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Mozambican Civil WarFrom Wikipedia,

Mozambican Civil WarPart of the Cold WarDate 1977 - 1992Location MozambiqueResult Peace treatyand multiparty elections

BelligerentsFRELIMO RENAMO ONUMOZCommanders and leadersFRELIMO Samora MachelFRELIMO Joaquim Chissano RENAMO Afonso DhlakamaCasualties and losses900,000

The Mozambican Civil War began in 1977, two years after the end of the war of independence. The ruling party, Front for Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO), wasviolently opposed from 1977 by the Rhodesian- and (later) South African-funded Mozambique Resistance Movement (RENAMO). Over 900,000 died in fighting and from starvation, five million civilians were displaced, many were made amputees by landmines, a legacy from the war that continues to plague Mozambique.[1][2] Fightin

g ended in 1992 and the country's first multi-party elections were held in 1994.

IndependenceMain articles: Mozambican War of Independence and Overseas Province of MozambiqueMozambican resistance began to surface, as some groups within the Mozambican society eventually started to blame the Portuguese authorities for centuries of exploitation, oppression and neglect.[citation needed] After a successful wave of independence movements in other African territories, cold war powers and the international community started to suggest that Portugal should leave its territories in Africa. Sentiment for Mozambique's own national independence developed andon 25 June 1962 several Mozambican anti-Portuguese political groups formed the M

ozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania.

Frelimo's first president was Eduardo Mondlane whose first objective was to forge a broad based insurgent coalition that could effectively challenge the colonial regime.[citation needed] Anonymous private contributors, many of them friendsof Mondlane, financed or secured money for Frelimo's health, publicity, and educational projects, while military equipment and training came from Algeria, Soviet Union and China.

On September 25, 1964, Frelimo soldiers, with logistical assistance from the surrounding population, attacked the administrative post at Chai in the province ofCabo Delgado. This raid marked the beginning of the armed struggle against thePortuguese colonial government. Frelimo militants were able to evade pursuit and

surveillance by employing guerrilla tactics: ambushing patrols, sabotaging communication and railroad lines, and making hit-and-run attacks against colonial outposts before rapidly fading into accessible backwater areas. At the war's outset, Frelimo had little hope for a military victory; its hope lay in a war of attrition to compel a negotiated independence from Lisbon. Portugal fought its own version of protracted warfare. Had the military succeeded with a minimum of expenditure and casualties, the war could have remained undecided for much longer until FRELIMO's ultimate disbanding. In the early 1970s, Gordian Knot Operation andthe following Portuguese campaigns were militarily successful in destroying guerrilla forces and support bases in the territory. But the expense in blood and t


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reasure, not military defeat, was costly for Lisbon; the Portuguese army was never destroyed on the battlefield, although some of its officers were converted toFrelimo's communist ideology for Portugal.

On 25 April 1974 the authoritarian regime of Estado Novo had been overthrown inLisbon, a move that was supported by many Portuguese workers and peasants. The Armed Forces Movement (Movimento das Foras Armadas) in Portugal pledged a return to civil liberties and an end to the fighting in all colonies (or the overseas provinces). The rapid chain of events within Portugal caught Frelimo, which had anticipated a protracted guerrilla campaign, by surprise. It responded quickly tothe new situation and on 7 September 1974 won an agreement from the Armed ForcesMovement to transfer power to Frelimo within a year. When this was made known to the public, several thousand of Portuguese people fled the newly-independent country and, as a result of the exodus, the economy and social organization of Mozambique collapsed. On June 25, 1975 Mozambique gained independence from Portugal, with Samora Machel as the Head of State.

A couple of years later, Mozambican RENAMO rebels, armed and aided by South Africa, would start to fight against the Marxist-oriented Government of FRELIMO, which had come to power after Portugal granted its African overseas province independence in 1975.

[edit] Civil war beginsIn 1976[citation needed] a new resistance movement was formed called the Mozambi

que Resistance Movement (RENAMO). This force was formed to counter the Frelimo government and to disrupt the logistical flow of weapons to ZANLA guerrilla fighters based in Mozambique's border areas who were fighting against neighboring Rhodesia. After Rhodesia became Zimbabwe South Africa then became Renamo's chief sponsor. South Africa, just like Rhodesia before was determined to prevent guerrillas, this time from the African National Congress (ANC), from basing themselvesin Mozambique. Renamo was led by Afonso Dhlakama. Many Portuguese nationals andMozambicans of Portuguese heritage left again in mass exodus.

The Gersony report, Summary of Mozambican Refugee Accounts of Principally Conflict-Related Experience in Mozambique, written by Robert Gersony for the U.S. State Department submitted on April 1988, reported that refugees provided eyewitnessor other credible accounts about killings (from Renamo) which included shooting

executions, knife/axe/bayonet killings, burning alive, beating to death, forcedasphyxiation, forced starvation, and random shooting at civilians in villages during attacks. Mozambican civilians were Renamo's principal targets in the war,although they also attacked government installations and the economic infrastructure. Renamo were notorious for their use of child soldiers.

The Frelimo administration, led by President Machel, was economically ruined byRenamo's rebels. The military and diplomatic entente with the Soviet Union couldnot alleviate the nation's economic misery and famine. As a result, a reluctantPresident Machel signed a non-aggression pact with South Africa, known as the Nkomati Accord. In return, Pretoria promised to sever economic assistance in exchange for Frelimo's commitment to prevent the ANC from using Mozambique as a sanctuary to pursue its campaign to overthrow white minority rule in South Africa. T

he volume of direct South African government support for Renamo diminished afterthe Nkomati accord, but documents discovered during the capture of Renamo headquarters at Gorongosa in central Mozambique in August 1985 revealed continuing South African government communications along with military support for Renamo.

On 19 October 1986, Mozambique's first president, Samora Machel died when his presidential aircraft crashed near South Africa's border. An international investigation determined that the crash was caused by errors made by the flight crew. Machel's successor was Joaquim Alberto Chissano, who had served as foreign minister from 1975 until Machel's death. Chissano continued Machel's policies of expan


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ding Mozambique's international ties, particularly the country's links with theWest, and pursuing internal reforms.

In 1990, with the end of the cold war, and apartheid crumbling in South Africa,support for Renamo was drying up in South Africa and the United States, the first direct talks between the Frelimo government and Renamo were held. Frelimo's draft constitution in July 1989 paved the way for a multiparty system and in November 1990 a new constitution was adopted. Mozambique was now a multiparty state,with periodic elections, and guaranteed democratic rights.

On 4 October 1992, the Rome General Peace Accords, negotiated by the Community of Sant'Egidio with the support of the United Nations, were signed in Rome between President Chissano and Renamo leader Afonso Dhlakama, which formally took effect on the October 15, 1992. A UN peacekeeping force (ONUMOZ) of 7,500 arrived inMozambique and oversaw a two year transition to democracy. 2,400 internationalobservers also entered the country to supervise the elections held on October 27-28, 1994. The last ONUMOZ contingents departed in early 1995.

Ivory Coast crisis: Q&AHow Ivory Coast plunged into civil war after Laurent Gbagbo's defeat by AlassaneOuatarra in last year's presidential election

guardian.co.uk, Thursday 7 April 2011 14.24 BST

Who is Alassane Ouatarra?Internationally recognised as the winner of last year's election, Alassane Ouatarra studied in the US and obtained a doctorate in economics in 1972 from the University of Pennsylvania. He worked as an economist for the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and later at the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO). He re

turned to the IMF in 1984 as director of the African department, and in May 1987was appointed counsellor to the managing director at the IMF. Ouattara became prime minister of Ivory Coast in 1990, but was barred twice from running for thepresidency because his father's side of the family is from Burkina Faso. In 2007, however, Laurent Gbagbo said Ouattara could stand in the next Ivorian presidential election. Ouattara won 54.1% of the vote, his support coming mainly from the predominantly Muslim north, and from the poor immigrant workers from Mali andBurkina Faso working on coffee and cocoa plantations.

Who are the rebel forces?Ouattara's troops, the Republican Forces of Ivory Coast (FRCI) consists of a loose coalition of fighters who previously fought for the Forces Nouvelles (New For

ces) rebellion local defence forces, former soldiers and policemen who defectedfrom Gbagbo's side. FN commanders Soumala Bakayoko, Chrif Ousmane, Tuo Fozi and Tor Herv took part in the September 2002 rebellion that nearly toppled Gbagbo. After2002, the FN took control of the north and based themselves in Bouak, in effectsplitting Ivory Coast in two. Unlike Libya's novice revolutionaries, they had uniforms, heavy weapons, a command structure and headquarters in Bouak, where tablecloths in official colours and framed photographs of senior officers adorn the air-conditioned rooms. The FN's secretary-general and main public face is Guillaume Soro, a 30-year-old former student leader and now Ouattara's prime minister.


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Why have they been so successful?When the FN launched an offensive in mid-March, Gbagbo's army put up only tokenresistance, with an estimated 50,000 soldiers, police and gendarmes deserting, including his top general. Some have pragmatically chosen to fight for Ouattara,the defectors reaching a critical mass that still eludes Libyans.

Have the FN committed human rights abuses?Human Rights Watch (HRW) said in a report last week that the vast majority of abuses it documented in a four-month period were perpetrated by forces loyal to Gbagbo against real or perceived Ouattara supporters, notably members of politicalparties allied to Ouattara, as well as west African immigrants and Muslims. Thedocumented abuses include targeted killings, enforced disappearances, politically motivated rapes, and unlawful use of lethal force against unarmed demonstrators. HRW, however, has also documented extrajudicial executions by Ouattara's forces against alleged pro-Gbagbo supporters and combatants detained in Ouattara territory since late February. HRW documented 11 such cases from both witnesses and perpetrators including three detainees who were burned alive and another fourwhose throats were slit, acts amounting to war crimes under international humanitarian law. Analysts say Ouattara does not have complete control of his own forces, let alone those of the former incumbent, and other armed groups both criminal and mercenary which will make it difficult for him to restore stability and order.

Q+A-Ivory Coast's slide back into civil warFri Mar 18, 2011 3:36pm GMTPrint | Single Page[-] Text [+] By David LewisDAKAR, March 18 (Reuters) - Fighting in Ivory Coast's main city is spreading andthe death toll from a power struggle between incumbent leader Laurent Gbagbo and his rival Alassane Ouattara is mounting.

Here are some questions and answers on the latest developments:

HAS THE CIVIL WAR ALREADY RESTARTED?

It looks like it.

There have been numerous warnings that the election intended to heal rifts froma 2002-3 civil war could instead spark a new conflict. Intense fighting betweenforces backing the rivals in Abidjan and clashes in the west have now gone on for weeks.

But Ouattara's establishment this week of a new army -- the Republican Forces ofIvory Coast (FRCI) -- ends efforts by his camp to distance the former IMF man from armed conflict.

The move puts gunmen who still control the north and have launched a number of pushes south, as well as any members of the security forces who defect, under hiscommand.\\\

Q+A-Ivory Coast's slide back into civil warFri Mar 18, 2011 3:36pm GMTPrint | Single Page[-] Text [+] By David Lewis


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DAKAR, March 18 (Reuters) - Fighting in Ivory Coast's main city is spreading andthe death toll from a power struggle between incumbent leader Laurent Gbagbo and his rival Alassane Ouattara is mounting.

Here are some questions and answers on the latest developments:

HAS THE CIVIL WAR ALREADY RESTARTED?

It looks like it.

There have been numerous warnings that the election intended to heal rifts froma 2002-3 civil war could instead spark a new conflict. Intense fighting betweenforces backing the rivals in Abidjan and clashes in the west have now gone on for weeks.

But Ouattara's establishment this week of a new army -- the Republican Forces ofIvory Coast (FRCI) -- ends efforts by his camp to distance the former IMF man from armed conflict.

The move puts gunmen who still control the north and have launched a number of pushes south, as well as any members of the security forces who defect, under hiscommand.

One diplomat said the former rebels are already being recognised as members of an army serving under Ouattara.This could pave the way for more international backing for them, but is unlikelyresolve the fractious nature of these forces. A number of analysts say the control and command of these forces is not clear and may sometimes escape Ouattara.

Either way, fighting is intensifying, the death toll is mounting. "If you look at the dead and displaced, it doesn't need to be more to be a civil war," said Kwesi Aning, head of research at the Ghana-based Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre.

DOES THIS CHANGE THE REALITY?

Ouattara said this week Gbagbo has been given his last chance to stand down peacefully, although he did not set a deadline for Gbagbo to comply. He called on the security forces to switch their allegiance to him.

Clashes have spread from the pro-Ouattara Abobo stronghold in Abidjan, bringingautomatic and heavy weapons fire closer to the leafy middle class districts closer to the centre of town.

Ouattara's camp looks likely to seek further divisions within the pro-Gbagbo forces before any full-blown offensive.

For now, this means more protracted, low-level skirmishes. At least 25 people we

re killed on Thursday after shelling by pro-Gbagbo forces, the U.N. said.

The death toll from the crisis has risen to more than 435 according to the United Nations, 720 according to the Ouattara camp. Some 12,000 U.N. peacekeepers areurged to do more to protect civilians.Their mandate allows them to intervene, and they recently secured two Mi-24 helicopter gunships, but they seem reluctant to take robust action against pro-Gbagbo forces.

U.N. officials say part of their problem is that Gbagbo's forces are the main th


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reat to civilians, so protecting the public would sometimes mean firing on the Ivorian military, which risks dragging peacekeepers into active conflict.

HOW WILL THE REGION RESPOND?

The African Union's reconfirmation of Ouattara as the president after weeks of mediation by African presidents was a significant blow to Gbagbo, who had soughtto play on divisions across the continent over the U.N.'s rapid backing of his rival.

South Africa, the most significant nation to waver in support for Ouattara, thisweek confirmed it stood by the AU's decision, in a move that analysts say willmake it harder for other nations like Angola to back Gbagbo.

However, regional military intervention, as threatened by West Africa's ECOWAS bloc, still appears a long way off.

Regional powerhouse Nigeria, without which an operation is unlikely, is weeks away from a presidential election while other nations remain reluctant to commit to any such force.

Tacit international backing of anti-Gbagbo forces now officially in Ouattara's army could follow, although such a move would be highly sensitive and, if publici

sed, could provoke further escalation of nationalistic rhetoric and violence.WHAT ABOUT THE ECOMOMY AND COCOA EXPORTS?

The crisis has long since paralysed the world's top grower's cocoa exports, withsome 475,000 tonnes of beans sitting in storage due to a ban on shipments by Ouattara and EU sanctions.

The drying up of beans has sent cocoa futures to 30-year highs before prices fell back following Japan's earthquake.

There are increasing fears over the quality of the beans as the rainy season approaches. Unless the crisis swiftly ends, it is not clear what will happen to the

200,000-odd tonne mid-crop that is still on trees.

Smuggling has helped farmers sell their crop via neighbours, but slowed as Ghanareinforced border controls.

The banking sector is seizing up and the IMF warns of "serious risks" for the West Africa region.

A defaulted $2.3 billion Eurobond is trading at 36 percent of face value, and some analysts think this an attractive entry level on the hope for a resolution. (Editing by Tim Cocks and Peter Graff)

&A: Sudan's Darfur conflict

As many as 300,000 people have died in the conflict

Sudan's President Omar al-Bashir and the main rebel group in Darfur, the Justiceand Equality Movement (Jem), are about to sign a ceasefire.


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It is being seen as an important step to achieving peace before a national election in April.

Some 2.7 million people have fled their homes since the conflict began in the arid western region, and the UN says about 300,000 have died - mostly from disease.

How did the conflict start?

The Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and Justice and Equality Movement (Jem) began attacking government targets in early 2003, accusing Khartoum of oppressing blackAfricans in favour of Arabs.

Darfur, which means land of the Fur, has faced many years of tension over land and grazing rights between the mostly nomadic Arabs, and farmers from the Fur, Massaleet and Zaghawa communities.

How did the government respond to the rebellion?

It admits mobilising "self-defence militias" following rebel attacks.

But it denies any links to the Arab Janjaweed militia - who are accused of trying to drive out black Africans from large swathes of territory.

KEY REBEL PLAYERSSLM: Minni Minnawi's factionSLM: Abdul Wahid Mohammad Ahmed al-Nur's factionJem: Khalil Ibrahim, one of the first rebel groups

A step forward for Darfur peace?President Omar al-Bashir has called the Janjaweed "thieves and gangsters".

But refugees say air raids by government aircraft would be followed by attacks from the Janjaweed, who would ride into villages on horses and camels, slaughtering men, raping women and stealing whatever they could find.

The US and some human rights groups have said genocide is taking place - thougha UN investigation team in 2005 concluded that war crimes had been committed butthere had been no intent to commit genocide.

Trials have been announced in Khartoum of some members of the security forces suspected of abuses - but this is viewed as part of a campaign against attempts toget suspects tried at the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague.

What has happened to Darfur's civilians?

The United Nations says more than 2.7 million people have fled their homes and now live in camps near Darfur's main towns.

SEARCH FOR PEACEMay 2006: Khartoum makes peace with main Darfur rebel faction, Sudan LiberationMovement; Jem rejects the dealMay 2008: Unprecedented assault by Jem on KhartoumJul 2008: ICC calls for arrest of President BashirNov 2008: President Bashir announces ceasefireNov 2008: ICC calls for arrest of three rebel commandersFeb 2009: Army says it has captured key town of Muhajiriya


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Feb 2009: Khartoum and Jem sign a deal in Qatar

Mixed views on Darfur dealDarfuris say the Janjaweed patrol outside the camps and men are killed and womenraped if they venture too far in search of firewood or water.

Some 200,000 people have also sought safety in neighbouring Chad. Many of theseare camped along a 600km (372 mile) stretch of the border and remain vulnerableto attacks from the Sudan side.

Chad's eastern areas have a similar ethnic make-up to Darfur and the violence has spilled over the border area, with the neighbours accusing one another of supporting each other's rebel groups.

Many aid agencies have been working in Darfur but they are unable to get accessto vast areas because of the insecurity.

Several were banned from northern Sudan after the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for President Bashir in 2009 for alleged war crimes.

How many have died?

The United Nations says up to 300,000 people have died from the combined effects

of war, hunger and disease.

Janjaweed gunmen are accused of prowling outside refugee campsPresident Bashir puts the death toll at 10,000.

Accurate figures are difficult to research and have made no distinction betweenthose dying as a result of violence and those dying as a result of starvation ordisease in the camps.

The numbers are crucial in determining whether the deaths in Darfur are genocideor - as the Sudanese government says - the situation is being exaggerated.

Is anyone trying to stop the fighting?

Yes.

There are thousands of peacekeepers in the region under the auspices of a jointAfrican Union-UN peacekeeping mission, Unamid.

Last August, the UN's outgoing military commander General Martin Agwai said theconflict was effectively over and isolated attacks and banditry were the region's main problems now.

There was a peace deal in 2006, but only one of many rebel factions signed up to

it.

Qatar, the United Nations, the African Union, Arab League and Chad have all helped to arrange peace talks between Khartoum and Jem over the past few years.

The US envoy to Darfur, Scott Gration, has also been involved in talks aimed atgetting the rebel groups to agree a common position so they can take part in broader peace talks.

It is hoped that the ceasefire with Jem will see other rebels sit down at the ne


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gotiating table.

Who is to blame?

The international community lays much of the blame on Mr Bashir.

Omar al-Bashir says ICC charges reflect Western hostility to SudanHe has frequently been accused of supporting the pro-government militias.

The International Criminal Court in The Hague issued an arrest warrant last yearfor war crimes and crimes against humanity.

An attempt to add genocide to the charge was initially refused - but prosecutorsappealed and the court's pre-trial chamber has now been ordered to reconsider genocide charges.

Rebel groups have also been held responsible for some atrocities.

But the case against rebel leader Bahar Idriss Abu Garda, accused of planning the killing of 12 African Union peacekeepers in 2007, was dropped this year as theICC ruled there was not enough evidence to support a trial.

Colombian armed conflict (1964present)From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (Redirected from Colombian Civil War)Jump to: navigation, searchFor other Colombia-related conflicts, see List of wars involving Colombia.This article needs additional citations for verification. Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. (July 2010)Colombian Armed Conflict

Colin Powell, then the US Secretary of State visiting Colombia as part of the Un

ited States' support of Plan Colombia.Date 1964 presentLocation ColombiaStatus Ongoing; insurgency continues, drug war unresolvedTerritorialchanges El Caguan DMZ

BelligerentsParamilitariesAUC (De)*AAA (Dis)*CONVIVIR (Dis)*Black Eagles

Other paramilitary successor groups.[1]--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Drug cartels

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------Government

ArmyNavy


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Air ForceNational PoliceCONVIVIR (Dis)*USA--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Drug cartels

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------GuerrillasFARCELNM-19 (Dis)*EPLMOEC (Dis)*CGSB (Dis)*Quintn Lame Command (Dis)*ERC (De)*GRAIRAFP--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Drug cartels

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------Commanders and leadersFidel Castao Carlos Castao Vicente Castao [citation needed]Rodrigo Tovar PupoSalvatore MancusoDiego Murillo Juan Manuel SantosPadilla LenMontoya Uribe Mauricio Jaramillo

Timolen JimnezJoaqun GmezIvn MrquezAntonio GarcaFrancisco GalnStrengthParamilitary successor groups, including the Black Eagles: 3,749 13,000[2][3][4]National Police: 145,871[5]

Army: 238,889[6]Air Force: 13,108[6] FARC: 9,00018,000 in 2010, according to the Colombian ArmedForces.[7]+ ~30,000 part time militants according to analysts.[8]ELN: 3,500 5,000

IRAFP: ~80Casualties and lossesArmy and Police: 4,286 killed, 13,076 injured (since 2002[6]) FARC: 12,981 de

mobilized (since 2002[6])ELN: 2,789 demobilized (since 2002[6])

Since 2002, 34,512 guerrillas captured, 13,197 killed[6]total casualties=50,000200,000[9]total people displaced= 2,400,0004,000,000[10]


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The Colombian armed conflict or Colombian Civil War are terms that are employedto refer to the current asymmetric low-intensity armed conflict in Colombia thathas existed since approximately 1964 or 1966, between the Colombian governmentand peasant guerrillas such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and the National Liberation Army (ELN).

It is historically rooted in the conflict known as La Violencia, which was triggered by the 1948 assassination of populist political leader Jorge Elicer Gaitn,[11] and in the aftermath of United States-backed military attacks on peasant communities in rural Colombia in the 1960s that led Liberal and Communist militants to re-organize into FARC.[12]

The reasons for fighting vary from group to group. The FARC and other guerrillamovements claim to be fighting for the rights of the poor in Colombia to protectthem from government violence and to provide social justice through socialism.[13] The Colombian government claims to be fighting for order and stability, andseeking to protect the rights and interests of its citizens. The paramilitary groups, such as the AUC, claim to be reacting to perceived threats by guerrilla movements.[14] Both guerrilla and paramilitary groups have been accused of engaging in drug trafficking and terrorism. All parties engaged in the conflict have been criticized for numerous human rights violations.

The fighting has killed tens of thousands of people, and displaced millions.Contents [hide]1 Background2 Timeline2.1 1960s2.2 1970s2.3 1980s2.4 1990s2.4.1 Early 1990s2.4.2 Mid-1990s2.5 Late 1990s Early 2000s2.6 Early 2000s 2006

2.7 200720092.8 201020113 Role of the United States4 See also5 Notes6 References7 Further reading7.1 Books7.1.1 English7.1.2 Other languages7.2 Journals / Periodicals7.3 Government/NGO reports7.4 News

7.5 Websites

[edit] BackgroundThe direct origins of the current conflict are usually dated to19641966, while the remote origins would at least go back as far as 1948[citation needed].

The 1948 assassination of populist Jorge Eliecer Gaitn lead to the Bogotazo, an urban riot killing more than 4,000 people, and subsequently to ten years of sustained rural warfare between members of Colombian Liberal Party and the Colombian


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Conservative Party, a period known as La Violencia ("The Violence"), which tookthe lives of more than 200,000 people throughout the countryside.[11]

As La Violencia wound down, most self-defense and guerrilla units made up of Liberal Party supporters demobilized, but at the same time some former Liberals andactive Communist groups continued operating in several rural enclaves. One of the Liberal bands was a group known as the "Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia" (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), or FARC, formed by Dumar Aljure in the early 1950s, one of the largest Liberal guerrillas in 1958.[15] This group eventually ceased to exist, but its name remained as a historical reference[citation needed].

Also in 1958, an exclusively bipartisan political alternation system, known as the National Front, resulted from an agreement between the Liberal and Conservative parties. The agreement had come as a result of the two parties attempting tofind a final political solution to the decade of mutual violence and unrest, remaining in effect until 1974.[11]

[edit] Timeline[edit] 1960sIn the early 1960s Colombian Army units loyal to theNational Front began, at the behest of the United States, to attack peasant communities throughout Colombia that they considered to be enclaves for bandits andCommunists. It was the 1964 attack on the community of Marquetalia that motivated the later creation of FARC.[16]

Unlike the rural FARC, which had roots in the previous Liberal peasant struggles, the ELN was mostly an outgrowth of university unrest and would subsequently tend to follow a small group of charismatic leaders, including Camilo Torres Restrepo.[17]

Both guerrilla groups remained mostly operational in remote areas of the countryduring the rest of the 1960s[citation needed].

The Colombian government organized several short-lived counter-guerrilla campaigns in the late 1950s and early 1960s. These efforts were aided by the U.S. government and the CIA, which employed hunter-killer teams and involved U.S. personnel from the previous Philippine campaign against the Huks, and which would laterparticipate in the subsequent Phoenix Program in Vietnam.[14][18]

[edit] 1970sBy 1974, another challenge to the state's authority and legitimacy had come from the 19th of April Movement (M-19), leading to a new phase in the conflict. The M-19 was a mostly urban guerrilla group, founded in response to an electoral fraud during the final National Front election of Misael Pastrana Borrero (19701974) and the defeat of former dictator Gustavo Rojas Pinilla[citation needed].

[edit] 1980sBy 1982, the perceived passivity of the FARC, together with the relative success of the government's efforts against the M-19 and ELN, enabled the administration of the Liberal Party's Julio Csar Turbay Ayala (19781982) to lift astate-of-siege decree that had been in effect, on and off, for most of the previous 30 years. Under the latest such decree, president Turbay had implemented sec

urity policies that, though of some military value against the M-19 in particular, were considered highly questionable both inside and outside Colombian circlesdue to numerous accusations of military human rights abuses against suspects and captured guerrillas[citation needed].

Citizen exhaustion due to the conflict's newfound intensity led to the electionof president Belisario Betancur (19821986), a Conservative who won 47% of the popular vote, directed peace feelers at all the insurgents, and negotiated a 1984 cease-fire with the FARC at La Uribe, Meta, after a 1982 release of many guerrillas imprisoned during the previous effort to overpower them. A truce was also arr


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anged with the M-19. The ELN rejected entering any negotiation and continued torecover itself through the use of extortions and threats, in particular againstforeign oil companies of European and U.S. origin[citation needed].

As these events were developing, the growing illegal drug trade and its consequences were also increasingly becoming a matter of widespread importance to all participants in the Colombian conflict. Guerrillas and newly wealthy drug lords had mutually uneven relations and thus numerous incidents occurred between them. Eventually the kidnapping of drug cartel family members by guerrillas led to thecreation of the 1981 Muerte a Secuestradores (MAS) death squad ("Death to Kidnappers"). Pressure from the U.S. government and critical sectors of Colombian society was met with further violence, as the Medelln Cartel and its hitmen, bribed or murdered numerous public officials, politicians and others who stood in its way by supporting the implementation of extradition of Colombian nationals to theU.S. Victims of cartel violence included Justice Minister Rodrigo Lara Bonilla,assassinated in 1984, an event which made the Betancur administration begin to directly oppose the drug lords[citation needed].

The first negotiated cease-fire with the M-19 ended when the guerrillas resumedfighting in 1985, claiming that the cease-fire had not been fully respected by official security forces, saying that several of its members had suffered threatsand assaults, and also questioning the government's real willingness to implement any accords. The Betancur administration in turn questioned the M-19's actions and its commitment to the peace process, as it continued to advance high profi

le negotiations with the FARC, which led to the creation of the Patriotic Union(Unin Patritica) -UP-, a legal and non-clandestine political organization[citationneeded].

On November 6, 1985, the M-19 stormed the Colombian Palace of Justice and held the Supreme Court magistrates hostage, intending to put president Betancur on trial. In the ensuing crossfire that followed the military's reaction, some 120 people lost their lives, as did most of the guerrillas, including several high-ranking operatives and 12 Supreme Court Judges.[3] Both sides blamed each other forthe outcome. This marked the end of Betancur's peace process.[4]

Meanwhile, individual FARC members initially joined the UP leadership in representation of the guerrilla command, though most of the guerrilla's chiefs and mili

tiamen did not demobilize nor disarm, as that was not a requirement of the process at that point in time. Tension soon significantly increased, as both sides began to accuse each other of not respecting the cease-fire.[citation needed].

According to historian Daniel Pecut, the creation of the Patriotic Union took theguerrillas' political message to a wider public outside of the traditional communist spheres of influence and led to local electoral victories in regions suchas Urab and Antioquia, with their mayoral candidates winning twenty-three municipalities and their congressional ones gaining fourteen seats (five in the Senate,nine in the lower Chamber) in 1988.[19] According to journalist Steven Dudley,who interviewed ex-FARC as well as former members of the UP and the Communist Party,[20] FARC leader Jacobo Arenas insisted to his subordinates that the UP's creation did not mean that the group would lay down its arms nor a rejection of th

e Seventh Conference's military strategy.[21] Pecut states that new recruits entered the guerrilla army and its urban militia units during the period, also claiming that FARC did not stop kidnapping and continued to target regional politicians for assassination.[22]

In October 1987, the UP's 1986 presidential candidate Jaime Pardo Leal was assassinated amid a wave of violence that would lead to the deaths of thousands of its party members at the hands of death squads.[23][24] According to Pecut, the killers included members of the military and the political class who had opposed Belisario Betancur's peace process and considered the UP to be little more than a


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"facade" for FARC, as well as drug traffickers and landowners who were also involved in the establishment of paramilitary groups.[25]

[edit] 1990s[edit] Early 1990sThe Virgilio Barco Vargas (19861990) administration, in addition to continuing to handle the difficulties of the complex negotiations with the guerrillas, also inherited a particularly chaotic confrontation against the drug lords, who were engaged in a campaign of terrorism and murder in response to government moves in favor of their extradition overseas.[citation needed].

In June 1987, the ceasefire between FARC and the Colombian government formally collapsed after the guerrillas attacked a military unit in the jungles of Caquet.[26][27] According to journalist Steven Dudley, FARC founder Jacobo Arenas considered the incident to be a "natural" part of the truce and reiterated the group'sintention to continue the dialogue, but President Barco sent an ultimatum to the guerrillas and demanded that they immediately disarm or face military retaliation.[27] Regional guerrilla and Army skirmishes created a situation where each violation of the ceasefire rendered it null in each location, until it was rendered practically nonexistent[citation needed].

By 1990, at least 2,500 members of the FARC-founded Patriotic Union had been murdered, according to historian Daniel Pecut, leading up to that year's assassination of presidential candidate Bernardo Jaramillo Ossa. The Colombian government initially blamed drug lord Pablo Escobar for the murder but journalist Steven Dud

ley argues that many in the UP pointed at then-Interior Minister Carlos Lemos Simmonds for publicly calling out the UP as the "political wing of FARC" shortly before the murder, while others claimed it was the result of an alliance betweenFidel Castao, members of the Colombian military and the DAS.[28] Pecut and Dudleyargue that significant tensions had emerged between Jaramillo, FARC and the Communist Party due to the candidate's recent criticism of the armed struggle and their debates over the rebels' use of kidnapping, almost leading to a formal break.[29][30] Jaramillo's death led to a large exodus of UP militants; in addition,by then many FARC cadres who joined the party had already returned to clandestinity, using the UP experience as an argument in favor of revolutionary war.[24][26][31]

The M-19 and several smaller guerrilla groups were successfully incorporated int

o a peace process as the 1980s ended and the 90s began, which culminated in theelections for a Constituent Assembly of Colombia that would write a new constitution, which took effect in 1991[citation needed].

Contacts with the FARC, which had irregularly continued despite the end of the ceasefire and the official 1987 break from negotiations, were temporarily cut offin 1990 under the presidency of Csar Gaviria Trujillo (19901994). The Colombian Army's assault on the FARC's Casa Verde sanctuary at La Uribe, Meta, followed bya FARC offensive that sought to undermine the deliberations of the Constitutional Assembly, began to highlight a significant break in the uneven negotiations carried over from the previous decade[citation needed].

Both parties nevertheless never completely broke off some amount of political co

ntacts for long, as some peace feelers continued to exist, leading to short rounds of conversations in both Caracas, Venezuela (1991) and Tlaxcala, Mexico (1992). Despite the signing of several documents, no concrete results were achieved when the talks ended[citation needed].

[edit] Mid-1990sFARC military activity increased throughout the bulk of the 1990s as the group continued to grow in wealth from both kidnapping and drug-relatedactivities, while drug crops rapidly spread throughout the countryside. The guerrillas protected many of the coca growers from eradication campaigns and allowed them to grow and commercialize coca in exchange for a "tax" either in money or


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in crops[citation needed].

In this context, FARC had managed to recruit and train more fighters, beginningto use them in concentrated attacks in a novel and mostly unexpected way. This led to a series of high profile raids and attacks against Colombian state bases and patrols, mostly in the southeast of Colombia but also affecting other areas[citation needed].

In mid-1996 a civic protest movement made up of an estimated 200,000 coca growers from Putumayo and part of Cauca began marching against the Colombian government to reject its drug war policies, including fumigations and the declaration ofspecial security zones in some departments. Different analysts have stressed that the movement itself fundamentally originated on its own, but at the same time,FARC heavily encouraged the marchers and actively promoted their demands both peacefully and through the threat of force.[32][33]

Additionally, in 1997 and 1998, town councilmen in dozens of municipalities of the south of the country were threatened, killed, kidnapped, forced to resign orto exile themselves to department capitals by the FARC and the ELN.[34][35]

In Las Delicias, Caquet, five FARC fronts (about 400 guerrillas) recognized intelligence pitfalls in a Colombian Army base and exploited them to overrun it on August 30, 1996, killing 34 soldiers, wounding 17 and taking some 60 as prisoners.Another significant attack took place in El Billar, Caquet on March 2, 1998, whe

re a Colombian Army counterinsurgency battalion was patrolling, resulting in thedeath of 62 soldiers and the capture of some 43. Other FARC attacks against Police bases in Miraflores, Guaviare and La Uribe, Meta in August 1998 killed morethan a hundred soldiers, policemen and civilians, and resulted in the capture orkidnapping of a hundred more[citation needed].

These attacks, and the dozens of members of the Colombian security forces takenprisoner by the FARC, contributed to increasingly shaming the government of president Ernesto Samper Pizano (19941998) in the eyes of sectors of public and political opinion. He was already the target of numerous critics due to revelations of a drug-money scandal surrounding his presidential campaign. Perceptions of corruption due to similar scandals led to Colombia's decertification as a country cooperating with the United States in the war on drugs in 1995 (when the effects

of the measure were temporarily waived), 1996 and 1997.[36][37]

The Samper administration reacted against FARC's attacks by gradually abandoningnumerous vulnerable and isolated outposts in more than 100,000 km. of the rural countryside, instead concentrating Army and Police forces in the more heavily defended strongholds available, which allowed the guerrillas to more directly mobilize through and influence events in large areas of rural territory which were left with little or no remaining local garrisons[citation needed].

Samper also contacted the guerrillas in order to negotiate the release of some or all of the hostages in FARC hands, which led to the temporary demilitarizationof the municipality of Cartagena del Chair, Caquet in July 1997 and the unilateral liberation of 70 soldiers, a move which was opposed by the command of the Colo

mbian military. Other contacts between the guerrillas and government, as well aswith representatives of religious and economic sectors, continued throughout 1997 and 1998[citation needed].

Altogether, these events were interpreted by some Colombian and foreign analystsas a turning point in the armed confrontation, giving the FARC the upper hand in the military and political balance, making the Colombian government a target of critics from some observers who concluded that its weakness was being evidenced, perhaps even overshadowing a future guerrilla victory in the middle term. A leaked 1998 U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) report went so far as to specu


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late that this could be possible within 5 years if the guerrilla's rate of operations was kept up without effective opposition. Some viewed this report as inaccurate and alarmist, claiming that it did not properly take into account many factors, such as possible actions that the Colombian state and the U.S. might takein response to the situation, nor the effects of the existence of paramilitary groups.[38]

Also during this period, paramilitary activities increased, both legally and illegally. The creation of legal CONVIVIR self-defense and intelligence gathering groups was authorized by Congress and the Samper administration in 1994. Membersof CONVIVIR groups were accused of committing numerous abuses against the civilian population by several human rights organizations. The groups were left without legal support after a 1997 decision by the Colombian Constitutional Court which restricted many of their prerrogatives and demanded stricter oversight. After1997, preexisting paramilitary forces and several former CONVIVIR members joinedin creating the "Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia" ("United Self-defense Forcesof Colombia") or AUC, a now illegal loose federation of regional paramilitary groups[citation needed].

The AUC, originally present around the central/northwest part of the country, executed a series of raids into areas of guerrilla influence, targeting those thatthey considered as either guerrillas in disguise or their suspected collaborators. This resulted in a continuing series of massacres, such as a July 1997 operation against the village of Maripipn, Meta, which left between 30 and 49 civilian

s dead. After some of these operations, government prosecutors and/or human rights organizations repeatedly blamed officers and members of Colombian Army and Police units for either passively permitting these acts, or directly collaboratingin their execution.[39][40]

[edit] Late 1990s Early 2000sOn August 7, 1998, Andrs Pastrana Arango was sworn in as the President of Colombia. A member of the Conservative Party, Pastrana defeated Liberal Party candidate Horacio Serpa in a run-off election marked by highvoter turn-out and little political unrest. The new president's program was based on a commitment to bring about a peaceful resolution of Colombia's longstanding civil conflict and to cooperate fully with the United States to combat the trafficking of illegal drugs[citation needed].

In July 1999, Colombian military forces attacked the town of Puerto Lleras, Colombia where FARC rebels were stationed. Using U.S. supplied aircraft and equipment, and backed with U.S. logistical support, Colombian government forces strafedand bombed the town for over 72 hours. In the attack, three civilians were killed, and several others were wounded as the military attacked hospitals, churches,ambulances, and residential areas. FARC rebels were forced to flee the area, and many were killed or wounded. The Colombian government claimed that this was asignificant victory, while human rights groups claimed this as proof that "anti-narcotics" aid, was actually just military aid which was being used to fight a leftist insurgency.[41]

On September 10, 2001, the AUC were added to the US State Department's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations. Critics [WHO?][citation needed]. had long accuse

d the US of hypocrisy for labeling the FARC and ELN terrorists, while ignoring the AUC, which was responsible for far more killings.[5] Due to payments made byChiquita Brands International to the AUC, requests have been made for the extradition of Chiquita's board members and executive officers.[42]

On January 17, 2002, right-wing paramilitaries entered the village of Chengue, and divided up the villagers into two groups. They then went from person to person in one of the groups, smashing each person's head with sledgehammers and rocks, killing 24 people, as the Colombian military sat by and watched. Two other bodies were later discovered dumped in a shallow grave. As the paramilitaries left,


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they set fire to the village.[43]

[edit] Early 2000s 2006Army soldiers wearing a new version of digitalized camouflage.During President Uribe's first term in office (20022006), the security situation inside Colombia showed some measure of improvement and the economy, while still fragile, also showed some positive signs of recovery according to observers. But relatively littlehas been accomplished in structurally solving most of the country's other graveproblems, such as poverty and inequality, possibly in part due to legislative and political conflicts between the administration and the Colombian Congress (including those over a controversial project to eventually give Uribe the possibility of re-election), and a relative lack of freely allocated funds and credits[citation needed].

Some critical observers [WHO?] considered that Uribe's policies, while reducingcrime and guerrilla activity, were too slanted in favor of a military solution to Colombia's internal war while neglecting grave social and human rights concerns. Critics [WHO?] have asked for Uribe's government to change this position andmake serious efforts towards improving the human rights situation inside the country, protecting civilians and reducing any abuses committed by the armed forces. Political dissenters and labor union members, among others, have suffered fromthreats and have been murdered.[citation needed]

In 2004, it was revealed by the National Security Archive that a 1991 document f

rom the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency had described then-Senator Uribe as a "close personal friend" and collaborator of Pablo Escobar. The Uribe administration denied several of the allegations in the 1991 report.[44][citation needed]

In May 2006, Uribe was re-elected on the first round of the elections, with a historically unprecedented 62% of the total vote, with leftist Carlos Gaviria in second place (22%) and Horacio Serpa in third.

[edit] 20072009See also: Colombian parapolitics scandalOn June 28, 2007 the FARC suddenly reported the death of 11 of the 12 kidnappedprovincial deputies from Valle del Cauca Department. The Colombian government accused the FARC of executing the hostages and stated that government forces had not made any rescue attempts. FARC claimed that the deaths occurred during a cros

sfire, after an attack to one of its camps by an "unidentified military group".FARC did not report any other casualties on either side.[45]

In 2007, Venezuelan President Hugo Chvez and Colombian Senator Piedad Crdoba wereacting as authorised mediators in the ongoing Humanitarian Exchange between theFARC and the government of Colombia. Colombian President lvaro Uribe had given Chvez permission to mediate, under the conditions that all meetings with the FARC would take place in Venezuela and that Chvez would not contact members of the Colombian military directly, but instead go through proper diplomatic channels.[46][47] However, President Uribe abruptly terminated Chvez's mediation efforts on November 22, 2007, after Chvez personally contacted General Mario Montoya Uribe, theCommander of the Colombian National Army.[48] In response, Chvez said that he was still willing to mediate, but had withdrawn Venezuela's ambassador to Colombia

and placed Colombian-Venezuelan relations "in a freezer"[49] President Uribe responded that Colombia needed "mediation against terrorism, not for Chvez to legitimise terrorism," that Chvez was not interested in peace in Colombia, and that Chvez was building an expansionist project on the continent.[50]

Several scandals have affected Uribe's administration. The Colombian parapolitics scandal expanded during his second term, involving numerous members of the administration's ruling coalition. Many pro-government lawmakers, such as the President's cousin Mario Uribe, have been investigated for their possible ties to paramilitary organizations.[51]


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At the end of 2007, FARC agreed to release former senator Consuelo Gonzlez, politician Clara Rojas and her son Emmanuel, born in captivity after a relationship with one of her captors. Operation Emmanuel was proposed and set up by VenezuelanPresident Hugo Chvez, with the permission of the Colombian government. The mission was approved on December 26. Although, on December 31, FARC claimed that thehostage release had been delayed because of Colombian military operations. On the same time, Colombian President lvaro Uribe indicated that FARC had not freed the three hostages because Emmanuel may not be in their hands anymore.[52] Two FARC gunmen were taken prisoner.

Colombian authorities added that a boy matching Emmanuel's description had beentaken to a hospital in San Jos del Guaviare in June 2005. The child was in poor condition; one of his arms was hurt, he had severe malnutrition, and he had diseases that are commonly suffered in the jungle. Having been evidently mistreated,the boy was later sent to a foster home in Bogot and DNA tests were announced inorder to confirm his identity.[52] On January 4, 2008, the results of a mitochondrial DNA test, comparing the child's DNA with that of his potential grandmotherClara de Rojas, were revealed by the Colombian government. It was reported thatthere was a very high probability that the boy was indeed part of the Rojas family.[53] The same day, FARC released a communique in which they admitted that Emmanuel had been taken to Bogot and "left in the care of honest persons" for safety reasons until a humanitarian exchange took place. The group accused PresidentUribe of "kidnapping" the child in order to sabotage his liberation.[54][55] How

ever, on January 10, 2008, FARC released Rojas and Gonzalez through a humanitarian commission headed by the International Committee of the Red Cross. On January13, 2008, Venezuelan President Hugo Chvez stated his disapproval with the FARC strategy of armed struggle and kidnapping saying "I don't agree with kidnapping and I don't agree with armed struggle".[56] He repeated his call for a politicalsolution and an end to the war on March and June 2008, "The guerrilla war is history...At this moment in Latin America, an armed guerrilla movement is out of place".[57]

On February 2008, FARC released four others political hostages "as a gesture ofgoodwill" toward Chvez, who had brokered the deal and sent Venezuelan helicopterswith Red Cross logos into the Colombian jungle to pick up the freed hostages.[58]

On March 1, 2008, the Colombian armed forces launched a military operation 1.8 kilometres into Ecuador on a FARC position, killing 24, including Ral Reyes, member of the FARC Central High Command. This led to the 2008 Andean diplomatic crisis between Colombia and Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa, supported by Venezuelan President Hugo Chvez.

On March 3, Ivn Ros, also a member of the FARC Central High Command was killed byhis security chief "Rojas".

On May 24, 2008, Colombian magazine, Revista Semana, published an interview withColombian defense minister Juan Manuel Santos in which Santos mentions the death of Manuel Marulanda Vlez. The news was confirmed by FARC-commander 'Timochenko'

on Venezuelan based television station Telesur on May 25, 2008. 'Timochenko' announced the new commander in chief is 'Alfonso Cano'.[59]

In May 2008, a dozen jailed paramilitary leaders were extradited to the United States on drug-related charges. In 2009, extradited paramilitary leader SalvatoreMancuso would claim that the AUC had supported Uribe's 2002 election, but saidthat this was a result of their similar "ideological discourse" and not the result of any direct prior arrangement.[60]

In March 2008 alone, FARC lost 3 members of their Secretariat, including their f


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ounder.

On July 2, 2008, the Colombian armed forces launched Operation Jaque that resulted in the freedom of 15 political hostages, including former Colombian presidential candidate ngrid Betancourt, Marc Gonsalves, Thomas Howes, and Keith Stansell,three American military contractors employed by Northrop Grumman[61] and 11 Colombian military and police.[62] Two FARC members were arrested. This trick to the FARC was presented by the Colombian government as a proof that the guerilla organisation and influence is declining.

On October 26, 2008, the ex-congressman, scar Tulio Lizcano escaped after 8 yearsof captivity with a FARC rebel he convinced to travel with him. Soon after theliberation of this prominent political hostage, the Vice President of Colombia Francisco Santos Caldern called Latin America's biggest guerrilla group a "paper tiger" with little control of the nation's territory, adding that "they have really been diminished to the point where we can say they are a minimal threat to Colombian security," and that "After six years of going after them, reducing theirincome and promoting reinsertion of most of their members, they look like a paper tiger." However, he warned against any kind of premature triumphalism, because "crushing the rebels will take time." The 500,000 square kilometers (190,000 sq mi) of jungle in Colombia makes it hard to track them down to fight.[63]

According to the Colombian government, in early 2009 FARC launched plan Rebirthto avoid being defeated. They planned to intensify guerrilla warfare by the use

of landmines, snipers, and bomb attacks in urban areas. They also plan to buy missiles to fight the Colombian airforce which highly contribute to their weaknesssince few years.[64]

On February 2009, the guerilla released 6 hostages as a humanitarian gesture. InMarch, they released Swedish hostage Erik Roland Larsson.

On April 2009, the Colombian armed forces launched Strategic Leap,[65] an offensive in borders areas where the FARC's forces has still a strong military presence, especially in Arauca, near the Venezuelan border.[66]

On November 2009, Nine Colombian soldiers were killed when their post was attacked by FARC guerrillas in a southwestern part of the country.[67]

On December 22, 2009, FARC rebels raided the home of Provincial governor Luis Francisco Cuellar, killing one police officer and wounding two. Cuellar was founddead the following day.

On January 1, 2010, Eighteen FARC rebels were killed when the Colombian Air Force bombed a jungle camp in Southern Colombia. Colombian troops of the elite TaskForce Omega then stormed the camp, capturing fifteen FARC rebels, as well as 25rifles, war materials, explosives, and information which was given to military intelligence. In Southwestern Colombia, FARC rebels ambushed an army patrol, killing a soldier. The troops then exchanged fire with the rebels. During the fighting, a teenager was killed in the crossfire.[68]

[edit] 20102011See also: List of attacks attributed to FARCWhen Juan Manuel Santos was elected president in August 2010 he promised to 'continue the armed offensive' against rebel movements. In the month after his inauguration FARC and ELN killed roughly 50 soldiers and policemen in attacks all over Colombia.[69] September also saw the killing of FARC's second-in-command MonoJojoy. By the end of 2010 it became increasingly clear that 'neo-paramilitary groups', referred to as 'criminal groups' (BACRIM) by the government, had become an increasing threat to national security, with violent groups such as Los Rastrojos and Aguilas Negras taking control of large parts of the Colombian countryside.[70]


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In 2010 the FARC killed at least 460 members of the security forces, while wounding more than 2,000.[71]

By early 2011 Colombian authorities and news media reported that the FARC and the clandestine sister groups have partly shifted strategy from guerrilla warfareto 'a war of militias', meaning that they are increasingly operating in civilianclothes while hiding amongst sympathizers in the civilian population.[72] In early January 2011 the Colombian army said that the FARC has some 18,000 members,with 9,000 of those forming part of the militias.[73] The army says it has 'identified' at least 1,400 such militia members in the FARC-strongholds of Valle delCauca and Cauca in 2011.[74] In June 2011 Colombian chief of staff Edgar Cely claimed that the FARC wants to 'urbanize their actions',[75] which could partly explain the increased guerrilla activity in Medelln and particularly Cali.[76][77][78][79][80] Jeremy McDermott, co-director of Insight Crime, estimates that FARCmay have some 30,000 'part-time fighters' in 2011, consisting of supporters making up the rebel militia network instead of armed uniformed combatants.[8]

In 2011 the Colombian Congress issued a statement claiming that the FARC has a 'strong presence' in roughly one third of Colombia, while their attacks against security forces 'have continued to rise' throughout 2010 and 2011.[81]

[edit] Role of the United StatesSee also: Plan Colombia and Paramilitarism in Colombia

The United States has been heavily involved in the conflict since its beginnings, when in the early 1960s the U.S. government pushed the Colombian military to attack peasant self-defense communities in rural Colombia, as part of its fight against communism.[82]

As of August, 2004, the US had spent $3 billion in Colombia, more than 75% of iton military aid. Before the Iraq war, Colombia was the third largest recipientof US aid only after Egypt and Israel, and the U.S. has 400 military personnel and 400 civilian contractors in Colombia..[6] [7]

Q&A: Colombia's civil conflictColombia and the US have spent billions of dollars on the drugs fight Colombia h

as suffered decades of civil conflict and has long been the world's biggest producer of cocaine.

President Alvaro Uribe, who came to power in 2002 and was re-elected in 2006, pursued a hardline stance against left-wing guerrillas while making tentative peace overtures.

His successor, Juan Manuel Santos, took office in 2010. He has made the releaseof all hostages a condition for opening peace talks with the Farc, along with anend to attacks and the use of land mines.

Why has Colombia historically experienced high levels of violence?

Colombia, in common with many Latin American nations, evolved as a highly segregated society, split between the traditionally rich families of Spanish descent and the vast majority of poor Colombians, many of whom are of mixed race.

This group provided a natural constituency for left-wing insurgents - with two main groups, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Farc) and the ELN (National Liberation Army).

At the other end of the political spectrum were right-wing paramilitaries, withroots in vigilante groups set up decades ago by landowners for protection agains


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t rebels. The main group was the AUC - the United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia, which officially at least has demobilised.

In a country where the presence of the state has always been weak, the result was a grinding war on multiple fronts, with the civilian population caught in thecrossfire and often deliberately targeted for "collaborating".

Human rights advocates blamed paramilitaries for massacres, "disappearances", and cases of torture and forced displacement. Rebel groups are behind assassinations, kidnapping and extortion.

What is the situation today?

The rebels, although much weakened, are still fighting the state. Another factorhas been the emergence of what the government calls Bacrims, namely criminal bands of gangs, which are involved in drug-trafficking and extortion.

These groups emerged after the demobilisation of the AUC paramilitaries in 2006.

The cocaine trade is the main motor of the armed conflict, providing hundreds ofmillions of dollars in funding for the illegal armed groups.

Who suffers?

It is difficult to find reliable statistics on the toll from the violence in Colombia. What is clear is that the scale of the suffering has been huge.

Especially at risk are those with high-profile roles in the community - including social leaders, political activists, human rights campaigners and trade unionists. Many indigenous communities have also suffered attacks.

Violent crime and kidnappings have, however, decreased in recent years. In May 2008, the government announced that kidnaps were at a 20-year low. Figures showedthat from a high in 2000, when more than 3,500 people were seized, in 2007 justunder 400 people were kidnapped. Of these, some 179 were freed.

But the fate of those taken hostage by rebels or seized by common criminals cont

inues to resonate in Colombian society.

Over the decades, some three million people have been internally displaced by the fighting.

The UN says that many displaced people often end up living in shanty towns around the cities, where they have little access to health or educational services.

What are the prospects for peace?

Although there have been many attempts at negotiations over the course of the conflict, these have always faltered.

In recent years, the tough security policy pursued by President Uribe and Mr Santos, then his defence minister, inflicted a series of significant blows on the rebels.

Several rebel leaders have died and there has been a high number of desertions from guerrilla ranks.

The audacious rescue by the Colombian military of the country's highest-profilehostage, Ingrid Betancourt, and 14 others in 2008 deprived the rebels of one oftheir biggest bargaining chips for obtaining the release of jailed rebels.


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Several hostages were unilaterally released by the Farc in early 2011, promptingspeculation that the rebels were increasingly ready for peace talks.

However, the rebels do still operate across large rural areas, where the presence of the state is weak.

What about paramilitary fighters?

Since 2003, some 31,000 paramilitaries handed in their weapons under a peace deal.

A controversial justice and peace law passed in 2005 meant that paramilitary fighters were eligible for reduced jail terms - of no more than eight years - if they gave details of their involvement in torture, killings and other crimes.

Critics argued that paramilitaries guilty of serious human rights violations could end up serving only token jail terms.

The government points to figures which it says show a decreasing level of violence as evidence that its strategy is working.

The extent of the paramilitaries' influence over and involvement in local, regional and national politics came to the fore in 2007.

In a scandal dubbed the "parapolitics", a dozen members of congress were jailedand dozens more politicians investigated for links to the AUC.

Why is the US involved in Colombia?

Up to 90% of all cocaine on American streets comes from Colombia, so the US administration is keen to tackle the supply at source.

Since 2000, Washington has spent some $6bn (3.8bn) on Plan Colombia, under whichColombian forces receive training, equipment and intelligence to root out drug-traffickers and eliminate coca crops.

Initially, the US Congress stipulated that this money should only be used against drug lords and not for any other campaigns, such as the government's fight with left-wing rebels. However, since 2002 the Bush administration indicated that some aid was being spent on counter-terrorism.

Human rights groups say the line between the war on drugs and the war on rebelsis increasingly blurred.

They say Colombia's rebels have been disproportionately targeted in Plan Colombia, though it is the paramilitaries who have been most involved in drug-trafficking.

The US and Colombia signed a controversial deal in October 2009 to allow the US

military use of several Colombian airbases.

The two countries said this was to counter drug-trafficking and terrorism.

Some of Colombia's neighbours expressed concern at what they saw as an increasedUS military presence in South America.


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14 September 2010 Last updated at 10:34 GMT Share this pageFacebook Twitter Email Print Share this pageQ&A: Kashmir disputeThe mountainous region of Kashmir has been a flashpoint between India and Pakistan for more than 50 years. BBC News Online provides a step-by-step guide to the dispute.

Why have there been so many violent protests this year in Indian-administered Kashmir?

Street protests in Indian-administered Kashmir have escalated in recent months The simple answer appears to be that many people in Indian-administered Kashmir -especially in the Muslim-majority Kashmir valley - do not want the territory tobe governed by India. They would prefer to be either independent or part of Pakistan.

The sense of alienation from Delhi among young people in the valley has been made worse by high unemployment and what they see as heavy-handed tactics from Indian paramilitary forces in stifling their protests.

Scores of protesters have been killed throughout 2010, prompting many commentators to say that Indian-administered Kashmir is is in the early stages of an intifada or uprising.

The BBC's Soutik Biswas say that the perceived "perpetual humiliation" by the security forces has left people angry, alienated and distrustful of the state.

With violent demonstrations and curfews taking place on an almost daily basis, there is a constant sense of tension on the streets of Srinagar and other towns in Indian-administered Kashmir.

Correspondents say this creates a "tinder box effect" - in which angry crowds take to the streets often without much notice. The protests in September 2010 against alleged Koran desecrations in the US are a manifestation of this.

Why is Kashmir disputed?

Srinagar was rocked by violence in the summer of 2008 The territory of Kashmir was hotly contested even before India and Pakistan won their independence from Britain in August 1947.

Under the partition plan provided by the Indian Independence Act of 1947, Kashmir was free to accede to India or Pakistan.

The Maharaja, Hari Singh, wanted to stay independent but eventually decided to accede to India, signing over key powers to the Indian government - in return formilitary aid and a promised referendum.

Since then, the territory has been the flashpoint for two of the three India-Pak

istan wars: the first in 1947-8, the second in 1965.

In 1999, India fought a brief but bitter conflict with Pakistani-backed forces who had infiltrated Indian-controlled territory in the Kargil area.

In addition to the rival claims of Delhi and Islamabad to the territory, there has been a growing and often violent separatist movement against Indian rule in Kashmir since 1989.

What are the rival claims?


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Islamabad says Kashmir should have become part of Pakistan in 1947, because Muslims are in the majority in the region.

Pakistan also argues that Kashmiris should be allowed to vote in a referendum ontheir future, following numerous UN resolutions on the issue.

Delhi, however, does not want international debate on the issue, arguing that the Simla Agreement of 1972 provided for a resolution through bilateral talks.

India points to the Instrument of Accession signed in October 1947 by the Maharaja, Hari Singh.

Both India and Pakistan reject the option of Kashmir becoming an independent state.

How dangerous is the Kashmir dispute?

It is potentially one of the most dangerous disputes in the world and in the worst-case scenario could trigger a nuclear conflict.

In 1998 India and Pakistan both declared themselves to be nuclear powers with astring of nuclear tests.

In 2002 there was a huge deployment of troops on both sides of the border as India reacted to an armed attack on the national parliament in Delhi the previous December. Tension between the two countries has rarely been so high.

India said the attack was carried out by Pakistani-based militants assisted by the Pakistan government - a charge always denied by Pakistan.

For much of the last two decades, separatist militancy and cross-border firing between the Indian and Pakistani armies has left a death toll running into tens of thousands and a population traumatised by fighting and fear.

Are there grounds to hope the Kashmir dispute can be resolved?

In the years prior to the Mumbai (Bombay) attacks of November 2008 - in which gunmen killed 165 people - relations between India and Pakistan saw a big thaw.

The Mumbai attacks were blamed by India on militants based in Pakistan and led India to suspend further negotiations until February 2010, when the first formaldiscussions between the two countries since the attacks were held in Delhi.

Before those attacks the two countries agreed on several Kashmir-specific confidence building measures. A bus service between the two parts of Kashmir was resumed in 2005.

Continue reading the main storyInsurgency 20 years on

Missed chances for peaceIn October 2008 an old trade road was reopened after 60 years across the Line ofControl (LoC) that divides Indian and Pakistani-administered Kashmir. Earlier in the same month a rail service was introduced.

The two governments have huge international backing to continue the peace process and make their negotiations succeed.

An end to the violence and uncertainty in Kashmir would also be widely welcomedin India and Pakistan - and not only by those weary of the fighting or those who


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see it as a hindrance to the economic development of the South Asia region.

However, a diplomatic solution has escaped both sides for more than 60 years, and there are no signs of any new proposals yet.

Furthermore, both governments face powerful hard line groups within their own countries who will be carefully monitoring the talks to make sure concessions theydeem to be unacceptable are not offered to the other side.

Who are the militants?

After the insurgency began in 1989, the number of armed Muslim separatists grewfrom hundreds to thousands. However their numbers have dwindled over the past two years.

The most prominent militant group are the pro-Pakistani Hizbul Mujahideen. Islamabad denies providing them and others with logistical and material support.

The Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) was the largest pro-independence militant group but it gave up the armed struggle in 1994 and has since been active on the political front. Its influence is thought to have waned.

Other former militant groups have joined the umbrella of the All-Party Hurriyat(Freedom) Conference (APHC), which campaigns peacefully for an end to India's pr

esence in Kashmir.However the hard-line faction of the APHC - as well as several armed militant groups - are demanding a tripartite dialogue among Indian, Pakistan and Kashmiri representatives - but India has so far not agreed to this.

The moderate faction of the APHC, led by Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, opened bilateral talks with the Indian government in 2004.

But they have complained that Delhi has not taken steps it promised to create aconducive atmosphere for dialogue - such as the release of prisoners and the withdrawal of the laws that give sweeping powers to the armed forces.

Talks between the two sides last took place in early 2006.

Is religion an issue?

Religion is an important aspect of the dispute. Partition in 1947 gave India's Muslims a state of their own: Pakistan. So a common faith underpins Pakistan's claims to Kashmir, where many areas are Muslim-dominated.

The population of the Indian-administered state of Jammu and Kashmir is over 60%Muslim, making it the only state within India where Muslims are in the majority.

What is the Line of Control?

A demarcation line was originally established in January 1949 as a ceasefire line, following the end of the first Kashmir war.

In July 1972, after a second conflict, the Line of Control (LoC) was re-established under the terms of the Simla Agreement, with minor variations on the earlierboundary.

The LoC passes through a mountainous region about 5,000 metres above sea level.


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The conditions there are so extreme that the bitter cold claims more lives thanthe sporadic military skirmishes.

North of the LoC, the rival forces have been entrenched on the Siachen glacier (more than 6,000 metres above sea level) since 1984 - the highest battlefield onearth.

The LoC divides Kashmir on an almost two-to-one basis: Indian-administered Kashmir to the east and south (population about nine million), which falls into the Indian-controlled state of Jammu and Kashmir; and Pakistani-administered Kashmirto the north and west (population about three million), which is labelled by Pakistan as "Azad" (Free) Kashmir. China also controls a small portion of Kashmir.

What's the UN involvement?

The UN has maintained a presence in the disputed area since 1949.

Currently, the LoC is monitored by the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (Unmogip).

So what of the future?

In Indian-administered Kashmir, many people are wary of confidence building measures (CBMs) which they fear may be used as a ploy to convert the LoC into a perm

anent border.Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has reiterated that Kashmir's borders cannot be redrawn, but they can be made "irrelevant".

The Pakistani and Indian armies are for the most part observing a ceasefire along the LoC .

In what seemed like a major break from its position over the Kashmir question in2008, Pakistan's President, Asif Ali Zardari, denounced separatist violence as"terrorism". However, his spokesperson later clarified that the remark was aboutnon-Kashmiri militants fighting in Kashmir.

Even so there has overall been a huge decline in militant violence in Indian-administered Kashmir over the past three years - but any satisfaction this may givethe authorities has to be offset by the large number of demonstrations againstIndian rule that have grown over roughly the same period of time.

In the summer of 2008, the government of Indian-administered Kashmir decided totransfer to a Hindu religious trust 100 acres of land on a mountain route leading to an important shrine.

This sparked widespread protests among Muslims in the valley. The decision was then rescinded, which in turn triggered large-scale protests in the Hindu-majority districts around the city of Jammu.

Last year protests raged throughout the Kashmir Valley for nearly two months after the alleged murders of two women by security forces.

And this year, the deaths of a number of civilians, mostly teenagers, in renewedclashes with security forces have led to the widespread unrest in the Kashmir valley.

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