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People of the Philippines vs Mahinay

Facts

Appellant Larry Mahinay rape a 12 year old child. After a series of follow-up operations, appellant was finally arrested. He was brought to theValenzuela Police Station. On July 7, 1995, with the assistance of Atty. Restituto Viernes, appellant executed an extra-judicial confessionwherein he narrated in detail how he raped and killed the victim.

Held

Another thing that militates against appellant is his extrajudicial confession, which he, however, claims was executed in violation of hisconstitutional right to counsel. But his contention is belied by the records as well as the testimony of the lawyer who assisted, warned andexplained to him his constitutionally guaranteed pre-interrogatory and custodial rights. As testified to by the assisting lawyer:

in accordance with the Constitution, jurisprudence and Republic Act No. 7438 : 41 It is high-time to educate our law-enforcement agencies who neglect either by ignorance or indifference the so-called Miranda rights which had become insufficient andwhich the Court must update in the light of new legal developments:

1.The person arrested, detained, invited or under custodial investigation must be informed in a language known to andunderstood by him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any; Everyother warnings, information or communication must be in a language known to and understood by saidperson;

2.He must be warned that he has a right to remain silent and that any statement he makes may be used as evidenceagainst him;

3.He must be informed that he has the right to be assisted at all times and have the presence of an independent andcompetent lawyer, preferably of his own choice;

4.He must be informed that if he has no lawyer or cannot afford the services of a lawyer, one will be provided for him;and that a lawyer may also be engaged by any person in his behalf, or may be appointed by the court uponpetition of the person arrested or one acting in his behalf;

5.That whether or not the person arrested has a lawyer, he must be informed that no custodial investigation in anyform shall be conducted except in the presence of his counsel or after a valid waiver has been made;

6.The person arrested must be informed that, at any time, he has the right to communicate or confer by the mostexpedient means — telephone, radio, letter or messenger — with his lawyer (either retained or appointed),any member of his immediate family, or any medical doctor, priest or minister chosen by him or by any onefrom his immediate family or by his counsel, or be visited by/confer with duly accredited national orinternational non-government organization. It shall be the responsibility of the officer to ensure that this isaccomplished;

7.He must be informed that he has the right to waive any of said rights provided it is made voluntarily, knowingly andintelligently and ensure that he understood the same;

8.In addition, if the person arrested waives his right to a lawyer, he must be informed that it must be done in writingAND in the presence of counsel, otherwise, he must be warned that the waiver is void even if he insist onhis waiver and chooses to speak;

9.That the person arrested must be informed that he may indicate in any manner at any time or stage of the processthat he does not wish to be questioned with warning that once he makes such indication, the police maynot interrogate him if the same had not yet commenced, or the interrogation must cease if it has alreadybegun;

10.The person arrested must be informed that his initial waiver of his right to remain silent, the right to counsel or anyof his rights does not bar him from invoking it at any time during the process, regardless of whether he mayhave answered some questions or volunteered some statements;

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11.He must also be informed that any statement or evidence, as the case may be, obtained in violation of any of theforegoing, whether inculpatory or exculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.

Miranda vs Arizona

Facts:

The Supreme Court’s decision in Miranda v. Arizona addressed four different cases involving custodial interrogations. In eac h of these cases,the defendant was questioned by police officers, detectives, or a prosecuting attorney in a room in which he was cut off from the outsideworld. In none of these cases was the defendant given a full and effective warning of his rights at the outset of the interrogation process. In allthe cases, the questioning elicited oral admissions and, in three of them, signed statements that were admitted at trial.

Miranda v. Arizona: Miranda was arrested at his home and taken in custody to a police station where he was identified by the complainingwitness. He was then interrogated by two police officers for two hours, which resulted in a signed, written confession. At trial, the oral andwritten confessions were presented to the jury. Miranda was found guilty of kidnapping and rape and was sentenced to 20-30 years

imprisonment on each count. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arizona held that Miranda’s constitutional rights were not viola ted in obtainingthe confession.

Vignera v. New York: Vignera was picked up by New York police in connection with the robbery of a dress shop that had occurred three daysprior. He was first taken to the 17th Detective Squad headquarters. He was then taken to the 66th Detective Squad, where he orally admittedthe robbery and was placed under formal arrest. He was then taken to the 70th Precinct for detention, where he was questioned by anassistant district attorney in the presence of a hearing reporter who transcribed the questions and answers. At trial, the oral confession and thetranscript were presented to the jury. Vignera was found guilty of first degree robbery and sentenced to 30-60 years imprisonment. Theconviction was affirmed without opinion by the Appellate Division and the Court of Appeals.

Westover v. United States: Westover was arrested by local police in Kansas City as a suspect in two Kansas City robberies and taken to a localpolice station. A report was also received from the FBI that Westover was wanted on a felony charge in California. Westover was interrogatedthe night of the arrest and the next morning by local police. Then, FBI agents continued the interrogation at the station. After two-and-a-halfhours of interrogation by the FBI, Westover signed separate confessions, which had been prepared by one of the agents during the

interrogation, to each of the two robberies in California. These statements were introduced at trial. Westover was convicted of the Californiarobberies and sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment on each count. The c onviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

California v. Stewart: In the course of investigating a series of purse-snatch robberies in which one of the victims died of injuries inflicted by herassailant, Stewart was identified as the endorser of checks stolen in one of the robberies. Steward was arrested at his home. Police alsoarrested Stewart’s wife and three other people who were visiting him. Stewart was placed in a cell, and, over the next five days, wasinterrogated on nine different occasions. During the ninth interrogation session, Stewart stated that he had robbed the deceased, but had notmeant to hurt her. At that time, police released the four other people arrested with Stewart because there was no evidence to connect any ofthem with the crime. At trial, Stewart’s statements were introduced. Stewart was convicted of robbery and first -degree murder and sentencedto death. The Supreme Court of California reversed, holding that Stewart should have been advised of his right to remain silent and his right tocounsel.

Issues:

Whether “statements obtained from an individual who is subjected to custodial police interrogation” are admissible against hi m in a criminaltrial and whether “procedures which assure that t he individual is accorded his privilege under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution not tobe compelled to incriminate himself” are necessary.

Supreme Court holding:

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The Court held that “there can be no doubt that the Fifth Amendment privilege is avail able outside of criminal court proceedings and serves toprotect persons in all settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed in any significant way from being compelled to incriminatethemselves.” As such, “the prosecution may not use statements , whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation ofthe defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By custodialinterrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of

his freedom of action in any significant way.”

The Court further held that “without proper safeguards the process of in -custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crimecontains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual’s will to resist and to compel him to speak w here he wouldotherwise do so freely.” Therefore, a defendant “must be warned prior to any q uestioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anythinghe says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorneyone will be appointed for him prior to any qu estioning if he so desires.”

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Supreme Court of Arizona in Miranda, reversed the judgment of the New York Court ofAppeals in Vignera, reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Westover, and affirmed the judgment of the SupremeCourt of California in Stewart.

People vs Rodriguez

Facts

Appellant and Wilfredo Rodriguez, employed as construction workers in the upper floors of the bank, were charged with the crime of Robberywith Homicide for the killing of the bank security guard whose lifeless body was discovered by a messenger in the early morning of October 11,1991.

Helds

At the time of their arrest in the afternoon of October 11, 1991, they were not informed of the well known Miranda rights. Worse, they werenot provided with competent counsel during the custodial investigation prior to the execution of the extrajudical confession. The maong pants

allegedly belonging to appellant stained with blood had no probative value since the blood type of appellant and the victim were not taken forpurposes of comparison.

The four fundamental requisites for the admissibility of a confession are (1) the confession must be voluntary; (2) the confession must be madewith the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) the confession must be express; and (4) the confession must be in writing. 19

We find the second requisite lacking. Prosecution witness SPO3 Jamoralin testified that the accused and appellant were arrested and broughtto the police station at around 5:00 P.M. of October 11, 1991. 20 The records show that the extrajudicial confession of Rodriguez was takendown by Pat. David D. Tuazon at 2:00 P.M. of October 15, 1991. 21 Atty. Lao confirmed on the stand that the police investigators called him ataround 2:00 P.M. of October 15, 1991, and that he conferred with the accused for about 10 minutes prior to the execution of the extrajudicialconfession. 22 Evidently, Rodriguez and appellant were detained for four days, but Atty. Lao of the PAO was called only on the fourth day ofdetention when accused was about to put his confession in writing. Under the factual milieu, the moment accused and appellant were arrestedand brought to the police station, they were already under custodial investigation.

People v Almanzor

Appelant rape a jollibee employer in a van and a crowded place. While going to her work. He was ordered to drive to the Makati Police Station.Accused-appellant pleaded to be allowed to go to his office but the policeman said that they had to go straight to the police station. He wasinformed that there was a complaint against him. Later in the evening, Sally arrived at the police station. Accused-appellant, together with five(5) other men, was then made to stand in a line up. Sally singled out accused-appellant as the man who raped her. 17

Held

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Accused-appellant's allegation with respect to the conduct of the police line-up is futile. That he was without counsel at the time of the policeline-up does not render the same irregular or invalid. The guarantees of Section 12(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution, or the so-calledMiranda rights, may be invoked only by a person while he is under custodial investigation. Custodial investigation starts when the policeinvestigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect taken into custody by thepolice who starts the interrogation and propounds questions to the person to elicit incriminating statements. A police line-up is not part of thecustodial investigation; hence, the right to counsel cannot yet be invoked at this stage. 32

It appears from the record that accused-appellant was not under custodial investigation when he was brought to the Makati police station. Thepolice did not, as yet, interrogate him or elicit incriminating statements from him. He was brought to the police station to be presented, alongwith other men, to Sally and to be identified by her. The presence of counsel at that stage was not therefore necessary.

People vs Ordono

Facts

Accused Ordoño and Medina were adjudged guilty of the crime of rape with homicide attended with conspiracy. Both accused claimed thatconstitutional infirmities attended the execution of their extrajudicial confessions, i.e. , mainly the lack of counsel to assist them during custodialinvestigation thereby making their confessions inadmissible in evidence

Held

On appeal, the Supreme Court held that their extrajudicial confessions were inadmissible as evidence, because: there was no counsel during thecustodial investigation when the extrajudicial statements were being taken; in the absence of a valid waiver, accused's relatives, the ParishPriest of Santol and Municipal Mayor cannot stand in lieu of counsel's presence in the custodial investigation; and the accused were noteffectively informed of their constitutional rights when they were arrested so that their admissions were obtained in violation of their rightagainst self-incrimination.

Accused's conviction, however, was upheld based on their taped interview to the news reporter where they voluntarily admitted to the rape-slay and even expressed remorse for having perpetrated the crime. The radio announcer is not a law enforcement officer, hence, theiruncounselled confession to him did not violate their constitutional rights.

A review of the contents of the tape as included in Roland Almoite's testimony reveals that the interview was conducted free from anyinfluence or intimidation from police officers and was done willingly by the accused. Despite allegations to the contrary, no police authorityordered or forced the accused to talk to the radio announcer. While it may be expected that police officers were around since the interviewwas held in the police station, there was no showing that they were within hearing distance nor within the vicinity where the interview wasbeing conducted. At most, the participation of the police authorities was only to allow Roland Almoite to conduct an interview.

People vs Bravo

Facts

Appellant is suspected to have raped a child. The testimony of the policeman that the accused admitted he was with the victim on the eveningof January 12, 1994 but the latter was too drunk to remember what happened should have been held inadmissible by the trial court in view ofthe policeman's own admission in court that although he informed the accused that he is a suspect in the rape and killing of one Juanita Antolinhe did not inform the accused of his constitutional rights before he asked him of his participation in the crime under investigation.

The mantle of protection under this constitutional provision covers the period from the time a person is taken into custody for investigation ofhis possible participation in the commission of a crime or from the time he is singled out as a suspect in the commission of a crime although notyet in custody . 17 The exclusionary rule sprang from a recognition that police interrogatory procedures lay fertile grounds for coercion, physicaland psychological, of the suspect to admit responsibility for the crime under investigation. It was not intended as a deterrent to the accusedfrom confessing guilt, if he voluntarily and intelligently so desires but to protect the accused from admitting what he is coerced to admitalthough untrue. 18 Law enforcement agencies are required to effectively communicate the rights of a person under investigation and to insurethat it is fully understood. Any measure short of this requirement is considered a denial of such right . 19 Courts are not allowed to distinguishbetween preliminary questioning and custodial investigation proper when applying the exclusionary rule. Any information or admission givenby a person while in custody which may appear harmless or innocuous at the time without the competent assistance of an independent counselshould be struck down as inadmissible. 20 It has been held, however, that an admission made to news reporters or to a confidant of theaccused is not covered by the exclusionary rule. 21

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People vs pavillare

Facts

Accused-appellant Eduardo Pavillare y Varona was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City of kidnapping for ransom and wassentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of death. he improper identification of the accused-appellant at the police line-up without theassistance of counsel rendered the said identification, including that made in court, inadmissible in evidence.

Held

The Supreme Court affirmed accused-appellant's conviction. The Court ruled that the prohibition for custodial investigation conducted withoutthe assistance of counsel under Section 12 (1), Art. III of the Constitution does not extend to a person in a police line-up because that stage ofan investigation is not yet a part of custodial investigation. The identification made by the private complainant in the police line-up pointingto Pavillare as one of his abductors is admissible in evidence although the accused-appellant was not assisted by counsel because it is stilloutside the mantle of protection of the right to counsel as it involves a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and is purely investigatory innature. The Court also ruled that the crime of kidnapping for ransom was sufficiently established. The crime of kidnapping is committed bydepriving the victim of liberty whether he is placed in an enclosure or simply restrained from going home. Accused-appellant released thecomplainant when the money was handed over to him and after counting the money Pavillare and his companions immediately left the scene.Said acts clearly indicated that the payment of the ransom money was in exchange for the liberty of the private complainant.

People v Maingan

accused-appellant EDNA confessed to Barangay Chairman Bernardo in the presence of multitudes of angry residents outside the Barangay Hallthat she set her employer's house on fire because she had not been paid her salary for about a year and that she wanted to go home to herprovince but her employer told her to just ride a broomstick in going home. IAaCST

Accused-appellant EDNA was then turned over to arson investigators headed by S[F]O4 Danilo Talusan, who broughther to the San Lazaro Fire Station in Sta. Cruz, Manila where she was further investigated and then detained.

When Mercedita Mendoza went to the San Lazaro Fire Station to give her sworn statement, she had the opportunityto ask accused-appellant EDNA at the latter's detention cell why she did the burning of her employer's house andaccused-appellant EDNA replied that she set the house on fire because when she asked permission to go home to herprovince, the wife of her employer Roberto Separa, Sr., named Virginia Separa (sic) shouted at her: " Sige umuwi ka,

pagdating mo maputi ka na. Sumakay ka sa walis, pagdating mo maputi ka na "

When interviewed by Carmelita Valdez, a reporter of ABS-CBN Network, accused-appellant EDNA while under detention (sic) was heard bySFO4 (sic) Danilo Talusan as having admitted the crime and even narrated the manner how she accomplished it. SFO4 (sic) Danilo Talusan wasable to hear the same confession, this time at his home, while watching the television program "True Crime" hosted by Gus Abelgas also of ABS-CBN Network.

Held

In her second assigned error, accused-appellant questions the admissibility of her uncounselled extrajudicial confession given to prosecutionwitnesses, namely Remigio Bernardo, Mercedita Mendoza, and to the media. Accused-appellant Edna contends that being uncounselledextrajudicial confession, her admissions to having committed the crime charged should have been excluded in evidence against her for beingviolative of Article III, Section 12(1) of the Constitution.

Particularly, she takes exception to the testimony of prosecution witnesses Remigio Bernardo and Mercedita Mendoza for being hearsay and inthe nature of an uncounselled admission.

With the above vital pieces of evidence excluded, accused-appellant is of the position that the remaining proof of her alleged guilt, consisting inthe main of circumstantial evidence, is inadequate to establish her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

We partly disagree.

Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution in part provides:

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(1)Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right toremain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannotafford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and inthe presence of counsel.

xxx xxx xxx

(3)Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this Section or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible inevidence.

We have held that the abovequoted provision applies to the stage of custodial investigation — when the investigation is no longer a generalinquiry into an unsolved crime but starts to focus on a particular person as a suspect. 41 Said constitutional guarantee has also been extendedto situations in which an individual has not been formally arrested but has merely been "invited" for questioning. 42

To be admissible in evidence against an accused, the extrajudicial confessions made must satisfy the following requirements:

(1)it must be voluntary;

(2)it must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel;

(3)it must be express; and

(4)it must be in writing . 43

Arguably , the barangay tanods, including the Barangay Chairman, in this particular instance, may be deemed as law enforcement officer forpurposes of applying Article III, Section 12(1) and (3), of the Constitution. When accused-appellant was brought to the barangay hall in themorning of 2 January 2001, she was already a suspect, actually the only one, in the fire that destroyed several houses as well as killed the wholefamily of Roberto Separa, Sr. She was, therefore, already under custodial investigation and the rights guaranteed by Article III, Section 12(1), ofthe Constitution should have already been observed or applied to her. Accused-appellant's confession to Barangay Chairman Remigio Bernardowas made in response to the "interrogation" made by the latter — admittedly conducted without first informing accused-appellant of her rightsunder the Constitution or done in the presence of counsel. For this reason, the confession of accused-appellant, given to Barangay ChairmanRemigio Bernardo, as well as the lighter found by the latter in her bag are inadmissible in evidence against her as such were obtained inviolation of her constitutional rights.

Be that as it may, the inadmissibility of accused-appellant's confession to Barangay Chairman Remigio Bernardo and the lighter as evidence donot automatically lead to her acquittal. It should well be recalled that the constitutional safeguards during custodial investigations do not applyto those not elicited through questioning by the police or their agents but given in an ordinary manner whereby the accused verbally admits tohaving committed the offense as what happened in the case at bar when accused-appellant admitted to Mercedita Mendoza, one of theneighbors of Roberto Separa, Sr., to having started the fire in the Separas' house. The testimony of Mercedita Mendoza recounting saidadmission is, unfortunately for accused-appellant, admissible in evidence against her and is not covered by the aforesaid constitutionalguarantee. Article III of the Constitution, or the Bill of Rights, solely governs the relationship between the individual on one hand and the State(and its agents) on the other; it does not concern itself with the relation between a private individual and another private individual — as bothaccused-appellant and prosecution witness Mercedita Mendoza undoubtedly are. 44 Here, there is no evidence on record to show that saidwitness was acting under police authority, so appropriately, accused-appellant's uncounselled extrajudicial confession to said witness wasproperly admitted by the RTC.

People vs Rapeza

Facts

Upon information supplied by a certain Mr. Dela Cruz that appellant had wanted to confess to the crimes, SPO2 Gapas set out to look forappellant. 13 He found appellant fishing in Asinan Island and invited the latter for questioning. Appellant expressed his willingness to make aconfession in the presence of a lawyer . 14Appellant was then brought to the police station after which SPO2 Gapas requested Kagawad ArnelAlcantara to provide appellant with a lawyer. The following day, appellant was brought to the house of Atty. Roberto Reyes, the only availablelawyer in the municipality. 15 The typewriter at the police station was out of order at that time and Atty. Reyes could not go to the policestation as he was suffering from rheumatism . 16 At the house of Atty. Reyes, in the presence of Vice-Mayor Emiliano Marasigan of Culion, two(2) officials of the Sangguniang Barangay , SPO2 Cuizon and an interpreter, SPO2 Gapas proceeded with the custodial investigation of appellantwho was assisted by Atty. Reyes. Appellant was expressly advised that he was being investigated for the death of Libas and Ganzon. EcTI

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constitutional rights. Atty. Reyes was not even presented in court to testify thereon whether on direct examination or on rebuttal. It appearsthat his participation in the proceeding was confined to the notarization of appellant's confession. Such participation is not the kind of legalassistance that should be accorded to appellant in legal contemplation.

Furthermore, Atty. Reyes was not appellant's counsel of choice but was picked out by the police officers allegedly through the barangayofficials. Appellant's failure to interpose any objection to having Atty. Reyes as his counsel cannot be taken as consent under the prevailingcircumstances. As discussed earlier, appellant was not properly informed of his rights, including the right to a counsel preferably of his own

choice. SPO2 Gapas testified thus:

Confession is not voluntary .

It is settled that a confession is presumed voluntary until the contrary is proved and the confessant bears the burden of proving thecontrary. 58 The trial court found that appellant's bare denials failed to overcome this presumption. However, several factors constrain us tohold that the confession was not given under conditions that conduce to its admissibility. EHTIDA

First , the confession contains facts and details which appear to have been supplied by the investigators themselves.

The voluntariness of a confession may be inferred from its language such that if, upon its face, the confession exhibits no suspiciouscircumstances tending to cast doubt upon its integrity, it being replete with details — which could only be supplied by the accused — reflectingspontaneity and coherence, it may be considered voluntary. 59 The trial court applied this rule but without basis. On closer examination of theevidence, the key details in the alleged confession were provided not by appellant but by the police officers themselves.

Second, again appellant was not assisted by counsel.

To reiterate, the purpose of providing counsel to a person under custodial investigation is to curb the police-state practice of extracting aconfession that leads appellant to make self-incriminating statements. 67 And in the event the accused desires to give a confession, it is theduty of his counsel to ensure that the accused understands the legal import of his act and that it is a product of his own free choice.

It bears repeating that appellant was held in the police station overnight before he was allegedly taken to the house of Atty. Reyes. He was notinformed of his rights and there is no evidence that he was assisted by counsel. Thus, the possibility of appellant having been subjected totrickery and intimidation at the hands of the police authorities, as he claims, cannot be entirely discounted. A

Confession was not sufficientlycorroborated.

Courts are slow to accept extrajudicial confessions when they are subsequently disputed unless they are corroborated. 68 There must be suchcorroboration so that when considered in connection with the confession, it will show the guilt of accused beyond a reasonable doubt. 69

As a general rule, a confession must be corroborated by those to whom the witness who testified thereto refers as having been present at thetime the confession was made 70 or by any other evidence . 71

The inconsistencies in the testimonies of the police officers as well as any lingering doubt as to the credibility of appellant's statement couldhave been laid to rest by the testimonies of Atty. Reyes, of Abad, and of those allegedly present during the custodial investigation. However,they were not presented in court. cCE

No motive could be ascribedto appellant.

For the purpose of meeting the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt, motive is essential for conviction when there is doubt as to theidentity of the perpetrator . 79 I n view of the inadmissibility of the confession, there is no other evidence that directly points to appellant as theculprit. However, the prosecution failed to show any motive on appellant's part to commit the felonies. Appellant consistently denied havingknown the victims. Although the confession states that Regino allegedly sought appellant's help in killing the victims as Regino was his nephew,the fact of their relationship was denied by appellant and was never established by the prosecution. In People v. Aguilar, 80 we held that "theabsence of apparent motive to commit the offense charged would, upon principles of logic, create a presumption of the innocence of theaccused, since, in terms of logic, an action without a motive would be an effect without a cause." 81 CAIHTE

People v. Antonio Lauga

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Later in the evening, he was awakened by the members of the "Bantay Bayan" headed by Moises Boy Banting . 38 They asked him to go withthem to discuss some matters. 39 He later learned that he was under detention because AAA charged him of rape . 40 SEcITC

On 8 July 2006, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, rendered its decision 41 in Criminal Case No. 10372-0, findingappellant guilty of rape qualified by relationship and minority, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua . 42 I t also orderedhim to indemnify AAA P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P50,000.00 as civil indemnity with exemplary damages of P25,000.00 . 43

Held

Admissibility in Evidence of anExtrajudicial Confession beforea "Bantay Bayan"

Appellant argues that even if he, indeed, confessed to Moises Boy Banting, a "bantay bayan," the confession was inadmissible in evidencebecause he was not assisted by a lawyer and there was no valid waiver of such requirement. 54

Following the rationale behind the ruling in Malngan, this Court needs to ascertain whether or not a "bantay bayan" may be deemed a lawenforcement officer within the contemplation of Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution.

In People of the Philippines v. Buendia, 59 this Court had the occasion to mention the nature of a "bantay bayan," that is, "a group of maleresidents living in [the] area organized for the purpose of keeping peace in their community[,which is] an accredited auxiliary of the . . .PNP." 60

Also, it may be worthy to consider that pursuant to Section 1 (g) of Executive Order No. 309 issued on 11 November 1987, as amended, a Peaceand Order Committee in each barangay shall be organized "to serve as implementing arm of the City/Municipal Peace and Order Council atthe Barangay level." 61 The composition of the Committee includes, among others: (1) the Punong Barangay as Chairman; (2) the Chairman ofthe Sangguniang Kabataan; (3) a Member of the Lupon Tagapamayapa; (4) a Barangay Tanod; and (5) at least three (3) Members ofexisting Barangay -Based Anti-Crime or neighborhood Watch Groups or a Non Government Organization Representative well-known in hiscommunity. 62

This Court is, therefore, convinced that barangay -based volunteer organizations in the nature of watch groups, as in the case of the "bantaybayan," are recognized by the local government unit to perform functions relating to the preservation of peace and order at the barangay level.Thus, without ruling on the legality of the actions taken by Moises Boy Banting, and the specific scope of duties and responsibilities delegatedto a "bantay bayan," particularly on the authority to conduct a custodial investigation, any inquiry he makes has the color of a state-relatedfunction and objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights provided for under Article III, Section 12 of theConstitution, otherwise known as the Miranda Rights, is concerned.

We, therefore, find the extrajudicial confession of appellant, which was taken without a counsel, inadmissible in evidence.

Be that as it may, We agree with the Court of Appeals that the conviction of the appellant was not deduced solely from the assailedextrajudicial confession but "from the confluence of evidence showing his guilt beyond reasonable doubt." 63

Luz vs People

Facts

O2 Emmanuel L. Alteza, who was then assigned at the Sub-Station 1 of the Naga City Police Station as a traffic enforcer, substantially testifiedthat on March 10, 2003 at around 3:00 o'clock in the morning, he saw the accused, who was coming from the direction of Panganiban Drive andgoing to Diversion Road, Naga City, driving a motorcycle without a helmet; that this prompted him to flag down the accused for violating a

municipal ordinance which requires all motorcycle drivers to wear helmet (sic) while driving said motor vehicle; that he invited the accused tocome inside their sub-station since the place where he flagged down the accused is almost in front of the said sub-station; that while he andSPO1 Rayford Brillante were issuing a citation ticket for violation of municipal ordinance, he noticed that the accused was uneasy and kept ongetting something from his jacket; that he was alerted and so, he told the accused to take out the contents of the pocket of his jacket as thelatter may have a weapon inside it; that the accused obliged and slowly put out the contents of the pocket of his jacket which was a nickel-liketin or metal container about two (2) to three (3) inches in size, including two (2) cellphones, one (1) pair of scissors and one (1) Swiss knife; thatupon seeing the said container, he asked the accused to open it; that after the accused opened the container, he noticed a cartoon cover andsomething beneath it; and that upon his instruction, the accused spilled out the contents of the container on the table which turned out to befour (4) plastic sachets, the two (2) of which were empty while the other two (2) contained suspected shabu . 3

Held

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In Berkemer v. McCarty , 13 the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court discussed at length whether the roadside questioning of a motorist detainedpursuant to a routine traffic stop should be considered custodial interrogation. The Court held that, such questioning does not fall undercustodial interrogation, nor can it be considered a formal arrest, by virtue of the nature of the questioning, the expectations of the motorist andthe officer, and the length of time the procedure is conducted. It ruled as follows:

First, detention of a motorist pursuant to a traffic stop is presumptively temporary and brief.

Second, circumstances associated with the typical traffic stop are not such that the motorist feels completely at the mercy of the police

The U.S. Court in Berkemer thus ruled that, since the motorist therein was only subjected to modest questions while still at the scene of thetraffic stop, he was not at that moment placed under custody (such that he should have been apprised of his Miranda rights), and neither cantreatment of this sort be fairly characterized as the functional equivalent of a formal arrest. Similarly, neither can petitioner here be considered"under arrest" at the time that his traffic citation was being made.

It also appears that, according to City Ordinance No. 98-012, which was violated by petitioner, the failure to wear a crash helmet while riding amotorcycle is penalized by a fine only. Under the Rules of Court, a warrant of arrest need not be issued if the information or charge was filed foran offense penalized by a fine only. It may be stated as a corollary that neither can a warrantless arrest be made for such an offense.

This ruling does not imply that there can be no arrest for a traffic violation. Certainly, when there is an intent on the part of the police officer todeprive the motorist of liberty, or to take the latter into custody, the former may be deemed to have arrested the motorist. In this case,however, the officer's issuance (or intent to issue) a traffic citation ticket negates the possibility of an arrest for the same violation.

Acquitted

People vs Cabiles

Appellant Panfilo Cabiles was convicted for the crime of Robbery with Rape as charged and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of ReclusionPerpetua .

The following day, November 9, 1989, at about 3:30 o'clock in the afternoon, Marites saw accused-appellant at the Kalookan City Police Station.The latter admitted his guilt and pointed to Jaime Mabingnay, Marites' brother-in-law, as the one who asked him to commit the crime. Maritesfurther recalled that she saw accused-appellant at Mabingnay's house on November 5, 1989, before the crime took place

Held

As regards the evidentiary weight of accused-appellant's sworn statement wherein he confessed to the crime charged, and his verbalconfession made before robbery victim, Marites Nas Atienza, we rule against the validity of the written confession but uphold the admissibilityof the verbal confession. cdasia

In People vs . Deniega , 251 SCRA 626 [1995], we laid down the four fundamental requirements needed for admissibility of a confession, to wit:(1) the confession must be voluntary; (2) the confession must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel: (3) theconfession must be express: and (4) the confession must be in writing.

Accused-appellant testified that he was forced to execute the sworn statement containing his confession (tsn, August 23, 1990, p. 9). Althoughthis assertion is uncorroborated, accused-appellant's free will and volition in signing his confession will not cure the defect that it was madewithout assistance of counsel. An admission made without the assistance of counsel during custodial investigation is inadmissible in evidence(People vs . Cascalla , 240 SCRA 482 [1995]). Even if the confession of an accused speaks the truth, if it was made without the assistance ofcounsel, it is inadmissible in evidence regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given ( People vs . Agustin , 240SCRA 541 [1995]). An uncounselled extrajudicial confession without a valid waiver of the right to counsel — that is, in writing and in the

presence of counsel is inadmissible in evidence

In contrast, accused-appellant's verbal confession before Marites Nas Atienza is, however, admissible in evidence. The case in pointis People vs . Andan (G.R., No. 116437, March 3, 1997) where we ruled that the accused's verbal confession made in a private meeting with themunicipal mayor, spontaneously, fully and voluntarily done, is admissible in evidence since it is not covered by the requirements of Section12(1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. When said accused talked with the mayor as a confidant and not as a law enforcement officer, hisuncounselled confession did not violate his constitutional rights. Constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to aspontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby the accused orallyadmitted having committed the crime — as in the case at bar. Cdtai

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People vs Deniega

Facts

Police authorities investigating the gruesome crime on August 31, 1989, arrested Rey Daniega y Macoy on information that thevictim was last seen with Daniega, 1 a waiter at the Gathering Disco where Canoy used to work. Friends of Canoy volunteered theinformation that the former had just broken off from a stormy relationship with Daniega . 2 The latter, it was bruited , 3 desperately triedto patch up the relationship.

Following the latter's arrest, and on the basis of a confession obtained by police authorities from him during custodialinvestigation (where he allegedly admitted raping and killing Canoy), 4 appellant Hoyle Diaz y Urnillo was invited by the investigators forquestioning. A second sworn statement, substantially similar and corroborating many of the details of Daniega's sworn affidavit, was laterextracted from Diaz. In the said statement, Diaz admitted his participation in the rape of Canoy, but denied that he had something to dowith the victim's death.

In a demurrer submitted to the trial court on December 28, 1990, appellants moved for the dismissal of the information for Rape with Homicideon the ground of insufficiency of evidence, stressing that: 1 ) the confessions obtained by police authorities were acquired without theassistance of counsel in violation of their constitutional rights and were hence, inadmissible in evidence; 2) the same (confessions) "wereobtained through torture, force, threat and other means which vitiat[ed] (their) free will"; and 3) except for the testimonies of the medico-legalofficer and two IBP lawyers who alleged that they assisted the accused during their custodial investigation, the prosecution presented no otherevidence to warrant a conviction.

Held

Apart from the defects evident on the face of the documents, there exists evidence indicating that the actual custodial investigation wasconducted at the police headquarters in the absence of counsel, as contended by appellants. While we have no dispute with the trial court'sobservation that the appellants were brought to the Quezon City IBP office during daytime when other individuals were holding office in the IBPfloor (who may have witnessed the presence of the appellants in the area), 17 it is one thing for appellants to be brought to the IBP office onlyfor the purpose of signing the confessions in plain view of the other employees of the office, while compliance with the constitutional mandaterequiring the presence of counsel during the actual custodial investigation is quite another.

There is convincing proof 18 that, while Attys. Sansano and Rous may have been present at the signing of the documents, theywere not present at all during the actual custodial investigation of the accused in the police headquarters.

For instance, Atty. Sansano placed the time of arrival of appellant Deniega at the IBP Quezon City chapter office at "around11:30 in the morning" of August 31, 1989 . 19 However, Deniega's extrajudicial confession taken by Pat. Maniquis gives the time of itsexecution as 11:20 A.M. also on August 31, 1989 or earlier than the time they allegedly arrived at the IBP office.

There would be denial of the right to the assistance of competent and independent counsel if the investigation or, as in thecase before us, during the process of signing. The competent or independent lawyer so engaged should be present from the beginning toend, i.e. , at all stages of the interview, counseling or advising caution reasonably at every turn of the investigation, and stopping theinterrogation once in a while either to give advice to the accused that he may either continue, choose to remain silent or terminate theinterview.

At the time, a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown thewarrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might makecould be used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by themost expedient means — by telephone if possible — or by letter of messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to itthat this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested,

by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right tocounsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence. 26

People vs Culala

On March 16, 1982, Juliana Simoy positively identified Elizalde Culala in a police line-up as the person who robbed and killed her son, on thenight of March 14, 1982 .15

The prosecution introduced in evidence the extra-judicial confession of the accused-appellant admitting the commission of the crime, allegedto have been obtained in the presence and with the assistance of Atty. Celso E. Santamaria, Municipal Attorney of Valenzuela, Metro Manila,who testified that he apprised the accused of his constitutional rights. 16 cdasia

Held

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On the admissibility of subject extra-judicial confession of accused-appellant, it is worthy to note that during the custodial investigation he wasassisted by Atty. Celso E. Santamaria, Municipal Attorney of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. In People vs. Bandula , 26 i t was held that a MunicipalAttorney cannot be an independent counsel as required by the Constitution . 27 As a legal officer of the municipality, he provides legalassistance and support to the mayor and the municipality in carrying out the delivery of basic services to the people, including the maintenanceof peace and order. It is therefore seriously doubted whether he can effectively undertake the defense of the accused without running intoconflict of interests. He is no better than a fiscal or a prosecutor who cannot represent the accused during custodialinvestigations. 28 Consequently, for being violative of the Constitution, the extrajudicial confession of accused-appellant is inadmissible.

People vs Andan

Facts

By this time, people and media representatives were already gathered at the police headquarters awaiting the results of the investigation.Mayor Trinidad arrived and proceeded to the investigation room. Upon seeing the mayor, appellant approached him and whispered a requestthat they talk privately. The mayor led appellant to the office of the Chief of Police and there, appellant broke down and said "Mayor, patawarinmo ako! I will tell you the truth. I am the one who killed Marianne." The mayor opened the door of the room to let the public and mediarepresentatives witness the confession. The mayor first asked for a lawyer to assist appellant but since no lawyer was available he ordered theproceedings photographed and videotaped. 10 In the presence of the mayor, the police, representatives of the media and appellant's own wifeand son, appellant confessed his guilt. He disclosed how he killed Marianne and volunteered to show them the place where he hid her bags. Heasked for forgiveness from Larin and Dizon whom he falsely implicated saying he did it because of ill-feelings against them . 11 He also said thatthe devil entered his mind because of the pornographic magazines and tabloid he read almost everyday. 12 After his confession, appellanthugged his wife and son and asked the mayor to help him . 13 His confession was captured on videotape and covered by the medianationwide. 14

Held

Appellant was already under custodial investigation when he confessed to the police. It is admitted that the police failed to inform appellant ofhis constitutional rights when he was investigated and interrogated. 27 His confession is therefore inadmissible in evidence. So too were thetwo bags recovered from appellant's house. SPO2 Cesar Canoza, a member of the investigating team testified:

Under these circumstances, it cannot be successfully claimed that appellant's confession before the mayor is inadmissible. It is true that amunicipal mayor has "operational supervision and control" over the local police 32 and may arguably be deemed a law enforcement officer forpurposes of applying Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. However, appellant's confession to the mayor was not made inresponse to any interrogation by the latter. 33 In fact, the mayor did not question appellant at all. No police authority ordered appellant to talkto the mayor. It was appellant himself who spontaneously, freely and voluntarily sought the mayor for a private meeting. The mayor did not

know that appellant was going to confess his guilt to him. When appellant talked with the mayor as a confidant and not as a law enforcementofficer, his uncounselled confession to him did not violate his constitutional rights. 34 Thus, it has been held that the constitutional procedureson custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in anordinary manner whereby appellant orally admitted having committed the crime. 35 What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure ofincriminating facts or confessions. The rights under Section 12 are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state as wouldlead the accused to admit something false, not to prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. 36 Hence we hold that appellant'sconfession to the mayor was correctly admitted by the trial court.

Appellant's confessions to the media were likewise properly admitted. The confessions were made in response to questions by news reporters,not by the police or any other investigating officer. We have held that statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters on atelevised interview are deemed voluntary and are admissible in evidence. 37

Clearly, appellant's confessions to the news reporters were given free from any undue influence from the police authorities. The news reportersacted as news reporters when they interviewed appellant . 44 They were not acting under the direction and control of the police. They were

there to check appellant's confession to the mayor. They did not force appellant to grant them an interview and reenact the commission of thecrime . 45 In fact, they asked his permission before interviewing him. They interviewed him on separate days not once did appellant protest hisinnocence. Instead, he repeatedly confessed his guilt to them. He even supplied all the details in the commission of the crime, and consented toits reenactment. All his confessions to the news reporters were witnessed by his family and other relatives. There was no coercive atmospherein the interview of appellant by the news reporters.

People vs Bacor

On the basis of his extrajudicial confession, Victor Bacor was found guilty with the murder of Dionesio Albores. The Court of Appeals affirmedthis decision, but from a penalty of reclusion temporal as maximum, it sentenced the accused to reclusion perpetua . Pursuant to the Rules on

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Criminal Procedure, the case was certified to this Court, the main question being whether accused-appellant validly waived his right to remainsilent and, therefore, whether his confession is admissible in evidence against him. cdasia

By voluntarily executing his extrajudicial confession, which he did in the presence of and with assistance of counsel and after having beeninformed of his constitutional rights, accused effectively waived his right to remain silent.

Both the trial and the appellate courts correctly convicted accused on the basis of the confession since, as they noted, it was corroborated by

evidence of the corpus delicti which dovetails with the confession.

The Court of Appeals correctly sentenced accused to reclusion perpetua . When the crime of murder was committed on March 17, 1991, thesame was punishable under Art. 284 of the Penal Code by reclusion temporal , in its maximum period to death. Each of the three distinctpenalties covered thereby forms a period and the penalty to be imposed is determined after reasonably offsetting the attending mitigating andaggravating circumstances. In the instant case, the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender of the accused was offset by the aggravatingcircumstance of dwelling considering that latter circumstance is not absorbed by the qualifying circumstance of treachery.

Held

First. Accused-appellant's confession, as quoted in the decision of the Court of Appeals, leaves no doubt as to its voluntariness and spontaneity.Accused-appellant does not deny that he surrendered to the police on June 6, 1991, almost three months after the fatal shooting of DionesioAlbores, and confessed to the crime because he "could no longer bear a guilty conscience." In his testimony before the trial court, he admittedthat the signature on pages 1, 2, and 3 of his sworn confession (Exh. B) was his without any claim that he was forced, coerced, or threatened to

make the confession . 6 Indeed, the details contained in his confession could have been known to accused-appellant alone.

Second. Accused-appellant claims that he gave the confession without being warned of his constitutional rights. This is nottrue. The record shows that he was advised of his rights, particularly the right to remain silent, not only once but thrice: first, by hiscounsel, Atty. Meriam Anggot of Public Attorney's Office (PAO); second, by SPO3 Maharlika Ydulzura, the investigator who took accused-appellant's confession; and lastly, by the branch clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court of Oroquieta City, Atty. Nora Montejo-Lumasag,before whom accused-appellant swore to the veracity of his confession. Each time, he was asked whether he was willing to give astatement and he said he was. This is sufficient. 7 Contrary to accused-appellant's contention, there is no need for a separate and expresswritten waiver of his constitutional rights. 8 Accused-appellant was not arrested. He presented himself to the authorities to confess to thecrime because, he said, he was being bothered by his conscience. By voluntarily executing his extrajudicial confession, which he did in thepresence of and with the assistance of counsel and after having been informed of his constitutional rights, accused-appellant effectivelywaived his right to remain silent . 9

Accused-appellant, when asked, said he wanted to have the assistance of counsel. Atty. Anggot of PAO was appointedcounsel de officio to assist accused-appellant and the latter expressly accepted her appointment as his counsel before giving hisconfession. 10 As this Court has held, a PAO lawyer can be considered an independent counsel within the contemplation of theConstitution considering that he is not a special counsel, public or private prosecutor, counsel of the police, or a municipal attorney whoseinterest is admittedly adverse to that of the accused-appellant. 11 Thus, the assistance of a PAO lawyer in the present case satisfies theconstitutional requirement of a competent and independent counsel for the accused.

Judging from Atty. Anggot's testimony before the trial court, there is no reason not to consider her a competent andindependent counsel. She testified that before the taking of accused-appellant's confession, she requested SPO3 Ydulzura and the otherpolicemen to step out of the room so that she could privately confer with the accused-appellant, free from pressure or intimidation. Shealso testified on the circumstances surrounding her appointment as counsel for accused-appellant. She said:

Not only was the confession signed by accused-appellant with the assistance of counsel, it was also sworn to by him before the branch clerk ofcourt who, before administering the oath to accused-appellant, read the affidavit of confession to him and informed him of his rights and theconsequences of his confession. Accused-appellant stood pat on his decision to tell it all. As Branch Clerk of Court Montejo-Lumasag testified:

Well-settled is the rule that a confession is presumed to be voluntarily and validly made unless the contrary is proven and that the burden ofproof is upon the party who claims the contrary.

People vs Base

Facts

However, he never reached his destination because he was picked up by three armed men in civilian clothes who told him to come along withthem as they would ask him some questions. 6 He was brought to Lodlod, Lipa City at the house of Amelia Quizon. 7 Upon their arrival atQuizon's place, a gun was poked at accused-appellant and he was ordered to lie down facing the ground . 8 As he lay thus, he was trussed up atthe neck, bound hand and foot with abaca rope with his hands tied behind his back. 9 He was then loaded on a top down jeep and brought tothe 217th PC Company Detachment in Rosario, Batangas.

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He likewise claimed that although the sworn statement bore the attesting signature of Atty. Romeo Reyes, he neither knew nor saw Atty.Reyes at the 217th PC Detachment on February 8, 1990 . 26 Accused-appellant denied that he knew his co-accused Conrado Guno, FrederickLazaro and Eduardo Patrocinio . 27 He likewise denied knowing Leo Valle and Erlinda Angeles. 28

Held

Furthermore, Atty. Romeo T. Reyes and the interrogator, Sgt. Romulo Mercado, testified to the voluntariness of his confession. In this regard, it

must be stressed that the aforementioned rule merely requires that there should be some other evidence " tending to show the commission ofthe crime apart from the confession."

People vs Espiritu

Appellant Rizal Espiritu was convicted as charged for the crime of murder and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua by theRegional Trial Court of Baguio City. The conviction was based mainly on his confession and the corroborating evidence of corpus delicti . Hisextra-judicial confession stated that he and Fred Malicdan killed Sato Sanad after being hired by Gerald Alicoy to do so for the sum ofP20,000.00. Aside from describing the details of how he had his cohort killed Sanad, during the ocular inspection, he even pointed out the placewhere the killing had been committed. And when he executed his extra-judicial confession before the police and during the preliminaryinvestigation of the case before the city prosecutor wherein he admitted his participation in the said incident, he was assisted by Atty. DanielMangallay. However, during the trial of the case, the accused denied any participation in the killing of Sanad. He also assailed the admissibilityof his extra-judicial confession. And, he claimed that Atty. Mangallay was retained by Alfredo Kinao and not by himself and that the said lawyerwas unable to advise or to explain to him the contents of his extra-judicial confession before he signed it. ECDHIc

Hence, this appeal.

The Court ruled that appellant's contention that Atty. Mangallay was retained not by the appellant personally but by his uncle, Alfredo Kinao, isnot proof of counsel deprivation. The fact remains that Kinao, in hiring the counsel, acted on behalf of appellant. Besides, appellant did notobject when Atty. Mangallay represented him during the investigations before the police and the city prosecutor. In fact, he expresslyacknowledged Atty. Mangallay as his counsel.

And as a consequence of the confession of the appellant, his conviction became inevitable. Such confession was evidence of a high order, "sinceit is supported by the strong presumption that no person of normal mind would deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime unless promptedby truth and his conscience."

The assailed Decision was AFFIRMED. HacADE

People vs Turla

Facts

In Criminal Case No. 2945 of the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga, Branch 41, San Fernando, Pampanga, Danilo Turla y Bati was charged withViolation of Rep. Act. No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972

The Court agrees with counsel for the accused-appellant that the Receipt for Custody (Exh. B) is inadmissible in evidence, as it was signed by theaccused during custodial investigation without the assistance of counsel of his choice and without having been first informed of hisconstitutional right to silence and to counsel. The said Receipt is a declaration against interest and a tacit admission of the crime charged, sincemere unexplained possession of prohibited drugs is punished by law. The Receipt is in the same category as extrajudicial confessions outlawedby the Constitution.

However, the claim of insufficiency of evidence to support a conviction is not tenable. As the trial court correctly found, "even if the documents,

more particularly the Booking and Arrest Report and the Receipt for Custody, are disregarded, there is more than enough evidence to sustain a judgment of conviction. As already stated, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses proved beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of theaccused in the offense charged.

Lumanog vs People

On June 13, 1996 retired Colonel Rolando N. Abadilla was killed in an ambush along Katipunan Avenue, Project 4, Quezon City. Policeinvestigation of the slaying incident resulted in the arrest of herein petitioners Lenido L. Lumanog, SPO2 Cesar A. Fortuna, Rameses C: De Jesus,Augusto G. Santos and their co-accused Joel V. De Jesus, Lorenzo C. Delos Santos and Arturo C. Napolitano. Subsequently, an information forthe crime of murder was filed against all the accused.

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Not perfunctory recital of rights

Meaningful transmission of information

Communicative in character