Connecting markets

Pamela Taylor, Ofgem

Gas Target Model, 3rd stakeholder workshop

11th April 2011, London

Connecting markets

2Gas Target Model, 3rd workshop, 11 April 2011, London

What are we trying to achieve?

1. Where technically feasible gas should flow to where it is valued most• Greater price convergence

2. Efficient use of cross-border infrastructure• Capacity hoarding must be avoided• Contractual congestion must be avoided • Amount of offered capacity must be

maximised

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ACER’s Capacity Allocation Framework Guideline

- Auctions -Bundled products

European Commission’s proposals on Congestion Management

Procedures - Capacity overbooking – firm UIOLI- Restriction of renominations

Existing policy proposals –out for consultation

Objective is for short term firm capacity to allow for more short term gas trading

Framework Guidelines

on Capacity Allocation Mechanisms for the European Gas Transmission

Network

Draft for Consultation

DFGC-2011-G-001

3 March 2011

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What are we observing today?

Markets are still not developed in all parts of Europe Progress has been made, but more needs to be done

Source: http://ec.europa.eu/energy/observatory/gas/doc/qregam_2010_quarter3.pdf

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Option 1: explicit, continuous

• Explicit capacity allocation with continuous trading Example for “overselling”:

-Shipper A books 100 units of capacity -Shipper A nominates 50 units -TSO assumes that shipper A will not use remaining 50 units, TSO sells them day-ahead -Shipper B buys remaining 50 units off TSO-Shipper A has paid for 100, but only used 50 units Capacity hoarding is a bad deal! TSO takes a risk and needs appropriate incentives

• Explicit auctions (CAM FG)

• Bundled Products

• No gate closure, no restriction of renomination rights

• Overselling

• Interruptible Use It Or Lose It

• All capacity is financially firm (not necessarily physically firm)

Has been effective in GB, but requires NRAs to set appropriate incentives

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• Explicit capacity allocation with gate closure

Option 2: explicit, gate closure

Gas trading would shift to where auction takes place, butcan be adapted to allow for renomination during the gas day

Example of Gate Closure with firm UIOLI or UIOSI- Shipper A has 100 units in long-term contract-Shipper A nominates 50 units, it loses or is paid for the remaining 50 units (or a proportion thereof) -TSO sells shipper A’s remaining 50 units (or a proportion thereof) in day-ahead auction on a firm basis- Shipper B buys the 50 units, nominates only 20, so loses the remainder intraday - If shipper A wants to increase its nomination, it buys additional capacity intraday

Intra-day shipper trading

Long-term market (explicit capacity allocation)

Nomination

Firm day-ahead auction of any capacity that was not nominated (Use It Or

Sell It)

Use it or lose it: unused capacity is sold through auction or FCFS

Gas day

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Option 3: implicit auctions

More efficient than explicit capacity auctions as it removes risk of separate transactions and allows markets to merge where no physical congestion

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CWE market coupling in electricity

Before CWE coupling After CWE coupling

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

5-Oct 12-Oct 19-Oct 26-Oct 2-Nov 9-Nov 16-Nov 23-Nov 30-Nov

Base

load

Pric

e

Belpex BelgiumEPEX FranceAPX NetherlandsEPEX Germany

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What is needed for implicit allocation?

• A party to do the coupling – exchange or TSO• Can be same party for both price areas (e.g.

ITVC in electricity)• Can be two parties that cooperate (e.g. CWE

in electricity)

• Algorithm for determining flows and prices

• Firm network capacity

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• Can be used FCFS or implicit auctions • FCFS day-ahead not compatible with CAM FGs?• Series of implicit auctions may disperse liquidity but more auctions allow for

flexibility

• Arbitrages realised by the TSO from low price area to high price area with implicit allocation of capacity valued at the day-ahead price spread (GRTgaz-Powernext market coupling work)

Option 4: implicit, continuous

Continuous implicit allocation may be a solution to allow for efficient gas flows while keeping the flexibility provided by continuous trading?

Day-ahead/ intra-dayLong-term market (explicit capacity allocation)

Auction gate

closures

Implicit allocation

11Gas Target Model, 3rd workshop, 11 April 2011, London

Interactions with long-term gas trading

• If short term capacity is freed-up, what should be the reserve price?

• Zero reserve price allows capacity to be re-allocated at 0 cost if there is no congestion

• If congestion, auction price will rise above zero

• Will a zero reserve price change shippers behaviour and move markets towards the short term?

• In non-peak periods maybe more reliance on short term

• Peak period: long-term capacity still needed

Some markets have higher proportion of transit than others

Con

gest

ion

reve

nues

No interconnection

High level of interconnection capacity

0

Hig

h r

even

ues

Surplus inter-

connection capacity

Interconnection capacity

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Interactions with long-term gas trading

Options for reserve prices for short term capacity

1. No reserve price (solution in electricity) but in gas domestic tariffs subsidise transit flows?

2. Set a reserve price to recover costs- impact on price convergence at congested points?

3. Set a reserve price at non-congested points but not at congested

4. No reserve price at interconnection points but a ’membership fee’ at end-user exit points

a. Flat rate

b. Based on flows

Need a redistribution mechanism

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Interactions with long-term gas trading

How could a redistribution mechanism work?1. Each NRA sets its TSO revenue requirements – identify how much needed for

domestic network and how much for transit.• Country A – 400 Euros domestic, 100 Euros transit • Country B – 300 Euros domestic, 200 Euros transit

2. Each NRA sets membership fee to recover:

a. Agreed amount form end-users for national network • Country A - to recover 400 Euros from end-users and • Country B 300 Euros from end-users

b. Estimate amount from congestion revenues• Country A & B recover at the interconnected point 150 Euros in congestion revenues (300

Euros is needed for transit)

c. Country A & B (or ACER) set a ‘membership fee’ to recover shortfall• 150 Euros

d. Congestion revenues and membership fee combined and redistributed• 100 Euros to Country A and 200 Euros to Country B

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Initial conclusions

1. Short term firm capacity is needed

2. Explicit continuous model has been successfully implemented in GB but needs incentivises for TSOs

3. Explicit gate closure may alter gas trading but will free up unused capacity and allows for renominations during gas day

4. Implicit auctions are worth exploring via pilot projects; more efficient than explicit auctions (electricity experience)

5. High proportion of transit capacity so pricing and redistribution of revenues is key for any model

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Thank you for your attention!

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