Confucian Ethics in Retrospect and Prospect

Confucian Ethics: Retrspect and ProspectCultural Heritage and Contemporary Change Series III, Asia, Volume 27
General Editor George F. McLean
Confucian Ethics in Retrospect and Prospect
Chinese Philosophical Studies, XXVII Edited by
Vincent Shen Kwong-loi Shun
Copyright © 2008 by
Box 261 Cardinal Station
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Confucian ethics in retrospect and prospect / edited by Vincent Shen,
Kwong-loi Shun. p. cm. -- (Cultural heritage and contemporary change. Series III, Asia ;
v. 27) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Confucian ethics. I. Shen, Qingsong. II. Shun, Kwong-loi, 1953- III.
Title. IV. Series. BJ1289.3.C662007 2007010736 170.951 dc22 CIP
ISBN 978-1-56518-245-5 (pbk.)
Table of Contents Introduction
Vincent Shen 1 Part I. Confucian Ethics in Historical Context Chapter I. Virtues of Junzi
Antonio Cua 7 Chapter II. Teacher-Disciple, or Friends?– An Historico-Exegetical Approach to the Analects
Yuet Keung Lo 27 Chapter III. Music [yue] in Classical Confucianism: On the Recently Discovered Xing Zi Ming Chu
Johanna Liu 61 Chapter IV. Is Mencius a Motivational Internalist?
Anh Tuan Nuyen 79 Chapter V. Xunzi and the Essentialist Mode of Thinking about Human Nature
Kim-chong Chong 93 Chapter VI. Do Sages Have Emotions?
Alan K. L. Chan 113 Chapter VII. Locating the Moral Self: Emotions and Human Agency in Song Neo-Confucian Thought
Curie Virág 137 Chapter VIII. Is Wang Yangming’s Notion of Innate Moral Knowledge (Liangzhi) Tenable?
Yong Huang 149 Chapter IX. On Mou Zongsan’s Idealist Confucianism
Wing-cheuk Chan 171 Part II: Confucian Ethics in Comparative Context and in Prospect Chapter X. Between the Good and the Right: The Middle Way in Neo-Confucian and Mahyna Moral Philosophy
Jinfen Yan 187
iv Table of Contents
Chapter XI. Chong Yagyong’s Four Books Learning Tsai Chen-feng 229
Chapter XII. Itô Jinsai on Confucius’ Analects: A Type of Confucian Hermeneutics in East Asia
Chun-chieh Huang 247 Chapter XIII. Confucius on li and Montaigne on Coustume: A Reflection on Customary Practices and Personal Autonomy
Cecilia Wee 277 Chapter XIV. Globalization and Confucianism: The Virtues of Shu and Generosity to Many Others
Vincent Shen 291 Contributors 305 Index 307
Introduction
Vincent Shen The original Chinese term for “Confucianism“ was “rujia” (),
a term which first appeared only late in the “Records of the Grand Historian” (completed around 100BCE) of Sima Qian (145-86BCE) in the former Han Dynasty. Nevertheless, it was formed as a school already in the pre-Qin era. Historically speaking, ru () were those people who served, in the Spring and Autumn period in ancient China, as officials of middle range related to education and public rites. In the later Spring and Autumn period, they lost their office and earned their livelihood as teachers of rites and ritual coordinators. “Confucius“, the latinization of Kong Fuzi (Master Kong), refers to Kong Qiu , also know as, Zhongni , who served more or less the same function, though he was most influential because of teaching the largest number of students (3000 students according to the legend), having systematically organized his teaching materials, and, most importantly, laying a philosophical foundation for rituals and Chinese civilization by their transcendental derivation from ren to yi to li.
Confucius (551-479BC), seen as the founder of classical Confucianism, was followed in its second phase by his grand son Zisi (493-406BC), to be developed by Mencius (371-289BC), and in the third phases by Xunzi (298-238BC). Xunzi’s idea of Heaven as Nature and his combination of li (ritual) with fa (law), was followed by most Confucians in Han Dynasty to serve emperors and to reinforce political stability of the state. Dong Zhongshu (c179-c104BC) was responsible for making Confucianism the state ideology of Han Dynasty. Unfortunately, since the end of later Han Dynasty, Confucianism became dormant and less influential for intellectuals who were led away first by Neo-Daoism and then by Chinese Mahayana Buddhism.
After Centuries of silence, Confucianism began to revive in the North Sung Dynasty as “Neo-Confucianism“, which developed through three lines of thought. First, from the five masters of North Sung Dynasty, such as Zhou Dunyi (1017-1073AD), Zhang Zai (1020-1077) Shao Yung (1011-1077AD), Cheng Hao (also known as Cheng Mingdao 1032-1085) and Cheng Yi (also known as Cheng Yichuan 1033-1107), to Zhu Xi in the South Song Dynasty; this line could be called the Neo-Confucianism of the Realist Type. Second, from Lu Xiangshan (1139-1193) to Wang Yangming (1472-1529); this line could be called Neo-Confucianism of the Idealist type. Third, thinkers from late Ming Dynasty to mid Qing Dynasty, such as Wang Fuzhi (1619-1692) Yan Yuan (1635-1704), Li Gong (1659-1733), Dai Zhen (1723-1777), etc.; this line constituted Neo-Confucianism of the Naturalist type.
2 Vincent Shen
This is only a very schematic presentation of Confucianism in Chinese History, abstracted from its very rich historical, philosophical and everyday meanings for the Chinese people. Indeed, Confucianism, both as a way of life and as a system of ideas, has been developing for some 26 Centuries, and is still developing in China, East Asia and even throughout the world. It has long been spreading in Europe, North and South Americas, Africa, Australia, and other parts of the world. This is not only because of the increasing Chinese Diaspora and cultural exchange, but also from the local interest of all these areas. It is worth mentioning that, recently in China, the idea of “governance by virtue” of Jiang Zheming, former President of China, and the guiding policy of “Building Up a Harmonious Society” proposed by Hu Jingtao, current President of China, both belong to the Confucian political program. In today’s context of globalization, there is always a need to delve into the depth of Confucian thought and practice, not only for the purpose of understanding the cultures in the areas under its influence, but also for drawing resources of spiritual values that might be helpful for solving problems in today’s world. For these reasons Confucianism is always an important subject for East Asian Studies and China Studies in North America, and it is not surprising to see the recent emergence of a group of distinguished American scholars, like Robert Neville, John Berthrong and others, who call themselves “Boston Confucians”.
American and Asian scholars gathered for the purpose of mutual understanding and deeper perception of what is at stake for Confucianism today, as to its method, history and fundamental values. Some highly respected and internationally renowned academic institutions organized the International Conference on “Confucianism: Retrospect and Prospect” which took place at the Department of East Asian Studies, University of Toronto, September 2-3, 2005. I’m most grateful to the co-sponsors of this conference: the Department of East Asian Studies, University of Toronto, represented by Professor Andre Schmid; the University of Toronto at Scarborough, represented by Professor Kown-loi Shun; National Taiwan University’s Center for Study on East Asian Civilizations represented by Professor Chun-chieh Huang; the Department of Philosophy of Singapore University, represented by Professor Alan K. L. Chan; and the Council for Research in Philosophy and Value, Washington D.C., represented by Professor George McLean.
This volume is the outcome of the synergy of this conference whose papers are dvided into two parts. Those in the first part are related to Confucian Ethics in Historical Context; those in the second part are related to Confucian Ethics in Comparative Context and in Prospect.
The first part covers all major phases of the development of Confucianism. It starts with Professor Antonio Cua’s keynote speech on the virtues of Junzi. Using an analytical method and ethical theories, his paper presents a very comprehensive discussion of the virtues of Confucian paradigmatic individual, the Junzi, consisting of such interdependent
Introduction 3
cardinal virtues as ren, li, and yi, and their dependent supportive or constitutive virtues. Professor Yuet-keung Lo’s paper on “Teacher-Disciple, or Friends? – An Historico-Exegetical Approach to the Analects” discusses with subtlety the concept of peng (friend/disciple) in the Analects, integrating both philological and hermeneutic considerations. Professor Johanna Liu’s presentation, “Music [yue] in Classical Confucianism: On the Recently Discovered Xing Zi Ming Chu“, unfolds the rich meaning of the Confucian philosophy of music on three levels: sounds, aesthetics and self-cultivation/personality transformation, based on her analysis of the recently discovered bamboo slips text “Xing Zi Ming Chu” (Human Nature comes from Mandate). Professor Anh Tuan Nuyen’s paper “Is Mencius a Moral Internalist?” argues, using the analytic method, that Mencius should not be considered only an internalist, for he takes into account also external factors. Professor Kim-chong Chong’s “Xunzi and the Essentialist Mode of Thinking about Human Nature”, in critically analyzing Professor Antonio Cua’s consequentialist approach to Xunzi’s theory of human nature as evil, makes it clear that Xunzi does not hold an essentialist theory of human nature.
As to the period of the Dynasties Wei and Jin, a period quite often neglected by Confucian scholars, we have fortunately an excellent paper presented by Professor Alan Chan, titled “Do Sages Have Emotions?” This discusses both historically and philosophically the concepts of xin (nature) and qing (feelings) of He Yan, Wang Bi and Guo Xiang under the influence of Daoism. This unfolds the philosophical and historical meaning of the proposition “The sage is forgetful of his own feelings” till its influence on the theory of emotion of Chen Hao in the North Song Dynasty. This paper leads us into the period of Neo-Confucianism developed in the Dynasties of Song and Ming. In this volume we have included Professor Huang Yong’s “Neo-Confucian Political Philosophy: The Cheng Brothers on li (Propriety) as Political, Psychological and Metaphysical”, and Professor Curie Virag’s “Locating the moral self: emotions and human agency in Song Neo-Confucian thought” that discusses the concept of “qing” (feeling, emotions) in Zhu Xi’s moral psychology. As to contemporary Confucianism, this volume included Professor Wing-cheuk Chan’s “On Mou Tsong-san’s Idealist Confucianism”, updating us with the most recent development of Modern New Confucianism.
The second part of the book, related to Confucian Ethics in Comparative Context and its Prospect, consists either in bringing Confucianism to the larger context of comparison with Buddhism, such as Professor Yan Jinfen’s “Between the Good and the Right: The Middle Way in Neo-Confucian and Mahayana Moral Philosophy”, and to the context of East Asia. Korean Confucianism is represented by Professor Chen-feng Tsai’s “Chong Yagyong’s Four Books Learning,” while Japanese Confucianism is represented by Professor Chun-chieh Huang’s “Itô Jinsai on Confucius’ Analects: A Type of Confucian Hermeneutics in East Asia”. Included here also is Professor Cecilia Wee’s paper that compares
4 Vincent Shen
Confucius with the Western thinker, Montaigne, entitled “Confucius on li and Montaigne on Coustume: A Reflection on Customary Practices and Personal Autonomy.” This part ends up with my “Globalization and Confucianism: Confucian Virtues of Shu and Generosity to the Other” which opens Confucianism to the future opened by the process of globalization.
It is also worthy of note that several philosophical methods are used in this book to discuss Confucianism, such as the analytic method and ethical theories used by Antonio Cua, Anh Tuan Nuyen, and Kim-chong Chong; the phenomenological and hermeneutic methods with postmodern reflections by Vincent Shen and Johanna Liu; philological and exegetical methods used by Yuet-keung Lo; the comparative method and methods of intellectual history used by Chun-chieh Huang, Tsai Chen-feng and Cecelia Wee. Despite the variety of methods, most of the papers presented here are concerned with ethical and axiological (such as aesthetic) dimensions of Confucianism. We may say therefore that methodology and ethics of Confucianism are the two major concerns of this volume.
I want to thank all the co-sponsors and authors of papers presented in the conference and published in this volume. It is their wisdom and their generosity that constitute the essence of this volume. In particular, I want to thank Professor George McLean, who has generously co-sponsored this conference by being willing to publish this volume. His wisdom and virtues have always given me an exemplar image of junzi, the Confucian paradigmatic individual. Also my special thanks go to Miss Hu Yeping, who’s careful arrangement and technical support have rendered an excellent assistance in the whole process of publication of this book.
At the end of this preface, I wish to note especially how sad it is for those who know Professor Antonio Cua that he passed away on March 27, 2007. This indeed was a great loss for the entire community of scholars in Chinese philosophy and Asian Studies. Antonio Cua was an inspiring teacher, a great scholar, an eminent philosopher, and most importantly, a junzi in the Confucian sense. The editors of this volume and the publisher would dedicate in his memory their efforts in publishing this volume.
Part I
Chapter I
Antonio S. Cua (Ke Xiongwen ) INTRODUCTION
It is an honor and a privilege to present this keynote address. I am
grateful to Professor Vincent Shen and the organizing committee of the International Conference on Confucianism for providing me this opportunity to present a portion of my recent work on Confucian ethics, focusing on the idea of junzi -- one of the main topics of interest in my early years of teaching. The other topic pertains to the logical character of Confucian dialogues. The Lunyu was my main subject of exploration. Subsequently, I devoted much effort in developing a Confucian moral philosophy, my writings range from the study of human nature, rituals, reasoning and argumentation, structure of basic Confucian concepts to the unity of knowledge and action. As I advance in years, I often thought of returning to Confucius’s conception of junzi, because it seems to me that this conception offers a way to contribute to the recent revival of virtue ethics and, more importantly, the conception has inherent import, quite apart from its relevance to current problems and issues in moral philosophy or normative ethics. Building and expanding on some of my previous studies of junzi and Confucian ethics, I just completed a long manuscript entitled “The Virtues of Junzi.” This paper draws from about a third of that text.
Throughout the Lunyu, we find frequent occurrence of certain terms such as ren (benevolence, humaneness), li (rules of proper conduct, ritual, rites), and yi (rightness, righteousness. fittingness), indicating Confucius’s ongoing concern with the cultivation of fundamental virtues.1 The unsystematic character of Confucius’s ethical thought in part reflects his emphasis on the concrete and the particular. Confucius made extensive use of notion of junzi, instead of principles, for explaining ethical virtues and instruction. Plausibly, Confucius’s notion of junzi reflects his concern for flexibility in coping with changing circumstances. In this light, Confucius’s ethical thought, unlike that of Mencius (Mengzi ) or
1 See Cua, “Reflections on the Structure of Confucian Ethics,”
Philosophy East and West 21, No. 2: 125-40, incorporated in Dimensions of Moral Creativity (University Park: Pennsylvania Stae University Press, 1978), chap. 4. For an extensive discussion of the conceptual framework of Confucian ethics, see Moral Vision and Tradition: Essays in Chinese Ethics (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1998), Essay 13.
8 Antonio S. Cua
Xunzi , is best characterized as an ethics of junzi or paradigmatic individuals.2 In this paper I present a reconstruction of some principal aspects of Confucius’s conception of junzi. I shall offer a way for sorting out the virtues in the Lunyu, with special emphasis on ren and yi as a virtue of flexibility.
At the outset, let us note some different translations of junzi: “superior man“ (Legge, Chan, Bodde, Dubs), “gentleman“ (Waley, Lau, Watson), and “noble man or person” (Giles, Fingarette, Schwartz, de Bary)3. Since there is no English equivalent, junzi is best left untranslated. In any case, for Confucius, as well as Mencius and Xunzi, junzi expresses an ideal of a cultivated, ethical character. Although more explanation is needed to avoid misleading interpretations, the various translations of junzi may be viewed as valuable attempts to bring forth the translator’s own appraisal of the salient features of this ideal of ethical character in a way that will be intelligible to English readers. Thus, we may regard junzi as a sort of emphatic term that, in context, serves to accentuate certain ethically desirable and commendable virtues (meide ) or qualities of an ideal person, in short, ethical excellences.
In general junzi is a paradigmatic individual who sets the tone and quality of the life of ordinary moral agents. A junzi is a person who embodies ren, and yi, and li. Every person may strive to become a junzi in the sense of a guiding paradigmatic individual, rather than a xiaoren (small-minded person). There are of course degrees of personal ethical achievement, depending on the situation, character, ability, and opportunity of moral agents.
BASIC INTERDEPENDENT AND DEPENDENT VIRTUES: REN , LI , AND YI
Concern with the basic interdependent virtues of ren, yi, and li also involves particular dependent virtues such as filiality (xiao ),
2 Cua, Dimensions of Moral Creativity, chap. 2-4. 3 Wing-tsit Chan, trans., A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963); Arthur Waley, trans. The Analects of Confucius (New York: The Modern Library, 1938); D. C. Lau (trans). Confucius: The Analects (Lun yü) (Middlesex, England: Penguin, 1979): Burton Watson (trans), Hsün Tzu: Basic Writings (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963). Lionel Giles, Sayings of Confucius (London: John Murray, 1907); Herbert Fingarette, Confucius: The Secular as Sacred (New York: Harper and Row, 1972); Benjamin Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985); and Wm. Theodore de Bary, The Trouble with Confucianism (Cambridge, Mass and London, UK: Harvard University Press, 1991).
Virtues of Junzi 9
magnanimity (kuan ), trustworthiness (xin ), and courage (yong ). These particular virtues are called dependent virtues in the sense that their ethical significance depends on connection with the basic, interdependent, cardinal virtues (henceforth, cardinals). Dependent virtues are not subordinate or logical derivatives of the basic virtues. 4 The ethical significance of the particular dependent virtues is determined by ren and yi, since these are criteria of moral virtues.5 Of course, when li is invested with an ennobling function, it entails the presence of ren and yi.6 As Chen Daqi maintains, what Confucius meant by de , in the sense of excellence or virtue, has to do with the product of the intersection of ren and yi. Thus both ren and yi may be said to be the constituent elements of de.7
4 The distinction between basic and dependent virtues is not the
distinction between basic and subordinate virtues mistakenly attributed to me by Schoper, citing my earlier paper “Hsn Tzu and the Unity of Virtues” (Cua 1987). See See Jonathan W. Schoper, “Virtues in Xunzi’s Thought” in Virtue, Nature, and Moral Agency in the Xunzi, edited by T. C. Kline and Philip J. Ivanhoe (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2000). For elaboration of the relation between basic, interdependent virtues and dependent virtues, see my Moral Vision and Tradition, Essay 13.
5 In Dimensions of Moral Creativity, I considered ren as an internal criterion of morality and li as the external criterion. Since the application of li as rules of propriety is determined by yi, yi can also be regarded as an internal criterion, as it is an exercise of judgment concerning the applicability of li. Moreover, “just as jen [ren] cannot be practiced without li, or the cultural setting, jen cannot be realized without i [yi], or the judgment of the relevance of jen and li in concrete situations of moral performance” (Cua 1978, 51-57, 67-69). In Moral Vision and Tradition, based on a modification of Chen Daqi’s work on Lunyu, I discussed the criteria for determining the central or fundamental concepts in the Lunyu. See Chen Daqi, Kongzi xueshuo (Taipei: Zhengzhong, 1977).
6 See my “The Concept of Li in Confucian Moral Theory” in Understanding the Chinese Mind: The Philosophical Roots, edited by Robert E. Allinson (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1989). For…