7/29/2019 Consti2 Academic Freedom http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/consti2-academic-freedom 1/70 ACADEMIC FREEDOM GARCIA VS. FACULTY OF ADMISSION – 68 SCRA 277 (1975) The specific issue posed by this mandamus proceeding to compel the Faculty Admission Committee of the Loyola School of Theology, represented by Father Antonio B. Lambino, to allow petitioner Epicharis T. Garcia, to continue studying therein is whether she is deemed possessed of such a right that has to be respected. That is denied not only on general principle, but also in view of the character of the particular educational institution involved. It is a seminary. It would appear therefore that at most she can lay claim to a privilege, no duty being cast on respondent school. Moreover, as a reinforcement to such an obvious conclusion, there is the autonomy recognized by the Constitution in this explicit language: "All institutions of higher learning shall enjoy academic freedom." 1 The petition must therefore fail. Petitioner alleged: "3. That in summer, 1975, Respondent admitted Petitioner for studies leading to an M.A. in Theology; 4. That on May 30, 1975, when Petitioner wanted to enroll for the same course for the first semester, 1975-76, Respondent told her about the letter he had written her, informing her of the faculty's decision to bar her from re- admission in their school; 5. That the reasons stated in said letter, dated May 19, 1975 ... do not constitute valid legal ground for expulsion, for they neither present any violation of any of the school's regulation, nor are they indicative of gross misconduct; 6. That from June 25, 1975, Petitioner spent much time and effort in said school for the purpose of arriving at a compromise that would not duly inconvenience the professors and still allow her to enjoy the benefits of the kind of instruction that the school has to offer, but all in vain; she was in fact told by Fr. Pedro Sevilla, the school's Director, that the compromises she was offering were unacceptable, their decision was final, and that it were better for her to seek for admission at the UST Graduate School; 7 Petitioner then subsequently made inquiries in said school, as to the possibilities for her pursuing her graduate studies for an for M.A. in Theology, and she was informed that she could enroll at the UST Ecclesiastical Faculties, but that she would have to fulfill their requirements for Baccalaureate in Philosophy in order to have her degree later in Theology — which would entail about four to five years more of studies — whereas in the Loyola School of Studies to which she is being unlawfully refused readmission, it would entail only about two years more; 8. That Petitioner, considering that time was of the essence in her case, and not wanting to be deprived of an opportunity for gaining knowledge necessary for her life's work, enrolled as a special student at said UST Ecclesiastical Faculties, even if she would not thereby be credited with any academic units for the subject she would take; 9. That Petitioner could have recourse neither to the President of her school, Fr. Jose Cruz, he being with the First Couple's entourage now in Red China, nor with the Secretary of Education, since this is his busiest time of the year, and June 11, 1975 is the last day for registration; ... " 2 She prayed for a writ of mandamus for the purpose of allowing her to enroll in the current semester. She made it more specific in a pleading she called Amended Petition so that she would be allowed cross-enrollment even beyond the June 11, 1975 deadline for registration and that
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GARCIA VS. FACULTY OF ADMISSION – 68 SCRA 277 (1975)
The specific issue posed by this mandamus proceeding to compel the Faculty Admission Committee of the Loyola School of Theology, represented by Father AntonioB. Lambino, to allow petitioner Epicharis T. Garcia, to continue studying therein iswhether she is deemed possessed of such a right that has to be respected. That isdenied not only on general principle, but also in view of the character of the particular educational institution involved. It is a seminary. It would appear therefore that at mostshe can lay claim to a privilege, no duty being cast on respondent school. Moreover, asa reinforcement to such an obvious conclusion, there is the autonomy recognized by theConstitution in this explicit language: "All institutions of higher learning shall enjoyacademic freedom." 1 The petition must therefore fail.
Petitioner alleged: "3. That in summer, 1975, Respondent admitted Petitioner for studiesleading to an M.A. in Theology; 4. That on May 30, 1975, when Petitioner wanted toenroll for the same course for the first semester, 1975-76, Respondent told her aboutthe letter he had written her, informing her of the faculty's decision to bar her from re-admission in their school; 5. That the reasons stated in said letter, dated May 19, 1975... do not constitute valid legal ground for expulsion, for they neither present anyviolation of any of the school's regulation, nor are they indicative of gross misconduct; 6.That from June 25, 1975, Petitioner spent much time and effort in said school for thepurpose of arriving at a compromise that would not duly inconvenience the professorsand still allow her to enjoy the benefits of the kind of instruction that the school has tooffer, but all in vain; she was in fact told by Fr. Pedro Sevilla, the school's Director, that
the compromises she was offering were unacceptable, their decision was final, and thatit were better for her to seek for admission at the UST Graduate School; 7 Petitioner then subsequently made inquiries in said school, as to the possibilities for her pursuingher graduate studies for an for M.A. in Theology, and she was informed that she couldenroll at the UST Ecclesiastical Faculties, but that she would have to fulfill their requirements for Baccalaureate in Philosophy in order to have her degree later inTheology — which would entail about four to five years more of studies — whereas inthe Loyola School of Studies to which she is being unlawfully refused readmission, itwould entail only about two years more; 8. That Petitioner, considering that time was of the essence in her case, and not wanting to be deprived of an opportunity for gainingknowledge necessary for her life's work, enrolled as a special student at said USTEcclesiastical Faculties, even if she would not thereby be credited with any academicunits for the subject she would take; 9. That Petitioner could have recourse neither tothe President of her school, Fr. Jose Cruz, he being with the First Couple's entouragenow in Red China, nor with the Secretary of Education, since this is his busiest time of the year, and June 11, 1975 is the last day for registration; ... " 2 She prayed for a writ of mandamus for the purpose of allowing her to enroll in the current semester. She made itmore specific in a pleading she called Amended Petition so that she would be allowedcross-enrollment even beyond the June 11, 1975 deadline for registration and that
whatever units may be accredited to her in the UST Ecclesiastical Faculties be likewiserecognized by respondent. Her petition included the letter of respondent Father Lambino which started on a happy note that she was given the grade of B+ and B in twotheology subjects, but ended in a manner far from satisfactory for her, as shown by thisportion thereof: "Now, you will have to forgive me for going into a matter which is not too
pleasant. The faculty had a meeting after the summer session and several members arestrongly opposed to having you back with us at Loyola School of Theology. In the spiritof honesty may I report this to you as their reason: They felt that your frequentquestions and difficulties were not always pertinent and had the effect of slowing downthe progress of the class; they felt you could have tried to give the presentation achance and exerted more effort to understand the point made before immediatelythinking of difficulties and problems. The way things are, I would say that the advisabilityof your completing a program (with all the course work and thesis writing) with us is veryquestionable. That you have the requisite intellectual ability is not to be doubted. But itwould seem to be in your best interests to work with a faculty that is more compatiblewith your orientation. I regret to have to make this report, but I am only thinking of your
welfare."
3
This Court, in a resolution of June 23, 1975, required comment on the part of respondent Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology. 4 As submittedon behalf of Father Lambino, it set forth the following: "Respondent is the Chairman of the Faculty Admission Committee of the Loyola School of Theology, which is a religiousseminary situated in Loyola Heights, Quezon City; In collaboration with the Ateneo deManila University, the Loyola School of Theology allows some lay students to attend itsclasses and/or take courses in said Loyola School of Theology but the degree, if any, tobe obtained from such courses is granted by the Ateneo de Manila University and notby the Loyola School of Theology; For the reason above given, lay students admitted tothe Loyola School of Theology to take up courses for credit therein have to be officiallyadmitted by the Assistant Dean of the Graduate School of the Ateneo de ManilaUniversity in order for them to be considered as admitted to a degree program ;Petitioner in the summer of 1975 was admitted by respondent to take some courses for credit but said admission was not an admission to a degree program because only the
Assistant Dean of the Ateneo de Manila Graduate School can make such admission;That in the case of petitioner, no acceptance by the Assistant Dean of the Ateneo deManila Graduate School was given, so that she was not accepted to a degree programbut was merely allowed to take some courses for credit during the summer of 1975;Furthermore, petitioner was not charged a single centavo by the Loyola School of Theology and/or the Ateneo de Manila University in connection with the courses shetook in the summer of 1975, as she was allowed to take it free of charge; Thatrespondent Fr. Antonio B. Lambino, S.J., and/or the Loyola School of Theology thru itsFaculty Admission Committee, necessarily has discretion as to whether to admit and/or to continue admitting in the said school any particular student, considering not onlyacademic or intellectual standards but also other considerations such as personalitytraits and character orientation in relation with other students as well as considering thenature of Loyola School of Theology as a seminary. The Petition for Mandamus therefore does not lie, as there is no duty, much less a clear duty, on the part of
respondent to admit the petitioner therein in the current year to take up further coursesin the Loyola School of Theology." 5 It was likewise alleged in the aforesaid commentthat as set forth in the letter of May 19, 1975, the decision not to allow petitioner to takeup further courses in said seminary "is not arbitrary, as it is based on reasonablegrounds, ... ." 6 Then reference was made to the availability of non-judicial remedies
which petitioner could have pursued.
7
The prayer was for the dismissal of the petitionfor lack of merit. Petitioner sought permission to reply and it was granted. Thereafter,she had a detailed recital of why under the circumstances she is entitled to relief fromthe courts. In a resolution of August 8, 1975, this Court considered the comment of respondent as answer and required the parties to file their respective memoranda. Thatthey did, and the petition was deemed submitted for decision. As was made clear at theoutset, we do not see merit in it. It must therefore be dismissed.
1. In respondent's memorandum, it was made clear why a petition for mandamus is notthe proper remedy. Thus: "Petitioner cannot compel by mandamus, the respondent toadmit her into further studies in the Loyola School of Theology. For respondent has no
clear duty to so admit the petitioner. The Loyola School of Theology is a seminary for the priesthood. Petitioner is admittedly and obviously not studying for the priesthood,she being a lay person and a woman. And even assuming ex gratia argumenti that sheis qualified to study for the priesthood, there is still no duty on the part of respondent toadmit her to said studies, since the school has clearly the discretion to turn down evenqualified applicants due to limitations of space, facilities, professors and optimumclassroom size and component considerations." 8 No authorities were cited, respondentapparently being of the view that the law has not reached the stage where the matter of admission to an institution of higher learning rests on the sole and uncontrolleddiscretion of the applicant. There are standards that must be met. There are policies tobe pursued. Discretion appears to be of the essence. In terms of Hohfeld's terminology,what a student in the position of petitioner possesses is a privilege rather than a right.She cannot therefore satisfy the prime and indispensable requisite of a mandamusproceeding. Such being the case, there is no duty imposed on the Loyola School of Theology. In a rather comprehensive memorandum of petitioner, who unfortunately didnot have counsel, an attempt was made to dispute the contention of respondent. Therewas a labored effort to sustain her stand, but it was not sufficiently persuasive. It isunderstandable why. It was the skill of a lay person rather than a practitioner that wasevident. While she pressed her points with vigor, she was unable to demonstrate theexistence of the clear legal right that must exist to justify the grant of this writ.
2. Nor is this all. There is, as previously noted, the recognition in the Constitution of institutions of higher learning enjoying academic freedom. It is more often identified withthe right of a faculty member to pursue his studies in his particular specialty andthereafter to make known or publish the result of his endeavors without fear thatretribution would be visited on him in the event that his conclusions are found distastefulor objectionable to the powers that be, whether in the political, economic, or academicestablishments. For the sociologist, Robert McIver it is "a right claimed by the accreditededucator, as teacher and as investigator, to interpret his findings and to communicatehis conclusions without being subjected to any interference, molestation, or penalization
because these conclusions are unacceptable to some constituted authority within or beyond the institution." 9 As for the educator and philosopher Sidney Hook, this is hisversion: "What is academic freedom? Briefly put, it is the freedom of professionallyqualified persons to inquire, discover, publish and teach the truth as they see it in thefield of their competence. It is subject to no control or authority except the control or
authority of the rational methods by which truths or conclusions are sought andestablished in these disciplines." 10
3. That is only one aspect though. Such a view does not comprehend fully the scope of academic freedom recognized by the Constitution. For it is to be noted that thereference is to the "institutions of higher learning" as the recipients of this boon. It wouldfollow then that the school or college itself is possessed of such a right. It decides for itself its aims and objectives and how best to attain them. It is free from outside coercionor interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint.It has a wide sphere of autonomy certainly extending to the choice of students. Thisconstitutional provision is not to be construed in a niggardly manner or in a gradging
fashion. That would be to frustrate its purpose, nullify its intent. Former PresidentVicente G. Sinco of the University of the Philippines, in his Philippine Political Law, issimilarly of the view that it "definitely grants the right of academic freedom to theuniversity as an institution as distinguished from the academic freedom of a universityprofessor." 11 He cited the following from Dr. Marcel Bouchard, Rector of the Universityof Dijon, France, President of the conference of rectors and vice-chancellors of European universities: " "It is a well-established fact, and yet one which sometimestends to be obscured in discussions of the problems of freedom, that the collectiveliberty of an organization is by no means the same thing as the freedom of the individualmembers within it; in fact, the two kinds of freedom are not even necessarily connected.In considering the problems of academic freedom one must distinguish, therefore,between the autonomy of the university, as a corporate body, and the freedom of theindividual university teacher." " 12 Also: "To clarify further the distinction between thefreedom of the university and that of the individual scholar, he says: "The personalaspect of freedom consists in the right of each university teacher — recognized andeffectively guaranteed by society — to seek and express the truth as he personally seesit, both in his academic work and in his capacity as a private citizen. Thus the status of the individual university teacher is at least as important, in considering academicfreedom, as the status of the institutions to which they belong and through which theydisseminate their learning."' 13 He likewise quoted from the President of the Queen'sUniversity in Belfast, Sir Eric Ashby: "'The internal conditions for academic freedom in auniversity are that the academic staff should have de facto control of the followingfunctions: (i) the admission and examination of students; (ii) the curricula for courses of study; (iii) the appointment and tenure of office of academic staff; and (iv) the allocationof income among the different categories of expenditure. It would be a poor prospect for academic freedom if universities had to rely on the literal interpretation of their constitutions in order to acquire for their academic members control of these four functions, for in one constitution or another most of these functions are laid on theshoulders of the law governing body .'" 14 Justice Frankfurter, with his extensivebackground in legal education as a former Professor of the Harvard Law School,
referred to what he called the business of a university and the four essential freedoms inthe following language: "It is the business of a university to provide that atmospherewhich is most conducive to speculation, experiment and creation. It is an atmosphere inwhich there prevail "the four essential freedoms" of a university — to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and
who may be admitted to study."
15
Thus is reinforced the conclusion reached by us thatmandamus does not lie in this case.
4. It is not an easy matter then to disregard the views of persons knowledgeable in thefield, to whom cannot be imputed lack of awareness of the need to respect freedom of thought on the part of students and scholars. Moreover, it could amount to minimizingthe full respect that must be accorded the academic freedom expressly granted by theConstitution "to institutions of higher learning." It is equally difficult to yield conformity tothe approach taken that colleges and universities should be looked upon as publicutilities devoid of any discretion as to whom to admit or reject. Education, especiallyhigher education, belongs to a different, and certainly higher, category.
5. It only remains to be added that the futility that marked the persistence of petitioner tocontinue her studies in the Loyola School of Theology is the result solely of a legalappraisal of the situation before us. The decision is not to be construed as in any wayreflecting on the scholastic standing of petitioner. There was on the part of respondentdue acknowledgment of her intelligence. Nonetheless, for reasons explained in theletter of Father Lambino, it was deemed best, considering the interest of the school aswell as of the other students and her own welfare, that she continue her graduate workelsewhere. There was nothing arbitrary in such appraisal of the circumstances deemedrelevant. It could be that on more mature reflection, even petitioner would realize thather transfer to some other institution would redound to the benefit of all concerned. At
any rate, as indicated earlier, only the legal aspect of the controversy was touched uponin this decision.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
NAGTATAGIS sa kasong ito ang karapatang mag-aral ng apat na estudyante nanasangkot sa away ng dalawang fraternity at ang karapatang akademiko ng isangpamantasan.
PRIVATE respondents Alvin Aguilar, James Paul Bungubung, Richard Reverente and
Roberto Valdes, Jr. are members of Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity who were expelled bythe De La Salle University (DLSU) and College of Saint Benilde (CSB)1 Joint DisciplineBoard because of their involvement in an offensive action causing injuries to petitioner James Yap and three other student members of Domino Lux Fraternity. This is thebackdrop of the controversy before Us pitting private respondents' right to education vis- a-vis the University's right to academic freedom.
ASSAILED in this Petition for Certiorari , Prohibition and Mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court are the following: (1) Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) datedJuly 30, 1996 dismissing DLSU's petition for certiorari against respondent Judge andprivate respondents Aguilar, Bungubung, Reverente, and Valdes, Jr.;2 (2) Resolution of
the CA dated October 15, 1996 denying the motion for reconsideration;
3
(3) Order datedJanuary 7, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 36 Manila granting privaterespondent Aguilar's motion to reiterate writ of preliminary injunction;
4 and (4)
Resolution No. 181-96 dated May 14, 1996 of the Commission on Higher Education(CHED) exonerating private respondent Aguilar and lowering the penalties for the other private respondents from expulsion to exclusion.
5
Factual Antecedents
Gleaned from the May 3, 1995 Decision of the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board, twoviolent incidents on March 29, 1995 involving private respondents occurred:
x x x From the testimonies of the complaining witnesses, it appears that oneweek prior to March 29, 1995, Mr. James Yap was eating his dinner alone inManang's Restaurant near La Salle, when he overheard two men bad-mouthingand apparently angry at Domino Lux. He ignored the comments of the two. Whenhe arrived at his boarding house, he mentioned the remarks to his two other brods while watching television. These two brods had earlier finished eating their dinner at Manang's. Then, the three, together with four other persons went backto Manang's and confronted the two who were still in the restaurant. Byadmission of respondent Bungubung in his testimony, one of the two was amember of the Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity. There was no rumble or physicalviolence then.
After this incident, a meeting was conducted between the two heads of thefraternity through the intercession of the Student Council. The Tau Gamma PhiFraternity was asking for an apology. "Kailangan ng apology" in the words of respondent Aguilar. But no apology was made.
Then, 5 members of the Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity went to the tambayan of theDomino Lux Fraternity in the campus. Among them were respondentsBungubung, Reverente and Papio. They were looking for a person whosedescription matched James Yap. According to them, this person supposedly"nambastos ng brod ." As they could not find Mr. Yap, one of them remarked
"Paano ba iyan. Pasensiya na lang ."
Came March 29, 1995 and the following events.
Ten minutes before his next class at 6:00 p.m., Mr. James Yap went out of thecampus using the Engineering Gate to buy candies across Taft Avenue. As hewas about to re-cross Taft Avenue, he heard heavy footsteps at his back. Eightto ten guys were running towards him. He panicked. He did not know what to do.Then, respondent Bungubung punched him in the head with something heavy inhis hands – "parang knuckles." Respondents Reverente and Lee were behindYap, punching him. Respondents Bungubung and Valdes who were in front of
him, were also punching him. As he was lying on the street, respondent Aguilar kicked him. People shouted; guards arrived; and the group of attackers left.
Mr. Yap could not recognize the other members of the group who attacked him.With respect to respondent Papio, Mr. Yap said "hindi ko nakita ang mukha niya,hindi ko nakita sumuntok siya ." What Mr. Yap saw was a long haired guy alsorunning with the group.
Two guards escorted Mr. Yap inside the campus. At this point, Mr. DennisPascual was at the Engineering Gate. Mr. Pascual accompanied Yap to theuniversity clinic; reported the incident to the Discipline Office; and informed his
fraternity brods at their tambayan. According to Mr. Pascual, their head of theDomino Lux Fraternity said: "Walang gagalaw. Uwian na lang ."
Mr. Ericson Cano, who was supposed to hitch a ride with Dennis Pascual, sawhim under the clock in Miguel Building. However, they did not proceed directly for home. With a certain Michael Perez, they went towards the direction of DagonoyStreet because Mr. Pascual was supposed to pick up a book for his friend fromanother friend who lives somewhere in the area.
As they were along Dagonoy Street, and before they could pass the Kolehiyo ngMalate Restaurant, Mr. Cano first saw several guys inside the restaurant. He said
not to mind them and just keep on walking. However, the group got out of therestaurant, among them respondents Reverente, Lee and Valdes. Mr. Cano toldMr. Lee: "Ayaw namin ng gulo ." But, respondent Lee hit Mr. Cano withoutprovocation. Respondent Reverente kicked Mr. Pascual and respondent Lee alsohit Mr. Pascual. Mr. Cano and Mr. Perez managed to run from the mauling andthey were chased by respondent Lee and two others.
Mr. Pascual was left behind. After respondent Reverente first kicked him, Mr.Pascual was ganged-upon by the rest. He was able to run, but the group wasable to catch up with him. His shirt was torn and he was hit at the back of hishead with a lead pipe. Respondent Lee who was chasing Cano and Perez, thenreturned to Mr. Pascual.
Mr. Pascual identified respondents Reverente and Lee, as among those who hithim. Although Mr. Pascual did not see respondent Valdes hit him, he identifiedrespondent Valdez (sic ) as also one of the members of the group.
In fact, Mr. Cano saw respondent Valdes near Mr. Pascual. He was almost near the corner of Leon Guinto and Estrada; while respondent Pascual who managedto run was stopped at the end of Dagonoy along Leon Guinto. RespondentValdes shouted: "Mga putang-ina niyo ." Respondent Reverente hit Mr. Pascualfor the last time. Apparently being satisfied with their handiwork, the group left.The victims, Cano, Perez and Pascual proceeded to a friend's house and waited
for almost two hours, or at around 8:00 in the evening before they returned to thecampus to have their wounds treated. Apparently, there were three cars roamingthe vicinity.
6
The mauling incidents were a result of a fraternity war. The victims, namely: petitioner James Yap and Dennis Pascual, Ericson Cano, and Michael Perez, are members of the"Domino Lux Fraternity," while the alleged assailants, private respondents Alvin Aguilar,James Paul Bungubung, Richard Reverente and Roberto Valdes, Jr. are members of "Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity," a rival fraternity.
The next day, March 30, 1995, petitioner Yap lodged a complaint7 with the Discipline
Board of DLSU charging private respondents with "direct assault." Similar complaints
8
were also filed by Dennis Pascual and Ericson Cano against Alvin Lee and privaterespondents Valdes and Reverente. Thus, cases entitled "De La Salle University and College of St. Benilde v. Alvin Aguilar (AB-BSM/9152105), James Paul Bungubung (AB- PSM/9234403), Robert R. Valdes, Jr. (BS-BS-APM/9235086), Alvin Lee (EDD/9462325), Richard Reverente (AB-MGT/9153837) and Malvin A. Papio (AB- MGT/9251227)" were docketed as Discipline Case No. 9495-3-25121.
The Director of the DLSU Discipline Office sent separate notices to private respondents Aguilar, Bungubung and Valdes, Jr. and Reverente informing them of the complaintsand requiring them to answer. Private respondents filed their respective answers.
9
As it appeared that students from DLSU and CSB10 were involved in the maulingincidents, a joint DLSU-CSB Discipline Board11 was formed to investigate the incidents.Thus, petitioner Board Chairman Emmanuel Sales sent notices of hearing12 to privaterespondents on April 12, 1995. Said notices uniformly stated as follows:
Please be informed that a joint and expanded Discipline Board had beenconstituted to hear and deliberate the charge against you for violation of CHED
Order No. 4 arising from the written complaints of James Yap, Dennis C.Pascual, and Ericson Y. Cano.
You are directed to appear at the hearing of the Board scheduled on April 19,1995 at 9:00 a.m. at the Bro. Connon Hall for you and your witnesses to give
testimony and present evidence in your behalf. You may be assisted by a lawyer when you give your testimony or those of your witnesses.
On or before April 18, 1995, you are further directed to provide the Board,through the Discipline Office, with a list of your witnesses as well as the swornstatement of their proposed testimony.
Your failure to appear at the scheduled hearing or your failure to submit the list of witnesses and the sworn statement of their proposed testimony will beconsidered a waiver on your part to present evidence and as an admission of theprincipal act complained of.
For your strict compliance.13
During the proceedings before the Board on April 19 and 28, 1995, private respondentsinterposed the common defense of alibi, summarized by the DLSU-CSB Joint DisciplineBoard as follows:
First, in the case of respondent Bungubung, March 29, 1995 was one of the fewinstances when he was picked-up by a driver, a certain Romeo S. Carillo. Most of the time, respondent Bungubung goes home alone sans driver. But on thisparticular date, respondent Bungubung said that his dad asked his permission to
use the car and thus, his dad instructed this driver Carillo to pick-up his son. Mr.Carillo is not a family driver, but works from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. for thePhilippine Ports Authority where the elder Bungubung is also employed.
Thus, attempting to corroborate the alibi of respondent Bungubung, Mr. Carillosaid that he arrived at La Salle at 4:56 p.m.; picked-up respondent at 5:02 p.m.;took the Roxas Blvd. route towards respondent's house in BF Parañaque (on aWednesday in Baclaran); and arrived at the house at 6:15 p.m. RespondentBungubung was dropped-off in his house, and taking the same route back, Mr.Carillo arrived at the South Harbor at 6:55 p.m. the Philippine Ports Authority islocated at the South Harbor .14
x x x x
Secondly, respondent Valdes said that he was with his friends at McDonald's Taft just before 6:00 p.m. of March 29, 1995. He said that he left McDonald at 5:50p.m. together to get some medicine at the university clinic for his throat irritation.He said that he was at the clinic at 5:52 p.m. and went back to McDonald, allwithin a span of 3 or even 4 minutes.
Two witnesses, a certain Sharon Sia and the girlfriend of respondent Valdes, acertain Jorgette Aquino, attempted to corroborate Valdez' alibi.
15
x x x x
Third, respondent Reverente told that (sic) the Board that he was at his home at5:00 p.m. of March 29, 1995. He said that he was given the responsibility to bethe paymaster of the construction workers who were doing some works in theapartment of his parents. Although he had classes in the evening, the workersaccording to him would wait for him sometimes up to 9:00 p.m. when he arrivesfrom his classes. The workers get paid everyday.
Respondent Reverente submitted an affidavit, unsigned by the workers listedthere, supposedly attesting to the fact that he paid the workers at the date andtime in question.
16
x x x x
Fourth, respondent Aguilar "solemnly sw[ore] that [he] left DLSU at 5:00 p.m. for Camp Crame for a meeting with some of the officers that we were preparing. "
17
On May 3, 1995, the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board issued a Resolution18
findingprivate respondents guilty. They were meted the supreme penalty of automaticexpulsion,19 pursuant to CHED Order No. 4.20 The dispositive part of the resolutionreads:
WHEREFORE, considering all the foregoing, the Board finds respondents ALVIN
AGUILAR (AB-BSM/9152105), JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG (AB-PSM/9234403), ALVIN LEE (EDD/94623250) and RICHARD V. REVERENTE(AB-MGT/9153837) guilty of having violated CHED Order No. 4 and therebyorders their automatic expulsion.
In the case of respondent MALVIN A. PAPIO (AB-MGT/9251227), the Boardacquits him of the charge.
SO ORDERED.21
Private respondents separately moved for reconsideration22
before the Office of the
Senior Vice-President for Internal Operations of DLSU. The motions were all denied in aLetter-Resolution23 dated June 1, 1995.
On June 5, 1995, private respondent Aguilar filed with the RTC, Manila, againstpetitioners a petition for certiorari and injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of Courtwith prayer for temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction. Itwas docketed as Civil Case No. 95-74122 and assigned to respondent Judge of Branch36. The petition essentially sought to annul the May 3, 1995 Resolution of the DLSU-
CSB Joint Discipline Board and the June 1, 1995 Letter-Resolution of the Office of theSenior Vice-President for Internal Affairs.
The following day, June 6, 1995, respondent Judge issued a TRO24 directing DLSU, itssubordinates, agents, representatives and/or other persons acting for and in its behalf to
refrain and desist from implementing Resolution dated May 3, 1995 and Letter-Resolution dated June 1, 1995 and to immediately desist from barring the enrollment of Aguilar for the second term of school year (SY) 1995.
Subsequently, private respondent Aguilar filed an ex parte motion to amend his petitionto correct an allegation in paragraph 3.21
25 of his original petition. Respondent Judge
amended the TRO26 to conform to the correction made in the amended petition.27
On June 7, 1995, the CHED directed DLSU to furnish it with copies of the case recordsof Discipline Case No. 9495-3-25121,
28 in view of the authority granted to it under
Section 77(c) of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools (MRPS).
On the other hand, private respondents Bungubung and Reverente, and later, Valdes,filed petitions-in-intervention29 in Civil Case No. 95-74122. Respondent Judge alsoissued corresponding temporary restraining orders to compel petitioner DLSU to admitsaid private respondents.
On June 19, 1995, petitioner Sales filed a motion to dismiss30
in behalf of all petitioners,except James Yap. On June 20, 1995, petitioners filed a supplemental motion todismiss31 the petitions-in-intervention.
On September 20, 1995, respondent Judge issued an Order 32 denying petitioners'
(respondents there) motion to dismiss and its supplement, and granted privaterespondents' (petitioners there) prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. The pertinentpart of the Order reads:
For this purpose, respondent, its agents, representatives or any and all other persons acting for and in its behalf is/are restrained and enjoined from –
1. Implementing and enforcing the Resolution dated May 3, 1995 orderingthe automatic expulsion of petitioner and the petitioners-in-interventionfrom the De La Salle University and the letter-resolution dated June 1,1995, affirming the Resolution dated May 3, 1995; and
2. Barring the enrolment of petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention in thecourses offered at respondent De La Salle University and to immediatelyallow them to enroll and complete their respective courses/degrees untiltheir graduation thereat in accordance with the standards set by the latter.
WHEREFORE, the ancillary remedy prayed for is granted. Respondent, itsagents, representatives, or any and all persons acting for and its behalf arehereby restrained and enjoyed from:
1. Implementing and enforcing the Resolution dated May 3, 1995 ordering
the automatic expulsion of petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention andthe Letter-Resolution dated June 1, 1995; and
2. Barring the enrollment of petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention in thecourses offered at respondent (De La Salle University) and to forthwithallow all said petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention to enroll andcomplete their respective courses/degrees until their graduation thereat.
The Writ of Preliminary Injunction shall take effect upon petitioner andpetitioners-in-intervention posting an injunctive bond in the amount of P15,000.00executed in favor of respondent to the effect that petitioner and petitioners-in-
intervention will pay to respondent all damages that the latter may suffer byreason of the injunction if the Court will finally decide that petitioner andpetitioners-in-intervention are not entitled thereto.
The motion to dismiss and the supplement thereto is denied for lack of merit.Respondents are directed to file their Answer to the Petition not later than fifteen(15) days from receipt thereof.
SO ORDERED.33
Despite the said order, private respondent Aguilar was refused enrollment by petitioner
DLSU when he attempted to enroll on September 22, 1995 for the second term of SY1995-1996. Thus, on September 25, 1995, Aguilar filed with respondent Judge anurgent motion to cite petitioners (respondents there) in contempt of court .
34 Aguilar also
prayed that petitioners be compelled to enroll him at DLSU in accordance withrespondent Judge's Order dated September 20, 1995. On September 25, 1995,respondent Judge issued
35 a writ of preliminary injunction, the relevant portion of which
reads:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED by the undersigned of the REGIONAL TRIAL COURTOF MANILA that until further orders, you the said DE LA SALLE University aswell as your subordinates, agents, representatives, employees and any other
person assisting or acting for or on your behalf, to immediately desist fromimplementing the Resolution dated May 3, 1995 ordering the automatic expulsionof petitioner and the intervenors in DLSU, and the letter-resolution dated June 1,1995 affirming the said Resolution of May 3, 1995 and to immediately desist frombarring the enrolment of petitioner and intervenors in the courses offered atDLSU and to allow them to enroll and complete their degree courses until their graduation from said school.36
On October 16, 1995, petitioner DLSU filed with the CA a petition for certiorar i37 (CA-G.R. SP No. 38719) with prayer for a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjointhe enforcement of respondent Judge's September 20, 1995 Order and writ of preliminary injunction dated September 25, 1995.
On April 12, 1996, the CA granted petitioners' prayer for preliminary injunction.
On May 14, 1996, the CHED issued its questioned Resolution No. 181-96,summarily disapproving the penalty of expulsion for all private respondents. Asfor Aguilar, he was to be reinstated, while other private respondents were to beexcluded.
38 The Resolution states:
RESOLUTION 181-96
RESOLVED THAT THE REQUEST OF THE DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY(DLSU), TAFT AVENUE, MANILA FOR THE APPROVAL OF THE PENALTY OF
EXPULSION IMPOSED ON MR. ALVIN AGUILAR, JAMES PAULBUNGUBUNG, ROBERT R. VALDES, JR., ALVIN LEE AND RICHARD V.REVERENTE BE, AS IT IS HEREBY IS, DISAPPROVED.
RESOLVED FURTHER, THAT THE COMMISSION DIRECT THE DLSU TOIMMEDIATELY EFFECT THE REINSTATEMENT OF MR. AGUILAR AND THELOWERING OF THE PENALTY OF MR. JAMES PAUL BUNGUBUNG, MR.ROBER R. VALDEZ, JR., (sic) MR. ALVIN LEE AND MR. RICHARD V.REVERENTE FROM EXPULSION TO EXCLUSION.39
Despite the directive of CHED, petitioner DLSU again prevented private respondent
Aguilar from enrolling and/or attending his classes, prompting his lawyer to write severaldemand letters40
to petitioner DLSU. In view of the refusal of petitioner DLSU to enrollprivate respondent Aguilar, CHED wrote a letter dated June 26, 1996 addressed topetitioner Quebengco requesting that private respondent Aguilar be allowed to continueattending his classes pending the resolution of its motion for reconsideration of Resolution No. 181-96. However, petitioner Quebengco refused to do so, promptingCHED to promulgate an Order dated September 23, 1996 which states:
Acting on the above-mentioned request of Mr. Aguilar through counsel enjoiningDe La Salle University (DLSU) to comply with CHED Resolution 181-96 (Re: Expulsion Case of Alvin Aguilar, et al. v. DLSU ) directing DLSU to reinstate Mr.
Aguilar and finding the urgent request as meritorious, there being no other plainand speedy remedy available, considering the set deadline for enrollment thiscurrent TRIMESTER, and in order to prevent further prejudice to his rights as astudent of the institution, DLSU, through the proper school authorities, is herebydirected to allow Mr. Alvin Aguilar to provisionally enroll, pending theCommission's Resolution of the instant Motion for Reconsideration filed byDLSU.
Notwithstanding the said directive, petitioner DLSU, through petitioner Quebengco, stillrefused to allow private respondent Aguilar to enroll. Thus, private respondent Aguilar'scounsel wrote another demand letter to petitioner DLSU.
42
Meanwhile, on June 3, 1996, private respondent Aguilar, using CHED Resolution No.181-96, filed a motion to dismiss
43 in the CA, arguing that CHED Resolution No. 181-96
rendered the CA case moot and academic.
On July 30, 1996, the CA issued its questioned resolution granting the motion todismiss of private respondent Aguilar, disposing thus:
THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, dismissal of herein petition is herebydirected.
SO ORDERED.
44
On October 15, 1996, the CA issued its resolution denying petitioners' motion forreconsideration, as follows:
It is obvious to Us that CHED Resolution No. 181-96 is immediately executory incharacter, the pendency of a Motion for Reconsideration notwithstanding.
After considering the Opposition and for lack of merit, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby denied.
SO ORDERED.
45
On October 28, 1996, petitioners requested transfer of case records to the Departmentof Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) from the CHED.
46 Petitioners claimed that it is
the DECS, not CHED, which has jurisdiction over expulsion cases, thus, necessitatingthe transfer of the case records of Discipline Case No. 9495-3-25121 to the DECS.
On November 4, 1996, in view of the dismissal of the petition for certiorari in CA-G.R.SP No. 38719 and the automatic lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction, privaterespondent Aguilar filed an urgent motion to reiterate writ of preliminary injunction datedSeptember 25, 1995 before respondent RTC Judge of Manila.47
On January 7, 1997, respondent Judge issued its questioned order grantingprivate respondent Aguilar's urgent motion to reiterate preliminary injunction. Thepertinent portion of the order reads:
In light of the foregoing, petitioner Aguilar's urgent motion to reiterate writ of preliminary injunction is hereby granted, and respondents' motion to dismiss isdenied.
The writ of preliminary injunction dated September 25, 1995 is declared to be inforce and effect.
Let a copy of this Order and the writ be served personally by the Court's sheriff upon the respondents at petitioners' expense.
SO ORDERED.48
Accordingly, private respondent Aguilar was allowed to conditionally enroll in petitioner DLSU, subject to the continued effectivity of the writ of preliminary injunction datedSeptember 25, 1995 and to the outcome of Civil Case No. 95-74122.
On February 17, 1997, petitioners filed the instant petition.
On June 15, 1998, We issued a TRO49 as prayed for by the urgent motion for theissuance of a TRO
50 dated June 4, 1998 of petitioners, and enjoined respondent Judge
from implementing the writ of preliminary injunction dated September 25, 1995 issued inCivil Case No. 95-74122, effective immediately and until further orders from this Court.
On March 27, 2006, private respondent Aguilar filed his manifestation51 stating that hehas long completed his course at petitioner DLSU. He finished and passed all hisenrolled subjects for the second trimester of 1997-1998, as indicated in his transcript of records
52 issued by DLSU. However, despite having completed all the academic
requirements for his course, DLSU has not issued a certificate of completion/graduationin his favor.
Issues
We are tasked to resolve the following issues:
1. Whether it is the DECS or the CHED which has legal authority to reviewdecisions of institutions of higher learning that impose disciplinary action on their students found violating disciplinary rules.
2. Whether or not petitioner DLSU is within its rights in expelling privaterespondents.
2.a Were private respondents accorded due process of law?
2.b Can petitioner DLSU invoke its right to academic freedom?
2.c Was the guilt of private respondents proven by substantial evidence?
3. Whether or not the penalty imposed by DLSU on private respondents isproportionate to their misdeed.
Prefatorily, there is merit in the observation of petitioner s53 that while CHED ResolutionNo. 181-96 disapproved the expulsion of other private respondents, it nonethelessauthorized their exclusion from petitioner DLSU. However, because of the dismissal of
the CA case, petitioner DLSU is now faced with the spectacle of having two differentdirectives from the CHED and the respondent Judge – CHED ordering the exclusion of private respondents Bungubung, Reverente, and Valdes, Jr., and the Judge orderingpetitioner DLSU to allow them to enroll and complete their degree courses until their graduation.
This is the reason We opt to decide the whole case on the merits, brushing asidetechnicalities, in order to settle the substantial issues involved. This Court has the power to take cognizance of the petition at bar due to compelling reasons, and the nature andimportance of the issues raised warrant the immediate exercise of Our jurisdiction.
54
This is in consonance with our case law now accorded near-religious reverence that
rules of procedure are but tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, such thatwhen its rigid application tends to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, thisCourt has the duty to suspend their operation.
55
I. It is the CHED, not DECS, which has the power of supervision and review over disciplinary cases decided by institutions of higher learning.
Ang CHED, hindi ang DECS, ang may kapangyarihan ng pagsubaybay atpagrepaso sa mga desisyong pandisiplina ng mga institusyon ng mas mataas na
pag-aaral.
Petitioners posit that the jurisdiction and duty to review student expulsion cases, eventhose involving students in secondary and tertiary levels, is vested in the DECS not inthe CHED. In support of their stance, petitioners cite Sections 4,56 15(2) & (3),57 54,58 57(3)
59 and 70
60 of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 232, otherwise known as the
"Education Act of 1982."
According to them, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7722 did not transfer to the CHED theDECS' power of supervision/review over expulsion cases involving institutions of higher learning. They say that unlike B.P. Blg. 232, R.A. No. 7722 makes no reference to the
right and duty of learning institutions to develop moral character and instill disciplineamong its students. The clear concern of R.A. No. 7722 in the creation of the CHEDwas academic, i.e., the formulation, recommendation, setting, and development of academic plans, programs and standards for institutions of higher learning. Theenumeration of CHED's powers and functions under Section 8 does not includesupervisory/review powers in student disciplinary cases. The reference in Section 3 toCHED's "coverage" of institutions of higher education is limited to the powers andfunctions specified in Section 8. The Bureau of Higher Education, which the CHED has
replaced and whose functions and responsibilities it has taken over, never had anyauthority over student disciplinary cases.
We cannot agree.
On May 18, 1994, Congress approved R.A. No. 7722, otherwise known as "An ActCreating the Commission on Higher Education, Appropriating Funds Thereof and for other purposes."
Section 3 of the said law, which paved the way for the creation of the CHED, provides:
Section 3. Creation of the Commission on Higher Education . – In pursuance of the abovementioned policies, the Commission on Higher Education is herebycreated, hereinafter referred to as Commission.
The Commission shall be independent and separate from the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) and attached to the office of the Presidentfor administrative purposes only. Its coverage shall be both public and privateinstitutions of higher education as well as degree-granting programs in all postsecondary educational institutions, public and private.
The powers and functions of the CHED are enumerated in Section 8 of R.A. No. 7722.They include the following:
Sec. 8. Powers and functions of the Commission . – The Commission shall havethe following powers and functions:
x x x x
n) promulgate such rules and regulations and exercise such other powers andfunctions as may be necessary to carry out effectively the purpose and objectivesof this Act; and
o) perform such other functions as may be necessary for its effective operationsand for the continued enhancement of growth or development of higher education.
Clearly, there is no merit in the contention of petitioners that R.A. No. 7722 did not
transfer to the CHED the DECS' power of supervision/review over expulsion casesinvolving institutions of higher learning.
First, the foregoing provisions are all-embracing . They make no reservations of powersto the DECS insofar as institutions of higher learning are concerned. They show that theauthority and supervision over all public and private institutions of higher education, aswell as degree-granting programs in all post-secondary educational institutions, publicand private, belong to the CHED, not the DECS.
Second, to rule that it is the DECS which has authority to decide disciplinary casesinvolving students on the tertiary level would render nugatory the coverage of theCHED, which is "both public and private institutions of higher education as well asdegree granting programs in all post secondary educational institutions, public andprivate." That would be absurd.
It is of public knowledge that petitioner DLSU is a private educational institution whichoffers tertiary degree programs. Hence, it is under the CHED authority.
Third, the policy of R.A. No. 772261 is not only the protection, fostering and promotionof the right of all citizens to affordable quality education at all levels and the taking of appropriate steps to ensure that education shall be accessible to all. The law is likewise concerned with ensuring and protecting academic freedom and with promoting itsexercise and observance for the continued intellectual growth of students, theadvancement of learning and research, the development of responsible and effectiveleadership, the education of high-level and middle-level professionals, and the
enrichment of our historical and cultural heritage.
It is thus safe to assume that when Congress passed R.A. No. 7722, its members wereaware that disciplinary cases involving students on the tertiary level would continue toarise in the future, which would call for the invocation and exercise of institutions of higher learning of their right to academic freedom.
Fourth, petitioner DLSU cited no authority in its bare claim that the Bureau of Higher Education, which CHED replaced, never had authority over student disciplinary cases.In fact, the responsibilities of other government entities having functions similar to thoseof the CHED were transferred to the CHED.62
Section 77 of the MRPS63 on the process of review in student discipline cases shouldtherefore be read in conjunction with the provisions of R.A. No. 7722.
Fifth, Section 18 of R.A. No. 7722 is very clear in stating that "[j]urisdiction over DECS-supervised or chartered state-supported post-secondary degree-granting vocational and tertiary institutions shall be transferred to the Commission [On Higher Education]." This provision does not limit or distinguish that what is beingtransferred to the CHED is merely the formulation, recommendation, setting anddevelopment of academic plans, programs and standards for institutions of higher learning, as what petitioners would have us believe as the only concerns of R.A. No.7722.
Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus : Where the law does not
distinguish, neither should we.
To Our mind, this provision, if not an explicit grant of jurisdiction to the CHED,necessarily includes the transfer to the CHED of any jurisdiction which the DECSmight have possessed by virtue of B.P. Blg. 232 or any other law or rule for that matter.
IIa. Private respondents were accorded due process of law.
Ang mga private respondents ay nabigyan ng tamang proseso ng batas.
The Due Process Clause in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution embodies a systemof rights based on moral principles so deeply imbedded in the traditions and feelings of our people as to be deemed fundamental to a civilized society as conceived by our
entire history.
64
The constitutional behest that no person shall be deprived of life, libertyor property without due process of law is solemn and inflexible.65
In administrative cases, such as investigations of students found violating schooldiscipline, "[t]here are withal minimum standards which must be met before to satisfythe demands of procedural due process and these are: that (1) the students must beinformed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2) theyshall have the right to answer the charges against them and with the assistance if counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them; (4) theyshall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence mustbe duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school
authorities to hear and decide the case."
66
Where a party was afforded an opportunity to participate in the proceedings but failed todo so, he cannot complain of deprivation of due process.67 Notice and hearing is thebulwark of administrative due process, the right to which is among the primary rightsthat must be respected even in administrative proceedings.68 The essence of dueprocess is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrativeproceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seekreconsideration of the action or ruling complained of .
69 So long as the party is given the
opportunity to advocate her cause or defend her interest in due course, it cannot be saidthat there was denial of due process.70
A formal trial-type hearing is not, at all times and in all instances, essential to dueprocess – it is enough that the parties are given a fair and reasonable opportunity toexplain their respective sides of the controversy and to present supporting evidence onwhich a fair decision can be based.71 "To be heard" does not only mean presentation of testimonial evidence in court – one may also be heard through pleadings and where theopportunity to be heard through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of dueprocess.
72
Private respondents were duly informed in writing of the charges against them by theDLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board through petitioner Sales. They were given theopportunity to answer the charges against them as they, in fact, submitted their respective answers. They were also informed of the evidence presented against themas they attended all the hearings before the Board. Moreover, private respondents weregiven the right to adduce evidence on their behalf and they did. Lastly, the DisciplineBoard considered all the pieces of evidence submitted to it by all the parties beforerendering its resolution in Discipline Case No. 9495-3-25121.
Private respondents cannot claim that they were denied due process when they werenot allowed to cross-examine the witnesses against them. This argument was alreadyrejected in Guzman v. National University 73
where this Court held that "x x x theimposition of disciplinary sanctions requires observance of procedural due process. Andit bears stressing that due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not
entail proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedingsin courts of justice. The proceedings in student discipline cases may be summary; andcross examination is not, x x x an essential part thereof."
IIb. Petitioner DLSU, as an institution of higher learning, possesses academic freedom which includes determination of who to admit for study.
Ang petitioner DLSU, bilang institusyon ng mas mataas na pag-aaral, aynagtataglay ng kalayaang akademiko na sakop ang karapatang pumili ng mgamag-aaral dito.
Section 5(2), Article XIV of the Constitution guaranties all institutions of higher learningacademic freedom. This institutional academic freedom includes the right of the schoolor college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to attain them freefrom outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public interestcalls for some restraint.
74 According to present jurisprudence, academic freedom
encompasses the independence of an academic institution to determine for itself (1)who may teach, (2) what may be taught, (3) how it shall teach, and (4) who may beadmitted to study.
75
It cannot be gainsaid that "the school has an interest in teaching the student discipline,a necessary, if not indispensable, value in any field of learning. By instilling discipline,
the school teaches discipline. Accordingly, the right to discipline the student likewisefinds basis in the freedom "what to teach."76 Indeed, while it is categorically stated under the Education Act of 1982 that students have a right "to freely choose their field of study, subject to existing curricula and to continue their course therein up tograduation,"77 such right is subject to the established academic and disciplinarystandards laid down by the academic institution. Petitioner DLSU, therefore, can verywell exercise its academic freedom, which includes its free choice of students for admission to its school.
IIc. The guilt of private respondents Bungubung, Reverente and Valdes, Jr. was proven by substantial evidence.
Ang pagkakasala ng private respondents na sina Bungubung, Reverente atValdes, Jr. ay napatunayan ng ebidensiyang substansyal.
As has been stated earlier, private respondents interposed the common defense of alibi.However, in order that alibi may succeed as a defense, "the accused must establish byclear and convincing evidence (a) his presence at another place at the time of the
perpetration of the offense and (b) the physical impossibility of his presence at thescene of the crime."
78
On the other hand, the defense of alibi may not be successfully invoked where theidentity of the assailant has been established by witnesses.
79 Positive identification of
accused where categorical and consistent, without any showing of ill motive on the partof the eyewitness testifying, should prevail over the alibi and denial of appellants whosetestimonies are not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence.
80 Well-settled is the
rule that denial and alibi, being weak defenses, cannot overcome the positivetestimonies of the offended parties.81
Courts reject alibi when there are credible eyewitnesses to the crime who can positivelyidentify the accused.82 Alibi is an inherently weak defense and courts must receive itwith caution because one can easily fabricate an alibi.83 Jurisprudence holds that denial,like alibi, is inherently weak and crumbles in light of positive declarations of truthfulwitnesses who testified on affirmative matters that accused were at the scene of the
crime and were the victim's assailants. As between categorical testimonies that ring of truth on one hand and a bare denial on the other, the former must prevail.84
Alibi is theweakest of all defenses for it is easy to fabricate and difficult to disprove, and it is for this reason that it cannot prevail over the positive identification of accused by thewitnesses.85
The required proof in administrative cases, such as in student discipline cases, isneither proof beyond reasonable doubt nor preponderance of evidence but onlysubstantial evidence. According to Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations ,86
it means"such reasonable evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to supporta conclusion."
Viewed from the foregoing, We reject the alibi of private respondents Bungubung,Valdes Jr., and Reverente.1awphi1 They were unable to show convincingly that theywere not at the scene of the crime on March 29, 1995 and that it was impossible for them to have been there. Moreover, their alibi cannot prevail over their positiveidentification by the victims.
We hark back to this Court's pronouncement affirming the expulsion of several studentsfound guilty of hazing:
No one can be so myopic as to doubt that the immediate reinstatement of
respondent students who have been investigated and found guilty by theDisciplinary Board to have violated petitioner university's disciplinary rules andstandards will certainly undermine the authority of the administration of theschool. This we would be most loathe to do.
More importantly, it will seriously impair petitioner university's academic freedomwhich has been enshrined in the 1935, 1973 and the present 1987 Constitution.87
Certainly, private respondents Bungubung, Reverente and Valdes, Jr. do not deserve toclaim a venerable institution as their own, for they may foreseeably cast a malevolentinfluence on the students currently enrolled, as well as those who come after them.
88 It
must be borne in mind that universities are established, not merely to develop theintellect and skills of the studentry, but to inculcate lofty values, ideals and attitudes;
nay, the development, or flowering if you will, of the total man.
89
As for private respondent Aguilar, however, We are inclined to give credence to his alibithat he was at Camp Crame in Quezon City at the time of the incident in question onMarch 29, 1995. This claim was amply corroborated by the certification that hesubmitted before the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board, to wit:
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
TO WHOM THIS MAY CONCERN:
We, the undersigned, hereby declare and affirm by way of thisCertification that sometime on March 29, 1995, at about and between 4:30P.M. and 5:30 P.M., we were together with Alvin A. Aguilar, at KianganHall, inside Camp Crame, Quezon City, meeting in connection with anaffair of our class known as Class 7, Batch 89 of the PhilippineConstabulary discussing on the proposed sponsorship of TAU GAMMAPHI from said Batch '89 affair.
That the meeting was terminated at about 6:30 P.M. that evening and Alvin Aguilar had asked our permission to leave and we saw him leave Camp Crame,in his car with the driver.
April 18, 1995, Camp Crame, Quezon City.90
The said certification was duly signed by PO3 Nicanor R. Faustino (Anti-OrganizedCrime CIC, NCR), PO3 Alejandro D. Deluviar (ODITRM, Camp Crame, Quezon City),PO2 Severino C. Filler (TNTSC, Camp Crame, Quezon City), and PO3 Ireneo M.Desesto (Supply Center, PNPLSS). The rule is that alibi assumes significance or strength when it is amply corroborated by credible and disinterested witnesses.91 It istrue that alibi is a weak defense which an accused can easily fabricate to escapecriminal liability. But where the prosecution evidence is weak, and betrays lack of credibility as to the identification of defendant, alibi assumes commensurate strength.
This is but consistent with the presumption of innocence in favor of accused.
92
Alibi is not always undeserving of credit, for there are times when accused has no other possible defense for what could really be the truth as to his whereabouts at the crucialtime, and such defense may, in fact, tilt the scales of justice in his favor .93
III. The penalty of expulsion imposed by DLSU on private respondents is disproportionate to their misdeed.
Ang parusang expulsion na ipinataw ng DLSU sa private respondents ay hindiangkop sa kanilang pagkakasala.
It is true that schools have the power to instill discipline in their students as subsumed intheir academic freedom and that "the establishment of rules governing university-
student relations, particularly those pertaining to student discipline, may be regarded asvital, not merely to the smooth and efficient operation of the institution, but to its verysurvival."
94 This power, however, does not give them the untrammeled discretion to
impose a penalty which is not commensurate with the gravity of the misdeed. If theconcept of proportionality between the offense committed and the sanction imposed isnot followed, an element of arbitrariness intrudes. That would give rise to a due processquestion.
95
We agree with respondent CHED that under the circumstances, the penalty of expulsionis grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the acts committed by private respondentsBungubung, Reverente, and Valdes, Jr. Each of the two mauling incidents lasted only
for few seconds and the victims did not suffer any serious injury. Disciplinary measuresespecially where they involve suspension, dismissal or expulsion, cut significantly intothe future of a student. They attach to him for life and become a mortgage of his future,hardly redeemable in certain cases. Officials of colleges and universities must beanxious to protect it, conscious of the fact that, appropriately construed, a disciplinaryaction should be treated as an educational tool rather than a punitive measure.
96
Accordingly, We affirm the penalty of exclusion97
only, not expulsion,98
imposed onthem by the CHED. As such, pursuant to Section 77(b) of the MRPS, petitioner DLSUmay exclude or drop the names of the said private respondents from its rolls for beingundesirable, and transfer credentials immediately issued.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Court of AppealsResolutions dated July 30, 1996 and dated October 15, 1996, and Regional Trial Courtof Manila, Branch 36, Order dated January 7, 1997 are ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE,while CHED Resolution 181-96 dated May 14, 1996 is AFFIRMED.
Petitioner DLSU is ordered to issue a certificate of completion/graduation in favor of private respondent Aguilar. On the other hand, it may exclude or drop the names of private respondents Bungubung, Reverente, and Valdes, Jr. from its rolls, and their transfer credentials immediately issued.
IS the president of a state university outside the reach of the disciplinary jurisdiction constitutionally granted to the Civil Service Commission (CSC) over all civil
servants and officials?
Does the assumption by the CSC of jurisdiction over a president of a state
The twin questions, among others, are posed in this petition for review on
certiorari of the Decision1[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) which annulled two (2) CSC
Resolutions2[2] against respondent Henry A. Sojor.
The Facts
The uncontroverted facts that led to the controversy, as found by the CSC and
the CA, are as follows:
On August 1, 1991, respondent Sojor was appointed by then President Corazon
Aquino as president of the Central Visayas Polytechnic College (CVPC) in Dumaguete
City. In June 1997, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8292, or the ―Higher Education
Modernization Act of 1997,‖ was enacted. This law mandated that a Board of Trustees
(BOT) be formed to act as the governing body in state colleges. The BOT of CVPC
appointed respondent as president, with a four-year term beginning September 1998 upto September 2002.3[3] Upon the expiration of his first term of office in 2002, he was
since the BOT is headed by the Committee on Higher Education Chairperson who was
under the OP, the BOT was also under the OP. Since the president of CVPC was
appointed by the BOT, then he was a presidential appointee. On the matter of the
jurisdiction granted to
CSC by virtue of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 80714[14] enacted in October 1975,
respondent contended that this was superseded by the provisions of R.A. No.
8292,15[15] a later law which granted to the BOT the power to remove university
officials.
CSC Disposition
In a Resolution dated March 30, 2004,16[16] the CSC dismissed respondent’s
appeal and authorized its regional office to proceed with the investigation. He was also
preventively suspended for 90 days. The fallo of the said resolution states:
WHEREFORE, the appeal of Henry A. Sojor, President of CentralVisayas Polytechnic College, is hereby DISMISSED. The Civil ServiceCommission Regional Office No. VII, Cebu City, is authorized to proceedwith the formal investigation of the cases against Sojor and submit theinvestigation reports to the Commission within one hundred five (105)
days from receipt hereof. Finally, Sojor is preventively suspended for ninety (90) days.17[17]
In decreeing that it had jurisdiction over the disciplinary case against respondent,
the CSC opined that his claim that he was a presidential appointee had no basis in fact
or in law. CSC maintained that it had concurrent jurisdiction with the BOT of the CVPC.
We quote:
His appointment dated September 23, 2002 was signed by then
Commission on Higher Education (CHED) Chairman Ester A. Garcia.Moreover, the said appointment expressly stated that it was approved andadopted by the Central Visayas Polytechnic College Board of Trustees on
August 13, 2002 in accordance with Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8292(Higher education Modernization Act of 1997), which explicitly providesthat, ―He (the president of a state college) shall be appointed by the Board of Regents/Trustees, upon recommendation of a duly constituted search committee .‖ Since the President of a state college is appointed by theBoard of Regents/Trustees of the college concerned, it is crystalclear that he is not a presidential appointee. Therefore, it is withoutdoubt that Sojor, being the President of a state college (Central
Visayas Polytechnic College), is within the disciplinary jurisdiction ofthe Commission.
The allegation of appellant Sojor that the Commission is bereft of disciplinary jurisdiction over him since the same is exclusively lodged inthe CVPC Board of Trustees, being the appointing authority, cannot beconsidered. The Commission and the CVPC Board of Trustees haveconcurrent jurisdiction over cases against officials and employees ofthe said agency. Since the three (3) complaints against Sojor were filedwith the Commission and not with the CVPC, then the former alreadyacquired disciplinary jurisdiction over the appellant to the exclusion of thelatter agency.18[18] (Emphasis supplied)
The CSC categorized respondent as a third level official, as defined under its
rules, who are under the jurisdiction of the Commission proper. Nevertheless, it
adopted the formal charges issued by its regional office and ordered it to proceed with
the investigation:
Pursuant to the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the CivilService, Sojor, being a third level official, is within the disciplinary
jurisdiction of the Commission Proper. Thus, strictly speaking, theCommission has the sole jurisdiction to issue the formal charge against
Sojor. x x x However, since the CSC RO No. VII already issued theformal charges against him and found merit in the said formal charges, thesame is adopted. The CSC RO No. VII is authorized to proceed withthe formal investigation of the case against Sojor in accordance withthe procedure outlined in the aforestated Uniform Rules.19[19](Emphasis supplied)
No merit was found by the CSC in respondent’s motion for reconsideration and,
accordingly, denied it with finality on July 6, 2004.20[20]
Respondent appealed the CSC resolutions to the CA via a petition for certiorari
and prohibition. He alleged that the CSC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it issued
the assailed resolutions; that CSC encroached upon the academic freedom of CVPC;
and that the power to remove, suspend, and discipline the president of CVPC was
exclusively lodged in the BOT of CVPC.
CA Disposition
On September 29, 2004, the CA issued a writ of preliminary injunction directing
the CSC to cease and desist from enforcing its Resolution dated March 30, 2004 and
Resolution dated July 6, 2004.21[21] Thus, the formal investigation of the
administrative charges against Sojor before the CSC-RO was suspended.
On June 27, 2005, after giving both parties an opportunity to air their sides, the
CA resolved in favor of respondent. It annulled the questioned CSC resolutions and
permanently enjoined the CSC from proceeding with the administrative investigation.
The dispositive part of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, and finding that therespondent Civil Service Commission acted without jurisdiction in issuingthe assailed Resolution Nos. 040321 and 040766 dated March 20, 2004and July 6, 2004, respectively, the same are hereby ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE. The preliminary injunction issued by this Court on September 29,
The CA ruled that the power to appoint carries with it the power to remove or to
discipline. It declared that the enactment of R.A. No. 929923[23] in 2004, which
converted CVPC into NORSU, did not divest the BOT of the power to discipline and
remove its faculty members, administrative officials, and employees. Respondent was
appointed as president of CVPC by the BOT by virtue of the authority granted to it under
Section 6 of R.A. No. 8292.24[24] The power of the BOT to remove and discipline
erring employees, faculty members, and administrative officials as expressly provided
for under Section 4 of R.A. No. 8292 is also granted to the BOR of NORSU under
Section 7 of R.A. No. 9299. The said provision reads:
Power and Duties of Governing Boards . – The governing boardshall have the following specific powers and duties in addition to itsgeneral powers of administration and exercise of all the powers granted tothe board of directors of a corporation under Section 36 of BatasPambansa Blg. 68, otherwise known as the Corporation Code of thePhilippines:
x x x x
to fix and adjust salaries of faculty members and administrative officialsand employees x x x; and to remove them for cause in accordancewith the requirements of due process of law. (Emphasis added)
The Constitution grants to the CSC administration over the entire civil
service.28[28] As defined, the civil service embraces every branch, agency,subdivision, and instrumentality of the government, including every government-owned
or controlled corporation.29[29] It is further classified into career and non-career
service positions. Career service positions are those where: (1) entrance is based on
merit and fitness or highly technical qualifications; (2) there is opportunity for
advancement to higher career positions; and (3) there is security of tenure. These
include:
(1) Open Career positions for appointment to which prior qualification inan appropriate examination is required;
(2) Closed Career positions which are scientific, or highly technical innature; these include the faculty and academic staff of state collegesand universities, and scientific and technical positions in scientific or research institutions which shall establish and maintain their own meritsystems;
(3) Positions in the Career Executive Service; namely, Undersecretary,
Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director, Assistant Bureau Director,Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director, Chief of DepartmentService and other officers of equivalent rank as may be identified by
the Career Executive Service Board, all of whom are appointed by thePresident;
(4) Career officers, other than those in the Career Executive Service,who are appointed by the President, such as the Foreign ServiceOfficers in the Department of Foreign Affairs;
(5) Commissioned officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces whichshall maintain a separate merit system;
(6) Personnel of government-owned or controlled corporations, whether performing governmental or proprietary functions, who do not fallunder the non-career service; and
(7) Permanent laborers, whether skilled, semi-skilled, or unskilled.30[30]
Career positions are further grouped into three levels. Entrance to the first two
levels is determined through competitive examinations, while entrance to the third level
is prescribed by the Career Executive Service Board.31[31] The positions covered by
each level are:
(a) The first level shall include clerical, trades, crafts, and custodialservice positions which involve non-professional or subprofessionalwork in a non-supervisory or supervisory capacity requiring less thanfour years of collegiate studies;
(b) The second level shall include professional, technical, and scientificpositions which involve professional, technical, or scientific work in anon-supervisory or supervisory capacity requiring at least four years of college work up to Division Chief level; and
(c) The third level shall cover positions in the Career ExecutiveService.32[32]
On the other hand, non-career service positions are characterized by: (1)
entrance not by the usual tests of merit and fitness; and (2) tenure which is limited to a
period specified by law, coterminous with the appointing authority or subject to his
pleasure, or limited to the duration of a particular project for which purpose employment
(1) Elective officials and their personal or confidential staff;
(2) Secretaries and other officials of Cabinet rank who hold their positions at the pleasure of the President and their personal or confidential staff(s);
(3) Chairman and members of commissions and boards with fixedterms of office and their personal or confidential staff;
(4) Contractual personnel or those whose employment in thegovernment is in accordance with a special contract to undertake aspecific work or job, requiring special or technical skills not available inthe employing agency, to be accomplished within a specific period,which in no case shall exceed one year, and performs or accomplishes the specific work or job, under his own responsibilitywith a minimum of direction and supervision from the hiring agency;
and
(5) Emergency and seasonal personnel.34[34]
It is evident that CSC has been granted by the Constitution and the
Administrative Code jurisdiction over all civil service positions in the government
service, whether career or non-career. From this grant of general jurisdiction, the CSC
promulgated the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service.35[35] We find that the specific jurisdiction, as spelled out in the CSC rules, did
not depart from the general jurisdiction granted to it by law. The jurisdiction of the
Regional Office of the CSC and the Commission central office (Commission Proper) is
Section 4. Jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission . – The CivilService Commission shall hear and decide administrative cases institutedby, or brought before it, directly or on appeal, including contested
appointments, and shall review decisions and actions of its offices and of the agencies attached to it.
Except as otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law,the Civil Service Commission shall have the final authority to passupon the removal, separation and suspension of all officers andemployees in the civil service and upon all matters relating to theconduct, discipline and efficiency of such officers and employees.
Section 5. Jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission Proper . – The Civil Service Commission Proper shall have jurisdiction over the
following cases:
A. Disciplinary1. Decisions of Civil Service Regional Offices brought
before it on petition for review;2. Decisions of heads of departments, agencies,
provinces, cities, municipalities and other instrumentalities, imposing penalties exceeding thirtydays suspension or fine in an amount exceedingthirty days salary brought before it on appeal;
3. Complaints brought against Civil Service
Commission Proper personnel;4. Complaints against third level officials who are not
presidential appointees;5. Complaints against Civil Service officials and
employees which are not acted upon by theagencies and such other complaints requiringdirect or immediate action, in the interest ofjustice;
6. Requests for transfer of venue of hearing on casesbeing heard by Civil Service Regional Offices;
7. Appeals from the Order of Preventive Suspension;
and8. Such other actions or requests involving issues
arising out of or in connection with the foregoingenumerations.
B. Non-Disciplinary1. Decisions of Civil Service Commission Regional
2. Requests for favorable recommendation on petitionfor executive clemency;
3. Protests against the appointment, or other personnelactions, involving third level officials; and
4. Such other analogous actions or petitions arising out
of or in relation with the foregoing enumerations.
Section 6. Jurisdiction of Civil Service Regional Offices . – The CivilService Commission Regional Offices shall have jurisdiction over thefollowing cases:
A. Disciplinary1. Complaints initiated by, or brought before, the
Civil Service Commission Regional Officesprovided that the alleged acts or omissions werecommitted within the jurisdiction of the Regional
Office, including Civil Service examinationanomalies or irregularities and the personscomplained of are employees of agencies, localor national, within said geographical areas;
2. Complaints involving Civil Service CommissionRegional Office personnel who are appointees of said office; and
3. Petitions to place respondent under PreventiveSuspension.
B. Non-Disciplinary1. Disapproval of appointments brought before it on
appeal;2. Protests against the appointments of first and
second level employees brought before it directly or on appeal. (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent, a state university president with a fixed term of office appointed by
the governing board of trustees of the university, is a non-career civil service officer. He
was appointed by the chairman and members of the governing board of CVPC. By
clear provision of law, respondent is a non-career civil servant who is under the
II. The power of the BOR to discipline officials and employees is not exclusive.CSC has concurrent jurisdiction over a president of a state university.
Section 4 of R.A. No. 8292, or the Higher Education Modernization Act of 1997,
under which law respondent was appointed during the time material to the present case,
provides that the school’s governing board shall have the general powers of
administration granted to a corporation. In addition, Section 4 of the law grants to the
board the power to remove school faculty members, administrative officials, and
employees for cause:
Section 4. Powers and Duties of Governing Boards . – Thegoverning board shall have the following specific powers and dutiesin addition to its general powers of administration and the exerciseof all the powers granted to the board of directors of a corporation under Section 36 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 68, otherwise known as theCorporation Code of the Philippines:
x x x x
h) to fix and adjust salaries of faculty members andadministrative officials and employees subject to theprovisions of the revised compensation and classificationsystem and other pertinent budget and compensationlaws governing hours of service, and such other dutiesand conditions as it may deem proper; to grant them, atits discretion, leaves of absence under such regulationsas it may promulgate, any provisions of existing law tothe contrary not withstanding; and to remove them forcause in accordance with the requirements of dueprocess of law. (Emphasis supplied)
The above section was subsequently reproduced as Section 7(i) of the
succeeding law that converted CVPC into NORSU, R.A. No. 9299. Notably, and in
contrast with the earlier law, R.A. No. 9299 now provides that the administration of the
university and exercise of corporate powers of the board of the school shall be
exclusive:
Sec. 4. Administration . – The University shall have the generalpowers of a corporation set forth in Batas Pambansa Blg. 68, asamended, otherwise known as ―The Corporation Code of the Philippines.‖The administration of the University and the exercise of its corporatepowers shall be vested exclusively in the Board of Regents and thepresident of the University insofar as authorized by the Board .
Measured by the foregoing yardstick, there is no question that administrative
power over the school exclusively belongs to its BOR. But does this exclusive
administrative power extend to the power to remove its erring employees and officials?
In light of the other provisions of R.A. No. 9299, respondent’s argument that the
BOR has exclusive power to remove its university officials must fail. Section 7 of R.A.
No. 9299 states that the power to remove faculty members, employees, and officials of
the university is granted to the BOR ―in addition to its general powers of administration.‖
This provision is essentially a reproduction of Section 4 of its predecessor, R.A. No.
8292, demonstrating that the intent of the lawmakers did not change even with the
enactment of the new law. For clarity, the text of the said section is reproduced below:
Sec. 7. Powers and Duties of the Board of Regents . – The Boardshall have the following specific powers and duties in addition to itsgeneral powers of administration and the exercise of all the powersgranted to the Board of Directors of a corporation under existing laws:
i. To fix and adjust salaries of faculty members andadministrative officials and employees, subject to the
provisions of the Revised Compensation and PositionClassification System and other pertinent budget andcompensation laws governing hours of service and suchother duties and conditions as it may deem proper; togrant them, at its discretion, leaves of absence under such regulations as it may promulgate, any provision of existing law to the contrary notwithstanding; and toremove them for cause in accordance with therequirements of due process of law.36[36] (Emphasissupplied)
Verily, the BOR of NORSU has the sole power of administration over the
university. But this power is not exclusive in the matter of disciplining and removing its
employees and officials.
Although the BOR of NORSU is given the specific power under R.A. No. 9299 to
discipline its employees and officials, there is no showing that such power is exclusive.
When the law bestows upon a government body the jurisdiction to hear and decide
cases involving specific matters, it is to be presumed that such jurisdiction is exclusive
unless it be proved that another body is likewise vested with the same jurisdiction, in
which case, both bodies have concurrent jurisdiction over the matter.37[37]
All members of the civil service are under the jurisdiction of the CSC, unless
otherwise provided by law. Being a non-career civil servant does not remove
respondent from the ambit of the CSC. Career or non-career, a civil service official or
employee is within the jurisdiction of the CSC.
This is not a case of first impression.
In University of the Philippines v. Regino ,38[38] this Court struck down the claim
of exclusive jurisdiction of the UP BOR to discipline its employees. The Court held then:
The Civil Service Law (PD 807) expressly vests in the Commissionappellate jurisdiction in administrative disciplinary cases involvingmembers of the Civil Service. Section 9(j) mandates that the Commissionshall have the power to ―hear and decide administrative disciplinary casesinstituted directly with it in accordance with Section 37 or brought to it onappeal.‖ And Section 37(a) provides that, ―The Commission shall decide
upon appeal all administrative disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty (30) days, or fine in anamount exceeding thirty days’ salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from office .‖ (Emphasis supplied)
Under the 1972 Constitution, all government-owned or controlledcorporations, regardless of the manner of their creation, were consideredpart of the Civil Service. Under the 1987 Constitution, only government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters fall within the scopeof the Civil Service pursuant to Article IX-B, Section 2(1), which states:
―The Civil Service embraces all branches,subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of thegovernment, including government-owned or controlledcorporations with original charters.‖
As a mere government-owned or controlled corporation, UP was
clearly a part of the Civil Service under the 1973 Constitution and nowcontinues to be so because it was created by a special law and has anoriginal charter. As a component of the Civil Service, UP is therefore
governed by PD 807 and administrative cases involving thediscipline of its employees come under the appellate jurisdiction ofthe Civil Service Commission.39[39] (Emphasis supplied)
In the more recent case of Camacho v. Gloria ,40[40] this Court lent credence to
the concurrent jurisdiction of the CSC when it affirmed that a case against a university
official may be f iled either with the university’s BOR or directly with the CSC. We quote:
Further, petitioner contends that the creation of the committee bythe respondent Secretary, as Chairman of the USP Board of Regents, wascontrary to the Civil Service Rules. However, he cites no specific provisionof the Civil Service Law which was violated by the respondents in formingthe investigating committee. The Civil Service Rules embodied inExecutive Order 292 recognize the power of the Secretary and theuniversity, through its governing board, to investigate and decide mattersinvolving disciplinary action against officers and employees under their
jurisdiction. Of course under EO 292, a complaint against a stateuniversity official may be filed either with the university’s Board of Regents or directly with the Civil Service Commission, although theCSC may delegate the investigation of a complaint and for thatpurpose, may deputize any department, agency, official or group ofofficials to conduct such investigation.41[41] (Emphasis supplied)
200751[2] and its resolution of June 20, 200852[3] that set aside the National Labor
Relations Commission’s (NLRC ) resolution dated July 18, 2005.53[4]
THE FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
The background facts are not disputed and are summarized below.
AMACC is an educational institution engaged in computer-based education in the
country. One of AMACC’s biggest schools in the country is its branch at Parañaque
City. The petitioners were faculty members who started teaching at AMACC on May 25,
1998. The petitioner Mercado was engaged as a Professor 3, while petitioner Tonog
was engaged as an Assistant Professor 2. On the other hand, petitioners De Leon,
Lachica and Alba, Jr., were all engaged as Instructor 1.54[5] The petitioners executed
individual Teacher’s Contracts for each of the trimesters that they were engaged to
teach, with the following common stipulation:55[6]
1. POSITION. The TEACHER has agreed to accept a non-tenuredappointment to work in the College of xxx effective xxx to xxx or forthe duration of the last term that the TEACHER is given a teaching
In view of the expiration of your contract to teach with AMACC-Paranaque, We wish to inform you that your contract shall no longer berenewed effective Thirty (30) days upon receipt of this notice. We
therefore would like to thank you for your service and wish you good luckas you pursue your career.
You are hereby instructed to report to the HRD for further instruction. Please bear in mind that as per company policy, you arerequired to accomplish your clearance and turn-over all documents andaccountabilities to your immediate superior.
For your information and guidance
The petitioners amended their labor arbitration complaint to include the charge of
illegal dismissal against AMACC. In their Position Paper, the petitioners claimed that
their dismissal was illegal because it was made in retaliation for their complaint for
monetary benefits and discriminatory practices against AMACC. The petitioners also
contended that AMACC failed to give them adequate notice; hence, their dismissal was
ineffectual.61[12]
AMACC contended in response that the petitioners worked under a contracted
term under a non-tenured appointment and were still within the three-year probationary
period for teachers. Their contracts were not renewed for the following term because
they failed to pass the Performance Appraisal System for Teachers (PAST ) while others
failed to comply with the other requirements for regularization, promotion, or increase in
salary. This move, according to AMACC, was justified since the school has to maintain
On March 15, 2002, Labor Arbiter (LA) Florentino R. Darlucio declared in hisdecision63[14] that the petitioners had been illegally dismissed, and ordered AMACC to
reinstate them to their former positions without loss of seniority rights and to pay them
full backwages, attorney’s fees and 13th month pay. The LA ruled that Article 281 of the
Labor Code on probationary employment applied to the case; that AMACC allowed the
petitioners to teach for the first semester of school year 2000-200; that AMACC did not
specify who among the petitioners failed to pass the PAST and who among them did
not comply with the other requirements of regularization, promotions or increase in
salary; and that the petitioners’ dismissal could not be sustained on the basis of
AMACC’s ―vague and general allegations‖ without substantial factual basis.64[15]
Significantly, the LA found no ―discrimination in the adjustments for the salary rate of the
faculty members based on the performance and other qualification which is an exercise
of management prerogative .‖65[16] On this basis, the LA paid no heed to the claims for
salary increases.
The NLRC Ruling
On appeal, the NLRC in a Resolution dated July 18, 200566[17] denied
AMACC’s appeal for lack of merit and affirmed in toto the LA’s ruling. The NLRC,
however, observed that the applicable law is Section 92 of the Manual of Regulations
for Private Schools (which mandates a probationary period of nine consecutive
trimesters of satisfactory service for academic personnel in the tertiary level where
In a decision issued on November 29, 2007,68[19] the CA granted AMACC’s
petition for certiorari and dismissed the petitioners’ complaint for illegal dismissal.
The CA ruled that under the Manual for Regulations for Private Schools, a
teaching personnel in a private educational institution (1) must be a full time teacher; (2)
must have rendered three consecutive years of service; and (3) such service must be
satisfactory before he or she can acquire permanent status.
The CA noted that the petitioners had not completed three (3) consecutive yearsof service (i.e. six regular semesters or nine consecutive trimesters of satisfactory
service) and were still within their probationary period; their teaching stints only covered
a period of two (2) years and three (3) months when AMACC decided not to renew their
contracts on September 7, 2000.
The CA effectively found reasonable basis for AMACC not to renew thepetitioners’ contracts. To the CA, the petitioners were not actually dismissed; their
respective contracts merely expired and were no longer renewed by AMACC because
they failed to satisfy the school’s standards for the school year 2000-2001 that
measured their fitness and aptitude to teach as regular faculty members. The CA
emphasized that in the absence of any evidence of bad faith on AMACC’s part, the
court would not disturb or nullify its discretion to set standards and to select for
regularization only the teachers who qualify, based on reasonable and non-
discriminatory guidelines.
The CA disagreed with the NLRC’s ruling that the new guidelines for the school
year 2000-20001 could not be imposed on the petitioners and their employment
contracts. The appellate court opined that AMACC has the inherent right to upgrade the
quality of computer education it offers to the public; part of this pursuit is the
implementation of continuing evaluation and screening of its faculty members for
academic excellence. The CA noted that the nature of education AMACC offers
As a general rule, in certiorari proceedings under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, the appellate court does not assess and weigh thesufficiency of evidence upon which the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC basedtheir conclusion. The query in this proceeding is limited to the
determination of whether or not the NLRC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in rendering its decision.However, as an exception, the appellate court may examine andmeasure the factual findings of the NLRC if the same are notsupported by substantial evidence. The Court has not hesitated toaffirm the appellate court’s reversals of the decisions of labor tribunals if they are not supported by substantial evidence.[Emphasis supplied]
As discussed below, our review of the records and of the CA decision shows that
the CA erred in recognizing that grave abuse of discretion attended the NLRC’s
conclusion that the petitioners were illegally dismissed. Consistent with this conclusion,
the evidence on record show that AMACC failed to discharge its burden of proving by
substantial evidence the just cause for the non-renewal of the petitioners’ contracts.
In Montoya v. Transmed Manila Corporation ,75[26] we laid down our basic
approach in the review of Rule 65 decisions of the CA in labor cases, as follows:
In a Rule 45 review, we consider the correctness of the assailedCA decision, in contrast with the review for jurisdictional error that weundertake under Rule 65. Furthermore, Rule 45 limits us to the review of questions of law raised against the assailed CA decision. In ruling for legal correctness, we have to view the CA decision in the same contextthat the petition for certiorari it ruled upon was presented to it; we have to
examine the CA decision from the prism of whether it correctlydetermined the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion inthe NLRC decision before it, not on the basis of whether the NLRCdecision on the merits of the case was correct. In other words, wehave to be keenly aware that the CA undertook a Rule 65 review, not areview on appeal, of the NLRC decision challenged before it. This is theapproach that should be basic in a Rule 45 review of a CA ruling in a labor case. In question form, the question to ask is: Did the CA correctlydetermine whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion inruling on the case?
Following this approach, our task is to determine whether the CA correctly found
that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling that the petitioners were
illegally dismissed.
Legal Environment in the Employment of Teachers
a. Rule on Employment on Probationary Status
A reality we have to face in the consideration of employment on probationary
status of teaching personnel is that they are not governed purely by the Labor Code.
The Labor Code is supplemented with respect to the period of probation by special
rules found in the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools.76[27] On the matter of
probationary period , Section 92 of these regulations provides:
Section 92. Probationary Period. – Subject in all instances tocompliance with the Department and school requirements, theprobationary period for academic personnel shall not be more than three(3) consecutive years of satisfactory service for those in the elementaryand secondary levels, six (6) consecutive regular semesters of satisfactoryservice for those in the tertiary level, and nine (9) consecutive trimestersof satisfactory service for those in the tertiary level where collegiatecourses are offered on a trimester basis. [Emphasis supplied]
The CA pointed this out in its decision (as the NLRC also did), and we confirm
the correctness of this conclusion. Other than on the period, the following quoted
portion of Article 281 of the Labor Code still fully applies:
x x x The services of an employee who has been engaged on aprobationary basis may be terminated for a just cause when he fails toqualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards made known by the employer to the employee at the time of his engagement . An employee who is allowed to work after a probationaryperiod shall be considered a regular employee. [Emphasis supplied]
The use of employment for fixed periods during the teachers’ probationary period
is likewise an accepted practice in the teaching profession. We mentioned this in
passing in Magis Young Achievers’ Learning Center v. Adelaida P. Manalo,77[28] albeit
a case that involved elementary, not tertiary, education, and hence spoke of a school
year rather than a semester or a trimester. We noted in this case:
The common practice is for the employer and the teacher toenter into a contract, effective for one school year. At the end of theschool year, the employer has the option not to renew the contract,particularly considering the teacher’s performance. If the contract is notrenewed, the employment relationship terminates. If the contract isrenewed, usually for another school year, the probationary employmentcontinues. Again, at the end of that period, the parties may opt to renewor not to renew the contract. If renewed, this second renewal of thecontract for another school year would then be the last year – since itwould be the third school year – of probationary employment. At the end
of this third year, the employer may now decide whether to extend apermanent appointment to the employee, primarily on the basis ofthe employee having met the reasonable standards of competenceand efficiency set by the employer. For the entire duration of thisthree-year period, the teacher remains under probation. Upon theexpiration of his contract of employment, being simply on probation,he cannot automatically claim security of tenure and compel theemployer to renew his employment contract. It is when the yearlycontract is renewed for the third time that Section 93 of the Manualbecomes operative, and the teacher then is entitled to regular or permanent employment status.
It is important that the contract of probationary employment specifythe period or term of its effectivity. The failure to stipulate its preciseduration could lead to the inference that the contract is binding for the fullthree-year probationary period.