannot be tried for treason since his allegiance to the Philippines was suspended at that time. Also, he claims that he cannot be tried under a change of sovereignty over the country since his acts were against the Commonwealth which was replaced already by the Republic.

Issue:

Whether or not, sovereignty was suspended during the Japanese occupation of the Philippines in WW2.

Ruling:

No, sovereignty was not suspended during the Japanese occupation of the Philippines in WW2. The accused was found guilty. A citizen owes absolute and permanent allegiance to his government or sovereign. No transfer of sovereignty was made; hence, it is presumed that the Philippine government still had the power.

Moreover, sovereignty cannot be suspended. It is either subsisting or eliminated and replaced. Sovereignty was not suspended during the occupation by the Japanese; rather, it was the exercise of sovereignty that was suspended. Thus, there is no suspended allegiance. Regarding the change of sovereign, there is no such change since the sovereign, the Filipino people, is still the same. What happened was a mere change of name of government, from Commonwealth to the Republic of the Philippines.

Subject: Constitutional Law ITopic: The Concept of the StateTitle of the Case: Magallona vs. ErmitaCitation: G.R. No. 187167, July 16, 2011

Facts:

RA 9522 was enacted by Congress in March 2009 to comply with the terms of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), being ratified on February 1984. Such compliance shortened one baseline, optimized the location of some base points around the Philippines archipelago and classified adjacent territories such as the Kalayaan Island Ground (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal as the “regime of islands” whose islands generate their own maritime zones.

Petitioners, in their capacity as citizens, taxpayers or legislators question the constitutionality of RA 9522. They argue that RA 9522 unconstitutionally converts internal waters into archipelagic waters, thus subjecting these waters to the right of innocent air and sea lane passage under UNCLOS III. Petitioners have contended that these passage rights will violate the constitution as it shall expose Philippine internal waters to nuclear and and maritime pollution hazard.

Issue:

Whether or not, RA 9522 is unconstitutional for converting internal waters into archipelagic waters.

Ruling:

No, RA 9522 is constitutional for converting internal waters into archipelagic waters. Under the Archipelagic Doctrine, the outermost point of the archipelago is connected with straight base lines. All the waters enclosed thereby are then considered internal waters. The entire archipelago is regarded as one integrated unit instead of being fragmented into so may thousand islands. An archipelagic state has the sovereign power that extends the waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast. Without this doctrine, the water that separates island in the Philippines will be considered international waters, where we have no jurisdiction as well as authority to check the passing vessel or aircraft. Moreover, had the RA 9522 was not approved; a possibility that the Philippines will be isolated among nations where our sea claims would not be recognized internationally.

Furthermore, RA 9522 is constitutional as it is consistent with national interest. Aside from being a vital step in safeguarding the country’s maritime zone, this law also allows an internationally recognized delimitation of the breadth of the Philippine maritime zone and continental shelf. Innocent passage of vessels and aircraft is granted by the UNCLOS III. With the RA 9522, vessels or aircraft may pass but their passing is subject to Philippine law, thus, making the RA 9522 more favorable to the national interest of the country.

Subject: Constitutional LawTopic: Doctrine of State ImmunityTitle: Republic vs. VillasorCitation: G.R. No. L-30671, November 28, 1973

Facts:

On July 3, 1961, a decision was rendered in Special Proceedings No. 2156-R in favor of respondents P. J. Kiener Co., Ltd., GavinoUnchuan, and International Construction Corporation, and against the petitioner herein, confirming the arbitration award in the amount of P1,712,396.40.

On June 24, 1969, respondent Honorable Guillermo P. Villasor, issued an order declaring the aforestated decision of July 3, 1961 final and executory, directing the Sheriffs of Rizal Province, Quezon City as well as Manila to execute the said decision. In pursuant to the said order dated June 24, 1969, the corresponding alias writ of execution was issued dated June 26, 1969.

On the strength of the afore-mentioned alias writ of execution, the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal served notices of garnishment dated June 28, 1969 with several banks, specially on the `monies due the Armed Forces of the Philippines in the form of deposits, sufficient to cover the amount mentioned in the said alias writ of execution’; the Philippine Veterans Bank received the same notice of garnishment on June 30, 1969

The funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines on deposit with the banks, particularly, with the Philippine Veterans Bank and the Philippine National Bank or their branches are public funds duly appropriated and allocated for the payment of pensions of retirees, pay and allowances of military and civilian personnel and for maintenance and operations of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, as per certification dated July 3, 1969 by the AFP Comptroller.

Hence, a petition was filed by the Republic of the Philippines on July 7, 1969. The petitioner in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding challenges the validity of an order issued by respondent, Judge Guillermo P. Villasor, then of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch I, 1 declaring a decision final and executory and of an alias writ of execution directed against the funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

Issue:

Whether or not the writ of execution directed against the funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines issued by the respondent, Judge Guillermo P. Villasor, is valid.

Ruling:

No, the writ of execution directed against the funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines issued by the respondent, Judge Guillermo P. Villasor, is not valid. The Constitution of the Philippines expressly provides that, “The State may not be sued without its consent.”

Thus, the State, by virtue of its sovereignty, may not be sued in its own courts except by express authorization by the Legislature. Furthermore, public funds cannot be object of a garnishment proceeding even if the consent to be sued had been previously granted and the state liability adjudged. The money sought to be garnished, as long as they remain in the hands of the disbursing officer of the Government, belong to the latter.

Wherefore, the writs of certiorari and prohibition are granted, nullifying and setting aside both the order of June 24, 1969 declaring executory the decision of July 3, 1961 as well as the alias writ of execution issued thereunder. The preliminary injunction issued by this Court on July 12, 1969 is hereby made permanent.

Subject: Constitutional LawTopic: Doctrine of State ImmunityTitle: Republic vs. FelicianoCitation: G.R. No. 70853, March 12, 1987

Facts:

On January 22, 1970, respondent, Pablo Feliciano, filed a complaint with the then Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur against the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land Authority, for the recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land, consisting of four lots with an aggregate area of 1,364.4177 hectares, situated in the Barrio of Salvacion, Municipality of Tinambac, Camarines Sur.

Plaintiff alleged that he bought the property in question from Victor Gardiola by virtue of a Contract of Sale dated May 31, 1952, followed by a Deed of Absolute Sale on October 30, 1954; that Gardiola had acquired the property by purchase from the heirs of Francisco Abrazado whose title to the said property was evidenced by an informacion posesoria that upon plaintiff's purchase of the property, he took actual possession of the same, introduced various improvements therein and caused it to be surveyed in July 1952, which survey was approved by the Director of Lands on October 24, 1954; that on November 1, 1954, President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 90 reserving for settlement purposes, under the administration of the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA), a tract of land situated in the Municipalities of Tinambac and Siruma, Camarines Sur, after which the NARRA and its successor agency, the Land Authority, started sub-dividing and distributing the land to the settlers; that the property in question, while located within the reservation established under Proclamation No. 90, was the private property of plaintiff and should therefore be excluded therefrom. Plaintiff prayed that he be declared the rightful and true owner of the property in question consisting of 1,364.4177 hectares; that his title of ownership based on informacion posesoria of his predecessor-in-interest be declared legal valid and subsisting and that defendant be ordered to cancel and nullify all awards to the settlers.

A motion for reconsideration was immediately filed by the intervenors. But before this motion was acted upon, plaintiff filed a motion for execution, dated November 18, 1971. On December 10, 1971, the lower court, this time through Judge Miguel Navarro, issued an order denying the motion for execution and setting aside the order denying intervenors' motion for postponement. The case was reopened to allow intervenors to present their evidence. Unable to secure a reconsideration of Judge Navarro's order, the plaintiff went to the Intermediate Appellate Court on a petition for certiorari. Said petition was, however, denied by the Intermediate Appellate Court, and petitioners brought the matter to this Court in G.R. No. 36163, which was denied on May 3, 1973 Consequently, the case was remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings.

On August 31, 1970, intervenors filed a motion to dismiss, principally on the ground that the Republic of the Philippines cannot be sued without its consent and hence the action cannot prosper.

Hence, a petition was filed seeking for the review of the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court on April 30, 1985 reversing the order of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, Branch VI, dated August 21, 1980, which dismissed the complaint of respondent Pablo Feliciano for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land on the ground of non-suability of the State.

Issue:

Whether or not the complaint filed against Republic of the Philippines for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land is valid.

Ruling:

No, the complaint filed against Republic of the Philippines for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land is not valid. The doctrine of non-suability has proper application in this case. The plaintiff has

impleaded the Republic of the Philippines as defendant in an action for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land, bringing the State to court just like any private person who is claimed to be usurping a piece of property.

A suit for the recovery of property is not an action in rem, but an action in personam. It is an action directed against a specific party or parties, and any judgment therein binds only such party or parties. The complaint filed by plaintiff, the private respondent herein, is directed against the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land Authority, a governmental agency created by Republic Act No. 3844.

Furthermore, the complaint is clearly a suit against the State, which under settled jurisprudence is not permitted, except upon a showing that the State has consented to be sued, either expressly or by implication through the use of statutory language too plain to be misinterpreted. There is no such showing in the instant case. Worse, the complaint itself fails to allege the existence of such consent. This is a fatal defect, and on this basis alone, the complaint should have been dismissed.

Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered reversing and setting aside the appealed decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court, dated April 30, 1985, and affirming the order of the court a quo, dated August 21, 1980, dismissing the complaint filed by respondent Pablo Feliciano against the Republic of the Philippines.

Subject: Constitutional LawTopic: Doctrine of State ImmunityTitle: Philippine National Bank vs. PabalanCitation: G.R. No. L-33112, June 15, 1978

Facts:

The reliance of petitioner Philippine National Bank in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding against respondent Judge Javier Pabalan who issued a writ of execution, followed thereafter by a notice of garnishment of the funds of respondent Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration, deposited with it, is on the fundamental constitutional law doctrine of non-suability of a state, it being alleged that such funds are public in character. This is not the first time petitioner raised that issue. It did so before in Philippine National Bank v. Court of industrial Relations, decided only last January. It did not meet with success, this Court ruling in accordance with the two previous cases of National Shipyard and Steel Corporation and Manila Hotel Employees Association v. Manila Hotel Company, that the funds of public corporations which can sue and be sued were not exempt from garnishment. As respondent Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration is likewise a public corporation possessed of the same attributes, a similar outcome is indicated. This petition must be dismissed.

It is undisputed that the judgment against respondent Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration had reached the stage of finality. A writ of execution was, therefore, in order. It was accordingly issued on December 17, 1970. There was a notice of garnishment for the full amount mentioned in such writ of execution in the sum of P12,724,66. In view of the objection, however, by petitioner Philippine National Bank on the above ground, coupled with an inquiry as to whether or not respondent Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration had funds deposited with petitioner's La Union branch, it was not until January 25, 1971 that the order sought to be set aside in this certiorari proceeding was issued by respondent Judge. Its dispositive portion reads as follows: Conformably with the foregoing, it is now ordered, in accordance with law, that sufficient funds of the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration now deposited with the Philippine National Bank, La Union Branch, shall be garnished and delivered to the plaintiff immediately to satisfy the Writ of Execution for one-half of the amount awarded in the decision of November 16, 1970."

Hence this certiorari and prohibition proceeding.

Issue:

Whether or not the complaint filed against Philippine National Bank for garnishment of the funds of Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration is valid.

Ruling:

Yes, not the complaint filed against Philippine National Bank for garnishment of the funds of Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration is valid.

As noted at the outset, petitioner, Philippine National Bank would invoke the doctrine of non-suability. It is to be admitted that under the present Constitution, what was formerly implicit as a fundamental doctrine in constitutional law has been set forth in express terms: "The State may not be sued without its consent."

However, if the funds appertained to one of the regular departments or offices in the government, then, certainly, such a provision would be a bar to garnishment. Such is not the case here. Garnishment would lie. Hence, funds of public corporations which can sue or be sued are not exempt from garnishment.

Wherefore, the petition filed for certiorari and prohibition is dismissed.

Subject: Constitutional LawTopic: Doctrine of State ImmunityTitle: Department of Agriculture vs. The National Labor Relations CommissionCitation: G.R. No. 104269, November 11, 1993

Facts:

In this petition for certiorari, the Department of Agriculture seeks to nullify the Resolution, 1 dated 27 November 1991, of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Fifth Division, Cagayan de Oro City, denying the petition for injunction, prohibition and mandamus that prays to enjoin permanently the NLRC's Regional Arbitration Branch X and Cagayan de Oro City Sheriff from enforcing the decision 2 of 31 May 1991 of the Executive Labor Arbiter and from attaching and executing on petitioner's property.

The Department of Agriculture (herein petitioner) and Sultan Security Agency entered into a contract on April 1, 1989 for security services to be provided by the latter to the said governmental entity. Save for the increase in the monthly rate of the guards, the same terms and conditions were also made to apply to another contract, dated May 1, 1990, between the same parties. Pursuant to their arrangements, guards were deployed by Sultan Agency in the various premises of the petitioner.

On September 13, 1990, several guards of the Sultan Security Agency filed a complaint for underpayment of wages, non-payment of 13th month pay, uniform allowances, night shift differential pay, holiday pay and overtime pay, as well as for damages, before the Regional Arbitration Branch X of Cagayan de Oro City, docketed as NLRC Case No. 10-09-00455-90 (or 10-10-00519-90, its original docket number), against the Department of Agriculture and Sultan Security Agency.

The Executive Labor Arbiter rendered a decision on 31 May finding herein petitioner and jointly and severally liable with Sultan Security Agency for the payment of money claims, aggregating P266,483.91, of the complainant security guards. The petitioner and Sultan Security Agency did not appeal the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Thus, the decision became final and executory.

On July 18, 1991, the Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution commanding the City Sheriff to enforce and execute the judgment against the property of the two respondents. Forthwith, or on 19 July 1991, the City Sheriff levied on execution the motor vehicles of the petitioner, i.e. one (1) unit Toyota Hi-Ace, one (1) unit Toyota Mini Cruiser, and one (1) unit Toyota Crown. These units were put under the custody of Zacharias Roa, the property custodian of the petitioner, pending their sale at public auction or the final settlement of the case, whichever would come first.

A petition for injunction, prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for preliminary writ of injunction was filed by the petitioner with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Cagayan de Oro, alleging, inter alia, that the writ issued was effected without the Labor Arbiter having duly acquired jurisdiction over the petitioner, and that, therefore, the decision of the Labor Arbiter was null and void and all actions pursuant thereto should be deemed equally invalid and of no legal, effect. The petitioner also pointed out that the attachment or seizure of its property would hamper and jeopardize petitioner's governmental functions to the prejudice of the public good.

Issue:

Whether or not the complaint directed against the property of the Department of Agriculture is valid.

Ruling:

No, the complaint directed against the property of the Department of Agriculture is not valid. Writs of execution issued by regular courts of justice in connection to money claims filed against the government may not be implemented without the same being first referred to the Commission on Audit.

As a general rule “the State cannot be sued without its consent”, however, this rule is not absolute as the State can be sued and that, the State’s consent may be given expressly or impliedly. In the case of Department of Agriculture against the National Labor Relations Commission, the former entered into a contract with Sultan Security Agency. Thus, implied consent has been given when the State commences litigation.

Act No. 3083, “the Government of the Philippine Islands hereby consents or submits to be sued upon moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract, express or implied, which could serve as a civil action between private parties. However, under C.A. No. 327 as amended by P.D. No. 1445, a claim against the government must first be in the Commission on Audit, which must act upon it within sixty days.

Wherefore, the petition is granted. The resolution, dated 27 November 1991, is hereby reversed and set aside. The writ of execution directed against the property of the Department of Agriculture is nullified, and the public respondents are hereby enjoined permanently from doing, issuing and implementing any and all writs of execution issued pursuant to the decision rendered by the Labor Arbiter against said petitioner.

Subject: Constitutional LawTopic: Doctrine of State ImmunityTitle: Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc. vs. Customs Arrastre ServiceCitation: G.R. No. L-23139, December 17, 1966

Facts:

Four cases of rotary drill parts were shipped from abroad on S.S. "Leoville" sometime in November of 1962, consigned to Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc., Manila. The shipment arrived at the Port of Manila on April 10, 1963, and was discharged to the custody of the Customs Arrastre Service, the unit of the Bureau of Customs then handling arrastre operations therein. The Customs Arrastre Service later delivered to the broker of the consignee three cases only of the shipment.

On April 4, 1964 Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc., filed suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the Customs Arrastre Service and the Bureau of Customs to recover the value of the undelivered case in the amount of P18,493.37 plus other damages.

On April 20, 1964 the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that not being persons under the law, defendants cannot be sued.

After plaintiff opposed the motion, the court, on April 25, 1964, dismissed the complaint on the ground that neither the Customs Arrastre Service nor the Bureau of Customs is suable. Plaintiff appealed to us from the order of dismissal.

Raised, therefore, in this appeal is the purely legal question of the defendants' suability under the facts stated.

Appellant contends that not all government entities are immune from suit; that defendant Bureau of Customs as operator of the arrastre service at the Port of Manila, is discharging proprietary functions and as such, can be sued by private individuals.

Issue:

Whether or not complaint filed against Bureau of Customs as operator of the Customs Arrastre Service is valid.

Ruling:

No, complaint filed against Bureau of Customs as operator of the Customs Arrastre Service of is not valid. The Bureau of Customs, acting as part of the machinery of the national government in the operation of Customs Arrastre Services, pursuant to express legislative mandate and as necessary incident of its prime governmental function, is immune from suit, there being no statute to the contrary.

Furthermore, the Bureau of Customs is part of the Department of Finance with no personality of its own apart from the national government. Its primary function is governmental. To this function, Customs Arrastre Services is a necessary incident.

Wherefore, the order of dismissal appealed from is hereby affirmed.

Subject: Constitutional LawTopic: Doctrine of State ImmunityTitle: National Airports Corporation vs. Teodoro, Sr. Citation: G.R. No. L-5122, April 30, 1952

Facts:

The National Airports Corporation was organized under Republic Act No. 224, which expressly made the provisions of the Corporation Law applicable to the said corporation.

On November 10, 1950, the National Airports Corporation was abolished by Executive Order No. 365 and to take its place the Civil Aeronautics Administration was created. Before the abolition, the Philippine Airlines, Inc. paid to the National Airports Corporation P65,245 as fees for landing and parking on Bacolod Airport No. 2 for the period up to and including July 31, 1948.

These fees are said to have been due and payable to the Capitol Subdivision, Inc. which owned the land used by the National Airports Corporation as airport, and the owner commenced an action in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental against the Philippine Airlines, Inc., in 1951 to recover the above amount.

The Philippine Airlines, Inc. countered with a third-party complaint against the National Airports Corporation, which by that time had been dissolved, and served summons on the Civil Aeronautics Administration.

The third party plaintiff alleged that it had paid to the National Airports Corporation the fees claimed by the Capitol Subdivision, Inc. "on the belief and assumption that the third party defendant was the lessee of the lands subject of the complaint and that the third party defendant and its predecessors in interest were the operators and maintainers of said Bacolod Airport No. 2 and, further, that the third party defendant would pay to the landowners, particularly the Capitol Subdivision, Inc., the reasonable rentals for the use of their lands."

The Solicitor General, after answering the third party complaint, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the third- party complaint, first, because the National Airports Corporation "has lost its juridical personality," and, second, because agency of the Republic of the Philippines, unincorporated and not possessing juridical personality under the law, is incapable of suing and being sued."

Issue:

Whether or not the Civil Aeronautics Administration which acquired the records, properties, equipment, assets, rights, choses in action, obligations, liabilities and contracts upon the abolishment of National Airport Corporation can be sued.

Ruling:

Yes, the Civil Aeronautics Administration which acquired the records, properties, equipment, assets, rights, choses in action, obligations, liabilities and contracts upon the abolishment of National Airport Corporation can be sued.

Furthermore, as a general rule “the State cannot be sued without its consent”, however this rule is not absolute as the State can be sued and that, the State’s consent may be given expressly or impliedly. An implied consent is given when the State itself commences litigation or when it enters into a contract.

Thus, the fact that Civil Aeronautics Administration can enter or execute into contracts, may not or should not claim itself the privileges and immunities of the sovereign state.

Wherefore, the order of dismissal appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellant.

Subject: Constitutional LawTopic: Doctrine of State ImmunityTitle: Municipality of San Fernando vs. FerminCitation: G.R. No. L-52179, April 8, 1991

Facts:

At about 7 o'clock in the morning of December 16, 1965, a collision occurred involving a passenger jeepney driven by Bernardo Balagot and owned by the Estate of Macario Nieveras, a gravel and sand truck driven by Jose Manandeg and owned by Tanquilino Velasquez and a dump truck of the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union and driven by Alfredo Bislig. Due to the impact, several passengers of the jeepney including Laureano Baniña Sr. died as a result of the injuries they sustained and four others suffered varying degrees of physical injuries.

On December 11, 1966, the private respondents instituted a complaint for damages against the Estate of Macario Nieveras and Bernardo Balagot, owner and driver, respectively, of the passenger jeepney, which was docketed Civil Case No. 2183 in the Court of First Instance of La Union, Branch I, San Fernando, La Union. However, the aforesaid defendants filed a Third Party Complaint against the petitioner and the driver of a dump truck of petitioner.

Thereafter, the case was subsequently transferred to Branch IV, presided over by respondent judge and was subsequently docketed as Civil Case No. 107-Bg. By virtue of a court order dated May 7, 1975, the private respondents amended the complaint wherein the petitioner and its regular employee, Alfredo Bislig were impleaded for the first time as defendants. Petitioner filed its answer and raised affirmative defenses such as lack of cause of action, non-suability of the State, prescription of cause of action and the negligence of the owner and driver of the passenger jeepney as the proximate cause of the collision.

The trial court rendered a decision ordering the petitioner and Bislig to pay the plaintiffs. The owner and driver of the jeepney were absolved from liability. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and for a new trial without prejudice to another motion which was then pending. However, respondent judge issued another order dated November 7, 1979 denying the motion for reconsideration of the order of September 7, 1979 for having been filed out of time.

Finally, the respondent judge issued an order dated December 3, 1979 providing that if defendants’ municipality and Bislig further wish to pursue the matter disposed of in the order of July 26, 1979, such should be elevated to a higher court in accordance with the Rules of Court.

Hence, a petition was filed for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction seeking for nullification or modification of the proceedings and the orders issued by the respondent.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion when it has deferred and failed to resolve the defense of non-suability of the State which amounting to lack of jurisdiction in a motion to dismiss.

Ruling:

No, the respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion when in the exercise of its judgment it arbitrarily failed to resolve the vital issue of non-suability of the State in the guise of the municipality. However, said judge acted in excess of his jurisdiction when he held the municipality liable for the quasi-delict committed by its regular employee in his decision on October 10, 1979.

Consent is given impliedly when the government enters into business contracts, thereby descending to the level of the other contracting party, and also when the State files a complaint, thus opening itself to a counterclaim.

However, municipal corporations, for example, like provinces and cities, are agencies of the State when they are engaged in governmental functions and therefore should enjoy the sovereign immunity from suit. Nevertheless, they are subject to suit even in the performance of such functions because their charter provided that they can sue and be sued.

Accordingly, the petition is granted and the decision of the decision of the respondent court is hereby modified, absolving the petitioner municipality of any liability in favor of private respondents.

Subject: Constitutional LawTopic: Doctrine of State ImmunityTitle: E. Merrit vs. Government of the Philippine IslandsCitation: G.R. No. L-11154, March 21, 1916

Facts:

It is a fact not disputed by counsel for the defendant that when the plaintiff, riding on a motorcycle, was going toward the western part of Calle Padre Faura, passing along the west side thereof at a speed of ten to twelve miles an hour, upon crossing Taft Avenue and when he was ten feet from the southwestern intersection of said streets, the General Hospital ambulance, upon reaching said avenue, instead of turning toward the south, after passing the center thereof, so that it would be on the left side of said avenue, as is prescribed by the ordinance and the Motor Vehicle Act, turned suddenly and unexpectedly and long before reaching the center of the street, into the right side of Taft Avenue, without having sounded any whistle or horn, by which movement it struck the plaintiff, who was already six feet from the southwestern point or from the post place there.

By reason of the resulting collision, the plaintiff was so severely injured that, according to Dr. Saleeby, who examined him on the very same day that he was taken to the General Hospital, he was suffering from a depression in the left parietal region, a would in the same place and in the back part of his head, while blood issued from his nose and he was entirely unconscious.

The marks revealed that he had one or more fractures of the skull and that the grey matter and brain was had suffered material injury. At ten o'clock of the night in question, which was the time set for performing the operation, his pulse was so weak and so irregular that, in his opinion, there was little hope that he would live. His right leg was broken in such a way that the fracture extended to the outer skin in such manner that it might be regarded as double and the would be exposed to infection, for which reason it was of the most serious nature.

At another examination six days before the day of the trial, Dr. Saleeby noticed that the plaintiff's leg showed a contraction of an inch and a half and a curvature that made his leg very weak and painful at the point of the fracture. Examination of his head revealed a notable readjustment of the functions of the brain and nerves. The patient apparently was slightly deaf, had a light weakness in his eyes and in his mental condition. This latter weakness was always noticed when the plaintiff had to do any difficult mental labor, especially when he attempted to use his money for mathematical calculations.

According to the various merchants who testified as witnesses, the plaintiff's mental and physical condition prior to the accident was excellent, and that after having received the injuries that have been discussed, his physical condition had undergone a noticeable depreciation, for he had lost the agility, energy, and ability that he had constantly displayed before the accident as one of the best constructors of wooden buildings and he could not now earn even a half of the income that he had secured for his work because he had lost 50 per cent of his efficiency. As a contractor, he could no longer, as he had before done, climb up ladders and scaffoldings to reach the highest parts of the building.

As a consequence of the loss the plaintiff suffered in the efficiency of his work as a contractor, he had to dissolved the partnership he had formed with the engineer. Wilson, because he was incapacitated from making mathematical calculations on account of the condition of his leg and of his mental faculties, and he had to give up a contract he had for the construction of the Uy Chaco building."

We may say at the outset that we are in full accord with the trial court to the effect that the collision between the plaintiff's motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital was due solely to the negligence of the chauffeur.

Hence, an appeal by both parties was raised from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of P14,741.

Issue:

Whether or not the complaint filed against the Government of the Philippine Islands due to the negligence of the chauffer of the General Hospital ambulance is valid.

Ruling:

No, the complaint filed against the Government of the Philippine Islands due to the negligence of the chauffer of the General Hospital ambulance is not valid.

The Act passed by the legislature authorizing E. Merrit to sue the State does not mean concession of its liability. Liability is determined after hearing on the basis of the relevant laws and established facts. When, therefore, the State allows itself to be sued, all it does in effect is to is give the other party an opportunity to prove, if it can, that the State is liable. The Sate, in many cases, may be suable but not liable.

Furthermore, in a damage case, the responsibility of the State is limited to that which it contracts through a special agent. However, the chauffer of the General Hospital ambulance is not a special agent nor was a government officer acting as a special agent hence, there can be no liability from the government.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from must be reversed, without costs in this instance. Whether the Government intends to make itself legally liable for the amount of damages above set forth, which the plaintiff has sustained by reason of the negligent acts of one of its employees, by legislative enactment and by appropriating sufficient funds therefor, we are not called upon to determine. This matter rests solely with the Legislature and not with the courts.

Subject: Constitutional LawTopic: Doctrine of State ImmunityTitle: United States of America vs. GuintoCitation: G.R. No. 76607, February 26, 1990

Facts:

In G.R. No. 76607, the private respondents are suing several officers of the U.S. Air Force stationed in Clark Air Base in connection with the bidding conducted by them for contracts for barber services in the said base.

On February 24, 1986, the Western Pacific Contracting Office, Okinawa Area Exchange, U.S. Air Force, solicited bids for such contracts through its contracting officer, James F. Shaw. Among those who submitted their bids were private respondents Roberto T. Valencia, Emerenciana C. Tanglao, and Pablo C. delPilar. Valencia had been a concessionaire inside Clark for thirty-four years; delPilar for twelve years; and Tanglao for fifty years.

The bidding was won by Ramon Dizon, over the objection of the private respondents, who claimed that he had made a bid for four facilities, including the Civil Engineering Area, which was not included in the invitation to bid.

The private respondents complained to the Philippine Area Exchange (PHAX). The latter, through its representatives, petitioners Yvonne Reeves and Frederic M. Smouse explained that the Civil Engineering concession had not been awarded to Dizon as a result of the February 24, 1986 solicitation. Dizon was already operating this concession, then known as the NCO club concession, and the expiration of the contract had been extended from June 30, 1986 to August 31, 1986. They further explained that the solicitation of the CE barbershop would be available only by the end of June and the private respondents would be notified.

On June 30, 1986, the private respondents filed a complaint in the court below to compel PHAX and the individual petitioners to cancel the award to defendant Dizon, to conduct a rebidding for the barbershop concessions and to allow the private respondents by a writ of preliminary injunction to continue operating the concessions pending litigation.

Upon the filing of the complaint, the respondent court issued an ex parte order directing the individual petitioners to maintain the status quo. On July 22, 1986, the petitioners filed a motion to dismiss and opposition to the petition for preliminary injunction on the ground that the action was in effect a suit against the United States of America, which had not waived its non-suability. The individual defendants, as official employees of the U.S. Air Force, were also immune from suit.

On the same date, July 22, 1986, the trial court denied the application for a writ of preliminary injunction.On October 10, 1988, the trial court denied the petitioners' motion to dismiss, holding in part as follows:

From the pleadings thus far presented to this Court by the parties, the Court's attention is called by the relationship between the plaintiffs as well as the defendants, including the US Government, in that prior to the bidding or solicitation in question, there was a binding contract between the plaintiffs as well as the defendants, including the US Government. By virtue of said contract of concession it is the Court's understanding that neither the US Government nor the herein principal defendants would become the employer/s of the plaintiffs but that the latter are the employers themselves of the barbers, etc. with the employer, the plaintiffs herein, remitting the stipulated percentage of commissions to the Philippine Area Exchange. The same circumstance would become in effect when the Philippine Area Exchange opened for bidding or solicitation the questioned barber shop concessions. To this extent, therefore, indeed a commercial transaction has been entered, and for purposes of the said solicitation, would necessarily be entered between the plaintiffs as well as the defendants.

The Court, further, is of the view that Article XVIII of the RP-US Bases Agreement does not cover such kind of services falling under the concessionaireship, such as a barber shop concession.

On December 11, 1986, following the filing of the herein petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, we issued a temporary restraining order against further proceedings in the court below.

Issue:

Whether or not non-suability of the State will apply in the case filed in connection with the bidding conducted for contracts of barber services against the official employees of the United States Air Force.

Ruling:

No, non-suability of the State will not apply in the case filed in connection with the bidding conducted for contracts of barber services against the official employees of the United States Air Force. The petitioner, United States of America, will be deemed to have waived its state immunity or non-suability upon entering into a contract, where the contact in question is being decidedly commercial.

Furthermore, the barbershops subject of the concessions granted by the United States government are commercial enterprises operated by private persons. They are not agencies of the United States Armed Forces nor are their facilities demandable as a matter of right by the American servicemen. These establishments provide for the grooming needs of their customers and offer not only the basic haircut and shave, as required in most military organizations, but such other amenities as shampoo, massage, manicure and other similar indulgences, and all for a fee. Interestingly, one of the concessionaires, private respondent Valencia, was even sent abroad to improve his tonsorial business, presumably for the benefit of his customers. No less significantly, if not more so, all the barbershop concessionaires are under the terms of their contracts, required to remit to the United States government fixed commissions in consideration of the exclusive concessions granted to them in their respective areas.

Wherefore, after considering all the above premises, the Court hereby renders judgment wherein in G.R. No. 76607, the petition is dismissed and the respondent judge is directed to proceed with the hearing and decision of Civil Case No. 4772. The temporary restraining order dated December 11, 1986, is lifted.

Subject: Constitutional LawTopic: Doctrine of State ImmunityTitle: Republic of Indonesia vs. VinzonCitation: G.R. No. 154705, June 26, 2003

Facts:

On August 1995, Petitioner, Republic of Indonesia entered into a Maintenance Agreement with respondent James Vinzon, sole proprietor of Vinzon Trade and Services. The Maintenance Agreement stated that respondent shall, for a consideration, maintain specified equipment at the Embassy Main Building, Embassy Annex Building and the Wisma Duta, the official residence of petitioner Ambassador Soeratmin.

The equipments covered by the Maintenance Agreement are air conditioning units, generator sets, electrical facilities, water heaters, and water motor pumps. It is likewise stated therein that the agreement shall be effective for a period of four years and will renew itself automatically unless cancelled by either party by giving thirty days prior written notice from the date of expiry.

Petitioners claim that sometime prior to the date of expiration of the said agreement, or before August 1999, they informed respondent that the renewal of the agreement shall be at the discretion of the incoming Chief of Administration, Minister Counsellor Azhari Kasim, who was expected to arrive in February 2000.

When Minister Counsellor Kasim assumed the position of Chief of Administration in March 2000,On August 31 2000, the Indonesian Embassy terminated the agreement in a letter because he allegedly found respondents work and services unsatisfactory and not in compliance with the standards set in the Maintenance Agreement. Petitioners claim, moreover, that they had earlier verbally informed respondent of their decision to terminate the agreement. On the other hand, respondent claims that the aforesaid termination was arbitrary and unlawful.

Respondent filed a complaint against petitioners (RTC) of Makati. Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss, alleging that the Republic of Indonesia, as a foreign sovereign State, has sovereign immunity from suit and cannot be sued as a party-defendant in the Philippines. The said motion further alleged that Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister Counsellor Kasim are diplomatic agents as defined under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and therefore enjoy diplomatic immunity.

On March 20, 2001, respondent filed, an Opposition to the said motion alleging that the Republic of Indonesia has expressly waived its immunity from suit. He based this claim upon the following provision in the Maintenance Agreement.

Issue:

Whether or not non-suability of the State will apply in the case filed in connection with the Maintenance Agreement against Republic of Indonesia.

Ruling:

Yes, non-suability of the State will apply in the case filed in connection with the Maintenance Agreement against Republic of Indonesia. The petitioner was acting in pursuit of a sovereign activity when it entered into a contract with respondent for the upkeep or maintenance of the air conditioning units, generator sets, electrical facilities, water heaters, and water motor pumps of the Indonesian Embassy and the official residence of the Indonesian Ambassador.

Apropos the present case, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign State with a private party cannot be construed as the ultimate test of whether or not it is an act jure imperii or jure gestionis. Such act is only the

start of the inquiry. Is the foreign State engaged in the regular conduct of a business? If the foreign State is not engaged regularly in a business or commercial activity, and in this case it has not been shown to be so engaged, the particular act or transaction must then be tested by its nature. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii.

The existence alone of a paragraph in a contract stating that any legal action arising out of the agreement shall be settled according to the laws of the Philippines and by a specified court of the Philippines is not necessarily a waiver of sovereign immunity from suit. The aforesaid provision contains language not necessarily inconsistent with sovereign immunity. On the other hand, such provision may also be meant to apply where the sovereign party elects to sue in the local courts, or otherwise waives its immunity by any subsequent act.

Wherefore, the petition is hereby granted. The decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 66894 are reversed and set aside and complaint in Civil Case No. 18203 against petitioner is dismissed.

Subject: Constitutional LawTopic: Doctrine of State ImmunityTitle: United States of America vs. RuizCitation: 136 SCRA 487

Facts:

Sometime in May, 1972, the United States invited the submission of bids for the following projects, first is repair offender system, Alava Wharf at the U.S. Naval Station Subic Bay, Philippines, and repair typhoon damage to NAS Cubi shoreline; repair typhoon damage to shoreline revetment, NAVBASE Subic; and second is repair to Leyte Wharf approach, NAVBASE Subic Bay, Philippines.

Eligio de Guzman & Co., Inc. responded to the invitation and submitted bids. Subsequent thereto, the company received from the United States two telegrams requesting it to confirm its price proposals and for the name of its bonding company. The company complied with the requests. [In its complaint, the company alleges that the United States had accepted its bids because "A request to confirm a price proposal confirms the acceptance of a bid pursuant to defendant United States' bidding practices.". The truth of this allegation has not been tested because the case has not reached the trial stage.

In June, 1972, the company received a letter which was signed by Wilham I. Collins, Director, Contracts Division, Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Southwest Pacific, Department of the Navy of the United States, who is one of the petitioners herein. The letter said that the company did not qualify to receive an award for the projects because of its previous unsatisfactory performance rating on a repair contract for the sea wall at the boat landings of the U.S. Naval Station in Subic Bay. The letter further said that the projects had been awarded to third parties. In the abovementioned Civil Case No. 779-M, the company sued the United States of America and Messrs. James E. Galloway, William I. Collins and Robert Gohier all members of the Engineering Command of the U.S. Navy. The complaint is to order the defendants to allow the plaintiff to perform the work on the projects and, in the event that specific performance was no longer possible, to order the defendants to pay damages. The company also asked for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the defendants from entering into contracts with third parties for work on the projects.

The defendants entered their special appearance for the purpose only of questioning the jurisdiction of this court over the subject matter of the complaint and the persons of defendants, the subject matter of the complaint being acts and omissions of the individual defendants as agents of defendant United States of America, a foreign sovereign which has not given her consent to this suit or any other suit for the causes of action asserted in the complaint."

Subsequently the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint which included an opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. The company opposed the motion. The trial court denied the motion and issued the writ. The defendants moved twice to reconsider but to no avail. Hence the instant petition which seeks to restrain perpetually the proceedings in Civil Case No. 779-M for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court.

Issue:

Whether or not, the United States Naval Base in bidding for said contracts exercise governmental functions to be able to invoke state immunity.

Ruling:

Yes, the United States Naval Base in bidding for said contracts exercise governmental functions to be able to invoke state immunity. The contract was jure imperii, hence, the State cannot be sued.

The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a state from being sued in the courts of another state without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of states. However, the rules of international law are not petrified; they are constantly developing and evolving. And because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them — between sovereign and governmental acts and private, commercial and proprietary acts. The result is that state immunity now extends only to sovereign and governmental acts.

The restrictive application of state immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. A state may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates the exercise of its sovereign function. In this case, the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the US and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.

Subject: Constitutional LawTopic: Doctrine of State ImmunityTitle: Froilan vs. Pan Oriental Shipping Co.Citation: G.R. No. L-6060, September 30, 1954

Facts:

On February 3, 1951, plaintiff-appellee, Fernando A. Froilan, filed a complaint against the defendant-appellant, Pan Oriental Shipping Co., alleging that he purchased from the Shipping Commission the vessel FS-197 for P200,000, paying P50,000 down and agreeing to pay the balance in installments; that to secure the payment of the balance of the purchase price, he executed a chattel mortgage of said vessel in favor of the Shipping Commission; that for various reason, among them the non-payment of the installments, the Shipping Commission took possession of said vessel and considered the contract of sale cancelled; that the Shipping Commission chartered and delivered said vessel to the defendant-appellant Pan Oriental Shipping Co. subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines; that he appealed the action of the Shipping Commission to the President of the Philippines and, in its meeting on August 25, 1950, the Cabinet restored him to all his rights under his original contract with the Shipping Commission; that he had repeatedly demanded from the Pan Oriental Shipping Co. the possession of the vessel in question but the latter refused to do so. He, therefore, prayed that, upon the approval of the bond accompanying his complaint, a writ of replevin be issued for the seizure of said vessel with all its equipment and appurtenances, and that after hearing, he be adjudged to have the rightful possession thereof.

On February 3, 1951, the lower court issued the writ of replevin prayed for by Froilan and by virtue thereof the Pan Oriental Shipping Co. was divested of its possession of said vessel.

On March 1, 1951, Pan Oriental Shipping Co. filed its answer denying the right of Froilan to the possession of the said vessel; it alleged that the action of the Cabinet on August 25, 1950, restoring Froilan to his rights under his original contract with the Shipping Commission was null and void; that, in any event, Froilan had not complied with the conditions precedent imposed by the Cabinet for the restoration of his rights to the vessel under the original contract; that it suffered damages in the amount of P22,764.59 for wrongful replevin in the month of February, 1951, and the sum of P17,651.84 a month as damages suffered for wrongful replevin from March 1, 1951; it alleged that it had incurred necessary and useful expenses on the vessel amounting to P127,057.31 and claimed the right to retain said vessel until its useful and necessary expenses had been reimbursed.

On November 10, 1951, after the leave of the lower court had been obtained, the intervenor-appellee, Government of the Republic of the Philippines, filed a complaint in intervention alleging that Froilan had failed to pay to the Shipping Commission (which name was later changed to Shipping Administration) the balance due on the purchase price of the vessel in question, the interest thereon, and its advances on insurance premium totalling P162,142.95, excluding the dry-docking expenses incurred on said vessel by the Pan Oriental Shipping Co.; that intervenor was entitled to the possession of the said vessel either under the terms of the original contract as supplemented by Froilan's letter dated January 28, 1949, or in order that it may cause the extrajudicial sale thereof under the Chattel Mortgage Law. It, therefore, prayed that Froilan be ordered to deliver the vessel in question to its authorized representative, the Board of Liquidators; that Froilan be declared to be without any rights on said vessel and the amounts he paid thereon forfeited or alternately, that the said vessel be delivered to the Board of Liquidators in order that the intervenor may have its chattel mortgage extrajudicially foreclosed in accordance with the provisions of the Chattel Mortgage Law; and that pending the hearing on the merits, the said vessel be delivered to it.

On November 29, 1951, the Pan Oriental Shipping Co. filed an answer to the complaint in intervention alleging that the Government of the Republic of the Philippines was obligated to deliver the vessel in question to it by virtue of a contract of bare-boat charter with option to purchase executed on June 16, 1949, by the latter in favor of the former; it also alleged that it had made necessary and useful expenses on the vessel and claimed the right of retention of the vessel. It, therefore, prayed that, if the Republic of the Philippines succeeded in obtaining

possession of the said vessel, to comply with its obligations of delivering to it (Pan Oriental Shipping co.) or causing its delivery by recovering it from Froilan.

On November 29, 1951, Froilan tendered to the Board of Liquidators, which was liquidating the affairs of the Shipping Administration, a check in the amount of P162,576.96 in payment of his obligation to the Shipping Administration for the said vessel as claimed in the complaint in intervention of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. The Board of Liquidators issued an official report therefor stating that it was a 'deposit pending the issuance of an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila.

On December 7, 1951, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines brought the matter of said payment and the circumstance surrounding it to the attention of the lower court "in order that they may be taken into account by this Honorable Court in connection with the questions that are not pending before it for determination".

On February 3, 1952, the lower court held that the payment by Froilan of the amount of P162,576.96 on November 29, 1951, to the Board of Liquidators constituted a payment and a discharge of Froilan's obligation to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and ordered the dismissal of the latter's complaint in intervention. In the same order, the lower court made it very clear that said order did not pre-judge the question involved between Froilan and the Oriental Shipping Co. which was also pending determination in said court (Rec. on App. pp. 92-93). This order dismissing the complaint in intervention, but reserving for future adjudication the controversy between Froilan and the Pan Oriental Shipping Co. has already become final since neither the Government of the Republic of the Philippines nor the Pan Oriental Shipping Co. had appealed therefrom.

On May 10, 1952, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines filed a motion to dismiss the counterclaim of the Pan Oriental Shipping Co. against it on the ground that the purpose of said counterclaim was to compel the Government of the Republic of the Philippines to deliver the vessel to it (Pan Oriental Shipping Co.) in the event that the Government of the Republic of the Philippines recovers the vessel in question from Froilan. In view, however, of the order of the lower court dated February 3, holding that the payment made by Froilan to the Board of Liquidators constituted full payment of Froilan's obligation to the Shipping Administration, which order had already become final, the claim of the Pan Oriental Shipping Co. against the Republic of the Philippines was no longer feasible, said counterclaim was barred by prior judgment and stated no cause of action. It was also alleged that movant was not subject to the jurisdiction of the court in connection with the counterclaim. (Rec. on App. pp. 94-97). This motion was opposed by the Pan Oriental Shipping Co. in its written opposition dated June 4, 1952.

Issue:

Whether or not, the Republic of the Philippines is immune from suability upon its intervention over the claim of possession of the questioned vessel.

Ruling:

No, the Republic of the Philippines is not immune from suability upon its intervention over the claim of possession of the questioned vessel. The Government has allowed itself to be sued impliedly when it filed a complaint for the purpose of asserting the claim for affirmative relief against the plaintiff, to wit, recovery of a vessel.

The immunity of the state from suits does not deprive it of the right to sue private parties in its own courts. The state as plaintiff may avail itself of the different forms of actions open to private litigants. In short, by taking the initiative in an action against a private party, the state surrenders its privileged position and comes down to the level of the defendant.

Wherefore, the appealed order is hereby reversed and set aside and the case remanded to the lower court for further proceedings.

Subject: Constitutional LawTopic: Doctrine of State ImmunityTitle: Amigable vs. CuencaCitation: G.R. No. L-26400, February 29, 1972

Facts:

Victoria Amigable, the appellant herein, is the registered owner of Lot No. 639 of Cebu City as shown by Transfer Certificate of Title. No annotation in favor of the government of any right or interest in the property appears at the back of the certificate. Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the government used a portion of said lot for the construction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues.

It appears that said avenues were already existing in 1921 although "they were in bad condition and very narrow, unlike the wide and beautiful avenues that they are now," and "that the tracing of said roads was begun in 1924, and the formal construction in 1925."

On March 27, 1958 Amigable's counsel wrote the President of the Philippines, requesting payment of the portion of her lot which had been appropriated by the government. The claim was indorsed to the Auditor General, who disallowed it in his 9th Indorsement dated December 9, 1958.

Within the reglementary period the defendants filed a joint answer denying the material allegations of the complaint and interposing the following affirmative defenses, to wit: (1) that the action was premature, the claim not having been filed first with the Office of the Auditor General; (2) that the right of action for the recovery of any amount which might be due the plaintiff, if any, had already prescribed; (3) that the action being a suit against the Government, the claim for moral damages, attorney's fees and costs had no valid basis since as to these items the Government had not given its consent to be sued; and (4) that inasmuch as it was the province of Cebu that appropriated and used the area involved in the construction of Mango Avenue, plaintiff had no cause of action against the defendant.

Issue:

Whether or not non-suability of the State will apply in the complaint filed against Nicolas Cuenca, as Commissioner of Public Highways and Republic of the Philippines.

Ruling:

No, non-suability of the State will not apply in the complaint filed against Nicolas Cuenca, as Commissioner of Public Highways and Republic of the Philippines. If the constitutional mandate that the owner be compensated for property taken for public use were to be respected, as it should, then a suit of this character should not be summarily dismissed. The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen.

Furthermore, it is not too much to say that when the government takes any property for public use, which is conditioned upon the payment of just compensation, to be judicially ascertained, it makes manifest that it submits to the jurisdiction of a court. There is no thought then that the doctrine of immunity from suit could still be appropriately invoked.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside and the case remanded to the court a quo for the determination of compensation, including attorney's fees, to which the appellant is entitled as above indicated. No pronouncement as to costs.