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Constitutional Economics. The prisoners' dilemma - the benefits of cooperation –Mueller – Theft as a “prisoner’s dilemma” –Why should theft be illegal?

Dec 17, 2015

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Page 1: Constitutional Economics. The prisoners' dilemma - the benefits of cooperation –Mueller – Theft as a “prisoner’s dilemma” –Why should theft be illegal?

Constitutional Economics

Page 2: Constitutional Economics. The prisoners' dilemma - the benefits of cooperation –Mueller – Theft as a “prisoner’s dilemma” –Why should theft be illegal?

Constitutional Economics

• The prisoners' dilemma - the benefits of cooperation– Mueller – Theft as a “prisoner’s dilemma”– Why should theft be illegal?

• If you are not using your car and I steal it, aren’t I putting a resource to a higher valued use?

• No. I would be substituting a high transactions cost process for allocating resources involving anti-theft devices, police, courts, prisons, etc., for a low transactions cost process called a “sale”.

Page 3: Constitutional Economics. The prisoners' dilemma - the benefits of cooperation –Mueller – Theft as a “prisoner’s dilemma” –Why should theft be illegal?

Constitutional Economics

• The prisoners' dilemma - the benefits of cooperation– Mueller – Theft as a

“prisoner’s dilemma”– Pm = payoff to me– Py = payoff to you

Work

YOU

Steal

Work Pm = 10

Py = 10

Pm = 6

Py = 12

ME

Steal Pm = 12

Py = 6

Pm = 5

Py = 5

Page 4: Constitutional Economics. The prisoners' dilemma - the benefits of cooperation –Mueller – Theft as a “prisoner’s dilemma” –Why should theft be illegal?

Constitutional Economics

• The prisoners' dilemma - the benefits of cooperation– Mueller – Theft as a

“prisoner’s dilemma”– When we both work

we maximize our wealth (TW).

Work

YOU

Steal

Work Pm = 10

TW = 20

Py = 10

Pm = 6

TW = 18

Py = 12

ME

Steal Pm = 12

TW = 18

Py = 6

Pm = 5

Py = 5

Page 5: Constitutional Economics. The prisoners' dilemma - the benefits of cooperation –Mueller – Theft as a “prisoner’s dilemma” –Why should theft be illegal?

Constitutional Economics

• The prisoners' dilemma - the benefits of cooperation– Mueller – Theft as a

“prisoner’s dilemma”– When we both work

we maximize our wealth (TW).

– This is “negative sum” symmetrical game

Work

YOU

Steal

Work Pm = 10

TW = 20

Py = 10

Pm = 6

TW = 18

Py = 12

ME

Steal Pm = 12

TW = 18

Py = 6

Pm = 5

Py = 5

Page 6: Constitutional Economics. The prisoners' dilemma - the benefits of cooperation –Mueller – Theft as a “prisoner’s dilemma” –Why should theft be illegal?

Constitutional Economics

• The prisoners' dilemma - the benefits of cooperation

• The “Nash Equilibrium” of a prisoners’ dilemma game is TW = 10

Work

YOU

Steal

Work Pm = 10

TW = 20

Py = 10

Pm = 6

TW = 18

Py = 12

ME

Steal Pm = 12

TW = 18

Py = 6

Pm = 5

TW = 10

Py = 5

Page 7: Constitutional Economics. The prisoners' dilemma - the benefits of cooperation –Mueller – Theft as a “prisoner’s dilemma” –Why should theft be illegal?

Constitutional Economics

• What we end up with is Hobbes’ “state of nature” where “everyman is at war with everyman, and life is nasty, brutish and short.”

Work

YOU

Steal

Work Pm = 10

TW = 20

Py = 10

Pm = 6

TW = 18

Py = 12

ME

Steal Pm = 12

TW = 18

Py = 6

Pm = 5

TW = 10

Py = 5

Page 8: Constitutional Economics. The prisoners' dilemma - the benefits of cooperation –Mueller – Theft as a “prisoner’s dilemma” –Why should theft be illegal?

Constitutional Economics

• So, is there a way out of Hobbes’ “state of nature”?

Work

YOU

Steal

Work Pm = 10

TW = 20

Py = 10

Pm = 6

TW = 18

Py = 12

ME

Steal Pm = 12

TW = 18

Py = 6

Pm = 5

TW = 10

Py = 5

Page 9: Constitutional Economics. The prisoners' dilemma - the benefits of cooperation –Mueller – Theft as a “prisoner’s dilemma” –Why should theft be illegal?

Constitutional Economics

• So, is there a way out of Hobbes’ “state of nature”?

• Sure, the usual route historically has been this way.

• Autocracy

Work

YOU

Steal

Work Pm = 10

TW = 20

Py = 10

Pm = 6

TW = 18

Py = 12

ME

Steal Pm = 12

TW = 18

Py = 6

Pm = 5

TW = 10

Py = 5

Page 10: Constitutional Economics. The prisoners' dilemma - the benefits of cooperation –Mueller – Theft as a “prisoner’s dilemma” –Why should theft be illegal?

Constitutional Economics

• “The good old rule,the simple plan,Let him take who has the power,Let him keep who can.”

William Wadsworth, “Rob Roy’s Grave”

Work

YOU

Steal

Work Pm = 10

TW = 20

Py = 10

Pm = 6

TW = 18

Py = 12

ME

Steal Pm = 12

TW = 18

Py = 6

Pm = 5

TW = 10

Py = 5

Page 11: Constitutional Economics. The prisoners' dilemma - the benefits of cooperation –Mueller – Theft as a “prisoner’s dilemma” –Why should theft be illegal?

Constitutional Economics

• Autocracy is more efficient than the “state of nature”

Work

YOU

Steal

Work Pm = 10

TW = 20

Py = 10

Pm = 6

TW = 18

Py = 12

ME

Steal Pm = 12

TW = 18

Py = 6

Pm = 5

TW = 10

Py = 5

?

Page 12: Constitutional Economics. The prisoners' dilemma - the benefits of cooperation –Mueller – Theft as a “prisoner’s dilemma” –Why should theft be illegal?

Constitutional Economics

• Autocracy is more efficient than the “state of nature”

• But these alternatives represent “tyranny”.

Work

YOU

Steal

Work Pm = 10

TW = 20

Py = 10

Pm = 6

TW = 18

Py = 12

ME

Steal Pm = 12

TW = 18

Py = 6

Pm = 5

TW = 10

Py = 5

?

Page 13: Constitutional Economics. The prisoners' dilemma - the benefits of cooperation –Mueller – Theft as a “prisoner’s dilemma” –Why should theft be illegal?

Constitutional Economics

• Autocracy is more efficient than the “state of nature”

• But these alternatives represent “tyranny”

• How do we get to here?.

Work

YOU

Steal

Work Pm = 10

TW = 20

Py = 10

Pm = 6

TW = 18

Py = 12

ME

Steal Pm = 12

TW = 18

Py = 6

Pm = 5

TW = 10

Py = 5

Page 14: Constitutional Economics. The prisoners' dilemma - the benefits of cooperation –Mueller – Theft as a “prisoner’s dilemma” –Why should theft be illegal?

Constitutional Economics

• How do we get to here?.

• Historically, we can’t (or, at least, we never have).

Work

YOU

Steal

Work Pm = 10

TW = 20

Py = 10

Pm = 6

TW = 18

Py = 12

ME

Steal Pm = 12

TW = 18

Py = 6

Pm = 5

TW = 10

Py = 5

Page 15: Constitutional Economics. The prisoners' dilemma - the benefits of cooperation –Mueller – Theft as a “prisoner’s dilemma” –Why should theft be illegal?

Constitutional Economics

• How do we get to here?.

• Historically, we can’t (or, at least, we never have).

• Revolution!! Off with their heads!!

Work

YOU

Steal

Work Pm = 10

TW = 20

Py = 10

Revolu-tion

Pm = 6

TW = 18

Py = 12

ME Riot, Mayhem

Coup de etat

Steal Pm = 12

TW = 18

Py = 6

Pm = 5

TW = 10

Py = 5

Page 16: Constitutional Economics. The prisoners' dilemma - the benefits of cooperation –Mueller – Theft as a “prisoner’s dilemma” –Why should theft be illegal?

Constitutional Economics

• How do we get to here?.

• Historically, we can’t (or, at least, we never have).

• Logically, how would we want to do it?

Work

YOU

Steal

Work Pm = 10

TW = 20

Py = 10

Pm = 6

TW = 18

Py = 12

ME

Steal Pm = 12

TW = 18

Py = 6

Pm = 5

TW = 10

Py = 5

Page 17: Constitutional Economics. The prisoners' dilemma - the benefits of cooperation –Mueller – Theft as a “prisoner’s dilemma” –Why should theft be illegal?

Constitutional Economics

• The way we get out of Hobbes’ “state of nature” is with a social contract

Page 18: Constitutional Economics. The prisoners' dilemma - the benefits of cooperation –Mueller – Theft as a “prisoner’s dilemma” –Why should theft be illegal?

Constitutional Economics

• The way we get out of Hobbes’ “state of nature” is with a social contract

• A social contract defines a modus vivendi – the way we live.

Page 19: Constitutional Economics. The prisoners' dilemma - the benefits of cooperation –Mueller – Theft as a “prisoner’s dilemma” –Why should theft be illegal?

Constitutional Economics

• The way we get out of Hobbes’ “state of nature” is with a social contract

• A social contract defines a modus vivendi – the way we live.

• A modus vivendi is an accommodation of divergent private values, e.g., religion, through some accepted common social value, e.g., tolerance of religious differences.

Page 20: Constitutional Economics. The prisoners' dilemma - the benefits of cooperation –Mueller – Theft as a “prisoner’s dilemma” –Why should theft be illegal?

Constitutional Economics

• The American colonial experiment was almost all about religious accommodation:– Pilgrim Puritans - New England

Page 21: Constitutional Economics. The prisoners' dilemma - the benefits of cooperation –Mueller – Theft as a “prisoner’s dilemma” –Why should theft be illegal?

Constitutional Economics

• The American colonial experiment was almost all about religious accommodation:– Pilgrim Puritans - New England– Catholics – Chesapeake

Page 22: Constitutional Economics. The prisoners' dilemma - the benefits of cooperation –Mueller – Theft as a “prisoner’s dilemma” –Why should theft be illegal?

Constitutional Economics

• The American colonial experiment was almost all about religious accommodation:– Pilgrim Puritans – New England– Catholics – Chesapeake – Quakers – Pennsylvania

Page 23: Constitutional Economics. The prisoners' dilemma - the benefits of cooperation –Mueller – Theft as a “prisoner’s dilemma” –Why should theft be illegal?

Constitutional Economics

• The American colonial experiment was almost all about religious accommodation:– Pilgrim Puritans – New England– Catholics – Chesapeake – Quakers – Pennsylvania– All dissenters from the Anglican Church

• Contrast this religious tolerance to Islam’s view of “Dhimmis”

Page 24: Constitutional Economics. The prisoners' dilemma - the benefits of cooperation –Mueller – Theft as a “prisoner’s dilemma” –Why should theft be illegal?

Constitutional Economics

• A key concept in Judeo – Christian – Islamic religions is property– “Thou shall not steal.” Etc.

• In Hobbes’ “state of nature” no man nor his property is safe

• To secure the right to property, individuals need civil liberties.

Page 25: Constitutional Economics. The prisoners' dilemma - the benefits of cooperation –Mueller – Theft as a “prisoner’s dilemma” –Why should theft be illegal?

Constitutional Economics

• John Rawls’ “A Theory of Justice” proposes an objective for framing a social contract or constitution.

Page 26: Constitutional Economics. The prisoners' dilemma - the benefits of cooperation –Mueller – Theft as a “prisoner’s dilemma” –Why should theft be illegal?

Constitutional Economics

• John Rawls’ “A Theory of Justice” proposes an objective for framing a social contract or constitution: the “Rawlsian Difference Principle.”

• Maximize the welfare of the least well off member of the community

Page 27: Constitutional Economics. The prisoners' dilemma - the benefits of cooperation –Mueller – Theft as a “prisoner’s dilemma” –Why should theft be illegal?

Constitutional Economics

• John Rawls’ “A Theory of Justice” also proposes a process for framing a social contract or constitution: the “veil of ignorance.”

• Behind of “veil of ignorance” decision makers choosing rules should not know whether they will be the least well off or most well off member of the community.

Page 28: Constitutional Economics. The prisoners' dilemma - the benefits of cooperation –Mueller – Theft as a “prisoner’s dilemma” –Why should theft be illegal?

Constitutional Economics

• John Rawls’ “A Theory of Justice” also proposes a process for framing a social contract or constitution: the “veil of ignorance.”

• Behind of “veil of ignorance” decision makers choosing rules should not know whether they will be the least well off or most well off member of the community.

• Think of a game of poker.

Page 29: Constitutional Economics. The prisoners' dilemma - the benefits of cooperation –Mueller – Theft as a “prisoner’s dilemma” –Why should theft be illegal?

Constitutional Economics

• John Rawls’ “A Theory of Justice” also proposes a process for framing a social contract or constitution: the “veil of ignorance.”

• Behind of “veil of ignorance” decision makers choosing rules should not know whether they will be the least well off or most well off member of the community.

• Think of a game of poker.• Rawls’ proposal is very “Madisonian”

Page 30: Constitutional Economics. The prisoners' dilemma - the benefits of cooperation –Mueller – Theft as a “prisoner’s dilemma” –Why should theft be illegal?

Constitutional Economics

• Rawls and numerous commentators believe that the Difference Principle makes a case for income equality.

Page 31: Constitutional Economics. The prisoners' dilemma - the benefits of cooperation –Mueller – Theft as a “prisoner’s dilemma” –Why should theft be illegal?

Constitutional Economics

• Rawls and numerous commentators believe that the Difference Principle makes a case for income equality.

• Does it really?

Page 32: Constitutional Economics. The prisoners' dilemma - the benefits of cooperation –Mueller – Theft as a “prisoner’s dilemma” –Why should theft be illegal?

Constitutional Economics

• Rawls and numerous commentators believe that the Difference Principle makes a case for income equality.

• Does it really?

• This would suggest a high degree of risk aversion and perceived lack of opportunity.

Page 33: Constitutional Economics. The prisoners' dilemma - the benefits of cooperation –Mueller – Theft as a “prisoner’s dilemma” –Why should theft be illegal?

Constitutional Economics

• Rawls and numerous commentators believe that the Difference Principle makes a case for income equality.

• Does it really?

• Would you rather be the poorest person if everyone is equally poor or if there are some wealthy people?

Page 34: Constitutional Economics. The prisoners' dilemma - the benefits of cooperation –Mueller – Theft as a “prisoner’s dilemma” –Why should theft be illegal?

Constitutional Economics

• Rawls and numerous commentators believe that the Difference Principle makes a case for income equality.

• Does it really?

• The existence of wealthy people suggests that there are opportunities for the poorest people to improve their situation.