G. R. Nos. 102009-10,July 6, 1994People vs. Rolando De
Gracia
FACTS:The incidents involved in this case took place at the
height of thecoup d' etatstaged in December, 1989 by ultra-rightist
elements headed by the Reform the Armed Forces Movement-Soldiers of
the Filipino People (RAM-SFP) against the Government. At that time,
various government establishments and military camps in Metro
Manila were being bombarded by the rightist group with
their"tora-tora"planes. At around midnight of November 30, 1989,
the 4th Marine Battalion of the Philippine Marines occupied
Villamor Air Base, while the Scout Rangers took over the
Headquarters of the Philippine Army, the Army Operations Center,
and Channel 4, the government television station. Also, some
elements of the Philippine Army coming from Fort Magsaysay occupied
the Greenhills Shopping Center in San Juan, Metro Manila.That on or
about the 5th day of DECEMBER, 1989, in QUEZON CITY, METRO MANILA,
PHILIPPINES, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and
mutually helping one another, and without authority of law, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly
have in their possession, custody and control, the following to
wit:Five (5) bundles of C-4 or dynamitesSix (6) cartoons of M-16
ammunition at 20 eachOne hundred (100) bottles of MOLOTOV
bombswithout first securing the necessary license and/or permit to
possess the same from the proper authorities, and armed with said
dynamites, ammunition and explosives and pursuant to their
conspiracy heretofore agreed upon by them and prompted by common
designs, come to an agreement and decision to commit the crime of
rebellion, by then and there participating therein and publicly
taking arms against the duly constituted authorities, for the
purpose of overthrowing the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines, disrupting and jeopardizing its activities and
removing from its allegiance the territory of the Philippines or
parts thereof.In Criminal Case No. Q-90-11756, Rolando de Gracia,
Chito Henson, Lamberto Bicus, Rodolfo Tor and several John Does
were charged with attempted homicide allegedly committed on
December 1, 1989 in Quezon City upon the person of Crispin Sagario
who was shot and hit on the right thigh.Appellant was convicted for
illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of rebellion, but was
acquitted of attempted homicide.As a consequence, at around 6:30
A.M. of December 5, 1989, a searching team composed of F/Lt.
Virgilio Babao as team leader, M/Sgt. Lacdao, Sgt. Magallion, Sgt.
Patricio Pacatang, and elements of the 16th Infantry Battalion
under one Col. delos Santos raided the Eurocar Sales Office. They
were able to find and confiscate six cartons of M-16 ammunition,
five bundles of C-4 dynamites, M-shells of different calibers,
and"molotov"bombs inside one of the rooms belonging to a certain
Col. Matillano which is located at the right portion of the
building. Sgt. Oscar Obenia, the first one to enter the Eurocar
building, saw appellant De Gracia inside the office of Col.
Matillano, holding a C-4 and suspiciously peeping through a door.
De Gracia was the only person then present inside the room. A
uniform with the nametag of Col. Matillano was also found. As a
result of the raid, the team arrested appellant, as well as
Soprieso Verbo and Roberto Jimena who were janitors at the Eurocar
building. They were then made to sign an inventory, written in
Tagalog, of the explosives and ammunition confiscated by the
raiding team. No search warrant was secured by the raiding team
because, according to them, at that time there was so much disorder
considering that the nearby Camp Aguinaldo was being mopped up by
the rebel forces and there was simultaneous firing within the
vicinity of the Eurocar office, aside from the fact that the courts
were consequently closed. The group was able to confirm later that
the owner of Eurocar office is a certain Mr. Gutierrez and that
appellant is supposedly a "boy" therein.Appellant Rolando de Gracia
gave another version of the incident. First, he claims that on
November 30, 1989, he was in Antipolo to help in the birthday party
of Col. Matillano. He denies that he was at the Eurocar Sales
Office on December 1, 1989. Second, he contends that when the
raiding team arrived at the Eurocar Sales Office on December 5,
1989, he was inside his house, a small nipa hut which is adjacent
to the building. According to him, he was tasked to guard the
office of Col. Matillano which is located at the right side of the
building. He denies, however, that he was inside the room of Col.
Matillano when the raiding team barged in and that he had
explosives in his possession. He testified that when the military
raided the office, he was ordered to get out of his house and made
to lie on the ground face down, together with "Obet" and "Dong" who
were janitors of the building. He avers that he does not know
anything about the explosives and insists that when they were asked
to stand up, the explosives were already there.Appellant stated
that he visited Col. Matillano in 1987 at the stockade of the
Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police (PC-INP), and
that he knew Matillano was detained because of the latter's
involvement in the 1987coup d' etat. In July, 1989, appellant again
went to see Matillano because he had no job. Col. Matillano then
told him that he could stay in the PC-INP stockade and do the
marketing for them. From that time until his arrest at the Eurocar
office, appellant worked for Matillano.De Gracia believes that the
prosecution witnesses were moved to testify against him
because"bata raw ako ni Col. Matillano eh may atraso daw sa kanila
si Col. Matillano kaya sabi nila ito na lang bata niya ang ipitin
natin."ISSUES:I. The first issue to be resolved is whether or not
intent to possess is an essential element of the offense punishable
under Presidential Decree No. 1866 and, if so, whether appellant De
Gracia did intend to illegally possess firearms and ammunition.
II. Whether or not there was a valid search and seizure in this
case.
RULING:The rule is that ownership is not an essential element of
illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. What the law
requires is merely possession which includes not only actual
physical possession but also constructive possession or the
subjection of the thing to one's control and management.This has to
be so if the manifest intent of the law is to be effective. The
same evils, the same perils to public security, which the law
penalizes exist whether the unlicensed holder of a prohibited
weapon be its owner or a borrower. To accomplish the object of this
law the proprietary concept of the possession can have no bearing
whatsoever.But is the mere fact of physical or constructive
possession sufficient to convict a person for unlawful possession
of firearms or must there be an intent to possess to constitute a
violation of the law? This query assumes significance since the
offense of illegal possession of firearms is amalum
prohibitumpunished by a special law,in which case good faith and
absence of criminal intent are not valid defenses.When the crime is
punished by a special law, as a rule, intent to commit the crime is
not necessary. It is sufficient that the offender has the intent to
perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law. Intent to commit
the crime and intent to perpetrate the act must be distinguished. A
person may not have consciously intended to commit a crime; but he
did intend to commit an act, and that act is, by the very nature of
things, the crime itself. In the first (intent to commit the
crime), there must be criminal intent; in the second (intent to
perpetrate the act) it is enough that the prohibited act is done
freely and consciously.In the present case, a distinction should be
made between criminal intent and intent to possess. While mere
possession, without criminal intent, is sufficient to convict a
person for illegal possession of a firearm, it must still be shown
that there wasanimus possidendior an intent to possess on the part
of the accused.11Such intent to possess is, however, without regard
to any other criminal or felonious intent which the accused may
have harbored in possessing the firearm. Criminal intent here
refers to the intention of the accused to commit an offense with
the use of an unlicensed firearm. This is not important in
convicting a person under Presidential Decree No. 1866. Hence, in
order that one may be found guilty of a violation of the decree, it
is sufficient that the accused had no authority or license to
possess a firearm, and that he intended to possess the same, even
if such possession was made in good faith and without criminal
intent.Concomitantly, a temporary, incidental, casual, or harmless
possession or control of a firearm cannot be considered a violation
of a statute prohibiting the possession of this kind of weapon,such
as Presidential Decree No. 1866. Thus, although there is physical
or constructive possession, for as long as theanimus possidendiis
absent, there is no offense committed.Coming now to the case before
the court, there is no doubt in its mind that appellant De Gracia
is indeed guilty of having intentionally possessed several
firearms, explosives and ammunition without the requisite license
or authority therefor. Prosecution witness Sgt. Oscar Abenia
categorically testified that he was the first one to enter the
Eurocar Sales Office when the military operatives raided the same,
and he saw De Gracia standing in the room and holding the several
explosives marked in evidence as Exhibits D to D-4.At first,
appellant denied any knowledge about the explosives. Then, he
alternatively contended that his act of guarding the explosives for
and in behalf of Col. Matillano does not constitute illegal
possession thereof because there was no intent on his part to
possess the same, since he was merely employed as an errand boy of
Col. Matillano. His pretension of impersonal or indifferent
material possession does not and cannot inspire credence.Animus
possidendiis a state of mind which may be determined on a case to
case basis, taking into consideration the prior and coetaneous acts
of the accused and the surrounding circumstances. What exists in
the realm of thought is often disclosed in the range of action. It
is not controverted that appellant De Gracia is a former soldier,
having served with the Philippine Constabulary prior to his
separation from the service for going on absence without
leave(AWOL).We do not hesitate, therefore, to believe and conclude
that he is familiar with and knowledgeable about the
dynamites,"molotov"bombs, and various kinds of ammunition which
were confiscated by the military from his possession. As a former
soldier, it would be absurd for him not to know anything about the
dangerous uses and power of these weapons. Afortiori, he cannot
feign ignorance on the import of having in his possession such a
large quantity of explosives and ammunition. Furthermore, the place
where the explosives were found is not a military camp or office,
nor one where such items can ordinarily but lawfully be stored, as
in a gun store, an arsenal or armory. Even an ordinarily prudent
man would be put on guard and be suspicious if he finds articles of
this nature in a place intended to carry out the business of
selling cars and which has nothing to do at all, directly or
indirectly, with the trade of firearms and ammunition.On the basis
of the foregoing disquisition, it is apparent, the SC hold, that
appellant De Gracia actually intended to possess the articles
confiscated from his person.
G.R. No. 125754, December 22, 1999People vs. Bolasa
FACTS:An anonymous caller tipped off PO3 Dante Salonga and PO3
Albert Carizon in the early evening of 11 September 1995 that a man
and a woman were repacking prohibited drugs at a certain house in
Sta. Brigida St., Karuhatan, Valenzuela, Metro Manila.PO3 Salonga
and PO3 Carizon together with SPO1 Fernando Arenas immediately
proceeded to the house of the suspects and parked their car some
three hundred (300) meters away.They walked towards their quarry's
lair accompanied this time by their unnamed informer.When they
reached the house they "peeped (inside) through a small window and
x x x saw one man and a woman repacking suspected
marijuana."[1]They entered the house and introduced themselves as
police officers to the occupants and thereupon confiscated the tea
bags and some drug paraphernalia.They arrested the two (2) who
turned out to be the accused Zenaida BolasayNakoboan and Roberto
delos Reyes.Subsequent examination of the tea bags by NBI Forensic
Chemist Rubie Calalo confirmed the suspicion that the tea bags
contained marijuana.
ISSUE:Whether vor not the arrest of Zenaida Bolasa and the
search preceeded by it was illegal.
RULING:The Supreme Court sustained the appeal.This case clearly
illustrates how constitutional guarantees against illegal arrests
and seizures can be violated by overzealous police officers in the
arrest of suspected drug offenders.Thus, after a meticulous
evaluation of the evidence at hand, this Court finds itself with no
other recourse but to strike down the process adopted by the
prosecution and acquit accused-appellants for insufficiency of
evidence and reasonable doubt.Section 2, Art. III, of the 1987
Constitution provides -The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall
be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.The State cannot in a cavalier fashion intrude into the
persons of its citizens as well as into their houses, papers and
effects.The constitutional provision sheathes the private
individual with an impenetrable armor against unreasonable searches
and seizures. It protects the privacy and sanctity of the person
himself against unlawful arrests and other forms of restraint, and
prevents him from being irreversibly "cut off from that domestic
security which renders the lives of the most unhappy in some
measure agreeable.For sure, this constitutional guarantee is not a
blanket prohibition against all searches and seizures as it
obviously operates only against searches and seizures that are
"unreasonable. Thus, arrests and seizures in the following
instances are not deemed unreasonable and are thus allowed even in
the absence of a warrant -1.Warrantless search incidental to a
lawful arrest(Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and
prevailing jurisprudence);2.Search of evidence in plain view. The
elements are:(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid
warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the
pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was
inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be
where they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and,
(d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further
search.3.Search of a moving vehicle.Highly regulated by the
government, the vehicles inherent mobility reduces expectation of
privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares
furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause
that the occupant committed a criminal activity;4.Consented
warrantless search;5.Customs search;6.Stop and Frisk; and7.Exigent
and emergency circumstances.[6]An arrest is lawful even in the
absence of a warrant:(a) when the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is about to commit an offense
in his presence; (b) when an offense has in fact been committed and
he has reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and, (c) when the person to be arrested is a
prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where
he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case
is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.[7]A person charged with an offense may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as
proof of the commission of the offense.[8]The manner by which
accused-appellants were apprehended does not fall under any of the
above-enumerated categories.Perforce, their arrest is
illegal.First, the arresting officers had no personal knowledge
that at the time of their arrest, accused-appellants had just
committed, were committing, or were about to commit a crime.Second,
the arresting officers had no personal knowledge that a crime was
committed nor did they have any reasonable ground to believe that
accused-appellants committed it.Third, accused-appellants were not
prisoners who have escaped from a penal establishment.Neither can
it be said that the objects were seized in plain view.First, there
was no valid intrusion.As already discussed, accused-appellants
were illegally arrested.Second, the evidence, i.e., the tea bags
later on found to contain marijuana, was not inadvertently
discovered.The police officers intentionally peeped first through
the window before they saw and ascertained the activities of
accused-appellants inside the room.In like manner, the search
cannot be categorized as a search of a moving vehicle, a consented
warrantless search, a customs search, or a stop and frisk; it
cannot even fall under exigent and emergency circumstances, for the
evidence at hand is bereft of any such showing.On the contrary, it
indicates that the apprehending officers should have conducted
first a surveillance considering that the identities and address of
the suspected culprits were already ascertained.After conducting
the surveillance and determining the existence of probable cause
for arresting accused-appellants, they should have secured a search
warrant prior to effecting a valid arrest and seizure.The arrest
being illegalab initio, the accompanying search was likewise
illegal.Every evidence thus obtained during the illegal search
cannot be used against accused-appellants;[9]hence, their acquittal
must follow in faithful obeisance to the fundamental law.
Francisco Chavez v. Raul M. Gonzales and National
Telecommunications Commission,G.R. No. 168338,February 15, 2008
FACTS:As a consequence of the public release of copies of the
Hello Garci compact disc audiotapes involving a wiretappedmobile
phone conversation between then-President Gloria Arroyo and Comelec
Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano, respondent DOJ Secretary Gonzales
warned reporters that those who had copies of the CD and those
broadcasting or publishing its contents could be held liable under
the Anti-Wiretapping Act. He also stated that persons possessing or
airing said tapes were committing a continuing offense, subject to
arrest by anybody. Finally, he stated that he had ordered the
National Bureau of Investigation to go after media organizations
found to have caused the spread, the playing and the printing of
the contents of a tape.
Meanwhile, respondent NTC warnedin a press release all radio
stations and TV network owners/operators that the conditions of the
authorization and permits issued to them by government like the
Provisional Authority and/or Certificate of Authority explicitly
provides that they shall not use their stations for the
broadcasting or telecasting of false information or willful
misrepresentation. The NTC stated that the continuous airing or
broadcast of the Hello Garci taped conversations by radio and TV
stations is a continuing violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law and
the conditions of the Provisional Authority and/or Certificate of
Authority.It warned that their broadcast/airing of such false
information and/or willful misrepresentation shall be a just cause
for the suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses
or authorizations issued to the said media establishments.
Subsequently, a dialogue was held between the NTC and
theKapisanan ng mga Brodkaster sa Pilipinas(KBP) which resulted in
the issuance of a Joint Press Statement which stated, among others,
that the supposed wiretapped tapes should be treated with
sensitivity and handled responsibly.
Petitioner Chavez filed a petition under Rule 65 against
respondents Secretary Gonzales and the NTC directly with the
Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
1.Will a purported violation of law such as the Anti-Wiretapping
Law justify straitjacketingthe exercise of freedom of speech and of
the press?
2.Did themere press statementsof respondents DOJ Secretary and
the NTC constitute a form of content-based prior restraint that has
transgressed the Constitution?
RULING:
[The Court voted 10-5 (CJ Puno, joined by JJ. Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez,
Carpio Morales, Azcuna, Reyes and Tinga in the majority, as against
JJ. Corona, Chico-Nazario, Nachura, Leonardo-De Castro and Velasco
in the minority) in granting the petition insofar as respondent
Secretary Gonzalezs press statement was concerned. Likewise, it
voted 10-5 (CJ Puno, joined by JJ. Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio Morales,
Azcuna, Reyes and Velasco in the majority, as against JJ. Corona,
Chico-Nazario, Nachura, Leonardo-De Castro and Tinga in the
minority) in granting the same insofar as NTCs press statement was
concerned.]
1.NO, a purported violation of law such as the Anti-Wiretapping
Law will NOT justify straitjacketingthe exercise of freedom of
speech and of the press.
A governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or of the
pressbased on contentis given thestrictest scrutiny,with
thegovernmenthavingtheburdenof overcoming the
presumedunconstitutionality by theclear and present danger
rule.This rule applies equally toallkinds of
media,includingbroadcast media.
Respondents, who have the burden to show that these acts do not
abridge freedom of speech and of the press, failed to hurdle the
clear and present danger test.[T]hegreat evilwhich government wants
to prevent is the airing of a tape recording in alleged violation
of the anti-wiretapping law. The records of the case at bar however
are confused and confusing, and respondents evidence falls short of
satisfying the clear and present danger test.Firstly, the various
statements of the Press Secretary obfuscate the identity of the
voices in the tape recording.Secondly, the integrity of the taped
conversation is also suspect. The Press Secretary showed to the
public two versions, one supposed to be a complete version and the
other, an altered version.Thirdly, the evidence of the respondents
on the whos and the hows of the wiretapping act is ambivalent,
especially considering the tapes different versions. The identity
of the wire-tappers, the manner of its commission and other related
and relevant proofs are some of the invisibles of this
case.Fourthly, given all these unsettled facets of the tape, it is
even arguable whether its airing would violate the anti-wiretapping
law.
We rule thatnot every violation of a law will justify
straitjacketingthe exercise of freedom of speech and of the press.
Ourlaws are of different kindsand doubtless, some of them provide
norms of conduct which[,] even if violated[,] have only an adverse
effect on a persons private comfort but does not endanger national
security. There are laws of great significance but their
violation,by itself and without more, cannot support suppression of
free speech and free press.In fine,violation of law is just a
factor, a vital one to be sure, which should be weighed in
adjudging whether to restrain freedom of speech and of the
press.Thetotality of the injurious effectsof the violation to
private and public interest must be calibrated in light of the
preferred status accorded by the Constitution and by related
international covenants protecting freedom of speech and of the
press. In calling for a careful and calibrated measurement of the
circumference of all these factors to determine compliance with the
clear and present danger test,the Court should not be
misinterpreted as devaluingviolationsof law.By all means,
violations of law should be vigorously prosecutedbythe State for
they breed their own evil consequence.But to repeat,the need to
prevent their violation cannot per setrump the exercise of free
speech and free press, a preferred right whose breach can lead to
greater evils.For this failure of the respondents alone to offer
proof to satisfy the clear and present danger test, the Court has
no option but to uphold the exercise of free speech and free press.
There is no showing that the feared violation of the
anti-wiretapping law clearly endangers thenational security of the
State.
2.YES, themere press statementsof respondents DOJSecretaryand
the NTC constituted a form of content-based prior restraint that
has transgressed the Constitution.
[I]tisnotdecisive that the press statements made by respondents
were not reduced in or followed up with formal orders or circulars.
It is sufficient that the press statements were made by respondents
while in the exercise of their official functions. Undoubtedly,
respondent Gonzales made his statements as Secretary of Justice,
while the NTC issued its statement as the regulatory body of
media.Any act done, such as a speech uttered, for and on behalf of
the government in an officialcapacityis covered by the rule on
prior restraint.The concept of an act does not limit itself to acts
already converted to a formal order or official circular.Otherwise,
the non formalization of an act into an official order or
circularwill result in the easy circumvention of the prohibition on
prior restraint.The press statements at bar are acts that should be
struck down as they constitute impermissible forms of prior
restraints on the right to free speech and press.
NEWSOUNDS BROADCASTING NETWORK INC. vs.HON. CEASAR G. DYG.R.
Nos. 170270 & 179411April 2, 2009FACTS:Petitioners operate and
run Bombo Radyo DZNC Cauayan (DZNC), an AM radio broadcast station,
and Star FM DWIT Cauayan, an FM radio broadcast station, in Cauayan
Citry, Isabela. Back in 1996, Newsounds commenced relocation of its
broadcasting station, management office, and transmitters on
propery located in Minante 2, Cauayan City, Isabela.On July 1996,
the Housing & Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) and Office of
the Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator (OMPDC) affirmed
and certified that the commercial structure to be constructed
conformed to local zoning regulations, noting as well that the
location is classified as a commercial area. The radio station was
able to fully operate smoothly thereafter.In 2002 however, when
petitioners applied for a renewal of mayors permit, City Zoning
Administratior-Designate Bagnos Maximo refused to issue zoning
clearance on the grounds that petitioners were not able to submit
conversion papers showing that the agricultural land was converted
to commercial land. Petitioners asked the court to compel the
issuance of mayors permit but the court denied the action. In the
meantime, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Region II office
issued to petitioners a formal recognition of conversion of the
property from agricultural to commercial.
In 2003, petitioners again filed their application for renewal
of mayors permit, attaching the DAR Order. Respondent Felicisimo
Meer, acting City Administrator of Cauayan City denied the same,
claiming that it was void on the grounds that they did not have
record of the DAR Order.The deadline lapsed on Febuary 15, 2004,
and respondents Meer and Racma Fernandez-Garcia, City Legal Officer
of Cauayan City, closed the radio station. Due to the prvosion of
Omnibus Election Code which prohibits the closure of radio station
during the pendency of election period, COMELEC issued an order
allowing the petitioners to operate before Febuary 17, 2004, but
was barred again by respondent Mayor Ceasar Dy on the grounds that
the radio station had no permit. Nonetheless, COMELEC allowed them
to run again until June 10, 2004 after elections.Petitioners filed
the case to the RTC and CA for the issuance of mayors permit but
both courts denied the petition.A municipal or city mayor is
likewise authorized under the LGC to issue licenses and permits,
and suspend or revoke the same for any violation of the conditions
upon which said licenses or permits had been issued, pursuant to
law or ordinance. In case of Cauayan City, the authority to require
a mayors permit was enacted through Ordinance No. 92-004, enacted
in 1993. However, nothing in the ordinance requires an application
for a mayors permit to submit either an approved land conversion
papers from DAR, showing that its property was converted from prime
agricultural land or an approved resolution from the Sangguniang
Bayan or Sangguniang Panglungsod authorizing the reclassification
of property from agricultural to commercial land.
In 1996, the HLURB issued a zoning decision that classified the
property as commercial. Petitioners are also armed with several
certifications stating that the property is indeed a commercial
area. Also, petitioners paid real property taxes based on the
classification of property as commercial without objections raised
by therespondents.
Petitioners argued that this consistent recognition by the local
government of Cauayan of the commercial character of the property
constitutes estoppels against respondents from denying the fact
before the courts. The lower courts had ruled that the government
of Cauayan City is not bound by estoppels, but petitioners
classified that this concept is understood to only refer to acts
and mistakes of its official especially to those which are
irregular.
ISSUE:Whether the lower court is correct in contending that the
government of Cauayan City is not bound by estoppels on the grounds
that the state is immune against suits.
RULING:
No.While it is true that the state cannot be put in estoppels by
mistake or error of its officials or agents, there is an
exception.Estoppels against the public are little favored. They
should not be invoked except in rare and unusual circumstances, and
may not be invoked where they would operate to defeat the effective
operation of a policy adopted to protect the public. They must be
applied with circumspection and should be applied only in those
special cases where the interests of justice clearly require it.
Nevertheless, the government must not be allowed to deal
dishonorably or capriciously with its citizens, and must not play
an ignoble part or do a shabby thing; and subject to limitations .
. ., the doctrine of equitable estoppel may be invoked against
public authorities as well as against private individualsThus, when
there is no convincing evidence to prove irregularity or negligence
on the part of the government official whose acts are being
disowned other than the bare assertion on the part of the State,
the Supreme Court have declined to apply State immunity from
estoppel. Herein, there is absolutely no evidence other than the
bare assertions of the respondents that the Cauayan City government
had previously erred when it certified that the property had been
zoned for commercial use. The absence of any evidence other than
bare assertions that the 1996 to 2001 certifications were incorrect
lead to the ineluctable conclusion that respondents are estopped
from asserting that the previous recognition of the property as
commercial was wrong.Respondents were further estopped from
disclaiming the previous consistent recognition by the Cauayan City
government that the property was commercially zoned unless they had
evidence, which they had none, that the local officials who issued
such certifications acted irregularly in doing so. It is thus
evident that respondents had no valid cause at all to even require
petitioners to secure approved land conversion papers from the DAR
showing that the property was converted from prime agricultural
land to commercial land.Respondents closure of petitioners radio
stations is clearly tainted with ill motvies. Petitioners have been
aggressive in exposing the widespread election irregularities in
Isabela that appear to have favored respondent Dy and his political
dynasty. Such statement manifests and confirms that respondents
denial of the renewal applications on the ground that property is
commercial and merely a pretext, and their real agenda is to remove
petitioners from Cauayan City and suppress the latters voice. This
is a blatant violation of constitutional right to press
freedom.WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. The assailed
decisions of the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court of
Cauayan City, Branch 24, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
KMU vs. ERMITAGR NO. 17855October 5, 2010
FACTS:In 2005, Executive Order No. 420 was passed. This law
sought to harmonize and streamline the countrys id system. Kilusang
Mayo Uno, Bayan Muna, and other concerned groups sought to enjoin
the Director-General from implementing the EO because they allege
that the said EO is unconstitutional for it infringes upon the
right to privacy of the people and that the same is a usurpation of
legislative power by the president.ISSUE:Whether or not the said EO
is unconstitutional.HELD:No.Section 1 of EO 420 directs these
government entities to adopt a unified multi-purpose ID system.
Thus, all government entities that issue IDs as part of their
functions under existing laws are required to adopt a uniform data
collection and format for their IDs.Section 1 of EO 420 enumerates
the purposes of the uniform data collection and format. The
President may by executive or administrative order direct the
government entities under the Executive department to adopt a
uniform ID data collection and format. Sec 17, Article 7 of the
1987 Constitution provides that the President shall have control of
all executive departments, bureaus and offices. The same Section
also mandates the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed. Certainly, under this constitutional power of control the
President can direct all government entities, in the exercise of
their functions under existing laws, to adopt a uniform ID data
collection and ID format to achieve savings, efficiency,
reliability, compatibility, and convenience to the public.The
Presidents constitutional power of control is self-executing and
does not need any implementing legislation. Of course, the
Presidents power of control is limited to the Executive branch of
government and does not extend to the Judiciary or to the
independent constitutional commissions. Thus, EO 420 does not apply
to the Judiciary, or to the COMELEC which under existing laws is
also authorized to issue voters ID cards. This only shows that EO
420 does not establish a national ID system because legislation is
needed to establish a single ID system that is compulsory for all
branches of government.
Tolentino vs. Secretary of FinanceG.R. No. 115455August 25,
1994
FACTS: The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter
or exchange of goods and properties as well as on the sale or
exchange of services. RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the
existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the
National Internal Revenue Code. There are various suits challenging
the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds.
One contention is that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in
the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the
Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the consolidation
of 2 distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. There is also a
contention that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings as required by
the Constitution.
ISSUE:Whether or not RA 7716 violates Art. VI, Secs. 24 and
26(2) of the Constitution
RULING:
The argument that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the
House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the
Constitution will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the
law but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to
originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. To insist
that a revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the
legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law must
substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the
Senates power not only to concur with amendments but also to
propose amendments. Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is
that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills
authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills
of local application must come from the House of Representatives on
the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the
members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the
local needs and problems. Nor does the Constitution prohibit the
filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its
receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate
as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill.
The next argument of the petitioners was that S. No. 1630 did
not pass 3 readings on separate days as required by the
Constitution because the second and third readings were done on the
same day. But this was because the President had certified S. No.
1630 as urgent. The presidential certification dispensed with the
requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill
on separate days. That upon the certification of a bill by the
President the requirement of 3 readings on separate days and of
printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the
weight of legislative practice.
Ebralinag vs. Division Superintendent of School of CebuGR NO.
95770December 29, 1995
FACTS:
Two special civil actions for certiorari, Mandamus and
Prohibition were filed and consolidated raising the same issue
whether school children who are members or a religious sect known
as Jehovahs Witnesses may be expelled from school (both public and
private), for refusing, on account of their religious beliefs, to
take part in the flag ceremony which includes playing (by a band)
or singing the Philippine national anthem, saluting the Philippine
flag and reciting the patriotic pledge.All of the petitioners in
both (consolidated) cases were expelled from their classes by the
public school authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag,
sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as
required by Republic Act No. 1265 (An Act making flagceremony
compulsory in all educational institutions) of July 11, 1955 , and
by Department Order No. 8 (Rules and Regulations for Conducting the
Flag Ceremony in All Educational Institutions)dated July 21, 1955
of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) making
the flag ceremony compulsory in all educational
institutions.Petitioners are Jehovahs Witnesses believing that by
doing these is religious worship/devotion akin to idolatry against
their teachings. They contend that to compel transcends
constitutional limits and invades protection against official
control and religious freedom. The respondents relied on the
precedence of Gerona et al v. Secretary of Education where the
Court upheld the explulsions. Gerona doctrine provides that we are
a system of separation of the church and state and the flag is
devoid of religious significance and it doesnt involve any
religious ceremony. The children of Jehovahs Witnesses cannot be
exempted from participation in the flag ceremony. They have no
valid right to such exemption. Moreover, exemption to the
requirement will disrupt school discipline and demoralize the rest
of the school population which by far constitutes the great
majority. The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the
Constitution does not and cannot mean exemption from or
non-compliance with reasonable and non-discriminatory laws, rules
and regulations promulgated by competent authority.ISSUE: Whether
or not the expulsion of petitioners violated their freedom of
religion?
RULING:YES. The Court held that the expulsion of the petitioners
from the school was not justified.Religious freedom is a
fundamental right of highest priority and the amplest protection
among human rights, for it involves the relationship of man to his
Creator. The right to religious profession and worship has a
two-fold aspect, vis., freedom to believe and freedom to act on
ones belief. The first is absolute as long as the belief is
confined within the realm of thought. The second is subject to
regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that
affect the public welfare. The only limitation to religious freedom
is the existence of grave and present danger to public safety,
morals, health and interests where State has right to
prevent.Petitioners stress that while they do not take part in the
compulsory flag ceremony, they do not engage in external acts or
behavior that would offend their countrymen who believe in
expressing their love of country through the observance of the flag
ceremony. They quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony
to show their respect for the right of those who choose to
participate in the solemn proceedings. Since they do not engage in
disruptive behavior, there is no warrant for their expulsion.
Islamic Dawah Council of the Philippines, Inc. vs. Executive
SecretaryG.R. No. 153888July 9, 2003
FACTS:Petitioner is a non-governmental organization that extends
voluntary services to the Filipino people, especially to Muslim
Communities. Petitioner began to issue, for a fee, halal
certifications to qualified products and food manufacturers on
account of the actual need to certify food products as halal and
also due to halal food producers' request. Subsequently, Executive
Order (EO) 46 was issued creating the Philippine Halal
Certification Scheme and designating respondent Office of Muslim
Affairs (OMA) to oversee its implementation. In this petition for
prohibition, petitioner alleged, among others, that the subject EO
violates the constitutional provision on the separation of Church
and State.
In granting the petition, the Supreme Court ruled that freedom
of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of the
fundamental law and it has consistently affirmed this preferred
status. Without doubt, classifying a food product as halal is a
religious function because the standards used are drawn from the
Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By giving the OMA the exclusive power
to classify food products as halal, EO 46 encroached on the
religious freedom of Muslim organizations like herein petitioner to
interpret for Filipino Muslims what food products are fit for
Muslim consumption. Also, by arrogating to itself the task of
issuing halal certifications, the State has in effect forced
Muslims to accept its own interpretation of the Qur'an and Sunnah
on halal food.
The Court further ruled that only the prevention of an immediate
and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community can
justify the infringement of religious freedom. In the case at bar,
the Court found no compelling justification for the government to
deprive Muslim organizations, like herein petitioner, of their
religious right to classify a product as halal, even on the premise
that the health of Muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by
assigning to OMA the exclusive power to issue halal
certificates.
ISSUE:Whether or not Eexecutive Order 46 violates the
constitutional provision on the separation of Church and State.
RULING:No. In granting the petition, the Supreme Court ruled
that freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the
framers of the fundamental law and it has consistently affirmed
this preferred status. Without doubt, classifying a food product as
halal is a religious function because the standards used are drawn
from the Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By giving the OMA the
exclusive power to classify food products as halal, Executive Order
46 encroached on the religious freedom of Muslim organizations like
herein petitioner to interpret for Filipino Muslims what food
products are fit for Muslim consumption. Also, by arrogating to
itself the task of issuing halal certifications, the State has in
effect forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation of the
Qur'an and Sunnah on halal food.
The Court further ruled that only the prevention of an immediate
and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community can
justify the infringement of religious freedom. In the case at bar,
the Court found no compelling justification for the government to
deprive Muslim organizations, like herein petitioner, of their
religious right to classify a product as halal, even on the premise
that the health of Muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by
assigning to OMA the exclusive power to issue halal
certificates.Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger
to the security and welfare of the community can justify the
infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails to show
the seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is
constitutionally unacceptable. In a society with a democratic
framework like ours, the State must minimize its interference with
the affairs of its citizens and instead allow them to exercise
reasonable freedom of personal and religious activity. In the case
at bar, we find no compelling justification for the government to
deprive Muslim organizations, like herein petitioner, of their
religious right to classify a product as halal, even on the premise
that the health of Muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by
assigning to OMA the exclusive power to issue halal certifications.
The protection and promotion of the Muslim Filipinos' right to
health are already provided for in existing laws and ministered to
by government agencies charged with ensuring that food products
released in the market are fit for human consumption, properly
labeled and safe.Unlike EO 46, these laws do not encroach on the
religious freedom of Muslims.