Consociational Lebanon - the Switzerland of the Middle East?

1

7AAJM205: Power-sharing agreements in deeply divided societies

“Lebanon would be the Switzerland of the Middle East if it were not for its predatory

neighbours.” Discuss.

Introduction

The purpose of this essay is to discuss whether or not Lebanon would be ‘the Switzerland of the

Middle East’ if it were not for its predatory neighbours. The essay does not aim to compare Lebanon

to Switzerland; rather, ‘Switzerland’ in this essay will be defined as ‘a successful example of a

consociational democracy.’ Furthermore, ‘predatory neighbours’ will here be defined as the Middle

East as a whole, given the ideological and strategic interconnectedness of the region. Since it is a

daunting and perhaps impossible task to take Lebanon out of its regional context, this essay will

discuss both internal and external factors contributing to Lebanon’s failures in regards to becoming a

successful consociational democracy. This will be done by examining two periods in the country’s

history: the period immediately preceding the civil war between 1967 and 1975, and the three years

following the Cedar Revolution of 2005. These periods are crucial moments in Lebanon’s history, and

demonstrate important examples of foreign involvement and of domestic political discontent.

Unfortunately, this essay will not be able to provide a fair assessment of Lebanese history, but will

instead highlight examples conducive for arriving at a response to the assertion outlined above. In

order to analyse these periods efficiently, the political systems in place, the National Pact and the Taif

Agreement, will be examined before the analysis of each time period. Before embarking on the

analysis, a discussion of the consociational theory will be provided, as it is paramount to the

understanding of Lebanon’s power-sharing agreements. What has been found during the course of this

essay is that Lebanon would not be a successful example of a consociational democracy, even without

the interference of ‘predatory neighbours’. The periods examined instead show the flaws of the

consociational systems in place, which in turn causes the immobilisation of the political system and to

some extent invites foreign meddling in Lebanon’s affairs. Rather than creating chaos, foreign powers

exacerbate tensions and cause instability to the political system. This makes them part of a vicious

cycle, to which sectarian tensions, caused by an inefficient political system, provide the base.

Consociational democracy

Consociational democracy is a term coined by Arend Lijphart. According to Lijphart ‘[c]onsociational

democracy means government by élite cartel designed to turn a democracy within a fragmented

political culture into a stable democracy.’1 Consociational democracy, or consociation, is thus a

political system based on power-sharing, and can be seen as ‘a state or a region within which two or

more cultural or ethnic or national communities peaceably coexist, with none being institutionally

superior to the others, and in which the relevant communities cooperate politically through self-

government and shared government.’2 The four key elements of consociation are grand coalition,

mutual veto, representation based on proportionality and segmental autonomy for groups in specific

matters. This means that community representatives might veto decisions potentially harmful to their

respective communities, and that they have autonomy over certain, often cultural, areas. It also entails

1 Arend Lijphart, “Consociational Democracy”, World Politics 21, No. 2 (January 1969): 216.

2 Brendan O‟Leary, cited in Michael Kerr, Imposing Power-Sharing: conflict and coexistence in Northern Ireland & Lebanon

(Dublin and Portland, OR: Irish Academic Press, 2006), 26.

2

a set number of, for example, seats in parliament for a specific group corresponding to their size in a

given country. By this, consociation ‘violates the principle of majority rule, but does not deviate very

much from normative democratic theory.’3 Despite the success of consociation as a form of conflict-

regulation, extensive criticism has been presented against this theory. Opponents of consociation claim

that it supports segregation4 and entrenches conflicts

5 through its emphasis on proportional

representation, ‘forcing’ people to only vote for candidates from their own group, which enables

candidates to run on ‘communal’ platforms. Furthermore, opponents of consociation argue that it

might create majority resentment6 as larger groups, likely to gain ground in a non-consociational

democratic system, feel that smaller groups are overrepresented in political institutions.

Others, most notably Brendan O’Leary and John McGarry, are proponents of consociation whilst

recognising the flaws of the theory in its traditional sense. For example, they highlight ‘the neglected

role of external actors in promotion and operation of consociational settlements’7 which has been

further emphasised by Michael Kerr.8 Most importantly, this group objects to the critique of

consociation failing to resolve conflicts by emphasising that it is not meant to. Rather, it is simply

meant to regulate it.9

Before embarking on the analysis of Lebanon’s power-sharing agreements, it is necessary to

differentiate between corporate consociation and liberal consociation. The two are, respectively,

closely related to the concepts of pre-determination and self-determination. Corporate, or pre-

determined, consociation ‘accommodates groups according to ascriptive criteria, such as ethnicity or

religion, on the assumption that group identities are fixed and that groups are both internally

homogenous and externally bounded.’10

This model favours those groups identified at the time of the

implementation of a consociation, at the expense of those groups not accommodated. Politicians

associated with the latter groups will find it difficult to thrive in a corporate consociation if votes are

cast along segmental lines. Conversely, a liberal, or self-determined, consociation ‘rewards whatever

salient political identities emerge in democratic elections, whether these are based on ethnic or

religious groups, or on subgroup or transgroup identities.’11

The National Pact

The National Pact of 1943 is an unwritten agreement that would serve as the basis for Lebanon’s

government until it was replaced by the Taif Agreement of 1989. Political offices were distributed

along sectarian lines based on the 1932 census, identifying the largest sects in the country to be, in

order of size, Maronites, Sunnis and Shias. This led to the allocation of the office of president to the

Maronites, prime minister to the Sunnis and speaker of the parliament to the Shias. Proportional

representation in parliament was institutionalised on a 6:5 ratio favouring Christians. Furthermore, it

enshrined Lebanon’s neutrality in foreign affairs. Because of the pre-determined identification of sects

and the ascription of them to different offices, the National Pact established a corporate consociation.

3 Lijphart, “Consociational Democracy”, 214.

4 Paul Dixon, “Why the Good Friday Agreement is Not Consociational”, in Political Quarterly 76, No. 3 (2005): 359.

5 Donald L. Horowitz, “Ethnic Power-Sharing: Three Big Problems” , in Journal of Democracy 25, Nol. 2 (2014): 12.

6 Ibid.

7 John McGarry & Brendan O‟Leary, ”Consociational Theory, Northern Ireland‟s Conflict, and its Agreement. Part

1: What Consociationalists Can Learn from Northern Ireland”, in Government and Opposition 41, No. 1 (2006): 51-3. 8 See Kerr, ”Imposing Power-Sharing”.

9 Kerr, “Imposing Power-Sharing”, 3, 15.

10 John McGarry and Brendan O‟Leary, ”Iraq‟s Constitution of 2005: Liberal Consociation As Political Prescription”,

in International Journal of Constitutional Law 5, No. 4 (2007): 675. 11

Ibid.

3

The agreement was negotiated and lobbied by élites representing Christians and Muslims, led

respectively by Beshara al-Khoury and Riad al-Solh.12

Despite being successful at regulating conflict

in a plural society, the National Pact was inherently weak as it was merely a temporary compromised

solution to a complex issue.13

. For the Muslims, this included an acceptance of a Lebanese state rather

than an Arab state, and for the Christians it entailed accepting a certain level of Arab nationalism.14

Farid el-Khazen points out that the Pact was based on two faulty assumptions: that communal élite

consensus reflected grassroot support, and that the regional context would remain unchanged and not

threaten the basic foundations of the Pact.15

Looking at how Lebanon has fared during the course of its

history, it is easy to dismiss the National Pact as failing to create a cohesive state. However, the Pact

was rather a symbol of unity than a tool used to create national cohesion.16

Moreover, it succeeded in

fending off conflict for several decades in Lebanon, and could be seen as ‘the most successful case of

consociational democracy in the developing world.’17

The outbreak of civil war

Lebanon has long been a refuge for a myriad of minorities and sects, and had experience with power-

sharing from as early as 1861 with the Mutasarrifiyya that drew up communal lines on territorial and

political levels.18

Regardless of whether one sees this as Lebanon having experience with consociation

or a history of ‘ethno-religious division’,19

the National Pact was not a major shift from what the

communities in Lebanon were used to. However, this was to become problematic in the age of the

nation-state. Regardless if the Pact intended to create a Lebanese national identity or not, it did not

undo the fact that many related more to their local community than to the Lebanese state.20

Each

community had their own leaders (za’im) - an élite acting as community representatives. These élites

were often from the same limited number of families, rendering the reading of Lebanese history a

sense of reading a series of violent dynasty sagas. These élites acted as arbitrators and steered off

conflict for a long period of time, but were to succumb to patrimonial and local political networks,

undermining their commitment to the Lebanese political system. In other words, the za’im-system

‘crystallized confessional loyalties and reinforced political cleavages.’21

Parliamentary candidates

from one group had to rely on votes from other communities in order to secure a parliamentary seat,

which in turn moderated parliament, and stabilised the country since there was little chance ‘radical’

sectarian candidates would be chosen.22

However, this also created a sense of inefficacy and

immobilism23

and also produced ‘weaker’ candidates from each communities, rather than ‘champions’

12

Farid el-Khazen, The Communal Pact of National Identities: the Making and Politics of the 1943 National Pact (Oxford: Centre for Lebanese Studies, 1991), 35-6, 38. 13

Kerr, “Imposing Power-Sharing”, 21, 187. 14

El-Khazen, ”Communal Pact”, 5-6, 15-6. 15

Ibid., 39. 16

Ibid., 60. 17

Brenda M. Seaver, “The Regional Sources of Power-Sharing Failure: the Case of Lebanon”, in Political Science Quarterly 115, No. 2 (Summer 2000): 249. 18

Farid el-Khazen, The Breakdown of the State in Lebanon 1967-1976 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), 131. 19

Marcello Mollica and James Cook Dingley, “Sectarian Dynamics of Multicultural Norms and the Law in Lebanon: Warning for the future of Northern Ireland”, in National Identities (2014): 5. 20

Tamirace Fakhoury Mühlbacher, Democracy and Power-Sharing in Stormy Weather: the Case of Lebanon (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Socialwissenschaften, 2009): 79-81. 21

Ibid., 88, 94-5. 22

Ibid., 86. 23

Michael Hudson, “The Lebanese Crisis: The Limits of Consociational Democracy”, in Journal of Palestine Studies 5, No. ¾ (April 1976): 114.

4

of each community’s cause.24

Furthermore, in the 1960’s, mobilisation and protests against the

growing socio-economic disparities appeared,25

often organised by Leftist parties and politicised

labour unions and student movements.26

It is against this backdrop that the large influx of Palestinians after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War and the

1970-1971 Jordanian War must be judged. Since Palestinians had only arrived in large numbers to

Lebanon after 1948 (that is, after the National Pact had been implemented) their presence rendered

complications to Lebanese society since there was ‘no room’ for another major group within the

power-sharing system.27

In total, the two wars displaced over 350 000 Palestinians into Lebanon.28

This influx destabilised Lebanon and its power-sharing system in two ways: first, it de facto moved

the Palestinian struggle into Lebanon and made the country a target for Israeli raids, thus threatening

Lebanon’s sovereignty and neutrality in foreign affairs. There was widespread contention over this

matter between the Maronites, who pointed out the risks mentioned above, and the Muslims and Druze

who favoured giving the Palestinian guerrillas freedom of action in line with Lebanon’s ‘obligation in

the Arab struggle against the Israeli enemy.’29

Second, the ascendant Palestinian activism coincided

with the demands for a change of policy to battle the growing inequalities, often articulated by Leftist

Muslim groups, which was to become linked to the Palestinian resistance.30

This in turn meant that

when the Lebanese army cracked down on these protests, they would also face Palestinian resistance.

By fighting the Palestinian guerrillas, the army inevitably brought the Palestinian question into

domestic politics, thus provoking further ideological and sectarian division on the question.

Even though Lijphart deemed external threats to be conducive to the maintenance of consociation,31

Pappalardo has pointed out that external threats might prove dangerous for a country’s consociational

system if internal disputes are not settled when threats appear.32

This seems to have been the case in

Lebanon. If the Palestinians were not a direct military threat to the country, Israel clearly was.

Lebanon had been marginally involved in Arab-Israeli politics before 1967, but Fatah had established

secret cells and training camps in the country during the mid-60’s, causing Israel to attack these

encampments and subsequently blowing up 13 civilian Lebanese airplanes at Beirut’s airport in

1968.33

In 1969, clashes broke out between the Lebanese army and Palestinian guerrillas, provoked by

Leftist-leaning demonstrations calling for sympathy with the Palestinian cause. The situation was

becoming more and more contagious, and as an attempt to resolve the Palestinian issue Lebanese

authorities and the PLO signed the Cairo Agreement, which would provide the PLO with unlimited

mobility and access to the Arqub region in southern Lebanon.34

The agreement led to more Palestinian

raids against Israel from Lebanese territory. As a response, Christian militias were formed in order to

fill in for the, in their eyes, incompetent state and army. They saw the Cairo Agreement as an act of

betrayal, and that restoring Lebanon’s sovereignty now was their duty. As a result of this, Christian

right-wing militias associated with the Kataeb-party started to militarily confront the Palestinians,

24

Fakhoury Mühlbacher, “Democracy and Power-Sharing”, 101. 25

Hudson, “Lebanese Crisis”, 115. 26

El-Khazen, “Breakdown”, 57, 73, 75, 77. 27

Ibid., 132. 28

Seaver, “Regional Sources”, 261. 29

El-Khazen, “Breakdown”, 149. 30

Seaver, “Regional Sources”, 262. 31

Lijphart, “Consociational Democracy”, 217. 32

Adriano Pappalardo, “The Conditions for Consociational Democracy: A Logical and Empirical Critique”, in European Journal of Poltical Research 9 (1981): 377. 33

El-Khazen, “Breakdown”, 136-140. 34

Ibid., 144-6, 161.

5

transforming a difference of opinions into Muslim-Christian clashes.35

Besides the different views on the Palestinian issue, many Muslims and Druze felt excluded by the

consociational system in place,36

and the sense of a shifting demographic left the Muslims, and

particularly the Shia community, discontent.37

In the early 1970’s, Musa as-Sadr’s Movement of the

Deprived rose to prominence as they mobilised against the government’s negligence of the Shia

hardships in the south – a result of fighting between Israeli and Lebanese military and the Palestinian

guerrillas. The state’s inability to protect its own population, together with the sense of a favourisation

of Christians – enshrined in the power-sharing agreement - had caused a major rift between the Shia

and the government 38

and fuelled the sectarian hostilities emerging in Lebanon. The Christians, on

their part, did not want to give in to pressures of reconstructing the Pact, fearing that Lebanon would

turn into a Muslim state which would further entrench their minority status in the region. These

sentiments partly explain why they chose to crack down on Palestinian resistance groups, as they

feared the Palestinian-Lebanese Muslim coalition.39

As a result of this fear, President Suleiman

Frangieh, exploiting his powers, repeatedly chose weak Sunni prime ministers during the beginning of

the 70’s, leading to inefficient leadership and inability to solve the Palestinian issue and shield

Lebanon from outside pressure.40

At the beginning of the 1970’s, Lebanon was unstable but not in complete chaos. 1973 would hasten

its descent towards it. In April, Israel carried out a raid in central Beirut killing three leaders within the

Palestinian resistance movement. Besides the embarrassment this meant to the Lebanese government,

the raid further divided élites and put them in open conflict and strengthened the Christians’ claim that

Lebanon’s sovereignty was threatened by the Palestinian presence. Prime Minister Salam demanded

the resignation of the Lebanese Army commander, who had failed to see the attack coming, while

President Frangieh refused. This caused protests from Palestinian guerrillas, leading Lebanon into a

state of war for a few days.41

Regionally, the 1973 Yom Kippur War would alter the Middle Eastern

power configuration for the years to come, since one consequence of it was Egypt’s estrangement

from the Palestinian struggle, as it would go on to promote peace with Israel. Syria saw its chance to

pick up the Arab nationalist torch, which inherently meant championing the Palestinian cause and

standing up against Israel. This would, later, motivate Syrian intrusion into Lebanon.42

These events to

some extent epitomise the impasse Lebanon was in during the period preceding the civil war: the

country had received a large influx of foreigners, which shifted the power balance between the already

existing communities. Since the communities were already ascribed in the political system, there was

no room for another large community. Within Lebanon, there was already a growing discontent with

the immobilism of the system and the augmenting socio-economic inequalities, causing people from

the more ‘excluded’ communities to question the power-sharing system. Adding the divisive

Palestinian factor to this, Lebanon became as fragmented politically as it was religiously.

When the Lebanese army cracked down on a Leftist demonstration in Sidon, and when Kataeb-

affiliated militias killed 27 passengers on a Palestinian bus in 197543

, there was no turning back from

Lebanon’s descent into civil war. But what caused it? What prevented Lebanon from being the

Switzerland of the Middle East at this point in history? Michael Hudson argues that the consociational

35

Fakhoury Mühlbacher, “Democracy and Power-Sharing”, 117, 118-9. 36

Ibid., 100. 37

Seaver, “Regional Sources”, 257. 38

Fakhoury Mühlbacher, “Democracy and Power-Sharing”, 119. 39

Seaver, “Regional Sources”, 259. 40

Fakhoury Mühlbacher, “Democracy and Power-Sharing”, 117-9. 41

El-Khazen, “Breakdown”, 203-7. 42

Seaver, “Democracy and Power-Sharing”, 261, 263. 43

Ibid., 259-61.

6

system itself was the root of the problem, as it was unable to bring political stability to Lebanon.44

Farid el-Khazen criticises Hudson’s approach, claiming that it ignores the regional turmoil Lebanon

found itself in.45

However, el-Khazen’s explanation itself ignores that the existing internal divisions

may invite foreign meddling into Lebanon’s domestic affairs, as is argued by Brenda Seaver.46

Along

similar lines, Tamirace Fakhoury suggests that Lebanon’s breakdown occurred as a result of a

combination of Lebanon’s de facto abandonment of neutrality in foreign affairs, lack of élite

consensus and ‘gradual loss of stability among subcultures’. When external pressure hit Lebanon, the

consociational system could not maintain the country’s stability because of these factors.47

This essay,

in turn, argues that neither Hudson’s nor el-Khazen’s dichotomous explanations are satisfactory.

Rather, a synthesis of the two, as articulated by Seaver and Fakhoury, provides a better explanation.

The state created and centred on the National Pact was neither ‘inherently weak’, as has been

suggested by Salamey,48

but undoubtedly there are far more challenges facing a divided society like

Lebanon regarding the establishment of a stable and cohesive state.49

Had the country been more

united when externally threatened, perhaps civil war could have been avoided. On the other hand, had

there not been regional turmoil, perhaps internal disputes would not have transformed into armed

conflict. Regardless of whether external powers caused the civil war or not, this essay argues that

Lebanon was not a successful example of a consociational democracy before the eruption of the civil

war. The consociational system is not entirely to blame for Lebanon’s war, but it created an

environment in which the impact of external players was enough to set Lebanon on its track towards

its own destruction.

The Taif Agreement of 1989

The Taif Agreement was reached in Taif in Saudi Arabia and approved by the Lebanese parliament on

November 4th 1989. It contains some significant changes compared to the National Pact. First of all,

the powers of the president were reduced. The president was no longer head of the Executive, and saw

greater powers fall into the hands of the prime minister. The president no longer had any power over

the council of ministers; in fact, he had ‘no political power of his own. The role of the president is thus

more formal than it was before.’50

Furthermore, it ensured a 50:50 representation in parliament divided

between Muslims and Christians, thus abandoning the Pact’s 6:5 ratio. Despite these changes, much of

the spirit of the Pact is still present in the Taif Agreement, as it reaffirms the corporate consociational

model as Lebanon’s political system, with slightly changed wording.51

Moreover, the Agreement

granted a major role to Syria, who would work as a de facto protector of Lebanon, despite clearly

stipulating Lebanon’s sovereignty in the very first article.52

As a long term goal, the Taif established

that confessionalism was to be abolished.53

44

Hudson, “Lebanese Crisis”, 114, 119. 45

El-Khazen, “Breakdown”, 18-20. 46

Seaver, “Regional Sources”. 47

Fakhoury Mühlbacher, “Democracy and Power-Sharing”, 114. 48

Imad Salamey, “Failing Consociationalism in Lebanon and Integrative Options”, in International Journal of Peace Studies 14, No. 2, (Autumn/Winter 2009): 84. 49

Mollica & Dingley, “Sectarian Dynamics”, 11. 50

Joseph Maila, Prospects for Lebanon: The Document of National Understanding (Oxford: Centre for Lebanese Studies, 1992), 28-9, 34-5, 41. 51

Ibid., 12, 18, 20, 53, 62. 52

Ibid., 80, 83. 53

Amal Hamdan, “The Limits of Corporate Consociation: Taif and the Crisis of Power-Sharing in Lebanon since 2005”, in Lebanon after the Cedar Revolution, ed. by Are Knudsen and Michael Kerr (London: Hurst & Co, 2012), 50-1.

7

Lebanon post-Cedar Revolution: 2005-2008

When Lijphart wrote that the basic principles of consociation ‘are so obviously the appropriate answer

to the problems of deeply divided […] societies’,54

perhaps he was partly referring to the success of

the Lebanese belligerents reaching the Taif Agreement a few years earlier, thus effectively ending the

civil war. However, despite the changes Taif provided, it is indeed very similar to the National Pact as

it possesses the same ‘basic character’ as the Pact.55

Whether or not it should be considered a success

that a country after a devastating civil war returns to the same corporate consociational system, by

some accused of being the root of said civil war,56

shall remained unsaid. Instead, the following

section will look at what prevented Lebanon from becoming a successful consociational state after the

Cedar Revolution.

The Cedar Revolution started as a protest movement after the assassination of former Prime Minister

Rafik Hariri on 14 February 2005. There was suspicion of Syrian involvement in the murder of Hariri,

and the protest took the shape of anti-Syrian resistance, leading Syria to be forced out of Lebanon the

same year by international pressure. Hariri’s killing also spurred the rival protest movements March 8

(led by Hezbollah with a pro-Syrian stance) and March 14 (led by the Future Movement with an anti-

Syrian stance), in turn provoking the Israel-Hezbollah war in 2006 and the clashes between Hezbollah

and government supporters in 2008.57

These events show that while Lebanon managed to move on

from civil war, its segments had not reconciled. Lebanon remained a deeply divided society, as many

of the factors that caused the civil war – both internal and external – were still present.58

These problems were of the same character, but had taken a different shape. The Muslim-Christian

divide present before and during the civil war had been replaced by a Sunni-Shia divide, as the Sunnis

elevated position in Taif frustrated the Shia community who saw themselves as marginalised.59

Whereas, before the civil war, the Maronite community saw the Palestinian guerillas as a threat to

Lebanese sovereignty, the March 14 Movement harboured similar fears about Hezbollah, who were

excluded from the Taif Agreement’s clause stating that all militias should de-militarise.60

Consequently, the Lebanese government did not possess a monopoly of violence.61

One consequence of the Syrian exit from Lebanon is that both the March 14 and the March 8

movements started to seek foreign support in the newly created power vacuum.62

Following Marie-

Jöelle Zahar’s line of thought, this could be the result of Lebanon being a failed state. It cannot deter

threats, nor can it assure the security or representation of all of its sects. This creates a ‘credible

commitment’ problem amongst unrepresented groups, who will then either seek to establish their own

paramilitaries or seek to form alliances with other, larger groups.63

This might cause a reliance on

54

Arend Lijphart, “Self-determination versus Pre-determination of Ethnic Minorities in Power-Sharing”, in The Rights of Minority Cultures, ed. Will Kymlicka (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 275. 55

Michael Hudson, “Trying Again: Power-Sharing in Post-Civil War Lebanon”, in International Negotiation 2 (1997): 113. Tamirace Fakhoury, “Debating Lebanon‟s Power-Sharing Model: An Opportunity or An Impasse for Democratization Studies in the Middle East”, in Arab Studies Journal 22, no 1 (Spring 2014): 230. 56

See Hudson, “Lebanese Crisis”. 57

Michael Kerr, “Before the Revolution”, in Lebanon after the Cedar Revolution, ed. by Are Knudsen and Michael Kerr (London: Hurst & Co, 2012), 25-6. 58

Ibid., 32. 59

Hamdan, “The Limits”, 59. 60

Kerr, “Before the Revolution”, 27. 61

Marie-Jöelle Zahar, “Foreign Interventions, Power Sharing and the Dynamics of Conflict and Coexistence in Lebanon”, in Lebanon After the Cedar Revolution, ed. by Are Knudsen and Michael Kerr (London: Hurst & Co, 2012), 68. 62

Ibid., 78. 63

Ibid., 67, 71, 78.

8

external allies in order to prevent ‘the other’ from getting the upper hand. In other words, this is a

communal ‘political survival strategy’, effectively making foreign intervention ‘a function of

Lebanese factions seeking to gain advantage over each other.’64

One example of this is the 2006 Israel-

Hezbollah War. On 12 July 2006, Hezbollah captured two Israeli soldiers after a raid across the Israeli

border. What followed was a 34 day war, in which Hezbollah saw its chance to ‘consolidate its

political-military position in Lebanon’ and a more prominent position in the struggle against Israel.65

The US supported the Israeli retaliation, seeking to weaken Hezbollah, as did certain elements within

the Lebanese Sunni community; effectively meaning that there was, at a certain stage in the conflict, a

convergence of US, Israeli and Sunni Lebanese interests.66

Just as certain factions of the Christian

community had supported Israel during the civil war, factions within the Sunni community now

supported a war against their own country. This was, and is, further exacerbated by foreign interests in

Lebanon, as the Sunni-Shia divide reflects a larger US/Saudi-Iranian rivalry.67

The March alliances did initially show promise, as they consisted of inter-sectarian coalitions: the

March 8 saw a coalition between Hezbollah and Maronite Michel Aoun whereas the March 14 saw a

coalition of Sunnis, Christians and the Druze loyal to Walid Jumblatt. However, these coalitions were

not able to bridge the Sunni-Shia divide.68

Part of this is because of Hezbollah, and in turn Shia,

discontent with the current consociational system. Hezbollah had more and more started to object to

the confessional system, which ensures the Sunnis as the most powerful group in Lebanon. The agreed

power-sharing feature of Christians having fifty percent of parliamentary seats further provoked the

Shia community, since it is a clear over-representation. Hezbollah demands for the abolishment of the

consociational system, as ‘promised’ in the Taif, are being met with hostility by Christians and Sunnis,

who are cautious to let go of their privileged positions. This effectively means that the Shia

community is not adequately represented in regards to their percentage of the Lebanese population,69

which seems to be the major problem with Lebanon’s corporate consociational system, and corporate

consociationalism in general. If groups are pre-determined and their proportional representation

established, the system might eventually grow obsolete, as it no longer reflects the demographic

reality. This was articulated by the Muslims in regards to Christian dominance before the civil war,

and it was after the Cedar Revolution being articulated by the Shia community. In this sense, corporate

consociationalism is ‘inherently conflict-ridden’.70

These sectarian hostilities certainly played a part of the protests that started in December 2006 towards

Fuad Siniora’s government. At this stage, the country was split between a pro-Western, mostly Sunni-

March 14 alliance which formed the majority of the government, and a pro-Iranian, mostly Shia,

opposition. Governmental tensions erupted when Shia ministers protested against the decision in

December 2005 to invite an international tribunal to investigate the death of Prime Minister Hariri.

This decision had been reached through a majoritarian vote instead of a consensus, which caused

outrage in the Shia community and was certainly seen as a metaphor for the dominating alliance’s

neglect of the Shiites.71

A year later, the government backed the UN-created Special Tribunal for

64

Ibid., 64, 67. 65

Kerr, 27-9. 66

Ibid., 28-9. 67

Zahar, “Foreign Interventions”, 78-9. 68

Fakhoury, “Democracy and Power-Sharing”, 365-7, 374. 69

Hamdan, “Limits”, 48-51. 70

Salamey, “Failing Consociationalism”, 87. 71

Fakhoury, “Democracy and Power-Sharing”, 378.

9

Lebanon (STL) despite protests from the opposition,72

sending the country into a political deadlock

that would resolve itself with the Doha Accords of 2008. What triggered the Accords was Hezbollah’s

armed reaction to a government decision to shut down Hezbollah’s telecom network. Hezbollah leader

Hassan Nasrallah called this a ‘declaration of war’73

and Hezbollah successfully surrounded Beirut and

closed down pro-government media.74

During the conflict, which would go on until the Doha Accords

were reached on 21 May, the army stood by without engaging in the fights between Hezbollah and

government supporters75

so as not to risk the appearance of choosing sides and thereby exacerbating

sectarian tensions. In the Doha Accords, all parties in parliament vowed to end the political deadlock76

and Michel Suleiman was sworn in as president soon after, thus preventing further conflict from

breaking out.

This chain of events provides a symbolic example of Lebanon in the immediate post-Cedar

Revolution. There are existing sectarian divisions in Lebanese society, partly due to a devastating civil

war from which each community has their own memory. In fact, there is still no standardised history

schoolbook because of varying communal historical interpretations.77

Another explanation of the

divides is the flawed power-sharing system, which causes mistrust in state institutions and enforces

communal institutions, in turn further increasing the sectarian divides. As we have seen, this

encourages groups to seek foreign support and build alliances in order to defeat a ‘common enemy’, a

phenomenon that became prevalent after the Syrian departure and subsequent power vacuum.

Certainly, the cross-sectarian alliances of March 8 and March 14 might be seen as a positive step, but

did de facto only create a new static two-bloc system fuelled by a larger US/Saudi-Iranian power

struggle in the region.78

The military’s decision to not step in during the 2008 clashes was probably

wise, but is itself a sign of mistrust of the state and its loss of its monopoly of violence. Furthermore,

Hezbollah’s role in Lebanon after the Cedar Revolution was reminiscent of that of the Palestinians

before the civil war, as the March 14 alliance questioned Hezbollah’s armed activities and its possible

effect on Lebanon’s ‘neutrality’.79

One might critique Hezbollah for threatening Lebanon’s

sovereignty or for violating the state’s monopoly of violence during this period. However, they also

provide a disenfranchised part of the Lebanese population with basic services that the government is

failing to ensure.80

So why is the political system failing? First of all, the Taif possessed an inherent weakness in the

sense that it was brokered under the influence of a self-interested exogenous actor: Syria.81

As Kerr

72

AP, November 25th 2006. http://web.archive.org/web/20061128235341/http://www.forbes.com/business/feeds/ap/2006/11/25/ap3203176.html. Retrieved January 10th 2015. 73

The New York Times, May 9th 2008. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/09/world/middleeast/09lebanon.html?ex=1367985600&en=27fbc7f2741a0ae2&ei=5124&partner=permalink&exprod=permalink&_r=0. Retrieved January 10th 2015. 74

BBC News, May 9th 2008. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/7391600.stm. Retrieved January 10th 2015. 75

CNN, May 9th 2008. http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/meast/05/08/lebanon.hezbollah/index.html. Retrieved January 10th 2015. 76

Doha Agreement. http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/Lebanon_DohaAgreement2008_Engl.pdf. Retrieved January 10, 2015. 77

Salamey, “Failing Consociationalism”, 89. 78

Are Knudsen and Michael Kerr, “Introduction: the Cedar Revolution and Beyond”, in Lebanon After the Cedar Revolution, ed. by Are Knudsen and Michael Kerr (London: Hurst & Co, 2012), 6-7. 79

Fakhoury, “Democracy”, 385-6. 80

Mona Harb, “Know Thy Enemy: Hizbullah, ‟Terrorism‟ and the Politics of Perception”, in Third World Quarterly 26, no 1 (2005): 186-9. 81

Kerr, “Before the Revolution”, 34-5.

10

has noted, the interests exogenous actors have whilst assisting in the creation of a power-sharing

agreement is crucial to the nature and survival of the agreement.82

Lebanon’s power-sharing system

may have survived but was negatively influenced by Syria, who gave themselves a privileged role in

the protection of Lebanon, leaving behind them a power vacuum after their departure in 2005. By

risking succumbing to traditional integrationist critique, one must admit that Lebanon’s corporate

consociation is not very democratic since it excludes groups from power,83

and that tension will occur

when groups compete for a limited number of positions.84

Furthermore, from what has been stated

above, it is easy to draw the conclusion that the system in place after the Cedar Revolution does invite

foreign meddling in Lebanese affairs,85

even if it is not always direct. Sadly, with the reality the 2006-

2008 period provides, and as expressed by Hezbollah, it seems Lebanon is stuck in a cycle of violence

unless the Taif is modified.86

However, an integrationist solution as proposed by Salamey,87

will

certainly not provide a rapid solution. Indeed, ‘changing the system would open Pandora’s box.’88

Unfortunately, this is the intrinsic impasse of Lebanon which prevents it from becoming a successful

consociational democracy.

Conclusion

From what has been presented thus far, this essay concludes that Lebanon would not be the

Switzerland (a successful example of a consociational democracy) of the Middle East even without the

interference of ‘predatory neighbours’. There is no doubt that external powers have negatively affected

and influenced Lebanon. However, this essay states, as demonstrated above, that external powers

predominantly exacerbates existing tensions rather than creating them. The influx of Palestinians did

not single-handedly send Lebanon into civil war, but rather revealed and provoked sectarian and

political tensions. The regional power-struggle intensifying after the Cedar Revolution may have

created new sorts of tensions, but has been able to feed on the already existing Sunni-Shia divide. The

conclusion is thus that the Lebanese corporate consociational system is not working. Undoubtedly, it

would have fared better in a more stable region, which one might deduce from the successful

European examples of consociational democracies. This provokes the thought that Lebanon could

have succeeded if the region was more stable. However, judging from the two examples discussed in

this essay, it is safe to assert that the consociational formula is not appropriate for Lebanon in its

regional context. The problem is that anything other than the consociational model might render

Lebanon even more unstable, because regardless of the National Pact’s or the Taif Agreement’s flaws,

Lebanon still exists as one state. Indeed, introducing majoritarian might rip Lebanon apart.

Regardless, however, of what may and may not have been, we have seen that Lebanon’s political

system does not produce efficient politics domestically. This was one reason of the existing discontent

later enflamed into civil war, and gridlocked the country between 2006 and 2008, further proving that

Lebanon will not be ‘the Switzerland of the Middle East’ unless a more efficient formula is found.

82

See Kerr, “Imposing Power-Sharing”. 83

Hamdan, “Limits”, 42. 84

Michael Hudson, ”Trying Again”, 117-9. 85

Salamey, ”Failing Consociationalism”, 94. 86

Hamdan, “Limits”, 54. 87

See Salamey, “Failing Consociationalism”. 88

Fakhoury, “Debating”, 243.

11

Bibliography

Dixon, Paul. “Why the Good Friday Agreement is Not Consociational”. Political Quarterly 76, No. 3 (2005):

357-367.

el-Khazen, Farid. The Communal Pact of National Identities: the Making and Politics of the 1943 National Pact.

Oxford: Centre for Lebanese Studies, 1991.

- The Breakdown of the State in Lebanon 1967-1976. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000.

Fakhoury Mühlbacher, Tamirace. Democracy and Power-Sharing in Stormy Weather: the Case of Lebanon.

Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Socialwissenschaften, 2009.

- “Debating Lebanon‟s Power-Sharing Model: An Opportunity or An Impasse for Democratization

Studies in the Middle East”. Arab Studies Journal 22, No. 1 (Spring 2014): 230-255.

Hamdan, Amal. “The Limits of Corporate Consociation: Taif and the Crisis of Power-Sharing in Lebanon

since 2005”. In Lebanon after the Cedar Revolution, edited by Are Knudsen and Michael Kerr. 39-62. London:

Hurst & Co, 2012.

Harb, Mona. “Know Thy Enemy: Hizbullah, „Terrorism‟ and the Politics of Perception”. Third World

Quarterly 26, No. 1 (2005): 173-197.

Horowitz, Donald L. “Ethnic Power-Sharing: Three Big Problems”. Journal of Democracy 25, Nol. 2 (2014):

5-20.

Hudson, Michael. “The Lebanese Crisis: The Limits of Consociational Democracy”. Journal of Palestine

Studies 5, No. ¾ (April 1976): 109-122.

- “Trying Again: Power-Sharing in Post-Civil War Lebanon”. International Negotiation 2 (1997): 103-122.

Kerr, Michael. Imposing Power-Sharing: conflict and coexistence in Northern Ireland & Lebanon. Dublin and

Portland, OR: Irish Academic Press, 2006.

- “Before the Revolution”. In Lebanon after the Cedar Revolution, edited by Are Knudsen and Michael Kerr.

23-38. London: Hurst & Co, 2012.

Knudsen, Are and Kerr, Michael. “Introduction: the Cedar Revolution and Beyond”. In Lebanon After the

Cedar Revolution, edited by Are Knudsen and Michael Kerr. 3-22. London: Hurst & Co, 2012.

Lijphart, Arend. “Consociational Democracy”. World Politics 21, No. 2 (January 1969): 207-225.

- “Self-determination versus Pre-determination of Ethnic Minorities in Power-Sharing”. InThe Rights of

Minority Cultures, edited by Will Kymlicka. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.

Maila, Joseph. Prospects for Lebanon: The Document of National Understanding. Oxford: Centre for Lebanese

Studies, 1992.

McGarry, John and O‟Leary, Brendan. ”Consociational Theory, Northern Ireland‟s Conflict, and its

Agreement. Part 1: What Consociationalists Can Learn from Northern Ireland”. Government and Opposition

41, No. 1 (2006): 43-63.

- “Iraq‟s Constitution of 2005: Liberal Consociation As Political Prescription”. International Journal of

Constitutional Law 5, No. 4 (2007): 670-698.

Mollica, Marcello and Cook Dingley, James. “Sectarian Dynamics of Multicultural Norms and the Law in

Lebanon: Warning for the future of Northern Ireland”. National Identities (2014): 1-27.

12

Pappalardo, Adriano. “The Conditions for Consociational Democracy: A Logical and Empirical Critique”.

European Journal of Poltical Research 9, No. 4 (1981): 365-390.

Salamey, Imad. “Failing Consociationalism in Lebanon and Integrative Options”. International Journal of

Peace Studies 14, No. 2, (Autumn/Winter 2009): 83-105.

Seaver, Brenda M. “The Regional Sources of Power-Sharing Failure: the Case of Lebanon”. Political Science

Quarterly 115, No. 2 (Summer 2000): 247-271.

Zahar, Marie-Jöelle. “Foreign Interventions, Power Sharing and the Dynamics of Conflict and

Coexistence in Lebanon”. In Lebanon After the Cedar Revolution, edited by Are Knudsen and Michael Kerr.

63-82. London: Hurst & Co, 2012.

Documents:

The Doha Agreement, 21 May 2008.

http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/Lebanon_DohaAgreement2008_Engl.pdf.