Consolidating Intelligence Analysis Under the DNI

AMERICAN MILITARY UNIVERSITY

Charles Town, West Virginia

CONSOLIDATING INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

UNDER THE

DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

A research paper submitted in partial fulfillment of the

requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

in

STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE

by

Jeremy Rodd Levin

July 1, 2012

The author hereby grants the American Public University System the right to display these contents for educational purposes.

The author assumes total responsibility for meeting the requirements set by the United States Copyright Law for the inclusion of any materials that are not the author's creation or in the public domain.

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© Copyright 2012 by Jeremy Rodd Levin

All rights reserved.

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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS

CONSOLIDATING INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

UNDER THE

DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

by

Jeremy Rodd Levin

American Military University, July 1, 2012

Charles Town, West Virginia

Doctor Kathleen Hogan, Thesis Professor

This paper will argue that consolidating national intelligence analysis under the Director

of National Intelligence could effectively address the outstanding problems of interagency

rivalry and parochialism that fall within the Director of National Intelligence's (DNI) mandate,

but have yet to be fixed. Further, this paper will attempt to answer the question, "is the Defense

Intelligence Agency (DIA) model appropriate for reassigning and consolidating current and

strategic national intelligence analysis under the DNI?"

To answer the question, this paper compares the precipitators to the DIA's formation to

the ongoing intelligence community shortcomings, and then compares the DIA's assigned

responsibilities to the DNI's tasked mandate. This paper finds that national intelligence analysis

must be unified under a single organization rather than left as a confederation of organizations.

Further, the DIA's formation may be a uniquely appropriate model to create this single

organization.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE

I. INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………….…….5

II. LITERATURE REVIEW…………………………………………………….….9Tactical, Current, and Strategic Intelligence…………………………….…..9Competition and Redundancy in Strategic Intelligence Analysis……….…13Stovepiping…...………………………………………………………...….17Analytic Professionalism………………………………………………...…19Intelligence Reform - the Goldwater-Nichols Model……………...………21History Repeats……………………………………………………….……23The DNI……………………………………………………………………25The Alternative to Competitive Analysis……………………………..……27

III. METHODOLOGY………………………………………………….…………31

IV. FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS…………………………………………...……33Comparison to Pre-DIA Military Intelligence Shortcomings………………33Comparison to DIA's Assigned Responsibilities……………………...……35

V. CONCLUSIONS……………………………………………………………….38Recruitment, Training, and Analyst Professionalism...……………………..38Improvements to Intelligence Production…………....……………………..39Ensuring Availability of Intelligence to Consumers....……………………..40Anticipated Opposition……………………………………………………..40The Bottom Line……………………………………………………………42

LIST OF REFERENCES…………………………………………………..………43

APPENDICES……………………………………………………………..………46

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I. Introduction

According to Darwin’s Origin of Species, it is not the most intellectual of the species that survives; it is not the strongest that survives; but the species that survives is the one that is able best to adapt and adjust to the changing environment in which it finds itself.

--Leon C. Megginson

American intelligence is actually older than America: Benjamin Franklin and John Jay

directed clandestine operations against the British that helped the United States (US) gain its

independence, and in his first presidential address George Washington requested funding for a

secret service dedicated to clandestine activities. Over the subsequent 236 years, the US

intelligence community (IC) has ballooned to enormous proportions: 17 government departments

and agencies conduct formal foreign or domestic intelligence activities and represent several

specialized intelligence collection disciplines, such as Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), Imagery

Intelligence (IMINT), Human Intelligence (HUMINT), Open Source Intelligence (OSINT),

Measures and Signals Intelligence (MASINT), in addition to performing intelligence analysis

and carrying out intelligence-led operations. According to a 2010 Washington Post expose on

the US IC, approximately 854,000 Americans hold Top Secret security clearances,

approximately 140,000 of whom work in intelligence. (Priest and Arkin 2010, 1)

Richard Best, an intelligence expert writing for the Congressional Research Service,

states "the ultimate goal of intelligence is accurate analysis." (Best 2011: 12) According to an

Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association (AFCEA) white paper titled

"Making Analysis Relevant: It's More than Connecting the Dots," intelligence analysis was

deliberately structured to exploit individual agencies’ specializations by maintaining their

independence from each other. Further, the structure's goal was to enhance each agency's

specialization by isolating external influences from other agencies and disciplines. President

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Reagan's Executive Order 12333 codified this, mandating that the IC would approach issues of

national intelligence through peer reviewed "competitive analysis." Best corroborates this,

stating in his 2011 "Intelligence Issues for Congress" that information from the various

intelligence disciplines collected, processed, and disseminated by specialized agencies form the

IC's foundation. (AFCEA 2005) (Best 2011)

The concept of competitive analysis is predicated on the assumption that the problem set

is well defined and intelligence analysts have sufficient time to create a basis for analytic debate.

Analysis of threats requires data from specialized agencies be brought together into all-source

analysis that largely relies on the talents of analysts brought into government service. However,

"The Future of Intelligence Analysis" project completed in 2006 by the Center for International

and Security Studies at Maryland calls the US IC "The Community that Isn't," instead describing

it as "a series of autonomous organizations, each with its own way of doing business," a

fragmentation reflected in its analytic enterprise. (Lahneman 2006, 10) Separately, Kenneth R.

Dahl, writing at the Brookings Institution, states the interagency process is fundamentally

broken, precluding unity of effort in devising solutions to critical national security problems.

Dahl claims the most common method of attempting interagency effort has been a "lead agency"

approach, which lacks real authority over the other agencies and has little ability to obtain the

support and cooperation required to achieve success. (AFCEA 2005) (Best 2011) (Dahl 2007)

This paper will therefore operate under a basic assumption: that the rivalry, parochialism,

and turf protectionism amongst IC members, as well as shortcomings in experience,

qualifications, and training amongst analysts, persist and are reflected in the poor quality of IC

members' analysis and analytic production. This paper argues that reassigning current and

strategic national intelligence analysis and analytic production away from IC component

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agencies and consolidating it under the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) could effectively

address the outstanding problems of interagency rivalry and parochialism and improve the

degree of analytical professionalism within the DNI's mandate.

However, identifying an end goal is only half of a solution; equally important is how to

achieve this goal. Therefore, this paper also discusses how the Goldwater-Nichols Act--used as

the model for intelligence reform under the DNI--is inappropriate for addressing the problems

identified in the two post-9/11 inquiries, specifically the 9/11 Commission Report and The Joint

Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities before and after the Terrorist Attacks of

September 11, 2001 (hereafter the Joint Inquiry). This paper explores whether IC-wide national

intelligence analysis and analytical production can be consolidated under the DNI in a similar

manner to the 1961 gathering of military intelligence under the Defense Intelligence Agency

(DIA) by posing the question, "is the DIA model appropriate for reassigning and consolidating

current and strategic national intelligence analysis under the DNI?"

The Joint Inquiry and the 9/11 Commission Report identified numerous problems that

contributed to the intelligence failures of 9/11, highlighting agency parochialism and interagency

turf battles and rivalries as a serious problem that contributed to the 9/11 intelligence failures.

Seven years after the DNI was mandated to fix the IC's shortcomings identified in the two

inquiries, it has been unable to solve these problems. Similarly, the DNI has not yet fixed the

shortcomings in analytic staff--specifically deficits in analyst experience, qualifications, and

training--or the poor analytic focus and quality identified in the same inquiries.

The wide array of problems within the IC detailed in the Joint Inquiry and the 9/11

Commission Report provided the impetus to create the DNI position mandated to solve these

problems. No intelligence position in modern history has been as scrutinized, documented, and

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criticized as much as the DNI. Numerous government officials, journalists, experts, and laymen

have weighed in on the DNI's successes and failures, and while assertions of progress and

success--or lack thereof--vary wildly, nearly all agree the DNIs to date have yet to overcome the

organizational and institutional obstacles that gave rise to the position. Additionally, in 2010,

Best identified the DNI's "Analysis 101" course as one of the only IC-wide attempts to improve

the quality of analytic staff, and stated it was watered-down and did not enjoy the Central

Intelligence Agency's (CIA) participation. (Best 2010)

The DNI's budgetary and limited personnel transfer authorities notwithstanding, previous

proposals to establish a single authority over the IC have assumed such reorganization would be

an "all or nothing" venture: either the IC falls fully under the authority's direction in all stages of

the intelligence cycle--from requirements and collection to dissemination and feedback--or the

IC remains a federation of autonomous agencies with overlapping, but separate intelligence

cycles. This paper will propose leaving the federation of agencies operationally autonomous for

intelligence collection while consolidating current and strategic national intelligence analysis

under the DNI to give the IC a single, credibly objective analytic voice in Washington D.C. and

among senior diplomatic personnel and military commanders.

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II. Literature Review

Intelligence professionals, pundits, journalists, activists, and laymen have authored an

abundance of literature detailing the IC's successes, failures, shortcomings, and processes, much

of it biased, and intended to influence policy or promote personal or professional agendas. This

paper attempts to reduce the potential for bias by focusing on the observations of intelligence

professionals, such as former Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell and former

Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Analysis and Production Mark Lowenthal, as well

as cited facts, statistics, and quotes from credible journalistic works, such as Dana Priest and

William Arkin's 2010 Washington Post expose on the IC, Top Secret America.

Tactical, Current, and Strategic Intelligence

Life is just an endless chain of judgments. . . . The more imperfect our judgment, the less perfect our success.

--B. C. Forbes (1880-1954)

Before addressing the potential for consolidating intelligence analysis under the DNI, this

paper identifies distinctions within intelligence analysis and production, as well as what analysis

intelligence consumers perceive they require. Some intelligence professionals approach

intelligence analysis as though it is a single trade or discipline; Roger George and James Bruce,

in introducing "Analyzing Intelligence," treat intelligence analysis in this way. Other

intelligence professionals approach intelligence analysis as though the target defines the analysis.

For example, the CIA categorizes its intelligence analysis into thirteen distinct analytical

specialties according to their targets. Still other intelligence professionals categorize intelligence

analysis according to its purpose: tactical analysis to support operations, strategic analysis to

support policy and plans, and current analysis to support policy and decision makers' immediate

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concerns and priorities. This paper adopts the latter approach, separating intelligence analysis

into tactical, strategic, and current. (CIA 2010)

Tactical and strategic intelligence have been defined and redefined in substantively

similar manners. Tactical intelligence analysis is intended to support short-term goals and

ongoing or imminent operations (for example, military or diplomatic engagement, or intelligence

collection), provide tactical warning, and prevent tactical surprise. For warfighters, tactical

analysis is typically a methodical line of thinking and action that includes both offensive and

defensive measures and countermeasures. For intelligence collectors, it helps focus and direct

intelligence collection, vet and validate sources of information, provide first-line validation and

context to reported information, and ensure the quality of disseminated reports. Strategic

intelligence analysis is intended to enable policy makers to formulate strategy, policy, and

military plans and operations at national and theater levels. Strategic analysis does this by

providing mid-long term forecasts, providing strategic warning, or preventing strategic surprise.

Current intelligence is less well defined. Carmen A. Medina's "The New Analysis"

defines current intelligence as analytical production based on recent reporting or current events.

Lowenthal describes current intelligence as analysis focused on issues of immediate concern to

policy makers. This paper asserts that current intelligence is analysis and production intended to

provide context to recent, current, or imminent events, situations, and developments of

importance or concern to policy makers, and to provide near-term prediction based on this

context. (George and Bruce 2008) (Lowenthal 2009)

Many intelligence experts agree that tactical intelligence analysis is vital to supporting

ongoing military and intelligence collection operations. The Department of Defense (DoD) and

its subcomponents consume a huge volume of intelligence to support combat operations, and

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each IC collection agency requires analytic support to help focus and direct intelligence

collection, and then process and disseminate the information collected. Battlefield commanders,

line troops, and intelligence collectors require constant, immediate access to their supporting

intelligence analysts, and the potential for losing this access was DoD's primary objection to

consolidating intelligence under a central authority. Additionally, tactical intelligence analysis is

absolutely vital in improving future intelligence collection; tactical analysts ensure proper focus,

context, and reliability of reported information, and to ensure quality, timely intelligence reports

are disseminated throughout the IC.

Similarly, strategic intelligence analysis is required by senior policy and decision makers.

In fact, Lowenthal asserts that "intelligence exists solely to support policy makers," (Lowenthal

2009, 2) and Best contends national intelligence--intelligence of concern to multiple departments

or agencies and providing the basis for national security policy making--is an essential part of the

DoD's planning. Because of its typical focus on trends and long-term analysis, strategic

intelligence analysis is far less perishable than tactical intelligence, and typically has a much

longer acceptable turnaround time from question to finished product dissemination. Strategic

intelligence analysts often do not work with, or even near their customers and consumers,

suggesting policy and decision makers do not necessarily need constant, immediate access to

strategic intelligence analysts. (Best 2004)

Jeffrey R. Cooper argues that current intelligence is intended to increase the IC's

responsiveness to customer demands, and Lowenthal describes current intelligence as "the

mainstay of the intelligence community." (Lowenthal 2009: 113) These descriptions are

probably most true in times of crisis when policy makers rely on current intelligence because it

provides some predictive element and its fast turnaround. In crises, policy makers also have less

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time to read intelligence products, so they prefer short current intelligence products over more

lengthy strategic assessments. Producers and customers of current intelligence are often

geographically separated, suggesting policy makers do not necessarily require constant access to

analysts. (Cooper 2005)

While tactical, strategic, and current intelligence have clear roles and customers, current

intelligence might be viewed as a net negative for the intelligence community and its policy

support role. Cooper claims the past decade's focus on current intelligence analysis and

production has created an analytic culture in which analysts do very little research. Their time is

primarily allocated to short term taskings, which limits analysts' understanding of events and

analytic targets beyond their customers' immediate crises. Additionally, the lack of depth to

analysts' understanding caused by emphasis on current intelligence has instilled an overreliance

on previous judgments that may not remain valid, leading to incorrect analytic assumptions.

Cooper further asserts this focus on current intelligence has created an overemphasis on finished

intelligence production, especially since it is a quantifiable metric--as opposed to the

unquantifiable value of intelligence to decision makers or the impact of analysis on decisions

made--by which to judge effectiveness for resource allocation within the IC. (Cooper 2005)

Lowenthal identifies another problem with the IC's focus on current intelligence: the risk

that analysts will become reporters of recent intelligence collection rather than giving added

value to reporting. While Lowenthal asserts intelligence managers can strike a balance between

long term strategic and current analysis, if intelligence managers feel they must use current

intelligence production to increase their organizations' quantifiable value in the IC, there is little

incentive for managers to attempt this balance. (Lowenthal 2009)

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Competition and Redundancy in Strategic Intelligence Analysis

Competition brings out the best in products and the worst in people.--David Sarnoff

According to Lowenthal, national leaders deliberately fostered the idea of competitive

analysis among IC components to "bring disparate points of view to bear on an issue."

(Lowenthal 2009; 62) The theory was that the relevant actors--primarily the US' senior political

and military decision makers--would understand that each IC component has different analytic

strengths, and complementary analytic products would enable policy makers to make decisions

based on more accurate assessments. (Lowenthal 2009; 139) Additionally, in a 2009 paper

delivered during the Miller Center of Public Affairs' forum, Thomas Fingar stated the US IC's

use of competitive redundancy was based on the philosophy that "analysts with different

expertise who work in different components of the intelligence community pool their insights as

well as their information in order to ensure that alternative explanations are considered and that

the results address questions of concern to their primary customers." He further stated that "one

size fits all" intelligence was to be discouraged because different customers had different

requirements, and a certain amount of duplication of effort is required to capture the analytic

specialization in each IC component. (Gilliam and Chao 2009; 52-73)

However, competitive analysis requires a large cadre of analysts to ensure intelligent

redundancy across the IC, and the IC lost approximately 23,000 positions in the 1990s due to

budget cuts. Thus, competitive analysis became much more difficult, and was reserved for high-

value issues. Despite this, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004

(IRTPA) specifically called on the IC to ensure competitive analysis continued to be performed

in analytic products, and since 2004 intelligence professionals and experts have called for

increased collaboration in an attempt to make competitive analysis work. Because of this,

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intelligence analysis is increasingly conducted by joint cells that are lauded as bringing together

representatives from several, and sometimes all IC components. These representatives are

intended to collaborate on local issues and ensure reach-back to each member's parent

organization. In fact, the Office of the DNI (ODNI) has promoted these joint cells as examples

of interagency collaboration that display progress toward fixing the previous parochialism and

turf protectionism criticized in post-9/11 inquiries. However, according to Kenneth Lieberthal,

while National Intelligence Estimates (NIE)--the IC's premier cross-IC strategic intelligence

products--are supposed to represent the highest quality assessments the IC can provide, they

typically end up as lowest common denominator assessments on which the IC can agree.

(Lowenthal 2011) (US Congress 2004) (Lieberthal 2009)

The downgraded value of these estimates is almost certainly caused by an incorrect

application of competitive analysis. AFCEA asserts that over time, the IC has distorted its view

of the "competitive analysis" concept to mean competition between analysis producers. For

example, a 2008 ODNI Office of the Inspector General (OIG) report found that turf

protectionism remained a problem, collaboration among IC elements remained lax, and the

perceived overlap in the authorities of different agencies caused "lanes in the road" disputes

within the IC that continued to be unresolved. Additionally, the report found collection agencies

continued to control and limit access to data and products essential for IC analysis. Separately,

Fingar asserts that the IC writ large has misconstrued competitive analysis as a "quest to 'scoop'

the 'competition' by being the first agency to provide an assessment of developments to senior

officials." (Gilliam and Chao 2009; 52-73) This encourages analysts to produce assessments

quickly rather than thoroughly, and increases the motivation to include either sensational

analysis or exclusive information to increase an analytic product's comparative attractiveness to

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intelligence consumers. In essence, the negative impact of interagency competition within the IC

appears to be threefold: poor interagency cooperation and collaboration, continued limits on

intelligence dissemination, and decreased quality among IC analytic products. (AFCEA 2005)

(Maguire 2008)

Despite the IC's general shift toward all-source and collaborative intelligence analysis,

intelligence experts often state that "stovepiping," or limiting intelligence dissemination and

hoarding information persists throughout the IC. Lowenthal, Lieberthal, and Rob Johnston of the

CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence all identify managerial and analyst preference to use

unique sources of information or reporting originating from their own agencies, in part to ensure

decision makers perceive their organizations as relevant and necessary for national security.

Anecdotal evidence suggests this bias is not only present, but endemic within the IC, especially

among agencies and organizations that conduct both intelligence collection and intelligence

analysis. This can be seen in the collaborative centers extolled by the ODNI. In "The U.S.

Intelligence Community and Foreign Policy," Lieberthal asserted that members in collaborative

projects represented their agencies rather than themselves, and therefore perpetuated inter-

agency rivalries and partisan manipulation. Additionally, according to the "Future of

Intelligence Analysis" project, the organizational culture of each IC component psychologically

segregates analysts, who then perceive themselves as National Security Agency, CIA, DIA, etc

analysts. This self-segregation reinforces perceived analytic differences that breed competition

more than cooperation between IC analytic components, and intelligence analysis continues to be

focused on specific missions that emphasize independent analysis rather than unity of effort.

(Lownethal 2009) (Lieberthal 2009) (Johnston 2005) (Lahneman 2006)

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Additionally, there is tremendous overlap in the intelligence analysis missions and

customers (see Appendix A), especially since there has been a general shift in the IC toward all-

source analysis instead of the specialized analysis on which the concept of competitive analysis

is based. This shift toward all-source intelligence analysis has caused increasing similarity

between IC products and reduced the value of collaborative analysis. Priest and Arkin stated

National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) products--which are supposed to be high-level

collaborative assessments that give added value over component agency products--did not

produce assessments that were significantly different or better than those of the CIA, DIA, or

Federal Bureau of Investigation. In fact, Major General John Custer, US Central Command's

former Director of Intelligence, stated the NCTC had not produced a single assessment of value

to him, and lamented that no one in Washington D.C. was tasked with reducing redundancy and

ensuring intelligence producers did not create essentially identical assessments. (Priest and Arkin

2010)

Separately, Richard Immerman described the competition to produce assessments as the

"soccer ball syndrome. Something happens, and [the IC components] want to rush to cover it."

(Priest and Arkin 2010, 5) This competition to produce assessments quickly results in a general

degradation in the quality of IC analytic products. For example, according to Lieberthal,

managerial overemphasis on the Presidential Daily Brief (PDB), the IC's flagship product, has

turned the product into a competition between analysts. Lieberthal states such competition

skews incentives and analyst treatment within the IC, reduces the objectivity of assessments as

analysts attempt to make them sensational enough for inclusion in the PDB, and overly

emphasizes abbreviated or current intelligence products over in-depth strategic analytic products

due to the PDB's format. Additionally, Lowenthal describes "meaningless footnote wars" in

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which analysis producers maintain separate points of view on similar issues, regardless of the

salience of these perspectives, to distinguish their organization's analysis from the analysis of

other agencies. (Priest and Arkin 2010) (Lieberthal 2009) (Lowenthal 2009)

This problem will likely persist. In his book, Bureaucracy, James Q. Wilson described

organizational turf protectionism as a key negative factor in bureaucratic operations. Wilson

asserts agencies and organizations attach high priority to their decision making autonomy, or

turf, and strongly resist and resent attempts to infringe on this turf. Wilson further states

"struggles over autonomy are especially visible when the organizations involved have similar

tasks." (Wilson 1989, 185) While Wilson was referring specifically to the armed forces, this

sentiment is applicable to intelligence stakeholders as well. Additionally, in his book, Getting

Agencies to Work Together, Eugene Bardach asserts agencies often resist collaboration for fear it

will blur agency missions and political accountabilities. Bardach further states agencies may fear

obsolescence, potentially resulting in a "ecosystem effect" in which policy aims to protect

individual species--in this case, individual agencies and organizations--rather than the ecosystem

writ large--in this case, the IC. Bardach identifies the same issues regarding autonomy Wilson

put forth, stating agencies may reject collaboration to preserve their decision making autonomy

and minimize potential threats from necessary relationships with other agencies. (Bardach 1998)

Stovepiping

When you approach a problem, strip yourself of preconceived opinions and prejudice, assemble and learn the facts of the situation, make the decision which seems to you to be the most honest, and then stick to it.

--Chester Bowles

The availability of information throughout the IC has greatly improved post-9/11, but a

common thread among those critically examining the IC is ongoing intelligence stovepiping, or

maintenance of intelligence within an organization rather than disseminating it to the wider IC.

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Many critics assert this stovepiping is a result of either security concerns--that those outside the

originating organization would leak or spill the intelligence--largely caused by disparities

between the IC component agencies' security and screening procedures. Critics also allege

stovepiping is born of the desire to use the withheld reporting to make their organizations'

analysis more valuable to national decision makers, thereby highlighting their individual

relevance to ensure continued funding and resources. Lieberthal and Lowenthal identify

intelligence managers' selection and use of intelligence reporting for analysis to ensure decision

makers continue to perceive their organizations as relevant and necessary for national security.

Lowenthal contends one way intelligence analysts attempt to make their products stand out is to

emphasize the unique nature of their sources, and Lieberthal claims intelligence managers often

overemphasize classified reporting, and effectively ignore, or even discount open source

reporting that could provide greater context to intelligence products. (Lowenthal 2009)

(Lieberthal 2009)

Separately, Wilson and Bardach identify the overarching desire of any and every

bureaucratic organization to seek and protect its decision making autonomy. One way to do this

is to ensure one's customers--in this case, national level decision and policy makers--rely on the

products provided by individual organizations, in the manner the organization provides them,

with the understanding that forced collaboration with other agencies will degrade that product.

Bardach also asserts agencies often resist collaboration for fear it will blur agency missions and

political accountabilities, and Lowenthal contends many of the developments within the IC since

2001 have actually increased rather than eradicated interagency rivalries, as producers of

finished intelligence products attempt to maintain separate points of view on intelligence topics

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in order to distinguish their respective organizations within the IC. (Wilson 1989) (Bardach

1998) (Lowenthal 2009)

Analytic Professionalism

Never ascribe to malice that which is adequately explained by incompetence.--Napoleon Bonaparte

The IC lost many of its quality analysts during the 1990s cutbacks, leaving the IC's

analytic enterprise top-heavy with management. The Joint Inquiry and 9/11 Commission Report

stated the recruiting, training, and tradecraft standards of IC analysts prior to 9/11 were lacking.

After 9/11, the IC began the process of recruiting thousands of new analysts, but according to

Lowenthal the net result has been a decrease in overall expertise. According to the "Future of

Intelligence Analysis" project, recruitment practices, performance standards, training, and career

development vary widely across the IC. The project stated the lack of analytic professionalism

across the IC reflected the IC's organization as a series of fragmented, autonomous agencies. To

address this, the project called for common doctrine and standardization of job descriptions,

recruitment, certification and training, and promotion to professionalize intelligence analysis

throughout the IC. (Lowenthal 2011) (Lahneman 2006)

Former DNI McConnell clearly acknowledged that IC hiring practices required change.

Uri Bar Joseph and Rose McDermott identified a fundamental starting point in their study on the

qualities required in the IC's analytic staff and the IC's practices in selecting, recruiting,

preparing, and supporting its analytic staff. Bar Joseph and McDermott state analysts are

currently selected and promoted based on their intelligence, oral and written ability to

communicate, and managerial skills. They claim analysts' ability to interpret information,

tolerate ambiguity, and overcome bias are actually more important, but are not considered in

recruitment or promotion. Separately, the recruiting practices in the armed services intelligence

19

branches focus almost exclusively on a standardized aptitude test and ability to gain a security

clearance; there is little, if any effort put forth to ensure that those recruited into intelligence

positions have even rudimentary oral or written communication skills, let alone have the mental

flexibility and cognitive ability to perform quality analysis. This has a secondary effect on the

greater IC, as military intelligence analysts often progress into civilian analytic positions

throughout the IC with little improvement to their communication or analytic skills. (McConnell

2007) (Bar Joseph and McDermott 2008)

Attendant with the shortcomings in analyst ability, Fingar described the need for

expertise when approaching analysis, which can, and probably should be considered when hiring

analysts. Fingar asserts that the decision making timeline has become too short to begin

searching for required expertise once requirements have been identified. (Gilliam and Chao

2009; 52-73) However, McConnell stated policy barriers had prevented the IC from attracting

intelligence professionals with useful backgrounds and experience, and Lieberthal claims

security constraints preclude many with deep country knowledge from qualifying as an analyst

candidate. Even more importantly, Lieberthal argues security constraints make it difficult to

build depth of knowledge through immersion in target countries even after entering the IC.

(McConnell 2007) (Lieberthal 2009)

Analyst training is also an IC-wide shortcoming. According to Cooper, "intelligence

analysis remains largely a craft culture that is conducted within a self-protective guild system

and taught by means of a broken apprenticeship process." (Cooper 2005: 28) Cooper claims that

intelligence analysis lacks formalized learning processes indicative of a "profession," and

standards and values are largely transmitted through mentorship. Cooper further asserts that

intelligence leadership has failed in basic management of IC analyst professionalism, and the

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analytic community may not possess the self-discipline and professionalism to develop and

regulate itself. Separately, Stephen Marrin argues that due to the lack of standardized

certifications or standards of conduct and competence has left intelligence consumers with no

assurance the intelligence provided them is consistently reliable, nor do they have confidence the

product is both independent and objective. Marrin contends this contributes to intelligence

consumers underutilizing intelligence analysis in their decision making. (Cooper 2005) (Marrin

2004)

While these shortcomings were identified in the two major post-9/11 inquiries and

acknowledged as problems to be rectified by former DNIs, analyst selection, recruitment, and

training remain dispersed throughout the IC components. In fact, the CIA's refusal to participate

in a watered down "Analysis 101" course--the DNI's only identified attempt to institute IC-wide

training--suggests the DNI is unable to rectify this failure without a significant change in

approach. (Best 2010)

Intelligence Reform - the Goldwater-Nichols Model

When it is obvious that the goals cannot be reached, don't adjust the goals, adjust the action steps.

--Confucius

Intelligence reform after 2004 was modeled on the Goldwater-Nichols Department of

Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (hereafter the Goldwater-Nichols Act), which was passed

after a series of failures in the early 1980s. The Goldwater-Nichols Act was intended to solve

several problems between US military branches related to competition over roles and

responsibilities in warfighting, as well as competition for resources and influence in political and

defense leadership structures. Prior to the Act, military branches largely planned and operated

independently of each other--often duplicating each others' efforts--which degraded the military

21

establishment's overall combat effectiveness. After the Goldwater-Nichols Act, much of the

military's planning, budgeting, training, and operations became joint ventures, greatly enhancing

the military establishment's overall performance. (Murdoch 2004) (National Commission on

Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States 2004)

Dahl stated the Goldwater-Nichols Act was extraordinarily valuable in attaining

interservice collaboration among military branches that performed different, complementary

missions with different, complementary assets toward the same goal. Its success in reforming the

defense establishment prompted intelligence reformists to use the Goldwater-Nichols Act as the

model for post-9/11 intelligence community reform, under the presumption that it would enable

IC components to collaboratively perform their specialized missions in the IC's competitive

intelligence structure. The 9/11 Commission Report called out the Goldwater-Nichols Act,

stating some believed it was applicable to law enforcement and intelligence reform in the wake

of 2001's terrorist attacks. Additionally, the IRTPA specifically stated the Goldwater-Nichols

Act should serve as the model for intelligence management reform, and McConnell explicitly

lauded the Act's success in creating a collaborative, unified military establishment, and stated the

IRTPA could serve as the IC's "Goldwater-Nichols Act." (Dahl 2007) (McConnell 2007)

Writing for the US Army Command and General Staff College, William J. Davis, Jr.,

looked closely at the post-9/11 attempt to improve the US' interagency coordination on national

security matters and the Goldwater-Nichols Act model that formed the basis of this effort. Davis

contends that the Goldwater-Nichols Act was extremely successful in reforming the military and

instilling an appreciation of joint effort, largely due to the military's already existent

subordination to a single department and combined congressional budget. Davis asserts post-

22

9/11 intelligence reform has been challenged by the number of agencies participating in the

reform effort, each with its own budget, mission, culture, and hierarchy. (Davis 2011)

This paper contends the lack of analytic specialization in modern intelligence and the

Goldwater-Nichols Act's focus on reforming failures in operations limit its applicability to

intelligence reform. Competitive intelligence analysis has almost vanished. Today's IC performs

similar analytic missions, with similar analytic assets, and largely identical information, while

the Goldwater-Nichols Act was designed to increase unity among organizations with differing,

complementary missions and assets. Additionally, the military's failures in the 1980s that led to

the Goldwater-Nichols Act were matters of conducting operations and prosecuting military

conflict. The Goldwater-Nichols Act was therefore designed to unify military intent and increase

interservice cooperation when conducting military operations--in essence, helping military

leadership focus downward to the warfighter in order to prevail in combat. The problems

afflicting the IC are not matters of tactical operations; the nature and specificity of each IC

component's mission and capabilities lend themselves to operations supported by several

agencies, but carried out by a single agency. Instead, the IC's problems are more strategic,

focused upward toward the policy and decision makers the IC supports.

History Repeats

Insanity is doing the same thing over and over and expecting a different result. --Anonymous

Modern intelligence reform effectively began in 1941 when President Roosevelt created

the nation's first "Coordinator of Information," (COI), whose office was re-designated in 1942 as

the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and later disbanded and replaced with the CIA. This

position and office's creation were intended to solve the persistent disconnects within the existent

23

intelligence services--primarily those of the Department of State, the Army, and the Navy.

According to a CIA historic study, at the time "information went up the chain of command,

perhaps even to the President, and might be shared across departmental lines, but no one short of

the White House tried to collate and assess all the vital information acquired by the US

government." (CIA 2008)

However, the Office of the COI and the OSS were unable to solve these disconnects.

According to DIA historian Deane J. Allen, competition within the military intelligence

departments hampered the OSS' efforts to integrate national intelligence information, and the

military departments opposed then-OSS Director Donovan's recommendation to establish an

independent intelligence agency responding to the President. After World War II ended and

President Truman disbanded the OSS, the Military and State Departments acknowledged greater

coordination among them was required, but convinced policy makers to allow each department

to retain autonomy over its intelligence branch, citing independent needs. (Defense Intelligence

Agency 1995)

In January 1946, President Truman established the Central Intelligence Group, headed by

the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI)--funded and staffed by the Military and State

Departments--to coordinate, plan, evaluate, and disseminate information. However, later that

year, the Congressional Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack stated

"operational and intelligence work required centralization of authority and clear-cut allocation of

responsibility," prompting the National Security Act of 1947--the first major US intelligence

reform document. This act created the CIA, and gave the DCI responsibility for "coordinating

the intelligence activities of the several government departments and agencies in the interest of

national security." (Defense Intelligence Agency 1995; np)

24

The Military and State Department continued to oppose centralized management, and the

DCI effectively became the coordinator for a confederation of intelligence organizations, loosely

represented in the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC), which was plagued by poor

coordination and component involvement, as well as unclear authority. A 1948 commission

established by President Truman found that duplication of effort, personnel problems, poor

coordination and conflicting intelligence estimates continued to plague the IC. While the inter-

service intelligence rivalries among the military branches were later addressed with the DIA's

formation, the interagency rivalries and disconnects within the broader intelligence community

persisted. In 1962, President Kennedy wanted the CIA's Director of Central Intelligence (DCI)

to coordinate all of the IC's activities. In 1971, President Nixon attempted to address leadership,

division of labor, and analysis and dissemination problems by directing the DCI to act as the IC's

manager. President Carter also attempted a degree of intelligence reform in his 1978 Executive

Order 12036. However, the IC's same internal problems continued into the next century,

prompting the DNI's establishment. (Defense Intelligence Agency 1995) (Richelson 2005)

The DNI

Competition has been shown to be useful up to a certain point and no further, but cooperation, which is the thing we must strive for today, begins where competition leaves off.

--Franklin D. Roosevelt

The DNI was created to rectify the disconnects, rivalries, and competition that plagued

the IC since before World War II, and which led to the information stovepiping that contributed

to 9/11. Arguably, the DNI has been more successful than its predecessors. Except for the CIA,

each IC component still falls under a cabinet agency for mission, tasking, and oversight, but the

DNI's budgetary and program authorities have some ability to compel components toward DNI

requirements, partially obviating the need to place IC components directly under the DNI's

25

authority. The establishment of the Department of Homeland Security--whose intelligence

function is still developing but is moving toward a hybrid of foreign and law-enforcement

intelligence--has the potential to effectively address the problematic gap between foreign and

domestic law enforcement intelligence. DNI initiatives have greatly increased the availability of

intelligence reporting throughout the IC, increasing the prevalence of all-source intelligence

analysis in the creation of national intelligence production.

However, the DNIs' efforts so far to fix the stovepiped intelligence and interagency

dysfunction--the symptom of the problem--have been attempts to replace the "need to know"

mentality with a "need to share" and "responsibility to provide" philosophy intended to increase

dissemination and collaboration throughout the IC. The DNI's 2008 Intelligence Sharing

Strategy laid out the DNI's directives for disseminating intelligence reporting throughout the IC,

and sought to establish incentives to encourage intelligence professionals to collaborate with

their counterparts in other organizations, as well as move toward a "Single Information

Environment" in which all reporting is disseminated and available to all appropriately cleared

intelligence professionals. Nearly all intelligence professionals and experts--including the DNIs

themselves--agree the DNIs to date have been challenged to overcome the organizational and

institutional obstacles that gave rise to the position, in much the same way the DNI's

predecessors were challenged by essentially the same issues. Despite mandates and efforts of

several centralized intelligence authorities, as well as the creation of numerous joint intelligence

groups to facilitate intelligence sharing, intelligence stovepiping, shortcomings among analytic

staff, and poor quality products continue to plague the intelligence community, suggesting these

problems are inherent to the IC's organization rather than symptoms of an ailing community.

(ODNI 2008)

26

The Alternative to Competitive Analysis

SEC. 102A. (a) PROVISION OF INTELLIGENCE.(1) The Director of National Intelligence shall be responsible for ensuring that national intelligence is provided (A) to the President; (B) to the heads of departments and agencies of the executive branch (C) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and senior military commanders (D) to the Senate and House of Representatives and the committees thereof (E) to such other persons as the Director of National Intelligence determines to be appropriate.(2) Such national intelligence should be timely, objective, independent of political considerations, and based upon all sources available to the intelligence community and other appropriate entities.

--Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004

This paper proposes the root of the IC's ongoing, pervasive problems is that the concept

of competitive intelligence, while valid in theory, depends on each agency conducting analysis,

including every member of each agency's managerial and analytic staff, to subordinate and

possibly forego their personal and organizational interests in favor of national interests.

However, as long as intelligence organizations and their staffs perceive competition for

resources, prominence, or relevance, successfully accomplished competitive analysis will

continue to elude the IC. The DNI cannot rely on the IC's component agencies and organizations

to properly and independently adhere to the concept of competitive intelligence analysis.

Therefore, an alternative must be found to ensure policy and decision makers are provided with

quality, timely, and objective intelligence analysis.

As early as March 2010, a Presidential Intelligence Advisory Board examining how to

solve the problems faced by the DNI since the position's inception stated "The IC cannot

continue to be an amalgam of independent and specialized agencies, each operating according to

its own premises and policies. The very intent of the IRTPA was to provide for the effective

integration of the IC. This has not yet happened. For the IC to function effectively and deliver

27

credible and timely intelligence, it needs an acknowledged leader. This should be the DNI."

(Fisher 2010)

However, the IC's intelligence collection agencies have vast experience managing and

exploiting their extraordinarily complex collection networks and systems; it is not feasible for

the DNI to assume responsibility for such architecture. Similarly, intelligence-led operations are

best carried out by specialized experts, which several IC components have dedicated decades to

develop. Instead, this paper contends the best, and possibly only solution is to reassign

responsibility for current and strategic national intelligence analysis production from the IC's

component agencies to the ODNI, abandoning the ineffective concept of competitive analysis in

favor of unified all-source national intelligence analysis. Unifying analysis in such manner

would largely obviate the intelligence stovepiping and analytic competition that has proven

endemic to the IC's competitive analysis. Additionally, such unification would preclude

adherence to organizational judgments and assessments from degrading the intelligence products

provided to policy and decision makers, and enable the DNI to increase the quality of the IC's

analytic staff and products.

Simply put, were IC component agencies no longer responsible for conducting national

intelligence analysis, there would be no benefit to continuing to hoard key intelligence. This

intelligence would necessarily be provided to the ODNI's analytic staff and incorporated into

truly all-source intelligence assessments. Also, reassigning and consolidating national

intelligence analysis under the DNI would help the IC avoid losing influence over policy makers,

which the "Future of Intelligence Analysis" project claimed was increasingly shifting to publicly

available sources of information due to intra-IC competition and information hoarding. IC

components would almost certainly then promote their relevance through their specialized

28

operations or intelligence collection, which are generally well defined and involve minimal

overlap. This would have the additional benefit of improving the overall level and quality of

intelligence collection and information available for national intelligence analysis. (Lahneman

2006)

Were IC components responsible only for collection and operations, and not national

intelligence analysis, there would be few, if any opportunities for the adherence to organizational

judgments or perspectives to impede production of high-quality intelligence assessments. This

would help make progress toward establishing the integrated intelligence culture for which the

"Future of Intelligence Analysis" project called. (Lahneman 2006)

Authority and responsibility for the analytic staff conducting national intelligence

analysis would enable the DNI to improve analyst quality and expertise that has so far been

lacking, as well as implement the training and professionalization standards for which several

experts have called. Additionally, DNI responsibility for analytic staff would enable

standardization of disparate security procedures and clearances that have contributed to the IC

components' reluctance to share information with the wider intelligence community.

Finally, DNI responsibility for current and strategic national intelligence analysis and

production would greatly improve the quality of intelligence assessments provided to policy and

decision makers. The DNI would be able to set and enforce professional tradecraft standards in

researching and analyzing information, sourcing and composing intelligence products, and

disseminating these intelligence products to appropriate customers and audiences. Additionally,

enabling analytic teams that combine individuals with several specializations--such as military,

political, law enforcement, financial, energy, and environmental--on a target problem or area,

without these analysts being beholden to external agencies or required to promote judgments and

29

assessments from a parent organization, would allow a holistic approach to all-source

intelligence analysis that is lacking in today's IC. This would greatly increase the quality and

value of national intelligence to intelligence consumers, and would enable flexible, quality

strategic and current intelligence production tailored to consumer requirements. Also, since

component organizations would no longer compete through production of finished intelligence,

the DNI would be able to better manage and balance the volume of current and strategic national

intelligence production. Not only would this greatly facilitate better strategic intelligence

analysis to support national goals, but it would also significantly reduce the volume of redundant

all-source intelligence products provided to policy and decision makers, allowing them more

time to digest each product in order to make more well-informed decisions.

However, reassigning and consolidating national intelligence analysis under the DNI

cannot be completed using the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act as the IC's model for reform; this act

was designed to accomplish joint combat operations, not support to policy and decision making.

Therefore, this paper contends reforming US intelligence under the Goldwater-Nichols Act

model will not successfully solve the IC's outstanding problems that remain part of the DNI's

mandate. The remainder of this paper will then concentrate on the feasibility of reassigning

national intelligence analysis under the DNI using the DIA model.

30

III. Methodology

This study examines the feasibility

of accomplishing the DNI's mandate by

reassigning responsibility for national

intelligence production under the DNI

using the DIA model. The hypothesis to

be proved or disproved, then, is:

H1: The DIA model is appropriate to

reassign current and strategic national

intelligence analysis to the DNI in order to

enable the DNI to successfully accomplish

its mandate.

To test this hypothesis, this paper

first identifies the problems described as

precipitators to the DIA's formation that were rectified by the DIA's formation, and then

compares these to the ongoing IC shortcomings identified in this paper. This paper also

compares the DIA's assigned responsibilities over military intelligence to the DNI's tasked

mandate. These antecedent variables identify similarities between both the intelligence problems

of each and the responsibilities of each--the independent variables. The independent variables

then suggest an answer to the dependent variable, whether the DIA model can be used as a model

to reassign current and strategic national intelligence analysis to the DNI in order to enable the

DNI to successfully accomplish its mandate. Graphically, this can be represented as:

31

The DIA Coming out of World War II, the US

military's service branches separately conducted intelligence collection, production, and dissemination, and provided separate estimates to the Secretary of Defense, the Unified and Specified Commands, and their wider government audiences. The Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 attempted, but failed to unify defense intelligence efforts by placing the service branches' intelligence structures under the control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff J2. (DIA 1996)

In October 1961, over the objections of all service branches, then-President Eisenhower formed the DIA specifically and deliberately as a union of military intelligence into a single organization, not a confederation of separate military intelligence agencies. Over the next several years, the service branches transferred their intelligence responsibilities, functions, and resources to the DIA in a time-phased process intended to prevent degradation in overall defense intelligence, after which the service branches were forbidden from producing intelligence assessments or estimates that duplicated or overlapped those produced by DIA. (DIA 1996)

32

IV. Findings and Analysis

DIA historian Deane Allen identified several key problems in military intelligence

immediately after World War II. There was no single, authoritative military estimate; each

service prepared its own, often self-serving estimate of the threats to US security. Additionally,

there was considerable duplication of effort, both in intelligence collection and in intelligence

production--and the assessments produced were uncoordinated, conflicting, and of poor quality.

Further, management inefficiency was prevalent, and neither the Joint Chiefs of Staff nor the

Secretary of Defense had an accurate picture of the overall military intelligence architecture.

(Defense Intelligence Agency n.d.) (Defense Intelligence Agency 1995) (See Appendix B)

Comparison to Pre-DIA Military Intelligence Shortcomings

The problems identified as precipitating the DIA's formation do not directly overlap with

the IC's outstanding problems today. However, there is significant correlation between them. In

both cases, senior intelligence managers and decision makers did not have a clear view of the

intelligence activities under them; in fact, Priest and Arkin cite several senior intelligence

officials complaining that they were overloaded with information, and were unable to maintain

visibility on the IC's programs and activities. Similarly, Lieberthal's depiction of the National

Intelligence Estimates and Presidential Daily Briefs and Priest and Arkin's depiction of NCTC

products suggest that in each case there was a lack of single, authoritative intelligence estimates.

(Priest and Arkin 2010) (Lieberthal 2009)

As discussed previously, duplication of effort and lack of coordination and collaboration

are also widely recognized problems in the IC today, as they were prior to the DIA's formation.

Additionally, Lowenthal's depiction of "footnote wars" and Lowenthal, Lieberthal, and

Johnston's claims that intelligence organizations withhold information for use in their own

33

products in an attempt to ensure their organization's relevance strongly resemble the service

branches' self-serving intelligence assessments cited as a driver for DIA's formation. The poor

quality of intelligence assessments described by Lieberthal also bears similarity to military

intelligence before the DIA's formation. (Lowenthal 2009) (Lieberthal 2009) (Johnston 2005)

There are several differences between pre-DIA military intelligence and today's IC as

well. The requirement for the Secretary of Defense to review dissenting opinions and achieve

consensus among the service branches was not identified as a significant problem in today's IC;

in fact, it can be argued that this is the intended purpose of joint organizations such as the NCTC.

However, other problems remain relevant, such as the assertion that prior to the DIA's formation,

service branches did not consistently provide timely, credible intelligence estimates. Today's IC

appears to have the opposite problem; intelligence organizations often compete to produce

assessments before their perceived "competition," and the focus of intelligence production

shifting toward current intelligence has given rise to a greater number of short-term assessments,

and fewer long-term or strategic assessments.

Additionally, while shortcomings in the recruitment, training, and overall quality of

military intelligence analysts were identified in post-9/11 inquiries, they were not specifically

and explicitly called into question in the historical documents on the DIA's formation. However,

complaints about the service branches' product quality, combined with the fact that in 1962--less

than one year following the DIA's formation--the DIA founded the Defense Intelligence School

(the predecessor to the National Defense Intelligence College, now the National Intelligence

University), it can be argued that the quality of military intelligence analysts prior to the DIA's

formation was thought to be poor. (US Congress 2002) (National Commission on Terrorist

Attacks Upon the United States 2004)

34

Comparison of the problems identified in military intelligence prior to the DIA's

formation and the outstanding problems within today's IC supports the validity of this paper's

first independent variable--the majority of the problems identified in the two cases are similar.

Comparison to DIA's Assigned Responsibilities

According to Allen, the DIA was assigned the following tasks: to produce and provide all

Department of Defense (DoD) estimative and current intelligence; provide senior defense leaders

and other organizations in the national intelligence community with military intelligence;

manage the DoD intelligence requirements and collection activities and develop DoD

intelligence research and development requirements; cooperate with the IC's other intelligence

organizations; provide DoD representation on national and intergovernmental intelligence

committees; guide the public release of defense intelligence information; integrate DoD

intelligence automation; and prepare and submit a consolidated DoD budget for intelligence

activities." (Defense Intelligence Agency n.d.) (See Appendix C)

As with the problems identified in the two cases, there are several similarities between

the responsibilities assigned to the DIA in 1961 and the DNI's mandated responsibilities from

2004. In 1961, the DIA was tasked with producing and providing all DoD intelligence estimates

and current intelligence assessments, while the DNI was tasked with ensuring similar products

created by the IC's component organizations were of high quality. Additionally, DIA was tasked

with providing national intelligence products to senior defense leaders, while the DNI was tasked

with providing national intelligence products to senior political and military leaders. The DNI

has so far been unsuccessful in ensuring the quality of IC products submitted to senior political

and military leaders and been unable to improve the IC's ability to regulate itself. However, the

DIA has successfully accomplished similar tasks once given responsibility for production

35

supports the earlier assertion of this paper--intelligence analysis should be reassigned and

consolidated under the DNI.

The DIA was also tasked with both managing the DoD's current intelligence activities

and requirements, as well as developing the Department's future requirements. Similarly, the

DNI's responsibilities include managing and directing the IC's intelligence activities and

developing the IC's overall strategies to address future intelligence requirements and

acquisitions. Additionally, the DIA's responsibility for managing a consolidated defense budget

is almost identical to the DNI's responsibility to manage the IC's overall budget. Finally, the

DIA's task to integrate defense intelligence automation and data processing strongly resembles

the DNI's task to ensure intelligence is available across the IC, which the DNI has largely

pursued by integrating technology among IC components.

Again, as with the problems in each case, several DIA and DNI responsibilities do not

overlap. The DIA's task to cooperate with other IC components and represent the DoD on

national and intergovernmental intelligence boards and committees is essentially irrelevant for

the DNI--the DNI was created to administer the component agencies as an authority rather than

participate with them as an equal. Separately, the DIA's task to provide guidance on public

disclosure of intelligence was not identified as a problem or assigned as a task to the DNI.

However, the DNI was tasked with increasing the IC's intelligence sharing with state, local, and

tribal authorities--identified as a significant problem in the two post-9/11 inquiries--which can be

considered a rough parallel to the DIA's task on public disclosure.

Comparison of the responsibilities identified in the DIA's formation and the DNI's

mandate over today's IC supports the validity of this paper's second independent variable--the

majority of responsibilities identified in the two cases are similar. The validity of this paper’s

36

two independent variables suggests that the hypothesis is valid; the DIA model is appropriate for

reassigning current and strategic national intelligence analysis to the DNI in order to enable the

DNI to successfully accomplish its mandate.

37

V. Conclusions

The IC should follow the DIA model in reassigning and consolidating current and

strategic national intelligence under the DNI, removing it from the IC components' purview.

This would almost certainly not be an instant occurrence--if following the DIA model, enacting

such a change can be expected to take several years, and be phased to ensure minimal

degradation to the intelligence provided to political and military decision makers. Additionally,

existing capabilities or recommended changes or improvements to the IC's operations identified

by several intelligence professionals and experts can be incorporated in such a transition.

Recruitment, Training, and Analyst Professionalism

The AFCEA, Bar Joseph and McDermott, Lowenthal, Lieberthal, and Marrin have

identified improvements that can be made to increase the quality of analysts conducting

intelligence production. As recruitment and staffing are transferred away from component

organizations, the DNI would be able to enact standards and practices to improve the quality of

the analytic staff producing the intelligence destined to impact the US' political and military

decision making.

AFCEA claims current intelligence analyst recruitment involves little cognitive testing,

which contributes to a high attrition rate during training, and argues rigorous cognitive testing--to

include technical skills, personality, and motivation could reduce the attrition rate and place

analysts where they are best suited. Bar Joseph and McDermott support this, stating the use of

psychological personality tests already in existence would improve the quality of analysts

recruited into the IC. Lowenthal also identifies several areas in which the IC can improve its

analytic staff; increasing the focus on knowledge building, emphasizing expertise and depth over

passing familiarity with several subjects, and intensive training on intelligence fundamentals--

38

such as writing, analytic thought, and organizational skills--early in analysts' careers.

Additionally, Lieberthal and Lowenthal both recommend the establishment of a National

Intelligence University, including a dedicated campus and faculty, to generate a dedicated,

integrated analytic corps within and throughout the IC, and allocating time and resources to

continued training throughout an analyst's career. (AFCEA 2005) (Bar Joseph and McDermott

2008) (Lieberthal 2009) (Lowenthal 2011)

Separately, Marrin strongly supports intelligence professionalism, and recommended

several changes within the analytic community. In "Professionalizing Intelligence Analysis,"

Marrin advocated creating a regulated body modeled on the American Medical Association--

which bridges many medical specialties with different knowledge bases--to help define systemic

formal knowledge, set and enforce standards of practice and conduct, establish and regulate

qualifications and certifications, and ensure competency. Marrin recognizes that some

organizations exist to gather intelligence professionals--such as the International Association of

Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts and the Society of Competitive Intelligence

Professionals--but seeks an organization that would both ensure analyst professionalism and

include the three analytic specialties; national security, law enforcement, and business

intelligence rather than concentrating on a single specialty. (Marrin 2004)

Improvements to Intelligence Production

The balance and quality of intelligence production could also be improved during a

transfer from component organizations to the DNI. Cooper recommends refocusing intelligence

analysis along a series of basic principles, including re-developing a deep understanding of the

phenomena under investigation, deemphasizing production on individual factoids, and re-

emphasizing production on sense-making and understanding. (Cooper 2005)

39

It will be vital to learn from the DIA's model for success in regard to intelligence

production. Once responsibility has been transferred, the DNI must enforce a ban on IC

components producing intelligence assessments that duplicate or overlap those produced by the

DNI.

Ensuring Availability of Intelligence to Consumers

Of significant concern in any proposal to transfer analysis away from component

organizations would be ensuring availability of current and strategic national intelligence to

political and military consumers who would still require such intelligence, such as Department

heads and senior military commanders. In the DNI's seven years of existence, one thing those in

the position have done exceedingly well is to improve the technology available to the IC for

interagency communication. These advancements would allow the DNI to ensure minimal

degradation to consumers' intelligence requirements during and after any transition of

intelligence production responsibility. According to Best, as of 2004 a significant portion of

intelligence was already processed and analyzed in Washington D.C., then accessed by

customers--including DoD--around the world to support operations and decision making.

Additionally, video teleconferencing (VTC) through secure channels has come to widespread use

throughout the IC. Current and strategic analysis teams could be made available by VTC to

support nearly all intelligence consumers, largely obviating the requirement to have current or

strategic intelligence analysts dedicated to particular customers, let alone on-site to brief

intelligence. (Best 2004)

Anticipated Opposition

DIA's formation and the transition of intelligence responsibilities was not easy, and it

required several reorganizations to develop its role in the IC. The service branches continued to

40

oppose centralizing military intelligence under the DIA and continued submitting their own

intelligence estimates for several years after the DIA's formation. Even into the early 1970s, the

service branches attempted to discredit the DIA's intelligence estimates and called for the DIA's

dissolution. The "Future of Intelligence Analysis" project noted that previous recommendations

for intelligence reform or consolidation under a single authority were not implemented due to

resistance from within the IC, and that strong resistance can be expected to any future

recommendations or attempts to change the IC's structure or habits. For example, the CIA has

already acted to protect its historic "turf" against DNI encroachment--in 2009, then-DNI Dennis

Blair lost a clash with then-CIA Director Leon Panetta over intelligence appointments due to a

lack of White House support, although such appointments were ostensibly under the DNI's

purview. (Defense Intelligence Agency 2005) (Defense Intelligence Agency n.d.) (Defense

Intelligence Agency 2012) (Lahneman 2006) (CBS News 2009)

Separately, the AFCEA identified several challenges to transitioning from competitive

analysis to comprehensive analysis. Significant time, effort, and funds have already been

devoted to establishing existing infrastructures built around data types, intelligence subjects, and

customer relations. Additionally, recurring costs to maintain and continue operations under the

existing architecture have already been allocated and programmed for future years. Most

importantly, experienced, accomplished intelligence professionals are already invested in the

current intelligence or customer specific architecture. (AFCEA 2005)

The DNI can expect fierce battles from IC components that would lose their individual

analytic voices in Washington. At best, the DNI can anticipate grudging, perfunctory

cooperation in any transition of analytic responsibilities, which will likely take years to become

true support. At worst, the DNI will face several years of challenges, refusals to cooperate, and

41

appeals to Cabinet and Executive leaders to reverse the transition or dissolve the DNI altogether.

The DNI will require unwavering White House and congressional support to persevere through

this type of opposition and successfully transition to coherent intelligence analysis and

production.

The Bottom Line

Transitioning intelligence analysis and production to the DNI would be neither a swift

nor easy undertaking. However, this undertaking is vital if the IC is to break the chain of

dysfunction and failure that has persisted as long as there have been multiple agencies

conducting intelligence work. With the creation of the DNI--responsible for the IC's strategic

vision, with no collection or operations responsibilities--the US is in an ideal situation

organizationally and bureaucratically to bolster this position to also be the clear strategic voice of

US intelligence. To do so, current and strategic national intelligence must be unified under a

single organization rather than left as a confederation of organizations, for which the DIA model

may be uniquely appropriate.

42

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Appendix A:Agency / Organization

All-Source Analysis

National / Senior Policy Maker Customer

Counter-Terrorism and National Security

Foreign Politics and Foreign Policy

Defense and Military Threats

CBRN / Proliferation

Medical Threats

Counter-Drug

Air Force Intelligence X X X

Army Intelligence X X X XCentral Intelligence Agency

X X X X X X X X

Coast Guard Intelligence X X X X

Defense Intelligence Agency

X X X X X X X

Department of Energy X X X

Department of Homeland Security

X X X X X X

Department of State X X X X X

Department of the Treasury X X X X

Drug Enforcement Administration

X X

Federal Bureau of Investigation X X X X X

Marine Corps Intelligence X

National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency

X X X

National Reconnaissance Office

X X X

National Security Agency X X X X X X

National Counter-Terrorism Center X X X X

Navy Intelligence X X X XODNI - the National Intelligence Council

X X X X X X X X

Sources: (2009. An Overview of the United States Intelligence Community for the 111th Congress) and advertised intelligence research and analysis employment opportunities identified on the Office of Personnel Management-

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operated http://www.usajobs.govNote: List of topics covered is not all-inclusive. Agency coverage of individual topics is based on stated mission

and job positions advertised and periodically noted between January-May 2012, but may not be exhaustive.

Appendix B:

Pre-DIA Military Intelligence Problems Outstanding IC Shortcomings

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary of Defense did not have a clear picture of military intelligence architecture and resource allocation.

The Director of Central Intelligence had little authority over or visibility on IC activities.

Each service branch prepared its own national security intelligence estimates; there was no mechanism or venue for single, authoritative military intelligence estimates.

The IC did not have a mechanism for centralized all-source terrorism-related intelligence analysis.

There was considerable duplication of effort among military intelligence products.

Intelligence production responsibilities were not clearly defined across the IC, and there was too much overlap in intelligence production.

Military intelligence estimates produced by service branches were uncoordinated or conflicting.

Information was not shared across the IC, and IC components did not adequately collaborate.

Military intelligence assessments were of poor quality, and often self-serving.

The IC suffered from insufficient analytic focus and quality, especially in its strategic analysis. Intelligence organizations continue to withhold key intelligence to use in their own products.

Service branches consistently failed to provide timely and credible intelligence estimates.The Secretary of Defense had to review dissenting opinions and achieve consensus among the service branches.

The IC failed to ensure analysts were experienced, qualified, trained, and had access to critical information.

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Appendix C:

DIA's Assigned Responsibilities DNI Mandate and Responsibilities

Produce and provide all DoD estimative and current intelligence, and establish and maintain the DoD indications center.

Ensure national intelligence is timely, objective, independent of political considerations, and based upon all sources available to the intelligence community.

Provide the Secretary of Defense, his assistants, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, DoD agencies, the Unified and Specified Commands, the Military Departments, and other organizations in the National intelligence community with military intelligence.

Responsible for ensuring that national intelligence is provided to the President, the heads of departments and agencies of the executive branch, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and senior military commanders, and the Senate and House of Representatives.

Manage the DoD intelligence requirements and collection activities.

Manage and direct tasking of collection, analysis, production, and dissemination of national intelligence by approving requirements and resolving conflicts.

Develop DoD intelligence research and development requirements.

Develops and determines the National Intelligence Program and submits Future Years Intelligence Plans. Exclusive decision authority on major IC acquisitions outside DoD, and joint authority with the Secretary of Defense on major DoD acquisitions.

Cooperate with and mutually support the Central Intelligence Agency and other intelligence organizations.Provide DoD representation on the United States Intelligence Board, its committees and on all other intergovernmental intelligence committees.Give guidance to the DoD components on the public release of Defense intelligence information.Integrate DoD intelligence automation and automatic data processing plans and programs.

Ensure intelligence is shared across the IC.

Prepare and submit a consolidated DoD budget for intelligence activities.

Budgetary authority over IC components and the authority to withhold funds if an agency fails to comply with the DNI's spending priorities.

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