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By RICKY BOY CABATU/ 3B/ L-100355
Employer-Employee Relationship
G.R. No. 185251 October 2, 2009
RAUL G. LOCSIN and EDDIE B. TOMAQUIN vs. PLT
VELASCO, JR., J.:
FACTS:
PLDT and the Security and Safety Corporation of the Philippines
(SSCP) entered into an agreement whereby SSCP would provide armed
security guards to PLDT to be assigned to its various offices.
Petitioners, among other security guards, were posted at a PLDT
office.
However, respondent issued a letter terminating the Agreement.
Despite the termination of the Agreement, however, petitioners
continued to secure the premises of their assigned office. They
were allegedly directed to remain at their post by representatives
of respondent thru presentation of pay slips. Subsequently, they
were terminated.
Thus, petitioners filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for
illegal dismissal and recovery of money claims against PLDT. The
Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision finding PLDT liable for illegal
dismissal. NLRC affirmed.
CA reversed. According to CA, SSCP was not a labor-only
contractor and was an independent contractor having substantial
capital to operate and conduct its own business. Further the
agreement stipulated that there shall be no employer-employee
relationship between the security guards and PLDT. Lastly, the
payslips were issued by SSCP.
ISSUE: Whether there exists an employer-employee
relationship?
HELD: An Employer-Employee Relationship Existed Between the
Parties. They became employees of respondent after the Agreement
between SSCP and respondent was terminated. In the ordinary course
of things, responsible business owners or managers would not allow
security guards of an agency with whom the owners or managers have
severed ties with to continue to stay within the business premises.
This is because upon the termination of the owners or managers
agreement with the security agency, the agencys undertaking of
liability for any damage that the security guard would cause has
already been terminated. Thus, in the event of an accident or
otherwise damage caused by such security guards, it would be the
business owners and/or managers who would be liable and not the
agency. The business owners or managers would, therefore, be
opening themselves up to liability for acts of security guards over
whom the owners or managers allegedly have no control.
Further, petitioners remained at their post under the
instructions of respondent. Thus, respondent dictated upon
petitioners that the latter perform their regular duties to secure
the premises during operating hours (proof of control). Hence,
there is an existence of an employer-employee relationship.
Power of control is the right to control not only the end to be
achieved but also the means to be used in reaching such end. With
the conclusion that respondent directed petitioners to remain at
their posts and continue with their duties, it is clear that
respondent exercised the power of control over them; thus, the
existence of an employer-employee relationship.
________________________
G.R. No. 170087 August 31, 2006
ANGELINA FRANCISCO vs. NLRC, KASEI CORPORATION, SEIICHIRO
TAKAHASHI, TIMOTEO ACEDO, DELFIN LIZA, IRENE BALLESTEROS, TRINIDAD
LIZA and RAMON ESCUETA
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
FACTS:
petitioner was hired by Kasei Corporation during its
incorporation stage. She was designated as Accountant and Corporate
Secretary and was assigned to handle all the accounting needs of
the company. She was also designated as Liaison Officer to the City
of Makati to secure business permits, construction permits and
other licenses for the initial operation of the company.
Later, petitioner was designated Acting Manager for five years.
As Acting Manager, petitioner was assigned to handle recruitment of
all employees and perform management administration functions;
represent the company in all dealings with government agencies,
especially with the BIR, SSS and in the city government of Makati;
and to administer all other matters pertaining to the operation of
Kasei Restaurant which is owned and operated by Kasei
Corporation.
However, petitioner was replaced as Manager. Petitioner alleged
that she was required to sign a prepared resolution for her
replacement but she was assured that she would still be connected
with Kasei Corporation. But her salary was reduced.
She was not paid portion of her salary and when she asked for
the unpaid salary, the company informed her that she was no longer
connected with it.
Since she was no longer paid her salary, petitioner did not
report for work and filed an action for constructive dismissal
before the labor arbiter.
According to respondent, petitioners designation as technical
consultant depended solely upon the will of management. As such,
her consultancy may be terminated any time considering that her
services were only temporary in nature and dependent on the needs
of the corporation. Further, petitioner did not go through the
usual procedure of selection of employees, but her services were
engaged through a Board Resolution designating her as technical
consultant. The money received by petitioner from the corporation
was her professional fee subject to the 10% expanded withholding
tax on
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By RICKY BOY CABATU/ 3B/ L-100355
professionals, and that she was not one of those reported to the
BIR or SSS as one of the companys employees.
The Labor Arbiter found that petitioner was illegally dismissed.
NLRC affirmed. CA reversed.
ISSUE: Whether there was an employer-employee relationship
between petitioner and private respondent Kasei Corporation (to
answer WON there was illegal dismissal).
HELD:
SC adopted a two-tiered test involving: (1) the putative
employers power to control the employee with respect to the means
and methods by which the work is to be accomplished; and (2) the
underlying economic realities of the activity or relationship (the
proper standard of economic dependence is whether the worker is
dependent on the alleged employer for his continued employment in
that line of business). This test is especially appropriate in this
case where there is no written agreement or terms of reference to
base the relationship on; and due to the complexity of the
relationship based on the various positions and responsibilities
given to the worker over the period of the latters employment.
By applying the control test, petitioner is an employee of Kasei
Corporation because she was under the direct control and
supervision of Seiji Kamura, the corporations Technical Consultant.
She reported for work regularly and served in
various capacities as Accountant, Liaison Officer, Technical
Consultant, Acting Manager and Corporate Secretary, with
substantially the same job functions, that is, rendering accounting
and tax services to the company and performing functions necessary
and desirable for the proper operation of the corporation such as
securing business permits and other licenses over an indefinite
period of engagement.
Under the broader economic reality test, the petitioner can
likewise be said to be an employee of respondent corporation
because she had served the company for six years before her
dismissal, receiving check vouchers indicating her salaries/wages,
benefits, 13th month pay, bonuses and allowances, as well as
deductions and Social Security contributions. Petitioners
membership in the SSS as manifested by a copy of the SSS specimen
signature card which was signed by the President of Kasei
Corporation and the inclusion of her name in the on-line inquiry
system of the SSS evinces the existence of an employer-employee
relationship between petitioner and respondent corporation.
Thus, petitioner is an employee of respondent Kasei Corporation.
She was selected and engaged by the company for compensation, and
is economically dependent upon respondent for her continued
employment in that line of business. Her main job function involved
accounting and tax services rendered to respondent corporation on a
regular basis over an indefinite period of engagement. Respondent
corporation hired and engaged petitioner for compensation, with the
power to dismiss her for cause. More importantly, respondent
corporation had the power to control petitioner with the means and
methods by which the work is to be accomplished.
___________________________
G.R. No. 179652 May 8, 2009
PEOPLE'S BROADCASTING (BOMBO RADYO PHILS., INC.) vs. DOLE
SECRETARY , THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, DOLE REGION VII, and JANDELEON
JUEZAN
TINGA, J.:
A complaint was filed by Jandeleon Juezan (respondent) against
Bombo Radyo for illegal deduction, non-payment of service incentive
leave, 13th month pay, etc. before the DOLE Regional Office in Cebu
City.
According to Bombo Radyo, Juezan is a drama talent hired on a
per drama " participation basis" hence no employer-employeeship
existed between them. As proof of this, management presented
photocopies of cash vouchers, billing statement, employments of
specific undertaking (a contract between the talent director &
the complainant), summary of billing of drama production etc. They
(mgt.) has no control of the talent if he ventures into another
contract w/ other broadcasting industries.
DOLE found that there was an er-ee relationship.
Bombo Radyo elevated the case to CA stating that is no
employer-employee relationship had ever existed between it and
respondent because it was the drama directors and producers who
paid, supervised and disciplined respondent. It also added that the
case was beyond the jurisdiction of the DOLE and should have been
considered by the labor arbiter because respondents claim exceeded
P5,000.00.
Jandeleon, on the other hand, invokes Republic Act No. 7730,
which "removes the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Labor and
Employment or his duly authorized representatives, from the effects
of the restrictive provisions of Article 129 and 217 of the Labor
Code, regarding the confinement of jurisdiction based on the amount
of claims."
ISSUE: Does the Secretary of Labor have the power to determine
the existence of an employer-employee relationship?
HELD: Art. 228 of LC is quite explicit that the visitorial and
enforcement power of the DOLE comes into play only "in cases when
the relationship of employer-employee still exists." It also
underscores the avowed objective underlying the grant of power to
the DOLE which is "to give effect to the labor standard provision
of this Code and other labor legislation." Of course, a persons
entitlement to labor standard benefits under the labor laws
presupposes the existence of employer-employee relationship in the
first place.
The clause "in cases where the relationship of employer-employee
still exists" signifies that the employer-employee relationship
must have existed even before the emergence of the controversy.
Necessarily, the DOLEs power does not apply in two instances,
namely: (a) where the employer-employee
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By RICKY BOY CABATU/ 3B/ L-100355
relationship has ceased; and (b) where no such relationship has
ever existed.
In the first situation, the claim has to be referred to the NLRC
because it is the NLRC which has jurisdiction in view of the
termination of the employer-employee relationship. The same
procedure has to be followed in the second situation since it is
the NLRC that has jurisdiction in view of the absence of
employer-employee relationship between the evidentiary parties from
the start.
It has long been established that in administrative and
quasi-judicial proceedings, substantial evidence is sufficient as a
basis for judgment on the existence of employer-employee
relationship. Substantial evidence, which is the quantum of proof
required in labor cases, is "that amount of relevant evidence which
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion." No particular form of evidence is required to prove
the existence of such employer-employee relationship. Any competent
and relevant evidence to prove the relationship may be admitted.
Hence, while no particular form of evidence is required, a finding
that such relationship exists must still rest on some substantial
evidence. Moreover, the substantiality of the evidence depends on
its quantitative as well as its qualitative aspects.
________________________
G.R. No. 192558 February 15, 2012
BITOY JAVIER (DANILO P. JAVIER) vs. FLY ACE
CORPORATION/FLORDELYN CASTILLO
MENDOZA, J.:
FACTS:
Javier filed a complaint before the NLRC for underpayment of
salaries and other labor standard benefits. He alleged that he was
an employee of Fly Ace performing various tasks at the respondents
warehouse such as cleaning and arranging the canned items before
their delivery to certain locations, except in instances when he
would be ordered to accompany the companys delivery vehicles, as
pahinante; that he reported for work from Monday to Saturday from
7:00 oclock in the morning to 5:00 oclock in the afternoon; that
during his employment, he was not issued an identification card and
payslips by the company; that on May 6, 2008, he reported for work
but he was no longer allowed to enter the company premises by the
security guard upon the instruction of his superior (Ong).
To support his allegations, Javier presented an affidavit of one
Bengie Valenzuela who alleged that Javier was a stevedore or
pahinante of Fly Ace. The said affidavit was subscribed before the
Labor Arbiter (LA).
For its part, Fly Ace averred that it was engaged in the
business of importation and sales of groceries; that Javier was
contracted by its employee, Mr. Ong, as extra helper on a pakyaw
basis at
an agreed rate of P 300.00 per trip, which was later increased.
Mr. Ong contracted Javier roughly 5 to 6 times only in a month
whenever the vehicle of its contracted hauler, Milmar Hauling
Services, was not available. Later, Fly Ace no longer needed the
services of Javier. Denying that he was their employee, Fly Ace
insisted that there was no illegal dismissal.
Fly Ace submitted a copy of its agreement with Milmar Hauling
Services and copies of acknowledgment receipts evidencing payment
to Javier for his contracted services bearing the words, "daily
manpower (pakyaw/piece rate pay)" and the latters
signatures/initials.
LA dismissed the complaint for lack of merit on the ground that
Javier failed to present proof that he was a regular employee of
Fly Ace: (1) that Javier has no employee ID showing his employment
with the Respondent (2) nor any document showing that he received
the benefits accorded to regular employees of the Respondents. His
contention that Respondent failed to give him said ID and payslips
implies that indeed he was not a regular employee of Fly Ace
considering that complainant was a helper and that Respondent
company has contracted a regular trucking for the delivery of its
products. Respondent Fly Ace is not engaged in trucking business
but in the importation and sales of groceries. Since there is a
regular hauler to deliver its products, we give credence to
Respondents claim that complainant was contracted on "pakiao"
basis. As to the claim for underpayment of salaries, the payroll
presented by the Respondents showing salaries of workers on
"pakiao" basis has evidentiary weight because although the
signature of the complainant appearing thereon are not uniform,
they appeared to be his true signature.
On appeal with the NLRC, Javier was favored. The NLRC stated
that a pakyaw-basis arrangement did not preclude the existence of
employer-employee relationship. Payment by result is a method of
compensation and does not define the essence of the relation. It is
a mere method of computing compensation, not a basis for
determining the existence or absence of an employer-employee
relationship. The NLRC further averred that it did not follow that
a worker was a job contractor and not an employee, just because the
work he was doing was not directly related to the employers trade
or business or the work may be considered as "extra" helper as in
this case; and that the relationship of an employer and an employee
was determined by law and the same would prevail whatever the
parties may call it. In this case, the NLRC held that substantial
evidence was sufficient basis for judgment on the existence of the
employer-employee relationship. Javier was a regular employee of
Fly Ace because there was reasonable connection between the
particular activity performed by the employee (as a "pahinante") in
relation to the usual business or trade of the employer
(importation, sales and delivery of groceries). He may not be
considered as an independent contractor because he could not
exercise any judgment in the delivery of company products. He was
only engaged as a "helper."
The CA annulled the NLRC findings that the non-issuance of a
company-issued identification card to private respondent supports
petitioners contention that private respondent was not its
employee; that Javiers failure to present salary vouchers,
payslips, or other pieces of evidence to bolster his contention,
pointed to the inescapable conclusion that he was not an
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By RICKY BOY CABATU/ 3B/ L-100355
employee of Fly Ace; that Javiers work was not necessary and
desirable to the business or trade of the company, as it was only
when there were scheduled deliveries, which a regular hauling
service could not deliver, that Fly Ace would contract the services
of Javier as an extra helper. He contracted work outside the
company premises; he was not required to observe definite hours of
work; he was not required to report daily; and he was free to
accept other work elsewhere as there was no exclusivity of his
contracted service to the company, the same being co-terminous with
the trip only. Since no substantial evidence was presented to
establish an employer-employee relationship, the case for illegal
dismissal could not prosper.
ISSUE: Whether Javier is an employee?
HELD:
(1) In dealing with factual issues in labor cases, substantial
evidence that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion is sufficient.
Although Section 10, Rule VII of the New Rules of Procedure of the
NLRC allows a relaxation of the rules of procedure and evidence in
labor cases, this rule of liberality does not mean a complete
dispensation of proof. Labor officials are enjoined to use
reasonable means to ascertain the facts speedily and objectively
with little regard to technicalities or formalities but nowhere in
the rules are they provided a license to completely discount
evidence, or the lack of it. The quantum of proof required,
however, must still be satisfied. Hence, "when confronted with
conflicting versions on factual matters, it is for them in the
exercise of discretion to determine which party deserves credence
on the basis of evidence received, subject only to the requirement
that their decision must be supported by substantial evidence."
No particular form of evidence is required to prove the
existence of such employer-employee relationship. Any competent and
relevant evidence to prove the relationship may be admitted.Hence,
while no particular form of evidence is required, a finding that
such relationship exists must still rest on some substantial
evidence. Moreover, the substantiality of the evidence depends on
its quantitative as well as its qualitative aspects." Although
substantial evidence is not a function of quantity but rather of
quality, the circumstances of the instant case demand that
something more should have been proffered. Had there been other
proofs of employment, such as inclusion in petitioners payroll, or
a clear exercise of control, the Court would have affirmed the
finding of employer-employee relationship."
In sum, the rule of thumb remains: the onus probandi falls on
petitioner to establish or substantiate such claim by the requisite
quantum of evidence. "Whoever claims entitlement to the benefits
provided by law should establish his or her right thereto x x x."
Sadly, Javier failed to adduce substantial evidence as basis for
the grant of relief.
(2) In this case, Javier was not able to persuade the Court that
the elements (er-ee relationship) exist in his case. He could not
submit competent proof that Fly Ace engaged his services as a
regular employee; that Fly Ace paid his wages as an employee, or
that Fly Ace could dictate what his conduct should be while at
work.
__________________________
G.R. No. 184885 March 7, 2012
ERNESTO G. YMBONG vs. ABS-CBN, VENERANDA SY AND DANTE LUZON
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Ernesto G. Ymbong started working for ABS-CBN in 1993
at its regional station in Cebu as a television talent,
co-anchoring Hoy Gising and TV Patrol Cebu. His stint in ABS-CBN
later extended to radio when ABS-CBN Cebu launched its AM station
DYAB in 1995 where he worked as drama and voice talent, spinner,
scriptwriter and public affairs program anchor.
Later, the ABS-CBN Head Office in Manila issued a Policy on
Employees Seeking Public Office--- that any employee who intends to
run for any public office position, must file his/her letter of
resignation; that any employee who intends to join a political
group/party or even with no political affiliation but who intends
to openly and aggressively campaign for a candidate or group of
candidates must file a request for leave of absence subject to
managements approval.
Subsequently, Ymbong ran for public office (councilor of
Lapu-Lapu City) but he lost. When he tried to come back to ABS-CBN
Cebu, he was informed that he cannot work there anymore because of
company policy.
Ymbong in contrast contended that after the expiration of his
leave of absence, he reported back to work as a regular talent and
in fact continued to receive his salary but later he received a
memorandum stating that his services are being terminated
immediately, much to his surprise. Thus, he filed an illegal
dismissal complaint against ABS-CBN.
ABS-CBN prayed for the dismissal of the complaints arguing that
there is no employer-employee relationship between the company and
Ymbong/ ABS-CBN contended that they are not employees but talents
as evidenced by their talent contracts. However, notwithstanding
their status, ABS-CBN has a standing policy on persons connected
with the company whenever they will run for public office.
LA found the dismissal illegal. NLRC ordered for Ymbongs
reinstatement. CA reversed.
ISSUE: Whether there was em-ee relationship.
HELD: CA is affirmed.
(1) Working for the government and the company at the same time
is clearly disadvantageous and prejudicial to the rights and
interest not only of the company but the public as well. In the
event an employee wins in an election, he cannot fully serve, as he
is expected to do, the interest of his employer. The employee
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By RICKY BOY CABATU/ 3B/ L-100355
has to serve 2 employers, obviously detrimental to the interest
of both the government and the private employer. In the event the
employee loses in the election, the impartiality and cold
neutrality of an employee as broadcast personality is suspect, thus
readily eroding and adversely affecting the confidence and trust of
the listening public to employers station.
(2) Ymbong is deemed resigned when he ran for councilor.
Ymbongs overt act of running for councilor of Lapu-Lapu City is
tantamount to resignation on his part. He was separated from
ABS-CBN not because he was dismissed but because he resigned. Since
there was no termination to speak of, the requirement of due
process in dismissal cases cannot be applied to Ymbong. Thus,
ABS-CBN is not duty-bound to ask him to explain why he did not
tender his resignation before he ran for public office as mandated
by the subject company policy.
_____________________________
G.R. No. 138051 June 10, 2004
JOSE Y. SONZA vs. ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION
CARPIO, J.: Facts: In May 1994, respondent signed an Agreement
with the Mel and Jay Management as represented by its President
Sonza. MJMDC agreed to provide Sonzas services exclusively to
ABS-CBN as talent for radio and television. ABS-CBN agreed to pay
for Sonzas services. On April 1, 1996, SONZA wrote a letter to
ABS-CBN informing the latter that he is waiving and renouncing
recovery of the remaining amount stipulated in paragraph 7 of the
Agreement but reserves the right to seek recovery of the other
benefits. On April 30, Sonza filed a complaint against ABS-CBN for
not paying his salaries and other labor standards benefits. On July
10, ABS-CBN filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that no
employer-employee relationship existed between the parties. Issue:
Whether or not Sonza is an employee of ABS-CBN Held; No. Sonza is
an independent contractor. ABS-CBN was not involved in the actual
performance that produced the finished product of SONZAs
work.ABS-CBN did not instruct SONZA how to perform his job. ABS-CBN
merely reserved the right to modify the program format and airtime
schedule "for more effective programming."ABS-CBN did not exercise
control over the means and methods of performance of SONZAs work.
It is well-settled that the less control the hirer exercises, the
more likely the worker is considered an independent contractor.
__________________________
G.R. No. 126297 February 11, 2008
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES, INC. vs. CA and NATIVIDAD and ENRIQUE
AGANA
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Natividad Agana was admitted at the Medical City because of
difficulty of bowel movement and bloody anal discharge. Dr. Ampil
diagnosed her to be suffering from "cancer of the sigmoid." Thus,
Dr. Ampil, assisted by the medical staff of Medical City, performed
an anterior resection surgery upon her. During the surgery, he
found that the malignancy in her sigmoid area had spread to her
left ovary, necessitating the removal of certain portions of
it.
Dr. Fuentes performed and completed the hysterectomy.
Afterwards, Dr. Ampil took over, completed the operation and closed
the incision. However, the operation appeared to be flawed. Tthey
found a piece of gauze in the vagina so Natividad underwent another
surgery.
Natividad and her husband filed with the RTC of Quezon City a
complaint for damages against PSI (owner of Medical City), Dr.
Ampil and Dr. Fuentes.
RTC decided in favor of the Aganas. CA affirmed. The found the
Petitioner PSI jointly and severally liable with Dr. Ampil for the
following reasons: first, there is an employer-employee
relationship between Medical City and Dr. Ampil. The Court relied
on Ramos v. Court of Appeals, holding that for the
purpose of apportioning responsibility in medical negligence
cases, an employer-employee relationship in effect exists between
hospitals and their attending and visiting physicians; second, PSIs
act of publicly displaying in the lobby of the Medical City the
names and specializations of its accredited physicians, including
Dr. Ampil, estopped it from denying the existence of an
employer-employee relationship between them under the doctrine of
ostensible agency or agency by estoppel; and third, PSIs failure to
supervise Dr. Ampil and its resident physicians and nurses and to
take an active step in order to remedy their negligence rendered it
directly liable under the doctrine of corporate negligence.
PSI contends that there is no employer-employee relationship
between it and its consultant, Dr. Ampil. PSI stressed that the
Courts Decision in Ramos holding that "an employer-employee
relationship in effect exists between hospitals and their
attending
and visiting physicians for the purpose of apportioning
responsibility" had been reversed in a subsequent Resolution.
Further, PSI argues that the doctrine of ostensible agency or
agency by estoppel cannot apply because spouses Agana
failed to establish one requisite of the doctrine, i.e., that
Natividad relied on the representation of the hospital in engaging
the services of Dr. Ampil. And lastly, PSI maintains that the
doctrine of corporate negligence is misplaced because the proximate
cause of Natividads injury was Dr. Ampils negligence.
ISSUE: WON there exists an er-ee relationship?
HELD: There exists.
Private hospitals hire, fire and exercise real control over
their attending and visiting "consultant" staff. While
"consultants" are not, technically employees, a point which
respondent hospital asserts in denying all responsibility for the
patients condition, the control exercised, the hiring, and the
right to terminate consultants all fulfill the important hallmarks
of an
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By RICKY BOY CABATU/ 3B/ L-100355
employer-employee relationship, with the exception of the
payment of wages. In assessing whether such a relationship in fact
exists, the control test is determining. Accordingly, on the basis
of the foregoing, we rule that for the purpose of allocating
responsibility in medical negligence cases, an employer-employee
relationship in effect exists between hospitals and their attending
and visiting physicians.
Even assuming that Dr. Ampil is not an employee of Medical City,
but an independent contractor, still the said hospital is liable to
the Aganas. In general, a hospital is not liable for the negligence
of an independent contractor-physician. There is, however, an
exception to this principle. The hospital may be liable if the
physician is the "ostensible" agent of the hospital. This exception
is also known as the "doctrine of apparent authority." (Sometimes
referred to as the apparent or ostensible agency theory). The
doctrine of apparent authority essentially involves two factors to
determine the liability of an independent contractor-physician
which are (1) the hospitals manifestations and is sometimes
described as an inquiry whether the hospital acted in a manner
which would lead a reasonable person to conclude that the
individual who was alleged to be negligent was an employee or agent
of the hospital and (2) the second factor focuses on the patients
reliance. It is sometimes characterized as an inquiry on whether
the plaintiff acted in reliance upon the conduct of the hospital or
its agent, consistent with ordinary care and prudence.
Clearly, PSI is estopped from passing the blame solely to Dr.
Ampil. Its act of displaying his name and those of the other
physicians in the public directory at the lobby of the hospital
amounts to holding out to the public that it offers quality medical
service through the listed physicians. This justifies Atty. Aganas
belief that Dr. Ampil was a member of the hospitals staff. It must
be stressed that under the doctrine of apparent authority, the
question in every case is whether the principal has by his
voluntary act placed the agent in such a situation that a person of
ordinary prudence, conversant with business usages and the nature
of the particular business, is justified in presuming that such
agent has authority to perform the particular act in question. In
these cases, the circumstances yield a positive answer to the
question.
__________________________
Labor Dispute
G.R. No. 108961 November 27, 1998
CITIBANK, N.A., vs CA, and CITI-BANK INTEGRATED GUARDS LABOR
ALLIANCE (CIGLA) SEGA-TUPAS/FSM LOCAL CHAPTER No. 1394.
PARDO, J.:
Citibank and El Toro Security Agency, Inc. entered into a
contract for the latter to provide security and protective services
to safeguard and protect the bank's premises. Citibank renewed the
security contract with El Toro yearly until 1990. On April 22,
1990, the contract between Citibank and El Toro expired.
Respondent CIGLA filed with the NCMB a request for preventive
mediation citing Citibank as respondent therein giving as issues
for preventive mediation the following: a) Unfair labor practice;
b) Dismissal of union officers/members; and c) Union bust.
Petitioner Citibank served on El Toro a written notice that the
bank would not renew anymore the service agreement with the LATTER.
Simultaneously, Citibank hired another security agency to render
security services at Citibank's premises.
Then, respondent CIGLA filed a manifestation with the NCMB that
it was converting its request for preventive mediation into a
notice of strike for failure of the parties to reach a mutually
acceptable settlement of the issues, which it followed with a
supplemental notice of strike alleging as supplemental issue the
mass dismissal of all union officers and members.
The security guards of El Toro who were replaced by guards of
the Golden Pyramid Security Agency considered the non-renewal of El
Toro's service agreement with Citibank as constituting a lockout
and/or a mass dismissal. They threatened to go on strike against
Citibank and picket its premises.
Subsequently, petitioner Citibank filed with the Regional Trial
Court Makati, a complaint for injunction and damages.
The
complaint sought to enjoin CIGLA and any person claiming
membership therein from striking or otherwise disrupting the
operations of the bank.
Respondent CIGLA filed with the trial court a motion to dismiss
the complaint. The motion alleged that (a) the Court had no
jurisdiction, this being labor dispute; b) The guards were
employees of the bank; c) There were pending cases/labor disputes
between the guards and the bank at the different agencies of the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).; d) The bank was guilty
of forum shopping in filing the complaint with the RTC after
submitting itself voluntarily to the jurisdiction of the different
agencies of the DOLE.
RTC denied the motion to dismiss. CA reversed and ruled that the
status quo ante declaration of strike shall be observed pending the
proceedings in the National Conciliation and Mediation Board,
Department of Labor and Employment, National Capital Region.
Petitioner Citibank contends that there is no employer-employee
relationship between Citibank and the security guards represented
by respondent CIGLA and that there is no "labor dispute" in the
subject controversy. The security guards were employees of El Toro
security agency, not of Citibank. Its service contract with
Citibank had expired and not renewed.
ISSUE: Whether it is the labor tribunal or the regional trial
court that has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
complaint filed by Citibank with the trial court.
HELD: There is no labor dispute. RTC has jurisdiction.
It has been decided also that the Labor Arbiter has no
jurisdiction over a claim filed where no employer-employee
relationship
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By RICKY BOY CABATU/ 3B/ L-100355
existed between a company and the security guards assigned to it
by a security service contractor.
In this case, it was the
security agency El Toro that recruited, hired and assigned the
watchmen to their place of work. It was the security agency that
was answerable to Citibank for the conduct of its guards.
The question arises. Is there a labor dispute between Citibank
and the security guards, members of respondent CIGLA, regardless of
whether they stand in the relation of employer and employees?
Article 212, paragraph 1 of the Labor Code provides the definition
of a "labor dispute". It "includes any controversy or matter
concerning terms or conditions of employment or the association or
representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining,
changing or arranging the terms and conditions of employment,
regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate
relation of employer and employee.
If at all, the dispute between Citibank and El Toro security
agency is one regarding the termination or non-renewal of the
contract of services. This is a civil dispute. El Toro was an
independent contractor. Thus, no employer-employee relationship
existed between Citibank and the security guard members of the
union in the security agency who were assigned to secure the bank's
premises and property. Hence, there was no labor dispute and no
right to strike against the bank.
____________________
G.R. No. 120567 March 20, 1998
PAL vs. NLRC, FERDINAND PINEDA and GOGFREDO CABLING
MARTINEZ, J.:
FACTS:
Private respondents are flight stewards of the petitioner. Both
were dismissed from the service for their alleged involvement in
the currency smuggling in Hong Kong.
Aggrieved by said dismissal, private respondents filed with the
NLRC a petition for injunction praying that a temporary
restraining order be issued, prohibiting respondents (petitioner
herein) from effecting or enforcing its Decision or to reinstate
petitioners temporarily while a hearing on the propriety of the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is being
undertaken;
The NLRC issued a temporary mandatory injunction enjoining
petitioner to cease and desist from enforcing its Memorandum of
dismissal.
Petitioner argued that the NLRC erred in granting a temporary
injunction order when it has no jurisdiction to issue an injunction
or restraining order since this may be issued only under Article
218 of the Labor Code if the case involves or arises from labor
disputes.
ISSUE: WON there was a labor dispute as to warrant the NLRCs
issuance of the assailed writ?
HELD:
In labor cases, Article 218 of the Labor Code empowers the NLRC
to enjoin or restrain any actual or threatened commission of any or
all prohibited or unlawful acts or to require the performance of a
particular act in any labor dispute which, if not
restrained or performed forthwith, may cause grave or
irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision
in favor of such party; . . ."
From the foregoing provisions of law, the power of the NLRC to
issue an injunctive writ originates from "any labor dispute" upon
application by a party thereof, which application if not granted
"may cause grave or irreparable damage to any party or render
ineffectual any decision in favor of such party."
The term "labor dispute" is defined as "any controversy or
matter concerning terms and conditions of employment or the
association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing.
maintaining, changing, or arranging the terms and conditions of
employment regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the
proximate relation of employers and employees."
8
The term "controversy" is likewise defined as "a litigated
question; adversary proceeding in a court of law; a civil action or
suit, either at law or in equity; a justiciable dispute."
A "justiciable controversy" is "one involving an active
antagonistic assertion of a legal right on one side and a denial
thereof on the other concerning a real, and not a mere theoretical
question or issue."
Taking into account the foregoing definitions, it is an
essential requirement that there must first be a labor dispute
between the contending parties before the labor arbiter. In the
present case, there is no labor dispute between the petitioner and
private respondents as there has yet been no complaint for illegal
dismissal filed with the labor arbiter by the private respondents
against the petitioner.
The petition for injunction directly filed before the NLRC is in
reality an action for illegal dismissal of which the LA has
original and exclusive jurisdiction.
_________________
Managerial Employee
G.R. No. 159577 May 3, 2006
CHARLITO PEARANDA vs. BAGANGA PLYWOOD CORPORATION and HUDSON
CHUA
PANGANIBAN, CJ:
FACTS:
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By RICKY BOY CABATU/ 3B/ L-100355
Sometime in June 1999, Petitioner Charlito Pearanda was hired as
an employee of Baganga Plywood Corporation (BPC) to take charge of
the operations and maintenance of its steam plant boiler. Later,
Pearanda filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal with money claims
against BPC and its general manager, Hudson Chua, before the
NLRC.
Pearanda through counsel in his position paper alleges that he
was employed by respondent as Foreman/Boiler Head/Shift Engineer
until he was illegally terminated. Further, [he] alleges that his
services [were] terminated without the benefit of due process and
valid grounds in accordance with law. Furthermore, he was not paid
his overtime pay, premium pay for working during holidays/rest
days, night shift differentials and finally claims for payment of
damages and attorneys fees having been forced to litigate the
present complaint.
Upon the other hand, respondent [BPC] allege that being a
managerial employee he is not entitled to overtime pay and if ever
he rendered services beyond the normal hours of work, [there] was
no office order/or authorization for him to do so.
The labor arbiter ruled that there was no illegal dismissal and
that petitioners Complaint was premature because he was still
employed by BPC. The temporary closure of BPCs plant did not
terminate his employment, hence, he need not reapply when the plant
reopened. Nevertheless, the labor arbiter found petitioner entitled
to overtime pay, premium pay for working on rest days, and
attorneys fees in the total amount of P21,257.98.
13
Respondents filed an appeal to the NLRC, which deleted the award
of overtime pay and premium pay for working on rest days. According
to the Commission, petitioner was not entitled to these awards
because he was a managerial employee.
CA reversed.
ISSUE: WON he is a managerial employee.
HELD:
Managerial employees and members of the managerial staff are
exempted from the provisions of the Labor Code on labor standards.
Since petitioner belongs to this class of employees, he is not
entitled to overtime pay and premium pay for working on rest
days.
The Court disagrees with the NLRCs finding that petitioner was a
managerial employee. However, petitioner was a member of the
managerial staff, which also takes him out of the coverage of labor
standards. Like managerial employees, officers and members of the
managerial staff are not entitled to the provisions of law on labor
standards. The
Implementing Rules of the Labor Code define members of a
managerial staff as those with the following duties and
responsibilities:
"(1) The primary duty consists of the performance of work
directly related to management policies of the employer;
"(2) Customarily and regularly exercise discretion and
independent judgment;
"(3) (i) Regularly and directly assist a proprietor or a
managerial employee whose primary duty consists of the management
of the establishment in which he is employed or subdivision
thereof; or (ii) execute under general supervision work along
specialized or technical lines requiring special training,
experience, or knowledge; or (iii) execute under general
supervision special assignments and tasks; and
"(4) who do not devote more than 20 percent of their hours
worked in a workweek to activities which are not directly and
closely related to the performance of the work described in
paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) above."
______________________
G.R. No. 169717 March 16, 2011
SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA SA CHARTER CHEMICAL SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN
THE PHILIPPINES FOR EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS (SMCC-SUPER), ZACARRIAS
JERRY VICTORIO-Union President vs. CHARTER CHEMICAL and COATING
CORPORATION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
FACTS:
SMCC filed a petition for certification election among the
regular rank-and-file employees of Charter Chemical and Coating
Corporation with the Mediation Arbitration Unit of the DOLE,
National Capital Region.
Respondent company filed an Answer with Motion to Dismiss on the
ground that petitioner union is not a legitimate labor organization
because of (1) failure to comply with the documentation
requirements set by law, and (2) the inclusion of supervisory
employees within petitioner union.
5
The Med-Arbiter dismissed the petition for certification
election for the reason that the list of membership of petitioner
union consisted of 12 batchman, mill operator and leadman who
performed supervisory functions. Under Article 245 of the Labor
Code, said supervisory employees are prohibited from joining
petitioner union which seeks to represent the rank-and-file
employees of respondent company.
DOLE ruled that there was no obstacle to the grant of petitioner
unions petition for certification election.
CA set aside DOLEs ruling upholding the Med-Arbiters finding
that petitioner union consisted of both rank-and-file and
supervisory employees.
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By RICKY BOY CABATU/ 3B/ L-100355
ISSUE: Whether the alleged mixture of rank-and-file and
supervisory employee[s] of petitioner [unions] membership is [a]
ground for the cancellation of petitioner [unions] legal
personality and dismissal of [the] petition for certification
election.
HELD: The mixture of rank-and-file and supervisory employees in
petitioner union does not nullify its legal personality as a
legitimate labor organization.
Preliminarily, we note that petitioner union questions the
factual findings of the Med-Arbiter, as upheld by the appellate
court, that 12 of its members are supervisory employees. However,
petitioner union failed to present any rebuttal evidence in the
proceedings below after respondent company submitted in evidence
the job descriptions of the aforesaid employees. The job
descriptions indicate that the aforesaid employees exercise
recommendatory managerial actions which are not merely routinary
but require the use of independent judgment, hence, falling within
the definition of supervisory employees under Article 212(m) of the
Labor Code. For this
reason, we are constrained to agree with the Med-Arbiter, as
upheld by the appellate court, that petitioner union consisted of
both rank-and-file and supervisory employees.
Nonetheless, the inclusion of the aforesaid supervisory
employees in petitioner union does not divest it of its status as a
legitimate labor organization. R.A. No. 6715 omitted specifying the
exact effect any violation of the prohibition [on the co-mingling
of supervisory and rank-and-file employees] would bring about on
the legitimacy of a labor organization.
On June 21, 1997, the 1989 Amended Omnibus Rules was further
amended by Department Order No. 9, series of 1997 (1997 Amended
Omnibus Rules). Specifically, the requirement under Sec. 2(c) of
the 1989 Amended Omnibus Rules that the petition for certification
election indicate that the bargaining unit of rank-and-file
employees has not been mingled with supervisory employees was
removed. Instead, what the 1997 Amended Omnibus Rules requires is a
plain description of the bargaining unit.
The applicable law and rules in the instant case are the same as
those in Kawashima because the present petition for certification
election was filed in 1999 when D.O. No. 9, series of 1997, was
still in effect. Hence,Kawashima applies with equal force here. As
a result, petitioner union was not divested of its status as a
legitimate labor organization even if some of its members were
supervisory employees; it had the right to file the subject
petition for certification election.
_____________________
G.R. No. 187887 September 7, 2011
PAMELA FLORENTINA P. JUMUAD vs. HI-FLYER FOOD, INC. and/or JESUS
R. MONTEMAYOR
MENDOZA, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Jumuad began her employment with respondent Hi-Flyer
Food, Inc. (Hi-Flyer), as management trainee. Based on her
performance through the years, Jumuad received several promotions
until she became the area manager for the entire Visayas-Mindanao 1
region, comprising the provinces of Cebu, Bacolod, Iloilo and
Bohol.
Aside from being responsible in monitoring her subordinates,
Jumuad was tasked to: 1) be highly visible in the restaurants under
her jurisdiction; 2) monitor and support day-to-day operations; and
3) ensure that all the facilities and equipment at the restaurant
were properly maintained and serviced. Among the branches under her
supervision were the KFC branches in Gaisano Mall, Cebu City
(KFC-Gaisano); in Cocomall, Cebu City(KFC-Cocomall); and in Island
City Mall, Bohol (KFC-Bohol).
In just her first year as Area Manager, Jumuad gained
distinction and was awarded the 3rd top area manager nationwide.
She was rewarded with a trip to Singapore for her excellent
performance.
However, an examination of the KFC branches by respondent
revealed several sanitation violations. Moreover, there were cash
shortages.
Seeking to hold Jumuad accountable for the irregularities
uncovered in the branches under her supervision, and was later on
dismissed.
Jumuad filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.
LA found that no serious cause for termination existed, thus
Jumuad was illegally dismissed. NLRC affirmed.
CA rendered the subject decision reversing the decision of the
labor tribunal.
ISSUE: WON dismissal is proper.
HELD: It cannot be denied that Jumuad willfully breached her
duties as to be unworthy of the trust and confidence of Hi-Flyer.
First, there is no denying that Jumuad was a managerial
employee for Jumuad executed management policies and had the
power to discipline the employees of KFC branches in her area. She
recommended actions on employees to the head office. Pertinent is
Article 212 (m) of the Labor Code defining a managerial employee as
one who is vested with powers or prerogatives to lay down and
execute management policies and/or hire, transfer, suspend, lay
off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees.
Based on established facts, the mere existence of the grounds
for the loss of trust and confidence justifies petitioners
dismissal. As long as there is some basis for such loss of
confidence, such as when the employer has reasonable ground to
believe that the employee concerned is responsible for the
purported misconduct, and the nature of his participation therein
renders him unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded of his
position, a managerial employee may be dismissed.
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By RICKY BOY CABATU/ 3B/ L-100355
In the present case, the CERs reports of Hi-Flyer show that
there were anomalies committed in the branches managed by Jumuad.
On the principle of respondeat superior or command responsibility
alone, Jumuad may be held liable for negligence in the performance
of her managerial duties. She may not have been directly involved
in causing the cash shortages in KFC-Bohol, but her involvement in
not performing her duty monitoring and supporting the day to day
operations of the branches and ensure that all the facilities and
equipment at the restaurant were properly maintained and serviced,
could have truly prevented the whole debacle from ever
occurring.
Moreover, it is observed that rather than taking proactive steps
to prevent the anomalies at her branches, Jumuad merely effected
remedial measures. In the restaurant business where the health and
well-being of the consuming public is at stake, this does not
suffice. Thus, there is reasonable basis for Hi-Flyer to withdraw
its trust in her and dismissing her from its service.
_____________________
Jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter
G.R. No. 185567 October 20, 2010
ARSENIO Z. LOCSIN, Petitioner,
vs. NISSAN LEASE PHILS. INC. and LUIS BANSON, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
BRION, J.:
FACTS:
Locsin was elected EVP and Treasurer of NCLPI. Locsin held this
position for 13 years until he was nominated and elected Chairman
of NCLPIs Board of Directors.
Seven months after his election as Chairman of the Board, on a
special meeting, Locsin was neither re-elected Chairman nor
reinstated to his previous position as EVP/Treasurer.
Subsequently, Locsin filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
with prayer for reinstatement, payment of backwages, damages and
attorneys fees before the Labor Arbiter against NCLPI and Banson,
who was then President of NCLPI.
NCLPI and Banson filed a Motion to Dismiss, on the ground that
the Labor Arbiter did not have jurisdiction over the case since the
issue of Locsins removal as EVP/Treasurer involves an
intra-corporate dispute.
LA denied the motion. CA reversed.
ISSUE: WON LA has jurisdiction.
HELD: The CA correctly ruled that no employer-employee
relationship exists between Locsin and Nissan. Hence, LA has no
jurisdiction.
Locsin was undeniably Chairman and President, and was elected to
these positions by the Nissan board pursuant to its By-laws. As
such, he was a corporate officer, not an employee. The CA reached
this conclusion by relying on the submitted facts and on
Presidential Decree 902-A, which defines corporate officers as
"those officers of a corporation who are given that character
either by the Corporation Code or by the corporations by-laws."
Likewise, Section 25 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 69, or the Corporation
Code of the Philippines (Corporation Code) provides that corporate
officers are the president, secretary, treasurer and such other
officers as may be provided for in the by-laws.
Even as Executive Vice-President/Treasurer, Locsin already acted
as a corporate officer because the position of Executive
Vice-President/Treasurer is provided for in Nissans By-Laws.
Article IV, Section 4 of these By-Laws specifically provides for
this position.
Given Locsins status as a corporate officer, the RTC, not the
Labor Arbiter or the NLRC, has jurisdiction to hear the legality of
the termination of his relationship with Nissan. As we also held in
Okol, a corporate officers dismissal from service is an
intra-corporate dispute:
A corporate officers dismissal is always a corporate act, or an
intra-corporate controversy which arises between a stockholder and
a corporation. so that the RTC should exercise jurisdiction.
Therefore, the Labor Arbiter does not have jurisdiction over the
termination dispute Locsin brought, and should not be allowed to
continue to act on the case after the absence of jurisdiction has
become obvious, based on the records and the law. In more practical
terms, a contrary ruling will only cause substantial delay and
inconvenience as well as unnecessary expenses, to the point of
injustice, to the parties. This conclusion, of course, does not go
into the merits of termination of relationship and is without
prejudice to the filing of an intra-corporate dispute on this point
before the appropriate RTC.
_________________________
G.R. No. 160146 December 11, 2009
LESLIE OKOL vs. SLIMMERS WORLD INTERNATIONAL, BEHAVIOR
MODIFICATIONS, INC., and RONALD JOSEPH MOY
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS:
Respondent SWI employed petitioner Okol as a management trainee.
She rose up the ranks to become Head Office Manager and then
Director and Vice President until her dismissal. The dismissal was
in connection with the equipment seized by the Bureau of
Customs.
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By RICKY BOY CABATU/ 3B/ L-100355
Okol filed a complaint with the Arbitration branch of the NLRC
against respondents for illegal suspension, illegal dismissal,
unpaid commissions, damages and attorneys fees, with prayer for
reinstatement and payment of backwages.
Respondents asserted, through their motion to dismiss, that the
NLRC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
complaint.
LA granted the motion. The labor arbiter ruled that Okol was the
vice-president of Slimmers World at the time of her dismissal.
Since it involved a corporate officer, the dispute was an
intra-corporate controversy falling outside the jurisdiction of the
Arbitration branch.
NLRC reversed.
CA reversed NLRC.
Petitioner enumerated the instances that she was under the power
and control of Moy, Slimmers Worlds president: (1) petitioner
received salary evidenced by pay slips, (2) Moy deducted Medicare
and SSS benefits from petitioners salary, and (3) petitioner was
dismissed from employment not through a board resolution but by
virtue of a letter from Moy. Thus, having shown that an
employer-employee relationship exists, the jurisdiction to hear and
decide the case is vested with the labor arbiter and the NLRC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the NLRC has jurisdiction over the illegal
dismissal case filed by petitioner.
HELD:
From the documents submitted by respondents, petitioner was a
director and officer of Slimmers World. The charges of illegal
suspension, illegal dismissal, unpaid commissions, reinstatement
and back wages imputed by petitioner against respondents fall
squarely within the ambit of intra-corporate disputes. Thus, the
question of remuneration involving a stockholder and officer, not a
mere employee, is not a simple labor problem but a matter that
comes within the area of corporate affairs and management and is a
corporate controversy in contemplation of the Corporation Code.
It is a settled rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter
is conferred by law. The determination of the rights of a director
and corporate officer dismissed from his employment as well as the
corresponding liability of a corporation, if any, is an
intra-corporate dispute subject to the jurisdiction of the regular
courts. Thus, the appellate court correctly ruled that it is not
the NLRC but the regular courts which have jurisdiction over the
present case.
________________
G.R. No. 89621 September 24, 1991
PEPSI COLA represented by its Plant General Manager ANTHONY B.
SIAN, ELEAZAR LIMBAB, IRENEO BALTAZAR
& JORGE HERAYA vs. HON. LOLITA O. GAL-LANG, SALVADOR
NOVILLA, ALEJANDRO OLIVA, WILFREDO CABAAS & FULGENCIO LEGO
CRUZ, J.:p
FACTS:
The private respondents were employees of the petitioner who
were suspected of complicity in the irregular disposition of empty
Pepsi Cola bottles. The petitioners filed a criminal complaint for
theft against them but this was later withdrawn and substituted
with a criminal complaint for falsification of private documents.
After a preliminary investigation conducted by the Municipal Trial
Court of Tanauan, Leyte, the complaint was dismissed.
Meantime, allegedly after an administrative investigation, the
private respondents were dismissed by the petitioner company. As a
result, they lodged a complaint for illegal dismissal with the
Regional Arbitration Branch of the NLRC in Tacloban City and
decisions manded reinstatement with damages. In addition, they
instituted in the RTC of Leyte a separate civil complaint against
the petitioners for damages arising from what they claimed to be
their malicious prosecution.
The petitioners moved to dismiss the civil complaint on the
ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the case
because it involved employee-employer relations that were
exclusively cognizable by the labor arbiter.
The RTC ruled that the present civil case is distinct from the
labor case for damages now pending before the labor courts." The
petitioners then came to this Court for relief.
ISSUE: WON RTC has jurisdiction.
HELD: It must be stressed that not every controversy involving
workers and their employers can be resolved only by the labor
arbiters. This will be so only if there is a "reasonable causal
connection" between the claim asserted and employee-employer
relations to put the case under the provisions of Article 217.
Absent such a link, the complaint will be cognizable by the regular
courts of justice in the exercise of their civil and criminal
jurisdiction.
The case now before the Court involves a complaint for damages
for malicious prosecution which was filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Leyte by the employees of the defendant company. It does
not appear that there is a "reasonable causal connection" between
the complaint and the relations of the parties as employer and
employees. The complaint did not arise from such relations and in
fact could have arisen independently of an employment relationship
between the parties. No such relationship or any unfair labor
practice is asserted. What the employees are alleging is that the
petitioners acted with bad faith when they filed the criminal
complaint which the Municipal Trial Court said was intended "to
harass the poor employees" and the dismissal of which was affirmed
by the Provincial Prosecutor "for lack of evidence to establish
even a slightest probability that all the respondents herein have
committed the crime imputed against them." This is a matter which
the labor arbiter has no
-
By RICKY BOY CABATU/ 3B/ L-100355
competence to resolve as the applicable law is not the Labor
Code but the Revised Penal Code.
____________________
G.R. No. 172013 October 2, 2009
PATRICIA HALAGUEA and other flight attendants of PHILIPPINE
AIRLINES vs. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES INCORPORATED
PERALTA, J.:
Petitioners were employed as female flight attendants of
respondent Philippine Airlines (PAL) on different dates. Respondent
and FASAP entered into a CBA incorporating the terms and conditions
of their agreement for the years 2000 to 2005, hereinafter referred
to as PAL-FASAP CBA that the compulsory retirement shall be
fifty-five (55) for females and sixty (60) for males.
Petitioners and several female cabin crews manifested that the
aforementioned CBA provision on compulsory retirement is
discriminatory, and demanded for an equal treatment with their male
counterparts.
Petitioners filed a Special Civil Action for Declaratory Relief
with Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and
Writ of Preliminary Injunction with the RTC of Makati City for the
invalidity of the assailed portion of the CBA.
RTC issued an Order upholding its jurisdiction over the present
case. According to RTC, this case is not directed specifically
against respondent arising from any act of the latter, nor does it
involve a claim against the respondent. Rather, this case seeks a
declaration of the nullity of the questioned provision of the CBA,
which is within the Court's competence, with the allegations in the
Petition constituting the bases for such relief sought.
CA reversed which declared that RTC have NO JURISDICTION OVER
THE CASE.
ISSUE: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the petitioners'
action challenging the legality or constitutionality of the
provisions on the compulsory retirement age contained in the CBA
between respondent PAL and FASAP.
HELD:
Jurisdiction of the court is determined on the basis of the
material allegations of the complaint and the character of the
relief prayed for irrespective of whether plaintiff is entitled to
such relief.
In the case at bar, the allegations in the petition for
declaratory relief plainly show that petitioners' cause of action
is the annulment of Section 144, Part A of the PAL-FASAP CBA. From
the petitioners' allegations and relief prayed
for in its petition, it is clear that the issue raised is
whether Section 144, Part A of the PAL-FASAP CBA is unlawful
and
unconstitutional. Here, the petitioners' primary relief in Civil
Case No. 04-886 is the annulment of Section 144, Part A of the
PAL-FASAP CBA, which allegedly discriminates against them for being
female flight attendants. The subject of litigation is incapable of
pecuniary estimation, exclusively cognizable by the RTC, pursuant
to Section 19 (1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended. Being an
ordinary civil action, the same is beyond the jurisdiction of labor
tribunals.
The said issue cannot be resolved solely by applying the Labor
Code. Rather, it requires the application of the Constitution,
labor statutes, law on contracts and the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, and the
power to apply and interpret the constitution and CEDAW is within
the jurisdiction of trial courts, a court of general
jurisdiction
_______________________
Article 221
G.R. Nos. 191288 & 191304 March 7, 2012
MERALCO vs. JAN CARLO GALA
BRION, J.:
FACTS:
Respondent Gala commenced employment with the petitioner Meralco
as a probationary lineman. Barely four months on the job, Gala was
dismissed for alleged complicity in pilferages of Meralcos
electrical supplies. He filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
The LA dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. She held that
Galas participation in the pilferage of Meralcos property rendered
him unqualified to become a regular employee.
Gala appealed to the NLRC which reversed the labor arbiters
ruling. It found that Gala had been illegally dismissed, since
there was "no concrete showing of complicity with the alleged
misconduct/dishonesty[.]" The NLRC, however, ruled out Galas
reinstatement, stating that his tenure lasted only up to the end of
his probationary period. It awarded him backwages and attorneys
fees.
Both parties moved for partial reconsideration; Gala, on the
ground that he should have been reinstated with full backwages,
damages and interests; and Meralco, on the ground that the NLRC
erred in finding that Gala had been illegally dismissed. The NLRC
denied the motions. Relying on the same grounds, Gala and Meralco
elevated the case to the CA through a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
CA denied Meralcos petition for lack of merit and partially
granted Galas petition. It concurred with the NLRC that Gala had
been illegally dismissed, a ruling that was supported by the
evidence.
-
By RICKY BOY CABATU/ 3B/ L-100355
Meralco faults the CA for not giving credit to its witnesses
Aguilar, Dola and Riano, and instead treated their joint affidavit
(Samasamang Sinumpaang Salaysay) as inconclusive to establish Galas
participation in the pilferage of company property.
Gala asks for a denial of the petition because of (1) serious
and fatal infirmities in the petition; (2) unreliable statements of
Meralcos witnesses; and (3) clear lack of basis to support the
termination of his employment.
Gala contends, in regard to the alleged procedural defects of
the petition, that the "Verification and Certification,"
"Secretarys Certificate" and "Affidavit of Service" do not contain
the details of the Community or Residence Tax Certificates of the
affiants, in violation of Section 6 of Commonwealth Act No. 465 (an
Act to Impose a Residence Tax). Additionally, the lawyers who
signed the petition failed to indicate their updated Mandatory
Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) certificate numbers, in violation
of the rules.
ISSUE: Whether there was procedural defect on part of Meralcos
petition.
HELD: It is the spirit and intention of labor legislation that
the NLRC and the labor arbiters shall use every reasonable means to
ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively, without
regard to technicalities of law or procedure, provided due process
is duly observed. In
keeping with this policy and in the interest of substantial
justice, we deem it proper to give due course to the petition,
especially in view of the conflict between the findings of the
labor arbiter, on the one hand, and the NLRC and the CA, on the
other. As we said in S.S. Ventures International, Inc. v. S.S.
Ventures Labor Union,
20 "the application of technical rules of procedure in labor
cases may be relaxed to serve the demands of substantial
justice."
_________________
G.R. No. 155844 July 14, 2008
NATIONWIDE SECURITY and ALLIED SERVICES, INC. vs. CA, NLRC and
JOSEPH DIMPAZ, HIPOLITO LOPEZ, EDWARD ODATO, FELICISIMO PABON and
JOHNNY AGBAY
QUISUMBING, J.:
FACTS:
Labor Arbiter found petitioner, a security agency, not liable
for illegal dismissal involving eight security guards who were
employees of the petitioner. However, the Labor Arbiter directed
the petitioner to pay the aforementioned security guards their
separation pay, unpaid salaries, underpayment and 10% attorneys
fees based on the total monetary award.
Dissatisfied with the decision, petitioner appealed to the NLRC
which dismissed its appeal for two reasons first, for having
been filed beyond the reglementary period within which to
perfect the appeal and second, for filing an insufficient appeal
bond.
Petitioner then appealed to the Court of Appeals to have the
appeal resolved on the merits rather than on pure technicalities in
the interest of due process. CA dismissed holding that in a special
action for certiorari, the burden is on petitioner to prove not
merely reversible error, but grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of or excess of jurisdiction on the part of public respondent
NLRC.
ISSUE:
(1) WHETHER OR NOT TECHNICALITIES IN LABOR CASES MUST PREVAIL
OVER THE SPIRIT AND INTENTION OF THE LABOR CODE UNDER ARTICLE 221
THEREOF WHICH STATES
(2) WHETHER OR NOT THE REQUIREMENT ON CERTIFICATION AGAINST
FORUM SHOPPING WHICH WAS RAISED BEFORE THE NLRC IS ENFORCEABLE IN
THE INSTANT CASE.
HELD: The petition lacks merit.
In the instant case, both the NLRC and the Court of Appeals
found that petitioner received the decision of the Labor Arbiter on
July 16, 1999. This factual finding is supported by sufficient
evidence, and we take it as binding on us. Petitioner then
simultaneously filed its "Appeal Memorandum", "Notice of Appeal"
and "Motion to Reduce Bond", by registered mail on July 29, 1999,
under Registry Receipt No. 003098. These were received by the NLRC
on July 30, 1999. The appeal to the NLRC should have been
perfected, as provided by its Rules, within a period of 10 days
from receipt by petitioner of the decision on July 16, 1999.
Clearly, the filing of the appeal--three days after July 26,
1999--was already beyond the reglementary period and in violation
of the NLRC Rules and the pertinent Article on Appeal in the Labor
Code.
Failure to perfect an appeal renders the decision final and
executory. The right to appeal is a statutory right and one who
seeks to avail of the right must comply with the statute or the
rules. The rules, particularly the requirements for perfecting an
appeal within the reglementary period specified in the law, must be
strictly followed as they are considered indispensable
interdictions against needless delays and for the orderly discharge
of judicial business. It is only in highly
meritorious cases that this Court will opt not to strictly apply
the rules and thus prevent a grave injustice from being done. The
exception does not obtain here. Thus, we are in agreement that the
decision of the Labor Arbiter already became final and executory
because petitioner failed to file the appeal within 10 calendar
days from receipt of the decision.
______________
Article 223
-
By RICKY BOY CABATU/ 3B/ L-100355
G.R. No. 168501, January 31, 2011 ISLRIZ TRADING/ VICTOR HUGO LU
VS. EFREN CAPADA et al.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
FACTS:
FACTS:
Respondents were drivers and helpers of Islriz Trading, a
gravel
and sand business. Claiming that they were illegally
dismissed,
respondents filed a Complaint
for illegal dismissal and non-
payment of overtime pay, holiday pay, rest day pay,
allowances
and separation pay against petitioner before the Labor
Arbiter.
On his part, petitioner imputed abandonment of work against
respondents.
LA ruled that there was illegal dismissal and reinstatement
without loss of seniority rights and the payment of full
backwages
from date of dismissal to actual reinstatement.
On appeal, NLRC ordered respondents' reinstatement but
without backwages.
Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereto but
same
was likewise denied in an NLRC Resolution which became final
and executory.
Respondents averred that since the Decision of Labor Arbiter
ordered their reinstatement, a Writ of Execution was already
issued for the enforcement of its reinstatement aspect as same
is
immediately executory even pending appeal. But this
notwithstanding and despite the issuance and subsequent
finality
of the NLRC Resolution which likewise ordered respondents'
reinstatement, petitioner still refused to reinstate them.
Thus,
respondents prayed that in view of the orders of reinstatement,
a
computation of the award of backwages.
Petitioner contends that in upholding the issuance of the
questioned Writ of Execution for the enforcement of
respondents'
accrued salaries, said Decision and Resolution, in effect,
altered
the NLRC Resolution which only decreed respondents'
reinstatement without backwages. Moreover, Article 223 of
the
Labor Code only applies when an employee has been illegally
dismissed from work. And since in this case the NLRC ruled
that
respondents' failure to continue working for petitioner was
not
occasioned by termination, there is no illegal dismissal to
speak
of, hence, said provision of the Labor Code does not apply.
Lastly, petitioner claims that the computation of
respondents'
accrued salaries in the total amount of P1,110,665.60 has no
legal and factual bases since as repeatedly pointed out by
him,
the NLRC Resolution reversing the Labor Arbiter's Decision
has
already ordered respondents' reinstatement without backwages
after it found that there was no illegal termination.
ISSUE: Whether respondents may collect their wages during
the
period between the Labor Arbiter's order of reinstatement
pending appeal and the NLRC Resolution overturning that of
the
Labor Arbiter.
HELD: Employees are entitled to their accrued salaries
during the period between the Labor Arbiter's order of
reinstatement pending appeal and the resolution of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) overturning
that of the Labor Arbiter. Otherwise stated, even if the order
of
reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is reversed on appeal,
the
employer is still obliged to reinstate and pay the wages of
the
employee during the period of appeal until reversal by a
higher
court or tribunal. In this case, respondents are entitled to
their
accrued salaries from the time petitioner received a copy of
the
Decision of the Labor Arbiter declaring respondents'
termination
illegal and ordering their reinstatement up to the date of
the
NLRC resolution overturning that of the Labor Arbiter.
On the other hand, if the employee has been reinstated
during
the appeal period and such reinstatement order is reversed
with
finality, the employee is not required to reimburse whatever
salary he received for he is entitled to such, more so if he
actually
rendered services during the period.
In other words, a dismissed employee whose case was
favorably
decided by the Labor Arbiter is entitled to receive wages
pending
appeal upon reinstatement, which is immediately executory.
Unless there is a restraining order, it is ministerial upon the
Labor
Arbiter to implement the order of reinstatement and it is
mandatory on the employer to comply therewith.
Application of the Two-Fold Test to the present case
(1) Was there an actual delay or was the order of
reinstatement
pending appeal executed prior to its reversal? Yes.
-
By RICKY BOY CABATU/ 3B/ L-100355
(2) Was the delay not due to the employer's unjustified act
or
omission? Yes.
NOTE: Respondents are entitled to their accrued salaries
only from the time petitioner received a copy of Labor
Arbiter Gan's Decision declaring respondents' termination
illegal and ordering their reinstatement up to the date of
the
NLRC Resolution overturning that of the Labor Arbiter.
______________________
G.R. No. 196830 February 29, 2012
CESAR V. GARCIA et al. vs. KJ Commercial and Reynaldo Que
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS:
Respondent KJ Commercial employed as truck drivers and truck
helpers petitioners.
Later, petitioners demanded for a P40 daily salary increase. To
pressure KJ Commercial to grant their demand, they stopped working
and abandoned their trucks at the Northern Cement Plant Station in
Sison,Pangasinan. They also blocked other workers from reporting to
work.
Petitioners filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for
illegal
dismissal, underpayment of salary and non-payment of service
incentive leave and thirteenth month pay.
The Labor Arbiter held that KJ Commercial illegally dismissed
petitioners.
KJ Commercial appealed to the NLRC. It filed before the NLRC a
motion to reduce bond and posted a P50,000 cash bond.
The NLRC dismissed the appeal. It must be stressed that under
Section 6, Rule VI of the 2005 Revised Rules of this Commission, a
motion to reduce bond shall only be entertained when the following
requisites concur: (1) The motion is founded on meritorious ground;
and (2) A bond of reasonable amount in relation to the monetary
award is posted. Further, they are unwilling to at least put up a
property to secure a surety bond. The P50,000.00 cash bond posted
by respondents-appellants which represents less than two (2)
percent of the monetary award is dismally disproportionate to the
monetary award of P2,612,930.00 and that the amount of bond posted
by respondents-appellants is not reasonable in relation to the
monetary award.
KJ Commercial filed a motion for reconsideration and posted
a P2,562,930surety bond. NLRC granted the motion and held that
petitioners were not dismissed.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. The NLRC denied
the motion for lack of merit.
The CA affirmed.
ISSUE: WON KJ Commercial failed to perfect an appeal since the
motion to reduce bond did not stop the running of the period to
appeal.
HELD: Petitoners cannot, for the first time, raise as issue in
their petition filed with this Court that the Labor Arbiters 30
October 2008 Decision had become final and executory. Points of
law, theories and arguments not raised before the Court of Appeals
will not be considered by this Court. Otherwise, KJ Commercial will
be denied its right to due process.
Furthermore, whether respondents were able to appeal on time is
a question of fact that cannot be entertained in a petition for
review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In general, the
jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought before it from the
Court of Appeals is limited to a review of errors of law allegedly
committed by the court a quo.
KJ Commercials filing of a motion to reduce bond and delayed
posting of theP2,562,930 surety bond did not render the Labor
Arbiters 30 October 2008 Decision final and executory. The Rules of
Procedure of the NLRC allows the filing of a motion to reduce bond
subject to two conditions: (1) there is meritorious ground, and (2)
a bond in a reasonable amount is posted. The filing of a motion to
reduce bond and compliance with the two conditions stop the running
of the period to perfect an appeal.
The NLRC has full discretion to grant or deny the motion to
reduce bond,
and it may rule on the motion beyond the 10-
day period within which to perfect an appeal. Obviously, at the
time of the filing of the motion to reduce bond and posting of a
bond in a reasonable amount, there is no assurance whether the
appellants motion is indeed based on meritorious ground and whether
the bond he or she posted is of a reasonable amount. Thus, the
appellant always runs the risk of failing to perfect an appeal.
In order to give full effect to the provisions on motion to
reduce bond, the appellant must be allowed to wait for the ruling
of the NLRC on the motion even beyond the 10-day period to perfect
an appeal. If the NLRC grants the motion and rules that there is
indeed meritorious ground and that the amount of the bond posted is
reasonable, then the appeal is perfected. If the NLRC denies the
motion, the appellant may still file a motion for reconsideration
as provided under Section 15, Rule VII of the Rules. If the NLRC
grants the motion for reconsideration and rules that there is
indeed meritorious ground and that the amount of the bond posted is
reasonable, then the appeal is perfected. If the NLRC denies the
motion, then the decision of the labor arbiter becomes final and
executory.
In the present case, KJ Commercial filed a motion to reduce bond
and posted a P50,000 cash bond. When the NLRC denied its motion, KJ
Commercial filed a motion for reconsideration and posted the full
P2,562,930 surety bond. The NLRC then granted the motion for
reconsideration.
-
By RICKY BOY CABATU/ 3B/ L-100355
In any case, the rule that the filing of a motion to reduce bond
shall not stop the running of the period to perfect an appeal is
not absolute. The Court may relax the rule when (1) fundamental
consideration of substantial justice; (2) prevention of miscarriage
of justice or of unjust enrichment; and (3) special circumstances
of the case combined with its legal merits, and the amount and the
issue involved.
The bond requirement on appeals may be relaxed when there is
substantial compliance with the Rules of Procedure of the NLRC or
when the appellant shows willingness to post a partial bond. While
the bond requirement on appeals involving monetary awards has been
relaxed in certain cases, this can only be done where there was
substantial compliance of the Rules or where the appellants, at the
very least, exhibited willingness to pay by posting a partial
bond.
________________
Article 224
G.R. No. 182915 December 12, 2011
MARIALY O. SY, et al. vs. FAIRLAND KNITCRAFT CO., INC.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
FACTS:
Fairland is a domestic corporation engaged in garments business,
while Susan de Leon (Susan) is the owner/proprietress of Weesan
Garments (Weesan). On the other hand, the complaining workers (the
workers) are sewers, trimmers, helpers, a guard and a secretary who
were hired by Weesan.
Petitioners Sy et al. filed with the Arbitration Branch of the
NLRC a Complaint for underpayment and/or non-payment of wages,
overtime pay, premium pay for holidays, 13th month pay and other
monetary benefits against Susan/Weesan.
However, Weesan filed before the DOLE-NCR a report on its
temporary closure for a period of not less than six months. The
complainants them amended the complaint adding illegal
dismissal.
LA dismissed the complaint but ruled that respondents are to pay
the complainants 5,000 as financial assistance. NLRC reversed and
ruled that there was illegal dismissal and ordered the respondents
to pay the claims. The NLRC however, denied both motions for lack
of merit.
CA affirmed the NLRCs ruling that the workers were illegally
dismissed and that Weesan and Fairland are solidarily liable to
them as labor-only contractor and principal, respectively.
However, the CAs Special Ninth Division reversed the First
Divisions ruling. It held that the labor tribunals did not
acquire
jurisdiction over the person of Fairland, and even assuming they
did, Fairland is not liable to the workers since Weesan is not a
mere labor-only contractor but a bona fide independent contractor.
The Special Ninth Division thus annulled and set aside the assailed
NLRC Decision and Resolution insofar as Fairland is concerned and
excluded the latter therefrom.
With regard to Susans petition, the CA Special Ninth Division
issued an order temporarily restraining the NLRC from enforcing its
assailed decision and thereafter the CA Special Eighth Division
issued a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction.
Citing PNOC Dockyard and Engineering Corporation v. National
Labor Relations Commission, the CA likewise emphasized that in
labor cases, both the party and his counsel must be duly served
their separate copies of the order, decision or resolution unlike
in ordinary proceedings where notice to counsel is deemed notice to
the party. It then quoted Article 224 of the Labor Code as
follows:
The CA then concluded that since Fairland and its counsel were
not separately furnished with a copy of the August 26, 2005 NLRC
Resolution denying the motions for reconsideration of its November
30, 2004 Decision, said Decision cannot be enforced against
Fairland. The CA likewise concluded that because of this, said
November 30, 2004 Decision which held Susan/Weesan and Fairland
solidarily liable to the workers, has not attained finality.
In the instant petition for certiorari, petitioner Santos
reiterates that he should not have been adjudged personally liable
by public respondents, the latter not having validly acquired
jurisdiction over his person whether by personal service of summons
or by substituted service under Rule 19 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: WON CA is correct.
HELD: Article 224 contemplates the furnishing of copies of final
decisions, orders or awards and could not have been intended to
refer to the period for computing the period for appeal to the
Court of Appeals from a non-final judgment or order. The period or
manner of appeal from the NLRC to the Court of Appeals is governed
by Rule 65 pursuant to the ruling of the Court in the case of St.
Martin Funeral Homes vs. NLRC. Section 4 of Rule 65, as amended,
states that the petition may be filed not later than sixty (60)
days from notice of the judgment, or resolution sought to be
assailed.
Corollarily, Section 4, Rule III of the New Rules of Procedure
of the NLRC expressly mandates that (F)or the purposes of computing
the period of appeal, the same shall be counted from receipt of
such decisions, awards or orders by the counsel of record. Although
this rule explicitly contemplates an appeal before the Labor
Arbiter and the NLRC, we do not see any cogent reason why the same
rule should not apply to petitions for certiorari filed with the
Court of Appeals from decisions of the NLRC. This procedure is in
line with the established rule that notice to counsel is notice to
party and when a party is represented by counsel, notices should be
made upon the counsel of record at his given address to which
notices of
-
By RICKY BOY CABATU/ 3B/ L-100355
all kinds emanating from the court should be sent. It is to be
noted also that Section 7 of the NLRC Rules of Procedure provides
that (A)ttorneys and other representatives of parties shall have
authority to bind their clients in all matters of procedure a
provision which is similar to Section 23, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court. More importantly, Section 2, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure analogously provides that if any party has appeared
by counsel, service upon him shall be made upon his counsel.
To stress, Article 224 contemplates the furnishing of copies of
final decisions, orders or awards both to the parties and their
counsel in connection with the execution of such final decisions,
orders or awards. However, for the purpose of
computing the period for filing an appeal from the NLRC to the
CA, same shall be counted from receipt of the decision, order or
award by the counsel of record pursuant to the established rule
that notice to counsel is notice to party. And since the period for
filing of an appeal is reckoned from the counsels receipt of the
decision, order or award, it necessarily follows that the reckoning
period for their finality is likewise the counsels date of receipt
thereof, if a party is represented by counsel. Hence, the date of
receipt referred to in Sec. 14, Rule VII of the then in force New
Rules of Procedure of the NLRC
106 which provides that
decisions, resolutions or orders of the NLRC shall become
executory after 10 calendar days from receipt of the same, refers
to the date of receipt by counsel. Thus contrary to the CAs
conclusion, the said NLRC Decision became final, as to Fairland, 10
calendar days after Atty. Tecsons receipt
107 thereof.
108 In