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BELTRAN VS SEC. OF HEALTH
Facts: In January of 1994, the New Tropical Medicine Foundation,
with the assistance of the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) released its final report of a study on the
Philippine blood banking system entitled Project to Evaluate the
Safety of the Philippine Blood Banking System. It was revealed that
of the blood units collected in 1992, 64.4 % were supplied by
commercial blood banks, 14.5% by the PNRC, 13.7% by government
hospital-based blood banks, and 7.4% by private hospital-based
blood banks ; showing that the Philippines heavily relied on
commercial sources of blood. It was further found, among other
things, that blood sold by persons to blood commercial banks are
three times more likely to have any of the four (4) tested
infections or blood transfusion transmissible diseases, namely,
malaria, syphilis, Hepatitis B and Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome (AIDS) than those donated to PNRC. Republic Act No. 7719
or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 was then enacted into
law on April 2, 1994. The Act seeks to provide an adequate supply
of safe blood by promoting voluntary blood donation and by
regulating blood banks in the country. One of the provisions of the
said act was the phasing out of commercial blood banks within 2
years from its effectivity.
Petitioners, comprising the majority of the Board of Directors
of the Philippine Association of Blood Banks assail the
constitutionality of RA 7719 on the ground among others that it is
an improper and unwarranted delegation of legislative power.
According to petitioners, the Act was incomplete when it was passed
by the Legislature, and the latter failed to fix a standard to
which the Secretary of Health must conform in the performance of
his functions. Petitioners also contend that the two-year extension
period that may be granted by the Secretary of Health for the
phasing out of commercial blood banks pursuant to Section 7 of the
Act constrained the Secretary to legislate, thus constituting undue
delegation of legislative power.
Issue: WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R.A. 7719 CONSTITUTES UNDUE
DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER
Held: In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to inquire
whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions
when it left the hands of the Legislature so that nothing was left
to the judgment of the administrative body or any other appointee
or delegate of the Legislature. Except as to matters of detail that
may be left to be filled in by rules and regulations to be adopted
or promulgated by executive officers and administrative boards, an
act of the Legislature, as a general rule, is incomplete and hence
invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite standard by
which the administrative board may be guided in the exercise of the
discretionary powers delegated to it.
Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994
is complete in itself. It is clear from the provisions of the Act
that the Legislature intended primarily to safeguard the health of
the people and has mandated several measures to attain this
objective. One of these is the phase out of commercial blood banks
in the country. The law has sufficiently provided a definite
standard for the guidance of the Secretary of Health in carrying
out its provisions, that is, the promotion of public health by
providing a safe and adequate supply of blood through voluntary
blood donation. By its provisions, it has conferred the power and
authority to the Secretary of Health as to its execution, to be
exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The Secretary of
Health has been given, under Republic Act No. 7719, broad powers to
execute the provisions of said Act. Specifically, Section 23 of
Administrative Order No. 9 provides that the phase-out period for
commercial blood banks shall be extended for another two years
until May 28, 1998 based on the result of a careful study and
review of the blood supply and demand and public safety. This power
to ascertain the existence of facts and conditions upon which the
Secretary may effect a period of extension for said phase-out can
be delegated by Congress. The true distinction between the power to
make laws and discretion as to its execution is illustrated by the
fact that the delegation of power to make the law, which
necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and
conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be
exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be
done; to the latter no valid objection can be made.
NICOLAS vs. ROMULO
FACTS: Herein respondent, Lance Corporal Daniel Smith, is a
member of the United States Armed Forces. He was charged with the
crime of rape committed against a Filipina, Suzette S. Nicolas.
Pursuant to the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between the
Republic of the Philippines and the United States, the United
States, at its request, was granted custody of defendant Smith
pending the proceedings. During the trial, the US Government
faithfully complied with its undertaking to bring defendant Smith
to the trial court every time his presence was required.
Eventually, the Regional Trial Court rendered its Decision, finding
defendant Smith guilty. He shall serve his sentence in the
facilities that shall be agreed upon by appropriate Philippine and
United States pursuant to the VFA. Pending agreement on such
facilities, accused is hereby temporarily committed to the Makati
City Jail. However, defendant was taken out of the Makati jail by a
contingent of Philippine law enforcement agents, and brought to a
facility for detention under the control of the United States
government, provided for under new agreements between the
Philippines and
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the United States, referred to as the Romulo-Kenney Agreement.
This agreement provides that in accordance with the Visiting Forces
Agreement signed, Smith, United States Marine Corps, be returned to
United States military custody at the U.S. Embassy in Manila.
Petitioners contend that the Philippines should have custody of
Smith because if they would allow such transfer of custody of an
accused to a foreign power is to provide for a different rule of
procedure for that accused. The equal protection clause of the
Constitution is also violated. ISSUE: Whether or Not there is a
violation of the equal protection clause. HELD: The equal
protection clause is not violated, because there is a substantial
basis for a different treatment of a member of a foreign military
armed forces allowed to enter our territory and all other accused.
The rule in international law is that a foreign armed forces
allowed to enter ones territory is immune from local jurisdiction,
except to the extent agreed upon. The Status of Forces Agreements
involving foreign military units around the world vary in terms and
conditions, according to the situation of the parties involved, and
reflect their bargaining power. But the principle remains, i.e.,
the receiving State can exercise jurisdiction over the forces of
the sending State only to the extent agreed upon by the parties. As
a result, the situation involved is not one in which the power of
this Court to adopt rules of procedure is curtailed or violated,
but rather one in which, as is normally encountered around the
world, the laws (including rules of procedure) of one State do not
extend or apply except to the extent agreed upon to subjects of
another State due to the recognition of extraterritorial immunity
given to such bodies as visiting foreign armed forces. Applying,
however, the provisions of VFA, the Court finds that there is a
different treatment when it comes to detention as against custody.
It is clear that the parties to the VFA recognized the difference
between custody during the trial and detention after conviction,
because they provided for a specific arrangement to cover
detention. And this specific arrangement clearly states not only
that the detention shall be carried out in facilities agreed on by
authorities of both parties, but also that the detention shall be
"by Philippine authorities." Therefore, the Romulo-Kenney
Agreements of December 19 and 22, 2006, which are agreements on the
detention of the accused in the United States Embassy, are not in
accord with the VFA itself because such detention is not "by
Philippine authorities." Respondents should therefore comply with
the VFA and negotiate with representatives of the United States
towards an agreement on detention facilities under Philippine
authorities as mandated by Art. V, Sec. 10 of the VFA. The Visiting
Forces Agreement (VFA) between the Republic of the Philippines and
the United States, is UPHELD as constitutional, but the
Romulo-Kenney Agreements are DECLARED not in accordance with the
VFA.
Ormoc Sugar Co. vs. Treasurer of Ormoc City
In 1964, Ormoc City passed a bill which imposes a (1%) per
export sale to the US and other foreign countries. Though referred
to as a production tax, the imposition actually amounts to a tax on
the export of centrifugal sugar produced at Ormoc Sugar Company,
Inc. For production of sugar alone is not taxable; the only time
the tax applies is when the sugar produced is exported. Ormoc Sugar
paid the tax (P7,087.50) in protest averring that the same is
violative of Sec 2287 of the Revised Administrative Code which
provides: It shall not be in the power of the municipal council to
impose a tax in any form whatever, upon goods and merchandise
carried into the municipality, or out of the same, and any attempt
to impose an import or export tax upon such goods in the guise of
an unreasonable charge for wharfage, use of bridges or otherwise,
shall be void. And that the ordinance is violative to equal
protection as it singled out Ormoc Sugar As being liable for such
tax impost for no other sugar mill is found in the city. The
defendants asserted that the tax ordinance was within defendant
city's power to enact under the Local Autonomy Act and that the
same did not violate the afore-cited constitutional limitations.
ISSUE: WON there has been a violation of equal protection. HELD:
The SC ruled in favor of Ormoc Sugar Company. The ordinance is
discriminatory for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and
exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and no other. At the time
of the taxing ordinances enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. was
the only sugar central in the city of Ormoc. The classification, to
be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future conditions
as well. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive
as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central, of the
same class as plaintiff, from the coverage of the tax. As it is
now, even if later a similar company is set up, it cannot be
subject to the tax because the ordinance expressly points only to
Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon.
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ROMMEL CORRO, petitioner, vs. HON. ESTEBAN LISING Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch XCV HON. REMIGIO
ZARI Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 98; CITY FISCAL'S
OFFICE, Quezon City; LT. COL. BERLIN A. CASTILLO and 1ST LT.
GODOFREDO M. IGNACIO, respondents,
Reynaldo L. Bagatsing for petitioner.
RELOVA, J.:
On September 29, 1983, respondent Regional Trial Court judge
Esteban Lising of Quezon City, upon application filed by Lt. Col.
Berlin Castillo of the Philippine Constabulary Criminal
Investigation Service, issued Search Warrant No. Q-00002
authorizing the search and seizure of
1. Printed copies of Philippine Times;
2. Manuscripts/drafts of articles for publication in the
Philippine Times;
3. Newspaper dummies of the Philippine Times;
4. Subversive documents, articles, printed matters, handbills,
leaflets, banners;
5. Typewriters, duplicating machines, mimeographing and tape
recording machines, video machines and tapes
which have been used and are being used as instrument and means
of committing the crime of inciting to sedition defined and
penalized under Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by PD 1835 ... (p. 24, Rollo)
On November 6, 1984, petitioner filed an urgent motion to recall
warrant and to return documents/personal properties alleging among
others that:
2. ... the properties seized are typewriters, duplicating
machines, mimeographing and tape recording machines, video machines
and tapes which are not in any way, inanimate or mute things as
they are, connected with the offense of inciting to sedition.
3. More so, documents or papers seized purporting to do the body
of the crime has been rendered moot and academic due to the
findings of the Agrava Board that a military conspiracy was
responsible for the slaying of the late Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr.
on August 21, 1983 at the Manila International Airport. The Agrava
Board which has the exclusive jurisdiction to determine the facts
and circumstances behind the killing had virtually affirmed by
evidence testamentary and documentary the fact that soldiers killed
Benigno Aquino, Jr.
4. More so, the grave offense of libel, RTC, Q.C. Branch XCV has
dismissed said case against the accused on all documents pertinent
and more so as we repeat, rendered moot and academic by the recent
Agrava Report. (p. 27, Rollo)
On January 28, 1985, respondent Judge Lising denied the motion
in a resolution, pertinent portions of which state:
... The said articles presently form part of the evidence of the
prosecution and they are not under the control of the prosecuting
arm of the government. Under these circumstances, the proper forum
from which the petition to withdraw the articles should be
addressed, is the Office of the City Fiscal, Quezon City and not
with this Branch of the Court. It is to be further noted that it is
not even with this Branch of the Court that the offense of inciting
to sedition is pending. (p 29, Rollo)
Hence, this petition for certiorari and mandamus, with
application for preliminary injunction and restraining order to
enjoin respondent Regional Trial Court, National Capital Region,
Branch 98 from proceeding with the trial of Criminal Case No.
S3-Q-29243, praying (a) that Search Warrant No. Q-00002 issued by
respondent Judge Esteban M. Lising be declared null and void ab
initio and that a mandatory injunction be issued directing
respondents City Fiscal's Office of Quezon City and Lt. Col. Berlin
Castillo and 1st Lt.
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Godofredo Ignacio jointly and severally to return immediately
the documents/properties illegally seized from herein petitioner
and that final injunction be issued enjoining respondents City
Fiscal's Office of Quezon City, Lt. Col. Castillo and 1st Lt.
Ignacio from utilizing said documents/properties as evidence in
Criminal Case No. 29243; and (b) that respondent PC-CIS officers
Lt. Col. Berlin A. Castillo and lst Lt. Godofredo Ignacio be
directed to reopen the padlocked office premises of the Philippine
Times at 610 Mezzanine Floor, Gochengco Building, T.M., Kalaw,
Ermita, Manila.
In Our Resolution of February 19, 1985, respondents were
required to file their comment. The plea for temporary restraining
order was granted and respondents City Fiscal's Office of Quezon
City, Lt. Col. Berlin Castillo and 1st Lt. Godofredo Ignacio were
enjoined from introducing as evidence for the state the
documents/properties seized under Search Warrant No. Q-00002 in
Criminal Cage No. Q-29243 (Sedition case against petitioner),
pending before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 98,
effective immediately and continuing until further orders from the
Court.
Respondents would have this Court dismiss the petition on the
ground that (1) the present action is premature because petitioner
should have filed a motion for reconsideration of respondent Judge
Lising's order of January 28, 1985; (2) probable cause exists
justifying the issuance of a search warrant; (3) the articles
seized were adequately described in the search warrant; (4) a
search was conducted in an orderly manner; (5) the padlocking of
the searched premises was with the consent of petitioner's wife;
(6) the findings of the Agrava Board is irrelevant to the issue of
the validity of the search warrant; (7) press freedom is not an
issue; and, (8) the petition is barred by laches.
There is merit in the petition.
Respondents contend that petitioner should have filed a motion
for reconsideration of the order in question before coming to Us.
This is not always so. When the questions raised before the Supreme
Court are the same as those which were squarely raised in and
passed upon by the lower court, the filing of the motion for
reconsideration in said court before certiorari can be instituted
in the Supreme Court is no longer a pre-requisite. As held in Bache
& Co. (Phil.), Inc. vs. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823, (t)he rule requiring
the filing of a motion for reconsideration before an application
for a writ of certiorari can be entertained was never intended to
be applied without considering the circumstances. The rule does not
apply where, the deprivation of petitioners' fundamental right to
due process taints the proceeding against them in the court below
not only with irregularity but also with nullity." Likewise, in
Pajo, et al. vs. Ago, et al., 108 Phil. 905 and in Gonzales vs.
Court of Appeals, 3 SCRA 465, this Court ruled that "it is only
when questions are raised for the first time before the high court
in a certiorari case that the writ shall not issue, unless the
lower court had first been given an opportunity to pass upon the
same." Further, in the case of Matute vs. Court of Appeals, 26 SCRA
768, We held that "while as a matter of policy a motion for
reconsideration in the lower court has often been considered a
condition sine qua non for the granting of a writ of certiorari,
this rule does not apply where the proceeding in which the error
occurred is a patent nullity or where 'the deprivation of
petitioner's fundamental right to due process ... taints the
proceeding against him in the court below not only with
irregularity but with nullity (Luzon Surety Co. v. Marbella et al.,
L-16038, Sept. 30, 1960), or when special circumstances warrant
immediate and more direct action. ..." The records of this petition
clearly disclose that the issues herein raised have already been
presented to and passed upon by the court a quo.
Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution provides:
SEC. 3. ...no search warrant or warrant of arrest issue except
upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other
responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.
and, Section 3, Rule 126 of the New Rules of Court, states
that:
SEC. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant
shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one
specific offense to be determined by the judge or justice of the
peace after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.
Probable cause may be defined as "such reasons, supported by
facts and circumstances, as will warrant a cautious man in the
belief that his actions, and the means taken in prosecuting it, are
legally just and proper (Burton vs. St. Paul, M & M. Ry. Co.,
33 Minn. 189, cited in U.S. vs. Addison, 28 Phil. 566)." Thus, an
application for search warrant must state with particularly the
alleged subversive materials published or intended to be published
by the publisher and editor of the Philippine Times, Rommel Corro.
As We have stated in Burgos, Sr. vs. Chief of Staff of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, 133 SCRA 800, "mere generalization will
not suffice." A search warrant should particularly describe the
place to be searched and the things to be seized. "The evident
purpose and intent of this requirement is to limit the things to be
seized to those, and only those, particularly described in the
search warrant- to leave the officers of the law with no discretion
regarding what articles they should seize, to the end that
unreasonable searches and seizures may not be committed, that
abuses may not be committed Bache & Co. Phil. Inc. vs, Ruiz,
supra)." The affidavit of Col. Castillo states that in several
issues of the Philippine Times:
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... we found that the said publication in fact foments distrust
and hatred against the government of the Philippines and its duly
constituted authorities, defined and penalized by Article 142 of
the Revised Penal Code as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1835;
(p. 22, Rollo)
and, the affidavit of Lt. Ignacio reads, among others
... the said periodical published by Rommel Corro, contains
articles tending to incite distrust and hatred for the Government
of the Philippines or any of its duly constituted authorities. (p.
23, Rollo)
The above statements are mere conclusions of law and will not
satisfy the requirements of probable cause. They can not serve as
basis for the issuance of search warrant, absent of the existence
of probable cause. In fact, as a consequence of the search warrant
issued, the items confiscated from the premises of the office of
the Philippine Times at 610 Mezzanine Floor, Gochengco Bldg., T.M.
Kalaw, Ermita, Manila were the following:
1. One bundle of assorted negative;
2. One bundle of assorted lay out;
3. Three folders of assorted articles/writings used by
Philippine Times news and other paraphernalias;
4. Four tape alleged speech of Mayor Climaco, two alleged
speeches of Aquino and a speech of one various artist;
5. One bundle Dummies;
6. Ten bundles of assorted copies of Philippine Times issued on
different dates (Nos. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 & 15):
7. One Typewriter Remington Brand Long Carriage with No.
J-2479373;
8. OneTypewriterAdler-short with No. 9003011;
9. Three (3) bundles of Philippine Times latest issue for Baguio
City (p. 26, Rollo)
In Stonehill vs. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383, this Court held that
search warrants authorizing the seizure of books of accounts and
records "showing all the business transactions" of certain persons,
regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal,
contravene the explicit comment of the Bill of Rights that the
things to be seized should be particularly described and defeat its
major objective of eliminating general warrants. In the case at
bar, the search warrant issued by respondent judge allowed seizure
of printed copies of the Philippine Times, manuscripts/drafts of
articles for publication, newspaper dummies, subversive documents,
articles, etc., and even typewriters, duplicating machines,
mimeographing and tape recording machines. Thus, the language used
is so all embracing as to include all conceivable records and
equipment of petitioner regardless of whether they are legal or
illegal. The search warrant under consideration was in the nature
of a general warrant which is constitutionally objectionable.
Respondents do not deny the fact that the business office of the
"Philippine Times" of which petitioner was the publisher-editor was
padlocked and sealed. The consequence is, the printing and
publication of said newspaper were discontinued. In Burgos, Sr. vs.
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, supra, We
held that "[sluch closure is in the nature of previous restraint or
censorship abhorrent to the freedom of the press guaranteed under
the fundamental law, and constitutes a virtual denial of
petitioners' freedom to express themselves in print. This state of
being is patently anathematic to a democratic framework where a
free, alert and even militant press is essential for the political
enlightenment and growth of the citizenry."
Finally, respondents argue that while the search warrant was
issued on September 29, 1983 and was executed on the very same day,
it was only on November 6, 1984, or one (1) year, one (1) month and
six (6) days when petitioner filed his motion for the recall of the
warrant and the return of the documents/personal properties. Having
failed to act seasonably, respondents claim that petitioner is
guilty of laches.
Laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due
diligence, could or should have been done earlier. The negligence
or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting
a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it (Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy,
L-21450, April 15, 1968, 23 SCRA 35).
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In his petition, Corro alleged that on October 1, 1983, less
than forty-two (42) hours after the military operatives shut down
his newspaper on September 29, 1983, he was invited by the
Director-General PC/INP, and subsequently detained. Thereafter, he
was charged with the crime of inciting to sedition before the City
Fiscal's Office in Quezon City, and on October 7, 1983, a
preventive detention action was served upon him. Consequently, he
had to file a petition for habeas corpus. It was only on November
8, 1984 when this Court issued its Resolution in G.R. No. 68976,
entitled: In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Rommel
Corro Angle Corro vs. Minister Juan Ponce Enrile, et al., releasing
Rommel Corro on recognizance of his lawyers, Attys. Humberto B.
Basco, Reynaldo Bagatsing and Edilberto Balce, In the same month,
November 1984, petitioner filed his motion to recall warrant and to
return the seized documents. When respondent judge denied the
motion, he came to Us.
Considering the above circumstances, the claim that petitioner
had abandoned his right to the possession of the seized properties
is incorrect.
WHEREFORE, Search Warrant No. Q-00002 issued by the respondent
judge on September 29, 1983 is declared null and void and,
accordingly, SET ASIDE.
The prayer for a writ of mandatory injunction for the return of
the seized articles is GRANTED and all properties seized thereunder
are hereby ordered RELEASED to petitioner. Further, respondents Lt.
Col. Berlin A. Castillo and lst Lt. Godofredo M. Ignacio are
ordered to RE-OPEN the padlocked office premises of the Philippine
Times at 610 Mezzanine Floor, Gochengco Bldg., T.M. Kalaw, Ermita,
Manila.
SO ORDERED.
Corro v. Lising 137 SCRA 341 (1985)
F: Respondent Judge issued a search warrant for the seizure of
articles allegedly used by petitioner in committing the crime of
sedition. Seized were printed copies of the Philippine Times,
newspaper dummies, typewriters, mimeographing machines and tape
recorders, video machines and tapes. The petitioner moved to quash
the warrant but his motion was denied.
HELD: The statements made in the affidavits are mere conclusions
of law and do not satisfy the requirement of probable cause. The
language used is all embracing as to include all conceivable words
and equipment of petitioner regardless of whether they are legal or
illegal. The search warrant under consideration was in the nature
of a general warrant which is objectionable.
Jose Burgos vs. Chief of Staff G.R. No L-64261 December 26, 1984
Facts: Two warrants were issued against petitioners for the search
on the premises of Metropolitan Mail and We Forum newspapers and
the seizure of items alleged to have been used in subversive
activities. Petitioners prayed that a writ of preliminary mandatory
and prohibitory injunction be issued for the return of the seized
articles, and that respondents be enjoined from using the articles
thus seized as evidence against petitioner. Petitioners questioned
the warrants for the lack of probable cause and that the two
warrants issued indicated only one and the same address. In
addition, the items seized subject to the warrant were real
properties. Issue: Whether or not the two warrants were valid to
justify seizure of the items. Held: The defect in the indication of
the same address in the two warrants was held by the court as a
typographical error and immaterial in view of the correct
determination of the place sought to be searched set forth in the
application. The purpose and intent to search two distinct premises
was evident in the issuance of the two warrant. As to the issue
that the items seized were real properties, the court applied the
principle in the case of Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo, ruling that
machinery which is movable by nature becomes immobilized when
placed by the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but not so
when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having
only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of
the owner. In the case at bar, petitioners did not claim to be the
owners of the land and/or building on
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which the machineries were placed. This being the case, the
machineries in question, while in fact bolted to the ground remain
movable property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant.
However, the Court declared the two warrants null and void.
Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the
objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place
sought to be searched. The Court ruled that the affidavits
submitted for the application of the warrant did not satisfy the
requirement of probable cause, the statements of the witnesses
having been mere generalizations. Furthermore, jurisprudence tells
of the prohibition on the issuance of general warrants. (Stanford
vs. State of Texas). The description and enumeration in the warrant
of the items to be searched and seized did not indicate with
specification the subversive nature of the said items.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ALYNN PLEZETTE DY, petitioners,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS, BILLY CERBO and JONATHAN CERBO,
respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
In our criminal justice system, the public prosecutor has the
quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or not case should
be filed in court. Courts must. respect the exercise of such
discretion when the information filed against the accused valid on
its face, and no manifest error, grave abuse of discretion or
prejudice can be imputed to the public prosecutor.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45, seeking to
reverse the June 28, 1996 Decision and the August 27, 1996
Resolution of the Court of Appeals 1 in CA-GR SP No. 36018. 2 The
assailed Decision dismissed the Petition for Certiorari filed by
the petitioners, which sought to annul and set aside two Orders of
the Regional Trial Court of Nabunturan, Davao: the June 28, 1994
Order dismissing the Information for murder filed against Private
Respondent Billy Cerbo and the August 18, 1994 Order denying
petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
The assailed August 27, 1996 Court of Appeals (CA) Resolution
likewise denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
The case below arose from the fatal shooting of Petitioner Dy's
mother, Rosalinda Dy, in which the primary suspect was Private
Respondent Jonathan Cerbo, son of Private Respondent Billy
Cerbo.
The procedural and factual antecedents of the case were
summarized in the challenged Decision of the Court of Appeals as
follows:
On August 30, 1993, Rosalinda Dy, according to the petition, was
shot at pointblank range by private respondent Jonathan Cerbo in
the presence and at the office of his father, private respondent
Billy Cerbo at Purok 9, Poblacion, Nabunturan, Davao.
On September 2, 1993, eyewitness Elsa B. Gumban executed an
affidavit positively identifying private respondent Jonathan Cerbo
as the assailant. (Annex C, Rollo, p. 34).
On September 20, 1993, private respondent Jonathan Cerbo
executed a counter-affidavit interposing the defense that the
shooting was accidental (Annex D: Rollo, pp. 35-36).
On October 6, 1993, the 3rd Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Nabunturan-Mawab, Davao, after a preliminary investigation, found
"sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief" that the
crime of murder has been committed by private respondent Jonathan
Cerbo and resolved to forward the entire records of the case to the
provincial prosecutor at Tagum, Davao (Annex E, Rollo, pp.
37-38).
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After [an] information for murder was filed against Jonathan
Cerbo, petitioner Alynn Plezette Dy, daughter of the victim
Rosalinda Dy, executed an affidavit-complaint charging private
respondent Billy Cerbo of conspiracy in the killing (Annex F,
Rollo, p. 39), supported by a supplemental affidavit of Elsa B.
Gumban, alleging "in addition" to her previous statement that:
3. In addition to my said sworn statement, I voluntarily and
freely aver as follows:
a) I vividly recall that while my mistress Rosalinda Go and I
were in the office of Billy Cerbo at about 11:45 a.m. on August 30,
1993, Mr. Cerbo personally instructed me to fetch the food from the
kitchen [and to bring it] to the office instead of the dining
room.
b) While bringing the food, Mr. Cerbo again instructed me to
place the food [o]n a corner table and commanded me to sit behind
the entrance door and at the same time Mr. Cerbo positioned
Rosalinda [on] a chair facing the entrance door for an easy
target.
c) Immediately after Rosalinda was shot, Mr. Billy Cerbo called
his son Jonathan who was running, but did not and ha[s] never
bothered to bring Rosalinda to a hospital or even apply first
aid.
d) To my surprise, Mr. Billy Cerbo, instead of bringing
Rosalinda to the hospital, brought her to the funeral parlor and
immediately ordered her to be embalmed without even informing her
children or any of her immediate relatives xxx.' Annex G. Rollo, p.
40.)
Private respondent Billy Cerbo submitted a counter-affidavit
denying the allegations of both petitioner Alynn Plezette Dy and
Elsa B. Gumban (Annex H, Rollo, pp. 41-42).
On or about April 8, 1994, Prosecutor Protacio Lumangtad filed a
"Motion for leave of court to reinvestigate the case" (Annex I,
Rollo, pp. 43-44) which was granted by the respondent judge in an
order dated April 28, 1994 (Annex J, Rollo, p. 45).
In his resolution dated May 5, 1994, Prosecutor Lumangtad
recommended the filing of an amended information including Billy
Cerbo ". . . as one of the accused in the murder case . . ." (Annex
K: Rollo, pp. 46-49).
Accordingly, the prosecution filed an amended information
including Billy Cerbo in the murder case. A warrant for his arrest
was later issued on May 27, 1994 (Rollo, p. 27).
Private respondent Billy Cerbo then filed a motion to quash
warrant of arrest arguing that the same was issued without probable
cause (Rollo, p. 27).
On June 28, 1994, respondent Judge issued the first assailed
order dismissing the case against Billy Cerbo and recalling the
warrant for his arrest[;] the dispositive portion of [the order]
reads:
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, [an] order is hereby issued
DISMISSING the case as against Billy Cerbo only.
Let, therefore, the warrant of arrest, dated May 27, 1994, be
RECALLED.
The prosecution is hereby ordered to withdraw its Amended
Information and file a new one charging Jonathan Cerbo only.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, pp. 29-30).
Private Prosecutor Romeo Tagra filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied by the respondent judge in his
second assailed order dated August 18, 1994 (Annex B, Rollo, pp.
31-33). 3
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
-
In its 10-page Decision, the Court of Appeals debunked
petitioners' assertion that the trial judge committed a grave abuse
of discretion in recalling the warrant of arrest and subsequently
dismissing the case against Billy Cerbo. Citing jurisprudence, 4
the appellate court held as follows:
The ruling is explicit. If upon the filing of the information in
court, the trial judge, after reviewing the information and the
documents attached thereto, finds that no probable cause exists,
must either call for the complainant and the witnesses or simply
dismiss the case.
Petitioners question the applicability of the doctrine laid down
in the above[-]mentioned case, alleging that the facts therein are
different from the instant case. We rule that the disparity of
facts does not prevent the application of the principle.
We have gone over the supplemental affidavit of Elsa B. Gumban
and taking into account the additional facts and circumstances
alleged therein, we cannot say that respondent judge gravely abused
his discretion in dismissing the case as against private respondent
Billy Cerbo for lack of probable cause.
xxx xxx xxx
The prosecution, if it really believed that Billy Cerbo is
probably guilty by conspiracy, should have presented additional
evidence sufficiently and credibly demonstrating the existence of
probable cause.
xxx xxx xxx 5
In sum, the Court of Appeals held that Judge Eugenio Valles did
not commit grave abuse of discretion in recalling the warrant of
arrest issued against Private Respondent Billy Cerbo and
subsequently dismissing the Information for murder filed against
the private respondent, because the evidence presented thus far did
not substantiate such charge.
Hence, this petition. 6
The Assigned Errors
Petitioner Dy avers:
1) The Court of Appeals gravely erred in holding that the
Regional Trial Court Judge had the authority to reverse [the public
prosecutor's] finding of probable cause to prosecute accused . . .
and thus dismiss the case filed by the latter on the basis of a
motion to quash warrant of arrest.
2) The Court of Appeals gravely erred in fully and unqualifiedly
applying the case of Allado, et. al. vs. PACC, et. al. G.R. No.
113630, [to] the case at bench despite [the] clear difference in
their respective factual backdrop[s] and the contrary earlier
jurisprudence on the matter. 7
On the other hand, the solicitor general posits this sole
issue:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding that no probable
cause exists to merit the filing of charges against private
respondent Billy Cerbo. 8
Essentially, the petitioners are questioning the propriety of
the trial court's dismissal, for want of evidence, of the
Information for murder against Private Respondent Billy Cerbo.
In resolving this petition, the discussion of the Court will
revolve around the points: first, the determination of probable
cause as an executive and judicial function and, second, the
applicability of Allado and Salonga to the case at bar.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious. The trial court erred in dismissing
the information filed against the private respondent. Consequently
the Court of Appeals was likewise in error when it upheld such
ruling.
Executive Determination
-
of Probable Cause
The determination of probable cause during a preliminary
investigation is a function that belongs to the public prosecutor.
It is an executive function, 9 the correctness of the exercise of
which is matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be
compelled to pass upon. The Separate (Concurring) Opinion of former
Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa in Roberts v. Court of Appeals 10
succinctly elucidates such point in this wise:
xxx xxx xxx
In this special civil action, this Court is being asked to
assume the function of a public prosecutor. It is being asked to
determine whether probable cause exists as regards petitioners.
More concretely, the Court is being asked to examine and assess
such evidence as has thus far been submitted by the parties and, on
the basis thereof, make a conclusion as to whether or not it
suffices "to engender a well founded belief that a crime has been
committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and
should be held for trial."
It is a function that this Court should not be called upon to
perform. It is a function that properly pertains to the public
prosecutor, one that, as far as crimes cognizable by a Regional
Trial Court are concerned, and notwithstanding that it involves an
adjudicative process of a sort, exclusively pertains, by law, to
said executive officer, the public prosecutor. It is moreover a
function that in the established scheme of things, is supposed to
be performed at the very genesis of, indeed, prefatorily to, the
formal commencement of a criminal action. The proceedings before a
public prosecutor, it may well be stressed, are essentially
preliminary, prefatory and cannot lead to a final, definite and
authoritative adjudgment of the guilt or innocence of the persons
charged with a felony or crime.
Whether or not that function has been correctly discharged by
the public prosecutor i.e., whether or not he has made a correct
ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a case, is a
matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be
compelled to pass upon. It is not for instance permitted for an
accused, upon the filing of the information against him by the
public prosecutor, to preempt trial by filing a motion with the
Trial Court praying for the quash or dismissal of the indictment on
the ground that the evidence upon which the same is based is
inadequate. Nor is it permitted, on the antipodal theory that the
evidence is in truth inadequate, for the complaining party to
present a petition before the Court praying that the public
prosecutor be compelled to file the corresponding information
against the accused.
xxx xxx xxx
Indeed, the public prosecutor has broad discretion to determine
whether probable cause exists and to charge those whom be or she
believes to have committed the crime as defined by law. Otherwise
stated, such official has the quasi-judicial authority to determine
whether or not a criminal case list be filed in court. 11 Thus, in
Crespo v. Mogul, 12 we ruled:
It is a cardinal principle that all criminal actions either
commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under
the direction and control of the fiscal. The institution of a
criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. He
may or may not file the complaint or information, follow or not
follow that presented by the offended party, according to whether
the evidence, in his opinion, is sufficient or not to establish the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The reason for
placing the criminal prosecution under the direction and control of
the fiscal is to prevent malicious or unfounded prosecutions by
private persons. . . . Prosecuting officers under the power vested
in them by the law, not only have the authority but also the duty
of prosecuting persons who, according to the evidence received from
the complainant, are shown to be guilty of a crime committed within
the jurisdiction of their office. They have equally the duty not to
prosecute when the evidence adduced is not sufficient to establish
a prima facie case.
This broad prosecutoral power is however nor unfettered, because
just as public prosecutors are obliged to bring forth before the
law those who have transgressed it, they are also constrained to be
circumspect in filing criminal charges against the innocent. Thus,
for crimes cognizable by regional trial courts, preliminary
investigations are usually conducted. In Ledesma v. Court of
Appeals, 13 we discussed the purposes and nature of a preliminary
investigation in this manner:
The primary objective of a preliminary investigation is to free
respondent from the inconvenience, expense, ignominy and stress of
defending himself/herself in the course of a formal trial, until
the reasonable probability of his or her guilt in a more or less
summary proceeding by a competent office designated by law for that
purpose. Secondarily, such summary proceeding also protects the
state from the burden of the unnecessary expense an effort in
prosecuting alleged offenses and in holding trials arising from
false, frivolous or groundless charges.
-
Such investigation is not part of the trial. A full and
exhaustive presentation of the parties' evidence is not required,
but only such as may engender a well-grounded belief than an
offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty
thereof. By reason of the abbreviated nature of preliminary
investigations, a dismissal of the charges as a result thereof is
not equivalent to a judicial pronouncement of acquittal. Hence, no
double jeopardy attaches.
Judicial Determination of
Probable Cause
The determination of probable cause to hold a person for trial
must be distinguished from the determination of probable cause to
issue a warrant of arrest, which is a judicial function. The
judicial determination of probable cause in the issuance of arrest
warrants has been emphasized in numerous cases. In Ho v. People, 14
the Court summarized the pertinent rulings on the subject, as
follows:
The above rulings in Soliven, Inting and Lim, Sr. were iterated
in Allado v. Diokno, where we explained again what probable cause
means. Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is
the existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense
has been committed by the person sought to be arrested. Hence, the
judge, before issuing a warrant of arrest, "must satisfy himself
that based on the evidence submitted, there is sufficient proof
that a crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested
is probably guilty thereof." At this stage of the criminal
proceeding, the judge is not yet tasked to review in detail the
evidence submitted during the preliminary investigation. It is
sufficient that he personally evaluates such evidence in
determining probable cause. In Webb v. De Leon we stressed that the
judge merely determines the probability, not the certainty, of
guilt of the accused and, in doing so, he need not conduct a de
novo hearing. He simply personally reviews the prosecutor's initial
determination finding probable cause to see if it is supported by
substantial evidence.
xxx xxx xxx
In light of the aforecited decisions of this Court, such
justification cannot be upheld. Lest we be too repetitive, we only
emphasize three vital matters once more: First, as held in Inting,
the determination of probable cause by the prosecutor is for a
purpose different from that which is to be made by the judge.
Whether there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is
guilty of the offense charged and should be held for trial is what
the prosecutor passes upon. The judge, on the other hand,
determines whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the
accused, i.e., whether there is a necessity for placing him under
immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.
Thus, even if both should base their findings on one and the same
proceeding or evidence, there should be no confusion as to their
distinct objectives.
Second, since their objectives are different, the judge cannot
rely solely on the report of the prosecutor in finding probable
cause to justify the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Obviously and
understandably, the contents of the prosecutor's report will
support his own conclusion that there is reason to charge the
accused of an offense and hold him for trial. However, the judge
must decide independently. Hence, he must have supporting evidence,
other than the prosecutor's bare report, upon which to legally
sustain his own findings on the existence or non-existence of
probable cause to issue an arrest order. This responsibility of
determining personally and independently the existence of
non-existence of probable cause is lodged in him by no less than
the most basic law of the land. Parenthetically, the prosecutor
could ease the burden of the judge and speed up the litigation
process by forwarding to the latter not only the information and
his bare resolution, but also so much of the records and the
evidence on hand as to enable His Honor to make his personal and
separate judicial finding on whether to issue a warrant of
arrest.
Lastly, It is not required that the complete or entire records
of the case during the preliminary investigation be submitted to
and examined by the judge. We do not intend to unduly burden trial
courts by obliging them to examine the complete records of every
case all the time simply for the purpose of ordering the arrest of
the accused. What is required, rather, is that the judge must have
sufficient supporting documents (such as the complaint, affidavits,
counter-affidavits, sworn statements of witnesses or transcript of
stenographic notes, if any) upon which to make his independent
judgment, or at the very least, upon which to verify the findings
of the prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause. The point
is: he cannot rely solely and entirely on the prosecutor's
recommendation, as the Respondent Court did in this case. Although
the prosecutor enjoys the legal presumption of regularity in the
performance of his duties and functions, which in turn gives his
report the presumption of accuracy, the Constitution, we repeat,
commands the judge to personally determine probable cause in the
issuance of warrants of arrest. This Court has consistently held
that a judge fails in his bounded duty if he relies merely on the
certification or the report of the investigating officer.
-
xxx xxx xxx
Verily, a judge cannot be compelled to issue a warrant of arrest
if he or she deems that there is no probable cause for doing so.
Corollary to this principle, the judge should not override the
public prosecutor's determination of probable cause to hold an
accused for trial on the ground that the evidence presented to
substantiate the issuance of an arrest warrant was insufficient, as
in the present case.
Indeed, it could be unfair to expect the prosecution to present
all the evidence needed to secure the conviction of the accused
upon the filing of the information against the latter. The reason
is found in the nature and the objective of a preliminary
investigation. Here, the public prosecutors do not decide whether
there is evidence beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the
person charged; they merely determine "whether there is sufficient
ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime . . . has
been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof,
and should be held for trial." 15 Evidentiary matters must be
presented and heard during the trial. 16 Therefore, if the
information is valid on its face, and there is no showing of
manifest error, grave abuse of discretion and prejudice on the part
of the public prosecutor , the trial court should respect such
determination.
Inapplicabilty of Allado
and Salonga
The Court of Appeals anchored its ruling on the pronouncement
made in Allado v. Diokno:" . . . [I]f, upon the filing of the
information in court, the trial judge, after reviewing the
information and the documents attached thereto, must either call
for the complainant and the witnesses themselves or simply dismiss
the case. There is no reason to hold the accused for trial and
further expose him to an open and public accusation of the crime
when no probable cause exists." 17
In Allado, Petitioners Diosdado Jose Allado and Roberto I.
Mendoza, practicing lawyers, were accused by the Presidential
Anti-Crime Commission (PACC) of kidnapping with murder and ordered
by Judge Roberto C. Diokno to be arrested without bail. The
petitioners questioned the issuance of the warrants for their
arrest contending that the respondent judge acted with grave abuse
of discretion and in excess of his jurisdiction in holding that
there was probable cause against them. They contended that the
trial court relied merely on the resolution of the investigating
panel and its certification that probable cause existed, without
personally determining the admissibility and sufficiency of the
evidence for such finding and without stating the basis thereof.
They maintained that the records of the preliminary investigation,
which was the sole basis of the judge's ruling, failed to establish
probable cause against them that would justify the issuance of
warrants for their arrest.
The Court declared that Judge Diokno has indeed committed grave
abuse of discretion in issuing the arrest warrants. Contrary to the
constitutional mandate and established jurisprudence, he merely
relied on the certification of the prosecutors as to the existence
of the probable cause, instead of personally examining the
evidence, the complainant and his witness." For otherwise," the
Court said "he would have found out that the evidence thus far
presented was utterly insufficient to warrant the arrest of the
petitioners" 18
In categorically stating that the evidence so far presented did
not meet the standard of probable cause and subsequently granting
the petition, the Court noted the following circumstances: first,
the corpus delicti was not established, and there was serious doubt
as to the alleged victim's death: second, the extra judicial
statement of the principal witness, who had priorly confessed his
participation in the crime, was full of material inconsistencies;
and third, the PACC operatives who investigated the case never
implicated the petitioners.
Citing Salonga v. Cruz-Pao, the Court of Appeals pointed out
that when there was no prima facie case against a person sought to
be charged with a crime, "the judge or fiscal, therefore, should
not go on with the prosecution in the hope that some credible
evidence might later turn out during trial, for this would be
flagrant violation of a basic right which the courts are created to
uphold." 19
In the aforecited case, Petitioner Jovito R. Salonga sought to
bar the filing of an Information for violation of the revised
Anti-Subversion Act, which Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano had ordered to be
filed against him. In sustaining the petitioner, the Court held
that the evidence upon which the Information was based was not
sufficient to charge him for a violation of the Revised Subversion
Act.
In all, the Court decreed in both cases that there was no basis
in law and in fact for the judicial and executive determination at
probable cause. The Court also held that the government, while
vested with the right and the duty to protect itself and its people
against transgressors of the law, must perform the same in a manner
that would not infringe the perceived violators' rights as
guaranteed by the Constitution.
However, the present case is not on all fours with Allado and
Salonga. First, Elsa Gumban, the principal eyewitness to the
killing of Rosalinda Dy, was not a participation or conspirator in
the commission of the said crime. In Allado and Salonga, however,
the main witnesses were the confessed perpetrators of the crimes,
whose testimonies the court deemed 'tainted'. 20 Second, in the
case at bar, the private respondent was accorded due process, and
no precipitate haste or bias during the investigation of the case
can be
-
imputed to the public prosecutor. On the other hand, the Court
noted in Allado the "undue haste in the filing of the Information
and in the inordinate interest of the government" in pursuing the
case; 21 and in Salonga, " . . . the failure of the prosecution to
show that the petitioner was probably guilty of conspiring to
commit the crime, the initial disregard of petitioner's
constitutioner rights [and] the massive and damaging publicity
against him." 22 In other words, while the respective sets of
evidence before the prosecutors in the Allado and Salonga were
"utterly insufficient" to support a finding of probable cause, the
same cannot be said of the present case.
We stress that Allado and Salonga constitute exceptions to the
general rule and may be invoked only if similar circumstances are
clearly shown to exist. But as the foregoing comparisons show, such
similarities are absent in the instant case. Hence, the rulings in
the two aforementioned cases cannot apply to it.
Motion Without Requisite Notice
One more thing, Petitioners aver that Private Respondent Cerbo
did not give them a copy of the Motion to Quash the Warrant of
Arrest, which had been issued against him, or a notice of the
scheduled hearing. Thus, they contend, Judge Valles should not have
entertained such motion.
It is settled that every written motion in a trial court must be
set for hearing by the applicant and served with the notice of
hearing thereof, in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the
other party. The provisions on this matter in Section 4 and 5, Rule
15 of the Rules of the Court, 23 are categorical and mandatory
character. 24 Under Section 6 of the said rule, no motion shall be
acted upon by the court without proof of service thereof. The
rationale for this rule is simple: unless the movants set the time
and the place of hearing, the court will be unable to determine
whether the adverse parties agree or object to the motions, since
the rules themselves do not fix any period within which they may
file their replies or oppositions. 25
The motion to quash the warrant of arrest in the present case
being pro forma, inasmuch as the requisite copy and notice were not
duly served upon the adverse party, the trial court had no
authority to act on it.
Epilogue
In granting this petition, we are not prejudging the criminal
case or the guilt or innocence of Private Respondent Billy Cerbo.
We simply saying that, as a general rule, if the information is
valid on its face and there is no showing of manifest error, grave
abuse of discretion or prejudice on the part of the public
prosecutor, courts should not dismiss it for 'want of evidence,'
because evidentiary matters should be presented and heard during
the trial. The functions and duties of both the trial court and the
public prosecutor in "the proper scheme of things" in our criminal
justice system should be clearly understood.
The rights of the people from what could sometimes be an
''oppressive" exercise of government prosecutorial powers do need
to be protected when circumstances so require. But just as we
recognize this need, we also acknowledge that the State must
likewise be accorded due process. Thus, when there is no showing of
nefarious irregularity or manifest error in the performance of a
public prosecutor's duties, courts ought to refrain from
interfering with such lawfully and judicially mandated duties.
In any case, if there was palpable error or grave abuse of
discretion in the public prosecutor's finding of probable cause,
the accused can appeal such finding to the justice secretary 26 and
move for the deferment or suspension of the proceeding until such
appeal is resolved.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the
Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is
REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Nabunturan, Davao, which is
ordered to reinstate the amended information against Private
Respondent Billy Cerbo and to proceed with judicious speed in
hearing the case. No. costs.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
SALAZAR VS. ACHACOSO [183 SCRA 145; G.R. NO. 81510; 14 MAR
1990]
Wednesday, February 04, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law Facts: Rosalie Tesoro of Pasay
City in a sworn statement filed with the POEA, charged petitioner
with illegal recruitment. Public respondent Atty. Ferdinand Marquez
sent petitioner a telegram directing him to appear to the POEA
regarding the complaint against him. On the same day, after knowing
that petitioner had no license to operate a recruitment agency,
public respondent Administrator Tomas Achacoso issued a Closure and
Seizure Order No. 1205 to petitioner. It stated that there will a
seizure of the documents and paraphernalia being used or intended
to be used as the means of committing illegal recruitment, it
having verified
-
that petitioner has (1) No valid license or authority from the
Department of Labor and Employment to recruit and deploy workers
for overseas employment; (2) Committed/are committing acts
prohibited under Article 34 of the New Labor Code in relation to
Article 38 of the same code. A team was then tasked to implement
the said Order. The group, accompanied by mediamen and Mandaluyong
policemen, went to petitioners residence. They served the order to
a certain Mrs. For a Salazar, who let them in. The team confiscated
assorted costumes. Petitioner filed with POEA a letter requesting
for the return of the seized properties, because she was not given
prior notice and hearing. The said Order violated due process. She
also alleged that it violated sec 2 of the Bill of Rights, and the
properties were confiscated against her will and were done with
unreasonable force and intimidation. Issue: Whether or Not the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or the Secretary of
Labor) can validly issue warrants of search and seizure (or arrest)
under Article 38 of the Labor Code Held: Under the new
Constitution, . . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized. Mayors and prosecuting officers cannot issue warrants of
seizure or arrest. The Closure and Seizure Order was based on
Article 38 of the Labor Code. The Supreme Court held, We reiterate
that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue
search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through
the judicial process. To that extent, we declare Article 38,
paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no force
and effect The power of the President to order the arrest of aliens
for deportation is, obviously, exceptional. It (the power to order
arrests) cannot be made to extend to other cases, like the one at
bar. Under the Constitution, it is the sole domain of the courts.
Furthermore, the search and seizure order was in the nature of a
general warrant. The court held that the warrant is null and void,
because it must identify specifically the things to be seized.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Article 38, paragraph (c) of
the Labor Code is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and null and void. The
respondents are ORDERED to return all materials seized as a result
of the implementation of Search and Seizure Order No. 1205. Qua
Chee Gan v. Deportation Board, GR L-10280September 30, 1983Ponente:
J. BarreraFacts:- May 12, 1952, Special Prosecutor Emilo Galang
charged petitioners before the DeportationBoard, having purchased
US dollars in the sum of $130,000.00, without the necessary
licensefrom the Central Bank of the Philippines, which was then
secretly remitted to Hong Kong- Petitioners Qua Chee Gan and Chua
Lim Pao alias Jose Chua and Basilio King attempted to bribeofficers
of the PHL and US governments (Antonio Laforteza, Chief of the
Intelligence Division of the Central Bank, Capt. A.P. Charak of the
OSI, US Air Force) to evade prosecution for theunauthorized
purchase.- A warrant of arrest of petitioners was issued by the
Deportation Board. They filed a surety bondof P10,000.00 and cash
bond for P10,000.00, thereby provisionally setting them at liberty-
Petitioners-appellants filed a joint motion to dismiss in the
Deportation Board for the reasonthat the same does not constitute
legal ground for deportation of aliens, and that the Board hasno
jurisdiction to entertain such charges. Motion was denied by the
Board on Feb. 9, 1953- Petitioners then filed a petition for habeas
corpus and/or prohibition to the Court, but madereturnable to the
Court of First Instance of Manila. After securing and filing a bond
for P5,000.00each, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued by
the lower court, restraining the DB fromhearing deportation charges
against petitioners pending termination of the habeas corpusand/or
prohibition proceedings.- The DB then filed its answer to the
original petition, saying as an authorized agent of thePresident,
it has jurisdiction over the charges filed, and the authority to
order their arrest. TheCourt upheld the validity of the delegation
by the president to the Deportation Board of hispower to conduct
the investigations. It also sustained the power of the DB to issue
warrant of arres t and fix bonds for the aliens temporary release
pending investigation, pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised
Adminsistrative Code.- Hence this appeal.Issues:1. WON the
President has powers to deport aliens and, consequently,2. WON the
delegation to the DB of the ancillary power to investigate, carries
with it the power toorder the arrest of the alien complained of
Held:1. Yes. As stated in Sec 69 od Act 2711 of the Revised
Administrative Code -x-SEC. 69 Deportation of subject to foreign
power . A subject of a foreign power residing inthe Philippines
shall not be deported, expelled, or excluded from said Islands or
repatriatedto his own country by the President of the Philippines
except upon prior investigation,
-
conducted by said Executive or his authorized agent , of the
ground upon which Suchaction is contemplated. In such case the
person concerned shall be informed of the chargeor charges against
him and he shall be allowed not less than these days for the
preparationof his defense. He shall also have the right to be heard
by himself or counsel, to producewitnesses in his own behalf, and
to cross-examine the opposing witnesses."-x-