Conflict, Cooperation, and Consejos Nacionales: Understanding the Politics of Afro-Ecuadorian Activism in Rafael Correa's Citizen's Revolution

Conflict, Cooperation, and Consejos Nacionales

Understanding the Politics of Afro-Ecuadorian Activism in Rafael Correa’s Citizen’s Revolution

(Indiana University)

by Austin K. Cole

Submitted in partial fulfillment for the degree of Bachelor of Arts in Development Studies

Brown University

April 15, 2015

Abstract

This thesis has two principal aims. The first, and more general, is to illuminate the struggle of Afro-Ecuadorians, and highlight their attempts to improve the wellbeing of their communities and eliminate racism from the country. Afro-descendant peoples have often been disregarded in academic disciplines that do not focus specifically on race and its intersections, such as Development Studies. Moreover, the struggles of Afro-Latin American peoples have long been overshadowed by those of African Americans in the U.S. and Indigenous peoples in Latin American. This has certainly been the case in Ecuador, and this paper is an attempt at balancing the scales and making visible the hard work of these communities.

The second is to demonstrate how political and social transformations in Ecuador have affected the political opportunities available to the Afro-Ecuadorian civil society. This thesis specifically sheds light on how individual activists and officials fight for racial justice and equality, and how their struggle interacts with the state’s agenda and rhetoric of inclusion, equality, and national development. Through an analysis of in-depth interviews and observations, I endeavor to illuminate how Afro-Ecuadorian civil society's complex, relationship with the state has influenced its capacity to mobilize and whether it has altered racial power dynamics in the nation. By using race as a lens through which to observe political processes, I also hope to make more generalizable arguments about the limitations, tensions, and possibilities that arise in eras of democratic reform. Here, I specifically examine the disparity between reformed ideals and reality, and analyze how Afro civil society works alleviate that.

I argue that the political changes ushered in by Correa's government have created new and more expansive political spaces within the state for Afro-Ecuadorian civil society to make demands. Paradoxically, the opening of political spaces has somewhat limited the possibilities and scope of Afro civil society’s mobilization in, as the state under Rafael Correa has taken ownership over the Ecuador’s ‘racial project’, and reduced civil society’s autonomy. As a consequence, I contend that activists struggle by working within the political frameworks crafted by the Correa administration. This marks a departure from past forms of activism, where activists pursued social change through mass mobilization and outside pressure on the state. Therefore, I make the case that these new opportunities spaces have not necessarily led to changes in racial power dynamics in Ecuador. Connecting this to a broader argument, I contend that because of the state's fundamental role in establishing prevailing racial hierarchies, racial movements can seldom hope to attain power to achieve more radical goals of altering the status quo. Thus, I will show how in Ecuador the state as led by Correa has continued to dictate and control racial power dynamics despite its rhetoric of citizen participation and political inclusion. Keywords: Afro-Ecuadorian, Ecuador, Civil Society, Social Movement, Race, Racial Activism, Democracy, Afro-Latin Americans, Political Opportunity

AUSTIN K. COLE

First Reader Anani Dzidzienyo

Second Reader Diana Graizbord

© Copyright by Austin K. Cole

2015

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To my parents, grandparents, and ancestors who have struggled against obstacles and violence that I will never know. I love you.

To all those in the Americas and across the globe who have fought, and continue to fight, for justice and equality. To you I will forever be indebted.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS Acknowledgements ....................................................................................................................... v!I: Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 1!

I: “Del dicho al hecho…” ........................................................................................................................1!II: Background and Context ...................................................................................................................3!

Afro-Ecuadorian History and Identity ..................................................................................................4!Latin America’s ‘Pink Tide’ & 21st Century Socialism ........................................................................7!Is There an Afro-Ecuadorian Social Movement? ................................................................................10!Personal Motivations ...........................................................................................................................11!

III: Aims and Argument .......................................................................................................................12!IV: Data and Methods ...........................................................................................................................13!

Case Selection .....................................................................................................................................13!Methodology .......................................................................................................................................14!

IV: Moving Forward .............................................................................................................................17!II: Literature Review .................................................................................................................. 19!

I: Theorizing Race .................................................................................................................................19!Racism and Racial Formation .............................................................................................................19!Race and Society .................................................................................................................................21!

II: Social Movements .............................................................................................................................23!Identity Politics ...................................................................................................................................23!Political Opportunity Structure ...........................................................................................................24!

III: The State and Society .....................................................................................................................25!Conceptions of the State ......................................................................................................................25!Defining Civil Society .........................................................................................................................26!The Notion of Politics .........................................................................................................................27!State-Led Multiculturalism .................................................................................................................28!Racial Movements in Latin America ..................................................................................................31!

III: The Road Has Not Been Easy ............................................................................................. 34!I: Context for Collective Action ...........................................................................................................35!

Ecuador’s Political Turbulence ...........................................................................................................35!State-Led Multiculturalism in Ecuador ...............................................................................................36!Early Afro-Ecuadorian Collective Action ...........................................................................................37!Multiculturalism and Afro-Ecuadorian identity ..................................................................................38!

II: Transitioning to Rafael Correa .......................................................................................................40!Civil Society Influence and the Rise of Correa ...................................................................................40!The 2008 Constitution .........................................................................................................................42!‘Golden Age’ of Afro-Ecuadorian Organization ................................................................................44!

III: Afro-Ecuadorian Civil Society and the Citizen’s Revolution .....................................................48!Afro-Ecuadorian Mobilization and Dispersion ...................................................................................48!The Citizen’s Revolution and Other Social Movements .....................................................................54!Consejos Nacionales para la Igualdad .................................................................................................57!

IV: Conclusion .......................................................................................................................................59!IV: Finding Space for Change ................................................................................................... 62!

Cooperative Contention ......................................................................................................................63!I: Creation of Networks ........................................................................................................................64!

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The International .................................................................................................................................64!The National ........................................................................................................................................67!

II: Building Consciousness & Advocacy Capacity .............................................................................68!Fundación Azúcar ...............................................................................................................................69!

III: Direct Engagement .........................................................................................................................72!The Case of Affirmative Action in Higher Education ........................................................................73!Feet on the Ground ..............................................................................................................................77!

IV: Discussion ........................................................................................................................................78!Seizing Political Opportunities ...........................................................................................................78!Towards Convergence? .......................................................................................................................82!

V: Conclusions .......................................................................................................................................83!V: Fighting the Hand that Feeds? ............................................................................................. 86!

I: The Trajectory of Orfa Reinoso .......................................................................................................90!Identity and Position ...........................................................................................................................92!Afro-Ecuadorian Professionals ...........................................................................................................96!

II: Trajectory of José Chalá Cruz ........................................................................................................98!Fighting the State from Within .........................................................................................................100!

III: The Role of Afro Activist-Officials .............................................................................................104!Between the State and Society ..........................................................................................................105!

IV: Constraints on Afro Officials’ Influence ....................................................................................109!Isolation .............................................................................................................................................109!Education ...........................................................................................................................................111!Potential Clientelism .........................................................................................................................112!

V: Conclusions .....................................................................................................................................113!VI: Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 115!

Afro-Ecuadorians and Rafael Correa: Opportunities and Constraints ..............................................116!Connecting Civil Society And State .................................................................................................118!Assessing Afro Mobilization: Present and Future ............................................................................120!Limits of the Racial State ..................................................................................................................122!

Appendix A ................................................................................................................................ 125!Appendix B ................................................................................................................................ 126!Appendix C ................................................................................................................................ 127!Appendix D ................................................................................................................................ 130!Works Cited ............................................................................................................................... 132!

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost, I want to thank Professor ANANI DZIDZIENYO, who has served as my advisor on this project. He has helped to focus this thesis and has challenged me throughout. But his influence also extends far beyond that. In his class on Afro-Latin Americans, I was first introduced to many of the ideas and issues that are present in this work, and have greatly influenced my academic career and personal beliefs. During my time in Cuba, he served as my advisor on a smaller project, and helped me to think critically about what I experienced there. And after returning from Ecuador, his guidance has helped me to make this thesis what it now is. Even more, in these times when issues of race are being forced into the public domain, his stories and perspectives have helped to keep me mindful and to avoid cynicism. Prof. Anani, I thank you for the conversations over the last two and a half years, and I hope to have many more.

I would also like to thank JENNIFER COSTANZA, who previously served as the Concentration Advisor for Development Studies and taught our research methods class. When I was just returning from Cuba and my head was jumbled with a thousand different ideas for research projects, you helped me to narrow my focus, and then narrow it some more. Without your insights and enthusiasm, I don’t think this thesis would have ever gotten off of the ground. Third, I have to express my gratitude to my second reader, DIANA GRAIZBORD. If Jen helped to turn my convoluted ideas into a single project, then Diana help make my data into a coherent argument. I went into each one of our meetings immensely stressed and having no idea what next steps to take, and left each one feeling as if an enormous weight had been lifted, and with a clear plan in my head. Your encouragement and suggestions have been fantastic from the first time I told you about my project to the very end. I wish that all of my peers were lucky enough to have a second reader as thoughtful, enthusiastic, and capable as you.

While in Ecuador, I was advised and guided by Professor JHON ANTÓN SÁNCHEZ, who served as a gatekeeper to all of my interviewees. He also volunteered his time so that I might learn more about the struggle for racial equality in Ecuador, and gain perspective that would contribute greatly to my analysis. And that analysis could not exist withou my interviewees, who graciously offered their time so that I might learn a bit about their experiences, opinions, and activism. I must also thank all the Ecuadorian, Afro and otherwise, who offered their opinions and perspectives, which shaped the development of this project, whether they know it or not.

My colleague and hermano IGNACIO SEMERENE started the process that led me to get in contact with Señor Alberto Acosta, whose acquaintance with Prof. Carlos de la Torre put me in correspondence with Prof. Antón Sánchez before I left for Ecuador. Thank you Ignacio for all of your help and most importantly, your friendship. In addition to Ignacio, I must thank the entire familia SEMERENE and the familia BAKER-BERÓN for inviting me into their homes for portions of my stay in Quito. Without their support and guidance I would have had to rush my research even more, and undoubtedly I would not have enjoyed my time in Quito as fully as I did. Thank you for your hospitality, your advice, and of course all of the meals. Un abrazo!

I cannot begin to properly express the gratitude I feel towards you AASHA. Your friendship, criticisms, and love have helped keep me sane on more occasions than one over the past four years. Without you I would not be who I am today. I love you.

Finally, I thank my fellow DS seniors, who have gone through this process with me. Without our little community, I might have abandoned this project long ago. I’m glad I did not.

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I: INTRODUCTION

I: “Del dicho al hecho…” After a long meeting with Ecuador’s Undersecretary of Higher Education,1 it didn’t seem

to me like we had made much progress on the issue of affirmative action2 policies to increase the

enrollment and success of young Afro-Ecuadorians3 in universities. The goal of that late evening

meeting, held in June 2014 was to discuss the implementation of such policies at the Universidad

Central de Quito, one of the largest universities in the country. When these measures are

instituted, the Universidad Central will be the first public university in Ecuador with such

policies, even though they are technically mandated by the constitution. The meeting was two

hours of butting heads, ideological discussions, and tricky legal interpretations concerning how

to effectively implement affirmative action policies for Ecuador’s racial minorities. Nonetheless,

the four Afro-Ecuadorian activists (Alodia Borja, Jhon Antón Sánchez, Nivo Estuardo Delgado,

and Sonia Viveros) that I accompanied to the meeting seemed to be in good spirits. Where I saw

unfulfilled legislation, they saw a goal within reach; where I saw confusing legal frameworks,

they saw a path to follow; where I saw bureaucratic stagnation, they saw state officials who were

slowly beginning to adopt a more agreeable stance. I had nearly finished my fieldwork in Quito,

but I had only just begun to understand the real work that goes into pushing for social change in

the Ecuador of Rafael Correa’s Revolución Ciudadana or Citizen’s Revolution, which is the

1 Subsecretaría de la Educación Superior, SENESCYT. 2 Affirmative action refers to policies of positive discrimination that attempt to provide equal access to education for historically excluded or marginalized groups, in this case Afro-Ecuadorians. 3 I define an Afro-Ecuadorian as any Ecuadorian citizen who recognizes and identifies with their Afro-descendant heritage. This inclusive category means any Ecuadorian whose ancestors were brought from the African continent to the Americas as slaves. Though Afro-Ecuadorian self-identification has increased in the last few decades, there are undoubtedly many black Ecuadorians who do not identify as ‘Afro’.

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official name given to the broad set of political, social, economic, and cultural reforms that

Correa’s has instituted since its rise to power in 2007.

Walking to my hostel, I found myself returning to a phrase that a friend had uttered to me

in my first few days in Ecuador: del dicho al hecho hay mucho trecho.4 No phrase better captures

the struggle that Afro-Ecuadorian civil society faces in attempting to eliminate racial

discrimination and work toward racial equality. The long meeting on university affirmative

action implementation that I had just come from was one of many steps toward these ambitious

goals. Of course, the difficulty of turning words into actions and ideas into reality is far from an

issue unique to Afro-Ecuadorian activists and civil servants. Nonetheless, the saying is especially

appropriate in this circumstance.

In the context of the Afro-Ecuadorian social movement, ‘del dicho al hecho’ has several

dimensions, two of which I discuss here. First, and perhaps most importantly, it points to the

necessity of a movement that represents the political aspirations of the Afro-Ecuadorian people.

Even a casual read of Ecuador’s 2008 Constitution would reveal a comprehensive list of rights5

the government affords to racial and ethnic minorities. Looking through the National Plan for

Development of the Afro-Ecuadorian People 2007-20106 presents an even more hopeful outlook,

as it outlines numerous specific guarantees, policies, and actions that have a goal of lifting up

Afro-Ecuadorians and making the nation more equitable racially. Though Ecuadorian President

Rafael Correa’s administration may tout these documents as evidence of the actions taken to

make the nation a more accepting and equitable country, the reality of the Afro-Ecuadorian

people complicates this matter. For example, Afro-Ecuadorians are among the poorest, least

educated, and least politically represented citizens of the country, and the situation has not

4 Literal Translation: ‘from said to done there is a large gap’. More simply: ‘it’s easier said than done’. 5 Artículo 1, Constitución del Ecuador. 6 Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 2007-2010, Pueblos Afroecuatorianos.

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improved much since 2007.7 Second, the phrase encompasses obstacles and frustrations that both

movement activists and government workers must overcome on the path to forming a more

equitable society. Whenever significant social change is attempted through public policy

implementation, complications will inevitably arise: political in-fighting, backlash by entrenched

interests, poor monitoring, etc.

This thesis is a qualitative case study of the current struggle for racial equality in Ecuador,

from the perspective of civil society activists and those Afro-Ecuadorian government officials

who consider themselves part of the struggle for racial equality in Ecuadorian society. More

specifically, I analyze how Afro-Ecuadorian activists and officials attempt to make their nation a

more racially equitable one, in the context of Rafael Correa’s Citizen’s Revolution. There is an

especially strong focus on the relationship between civil society and the state, and how this

relationship influences activism. The following section provides relevant background and

context that is important to review before delving further into my argument. After this, I present

the general aims and argument of the thesis. Next, I detail the data and the methodology of the

project, whose principal primary source is in-depth interviews.

II: Background and Context Before engaging fully with the argument that will guide this thesis, it is necessary to

understand the context in which this research took place (Chapter III will provide a more full an

nuanced perspective on this context). As such, I will briefly touch upon the history of Afro-

descendant Ecuadorians and their formation of a national identity. Next I present a snapshot of

Ecuador’s political landscape, and describe the connection that it has to the rest of Latin America.

Lastly, I provide insight into my personal motivation for undertaking this project, which I believe

is important for understanding the relationship between this case and broader arguments. 7 2010 Census, Instituto Nacional de Estadisticas y Censos

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Afro-Ecuadorian History and Identity Afro-Ecuadorians represent a small but significant minority in Quito; unfortunately, they

are routinely forgotten in the historical narrative of the nation, which tends to focus more heavily

on the white and mestizo portions of the population (Antón Sánchez 2007b). When this narrative

does touch on Afro-Ecuadorians, it is almost exclusively in reference to their success on the

soccer pitch for the Ecuadorian national team (Rahier 2008). This exclusion stems largely from

the legacy of slavery, the dominant ideology of national mestizaje, and the demographic

geography of the nation. Historically, most Ecuadorian blacks have resided either in la Costa or

in la Sierra8, specifically in the provinces of Esmeraldas, Imbabura, and Carchi. The province of

Esmeraldas and communities within the provinces of Imbabura and Carchi –specifically the

municipalities of Valle de Chota, la Concepción, and Salinas – were home to the vast majority of

Afro-descendant people during and immediately following the colonial period, and thus they are

routinely considered the heart of Afro-Ecuadorian culture, heritage, and spirit.

8 The Coast and the mountainous Andean regions, respectively. When speaking about Afro-Ecuadorians these denominations are often proxies for areas around Esmeraldas (Costa), and those around Chota Valley (Sierra).

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1.1 Map of Ecuador, Divided by Province

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1.2 Concentration of Afro-Ecuadorians

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9 http://www.mapsopensource.com/images/ecuador-map-black-and-white.gif 10 http://uselectionatlas.org/FORUM/GALLERY/10259_04_09_13_7_53_03.png

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Historically, Esmeraldas has been home to the largest and most concentrated number of

Afro-Ecuadorians in the country. The province is located on the northwestern coast of Ecuador,

and was relatively isolated from other regions of the country until the early-to-mid 20th Century.

Mobility to and from Esmeraldas has rapidly increased in the last half-century, and with it has

come an influx of Esmeraldeños into more metropolitan areas, especially Guayaquil, the largest

city in Ecuador and the current home of the largest population of Afro-Ecuadorians in the

country. In recent years, many Esmeraldeños have been making their way to Quito as well.

Unlike Esmeraldas, Valle de Chota lies less than 100 miles north of Quito, but for much

of Ecuadorian history it has been similarly isolated (Whitten 1974). As it is situated in the

mountainous Sierra region in the central of the country, this isolation was not a product of a

shipwreck. Rather, Afro-Ecuadorians who come from Chota are descendants of slaves brought

there by Jesuit priests who set out to cultivate the land and spread their ministry (Chalá Cruz

2006). Its history of relative isolation has allowed for a distinct Afro-Ecuadorian culture to arise

there, albeit quite different from that which exists in the coastal towns of Esmeraldas.

It may seem impertinent to discuss the geography demographics of Afro-Ecuadorians at

such length; however, its significance in the context of Afro-Ecuadorian identity and recognition

cannot be understated. Unlike in the United States, where the extensiveness of slavery and the

history of mass migration have made the presence of Afro-descendant people ubiquitous in most

urban areas, the same cannot be said about Ecuador. Large concentrations of Afro-Ecuadorians

have historically resided in a few specific areas. Though this has changed in the last half century,

it is still true to an extent, as the map above shows. Thus the idea that all Afro-Ecuadorians in

Quito are recent migrants from Esmeraldas or Chota is surprisingly pervasive, especially given

the fact that there is a documented history of Afro-Ecuadorians residing there since the city’s

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founding in 1534 (de la Torre 2002). Due to social, cultural, and political mobilization in recent

decades, as well as significant rural to urban migration, this skewed perspective is slowly

changing. Through official recognition and increasing urban presence, Afro-Ecuadorians have

come to be seen more as a national minority group and less as a people confined to a single few

territories. However, the image of the rural black has been hard to shake for urban Afros. In the

last few decades, the black presence has also become more recognized both inside and outside of

Ecuador, a fact that has led to increased efforts to improve the lives of Afro-Ecuadorians.

Although black social organizations have succeeded in bringing visibility and heightened

political representation to the Afro-Ecuadorian community, severe social and economic

disparities still abound. Unfortunately, Afro-Ecuadorians are still less employed, less educated,

and much less wealthy than their white or mestizo counterparts.11 This is the result of years of

racial discrimination and social neglect, which have historically denied opportunities to Afros

and continue to prevent mass social mobility.

Latin America’s ‘Pink Tide’ & 21st Century Socialism Beginning with the election of Hugo Chavez to the Venezuelan Presidency in 1998, Latin

America has experienced surge in the popularity and success of leftist governments. This trend is

ongoing, but seemed to have reached its zenith near the end of the first decade of the 21st

Century. The leaders and governments propelling this ‘Pink Tide’, as it has often been termed,

vary in their policies and govern distinct nations, but generally they support a refocusing of the

state’s role in providing for its citizens through expanded social programs and attempts at

increased social inclusion (Vanden and Prevost 2009). A key feature of these governments has

been a strong rebuke of the neoliberalism pushed by the ‘Washington Consensus In general,

11 2010 Census, Instituto Nacional de Estadisticas y Censos

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these progressive governments have proven popular, but as this is a recent trend, the jury is still

out on how their initial successes will translate in the long term (Prevost 2012).

Many of the left-leaning governments recently elected in Latin America have risen to

power partially through the support of civil society and social movements (Prevost, Vanden and

Oliva Campos 2012, Cannon and Kirby 2012). However, the relationship between movements

and these supposedly progressive governments has been rocky. Prevost, Vanden and Oliva

Campos (2012) specifically point out the tension between movement cooperation with

government and the potential of cooptation and silencing of dissent. In essence, there is

significant fear that though the leaders of newly empowered left-leaning movements have

impressive rhetoric, their intentions are only to continue enforcing patterns of state power that

have long existed in Latin America (Vanden and Prevost 2009). This has become especially

important because some of these states, like Ecuador and Bolivia, have espoused a form of

governance aimed at broad social inclusion, called plurinationalism (Antón Sánchez 2013b, de la

Torre 2013b). Plurinationalism is supposed to be an alternative to neoliberal multiculturalism in

that it purports to give minority groups and social movements true representation on a national

scale (Antón Sánchez 2013b). Whether the plurinationalism of these states is actually generating

social and political inclusion is a hotly debated subject. Correa’s Ecuador, in particular, has come

under intense scrutiny for its dealings with social movements since the establishment of a new

Constitution that required significant civil society participation and accordance (Becker 2012, de

la Torre 2012, Antón Sánchez 2013a).

A key feature of many – but certainly not all – of the Pink Tide governments is a belief in

the ideas of Socialism of the 21st Century. Coined by Heinz Dieterich (Chomsky and Dieterich

1999) and popularized by Hugo Chavez, Socialism of the 21st Century is a set of ideals that

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applies socialism to a post-Soviet context, in which a solely state-dominated production is no

longer credible, nor desirable. In theory, Socialism of the 21st Century aims to more effectively

democratize society and reverse the supposed socioeconomic damage caused by a proliferation

of US-backed neoliberal governments in past decades. However, critics accuse these leaders of

using populist tactics and unsubstantiated rhetoric to consolidate and centralize power, as well as

attempting to establish a virtually uncontested political rule (de la Torre 2013a).

In Ecuador this 21st Century Socialist doctrine is encapsulated in President Rafael

Correa’s Citizen’s Revolution, which his Alianza País coalition government has promoted since

it came into office in 2007. The name pays homage to Castro’s Cuban Revolution and Hugo

Chavez’s Bolivarian Revolution in Venezuela. However, the Ecuadorian incarnation of this

ideology strongly emphasizes the democratization of society, without embracing socialist

economic views. In fact, Correa’s Ecuador operates under a firmly capitalist but redistributive

economic system that stands in contrast to its more leftist contemporaries. The Correa

government has based the revolution on five axes: (1) Political Revolution, (2) Economic

Revolution, (3) Ethical Revolution, (4) Social Revolution, and (5) The Sovereignty Revolution

and Latin America Integration.12 In essence, these areas of focus have as their goal the creation

of a more democratic, independent, and socioeconomically healthy Ecuadorian state. Moreover,

Correa’s administration claims to be interested in lifting up all of Ecuadorian society equally,

and not falling prey to special interests, or taking part in doling out ‘corporatist’ privileges

(Prevost 2012). There is considerable debate as to whether these ideals are being applied

faithfully or if they are just rhetorical fodder hiding the true intentions of the government.

Nonetheless, these are the ideological underpinnings by which the Ecuadorian state has defined

12 Plan Nacional del Buen Vivir, 2009-2013.

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its plans for the socioeconomic development of the nation. This is the political and social context

in which the struggle for Afro-Ecuadorian equality currently takes place.

Is There an Afro-Ecuadorian Social Movement? There is considerable debate as to whether the organization and mobilization of Afro-

Ecuadorian deserves the moniker ‘social movement’.13 Activist and former government official

Oscar Chalá Cruz bluntly told me that “the Afro-Ecuadorian social movement does not exist”

anymore. Many activists, however, including Jhon Antón Sánchez, Alodia Borja, Sonia Viveros,

Nivo Estuardo Delgado, and several others were adamant about its very real existence. Some

others like government officials Alexandra Ocles and Orfa Reinoso lie somewhere in the middle.

They refrain from the phrase social movement, and instead opt for the term ‘organizational

process’ to describe the phenomenon both as it stands currently and in the past. To some extent I

believe that this argument is more about semantics and less about substantial differences in

thought. There are some interesting nuances in the distinction between ‘organizational process’

and ‘social movement’, but they are of lesser importance in this distinction. Furthermore, I

believe that to say the Afro-Ecuadorian social movement is non-existent is a disservice to the

work and coordination that I have seen firsthand. For this reason, I have chosen to describe this

phenomenon of the Afro-descendant peoples struggle for racial justice, favorable social policies,

and legitimate political power as the Afro-Ecuadorian social movement. Tarrow (1998) notes

that social movements need not be centralized nor powerful, they must just take part in

continuous politics of contention with the state – a requirement that I believe Afro-Ecuadorian

social movement fulfills.

Nonetheless, throughout the thesis I will refer more often to Afro-Ecuadorian civil

society, which is the collection of organizations and activists involved in political and social

13 See Chapter II for a more detailed analysis of what constitutes a ‘social movement’.

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confrontation and cooperation with the state. Cannon and Kirby describe civil society not as “a

fixed entity, with established permanent features, but rather an empty signifier over which

struggles take place among contending social forces” (2012: 7). Afro-Ecuadorian civil society

can be understood in this way. This is because I feel as though these individual organizations and

activists seldom present themselves as single ‘social movement; rather, their actions and

mobilization as a whole represent the continuation of the Afro-Ecuadorian social movement.

Personal Motivations Though I undertook this research with no significant previous ties to Ecuador, as a proud

member of the African diaspora this is a deeply personal issue for me. Both of my parents are

African-American, but they experienced their race differently as one grew up in Jim Crow

Mississippi, while the other was born in Alabama but raised in the urban Northeast. My

experiences growing up as an African-American in what has come to be called ‘The Age of

Obama’, along with the lessons and stories passed down from my parents and grandparents, has

given me a specific consciousness about race in the Americas. I am of the belief that Afro-

descendant movements throughout the history are inextricably linked, and my time in Latin

America has only solidified that belief. In Ecuador, there are groups named after Martin Luther

King, Jr., Malcolm X, and various other historical black leaders from the United States.

Additionally, many movements in Latin America have borrowed tactics and discourse from

African-American activists and organizations in the United States.

I am particularly concerned with Ecuador because I see similarities in the stagnation of

the Afro-Ecuadorian movement in recent years and the lack of mobilization by African-

Americans in the United States. I believe that racial equality in the Americas has progressed

immensely in the last few decades, but these gains are not necessarily permanent and vast

inequalities still exist. In order to work towards creating more racially equitable societies,

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constant advancement is necessary. This study looks to pinpoint the ways in which the Afro-

Ecuadorians navigate the political space that they inhabit in order to achieve such a goal.

III: Aims and Argument Considering the above context and motivations, this thesis has two principal aims. The

first, and more general, is to illuminate the struggle of Afro-Ecuadorians, and highlight their

attempts to improve the wellbeing of their communities and eliminate racism from the country.

As de la Torre (2002) notes, blacks in the Americas are “invisible and disregarded” in their own

countries (24). Afro-descendant peoples have often been disregarded in academic disciplines that

do not focus specifically on race and its intersections, such as Development Studies. Moreover,

the struggles of Afro-Latin American peoples have long been overshadowed by those of African

Americans in the U.S. and Indigenous peoples in Latin American. This has certainly been the

case in Ecuador, and this thesis is an attempt at balancing the scales and making visible the hard

work of these communities.

The second aim is to demonstrate how political and social transformations in Ecuador

have affected the political opportunities available to the Afro-Ecuadorian civil society. This

thesis specifically sheds light on how individual activists and officials fight for racial justice and

equality, and how their struggle interacts with the state’s agenda and rhetoric of inclusion,

equality, and national development. I endeavor to illuminate how Afro-Ecuadorian civil society's

complex relationship with the state has influenced its capacity to mobilize and analyze whether it

has changed racial power dynamics in the nation. By using race as a lens through which to

observe political processes, I also hope to make more generalizable arguments about the

limitations, tensions, and possibilities that arise in eras of democratic reform. Here, I specifically

examine the disparity between reformed ideals and reality, and analyze how Afro civil society

works alleviate that. To accomplish these aims, I answer two key questions:

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1. How has the Rafael Correa’s 21st Century Socialist government changed the political opportunities available to Afro-Ecuadorian civil society?

2. How have Afro activists’ and officials’ responses to these altered circumstances transformed the Afro-Ecuadorian social movement?

I argue that the political changes ushered in by Correa's government have created new

and more expansive political spaces within the state for Afro-Ecuadorian civil society to make

demands. Paradoxically, the opening of political spaces has somewhat limited the possibilities

and scope of Afro civil society’s mobilization, as the state under Rafael Correa has taken

ownership over the Ecuador’s ‘racial project’, and reduced civil society’s autonomy. As a

consequence of this, I contend that activists fight by working within the political frameworks

crafted by the Correa administration. This marks a departure from past forms of activism, where

activists pursued social change through mass mobilization and outside pressure on the state.

Therefore, I maintain that these new opportunities and spaces have not necessarily led to

changes in racial power dynamics in Ecuador. Connecting this to a broader argument, I contend

that because of the state's fundamental role in establishing prevailing racial hierarchies, racial

movements can seldom hope to attain power to achieve more radical goals of altering the status

quo. Thus, I will show how in Ecuador the state has continued to dictate and control racial power

dynamics despite all its rhetoric of citizen participation.

IV: Data and Methods Case Selection

I examine Ecuador, and specifically Quito, as a case for several reasons. First, the Afro-

Ecuadorian social movement has reached a critical juncture in its development (Antón Sánchez,

2011, 2013a). The cohesive mobilizations that Afro-Ecuadorians were able to achieve in the past

have largely evaporated. Moreover, these developments have occurred at a time of intense

political, social and economic change in the nation. Afro-Ecuadorian civil society’s ability to

14

affect change and strive toward racial equality depends largely on how activists and sympathetic

government functionaries proceed in an ever-evolving political atmosphere.

Secondly, Ecuador is the country in which a politically significant Afro-descendant

movement has arisen and must interact within a state that espouses the political and social ideals

of Socialism of the 21st Century at a national level. Literature surrounding racial and ethnic

social movements is quite extensive, but the vast majority of these studies deal with how these

movements operate in a neoliberal political framework. Similarly, literature on social movements

in 21st Century Socialist states has largely focused on the issue of class-based mobilizations and

their conflicts with national governments. Most studies that examine racial or ethnic movements

in these political contexts deal with indigenous movements, which typically have a large

territorial and cultural heritage component. Though these issues do arise when discussing

circumstances within the Afro-Ecuadorian community and social movement, such studies do not

typically include the considerations that are present in an urban sphere, where this research takes

place. Even considering that such studies may be comparable in some ways, the Afro-Ecuadorian

movement is quite unique in that it has relatively recently had impressive successes and

represents a fairly small proportion of the Ecuadorian population. In this regard, the only other

country that even partially resembles situation is Bolivia and its indigenous movement. However,

it is a country where the president and over half the population are indigenous, thus the

circumstances are quite distinct. Therefore, this thesis makes a contribution to literature

concerning racial and ethnic social movements in the 21st Century.

Methodology In order to examine and evaluate this case, I conducted interviews to extract qualitative

data from activists involved in Afro-Ecuadorian civil society, Afro-Ecuadorian bureaucrats and

elected officials, and relevant researchers. The data is composed of the experiences, opinions,

15

and perspectives of these participants. I approached this research with the intention of looking to

discover how these individuals view the Afro-Ecuadorian social movement, what their

motivations are in regards to Afro-Ecuadorian equality and recognition, why they choose to

engage with the Afro-Ecuadorians social movement in the way that they do, what they believe

their roles are in the organizations they work within, how they view the relationship between the

state and their organization, and how they believe their organization and the Afro movement as a

whole can contribute to structural change for Afro-Ecuadorians. After completing my fieldwork,

I came to focus more specifically on the political choices and actions that significantly inform

how these individuals complete their functions as activists or officials. For this reason, my

research question exists in the form presented previously.

To collect this data I relied on semi-structured and in-depth interviews with seven leading

activists in Afro-Ecuadorian civil society, five Afro-Ecuadorian government officials, and two

academics who study the subject. All interviews took place within May and June of 2014. They

were all conducted in Spanish and all translations into English are my own. These interviews

have given me a perspective on how the Afro-Ecuadorian struggle for justice equality is shaped

and how these individuals involved in it go about making social change, from the perspective of

organizational and institutional leadership.14 I supplemented these interviews with field notes

from observations of meetings between members of Afro-Ecuadorian civil society and

government bureaucrats, relevant events that engaged the Afro-Ecuadorian community, and time

spent with activists or at social organizations.

The distinction between Afro activists and government officials is not always clear, and

the boundaries dividing the two are evidently porous. All of the activists I encountered, and

mention in the course of my research, are involved in, or associated with, the struggle for Afro- 14 My interview guides, as well as quotes in their original Spanish are available in Appendix II.

16

Ecuadorian equality. Though not all of them consider themselves to be part of a specific ‘social

movement’, they do recognize that they are part of a fight greater than themselves or their

singular organization. In their current positions, they are not affiliated with any government

office, although many of them have previously occupied bureaucratic posts or have run for

elected office. Collectively, I refer to them throughout this thesis as members of civil society.

Civil society also includes the organizations undertaking any form of social, cultural, or political

mobilization not connected to the state. In some cases, the line between civil society and state

has become blurred, but these complications will be discussed at length in the coming chapters.

Government officials are the other participants I include in of my analysis. In this thesis,

they include bureaucrats and elected legislators. All of these officials are Afro-Ecuadorian and,

except for one legislator, were previously involved in the Afro-Ecuadorian social movement.

Though they all pursue work pertaining to the Afro-Ecuadorian community, and at least one is

still a member of a civil society organization, in this analysis I consider them separate from civil

society because the government employs them, thus ensuring their livelihood.

I gained access to most interviewees and locations through two sources of contact. The

first is Jhon Antón Sánchez, an Afro-Colombian scholar and activist working in Quito. He

studies and works on the Afro-Ecuadorian organizational process and, introduced me to leaders

and workers at various Afro organizations in Quito. The second is Nieves Mendez, a worker at

the Afro-Ecuadorian Cultural Center [CCAE],15 who was originally introduced to me by Mr.

Antón Sánchez, and helped me gain access to some government officials. In analyzing the data

taken from the interviews, I transcribed and coded my interviews and organized the opinions and

experiences of my interviewees into categories according to my research questions. In terms of

broader validity, I believe that this method of interviewing and the number of interviews I 15 Centro Cultural Afroecuatoriano

17

conducted provide a sufficient sample in order to get a good sense of how Afro-Ecuadorian

leaders fight for racial equality.

IV: Moving Forward As detailed previously, this thesis analyzes how Afro-Ecuadorian activists and officials

work towards racial equality in their nation. This contemporary fight takes place in the context of

Correa’s Citizen’s Revolution, which presents unique opportunities and challenges for Afro-

Ecuadorians involved in this struggle. These Afro-Ecuadorians push for racial equality by

working within the political boundaries set up by the Correa administration to institute and fulfill

actionable public policies on behalf of Afro-Ecuadorian communities. Due to this government’s

willingness to promote racial inclusion in its national plan, its increasingly centralizing

tendencies, and its prohibition of multilateral groups such as the World Bank or IADB,

mobilizing against the state is both much more difficult and much less effective in this

contemporary context. In order to gather wider appeal and ensure government support, Afro-

Ecuadorians involved in this struggle for racial equality have begun to frame their arguments

within the discourse of the ‘democratization of society’. In doing so, they have been able to gain

more allies and alter the radical nature of the movement in its recent past.

Moreover, much of Afro-Ecuadorian civil society has seen its options and resources

dwindling, and many former activists have either been elected or appointed as government

officials. This reduction of opportunities has incentivized the use of gradual steps to affect

influential change from within current political power structures, as opposed to attacking these

structures from without. I contend that as a result, the movement’s capacity to engage in

contentious politics with the state has weakened, and thus individuals seeking to affect change

are left with few avenues, which they must traverse carefully lest state interests undermine their

goals and ideals.

18

In the following chapters I will expand on this argument and explore the implications of

these individuals’ pursuit of social change. Chapter II reviews relevant literature and expand on

the concepts detailed in this chapter. Chapter III will answer the first research question by

contextualizing the political and social landscape around which Afro-Ecuadorian activism takes

place, and pointing to ways in which Correa’s administration has altered that landscape. Chapter

IV explicitly explores the various strategies or repertoires of mobilization that Afro-Ecuadorian

activists employ in their struggle for racial equality and justice. Chapter V analyzes the

trajectories of multiple Afro former activists who are now embedded within the state

bureaucracy. This chapter will illustrate the constraints that these officials face and highlight

instances of their continued activism. The concluding chapter makes a final argument about how

these various individuals within the Afro-Ecuadorian social movement and the government strive

for social change in the form of expanded Afro-Ecuadorian equality and inclusion in their nation.

19

II: LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter will review key literatures and concepts that will serve as the backbone of this thesis.

This literature covers theories of race, social movements, and the relationship between state and

society. These are essential to understanding and analyzing the opportunities, challenges, and

limitations that Afro-Ecuadorian civil society has faced and continues to face. First, I explore

theories of race and racial formation, and then move on to look at how the racial state16 and

racial movements interact to form structures and norms in society. Second, I consider

conceptions of social movements, and how they apply, or do not, to Afro-Ecuadorian civil

society. In this section I also offer some working definitions of concepts embedded within this

discussion of social movements and civil society, in order to show their contested meanings but

provide some grounding that will clarify my argument. Finally, I analyze conceptions of the state

and politics, and then turn to discussions of neoliberal multiculturalism and leftist attempts at

creating plurinational communities, which represent two distinct forms of the state’s leading role

in national ‘racial projects’.

I: Theorizing Race Racism and Racial Formation

Outright racial discrimination is a social ill that is obvious to almost all that see it, but this

discrimination is largely the result of more clandestine but pervasive stereotypes and stigmas that

allow racism to emerge and flourish. In his work on racial stereotypes, Loury (2002) outlines the

process through which ‘racial classifications’ become stereotypes and how those play out in

16 Essentially, the ‘racial state’ is the idea that race is integral to the philosophy and practice of the modern nation-state (Goldberg 2001).

20

society. Though his study deals specifically with the United States, the lessons he puts forth can

be applied to most countries that have any significant Afro-descendant population, including

Ecuador. Loury, like many other social scientists, defines race as a “socially constructed mode of

human categorization” that in itself is not necessarily good or evil (2002: 5). However, he

recognizes that because of historical realities this social consciousness is imbedded with

inherited stigmas that inhibit blacks from reaching their full potential (ibid).

In their work on racial formation in the United States Omi and Winant (1986) assert that

along with being a social construct, race is a matter of ‘political contention’, which is informed

by innumerable social and historical factors (57-60). The authors see race as a “central axis of

social relations”, which is formed by economic, social, and political forces that establish the

meaning and importance of racial classification (61). The process by which this happens is their

concept of racial formation. Though they developed this theory for the United States, it warrants

application to this study, which examines Ecuador. Too often, scholars have considered the

United States as an exceptional case in terms of race – and to some extent this is valid – but race

relations in much of Latin America (especially those places where African slavery abounded)

offer as many parallels as they do contrasts.

The concept of racial formation has two levels: the micro, which deals with individuality

and identity formation, and the macro, which is a collective matter dealing with the formation of

social, economic, political, and cultural structures (ibid 66-67). Of course, the distinction

between the micro and macro exists only in theory, as in the quotidian they inform one another

continuously. Thus, for Omi and Winant, race can never be a simple and stagnant characteristic

of a person or group; rather, race must be understood “as an unstable and ‘decentered’ complex

of social meanings constantly being transformed by political struggle” (68). Such political

21

struggle, which has the power to transform the meaning and formation of race, is the central

subject of this study.

Race and Society For Omi and Winant, a key player in the formation of race is the ‘racial state’. I define

the state (nation-state) as a ‘centralized system of rule’ operating in a specific and definitive

territory, which possesses legal and coercive institutions and a monopoly on force (Weber 1947,

Sørenson 2004). Furthermore, the modern nation-state serves as a societal actor crucial actor that

is both built upon and establishes the norms of social relations (Omi and Winant, 1986; Goldberg,

2001; Kirby and Cannon, 2012). In essence, the state cannot be separated from the axes of

society, and race is one of the most important of those. However, unlike other sectors of society,

the state has the means to coercively influence social institutions and relations with relative ease

(Sørenson 2004). Thus, state institutions, and the policies and projects that emanate from them,

simultaneously inform and are informed by societal concepts and definitions of race.

As the central institution around which modern nations are built, the state has immense

power. In terms of race, the state maintains a racial order or racial ‘equilibrium’ through policy-

making and law, and enforces that order through repression and force (Omi and Winant 1986:

79). However, Omi and Winant argue, this equilibrium is unstable and dependent on several

conflicting interests, which often prove difficult to pacify (79). Nonetheless, the state is only

moved to reform the racial equilibrium when movements challenge that order (ibid: 82). This is

especially true in majoritarian politics, where the demands of minorities will undoubtedly be

submerged if an external force, like a political movement, does not pressure the state (ibid: 132).

These race-based political movements seek to transform the dominant racial ideology that

the state espouses (which is white and mestizo superiority in Ecuador), and because of this they

are “inconceivable without the racial state” (ibid: 80). Put more bluntly, without the racial state,

22

racial politics from civil society could not exist, as it would have no dominant entity against

which to protest and make demands. This interplay between the state and political movements is

crucial to the “trajectory of racial politics” that the authors conceptualize (82). This ‘trajectory’

links the racial state and racial movements, and the authors theorize the necessary conditions

under which social change in the form of racial justice can occur:

[Change is] achieved only when the state has initiated reforms, when it has generated new programs and agencies in response to movement demands. Movements capable of achieving such reforms only arise when there is significant decay in the capacities of pre-existing state programs and institutions to organized and enforce racial ideology (ibid).

Essentially, Omi and Winant describe change as occurring only when movements take advantage

of political opportunities arising from state decay, and make demands. They further acknowledge

that in taking advantage of these political opportunities, racial movements force the racial state to

change (139). This can prove a blessing and a curse, as when working with a “reformed racial

state” is more possible, then confronting that state will prove more difficult than before (ibid).

In large part, this describes the experience of Afro-Ecuadorian civil society. One of the

key contributions of this thesis will be to examine how a ‘reformed racial state’ (Rafael Correa’s

government), has impacted Afro civil society and Afro-descendants’ place in Ecuadorian society.

Too often, the end goal of movements and activists seems simply to be a reformation of the

racial state. Thus, I endeavor to show the opportunities and constraints present after such a

reformation has taken place17. To properly explore these opportunities and constraints, the

following section delves more specifically into conceptions of civil society and social

movements, which will prove key to further analysis of Afro-Ecuadorian mobilization.

17 To quote one of Nieves Mendez, one of my interviewees, in this study I am more interested in the ‘después’ [afterwards – or secondary phase in this regard], than in the initial period of struggle and reform that took place in Ecuador. This interest stems largely from my feeling that in the United States and much of the Americas, this period after initial reform has been characterized by stagnation, dispersion, and regression.

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II: Social Movements Identity Politics

Over the last few decades theorists have increasingly begun to note changes in the ways

that social movements organize and engage in collective action. Some theorize that movements

are increasingly motivated to mobilize for recognition and political rights, instead of

redistribution for material gains. Polletta & Jasper (2001) focus on this struggle over the

incentives that drive social movement. The authors argue that movements centered around

identity politics have become an attractive alternative to mobilization based on material

incentives. They define collective identity as “as an individual’s cognitive, moral, and emotional

connection with a broader community, category, practice, or institution…and unlike ideology,

collective identity carries with it positive feelings for other members of the group” (ibid 285).

The theory of new social movements, which posits that class-based movements of the past have

given way to ones based on other similar interests such as identity, forms the basis of this

argument. Mobilization around identity has also helped nuance the association of social

movements as Marxist, which became especially problematic with the fall of the Soviet bloc

(Petras & Veltmeyer, 2000). This change has created a push for recognition of marginalized

identities, which has resulted in social movements blending of political and cultural goals.

This was certainly the case with the early Afro-Ecuadorian collective action, which began

in the 1970s on the basis of building and projecting identity. However, these movements and

their organizations have had to decide whether their mobilization is directed at achieving

material gains or changing “cultural representations [and] social norms” (Polletta & Jasper,

2001). Both of these driving forces are valid, but they create distinct solutions and results in

fighting racism. They can also play a role in determining the forms of resistance that the

movements choose to employ when faced with state power and influence.

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Political Opportunity Structure While I recognize the importance of identity in sustaining social movements, I believe

that this theory paints an incomplete picture of political movements, especially given the

example of Afro-Ecuadorian civil society. As opposed to identity politics, I argue that political

opportunities and constraints are the principal motivators and determinants of Afro-Ecuadorian

activists and organizations’ manifestations of collective action. I borrow these terms of political

opportunities and constraints from Tarrow (1998) and Tarrow and Tilly (2006), who maintain

that such opportunities offer incentives for actors to engage in contentious politics, especially

when those actors lack sufficient resources on their own. More specifically, political opportunity

structure refers to the “features of regimes and institutions that facilitate or inhibit a political

actor’s collective action and to changes in those features” (Tarrow and Tilly, 2006: 49). Thus,

this concept of political opportunity connects “regimes, institutions, and repertoires” (ibid: 57).

Regimes are the state’s administration; institutions are the tools the administration employs to

exert its will; and repertoires refer to the ways that political movements engage in contention

with the state. The term contentious politics, or contention, specifies those instances when

“ordinary people, often in league with more influential citizens, join forces in confrontations

with elites, authorities, and opponents” (Tarrow, 1998: 2). When actors coordinate and sustain

these challenges against powerful opponents, then a social movement is born.

Complementing this concept of political opportunity structure is the aforementioned

theory of racial formation proposed by Omi and Winant (1986). In placing these two theories in

conversation, I aim to demonstrate the limits of political opportunities created by the racial state

for race-based movements, like those seen in Ecuador. In terms of the development of nations

and groups, these theories are too often examined separately, which downplays the crucial and

25

enriching interplay between them. Together, these concepts form the lens through which I will

examine and analyze Afro-Ecuadorian civil society and the Ecuadorian state’s influence on it.

To do this, I will now turn to theories about the state, civil society, and how their interaction

defines politics in the modern era generally and in Latin America specifically.

III: The State and Society Conceptions of the State

I have already defined the state, according to Weber (1947) and Sørenson (2004), as the

centralized and monopolistic apparatus governing a territory through legal and coercive means.

When referring to the ‘state’ in this study, I focus on the central administrative apparatus

governing a nation. This includes the executive, judicial, and legislative branches of government,

and the bureaucratic institutions involved in administration of the nation. It is also important to

examine how this centralized entity governs and interacts with society. Ranciére (1999)

envisions the state as the body that manages difference and disagreement in society, although he

does not maintain that it is necessarily neutral or completely detached. Throughout this study, I

maintain that the state is far more than merely an administrator of society. Due to its coercive

and legal capacities, the state has the ability to influence, and at the very least guide, the rest of

society’s norms. At the same time, the state is built upon norms and traditions of society, and

therefore cannot be seen as separate from those other spheres. Nonetheless, state autonomous

theory does have an important role in this discussion. One aspect of this theory is that personnel

in the government can act autonomously from the government and use their position in the state

to advance their own interests in society (Skocpol, 1985, 1995). As Skocpol argues, however,

this autonomous action often has the consequence of reinforcing state power and control in

society (1985: 15). This reproduction of state power proves especially important when racial

political movements are involved.

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Defining Civil Society The concept of ‘civil society’ has often been defined in contrast to the state. In one sense

this contrast is warranted, as civil society cannot be conceived without the state (Gramsci 1996).

However, the two are also complementary and overlapping. Early theorizing of civil society

categorized it as the set of social systems outside of the state and its economic and political

apparatus, which appeared with the rise of capitalism and the creation of ‘market societies’

alongside market economies (Hegel, 1991 [1821]). Similarly, Marx saw civil society as a base to

the state’s political superstructure, while Gramsci conceived it as part of that same superstructure,

and a key tool of the bourgeoisie (Ehrenberg, 1999). Contemporary theorists have come to see

modern civil society as a key player in the nation-state’s political landscape, which represents the

will and interests of the populace, especially marginalized or excluded portions of it (Cannon and

Kirby, 2012; Prevost, Vanden and Oliva Campos, 2012).

Throughout this thesis, I endeavor to show that the state and civil society are not opposite

entities, but rather they share various political spaces throughout society. Like Gramsci, I believe

that the civil society and ‘political society’ of the state are interrelated and even overlapping. I

even make the case that individuals can be involved both with civil society and the state,

although these relationships do not come without their own set of complexities (which will be

analyzed in Chapter V). Adding what might be termed a ‘post-colonial’ nuance to Gramsci’s

beliefs, I maintain that civil society can both represent the ‘base’ of society and a popular

defense against the state and markets that are often dominated by elites18. Though definitions of

civil society may be murky and susceptible to inconsistencies, I maintain that a key trait of civil

society is that it engages in politics on behalf of citizens and social organizations.

18 In other words, civil society can represent both the social concerns of the masses, and the political interests of organizational leaders. Thus, I do not consider ‘civil’ society and ‘political’ society to be two entirely different spheres.

27

The Notion of Politics After defining the state and equating civil society with politicization, it is necessary to

ascertain some working conception of politics. Weber (1947) defines politics largely as the

struggle for power, and in the most general of senses this is an apt definition. However, in

focusing solely on power in politics, it is easy to discount those actors that either lack power or

lack the resources to obtain it. Contrastingly, Rancière (2001) argues that politics is not a process

of the powerful, nor an attempt by others to grab power. Rather, he envisions politics in the

relationships between distinct societal stakeholders over how to allocate “parts” or societal

spaces and advantages (Rancière 1999: 4). He contends that politics should not be conceived

solely as the act of two stakeholders confronting one another, but rather as the creation and

collective representation of stakeholder groups, or as Rancière illustrates: politics “causes the

poor [or any group without a ‘part’] to exist as an entity” (ibid: 11). Essentially, he claims that

politics is the process by which individuals outside of the dominant group form collective

identity as an entity separate from the ‘dominant class’, and challenge the system of domination

(ibid 11-12). When referring to the politics of civil society, I reference this conception of a

challenge to the domination of the status quo.

Such a conception of politics is important for this study, as throughout I will analyze

activists and organizations that often have little ‘power’ as conceived in the traditional sense.

Nonetheless, they continue to engage in political action as a group, both autonomously and in

conjunction with the state. Therefore, Afro-Ecuadorian politics can be seen as the process of

actors attempting to create a ‘part’ for themselves and their communities in Ecuadorian society –

whether this is by confronting the state, collaborating with other groups, or simply gathering as

representatives of certain sectors of society. Though throughout this thesis I will not often

explicitly use the language of ‘parts’ and ‘parts without a part’ (I prefer more straightforward

28

rhetoric of ‘inclusion’ and ‘exclusion’). The conception of politics as a challenge to domination

will carry throughout my argument. Moving away from definitions, I will now look at various

relevant forms that the state takes, and how those forms impact its relationship with movements

and society in general.

State-Led Multiculturalism Throughout this thesis I will refer to neoliberalism to signify a form of governance that

took hold in the 80s and 90s, especially in the Americas, and has held sway ever since.

Neoliberalism espouses the idea that liberating the individual through freedom of markets and

trade, and strong private property rights will lead to the best outcomes for society (Mirowski

2009, Harvey 2011). Defined by the ‘Washington Consensus’, neoliberal capitalism dominated

ideological debates of practices of political economy for much of the last two decades,

particularly before the global financial crisis (Fominaya 2014). In Latin America, neoliberalism

has come to represent a ‘retreat of the state’, or a view that the state is not responsible for

providing extensive programs and services for its citizens (Petras and Voltmeyer 2010). Critics

of policies emerging from this neoliberal

In this study, I am concerned principally with neoliberalism in it relationship with racial

groups and movements within nations. The period of neoliberal reforms in Latin America also

coincided with an increased focus on embracing multiculturalism on a national and international

level (Petras and Voltmeyer 2005, Rahier 2014). This has meant that even states in ‘retreat’ had

to answer to, or at the very least recognize, the demands that such groups have made. Thus, a

certain model of neoliberal multiculturalism arose that has focused on celebrating the cultural

rights of racial and ethnic groups, and publicly recognizing the legitimacy of their identities

(Hale 2002, Petras and Voltmeyer 2005).

29

However, critics believe that the neoliberal state’s recognition of multicultural identities

is a method being used by governments that don’t want to implement policies that might lead to

a restructuring of systems that propagate racial inequality (de la Torre 2002, Hale 2002, Petras

and Voltmeyer 2005). Hale (2002) contends that throughout Latin America this state-led

neoliberal multiculturalism has become the new mestizaje in the sense that it is a way for

governments to put forth inclusive rhetoric, while still denying true power and influence to

minority ethnic and racial groups. In making this argument, Hale rejects the notion that

recognition through identity politics can engender structural change. Rather, he says, it limits the

ability for groups and movements to push for social change outside of the parameters that the

state has set. Under this assumption, state actors from marginalized positions are forced into

ideological conflicts concerning how best to push their interests.

However, Hale’s argument seems to be too deterministic in that it diminishes the role that

individual activists play in the creation and execution of policies that aim to bring about social

change. In Chile, Mapuche government workers are often caught between their sympathies for

indigenous movements and their obligations as employees and representatives of the state (Park

& Richards 2007). This proves especially problematic when former grassroots activists and

leaders receive appointments to government positions, as has been the case in both Chile and

Ecuador (Parks & Richards 2007, de la Torre and Antón Sanchez 2012, Johnson 2012). This is

one example of what many scholars see as the government’s over-bearing role in state-led

multiculturalism (Fraser 1996, de la Torre 2002, Hale 2002). Nonetheless, government

appointments for former grassroots activists cannot simply be labeled as instances of state

cooptation of an organic movement or organization. Rather the various opportunities, limitations,

and resources that these positions offer must be carefully considered in order to give a

30

sufficiently balanced analysis. Also, in this analysis the motivations of activists that choose to

remain in their non-state organizations must be accounted for.

This conflict of interest is at the center of relationships and struggles between the state

and social movements that desire structural change. Petras and Veltmeyer (2006) argue that

social change can be brought about in three different ways: electoral politics, creation of social

movements, and local development. By looking at four countries in Latin America (Argentina,

Brazil, Bolivia, and Ecuador), they discern that electoral politics requires too much conformity

for marginalized groups, and sweeping change is slow and difficult through local development.

Thus, social movements seem to provide a convenient answer. However, the relationship

between these and the state can be tense and destructive. For better or worse, most governments

tend to favor the continuation of the status quo, while the social movements by definition look to

change it. Thus, it is usually in the interest of the powers that be to stop or curtail them. As they

note, these four Latin American states have at times responded to social mobilization in six

different ways: (1) creation of parallel organizations to avoid confrontation, (2) repression of

organizations with an anti-systemic agenda, (3) negotiation with representatives of organizations,

(4) accommodation of leadership to reform policies, (5) pacification of belligerent agencies

through reform, (6) strengthening organizations within civil society and weakening anti-systemic

ones, (7) incorporating groups into government institutions (pp. 89-90).

Similarly, in his study on movements and patronage politics in Argentina, Lapegna

(2013) shows that leaders of social movements are often faced with this ‘dual pressure’, from the

government or state officials, and separately from their constituents or the people from their

target communities. For Lapegna, these pressures from above can include even alliance with

other political actors, which have the ability to create conflicts and obstacles in mobilization. In

31

Argentina, such alliances between social movement organizations and state actors result in a

quick decline in popular mobilization. However, in the case of MoCaFor, the movement under

analysis, a complex series of alliances with various politics actually afforded the organization

relative autonomy from the government because it wasn’t overly reliant on a single ‘patron’

(Lapegna 2013). Despite this, the organization was still slightly beholden to each of its allies,

which would go on to create conflicts.

This dual pressure is almost certainly stronger on individuals than the organization as a

whole. As Park and Richards (2007) state, the motivations and considerations that form decisions

made by individual actors often include all those faced by organizations, plus others like income

and security. Under pressure by the state officials or policy, bureaucrats, or possibly even leaders

of grassroots organizations, often must do what serves the government’s interests because of the

power, influence, and legitimacy the state naturally holds. However, this bureaucrat may have

likely begun her/his career as a movement activist, in which case there will be significant

pressures to act for the good of the movement both ‘from below’ and internally. These

conflicting pressures do not create a clear picture of what the ‘right’ decision may be.

Racial Movements in Latin America Because of the complicated nature and perceived difficulty of this dilemma, prospects for

the intensification of social change may look grim. But some black movements in Latin America

have found ways to overcome the obstacles they face in domestic politics. Paschel & Sawyer

(2008) describe how black movements in Brazil and Colombia as have overcome numerous

obstacles to arrive at their present state. The first was in creating a racial dialogue where none

had ever existed and dismissing claims that bringing up race is racist; the second involved

surpassing challenges of government repression and civil society formation; the third was in

working to alleviate poverty. International and non-governmental organizations play a large role

32

in helping movements overcome these obstacles, especially in nations where the state is more

concerned with controlling resistance than working with it to democratize society (ibid).

Less divisive, but possibly also effective at continuing to pressure governments to enact

reforms, is a change in rhetoric such as that employed in Colombia. There, black activists have

reframed their demands in terms of human and civil rights, not political ones (Paschel 2010). The

designation has helped increase international attention and influence to the cause of Afro-

Colombians. Viewing racial discrimination and community displacement as a human rights crisis

is aided by the fact that many Afro-Colombians have become refugees because of civil violence

that has disproportionately affected their lands, but this terminology is not necessarily an

exclusively Colombian possibility (Paschel & Sawyer 2008).

This is exactly a strategy that Wade (2010) espouses in his analysis of black and

indigenous social movements. Though human rights claims are most often used when territorial

or land disputes arise, they are also valid when “access to resources, education, and racism” are

problems facing the marginalized population (Wade 2010: 115). Like Paschel & Sawyer, Wade

agrees that claims of human rights abuse help engender international support and legitimacy,

which can be crucial for movements trying to work around stringent or paternalistic states.

However, he does warn that when race intersects with other factors (class, education level, etc.),

such a consensus change in focus is extremely difficult to create because of differing interests

among the members of the racial or ethnic group. Thus, reframing the dialogue around

mobilization to focus more on the human rights of Afros could potentially help Afro-Ecuadorian

movements pick up lost steam and continue to pressure their government. Therefore it will be

important to analyze whether this reframing is occurring and the motivations behind its existence,

or lack thereof.

33

I theorize that Afro-Ecuadorian civil society’s struggle for racial justice can be

understood through Tarrow’s (1998) political opportunity structure. I believe that Omi and

Winant’s (1986) theory on racial formation further informs how Afro-Ecuadorian civil society

engages in the politics of racial equality, justice, and citizenship, and how it approaches the

political opportunities and limitations that it faces. In Ecuador, Rafael Correa’s government has

responded to Afro civil society’s demands in a way that doesn’t fit the absorption or insulation

models of state behavior laid out by Omi and Winant (ibid: 81). Because of this unique response,

Afro civil society has adopted a new repertoire of strategies in order to continue to pressure the

Ecuadorian state. Nonetheless, the Ecuadorian state continues to reproduce patterns and

dynamics of state paternalism that, which along with a perpetuation of unequal racial hierarchies,

make Afro activists and organizations less autonomous and more vulnerable. Moreover, the

state’s response has put Afro activists working in government positions in precarious situations

between civil society and the state. I further contend that these Afro activist officials’ methods of

pursuing continued activism while in government can be partially understood through Park and

Richards’ (2007) work on Mapuche activists in Chile, which analyzes the personal

considerations and constraints that arise when former activists become government officials.

This literature will be important throughout the thesis, as it shows not only how states

have attempted to organize and manage racial groups, but also how those groups have responded

and circumvented the state. Chapter V will specifically examine the considerations and

motivations for former Afro activists turned officials in Ecuador. In the following chapter I will

look extensively at how these policies of state-led multiculturalism and Correa’s plurinational

plan have influenced and impacted Afro-Ecuadorian civil society and its mobilization.

34

III: THE ROAD HAS NOT BEEN EASY Afro Political Activism, Past and Present

Africans and Afro-descendants have inhabited the area that would become Ecuador since the

Spanish first settled the land, and they have been in Quito at least since the city’s founding in

1534, almost 300 years before Ecuador became a country (de la Torre 2002). In other words, the

story of Ecuador is in part the story of Afro-Ecuadorians and their exclusion from social,

political, and economic spheres. This has become even more evident in the last two decades, as

Afro-Ecuadorian civil society has burst on the political scene not only to fight for racial justice,

but also to make Ecuador a more inclusive nation overall (de la Torre and Antón Sánchez 2012).

Unlike the nation’s other minorities (Indigenous and Montubio people), Afro-

Ecuadorians now live primarily [75%] in urban cities (Becker 2012). Due to this urban living

situation, Afro-Ecuadorians have more everyday exposure to political struggles, labor market

fluctuations, and social and personal discrimination that accompany this urban setting (Antón

Sánchez 2007a, Beck, Mijeski and Stark 2011). Thus, it is of little surprise that Afro-Ecuadorian

political groups and organizations share many characteristics of – and in some cases mirror –

Ecuadorian politics in general (Johnson 2012). Therefore, it would be a grave error to study

Afro-Ecuadorian civil society without intimately considering the political, social, and economic

context in which it operates. The goal of this chapter is to provide and analyze that context.

Tarrow (1998) notes that both internal and external factors influence how groups

undertake collective action. This chapter will analyze those external factors and how they have

impacted the formation of Afro-Ecuadorian identity and collective action. Accordingly, I

describe how Afro-Ecuadorian civil society emerged as a political force and detail its primary

35

interactions with the nation’s neoliberal governments in the 1990s and early 2000s. From there I

analyze how the rise of Rafael Correa and his Citizen’s Revolution have interacted with Afro-

Ecuadorian civil society. In doing so, I argue that Correa’s government has reformed the

Ecuadorian political and bureaucratic state and expanded opportunities for Afro civil society to

participate in government. However, it has designed these opportunities in a way that eschews

true participation by non-state actors and reinforces state dominance and fails to alter the unequal

racial hierarchies that activists look to overturn. Therefore, the reformed state under Correa

continues to perpetuate many of the problematic dynamics that have plagued Ecuadorian politics

and race relations. Before expanding on this argument, I contextualize the changing relationship

between Afro activism and the Ecuadorian state.

I: Context for Collective Action Ecuador’s Political Turbulence

Much like other Latin American countries, Ecuador has endured a turbulent and often

unstable political history. In fact, it has sometimes been cited as one of the most, if not the most,

politically unstable country in Latin America (Becker 2008). Moreover, Ecuadorian politics has

tended to be dominated by strong leaders who wield extensive power through personalism and

populism (Johnson 2012). Such a political legacy has not lent itself to consistent democratic

governance. After years of swinging between electoral representation and military dictatorship,

Ecuador returned to democracy in 1979, but democracy has not been synonymous with stability.

There have been thirteen heads of state since 1979, and current President Rafael Correa (who

was first elected in 2006) is the first since 1996 to finish an entire term in office.

From the early 1990s on, social mobilization through civil society exploded in Ecuador.

Many of these president’s who left office before their mandate finished did so because of

pressure by various social movements, primarily indigenous groups. The expansion of social

36

movements, in both influence and number, was sparked largely by protests by Indigenous groups

in 1990, which took the government by surprise and caused a national political crisis for the state

(Becker 2008). This came at a time when the government was operating under a neoliberal form

of governance, which represented a retreat of the state from the social policies and protections of

the past brought about increased social isolation of marginalized groups and a weakening of state

capacity (Becker 2008, Petras and Veltmeyer 2005). In the late 1990s, this coincided with a

series of economic crises that shook the nation, and a nearly complete collapse of the financial

system in 1999, which brought the nation’s political leaders to their knees.

Afro-Ecuadorian civil society was forming as a national force at precisely this time, in

which social mobilization in the country reached new heights, and the state was relatively weak

and unstable. Therefore, political opportunities presented themselves at a moment when Afro-

Ecuadorian civil society did not have a cohesive agenda, but its leaders nonetheless managed to

gain recognition for their communities when the government of Interim President Fabián

Alarcón called on a new National Assembly to draft a Constitution, which was signed into law in

1998. The Constitution gave Afro-Ecuadorians and Indigenous peoples cultural rights, and set a

precedent for racial groups to make claims to land rights and cultural recognition.

State-Led Multiculturalism in Ecuador By recognizing the existence and place in society of Afro-Ecuadorians and Indigenous

communities in the 1998 Constitution, the Ecuadorian government eschewed almost 170 years of

an ideology of mestizaje, which had defined the nation’s dominant cultural and racial perspective

since its foundation. After the adoption of this Constitution, more Afro-Ecuadorian national

groups formed, and the state more actively pursued creating institutions for them, of which the

principal was the Corporation for the Development of Afro-Ecuadorians, CODAE, whose

mandate is to serve as a semi-autonomous government agency that would represent civil society.

37

This official recognition, and the further incorporation of institutions like CODAE into

the government’s bureaucratic apparatus, cemented the government’s vision of a form of state-

led neoliberal multiculturalism, which combines multiculturalist social agenda with a neoliberal

economic one. Essentially, the state aimed to manage distinct groups by separating them into

sectors and appealing to their specific interests. This ‘corporatist’ style of organizing society is

often seen as a hallmark of state multiculturalism (Tarrow, 1998; de la Torre, 2002; Hale, 2002).

Corporatism is the state’s form of organizing social groups into defined institutions, so that they

might serve as a link between the government and the communities that the group represents.

However, critics deride this as the state’s attempt to quiet discontent through symbolic and

powerless institutions. (Tarrow 1998, de la Torre 2002, Hale 2002, Yashar 2005, Petras and

Veltmeyer 2006, Horton 2006). This view holds weight for two reasons: 1) Numerous

governments fill these institutions with leaders from civil society organizations, which often

debilitates those groups, and 2) Such institutions are rarely autonomous from the government,

and thus have a limited capacity for action that does not favor the state’s ideology and agenda.

Therefore, CODAE and other intermediary institutions developed during the time of state-led

neoliberal multiculturalism have come to represent government’s hollow commitment to racial

justice and equality. The next section briefly chronicles early Afro-Ecuadorian social

mobilization and how state-led multiculturalism influenced it.

Early Afro-Ecuadorian Collective Action Most scholars (as well as my interviewees) trace the beginnings of Afro-Ecuadorian

national consciousness and collective action to the end of the 1970s (Whitte and Quiroga 1995,

de la Torre 2002, Antón Sánchez 2011, Johnson 2012, Rahier 2012a). In 197919, groups of Afro-

19 Not coincidentally, this was the first year of a return to democratic rule in the country. Therefore, the history of Afro-Ecuadorian collective action goes hand-in-hand with the country’s current legacy of democracy.

38

Ecuadorian students in Quito, who were starving to know more about their roots and the culture

of Afro-descendant Ecuadorians, founded the Centro de Estudios Afroecuatorianos [Center for

Afro-Ecuadorian Studies]. Around the same time, Catholic missionaries, of the Comboni order,

would help establish the Afro-Ecuadorian Cultural Center [CCAE], which became a focal point

for research into the Afro-Ecuadorian past and present. In the provinces of Esmeraldas and the

area around the Chota Valley, similar attempts were made to investigate and compile the

histories of Afro-Ecuadorian communities (Antón Sánchez 2011, Johnson 2012). This was the

first step in bringing a national awareness to the existence and rich culture and history of Afro-

descendant Ecuadorian peoples. This is not to say that Afro-Ecuadorians were not politically

active before the late 1970s. On the contrary, they were involved in several forms of activism,

but mainly as part of other interests groups (workers, landowners, etc.), and not as

representatives of a greater Afro-Ecuadorian community (Antón Sánchez 2011, Johnson 2012).

Up until this point, Afro-Ecuadorians had identified more with the region or community

in which they or their parents had been born than with a national or international Afro-

descendant community (Whitten 1974, Antón Sánchez 2011). Thus, when Afro-Ecuadorian

organizations began to explode into existence in the 1980s and early 90s, they were largely

regionally focused and disparate. At the time, the indigenous movement in Ecuador began to

generate considerable political, social and media attention at a nationwide scale, while Afro-

Ecuadorian groups were mostly community-based and regional operations.

Multiculturalism and Afro-Ecuadorian identity Due to the corporatist multiculturalism that was a key part of neoliberal governments’

agendas in Ecuador, many scholars have pointed out that Afro-Ecuadorian civil society

39

attempted to position itself in a similar light as the Indigenous movement,20 in order to gain a

national presence (de la Torre 2002, Antón Sánchez 2011, Becker 2012). In essence, as Wade

(2010) argues, they looked to ‘indianize’ their struggle in order to make demands that the state

might recognize and fulfill. This strategy, Paschel (2010) recognizes, has proven effective in

Colombia. However, in Ecuador, many Afro-descendants live in urban settings, and beyond

recognition, their political agenda differs greatly from that of Indigenous communities’ (Wade

2010, Johnson 2012 Rahier 2012a). Thus, this ideology of ‘indianization’ worked well for the

purposes of the 1998 Constitution, but it did not serve as a strategy for national mobilization.

This is likely because Afro-Ecuadorians do not have the same firm cultural ground to

stand on as Indigenous groups. Because of their geographic dispersion, they cannot organize

over specific shared community practices or histories, and they do not speak common and unique

language apart from Spanish. Thus, Afro-Ecuadorians on a nationwide scale must bond largely

over race, which depends on a contested and vague interpretation of skin color and ancestry

(Wade 2010). This ambiguity stems from socio-historical circumstances in the way that race has

been conceived in Latin America. Unlike Indigenous peoples, who were institutionalized as part

of the mestizo nature of the continent21, blacks were thrown into a category of ‘Other’, and

essentially had no place in the cultural and ethnic ideology of the nation-state (Wade 2010: 26-

29). This ambiguity continues to this day, and still poses a challenge for Afro-descendant

collective action throughout the continent, as Afro-descendant peoples have both been excluded

20 Ecuador’s Indigenous movement is widely considered one of the most successful and influential racial social movements in Latin America (Becker 2012). As such, it is of little wonder that Afro-Ecuadorians would style much of their early mobilization after it . 21 The idea of ‘monocultural mestizaje’ sees white European and Indigenous peoples as the two major components in the creation of race throughout most of Spanish America. Thus, though they were marginalized, the role of Indigenous peoples was evident, whereas Africans and Afro-descendants have had their role greatly diminished..

40

from dominant conceptions of national culture and been dispersed in a way that has made

creating a somewhat universal subaltern culture very difficult.

Thus, Omi and Winant’s (1986) vision of racial formation applies quite well in the

Ecuadorian case. Afro-Ecuadorian national identity has proven to be as much a product of

political forces of the time as of concerted identity activism. Afro-Ecuadorian civil society rose

as a national force and gained widespread recognition in a time of state-led neoliberal

multiculturalism. As such, its identity and was molded by the political opportunities and

limitations that those circumstances presented. The way the Afro-Ecuadorian political

organizations and movements have positioned themselves owes much to the state’s ideology of

multiculturalism that reigned supreme when they were developing a national presence and

community. This multiculturalist agenda afforded distinct groups various cultural rights, but did

not attempt to address the structural concerns that originally caused marginalization. Though

Rafael Correa’s government claims it is intent on changing the nature of Ecuadorian society and

the state’s way of interacting with civil society, the legacy of this period continues to manifest

itself in sometimes-problematic ways, which will be discussed in the following sections.

II: Transitioning to Rafael Correa Civil Society Influence and the Rise of Correa In the years leading up to the election of Rafael Correa, Ecuador faced several political,

social, and economic crises. The country defaulted on debts multiple times, and in 2000,

President Jamil Mahuad chose to dollarize the Ecuadorian economy in order to avoid further

financial collapse (Edwards and Magendzo 2003: 351). According to Alodia Borja, these crises

wreaked havoc on Ecuadorians’ social and economic lives, but provided opportunities for social

movements, which took advantage of the state’s incapacity and exerted their influence. Various

types social movements (environmental, racial, labor, etc.) mobilized more heavily against

41

perceived injustices and government ineptitude, while the state proved fairly incapable of

suppressing discontent, providing adequate services, and guaranteeing rights for the marginalized.

Two presidents were brought down as a direct result of social movement protest, and no

president in the decade between 1996-2006 managed to complete a full term. This immense

social upheaval weakened the capacity of the state, while simultaneously strengthening the

influence of civil society and social movements.

Ecuador was not alone in experiencing societal turbulence at this time. The early 21st

Century saw the election of several leftist governments throughout Latin America, often termed

the Pink Tide – in reference to the soft-socialism espoused by many of these leaders (Prevost,

Vanden and Oliva Campo 2012, de la Torre 2013a). Within this context, emerged Rafael Correa,

a US-trained economist, and former Minister of Finance. In 2006, Correa founded Alianza PAIS

[‘Proud and Sovereign Fatherland’ Alliance], a movement that promotes 21st Century Socialism,

economic pragmatism directed at helping the poor, political sovereignty, bureaucratic

transparency, and regional integration (El Universo, 23 July 2007).

A central aspect of Correa’s campaign was a criticism of neoliberal policies adopted by

past presidents, especially a free trade agreement with the US and the dollarization of the

economy in 2000. In this way, Correa fits in well with other ‘new leftist’ Latin American leaders,

who have been motivated by criticisms of neoliberals and guarantees to alleviate the struggles of

the poor by bringing the state back into everyday life through social programs (Cannon and

Kirby 2012: 11). This attack on neoliberalism and Correa’s technocratic approach to relieving

Ecuador’s economic and social woes made him and Alianza PAIS popular with many of

Ecuador’s poor. Alianza PAIS eventually won the 2006 election in a runoff by allying with

several other political parties and social organizations, like the Indigenous movement, the

42

Socialist Party, environment groups, and Afro-Ecuadorian organizations. Thus, the election of

Correa would have been nearly impossible without the support of many sectors of civil society.

The 2008 Constitution In 2007, Rafael Correa called for and won a referendum to elect a Constitutional

Assembly that would work with various government institutions and representatives of various

civil society groups and organizations to draft a new Constitution. The Constitution, which was

completed and accepted in 2008, purports to establish a new form of society in Ecuador, based

on citizen participation in governance.22 Among the many novel aspects of the Constitution are

expanded collective rights and guarantees for minority groups (called ‘Peoples and Nationalities),

acknowledgement of rights for Mother Nature, and the recognition of the nation’s sovereignty

over international investment in the country. In general, the Constitution emphasizes social

inclusion, citizen participation, and a desire to improve well-being and national pride in Ecuador.

For this study, there are three critical aspects of the Constitution. First, it defines Ecuador as a

plurinational state,23 which means that the country recognizes the various communities, cultures,

and groups that exist within the nation-state. This specifically rejects the notion of a mono-

cultural mestizaje culture or race in Ecuador. Second, it establishes a model of governance that

centers the state as a key participant in the social and economic life of the country, and thus

rejects neoliberal experiments of the past. Third, it calls for a decentralized form of government

administration, to allow for greater participation by various social sectors.

In conversations with interviewees, Ecuadorian friends, and acquaintances, all recognize

that Ecuador has changed substantially under Rafael Correa, and that most of these changes have

been for the better. For one, Correa’s government has made a concerted effort to increase 22 Constitución de la República del Ecuador de 2008, Asamblea Nacional Constituyente. http://www.asambleanacional.gov.ec/documentos/constitucion_de_bolsillo.pdf 23 This is the type of “postmodern celebration of diversity” to which Wade (2010) refers. It defines the nation as multicultural and eschew the idealization of homogeneity (p.138).

43

Ecuadorian national pride. This is evident through his charismatic speeches, government

propaganda celebrating the progress of the country, and his foreign policy. A friend, who I

should add is not a Correa supporter, remarked to me that he has helped to make being

Ecuadorian feel significant on an international stage. Second, he has been willing to engage with

the populace in a way that few recent presidents have. He holds informal weekly addresses,

called Citizen Link24, where he talks about everything from politics to pop culture, and responds

to questions and criticisms. Third, under Correa, Ecuador’s diverse history and culture have been

recognized and put on display more fully. For example, all important state announcements on

radio and television must be broadcast not only in Spanish but also in Quechua, the principal

language spoken in most Indigenous communities in Ecuador. Furthermore, there is recognition

of the Peoples and Nationalities (national minority groups) of the country – a far cry from the

days when mestizaje was the only cultural and racial ideology of the nation.

Last and most importantly, social indicators in the nation have improved since Correa’s

government has taken hold. Poverty is down by roughly 37%, unemployment has been cut by

over 60%, and infant mortality has been reduced by 20%25. Furthermore, the economy has

become much more stable than in years past, a testament to his technocratic economic agenda.

Though Correa’s rhetoric may seem similar to that of Hugo Chávez, he believes strongly in

operating a market economy, including continuing to exploit the country’s natural resources. To

Correa’s credit, he has used the revenue from these resources to invest in social programs for

Ecuador’s poor and other disadvantaged groups. Nonetheless, Correa is without his detractors, of

which there are many. Though he has convincingly won two elections since his first, the country

seems to be fairly divided on his legacy. Some see him as a national hero, while others have

24 Enlace Ciudadano, http://www.ecuadortv.ec/micrositio.php?c=1314 25 http://www.siise.gob.ec/siiseweb/siiseweb.html?sistema=1#

44

called him ‘technopopulist’, a traitor to social movements, and simply a hypocrite (de la Torre

2013a, Interview with Alodia Borja). Moreover, improvements in social indicators have largely

been concentrated in urban sectors, – which represent much of Correa’s political base – while

rural poverty has actually increased since he took office (Becker 2012, SIISE). Needless to say,

there is a complex situation to be analyzed here. However, I leave that discussion until Section

III, and now turn to the organization and mobilization of Afro-Ecuadorians in the years before

and immediately following the election of Rafael Correa.

‘Golden Age’ of Afro-Ecuadorian Organization The Constitutional achievements in recognition, rights, and guarantees for Afro-

Ecuadorians were a direct result of intense and sustained mobilization by Afro groups,

individuals, and organizations leading up to and during the drafting of the 2008 Constitution.

Various leaders have referred to this period from 2001-2008 as a ‘golden age’26 for mobilization

in Afro-Ecuadorian civil society. This period is generally bookended by the 2001 World

Conference Against Racism in Durban, South Africa (Durban) on end, and the drafting and

adoption of the 2008 Ecuadorian Constitution on the other.

Durban is a seminal moment for Afro-Ecuadorian civil society: every activist or former

activist that I interviewed referenced Durban as an important event for the development of Afro-

Ecuadorian civil society’s goals, ideology, and transnational connections. According to most

interviewees, three crucial outcomes for Afro-Ecuadorian civil society emerged from Durban: 1)

A view that Afro-descendant people had a right to reparations (usually through affirmative action

and an official responsibility of the state to improve the well-being of Afro-descendant

communities) by their respective nation-states for the crime of slavery and the continued

26 Although only Alodia Borja specifically termed this period a ‘golden age’, many other activists and former activists recognized the special importance of this time period on Afro-Ecuadorian organization.

45

discrimination and violence against blackness and its beholders. 2) The recognition of the

existence of both collective and individual rights for Afro-descendant peoples, and the adoption

of a perspective of these as fundamental human rights for Afro-descendants. 3) A deeper

connection and affiliation with other Afro-descendant movements throughout the hemisphere.

The standards that Durban established proved crucial to Afro-Ecuadorians’ subsequent

collective action in civil society and in government. For example, José Chalá Cruz, Secretary

General of CODAE, asserts that the plan of action that emerged from Durban led activists to

pursue the attainment of public policies and programs directed at Afro-Ecuadorians. Additionally,

he claims that this view continues to hold in his government work, illustrating the importance of

the conference for Afro-Ecuadorian organizations and institutions. Beyond ideological formation,

Durban also opened up new political opportunities because of the pressure that it put on

governments to confront issues of racism in their nations. Though some like the United States

and Western European nations did not accept the plan of action that emerged from the

conference, others, like Ecuador, had recently begun to publicly recognize long-standing issues

of racial exclusion and discrimination, and thus faced much pressure from social organizations to

take the conference’s outcomes seriously. In the words of Sonia Viveros, current President of

Fundación Azúcar27, Durban represented a “tool” that social organizations employed to “create

and open [political] spaces” within society and toward the state. Organizations took advantage of

these newly opened spaces, and the political turmoil of the time, to increase their mobilizations

and visibility on a national scale.

Participation in the Durban conference, recent official recognition by the state, and high-

levels of national organization also led to international recognition and assistance. Multilateral

27 Fundación Azúcar is an Afro-Ecuaodrian social organization that promotes cultural activites and political and educational training for young Afro-Ecuadorians in Quito.

46

institutions like the World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank, likely influenced by the

Durban Conference, began to focus more on improving the livelihoods of racial minorities

throughout the globe. Consequently, these organizations began projects focused on improving

the standards of living and human development of Afro-Ecuadorians. For Example the IADB

helped Ecuador’s government work with social organizations to uncover the social problems that

most heavily afflicted Afro-Ecuadorians. They did this through direct funding to Afro social

organizations, like Vivero’s Fundación Azúcar. This funding, says Nivo Delgado, allowed

organizations increased flexibility and organizational capacity to undertake projects and mobilize

toward their goals. In addition to organizational support, many individual Afro-Ecuadorian

activists were invited to nations throughout the hemisphere – especially the United States, Brazil,

and Colombia – to meet with other Afro-descendant leaders.

A byproduct of this international recognition was increasing legitimacy and bargaining

power within the nation, which would prove important in negotiations with the state. Such

legitimacy helped Afro organizations to make alliances with other political groups in the country

and stage demonstrations that garnered national attention. Orfa Reinoso, currently an assistant

director at the Sub-Secretariat of Peoples and Nationalities28, retells her experiences from a time

of active protest, when taking to the streets to protest discrimination was a regular occurrence: “I

am very revolutionary and before the Citizen’s Revolution I was always in the street…we took to

the streets not to throw rocks, but to fight nonetheless.” There is an evident nostalgia in

storytelling, which lends itself to the perspective of this time as a golden age for the Afro-

Ecuadorian organizational process.

28 Which is a branch of the National Secretariat of Policy Management [Secretaría Nacional de Gestíon de la Política]

47

The crowning achievements of this golden age of Afro-Ecuadorian organization are the

rights and guarantees embedded within the 2008 Constitution. Few other countries explicitly

give minority groups the rights that Ecuador grants to its own. This has much to do with the

Correa administration’s desire to promote social inclusion and plurinationality29, but it is

principally a testament to the continued mobilization and negotiation of these social movements.

Like many other sectors of civil society, Afro-Ecuadorians worked closely with legislators and

the executive branch to draft language aimed not only at guaranteeing equal citizenship,

collective rights, and protection from discrimination, but also instituting reparations in the form

of affirmative action policies. On paper, the rights and guarantees for national minorities,

including Afro-descendent peoples and communities, are among the most progressive and

substantial on the globe.30 In practice, however, this same cannot be said.

Afro-Ecuadorian social and political leaders obviously deserve immense credit for the

success of their civil society mobilization in this period. However, the story of the ‘golden age’

of mobilization is also the story of well-timed political opportunities. The convergence of

beneficial circumstances around the turn of the century helped foster the focused activism,

international recognition, and national presence that Afro civil society achieved during this

‘golden age’. Essentially, Afro civil society benefitted from what Omi and Winant call a decay in

the state’s ability to enforce and organize its racial ideology, which permitted a ‘trajectory of

racial politics’ that benefitted Afro Ecuadorians. (1986: 82). Similarly, Sonia Viveros contends

that the Afro movement has been quite lucky through much of its recent history: “We had the

luck to fall in a space, a political aperture that opened the door for us. I say luck because I still

believe that we were not prepared.” Several other activists and officials share Viveros’

29 Within the Ecuadorian Constitution, Plurinationality is the coexistence of several distinct cultures and peoples within a nation-state. Thereby emphasizing that nationality is not based on a monocultural and homogenous ideal. 30 An example of these can be found in Appendix III.

48

perspective on this topic. They see that the Afro movement took advantage of the political

opportunities presented, but rushed into them without properly considering their consequences.

Consequently, says Alodia Borja, Afro organizations and leaders became susceptible to

political forces and institutional changes, which they could not have predicted. Thus, his golden

age has received the distinction because of difficult times that followed. The next section details

how Afro-Ecuadorian civil society has interacted with the state in the context of Citizen’s

Revolution, and what the consequences have been for Afro’s political identity and mobilization.

III: Afro-Ecuadorian Civil Society and the Citizen’s Revolution Afro-Ecuadorian Mobilization and Dispersion

The 2008 Constitution and the implementation of the Citizen’s Revolution likely

represent the most drastic political and institutional changes to occur in Ecuador since the return

to democracy in 1979 (Becker 2012, de la Torre 2013a). As with any such occurrence, few, if

any, social and political groups can remain unaffected. Yashar (2005) argues that institutional

change can alter political identities in “new and unintended ways”, which have important

consequences for political action and collective identity formation (p. 8). The election of Rafael

Correa, the drafting of a new Constitution, and the implementation of the Citizen’s Revolution

certainly represent the forms of institutional change that Yashar references. As such, it has had

consequences for Afro-Ecuadorian political identity formation.

As the previous section detailed, the early 2000s were a time of active mobilization for all

of civil society, but especially for Afro-Ecuadorian organizations. Since the implementation of

the 2008 Constitution, Afro-Ecuadorians have continued to organize and maintain their political

presence through demonstrations, events, and programs. However, a new political landscape has

necessitated a different form of organization and engagement with the government. Due to the

guarantees and concessions that the Constitution grants Afros, and the cooperative rhetoric of the

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Correa administration, Afro civil society cannot engage in the same confrontational political

mobilizations that it did with previous governments. And as I have previously mentioned, there

is considerable debate as to whether the organization and mobilization of Afro-Ecuadorian

deserves the moniker ‘social movement’. Though some interesting nuances exist in the

distinctions that various individuals make, I believe that this argument is one more of semantics

and less of substantial differences in thought.

What is more important is that since 2008 Afro civil society unarguably become more

disperse, weak, and disjointed. Consequently, it is less able to confront the state when it desires.

In this way, the Afro-Ecuadorian social movement has exhibited a typical issue that most racial

movements make when some of their demands are met by the state: they lose their “decentered

political unity” as “working within the newly reformed racial state [is] more possible, and

confronting it more difficult” than in the past (Omi and Winant 1986: 139). In other words,

reform through government is a mixed blessing. On the one hand, the movement has achieved

much of what it originally had set out to achieve. On the other, the reformed state will not want

the movement to engage in contention as it did in the past, and therefore pushing for more

change – as well as trying to maintain and realize written guarantees – can prove even more

difficult as activists and organizations must adapt to a new climate. This is precisely the

challenge that has faced Afro-Ecuadorian civil society since 2008, and it has yet to be resolved.

In some ways, Afro civil society’s recent troubles can be attributed to its substantial

previous success. Decades of research, organization, and protest have resulted in increased

recognition and decreasing discrimination throughout the country. This representation is evident

way Afro-Ecuadorians appear in the media. Around the turn of the 21st Century nearly every

article about Afro-Ecuadorians was in some way related to soccer. Now there are consistently

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pieces on a number of topics, especially related to community organization and civil society

action. Also, the more bold forms of racism that were part of everyday life for urban Afro-

Ecuadorians in the past are now extremely rare. Alodia Borja describes how her experience in

Quito has changed over the years:

I’ve lived in Quito 31 years, and when I came to this city I could couldn’t walk on the street, I couldn’t catch taxi, I couldn’t get on the bus. To get on a public bus, I had to be in a group of several people. I couldn’t enter an elite 5-star restaurant like the Hotel Colón. It was prohibited that a black enter unless she was a foreigner. I couldn’t enter nice stores to go shopping. I couldn’t study in the nice places…So, for me this state has changed a lot, but it has changed thanks to the social struggle and to the leadership that began with four, and then eight, and then twenty, and is now thousands.

Due to these positive changes, much of the blatant discrimination that Afros used to mobilize

against no longer exists in a significant way. To be sure, racism and discrimination are alive and

well in Ecuador, but they have largely taken more subtle forms, much like in the United States

and other countries throughout the hemisphere. These subtle and everyday manifestations of

discrimination often go unnoticed, and thus they are difficult to form a rally or protest against.

At the beginning of the Afro movement in Ecuador, most organizations had has their top

priorities an increase in national recognition and acceptance, and an elimination of

discrimination. As Afro-Ecuadorians face a much less hostile society than they once did,

individuals and organizations with different goals, focuses, and methods have lost their

overarching source of unification. This is what Yashar might call a crisis of political identity for

Afro civil society, which has led to dispersion and separation. In reality, many of these

organizations never had aligned goals, but the goal of significant state recognition and a

guarantee of rights was a draw powerful enough to hold them together.

This fracturing is made more severe by the ways in which Afro-Ecuadorian groups mirror

national Ecuadorian politics in terms of regional division and political personalism (de la Torre

2002, Johnson 2012). The fragile national coalitions and organizations that managed to unite

51

Afros in the ‘golden age’ have largely disintegrated due to regional fractures. Afro-Ecuadorians

in Esmeraldas deal with significantly different issues than those in Quito, and the same could be

said between all the cities in the four principal Afro-Ecuadorian areas. Nonetheless, there are

exceptions. Certain groups of activists from various regions have joined together in order

promote specific initiatives, and in 2012, hundreds of Afro activists and officials – who

recognized that many of the rights achieved in the Constitution were not being enforced or

fulfilled – gathered for a large conference in order to hammer out a ‘proposal of the Afro-

Ecuadorian people’ to the government. According to several interviewees, the conference was

seen as a success at the time, but the follow-up. Alexandra Ocles, then a member of Correa’s

cabinet and now an Assemblywoman, said that the government’s inattention to the conference’s

proposal is due to a mix of government bureaucracy and Afro civil society’s lack of pressure and

focus. However, both Alodia Borja and Nivo Estuardo Delgado maintain that the Correa

administration does not want to see a strong national Afro movement, and thus has intentionally

ignored the proposal in hopes that it will demoralize activists and organizations. Whether or not

this is the administration’s goal, this demoralization seems to have occurred. Borja and Estuardo

Delgado themselves are attempting to revive the Afro-Ecuadorian National Conference, but a

lack of funds and continued divisions have made this a nearly impossible task.

The division and animosity that have become evident in Afro civil society are a

consequence of several external constraints and opportunities that Afro-Ecuadorian officials and

activists face under the Correa administration. It is pertinent to discuss three of the key ones.

First is the incorporation of leaders from Afro civil society into the government apparatus. Under

the guise of further inclusion, many leaders from Afro civil society have been appointed to

positions within the Correa administration bureaucracy. Among my interviewees who identify as

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part, or formerly part of Afro civil society, five of eleven are government officials and two spent

considerable time in government and then returned to civil society. Organizations with their

bases in Quito have been especially affected because of proximity to the central government, but

a similar story has also played out throughout the rest of country. Many argue that the result of

these appointments has been a ‘beheading’ of organizations, which are left leaderless and

partially incapacitated (de la Torre and Antón Sánchez 2012, Johnson 2013, Rahier 2012a). This

view may slightly exaggerate the importance of single leaders, but it certainly illustrates how

attempts to provide spaces for Afros in government have had the consequence of weakening civil

society. The absence of leaders also once again reveals the fragile nature of many of these social

organizations and their lack of full development and sustainability.

Activists and officials also continue to face disadvantages in educational and economic

attainment. Afro-Ecuadorians are disproportionately poor and have lower education levels than

the general population. This education gap is not only important for economic concerns, but it

also affects their ability to rise to decision-making positions inside the state. Many of those

aforementioned activists who entered the state have quickly hit a ceiling because of their lack of

advanced education, and all those who have managed to become leaders (Secretary or President)

in their institution hold Master’s degrees or higher. Economic disadvantage may provide an even

greater boundary to civil society mobilization. Not only are many Afro organizations strapped

for funds, – especially considering that Correa banned multilateral banks like the World Bank

and IDB, which heavily funded Afro-Ecuadorian projects – but also the activists themselves

must make enormous sacrifices in order to continue as active members of civil society.

Lastly, the centralization of governance has limited Afro civil society’s ability to confront

the state, and given Afros in government less room to maneuver and affect decisions. The 2008

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Constitution espouses a view of governance that promises decentralization over a consolidation

of power in the hands of a few. However, many scholars have pointed out that the administration

seems to be doing precisely the opposite of what it had promised, and centralizing power even

further (de la Torre 2013b). Cannon and Kirby note that such tensions are almost inevitable when

governments propelled to power by social movements try to establish their own institutions and

forms of governance (2012: 3). This tension arises because the state and civil society see

themselves as allies in the creation of a new society, but they quickly discover that state power

almost inevitably reproduces itself (ibid: 11). This is a situation that can be observed throughout

the world, but especially in Latin America, where Brazil, Bolivia, Venezuela, and other countries

have all seen social movements institutionalized into government and then come to embody the

dynamics that they originally fought to eliminate.

A key aspect of the ‘pink tide’ governments is the idea of increased administrative

decentralization and citizen participation. As mentioned, this is crucial in Ecuador’s 2008

Constitution. Cannon and Kirby argue that between the ideal and practice of this citizenship

participation are various compromises made by the state, which make idealism and reality almost

indistinguishable (2012: 190). Thus the institutional legacy in Latin America, which is largely

one of authoritarianism and centralization, tends to creep in and undermine the idealism of

participation. Although such centralization is anathema to civil society, Panizza theorizes that it

enables governments to balance conflict and accommodation with social sectors, in order to

avoid ‘polarization’ that will lead to a breakdown of democracy (2009: 198). This seems to be

the case in Correa’s Ecuador as the centralization and relative political stability that Correa has

brought to the country has narrowed the opportunities for political movements to challenge the

status quo. As Tarrow (1998) and Omi and Winant (1986) agree, the weaker the state’s capacity

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to enforce its dominance, the more difficult a time social movements will have confronting that

state. Thus, the political stability brought on by Correa’s unprecedented three consecutive terms

may be another factor in limiting the confrontational ability of civil society groups.

Though these constraints do represent limitations for the Afro movement, if their positive

aspects are taken advantage of then they could create opportunities for civil society. For example,

if leaders from civil society and government come together and form somewhat of a united front,

then they can leverage one another’s’ positions in order to promote issues pertinent to Afro

communities. Unfortunately, this is easier said than done. What may be more feasible are unions

with other civil society groups. I will now turn to briefly look at how the Correa administration

has interacted with other social groups and organizations since taking office.

The Citizen’s Revolution and Other Social Movements Afro-Ecuadorian civil society has not been the only social sector to suffer debilitation and

dispersion with the rise of Correa. Several other movements, specifically labor,

environmentalists, and Indigenous grousps have been at odds with Correa because of

backtracking on rhetoric he used during his campaign and the drafting process of the

Constitution (Becker 2012). For example, the 2008 Constitution guarantees rights for Mother

Earth, and Correa has previously stated that new oil extractions that displaced communities will

not be pursued. However, soon after taking office Correa began to explore the possibilities of

extracting oil from lands belonging to Indigenous groups, sparking great outrage and protests

throughout Ecuadorian society, which continue to this day.

Though much of this outrage stems from Correa doing precisely the opposite of what he

said he would, some of it is also a result of Correa’s particular way of ‘managing difference’.

Unlike the neoliberal multiculturalist practice of giving different interest groups corporatist

privileges in order to appease and quiet them, Correa has chosen to reinsert the state into civil

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society through “central planning, an expansion of the bureaucracy, and the regulation and

control of economic, cultural, and social activities” (de la Torre 2012: 66). As many have noted,

the doling out of corporatist privileges quickly transforms into patronage and clientelism (de la

Torre 2012, Vanden and Prevost 2009). Therefore, rather than appeal to these interest groups,

Correa considers itself as representing the entire nation’s interests, and thus has attempted do

away with these privileges by instituting a more populist framework of governance (ibid: 75).

Various sectors of civil society have responded to the revoking of these privileges through

conflict and protest of the government, specifically because greater forms of participation and

inclusion have not concurred continuing state paternalism.

Although they helped to elect Correa, some social movements – like the Indigenous and

environmentalist – are now in open conflict with him. Unfortunately for them, it they have had

little success in redirecting the government’s plans. I shy away from identifying a widespread

government conspiracy to destroy the nation’s social movements, but it is hard not to believe that

the administration has tried to limit their capacity after it used their support to push forth its goals.

It has done so first by actively speaking against these movements, and limiting the influence of

their representation in the National Assembly. This is possible because of the large majority that

Alianza PAIS holds. Second, Correa’s administration has eschewed intermediary institutions like

CODAE, preferring to leave them to their own devices without much government support. Thus,

the institutions that were originally established to be intermediaries between civil society and the

state are more like islands within the bureaucracy. Instead, the government has developed its

own intermediaries in the National Councils for Equality, which will be discussed later on.

Beyond its dealings with civil society, President Correa’s administration has also come

under fire for perpetuating Ecuador’s historically less-than-democratic style of governance. As

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de la Torre argues, Correa has filled his cabinet and bureaucracy with technical experts (and is

himself a Doctor of Economics), but employs his charisma in order to win over voters, and does

not routinely follow up on his word (2013a). The consequence of this is a further consolidation

of power in the hands of Correa and those close to him (ibid). This critique of Correa is lending

credibility to this argument is the fact that there hardly seems to be the separation of powers that

democracies are supposed to embody as Alianza PAIS dominates the legislature, and Correa has

filled the judiciary with his allies, leaving little room for significant opposition to arise from

national political ranks (AP, Jan. 2014). Additionally, in November of 2014, President Correa

backtracked on previous statements and claimed that he would likely seek indefinite re-election

in 2017, and that this doesn’t violate the spirit of democracy (El Comercio, Nov 2014).

Nonetheless, Correa maintains approval ratings that are consistently among the highest in

the Americas, around 80% in 2014 (Telesur, Sep 2014). Detractors say this popularity is due to

his charismatic brand of populism (Becker 2012, de la Torre 2013a). However, the nation is

much doing better economically, and its citizens are enjoying better health outcomes, educational

achievement. Unfortunately these progresses have slowed in recent years, and previous

economic growth has been principally stimulated by natural resource extraction, and not more

dynamic and broad-based economic improvements. Moreover, it is still evident that the Citizen’s

Revolution has not represented the type of break from the past that Correa and his party claimed

that it would be. As de la Torre (2012) points out, there is a stark difference between political

representation and participative inclusion. With Correa, Afro-Ecuadorians seem to be well

represented politically, but in terms of inclusion they have not come as far. José Chalá Cruz,

Nivo Estuardo Delgado, and others believe that many of the Afro-Ecuadorians now occupying

offices in government bureaucracy or legislature have been placed in those positions to be

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‘symbolic blacks’, who are placed in their positions so that the administration can make claims to

diversity. This is a similar idea to that of Hale’s (2002) ‘symbolic Indian’ in Guatemala, and is a

hallmark of a neoliberal multiculturalist practice of giving cultural recognition but not ceding

any real influence to historically excluded groups. Whether or not this is Correa’s intention, it is

evident that most Afro-Ecuadorians within government have failed to reach positions of

substantive decision-making power, and a lack of Afro-Ecuadorians in influential offices makes

fulfilling the proposals of their communities and organizations a herculean task.

Consejos Nacionales para la Igualdad The National Councils for Equality, or Consejos, may be the answer to this issue of

lingering vestiges of neoliberal multiculturalism. In their final form, these Consejos are supposed

to serve as interlocutors between society and the state. Unlike the intermediary institutions like

CODAE, these Consejos will be pre-legislative, so they will work with the executive branch to

develop policies and programs for the various groups that each represents. Since they answer

only to the executive, they will potentially have far more power than previous intermediary

institutions, and may give civil society true representation within the government. Not only do

these possibly represent a new era for Ecuador, but they also represent the first pre-legislative

body explicitly formed to represent civil society interests in the Americas.

The 2008 Constitution and the government’s Plurinational Plans mandate these Consejos,

but like many other mandates they have been slow to materialize. But this is changing as the

Consejos are being developed and will soon be functional. There are several of these Consejos,

representing various sectors of society, but the most important for this study is the Council for

Peoples and Nationalities, whose development is headed by Assemblywoman Zobeida Gudiño,

an Afro-Ecuadorian from the province of Zamora-Chinchipe, and the President of the

Commission for Collective and Community Rights, and Intercultural Affairs. Gudiño is a

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member of Alianza PAIS, and emerged on the political scene not as a representative of Afro civil

society, but as a member of the student movement. Nonetheless, in an interview with her she

recognized the achievement of the Afro movement in the past, and stated her belief in the need

for greater public policies and economic development efforts to lift up Afro communities.

As one of the leaders in the push to create the Consejos, Gudiño is unsurprisingly

optimistic about their future:

These Councils for Equality are administrative institutions that for the first time in the country will allow for coordination of public policy from the state – pardon, from the executive – with all the functions of the state so that we can transform politics with excluded and minority social sectors….This is going to allow for the first time the construction of agendas for equality that are essentially an instrument taken from the bases of civil society in order to work with the executive and other offices of the state in whatever way that creates differentiated and exclusive public policy for these sectors, so that we can achieve real equality in this country.

From her perspective, the Consejos are the tool that will narrow the gap between the state and

civil society, and fulfilling some of the essential goals of the Citizen’s Revolution. Furthermore,

like others Gudiño dismisses CODAE and other institutions as evidence of lingering corporatism

from Ecuador’s era of neoliberalism and exclusive government. In essence, she sees the

Consejos as a representation of a fundamental change in governance for Ecuador, a change that

she believes will make the nation more equitable and participative. Other government officials

like Alexandra Ocles and José Chalá Cruz also seem to be optimistic about the potential of the

Consejos for many of the same reasons as Gudiño, as both of them expressed the necessity of

better intermediary institutions between state and society.

On the surface, the Consejos certainly represent a new era in Ecuadorian political

representation and participation. Nonetheless, many in civil society are skeptical. Juan Carlos

Ocles, of FOGNEP, called the Consejos a “regression of 20 years” from the perspective of state-

society relations because they lump all Peoples and Nationalities together, and thus don’t

develop different institutions for each groups needs. At the same time, he recognizes the

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opportunity that they create to have various sectors of civil society come together and possibly

work more cooperatively. Jhon Antón Sánchez is as much a critic of the government’s stats quo

as anyone, but he remains cautiously optimistic about these changes. If Consejos become what

Gudiño and the government claim they will be, he says, then that represents a fantastic

opportunity for communities, but there is the potential that they fail to fulfill their mandate and

come to represent another superficial policy that will stir discontent among civil society.

Past experience might shift one to believe the latter, as the Correa administration’s track

record on accepting civil society representation has not proven to be stellar. In his chapter on the

relation between Correa and social movements, de la Torre (2012) criticizes the government’s

lack of commitment to participation and inclusion, and points to a failure to develop the

Consejos as proof of that. If the Consejos are to be the transformative institutions that some

claim they will be, then maybe the past is not the best predictor of the future in this circumstance.

Now that they are finally entering implementation stage, there seems to be some hope for the

increased citizen participation that the Citizen’s Revolution has promised.

IV: Conclusion In this chapter, I have offered a look at the trajectory of Afro-Ecuadorian civil society and

the Afro social movement in Ecuador. Afro civil society has engaged with several forms of

Ecuadorian national government over the past three decades, from the distant neoliberal states of

the turn of the century to the involved but controversial administration of Correa. Throughout

this time, political circumstances have changed considerably, and Afro civil society has adapted

to these circumstances to engage in confrontation with the state. However, since 2008 this has

not been the case. I have argued that the Correa administration has seemingly expanded the

political opportunities for influencing change available to Afro activists and organization.

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Nonetheless, the government has continued to limit the scope of these opportunities to fit only

within its political goals, thereby limiting the true influence and autonomy of activists.

With Correa in power, Afro-Ecuadorian organization and mobilization has grown more

sporadic and dispersed. In some regards, the Afro movement’s debilitation is a product of its

own success. Racism and discrimination are less brazen than they once were. This gives activists

less ammunition to use in spurring popular discontent, and has caused the youth to see less of a

need for collective action focused on racial politics. On the other hand, political forces have also

transformed the options available to activists and organizations. The incorporation of collective

rights and guarantees into the Constitution, the political appointments of Afro officials, the

persistence of economic disadvantages in Afro communities, and the Correa administration’s

style of bureaucratic governance and relative political stability have fundamentally altered the

tools that civil society can use. In essence, Afro civil society has not cracked the puzzle of how

to navigate the political opportunities and constraints presented by Correa.

In arguing for looking at trajectories of social movements through the lens of political

opportunity structure, Tarrow clarifies that the concept “emphasizes resources external to the

group…these can be taken advantage of by even weak or disorganized challengers but in no way

‘belong’ to them” (1998: 20). When examining the progression of Afro-Ecuadorian civil society,

it is evident that it has engaged in contentious politics through exploiting political opportunities

and fortunate circumstances. Afro civil society in Ecuador has never been well-funded or held

significant political power. Moreover, its challenges to the state have often proven disorganized,

yet they have successfully made demands to the state for over a decade. This cannot be explained

by solely looking at internal organization or by claiming that other movements entirely paved the

way. Internal factors are certainly crucial to the character and activities of organizations and

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activists, and have certainly shaped civil society’s path. Regional fractures, the souring of

organizational relationships, and personal ambition/egotism are some that have played a part in

this dispersion. Nonetheless, I maintain that these internal characteristics of the movement and

organizations –such as methods of organization, funding sources, points of political convergence,

etc. – have been fundamentally shaped by the political climate and opportunities of the nation at

any given point in time. These have ranged from state weakness around the turn of the century,

to government participation initiatives in the last eight years.

Finally, it is no coincidence that the dispersion of Afro-Ecuadorian civil society occurred

shortly after the establishment of Correa’s new form of governance. Such transformative

political moments enable new opportunities, but also create new constraints, to which social

movements must adapt. The consensus of my interviewees is that Afro civil society must find

new ways of organizing and mobilizing with the state, ways that do not rely on outdated

frameworks but rather take the experiences of the past and pair them when fresh methodologies

of organization and contestation. Since the Consejo for Peoples and Nationalities will give voice

to Afros and Indigenous activists, it is quite possible that it may heal some of the issues that have

somewhat stymied activism since 2008. Unfortunately, until the Consejos are functional and

their impact felt, that is all speculation. What is clear is that the Citizen’s Revolution has

transformed political opportunities, thus fundamentally changing Afro-Ecuadorian political

mobilization. Despite the transformative nature of these reforms, they have not altered the racial

and political hierarchies in Ecuador, which perpetuate state paternalism and minimal Afro

influence. The next chapter examines how Afro-Ecuadorian activists have coped with this

changed opportunity structure, and analyzes some of methods of mobilization that activists

employ in order to continue confronting the state.

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IV: FINDING SPACE FOR CHANGE Cooperative Contention as a Strategy Afro-Ecuadorian Activism

“Yes, we do things, small things, but we do them. Because in the end these small things will result in a great benefit for the Afro community.”31

The previous chapter examined how the Ecuadorian state’s history of neoliberal

multiculturalism and the introduction of Rafael Correa’s Citizen’s Revolution have influenced

Afro-Ecuadorian organization and engagement with the state This political context is crucial to

understanding the ways in which Afro-Ecuadorians work towards the goal of creating a more

racially equitable country. Different individuals, organizations, and institutions employ distinct

strategies in response to the various political, social, and individual circumstances that they face.

In this chapter, I analyze how individual Afro-Ecuadorian actors involved in the struggle for

Afro-Ecuadorian equality attempt to enact social change from Quito. This chapter will examine

the strategies from both an individual and collective perspective, which will ensure a more

complete analysis than one that only focuses on organization-level tactics.

As noted previously, there is no consensus as to where Afro-Ecuadorian civil society falls

on the spectrum of autonomy in terms of its relation to the state. However, one thing is clear: this

civil society does exist and is engaged in political activism. I argue that Afro-Ecuadorian civil

society has not been captured by the state, but neither is it approaching the state in head-on

confrontation from the outside. Rather, actors in Afro-Ecuadorian civil society take a long-term

perspective and are working to enact small changes in state policy, and to design and implement

projects that improve racial equality in the nation. In contrast with previous periods, civil society

31 Interview with Nivo Estuardo Delgado, 28 May 2014.

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does not look to substantively alter the state’s ideology or written policies, but rather change the

mechanisms by which the state fulfills its constitutional obligations. Civil society activists

undertake these initiatives while accepting the political realities of the Correa government.

Cooperative Contention I call this strategy cooperative contention. I use contention in terms of Tarrow’s (1998)

definition of contentious politics discussed in the literature review, and I choose to term

cooperative to note how these activists have joined forces to work alongside government offices,

while still attempting to pressure the state. By engaging in this cooperative contention, activists

hope that these incremental changes will create a snowball effect and eventually undermine what

they see as the racist social structures of Ecuadorian society. Furthermore, I argue that the civil

society strategies of creating networks and building consciousness work to bolster Afro activists

positions when engaging in cooperative contention with the government.

Given the dispersion of Afro-Ecuadorian organizations and activists, leaders32 have

adopted the idea that incremental progress through small victories is the most effective and

accessible way for them to work towards racial equality. However, various activists and

organizations have employed this idea through different approaches. Some are concerned with

creating networks, internal or external, through which they can engender support or create strong

bilateral or multilateral ties. Others focus on building the political consciousness of youths and

adults, which they hope will serve to form the Afro-Ecuadorian activists of tomorrow. Still other

activists choose to engage more directly with state agencies and institutions, but not to confront

them. In this section, I detail these distinct strategies that these individuals employ, and analyze

the political, social, and personal circumstances that inform their methods and intentions. 32 In this section, I draw from interviews with seven members of Afro-Ecuadorian civil society. Six self-identity as civil society activists and are actively affiliated with, and involved in activities of, social organizations. One, Oscar Chalá Cruz, identifies only as an ‘Afro-Ecuadorian professional’, and is an independent anthropologist. He and Sonia Viveros have previously held bureaucratic appointments in the Correa administration.

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I: Creation of Networks As the previous chapter explained, the intra-country relationships among members of

Afro-Ecuadorian civil society are tenuous at best and non-existent at worst. The difficulty of

developing meaningful international ties only compounds this organizational isolation. Thus,

from their positions in Quito, some Afro-Ecuadorian leaders have concentrated their

organizational activities on creating networks, both national and international. By undertaking

this strategy, activists hope to revitalize Afro-Ecuadorian civil society and make it more

autonomous from government forces, thereby increasing its effectiveness and mobilizing

capacity. I will first look at how the activists undertake the creation of international networks and

relationships, and then turn my focus to networks that are domestic in scope.

The International I start with these international networks because in many regards the Afro-Ecuadorian

movement would not have been able to mobilize as quickly and effectively as it did in the past

without the efforts of the Catholic Church (Anton Sánchez, 2011). Specifically, Combonian

friars helped establish the CCA, Fundación Azúcar, and other Afro-Ecuadorian organizations

and initiatives. Moreover, the political consciousness of Afro-Ecuadorians rose sharply because

of, and was largely inspired by, the Civil Rights Movement in the United States, decolonization

in Africa, and various other diaspora movements in Latin America and the Caribbean33. Thus, it

would not be incorrect to assert that Afro-Ecuadorian civil society has been heavily influenced

by international networks since its conception. However, these networks have gone through

periods of strength and weakness, and under the Correa administration have weakened

considerably. As previously discussed, Rafael Correa essentially kicked the World Bank and

IDB out of Ecuador, an action that severely limited the assistance, funding, and international 33 Several activists, including Juan Carlos Ocles, José Chalá Cruz, and Alodia Borja emphasized the important role that other social movements in Africa and the diaspora have played in the development of Afro-Ecuadorian civil society. The abundance of Afro-Ecuadorian institutions named after leaders from other countries evidences this fact.

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exposure of Afro-Ecuadorian civil society. Thus, many Afro-Ecuadorian activists hope to

establish relationships with international institutions and governments, both as a way of securing

funding/support and as a method of bypassing the Ecuadorian state without confrontation.

For example, Nivo Estuardo Delgado, of the Conferencia Nacional Afroecuatoriana

(CNA) has been quite focused on establishing such international networks for years. Delgado has

pushed this strategy by working to foster connections with officials in several governments,

multilateral agencies, and NGOs. Though a lack of funds prevents him from traveling the globe

on his quest for a greater international presence and network, he has built relationships with

officials by undertaking activities like meeting with the IDB officials (who hope that Correa will

loosen restrictions because of an ever-growing economic crisis), to lobbying amenable embassies

(like that of Germany and sometimes Venezuela), to reaching out to independent foundations for

project funding and support (usually in the United States). Some of these potential partners have

pledged support in the future, other have shown interest but taken little action, and many are too

worried about the political landscape in Ecuador to make any commitments to civil society

groups involved in the types of political activism that Estuardo Delgado espouses.

Still, Delgado maintains that if only given opportunities and funding, Afro organizations

will be revitalized, and can once again begin more concerted mobilizations. When asked why

Afro organizations are not able to more effectively organize on a national level, Estuardo

Delgado cites, above all else, a lack of available funds from international partners: “it’s that we

don’t have economic resources, those economic resources don’t allow us to meet, or come

together, or convene congresses, or do projects so that we can have a good relationships with

multilateral organizations.”34 Thus, not only does the dearth of funding limit the effectiveness of

34 Interview with Nivo Estuardo Delgado, 28 May 2014. Unless otherwise noted, all quotes attributed to Estuardo Delgado come from this interview.

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Afro-Ecuadorian organizations, but also it makes the creation and strengthening of outside

networks more difficult. In essence, many organizations are trapped in a downward cycle of

sparse funding, isolation, and institutional decay.

Naturally, Estuardo Delgado feels that enhanced and expanded relationships with

multilateral institutions will help not only revitalize organizations, but also allow them to take a

more effective and more long-term perspective on fighting racial inequality: “nobody gives

[organizations] much money. So they give you at most half a million dollars, which allow you

the ability to do immediate arts projects, undertake cultural work, and make agricultural spaces.”

Thus, he cites limited funding as a cause of the short-mindedness of Afro civil society, and

which he desires to solve this funding crisis through international connections and assistance. On

a more positive note, Delgado believes that such short-term projects do have a place in

establishing international publicity, confidence, and support of Afro organizations and activists.

He notes, “At the very least we have small things to do, but small things that in the long run will

fulfill the needs of the people and it is through doing these small things that we can demonstrate

that we are capable of completing greater things”.

Unfortunately, Afro civil society’s lack of cohesion makes establishing these

relationships, creating these networks, and searching for funding even more difficult. “Thus,”

continues Delgado, “this is where I say to my black brothers in the United States – more than

anyone – help us! Because we need economic resources here.” He sees transnational Afro-

descendant connections as a possible solution to the troubling economic situation that currently

befalls many Afro-Ecuadorian organizations. The creation of such a network that Afro-

Ecuadorians could benefit from is the second main goal of the consciousness-building pageant,

Diosas de Ébano, which Delgado hopes to will be funded. By bringing various young women of

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the African diaspora to compete in a forum that is explicitly political, he desires to not only raise

awareness, but also to gather various stakeholders who may be interested in advancing

transnational diaspora networks that could make a valuable difference for Afro-Ecuadorians.

The National Alodia Borja, President of the CNA (Afro-Ecuadorian National Conference), agrees that

funding is an issue, but believes that the problem is more complex than that. Certainly the Afro-

Ecuadorian movement needs assistance from outside sources like the World Bank and IDB, she

says, but it also needs to be more cohesive within and between Afro-Ecuadorian communities.

For these reasons, she is focused on a strategy of building internal networks, namely by

revitalizing and reconstructing the CNA:

…my own agenda is called ‘the Afro-Ecuadorian people and the reconstruction of the CNA’. For example, I pull some leaders from professional spaces, from visible spaces, from spaces of work. I am doing this, and I am going to continue doing this….from each province I’ll involve two or three…I’ll involve 150 or 200 [national]. That puts pressure [on the government], you see.35

In doing this, Borja hopes do avoid the mistakes of the history of the movement, in which civil

society became dispersed because of shallow national ties and a failure to establish a strong

national network of organizations and activists. She recalls a time not long before the entrance of

Correa, when being a representative of the CNA carried weight throughout the country, when the

organization had a stronger presence that allowed it to organize and mobilize Afro-Ecuadorians

throughout the nation, as well as present itself internationally as a legitimate organization.

Though a deeper connection would certainly improve the dispersion currently

experienced by Afro civil society, it cannot be the only answer. This is evident due to the lack of

action taken after the 2012 Congreso Unitario del Pueblo Afroecuatoriano36 (CUPA). In the

CUPA, hundreds of Afro-Ecuadorian activists and government officials met to discuss political,

35 Interview with Alodia Borja, 28 May 2014. Unless otherwise noted, all quotes attributed to Borja come from this interview, and all info about the CNA is taken from this and NIvo Estuardo Delgado’s interview. 36 United Congress of the Afro-Ecuadorian People

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economic, and social issues afflicting their communities, with the goal of creating focused policy

recommendations that a group of delegates would then deliver to and discuss with President

Correa. Inexplicably, over two years have passed and none of the proposals that this congress

created have been implemented, and any national organizational solidarity that the event created

has yet to be taken advantage of. Estuardo Delgado claims that the proposals were not shared in

the correct political circles, and this is what has prevented the CUPA from becoming a turning

point for Afro civil society. He cites a lack of awareness by the Afro-Ecuadorian population and

indifference on the part of government officials and ministries as the chief reasons why the

central government feels no need to fulfill its promise to incorporate the proposals into policy.

Borja too laments civil society’s inability to capitalize on this event’s show of force and

solidarity. Her desire to revitalize the CNA, through which a strong national network of

organizations and activists might arise, is partially to ensure that future gatherings do not simply

end in organizational malaise and disappointment. However, if these networks are to be effective,

then they must not only be structurally strong, but also focused on accomplishing specific goals.

Moreover, they must be able to engender support throughout several levels of Afro-Ecuadorian

society. This means implementing concerted efforts to increase the awareness and politicization

of the Afro-Ecuadorian community. Above all else, Borja claims, establishing a national voice of

authority for Afro-Ecuadorians, whether it be an organization or a single person at the head of an

organization, will be key to leveraging the power of the national network of organizations.

Without a singular national voice, she worries, Afro-Ecuadorian civil society will continue to

squander opportunities for change, and national networks will matter very little.

II: Building Consciousness & Advocacy Capacity Likely the most introspective of the strategies reviewed here is that of consciousness-

building and advocacy training. In essence, by employing this strategy, activists and

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organizations hope to make the Afro-Ecuadorian community more politically minded and

increase their critical thinking and activism around issues of race. The raising and building of

political consciousness was crucial in the early stages of the Afro-Ecuadorian (Anton Sanchez,

2011), but it has once again risen as an important issue because of the perceived retrocession of

Afro-Ecuadorian civil society. This consciousness-building is especially directed at Afro-

Ecuadorian youths, who many veterans of the movement feel should be more concerned with

issues of structural racism and more actively involved in civil society activism. As Nieves

Mendez of the CCAE expressed, “We are in a terrible organizational crisis, why?....One reason is

the Afro youth. The Afro youth should be the ones that are here now, that are the thinkers, that

are troubled by what is happening and what we still have yet to achieve.”37 This feeling that a

lack of youth activism is slowly thinning and weakening Afro-Ecuadorian civil society is one

that several leaders, both in civil society and government, acknowledge. Thus, political

consciousness-building has an important role to play in the future capability and survival of

Afro-Ecuadorian civil society.

Fundación Azúcar An active form of consciousness-building takes place within the Fundación de

Desarrollo Social Afroecuatoriano38 (henceforth referred to as ‘Azúcar’). Azúcar is a social

organization dedicated to the teaching, celebration, and advancement of Afro-Ecuadorian culture

and history. It fulfills its mission through a mix of ethno-education, workshops on issues that

impact the Afro-Ecuadorian community, art and artisanal groups (most prominently music and

37 Interview with Nieves Mendez, 27 May 2014. Unless otherwise noted, all quotes attributed to Nieves Mendez and all information on the CCA com from this interview. 38 Foundation for Afro-Ecuadorian Social Development. Azúcar translates to Sugar.

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dance), and social work. Sonia Viveros39 is the current president of Azúcar, and head of the

social-political group of the organization. The organization’s consciousness-building activities

are centered on teaching its members about Afro-Ecuadorian culture, history, and issues.

However, this is not done through classroom lessons, but rather cultural activities like dance,

volunteer work, and active workshops that engage with such relevant topics as human rights and

domestic violence. Azúcar’s directs its services largely at young Afro-Ecuadorians who it hopes

to endow with productive and creative skills, as well as politicize.

Viveros’ social-political group also takes part in political advocacy in what it sees as the

five most pressing areas for the Afro-Ecuadorian people: education, employment, access to

housing, violence, and sexual and reproductive health. Though some may see Azúcar’s

consciousness-building and advocacy as separate from the less-explicitly political groups in the

organization, Viveros disagrees:

Political issues are not separate from cultural issues. Party politics…is a form of politics, but social policy – that social activism, that demand to go and recognize, to go and make visible social problems, and go searching for alternatives for change – that too is to be political. Thus, that [political] message that is carried through this music, or through this choir, or through an encounter or exchange is a form of doing politics, it is a form of advocacy to carry a message to those that are in this decision-making space.

As is evident in this quote, Viveros and her organization believe quite strongly that Azúcar’s

consciousness-building, advocacy, and cultural other activities carry an explicit political message

that doesn’t just stay with its members, but rather radiates out and reaches the highest levels of

the political ranks. Beyond advocacy, she is not clear as to how this message reaches those ranks,

but we can assume that it is through the publicity of the group in the short-term, and the

politicization of its members in the long run.

39 Unless otherwise noted, all quotes attributed to Sonia Viveros and all information concerning Azúcar come from an interview with Sonia Viveros (12 June 2014), and, when possible, was cross-referenced with information available on Azúcar’s website.

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Viveros believes quite strongly that the multi-faceted nature of Azúcar makes it stronger

and more sustainable than other organizations that may solely focus on only policy issues.

Importantly, she notes, this sustainability allows the organization to be independent of

governmental and semi-governmental entities that it might otherwise rely on for funding. The

reasons for this are twofold. First, Azúcar’s more culturally focused groups generate income for

the more political practices. Second, the organization has a wide membership made up of

volunteers, participant/students, and most importantly many young people. In theory, the mix of

cultural, educational, and political activities attracts and engages a broader scope of members,

and allows the organization to reach a larger audience. It also creates an atmosphere that

welcomes a multitude of expressions of identity and forms of activism. In Viveros’ mind, this

translates to both more effective activism and more legitimacy, which can prove crucial to

attracting interest both domestically and abroad.

Furthermore, with such a large base, Azúcar has survived since 1993, and continues to

thrive. For Viveros, this sustainability is crucial to executing concerted and effective political

activities. A lack of focus on sustainability and stability is what she sees as a major weakness of

Afro civil society: “The problem right now that I see is that while more organizations make

themselves more isolated, we enact and search for short-term projects….And on this path we

don’t search for self-sustainability”. This makes perfect sense. If organizations don’t know how

they will fund their activities, or if they’ll even exist by the next year, they will be unlikely to

prioritize a long-term vision that makes consciousness-building a viable organizational strategy.

This sustainability becomes crucial, especially when considering that moving from the building

of consciousness to more direct government engagement requires some sustained organizational

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capacity. The next section analyzes how Afro civil society undertakes this engagement with

government officials and institutions towards a strategy of incremental change.

III: Direct Engagement “It is not that we want to attack a political system or an administrative system of the government. Simply, to the officials in the intermediary ministries: if the President is willing to make and sign a decree, the least that they have to do – the ministers or officials in this ministry – is apply the law. Because it is the mandate of the boss…But they don’t fulfill [their obligation].” – Nivo Estuardo Delgado

Both the building of networks and consciousness are important strategies of incremental

change for long-term gain, but both are less explicitly focused on affecting policy than is a

strategy of cooperative contention to directly engage with state entities and bureaucrats. As

mentioned before, Afro civil society activists normally refrain from direct confrontation against

the state when employing this strategy. Rather they work with various state agencies and

institutions to ensure that the state is fulfilling the laws and obligations it has agreed to in writing,

and to improve the mechanisms by which they execute these laws. However, it is important to

remember that these activists do not ally themselves with central government powers, even

though they work with certain ministries and officials within them.

Generally, this strategy plays out in the following way: Activists see a discrepancy

between established institutional norms and the rights that the Constitution and other directives

grant to Afro-Ecuadorians and other national minorities. They then work to meet with officials in

whatever ministry may be in charge of handling the topic of interest, and show how this

discrepancy is holding back the Afro-Ecuadorian people, and failing to live up to the guarantees

of the Constitution. This process can be the most difficult, as it requires secretaries and ministers

to acknowledge that their current policies fail to measure up to the goals of the Ecuadorian

Constitution, and to consent that they are willing to work changing them. Though sometimes

these officials can be persuaded, the bureaucratic inertia and indifference can oftentimes stymie

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proposals before they receive a fair look. However, if they are able to convince these officials of

the necessity of their proposed policy, then once past this point, activists and their allies must

work out the specifics of policy, which require a sophisticated interpretation of often dense and

occasionally contradictory policies and legalese. Though this step may prove to be excruciating

and lengthy, they have already won a small victory, in that government bureaucrats have

accepted the activists’ position that change is necessary and possible. At this point all that

remains to be determined is how to construct the mechanisms that can most effectively achieve

the desired outcomes.

For Afro-Ecuadorian activists, most such opportunities to meet with high-level officials

at government ministries and discuss policy are born from “initiatives of friendship,” says

Estuardo Delgado. This is a nice way of saying that these activists usually only have access to

influential officials when they have friends on the inside of those ministries. Such relationships

often ease the difficulties at reaching the point of understanding, and can vastly reduce the

amount of time wasted simply searching for the correct people with whom the discussion must

take place. This has certainly proven true in the push to establish racial affirmative action

policies at the Universidad Central de Quito, where Nivo Estuardo Delgado and fellow activists

have been working, which came about because of such an ‘initiative of friendship’.

The Case of Affirmative Action in Higher Education According to Decreto 60 of the 2008 Ecuadorian Constitution and the Ley Organica de

Educacion Superior40, higher education affirmative action policies41 aimed at Ecuador’s national

minorities (including Afro-Ecuadorians) are to be guaranteed at public institutions. These two

documents detail the rule of law in the sphere of higher education, and make explicit that

40 Organic Law for Higher Education. 41 By affirmative action, I refer to those policies of positive discrimination that promote the matriculation of traditionally underrepresented minorities into higher education.

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positive discrimination towards Afro-Ecuadorians and Indigenous peoples should serve as a key

part of the Ecuadorian higher education system. Nonetheless, not a single large public university

in the country has adopted such policies. Estuardo Delgado claims that indifference and

ignorance on the part of university administrators as the main reason that affirmative action has

yet to break into public institutions of higher education. Moreover, the national government is

either unwilling or unable (likely both) to ensure that these universities follow the directives laid

out by these two documents, admits Borja. Thus, without some form of outside intervention,

affirmative action is likely only to stay only as a written promise.

Nivo Estuardo Delgado and group of fellow activists42 have formed a cohort of sorts to

engage directly with the Ministry of Education, to begin ameliorating the discrepancy between

the written law and reality in the realm of higher education. To accomplish this, the cohort has

met with numerous administrators at the Universidad Central, to draft agreements that establish

mechanisms through which it will implement affirmative action. The policies are more than just

quotas for minorities. Rather, they include the following: secondary school programs targeted at

helping Afro-Ecuadorians take advantage of educational opportunities and prepare for national

exams, support for under-represented minority students at universities, curriculum changes that

more directly incorporate Afro-Ecuadorian history and culture into general classes, programs in

intercultural studies, funding for economically disadvantaged students, and of course spots

specifically for Afro-Ecuadorian students. The activists don’t want unqualified Afro-Ecuadorians

to be accepted into school; however, they do want to see those students given similar

opportunities as those that the generally wealthier and more provided-for white and mestizo

students receive.

42 Along with Nivo Estuardo Delgado of the CNA, the cohort includes: Alodia Borja (CNA), Jhon Anton Sanchez (IAEN), Sonia Viveros (Azúcar), Ofelia Lara (FOGNEP), Lindberg Valencia (Musician)

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Furthermore, because the central government is hesitant to adopt a discourse favoring

positive discrimination, the activists make sure to underline that these affirmative action policies

will serve for Afro-Ecuadorians and Indigenous peoples. In this regard, the activists see

themselves as not only improving the lives of Afro-Ecuadorians, but also advancing the nation as

a whole. This distinction has proven to be crucial not only in education, but in other spheres as

well. The idea that reforms that will improve the situation of Afro-Ecuadorians will lead to

enhanced democracy in the country as a whole is a powerful one, and one that Afro-Ecuadorian

activists have adopted, largely because of its usefulness in dealing with a government that

purports to desire a ‘democratization of society’.

After the cohort and the Universidad Central agree to such terms, they take their proposal

and begin the long processes of meeting with the Sub-secretary of Higher Education. The first

meeting, at which I was present, covered the basics of these proposals, and included frank

exchanges, disagreements, and tentative compromises. Due to the vague nature of the written

laws on affirmative action, these two sides are essentially crafting a policy that they hope will

serve as a model for an eventual nationwide policy. Though affirmative action has existed at the

Universidad San Francisco de Quito since 2005, this is a private school, so the logistics

regarding funding and other tricky matters were far simpler. Since the Universidad Central is a

public institution, the policy must be carefully crafted and executed. Thus, there is a long road

ahead for this cohort of activists, but the plans for implementing affirmative action at

Universidad Central are in place.

Officially, the deal is an agreement between the Universidad Central, SENECYT43, and

Viveros’ Fundación Azúcar, but having been in meetings, it is obvious that this policy success is

43 National Secretariat of Higher Education, Science, Technology, and Innovation. The agreement was specifically brokered with the Subsecretary of General Higher Education, María del Pilar Troya.

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largely a result of the united front that these activists have put forth. Borja sees the formation of

this cohort, and its more or less single coherent message as proof that civil society activists are

maturing. Before, she says, everyone would have been approaching the subject of education from

his or her own isolated arena of specialization, and each would be putting forth their own

different ideas about how to institute affirmative action at the Universidad Central. Now, the

message is a single one. Each person’s perspective certainly varies slightly depending on their

area of specialization and if asked to explain their thought processes each would give differing

opinions. But they have come together to put forth a single plan, which they believe will not only

help educate more Afro-Ecuadorians, but also provide them support in secondary school and

university, and make their educational career more fulfilling.

Designing such plans is naturally a slow process involving cooperation and compromise

on both sides. Estuardo Delgado’s cohort has been fortunate in that the Ministry of Education,

and more specifically the Sub-Secretariat of Higher Education, have proven receptive to the

needs of the Afro-Ecuadorian community. This is partially due to the personal relationships (in

this case between Estuardo Delgado and a mid-level official in the ministry) that have helped get

these activists feet in the right doors, but the coherent proposals – backed by Constitutional and

educational law guarantees – have ensured that the dialogue continues. Nonetheless, it must be

noted that these activists have stopped short of demanding deep structural changes to the

education system, instead opting for a more cooperative and less confrontational form of

contention with the government. Thus far, they are only establishing affirmative action policies

in one public university, with the hope that their success will lead to more substantive nation-

wide changes. In many ways, this is a representation of the overall process of incremental change

in which Afro-Ecuadorian civil society is involved.

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Feet on the Ground Another form of direct engagement with the state is the opportunistic popular protest over

an event that incenses the Afro-Ecuadorian community. As Catherine Chalá, a member of

FOGNEP44 and the Afro-Ecuadorian women’s group Despierta Negra, explains, when there is a

“significant event of racism of discrimination, the organizations activate towards that and fight

against the situation…so yes, we find ourselves in strong moments of gathering together

institutional forces through Afro-Ecuadorians in different institutions”. However, she continues,

these moments die down, and as the passion for protest fades the activists return to their separate

organizations and remain somewhat distant until the next event.

Chalá recounts the most recent such situation that rallied Afro-Ecuadorian groups into

action. A community called Concordia, on the Ecuadorian coast was home to a large statue that

demeaned the sexuality of black women, while simultaneously celebrating the beauty of whites.

Several Afro-Ecuadorian activists and Afro women’s organizations gathered to protest the statue

and the city of Concordia’s tolerance of it. The activists and organizations gathered to condemn

the statue, and drafted a formal complaint calling on the city to remove it and commit itself to

ending racism in its communities.

In this case, Chalá and others used their connections as employees of the Defensoría del

Pueblo to enlist the support of the institution throughout the protest. Along with the Defensoria

del Pueblo, Afro organizations worked with the municipal council of Concordia to take down the

statue and release a declaration that calls for Concordia as a city to free itself of racism. In this

process, the organizations made sure to promote cultural understanding about Afro-Ecuadorians,

both in the community and nationally. Though this form of direct engagement is slightly more

confrontational than that of the cohort’s affirmative action push, it certainly represents the

44 Federación de Grupos Negros de Pichincha [Federation of Black Groups of Pichincha]

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process of incremental change. Chalá and her fellow activists worked closely within legal

frameworks and with the local government representation to eliminate the racist symbolism and

created a powerful statement. This proved effective in accomplishing their goal, but the process

was far from what most people likely envision when the phrase popular protest enters the mind.

IV: Discussion Seizing Political Opportunities

As the above cases illustrate, Afro-Ecuadorian activists and organizations utilize a range

of strategies in their current fight against racial equality. These strategies are designed around the

idea that by approaching the fight for racial equality with a long-term perspective, Afro civil

society can regain its former mobilization capacity, while also building stronger foundations that

can handle a monumental political event, like the ascendance of Rafael Correa.

According to many civil society leaders, the underlying justification behind pursuing

small changes within the political structure of Correa’s government is that it is essentially the

only way they see to engender effective progress in the struggle for racial equality. The idea that

a push for small changes to policy mechanisms will ultimately lead to a more racially equitable

state is almost ubiquitous among the civil society leaders whom I interviewed. From their

perspectives, seeking incremental change has become the only way to interact with the

government entities that direct policy in a nation where having a relationship with the state is

only becoming more important. As Alodia Borja describes the situation, civil society leaders are

doing their best to work within a system that marginalizes them, and reap small gains whenever

possible:

It’s their game. We cannot design the game of political history. So what can we do? We can take advantage of political moments and get people involved and earn a space so that other might continue walking and climbing45

45 Interview with Alodia Borja, 28 May 2014

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Though Borja detailed the necessity of incremental change with this statement, there is a

near consensus among these leaders that the approach is necessary but difficult. Due to the

experienced paternalism of Correa’s Ecuadorian state, activists now work with the legal and

political opportunities that arise, with the hope of eventually undermining what they see as the

racist political, social, and economic structures of Ecuadorian society. The recent history of the

Afro-Ecuadorian movement informs this perspective.

All activists that I interviewed agree that the 2008 Constitution represented a massive

victory for Afro-Ecuadorians, and in many ways served as a written encapsulation of the efforts

of the previous thirty years of mobilization. However, as Mendez, Viveros and Borja expressed,

the movement was neither politically nor socially prepared for the aftermath of this supposed

victory. This is to say that the movement and the organizations within it had neither clear and

focused political plans nor strong ties with the Afro-Ecuadorian communities that they purported

to represent. From the perspective of many leaders, this lack of preparation and consolidation led

to a debilitation of the movement and its organizations46. Furthermore, the push for recognition

and rights that culminated in the rhetoric of the 2008 Constitution temporarily hid the regional

cleavages that have now made Afro-Ecuadorian civil society more dispersed and disjointed than

in the past – thus dire need for the network creation and consciousness-building described

previously.

Under these circumstances, these leaders have little choice but to work within the

political realities of Correa’s Ecuador. They have neither the political capital to enter what might

be termed his inner circle nor the social mobilization capabilities to force the government’s hand

through outside pressure. Though mobilizations do occur, Catherine Chalá notes, they are

46 Another relatively popular idea is that the Correa administration actively worked to dismember the Afro-Ecuadorian movement immediately following the passing of the 2008 Constitution. Predictably, this view is not widely voiced but is often alluded to.

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reactive and sporadic in nature – based more on outrage at single events than everyday

discrimination and disadvantage. As such, these displays of popular action end up being short-

lived and narrow in scope. Essentially, the flame of protest dies almost as quickly as it appeared.

With public discussions on race and injustice featuring more prominently in recent years, such

reactive protests have become increasingly popular in the United States, and other countries in

the Western Hemisphere.47 Predictably, these protests have resulted in little-to-no substantive

changes in policies to prevent the tragedies that spark this outrage, but it seems that these

mobilizations are gaining momentum.

In order to sustain such mobilizations and capture the momentum-building energy

towards long-term change (in Ecuador and in the United States), civil society leaders express a

need to work towards crafting more explicit political, social, and organizational objectives and

strategies. Activists in Afro-Ecuadorian civil society have responded to these necessities

principally through the strategies explained above. Not all of these strategies fit perfectly into the

boxes to which I have assigned them, nor do they serve as accurate representations of what these

leaders may think is the ideal form of activism. Nonetheless, this is the reality that these activists

must work with, and the strategies they utilize represent their best attempts to mobilize against

oppressive political and social structures. As the previous sections showed, these activists need

not be limited to a single strategy, or contained to a specific line of thought in their pursuit of

progressing racial equality. Nivo Estuardo Delgado actively employs all strategies in both his

individual activism and as part of the affirmative action team that he helped form. In general, all

of these activists incorporate some manifestations of each of these strategies in their individual

work or through their organizations.

47 To see this collective frustration and increasingly large protests, we need only think to the protests that swept throughout many U.S. cities November and December 2014 grand juries’ decisions not to indict the policemen who killed Eric Garner in New York City and Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri.

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Though these activists’ strategies may be small in an individual sense, their ambitions are

not. Through this process of incremental change, they aim to do nothing less than overthrow

what they see as a racist social and political structure in Ecuadorian society. This in undoubtedly

a long-term process, but they seem to be heading down the right path. However, the question of

how long this incremental change will continue to produce results still remains. In the present,

these activists have found themselves benefiting from political opportunities, similar to those

described by Tarrow (1998). They have taken advantage of these opportunities, specifically in

the legal ambiguity in policies and the appearance of amenable bureaucrats and high-level

officials. By seizing these political, and sometimes legal, opportunities, activists have promoted

their objectives, pushed the government to adopt more favorable policies and mechanisms.

Nonetheless, Afro civil society must sustain these strategies of incremental change over

long periods of time. To win a few victories here and there is admirable, but they cannot

continue to be “policies that don’t have sufficient force to make visible everything or to totally

eliminate the situations of discrimination,” as Viveros puts it. For real change to occur, the

combined weight of these changes in policies and mechanisms must be greater than the sum of

its parts. If not, then Afro-Ecuadorians may benefit from a few specific policies, but their place

in society and the structures of oppression that hold them down will likely remain unchanged. In

essence, sustained incremental change builds organizational momentum and creates a situation in

which civil society can begin to demand more substantive restructuring from the government.

Unfortunately, without such a sustained process, a policy-by-policy approach may or may not

generate the kind of substantive changes that these activists desire to see.

Moreover, this general strategy is entirely dependent on officials who are willing to work

with Afro-Ecuadorian activists, and a central government that desires to fulfill its Constitutional

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obligation. There is no guarantee that this will continue to be the case in the future. Thus, civil

society finds itself in a precarious, and potentially vulnerable political space. In a turn from his

previous stance, Rafael Correa announced that he might seek indefinite reelection, despite his

numerous denunciations of such a policy in the past (El Comercio, Oct 2014). This has stirred

fears not only of a creeping authoritarianism, but also of the government’s lack of preoccupation

with honoring its past promises. If the central government were to become more hostile to Afro-

Ecuadorian civil society, this strategy of finding a space within the political framework and

seeking incremental change would become inadequate, and civil society would unlikely be

equipped to issue a direct challenge against the state. For this, activists and organizations need to

become less of an ambiguous collection of individuals, and more of a cohesive force.

Towards Convergence? In its current state, Afro-Ecuadorian civil society hardly deserves the oft-overused

moniker of ‘social movement’. The typical images that this phrase conjures up are of masses of

protesters marching on a capital, armed with demands, chants, and a passion for change; or, less

aggressively, of leaders sitting down with high-level government officials to discuss their terms

of political change. As we’ve seen, neither of these accurately reflects the reality of Afro-

Ecuadorian civil society, but one day it may. After examining these various strategies of long-

term incremental change, one question that lingers quite heavily: will the confluence of the

above strategies lead to a more cohesive and forceful civil society, that can engender substantive

changes to the status quo? Essentially, can Afro-Ecuadorian civil society make successful

demands for recognition, redistribution, and reparation for their communities?

As Estuardo Delgado noted about his affirmative action cohort, “we are all directors of some

organization, but this is not the ultimate organizational expression of the Afro people.” The same

could be said about most initiatives that the activists in Afro civil society undertake. Borja

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describes a situation in which most activists and organizational leaders are concerned with their

own organizations and projects, and have less of a desire to work with other leaders outside of

their realm. This situation, she says, has improved in the past year, which is a very positive sign

for the movement going forward. This maturation of activists, to which Borja refers, is crucial as

it allows the movement to begin to build somewhat of a political force, with some weight behind

it. Though these activists actions don’t have to weight that comes with a movement sustained by

mass mobilization, they are working daily to build alliances in the government, international

institutions, and other sectors of society. This connection to other societal actors both legitimizes

the movement internally and externally, and ensures that its voice and actions will resonate

beyond the Afro-Ecuadorian community. This is key in the both getting a seat in decision-

making spaces, and in spreading awareness about the policy changes that they achieve.

Still, a concerted effort towards improving organizational and social cohesion among civil

society is necessary. The current dispersion of civil society – in geographic, organizational, and

somewhat ideological terms – makes these activists quite vulnerable to the state, as well as

dependent of the existence of political opportunities that they can take advantage of. Though

describing the Correa administration as favorable to Afro civil society would be foolish, but the

situation could potentially become one more of hostility, and less of the indifference that we see

today. To ensure that it can have more sustained activism and continue to promote incremental

change towards a larger societal restructuring, Afro civil society must become more cohesive

V: Conclusions The changes that Rafael Correa’s administration has brought on Ecuadorian society and

politics have fundamentally altered the political opportunity structure that Afro-Ecuadorian civil

society faces. Considering the political circumstance that Afro leaders find themselves in,

creating networks are building political consciousness are crucial to their ability to engage in

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forms of cooperative contention with the government. In witnessing this firsthand, two

characteristics of cooperative contention were evident.

The first was Afro activists’ emphasis on aligning their desires with the ideology of

Correa’s Citizen’s Revolution. This manifested itself principally in the use of selective

vocabulary that went along with the rhetoric of Correa and Alianza PAIS. For example,

throughout the meeting with the Sub-Secretary for Higher Education, the cohort of activists

repeatedly commented that affirmative action policies would not only benefit all peoples and

nationalities of Ecuador, but also create a more inclusive learning environment and improve the

quality of the university as a whole. The need to make all sectors of society better off is a point

upon which Correa’s government has repeatedly focused, and this cohort made sure to exploit it.

The second characteristic was the building of their argument on the basis of legal frameworks

established by the Constitution and supporting documents. The cohort brought multiple copies of

relevant sections of the 2008 Constitution and the Ley Orgánica de Educación Superior. In

detailing the type of affirmative action they demanded and the mechanisms through which they

wanted the policies fulfilled, activists always referenced passages of these two fundamental

documents. Therefore, as previously mentioned, the activists were clear that they did not wish to

change the Ministry’s interpretation of the law or combat an unjust framework; rather, they

simply desired to compel the state to do what its written laws says it should do (to move from

dicho to hecho, if you will), and to be included in the process of designing requisite mechanisms.

Through employing cooperative contention, Afro-Ecuadorian activists have begun to

accomplish success that they hope will accumulate to create substantive changes. Unfortunately,

the cooperative nature of this strategy reproduces state paternalism and makes Afro activists and

organizations beholden and vulnerable to the desires of the state. Thus, when the government –

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and specifically high-level government officials – agrees with Afro activists’ agenda, then

progress can be made in a somewhat painless manner. However, the government, and officials

within it, can also halt such change or attempt to sabotage civil society activists’ agendas if they

feel threatened or even annoyed by them. Therefore, it is crucial to remember that cooperative

contention does not imply an equal relationship. In this case, the state is making concessions to

Afro civil society because it agrees with activists’ particular agenda, not because it feels overtly

pressured by social mobilization. This is why network creation and consciousness-building are

important precursors to more autonomous strategies of contention that can alleviate such

vulnerability. Activists and organizations must build leverage these networks to generate more

effective mobilization through additional strategies. Similarly, they must continue to grow

community consciousness and advocacy capacity, to improve the base that stronger social

mobilization can be built upon.

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V: FIGHTING THE HAND THAT FEEDS? Activist-Officials Between State and Civil Society

Chapter IV examined strategies of mobilization employed by Afro-Ecuadorian activists. This

chapter will analyze a different population: former Afro activists who are now embedded in

government institutions. I focus principally on the position of activist-officials, and how they

navigate being between civil society and the state. Many Afro-Ecuadorians who now serve in the

government of the Rafael Correa administration were once civil society activists fighting for

change from the outside. Though activists of all types have entered government offices at

varying levels, those who have accepted management positions in government institutions, or

have been elected to national office, were among the most prominent leaders in Afro-Ecuadorian

civil society. Due to the nature of the Correa government’s rise – mostly through the support of

social movements – the demarcation between civil society and government bureaucracy has

proven to be quite fluid, with some activists moving back and forth between the two with relative

ease. This fluidity has created a complex situation in which the state and civil society are not

completely separate and not necessarily antagonistic. More accurately, the two sides are

sometimes complementary and sometimes at odds, but always closely intertwined.

This situation creates a complicated tension for activists who enter government service –

especially considering that many of them have spent a good portion of their lives fighting

inequities that they believe the government represents. Nonetheless, as the last two chapters

detailed, Afro-Ecuadorian civil society is heavily reliant on state cooperation. Thus, these

activists-turned-officials serve as crucial bridges between the two sectors. However, since their

professional obligations are to the government – and their livelihood depends on a government

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salary – there exists a delicate balancing act for those officials who desire to use their current

positions as a way to advance the work they began in civil society.

In this chapter, I examine this complex situation by describing and analyzing the

experiences of Afro-Ecuadorian government officials involved in the struggle for racial equality.

In doing this, I look to understand how these officials view themselves as continuing, or not

continuing, the struggle they began as activists in civil society. I intentionally exclude Afro-

Ecuadorian elected officials from this group, as none have been formally elected as

representatives of an Afro-Ecuadorian social organization, and thus owe their political allegiance

first and foremost to the political party to which they belong. Unlike those in elected office, the

Afro-Ecuadorians officials that I interviewed were appointed or hired directly from Afro social

organizations, and therefore should, in theory, feel more responsible for upholding the ideals and

desires of civil society.

Using the trajectories of two Afro-Ecuadorian government officials as a point of

departure, I will illustrate the challenges and opportunities that these former-activist officials

face in their current positions. Additionally, I will highlight their priorities and motivations for

fighting towards racial equality from within the state. In doing so, I will draw from Park and

Richards’ (2007) work on how former Mapuche activists negotiate a different form of state-led

multiculturalism in Chile. Parks and Richard detail the difficult obstacles, decisions, and

consequences that Mapuche activists who have entered government service face. Throughout the

analysis of Afro-Ecuadorian officials’ experiences, I will draw parallels and highlight points of

differentiation between these two sets of activists-turned officials. This allows me to make more

generalizable observations about the role of former civil society activists in government, and

their ability to affect change in government institutions.

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Beyond this specific example of Chilean Mapuche activists, Vanden and Prevost’s (2009)

perspectives on state power and clientelism in Latin America also heavily inform the analysis of

these trajectories. These authors argue that politics in much of Latin America can be seen as a

‘power game’, in which the powerful seek control above all else and often use bureaucratic

appointments to spread the reach of their influence and claim to be increasing representation of

vulnerable groups (minorities, poor, etc.). De la Torre (2002) illustrates Ecuador’s past political

state as clientelistic and dictated by patronage relationships, in which those in power hold

influence over vulnerable groups and essentially trade positions in government for loyalty to the

powers that be. Many argue that Correa’s appointment of many Afro-Ecuadorian activists to

bureaucratic positions is designed not to increase Afro representation, but rather to quiet

potential dissent from their organizations, and to buy the loyalty of those leaders (Becker 2012,

de la Torre 2013b, Antón Sanchez 2013a). These ideas about clientelism and patronage are

important when thinking about these activist officials and their autonomy (or lack thereof) as

bureaucrats in Correa’s administration, as they may provide clues about the capacity for former

activists to act as gatekeepers that lead to increased civil society influence within the state.

The trajectories that anchor this chapter come from government officials who work

directly with issues of racial and social equality in their bureaucratic positions, and were

previously prominent leaders in Afro-Ecuadorian civil society. The first details Orfa Reinoso’s

path from civil society to government bureaucracy, where she is now an assistant director at the

Sub-secretariat of Peoples and Nationalities. Her trajectory will illuminate some of the personal

and professional considerations that arise when civil society activists join government office.

The second follows José Chalá Cruz and his work as the Secretary General of the Corporation

for Afro-Ecuadorian Development [CODAE]. This trajectory will detail the institutional and

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organizational considerations that Chalá Cruz and other actors face as both a representative of a

state entity and also as activists fighting against inequalities enforced by the status quo. After, I

bring the two together in the discussion section to analyze common themes that arise in the two

trajectories, such as: the challenges and opportunities presented by civil society and the state, the

issue of representation and real decision-making power within state institutions, and the

difficulty of maintaining strong connections to Afro-Ecuadorian communities and civil society.

I have chosen Reinoso and Chalá Cruz’s stories as the centerpieces of this chapter

because their rich interviews illuminate themes and trends concerning the role of Afro-

Ecuadorian activists in government, which I have encountered in literature and through

conversations. Reinoso’s trajectory focuses more on the familial, professional, and economic

considerations that these officials must take into account. Chalá Cruz’s much more explicitly

discusses the tension that inevitably arises when activists join state institutions but continue to

push against the system that the central government represents. As Omi and Winant argue, “the

racial order is equilibrated by the state,” thus the ability of individuals within the state to change

the institutional order is limited because of the state’s very foundations (1986: 79). In engaging

with these activist-officials’ trajectories I hope to show how the intersection of activism, racist

institutions, state paternalism, and economic vulnerability impacts Afro officials’ influence. I

argue that in general Afro activist officials within the state have a limited capacity to affect

change in government institutions and institute policies that would transform the existing racial

hierarchies present in the Ecuadorian state and society. As a result of this constrained influence,

these officials are mostly unable to serve as true representatives of Afro civil society, and see

their potential for effective activism greatly truncated. They remain confined to the limits of their

positions and of the dominant ideology of the state under Correa’s administration. I detail the

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source of these constraints – which range from economic, to educational, to institutional, to

personal – throughout the chapter, by way of the following trajectories.

I: The Trajectory of Orfa Reinoso Though she now lives in Quito, Orfa Reinoso48 was born and raised in Esmeraldas, home

to the largest concentration of Afro-Ecuadorians in the country. From a young age, she

developed a deep connection with the traditional customs and culture of Afro-Esmeraldeños.

This connection led her to work with various social organizations and eventually found several

on her path to becoming an Afro-Ecuadorian social leader. Her introduction into what she terms

the ‘Afro-Ecuadorian organizational process’ is a deeply personal one. In the mid-1990s, her son

fell ill and had to be taken to the hospital for a week. He recovered, but the young boy (also

Afro-Ecuadorian) he was sharing a room with was quite sick and his parents didn’t have the

funds to pay for his treatment. Reinoso saw this as a fundamental flaw in the healthcare service,

and gathered friends, family, and community members together to collectively pay for the boy’s

treatment. Eventually he recovered and was able to leave the hospital.

This first foray into the world of collective action inspired her to think past her own

family, and to consider her impact on the greater Afro-Ecuadorian community. This newfound

awareness led her to found her own organization called Negra Bonita, a social organization for

young Afro women. After meeting a Comboni monk who was involved with the Afro-

Ecuadorian cultural center, Reinoso developed an interest in connecting with the wider and more

political Afro-Ecuadorian civil society movement that was gaining momentum. In this function

she and her organization became more involved with the political processes of social

development, government access, and economic empowerment. With this politicization, she

48 Unless otherwise noted, all information from this section comes from an in-depth interview with Orfa Reinoso, which took place on June 5th, 2014 at the Subsecretariat for Peoples and Nationalities.

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became a leader of the Afro-Ecuadorian youth process, and Negra Bonita became one of the

founding organizations of FOGNEP, the Federation of Black Organizations and Groups of

Pinchincha. Eventually she would become the President of FOGNEP, and one of the most visible

Afro-Ecuadorian social leaders in the country.

As a prominent leader, Reinoso was closely involved in the process of forming the 2008

Constitution, as a representative of Afro-Ecuadorian civil society. Afterwards, she continued to

work in the organizational process as she had before. After giving a presentation about the Afro-

Ecuadorian community to the Ministry of Economic and Social Inclusion (MIES), she was asked

to work in the Ministry as a contracted employee. As she remembers, she initially decided

against joining the ministry, thinking that doing so would be a betrayal of civil society. However,

fellow activists assured her that turning down the position would be foolish, as her prospects for

other types of employment related to social and political causes were minimal. Due to active

discrimination and generally lower levels of education, the career prospects are quite limited for

Afro-Ecuadorians who have spent considerable time as civil society activists (Chalá Cruz 2013).

Because of this, government jobs represent an important source of employment for Afro-

Ecuadorians, especially those involved in political activism. Moreover, government work offers

a steady salary and civil society work does not. Though it took an internal struggle, she

eventually decided that as a single mother, she needed to prioritize herself and her family after

years of civil society organizing and mobilizing:

And one night I was thinking and thinking, and it rained extremely hard. And I have a small house, I have a house that the bank gave me… and as my house is old, the rain began to leak through [the roof] and I started to feel it. I said to myself ‘wow, I’m going to be flooded’. So I said, ‘I have to take the opportunity’ because how could I not work?... And I spoke to my organizing mentor Juan Carlos Ocles and he said to me ‘it is time to think about yourself. End this cycle that you’re involved in because these opportunities don’t come around. Work! Accept the job.’ And from there I began.

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With this decision, she became the director of a new line of work at MIES, called

Participation & Equality. Because of her long history in the organizational process of Afro-

Ecuadorian civil society, she felt that she was especially qualified to create this new area of work

for the ministry. In that position she helped inform the ministry’s views on ways to most

effectively and broadly promote citizen participation in the country. Since many ministry

positions in Ecuador offer contracted work, after two years Reinoso moved on from MIES to the

Sub-Secretariat of People and Nationalities, as an assistant director. In this position she directly

oversees government projects, policies, and activities that have to do with Ecuador’s minority

populations, especially Afro-Ecuadorian communities.

Identity and Position Orfa Reinoso is but one example of a trend in Afro-Ecuadorian civil society. As Chapter

1 illustrated, many successful activists have found stable and seemingly-influential employment

in the government as Rafael Correa. For this reason, many view her as a coopted former activist

who betrayed the movement and became a ‘symbolic Afro’ in a state institution. However,

Reinoso strongly believes that while in government she has been in positions of real decision-

making power. Furthermore, she believes that those ‘pessimists’ holding these views – who think

that activists-turned-officials are but mouthpieces for the central government – insult both the

integrity and the intelligence of former Afro-Ecuadorian activists, while also perpetuating a

prejudice that Afros are not valued for their contributions to society. By viewing these officials

as captured by the Correa government, she argues, these critics discount the skills and hard work

that they put towards their work as government representatives of Afro-Ecuadorian communities.

Though she believes strongly in the good that can be done for Afro-Ecuadorians from

inside the government, she does not view herself as starting a career in government service.

Rather, herself as “passing through the institution” as part of her continual service to the Afro-

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descendant people of Ecuador. Though in accepting her ministerial positions she may have

prioritized her livelihood, Reinoso believes that serving the greater community is the ultimate

calling for Afro-descendant people:

Due to the fact that we are where we are, you have to serve. You have to be useful. Because being useful helps the collective and your family, which are connected to one another…. So I believe that it is pertinent that there are these [decision-making] spaces [in government]. We deserve to be in these spaces. Despite this commitment to her communities and her belief in the power of working from

government officialdom, Reinoso recognizes that there are limits to her service in government.

For one, she never received more than a secondary education, so her ability to rise in the Correa

administration’s technocracy is severely limited. Therefore, her ministerial work will be largely

based on two-year contracts in middle management roles. Second, by accepting government

employment, Reinoso recognizes that she has essentially forfeited her ability to criticize the

administration in any substantive and public fashion.

From the way that she speaks about her time as a grassroots activist protesting on the

street and making demands to government representatives, it is obvious that Reinoso cherishes

those experiences and that part of her yearns for another chance at that life. This is a dilemma

that former Afro-Ecuadorian activists in government face: to make a career out of government

work, or to return to the difficult and sometimes grueling, but often gratifying, life of a civil

society activist. This is especially difficult when activists age and start families, as Reinoso

recounts:

It is one thing when you are outside in the organizational process fighting battles, or as I say, when you are in the streets. It is another thing when others need you, when you have to eat. And you have to eat. I, in my position, I dedicated myself completely to the organizational process, and then I live as a single mother: father and mother and head of my household and my children. This choice between family and what might be perceived as civil society duty is not an

easy one, especially considering that many of these former activists joined in their youth and

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have watched their organizations grow and achieve important accomplishments. What Reinoso

terms the Afro-Ecuadorian organizational process has given her and other activists a strong sense

of pride, in both themselves and in their communities. Having left the organizational process and

her colleagues within it is something that Reinoso says “is a heavy weight” on her heart.

However, pride and identity do not pay bills, as Reinoso herself has acknowledged.

This pragmatic but hopeful view of government employment is similar to that which Park

& Richards (2007) highlight in the dilemma that Mapuche government workers face in Chile. As

the authors describe, the workers often don’t agree with government policy, but state

employment equals steady income (pp. 1327). Park and Richards go on to make the case that

Mapuche workers’ state employment represents a form of structural inequality in itself, as

discriminatory practices throughout the rest of the labor market may coerce activists into

accepting government jobs that they otherwise may not have (ibid). In the case of Afro-

Ecuadorian workers, I would argue that this is part of the story, but only part. In the Chile that

the authors describe, many of these Mapuche workers have essentially been absorbed into the

state apparatus and given menial jobs within it. In my experience with both current and former

Afro-Ecuadorian government activists, this does not seem to be the case.

As previously described, the Correa administration has an explicitly anti-neoliberal ideal.

Therefore, it aims to truly include former civil society activists within government, and put their

expertise to use. Though many debate the existence and fulfillment of such an inclusive system,

there has certainly been an attempt at establishing one that doesn’t fall victim to the failures of

neoliberal multiculturalism. And at least in Reinoso’s case, it is obvious that she sees her

ministerial work as relevant, as well as important. Due to this attempt at inclusivity, many of

these officials have been selected by the administration precisely because of their experience

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with organizational processes in civil society, and most continue to focus on those processes

while working with the government. Thus, their identities as part of Afro-Ecuadorian civil

society have not been eliminated by their employment as civil servants, which further

complicates the dilemma between position and identity.

Sonia Viveros,49 of Fundación Azúcar, bears witness to this fact. She spent two years

under contract with the Ministry of Culture before returning as president of the organization that

she helped found. Like Reinoso, Viveros’ contract expired after two years and she saw her lack

of an advanced degree50 as an impediment in her ability to move into more influential positions

in the government. Unlike Reinoso, Viveros has no children to feed and works on the side as an

artisan, while also collecting a small paycheck for her leadership role at Azúcar. Because of this

flexibility, Viveros has been able to continue civil society work, and has also enrolled at a

university in Quito in order to obtain her master’s degree. Viveros recognizes that because she

has no children she can be more flexible about her professional decisions, but she is also critical

of those that accept government positions simply because of the financial incentives. She notes

that all those who grew with the organizational process learned how to make due with little

income, either through developing other skills or relying on social networks.

This is not to suggest that because Orfa Reinoso and other bureaucrats do not maintain

formal links to their former organizations they have forgotten about the Afro organizational

process. Reinoso works closely with ConAfro51, a group of Afro-Ecuadorian organizations that

have joined together to represent their interests to the government. Nonetheless, it is evident that

49 Information on, and quotes by, Sonia Viveros were collected through an in-depth interview with her on June 11th, 2014 in Quito. 50 Unlike Reinoso, Viveros has a bachelor’s degree. However, it is in Computer Science, which is not valued by the current government in the same way that a degree in economics or public policy would be. 51 However, as many of its leaders are involved in some form of government work, the group has come under scrutiny for being a way for the government to pretend that it has taken an interest in the Afro-Ecuadorian community.

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there are those Afro government officials who in actuality have never ceased being activists,

regardless of their employment status.

Afro-Ecuadorian Professionals There are still other government officials who balance their official position with

activism in their spare time. Since her youth, Blanca Tadeo has been involved with Afro-

Ecuadorian social organization, but she has trained professionally as an accountant. Rather than

immerse herself in the more confrontational politics of some of her compatriots, Tadeo has

chosen to use her professional career as a means to advance the Afro-Ecuadorian community.

From the early 90s until the rise of the Correa government, she worked at the Council for the

Development of the Nationalities and Peoples of Ecuador52 [CONDENPE] as a treasurer. Now

she serves as Director of Organizational development at CODAE, and she is in charge of the

organizations financial administration. She has spent her professional life in government

institutions that “has allowed [her] to work with pleasure and work on what [she] actually enjoys

working on”, which are issues that impact the Afro-Ecuadorian people. Nonetheless, she

recognizes that others may not see her work in the same light, but maintains that she is doing

what she can to advance the Afro-Ecuadorian community.

Besides this professional association, Blanca Tadeo has maintained consistent

membership and activity with the Afro social organization that she came from despite years of

government service, most recently with CODAE since 2007. Tadeo comes from an area north of

Quito called la Concepción, near Valle de Chota, and she is a member of a regional group called

the Federation of Black Community Organizations of Imbabura and Carchi (FECONIC). Though

she lives in Quito, she regularly attends meetings and events, and is involved with the activities

52 This was the Council’s final name while Tadeo was there. During her tenure, it passed through three phases: first, as the National Secretariat for Indigenous and Ethnic Issues (SENAIE); second, as the Council for Planning and Development of the Indigenous and Black People (CONPLADIN), and then finally as CONDENPE.

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of the organization. In this way, she maintains firm links and membership with her civil society

organization, despite her position as high-ranking employee at a government institution.

Other former Afro-Ecuadorian activists use their professional qualifications to seek

employment within less explicitly political sectors of the government, or outside of it entirely.

Two examples of this are Catherine Chalá and Juan Carlos. Both work for the office of the

Public Defender (or the Ombudsman), Ocles as a lawyer and Chalá as a social worker. Both were

formerly active leaders in the Afro-Ecuadorian organizational process, but have since reduced

their roles in their respective organizations. While they will still attend important gathering or

rally when an injustice captures the public’s attention, they no longer participate in the day-to-

day struggle that made the Afro-Ecuadorian social movement a national force. Furthermore both

Chalá and Ocles assert that their professional employment has essentially no connection with

their activism in the organizational process. This may be true, but they work for a public

institution that works to protect the rights of citizens. Through this they serve a clientele that is

disproportionately low-income and minority, so they are not completely removed from the issues

that they once mobilized around.

Despite the lack of continuity between their civil society activism and their professional

careers, through their day-to-day work as Afro-Ecuadorian professionals they represent the

progress that the community has made in the last few decades. Both Ocles and Chalá, as well as

Viveros and Reinoso, recognize that this is crucial for Afro-Ecuadorians to achieve some

semblance of equality in their nation. Not all Afro-Ecuadorians can, nor should, be involved in

grassroots organizations. There must be room for Afro-Ecuadorian professionals, especially

those who care about and are familiar with racial political issues, and can bring this

consciousness to their employment environment.

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This section has dealt largely with the personal considerations of former activists serving

in government. The next explores the experiences of José Chalá cruz, and more explicitly

examine the challenges of working between government and civil society.

II: Trajectory of José Chalá Cruz José Chalá Cruz53 comes from what is often termed the Afro-Ecuadorian ancestral land:

the communities of Valle de Chota, la Concepción, and Salinas. These communities lie just 100

miles north of Quito, also in the mountainous Sierra region of the country. Like Esmeraldas, this

region has birthed many Afro-Ecuadorian leaders and is known as one of the focal points of

Afro-Ecuadorian culture. Chalá Cruz credits the spirit of his community and his ancestors with

inspiring him to join the fight for racial equality. It was this spirit, and a desire to learn more

about his roots that led to Chalá Cruz co-founding the Center for Research of the Black Family.

This center focused on researching and producing knowledge on the history, culture, and state of

Afro-Ecuadorians – and to a lesser extent, the entire African diaspora. Perhaps unsurprisingly,

Chalá Cruz received an education (Master’s degree) as an anthropologist, and has produced

multiple books and several scholarly articles, most of which are concerned with Afro-Ecuadorian

communities.

Since introduction to Afro-Ecuadorian civil society, Chalá Cruz continued active

involvement in the Afro organizational process, and eventually became a prominent social leader.

For a time, he was President of the Afro-Ecuadorian National Confederation, and has been in

leadership positions of several other social organizations. In recognition of his leadership, he was

appointed in 2007 to lead CODAE as Secretary General. The newly-elected Correa government

saw CODAE as an antiquated representation of a neoliberal and corporatist model of governance

53 Unless otherwise noted, all information from this section comes from an in-depth interview with José Chalá Cruz, which took place on June 4th, 2014 at his office in CODAE.

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that had operated in Ecuador since the 1980s, and Chalá Cruz was brought on to see the

institution phased out. Instead of closing CODAE’s doors, he repurposed its mission and, 7 years

later it is still operating.

From the beginning of his appointment as Secretary General, Chalá Cruz set out to make

CODAE a “model organization for how to work between state and society” in Ecuador.

Nonetheless, as CODAE is a government institution, it can only represent Afro-Ecuadorian civil

society – which is often critical of the same government – to a certain extent. Therefore, instead

of using the state institution as a mouthpiece for criticism, he has attempted to take advantage of

the limited state resources afforded to CODAE in order to advance a longer-term vision for the

development of Afro-Ecuadorian communities. To accomplish this, he has focused the

organization on generating public policies and programs to better conditions of Afro-Ecuadorian

communities. In this capacity, he has been most successful in implementing education and

housing initiatives.

The housing initiative begun under Chalá Cruz seeks to reduce the housing deficit in

Afro-Ecuadorian communities by providing families with “stable and dignified” homes. CODAE

does this by piggybacking on a wider government program that seeks to provide housing to low-

income Ecuadorians. For Afro-Ecuadorians, CODAE provides three to four thousand dollars in

addition to the six thousand that the government allocates as part of the general program.

Moreover, CODAE does not dictate how the houses are built, but rather allows individuals to

design their homes according to their preferences, an aspect that Chalá Cruz believes is crucial to

the programs success and sustainability. Though the program operates only in a few of Ecuador’s

provinces, Chalá Cruz hopes that it will expand and prove to be a critical part of economic and

social development for Afro-Ecuadorians (cite CODAE booklet).

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The other important area that CODAE works in is education. Through policy advocacy

and the enforcement of government mandates, the education gap between Afro-Ecuadorian and

white/mestizo students has been reduced in primary and secondary schools – though this in no

way measures the quality of education that those students receive in comparison to white and

mestizo students. Quality concerns aside, the largest education gap for Afro-Ecuadorians occurs

in tertiary and advanced degrees. This is the area where Chalá Cruz hopes that CODAE will

make a significant impact. Therefore, in 2009 CODAE partnered with FLASCO-Ecuador (The

Latin American Social Sciences Institute), to offer scholarships for Afro-Ecuadorians to seeking

advanced degrees (Masters and PhD’s). The program appears to have been a success, and the

first cohort of PhD students graduate in mid-2014, much to the elation of Chalá Cruz.

Fighting the State from Within Chalá Cruz considers the housing and education initiatives to be important steps in

advancing racial equality in Ecuador. He hopes that lowering the higher education deficit among

Afro-Ecuadorians will not only improve their professional opportunities, but also help to bring a

change in consciousness both in Afro communities and in society in general. Among Afro-

Ecuadorians he sees such educational programs as giving youth more hope in their future, and

believes that through education their consciousness as politically minded Afro-Ecuadorian will

awaken and lead to more united and active communities. On a more broad scale, Chalá Cruz

hopes the success of this program in education will show the executive branch of the government

how inequalities might be reduced through affirmative action policies.

Much like Omi and Winant (1986) and Goldberg (2001), Chalá Cruz is skeptical of the

effectiveness of racial projects as conceived by modern nation-states operating from a ‘Western

ideological’ framework. Along this line, he firmly believes that Ecuadorian society must undergo

“an epistemological rupture with western positivist thinking”, which he blames for a faulty

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thinking about how to deal with racial issues54. Broadly speaking, this ‘rupture’ would employ

the knowledge, wisdom, and traditions of African and Afro-descendant ancestors, and eliminate

a “colonial mindset” with one that does not treat Afro-descendant people as ‘others’ and

intruders in white/mestizo world.

Chalá Cruz’s words reflect a trend that Walsh (2002) observes in racial and ethnic

movements throughout the continent, which attempt to undo centuries of the ideological

domination of mestizaje. This work searches not only to change society’s treatment of racial

minorities, but to fundamentally change the exploitative racial order through which society

functions. Such a shift would also alter the “productive matrix” so that Afro-Ecuadorians would

have more control over their lands and economic well-being. Ideologically, he aligns himself

with Malcolm X and considers that any changes that do not eventually lead to such a rupture will

fail in their goal to transform the power structures of Ecuadorian society and bring true racial

equality to the country. In fact, he contends that equality cannot exist without a radical shift in

ideology because society in the Americas was established through and upon the subjugation of

Afro-descendant and indigenous peoples. Thus, true equality cannot arise in a system that was

built on the continuation of inequality (Chalá Cruz).

Obviously, this outlook has not won him many allies within other parts of the

government, which depends on the ideologically underpinnings of Western society for its

legitimacy. This is a fact that Chalá Cruz knows well, and accepts, which makes it all the more

interesting that he continues to occupy the position that he does – though he admits that he does

not make a habit out of professing these views to people at other government entities. Chalá

Cruz’s rhetoric around destroying the epistemological basis of Ecuadorian politics may seem

54 Under this mode of thinking, racial and other structural inequalities can be eliminated by improving the economic and social conditions of society as a whole, not through policies that target one demographic group over another.

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radical, similar thoughts have been echoed by other Afro-Ecuadorians in both civil society and

government. Both Orfa Reinoso and Nivo Estuardo Delgado (of the CNA) explicitly expressed a

need for Ecuadorians – and all inhabitants of the Americas, especially Afro-descendant people –

to rid themselves of the “slave mentality” created by the circumstances under which the Western

Hemisphere was colonized. Though they do not go as far as José Chalá Cruz in calling for an

epistemological overthrow, they do hint that something of that ilk is necessary. This

demonstrates that Chalá Cruz is not a lone radical within the government, but rather a vocal

activist that is willing to assert his personal views more readily than his peers.

Furthermore, though Chalá Cruz’s rhetoric is fairly radical considering his position, his

methods are not. The beginnings of this change of thought he describes are in the very programs

that CODAE runs and supports. The housing and education initiatives described previously may

not seem to be contributing to the breakdown of typical Western ideology, but Chalá Cruz

maintains that they are important first steps that represent that little he, as a government

employee, can do to fight back against that same government. Moreover, he has yet to return to

civil society because he views is position in government as giving him the closer proximity to

policy creation and execution, which would be impossible from outside of the state.

Returning the example of Mapuche officials in Chile, we see a similar, albeit less radical,

push back against the government. Much like Chalá Cruz, these Mapuche state workers

participate in the model of state-led multiculturalism, but they also reject conforming to its

ideology, and therefore simultaneously attempt to change it (2006, pp. 1324). Park and Richards

theorize that these officials “are necessarily hybrid, shifting, and context-driven, and unlikely to

be internally resolved” (ibid, pp.1325). This almost perfectly describes Chalá Cruz, who goes

back and forth between admitting that the Citizen’s Revolution has given Afro-Ecuadorians

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crucial recognition and advancement and calling for a revolution of thought that would likely

undermine it. Though this seems somewhat hypocritical, as Parks and Richards note, it is largely

a function of the complex system that these activist-officials are forced to deal with.

Even though he does exhibit the hybridity described by Parks and Richards, Chalá Cruz

does seem to believe quite fervently in this epistemological shift, so much so that several

chapters of his anthropological book Afroecuatorianos (2013) are dedicated to the idea. However,

it is highly unlikely that a radical break with Western ideology will emerge as a direct result of

CODAE’s current programs, and Chalá Cruz must be aware of that. Nonetheless, if this

epistemological change is to happen eventually, then it has to begin somewhere. Through this

example, Chalá Cruz’s long term-minded perspective emerges. He is of the belief that education

that builds consciousness, the improvement living standards, and increased community solidarity

will eventually lead to the necessary shifts in mindsets and eventual racial equality. This long-

term mindset of ideological change through a state-sponsored program essentially mirrors the

hybridity evident in Chalá Cruz’s interview.

Unfortunately, this strategy and the hybridity it represents, are not popular among the

Afro-Ecuadorian community, as it delivers very minimal short-term results in favor of uncertain

and far away structural changes. Moreover, all of my interviewees were critical of CODAE’s

representation of and work in Afro-Ecuadorian communities. Most considered the education

program a mild success, but didn’t recognize any real benefits of the institutions other initiatives,

and believe it to be too close to the government to fulfill its mandate. Thus, though this long-

term perspective is important, it must also be bolstered by continuous short-term activities that

have an impact on the communities that CODAE intends to represent. This is crucial, especially

for an institution that purports to be a link between the state and Afro-Ecuadorian society.

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Chalá Cruz is aware of the fact that many in the Afro-Ecuadorian community do not

agree with the methods and programs that he has implemented at CODAE, and that some see the

institution as only a tool of the central government. In fact, he understands, and to a certain

degree shares, some of their frustration. “I (as Secretary General) am part of the state” he says,

“and the state cannot attack the tate.” However, though he sympathizes with much of the

communities’ frustrations, he sees the continuation of this long-term road to progress as the

answer, as it represents a way to chip away at the government’s ideological framework by using

its own programs. Unfortunately, as we saw in the first chapter, CODAE’s doors may be closed

and the institution’s role replaced before this long-term plan can hold any traction.

The following section considers Reinoso and Chalá Cruz’s trajectories together, and

discusses the themes that emerge in them.

III: The Role of Afro Activist-Officials The trajectories of Orfa Reinoso and José Chalá Cruz unearth several topics worth

analysis. The most relevant to this discussion is the role of these former activist officials, both in

government and in Afro-Ecuadorian communities. As former activists now occupying significant

government positions, these individuals face a tension between their identities as civil society

activist and their positions in government. Moreover, many have stated their intentions to

eventually return to civil society whenever their government service may come to an end. Thus

there is a sense that they must tread lightly while in state institutions, so as not to burn bridges or

earn the scorn of their communities. Unlike other social movements in Ecuador, Afro-

Ecuadorian civil society has not been openly confrontational with the Correa government (de la

Torre & Antón 2012). As a result of this, Afro-Ecuadorian officials can potentially find a balance

between the obligations to the state and their perceived responsibility to their Afro-Ecuadorian

compatriots. The question is: how do they achieve this balance? Moving towards an answer is a

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highly subjective exercise, and requires a much more in-depth analysis than is possible here.

Nonetheless, the above trajectories and other interviews do offer some insights into the role that

these activist-officials really play.

Between the State and Society As the trajectories above have shown, Afro activist-officials maintain various levels of

connection to their former organizations and other civil society groups. Some, like Blanca Tadeo

and Sonia Viveros, are still part of the network of their former group, even if their participation

is not habitual. Still others like Orfa Reinoso and José Chalá Cruz have removed themselves

entirely from their former organization, but continue to exhibit the mindset of an activist. The

extent to which officials remain connected to civil society depends largely on two factors: 1) the

position they occupy in government, and 2) their career aspirations.

For example, Tadeo continues to attend meetings and events that relate to FECONIC, and

though Viveros was not an active leader in Fundación Azúcar during her time in government, she

kept her connections, and returned the organization after her contract with the state expired. As

she puts it: “while I was [in government] I never left being part of Azúcar. In other words, I

never forgot the place where I was born, the place that formed me socially.” In this statement she

directs a small judgment at those who do ‘forget’ the place where they received their

organizational formation. But, as is typical, the story is not so simple.

Both Viveros’ and Tadeo’s positions in government were outside of the spotlight. In

essence, how they spend their personal time and the activities they’re involved in are not readily

scrutinized by anyone besides friends and colleagues. Therefore, they can pursue other interests

that might be seen as conflicting with their government work if they were in more prominent

positions. Moreover, Viveros, as an employee in the Ministry of Culture, was not actively

involved in work relating to the Afro organizational process. And though Tadeo works at

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CODAE, her main role is in financial administration. This allows the two to distance their

professional work from the personal desire to continue as part of a civil society organization.

Contrastingly, both Reinoso and Chalá Cruz are intimately involved with issues relating

to organizational processes in the Afro community – and in Reinoso’s case, beyond it. Therefore,

to remain involved in a social organization would likely represent a conflict of interest. Reinoso

could not reasonably make objective analyses and reports for the Ministry on the Afro

organizational process, while continuing to actively participate. Similarly, could not purport to

represent all of Afro-Ecuadorian civil society while remaining a leader of one specific

organization. And this does not even take into account the workload that likely prevents them

from partaking in continually involvement.

Nonetheless, a less-nuanced view of these officials as government puppets often wins out.

Park and Richards note that Mapuche activists in Chile who accept government positions are

often immediately scorned as traitors of the movement because of their association with the state

(2007: 1323). This view creates a rift between the two sectors, and inhibits both sides’ capacity

to affect meaningful change. In Ecuador, Afro civil society has not taken nearly as conflictive

attitude toward the government as that of with Mapuche civil society’s in Chile. Furthermore,

those who are generally considered to have forgotten the Afro organizations that molded them

are the activists that have reached higher-level positions in government. There may be a tinge of

jealous in those accusations, but such feelings most likely come from a specific interpretation of

reality. Afro activist-officials who ascend to higher government office have a significant amount

of work and many considerations to make. Not all decisions made in office can be in the best

interest of Afro organizations. Additionally, many of these officials have been appointed to

offices that encompass a much broader scope of the population than just Afro-Ecuadorians. Thus,

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to make Afro-Ecuadorian civil society their main focus could potentially be a disservice to the

other groups and organizations that fall under their purview. This is not to say that all these

activist-officials would dedicate their time to advancing Afro-Ecuadorian issues if they could,

but merely to point out another potential sides of this story.

Nonetheless, many activists see some officials as having turned their back on Afro

organizations in favor of a career in government. This attitude has often put a strain on relations

between those in civil society and those in state institutions, further weakening civil society’s

capacity to influence government decisions. As Alodia Borja (of the CNA) describes, these

conflicts often result from one person badmouthing another out of frustration; thus, creating a

feud that has consequences far beyond their personal relationship. This can also occur between

two officials in government, as was the case when Alexandra Ocles was a minister and was in

“open conflict” with José Chalá Cruz (de la Torre and Antón Sánchez 2012). This conflict

between two of the most influential Afro activist-officials in the Correa government served only

to further divide the community and lower any chance of actionable programs coming to fruition.

Unfortunately, because of the small number of Afro-Ecuadorians occupying such positions, the

reverberations of the conflict are much larger than any two people.

Afro-Ecuadorians are not necessarily unique in facing issues of unity and connection

between state and civil society. Throughout Latin America, issues of state cooptation and

clientelism have increased disunity among civil society groups. However, a case from Brazil

draws an interesting contrast with the experiences of Afro-Ecuadorian officials. An interview

with Maria Inês Barbosa, a former Vice-Minister of the Secretariat for the Adoption of Policies

that Promote Racial Equality [SEPPIR], sheds light on how officials’ autonomy and influence in

the state can lead to effective policies (Rahier 2012). Like similar Ecuadorian government

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institutions, SEPPIR, which was created in 2003 under Lula’s government,55 in Brazil is charged

with developing policies and programs to combat racial discrimination and promote social

inclusion for minorities56 (Da Silva 2012). Like other government agencies, SEPPIR has been

used to promote political party objectives; however, it has also enacted significant public policies

for Afro-Brazilians, most notably in the realm of healthcare (Da Silva 2012, Rahier 2012b)

At the time of her appointment Barbosa was a university professor, after having spent

considerable time involved in the Black Movement in Brazil (Rahier 2012b: 220). In her position,

she recounts having the ability and confidence to approach other ministries and demand that they

work together on programs that would benefit affirmative action and Afro-Brazilians (ibid: 222).

Moreover, she describes having relative ease of access to executive circles, which aided in the

promotion and execution of SEPPIR’s programs (ibid: 223). This autonomy and influence she

enjoyed while part of the ministry, stands in contrast to the experiences of Afro-Ecuadorian

activists and officials detailed previously.57 All in all, Brazil may not provide the most effective

example of success in eliminating racism; however, it seems evident that the state and civil

society have worked together to implement promising programs toward that end. In large part

this is due to the relative autonomy and influence of Afro-Brazilians embedded within the state.

The next section deals with constraints on former Afro-Ecuadorian activists’ influence

while in government, which has much to do with the number of them in high-ranking positions.

55 Lula Da Silva, 2-term President of Brazil as a member of the Workers Party (PT). 56 Though SEPPIR may not exactly mirror any single institution in Ecuador, it does represent a similar attempt by the state to take the lead on fighting racial inequalities by promoting its own public policy. 57 With this experience in mind, one might ask why Afro-Brazilian officials feel less constrained and more than their counterparts in Ecuador. There are several potential explanations. Considering demographics, Brazil has a much larger Afro-descendant population in sheer number and proportion. This means that Afro civil society in Brazil is bound to be stronger. Moreover, while they are more widely dispersed than in Ecuador. On the political front, there are two central explanations: the relative decentralization of Brazilian politics (in comparison with Ecuador), and the history of Afro-Brazilian activism in the country. A decentralized political apparatus with strong regional forces makes access to officials with influence much more of a possibility. Furthermore, a long tradition of Afro-Brazilian activism has given the movement more political weight than is evident in Ecuador (Da Silva 2012).

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IV: Constraints on Afro Officials’ Influence It is easy for those outside of the government to accuse activist-officials of betraying Afro

civil society by not using their positions in the state to advance the goals of their former

organizations. These critics often describe officials as being politically opportunistic, in that they

use their official positions only as a way to get ahead, and not to benefit Afro-Ecuadorians. In

some cases this is likely true, but it is far from the whole story. Afro activist-officials capacity to

represent civil society and Afro communities depends directly on the decision-making power that

they are afforded. In these final sections, I will summarize a few of the factors that can prove to

be severe constraints on Afro activist-officials autonomy and influence in government office.

Isolation An important constraint on Afro officials ability to influence political decisions is their

relative isolation or proximity to positions and/or people with power. This essentially means the

capacity, or lack thereof, to have their voices heard and opinions taken seriously in decision-

making circles. As Omi and Winant note, the isolation of minority officials within government is

usually only combatted through informal network creation, which is seldom consistent (1986:

78). The juxtaposition of Alexandra Ocles and José Chalá Cruz shows how much this isolation

can impact an officials’ influence, despite the title of their position. Alexandra Ocles, the now

Assemblywoman was once a cabinet Minister. 58 Correa appointed her to this position because

of her involvement in Afro-Ecuadorian organizations, but also because of her affiliation with

Alizana PAÍS. In this position, she consistently had her mouth to the ear of the President, and

claims to have held significant influence (Rahier and Dougé-Prosper 2012).

José Chalá Cruz, however, does not enjoy the same proximity to the executive. This is

because CODAE is supposed to be an intermediary institution, and therefore not afforded cabinet

58 She was the Minister of Communities, Social Movements & Citizen Participation, but left and in 2013 was elected as a member of the National Assembly.

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status, but it also may be due to the fact that CODAE represents Ecuador’s corporatist past, at

least in the eyes of the Correa administration. Such institutional isolation makes enacting

influential programs a nearly impossible job. However, in the cases of Chalá Cruz and Ocles,

neither of their work in government has been viewed as being particularly helpful

The difference in influence extends to non-senior positions in bureaucracy as well. Orfa

Reinoso says that the presence of many Afros and Indigenous people in her Ministry have made

her time their quite enjoyable. Furthermore, she claims that her position has been one of relative

independence and influence. Contrastingly, Sonia Viveros recounts how isolated she felt as an

Afro-Ecuadorian in the Ministry of Culture:

I was in the ministry and involved in a project that I found very difficult to work on because the people didn’t understand discrimination and racism. Still, people don’t understand affirmative action, which is reparation. They don’t want to understand, and so leading those projects is very difficult because in this leadership you are not a minister or a president there. So if you aren’t able to change the mentality of those in the highest positions, you cannot achieve a greater voice.

Evidently, the isolation she felt was not merely because she was the only Afro-

Ecuadorian working on her anti-discrimination project, but because the mindsets of her

coworkers were far removed from her own. Compounding the problem was the fact that she had

no one in a higher leadership position to support her. Besides general incompetency, Viveros

also notes that she was discriminated against while working on a project aimed at creating anti-

discrimination programs, and felt her only options were to “accept it or leave”. In a hostile

working environment such as this, there is little wonder as to why she felt the government was

not the right place for her to dedicate her energies toward fighting for racial equality.

Though Viveros’ experience does not speak to that of all Afro activist-officials in

bureaucratic institutions, it is certainly part of a pattern. Nivo Delgado has little sympathy for

officials who he feels have betrayed Afro civil society, but he admits that even those who remain

faithful to their activism often have a difficult time when they enter state institutions because of

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the isolation that Viveros describes. One activist-official can have an impact, but without

considerable influence or support from superiors, that lone official’s voice will only carry so far.

Although many Afro activists have been appointed to positions throughout Correa’s government,

they have usually been offered short contracts, and have found themselves spread out through

many agencies, ministries, and institutions (de la Torre and Antón Sánchez 2012). This means

that many have likely encountered similar opposition and bureaucratic inertia when attempting to

enact programs and policies advancing racial equality. This seems to be especially true when the

ministry is not specifically dedicated to issues related to social movements and race/ethnicity.

Education Another important reason the more Afro-Ecuadorians haven’t risen to positions of real

decision-making is the previously mentioned wide educational gap in advanced degrees, which

has important political implications. In Ecuador, a small percentage of the population holds

advanced degrees, and very few of those are Afro-Ecuadorians. This means that the pool of

Afro-Ecuadorians who would qualify for high-level bureaucratic positions is quite small. This is

because the technocratic-minded Correa administration places high value on post-baccalaureate

education – Rafael Correa himself received a PhD in economics at the University of Illinois at

Champaign in the United States. Thus, in order for officials to climb the profession ladder in

government bureaucracy, it is crucial to hold an advanced degree. Without such a title, the

ceiling is quite low for individuals looking to obtain real decision-making power. This is a

ceiling that many, especially Afro-Ecuadorians who have entered government from civil society,

have been unable to break through. Both Orfa Reinoso and Sonia Viveros listed this inaccessible

mobility as reasons for their leaving their respective ministries after their contracts expired.59

59 Reinoso has moved onto another contract with a different ministry but hopes to one day continue her education. In Viveros’ case, she has a degree in computer science, but her superiors and peers in the Ministry of Culture not so

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In essence, the road to being in a position of power in the government is a long one,

especially for those who spent much of their early careers in social organizations and not in

universities accumulating degrees. Therefore, though Reinoso is right that being part of the

organizational process rewarded her with unmatchable “experiences and personal formation”, as

well as organizational and political skills, it does not grant degrees and as such it isn’t sufficient

qualification for promotion to a position of influence within state institutions. For this reason,

CODAE’s advanced degree program, and any broader programs that it may lead to, could prove

crucial to increasing the number of Afro-Ecuadorians ascending to high government office.

Potential Clientelism A final constraint on the influence and autonomy of these activist-officials is the potential

for clientelistic relationships to develop between them and more powerful government officials,

such as party leaders or executive cabinet members. This is a worry for two reasons: the

relatively limited labor options for many Afro-Ecuadorians, and the pressure on Correa’s

administration to make government offices more inclusive by increasing minority representation

within them. As de la Torre (2002) describes, clientelism in Ecuador emerges most easily when

vulnerable groups are given a position in exchange for loyalty to a more powerful party or person.

Thus, they have little autonomy and are beholden to their ‘patron’,60 rather than the group or

community they are supposed to represent. Such clientelstic appointments create what José

Chalá Cruz terms ‘symbolic blacks’, who only serve to help to validate the government’s claims

of Afro representation. If such a relationship does exist, then activists are right to be wary of

trading civil society activism for a government position, even if the latter does offer more

proximity to the executive and policy development. subtly hinted to her that it would be highly unusual for someone with that degree to rise to a position much higher than the one she had. She is currently pursuing a Master’s degree in social sciences. 60 This could be a more senior or powerful political figure, as well as a political party. For a more in-depth discussion of patronage and politics, see Hilgers (2012). For an Ecuador specific perspective, see de la Torre (2002).

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V: Conclusions The trajectories examined and the analysis put forth in this chapter shed some light on the

complicated situation that has arisen for Afro-Ecuadorian activist-officials. Many of these

officials have moved with some fluidity between civil society and the state, and therefore have

stakes in both sectors. This situation has serious implications for Afro-Ecuadorian civil society in

the present and for the future of Afro mobilization in the country. Undoubtedly, the Correa

administration has made including these Afro activists in state institutions a priority, whereas its

predecessor governments did not (de la Torre and Antón Sánchez 2012). However, the extent to

which this representation is truly inclusive and participative is subject to debate. The latter is

crucial, as it determines how viable an option moving to government is for activists who want to

continue to enact change in their country. Furthermore, the extent to which Afro activist-officials

have legitimate decision-making power may also determine the leverage that civil society is able

to exercise when negotiating with and making demands to the state.

This chapter has endeavored to show that some Afro officials find it difficult to have their

voices heard while occupying bureaucratic spaces. Alexandra Ocles, possibly the exception to

this rule, has cited few barriers to the efficacy of her decision-making power while she was a

Minister. However, her association with Correa’s Alianza País government helped her to achieve

a cabinet-level position and the influence that comes with it. Others who are less politically

aligned to Correa, like José Chalá Cruz, have found themselves somewhat isolated from the rest

of the government, and given little say in actual policy decisions. This diminishes officials’ and

their institutions’ capacity to enact substantive change from the government office, and also

weakens Afro communities’ ability to air their grievances through such intermediary institutions.

Such a situation also does not bode well for those activists hoping to affect change from within.

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Most government officials will claim that Afro civil society has the mandate to protest

and make demands to the state. This does make sense, as activist-officials, thankful for their

steady employment and (sometimes) prestigious positions, are unlikely to stir up trouble from

within their office. However, these are the same officials that describe civil society as

fragmented, disperse, and without leadership. From this perspective, Afro civil society seems

relatively incapable of affecting substantive change from within the government, just as from

outside of it. This relatively limited capacity for Afro civil society to pressure the government

and the organizational disconnect between it and Afro officials is detrimental to both parties as it

further limits Afro influence inside and outside of government. The precarious circumstances

that many Afro-Ecuadorian activist-officials find themselves in may point to why there has not

been better coordination between them and activists. Limits on Afro officials influence seems to

not only create frustration for them, but also create tension in the relationship between current

activists and officials. Better relationships between these two groups might have the effect of

enhancing political strength for Afro organizations and Afro officials. Unfortunately, due to

numerous circumstances, such a mutually beneficial alliance remains elusive.

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VI: CONCLUSION Prospects and Possibilities for Afro-Ecuadorian Civil Society

Throughout this thesis, I have examined the activism of Afro-Ecuadorian civil society and its

interactions with the state through the lens of Tarrow and Tilly’s (2006) ideas on contentious

politics. I have argued that the political opportunity structure that Rafael Correa’s government

has created permits activists to practice what I call cooperative contention in order to engage the

opportunities that the Constitution opened up and work with the constraints of the political

system. This opportunity structure has also given many activists the ability to enter government

bureaucracy and attempt to affect change through those means. The efficacy, motivations, and

consequences behind the results of these opportunities were analyzed in Chapters IV and V.

There, I argued that the Correa government has altered the political opportunity structure

facing social movements in the country, and particularly race-based movements. The results of

this transformation are more expansive and obvious opportunities within the state, but narrowed

spaces for making demands in a way that does not conform to the state’s political frameworks. In

other words, despite increased opportunities, the government under Correa continues to

reproduce dynamics of state paternalism that de la Torre (2002) notes were a hallmark of the

neoliberal state. Due to this, Afro-Ecuadorian civil society has found itself less autonomous and

more vulnerable to the state’s desires. Thus, activists have chosen strategies, and Afro officials

have occupied positions, that have forced them to adopt perspectives that favor incremental

changes within the frameworks of the Correa government. Because of the focus on participation

and equality in the 2008 Constitution, and the centralized power of Correa’s administration, Afro

activists see this as the most promising and potentially effective method of pursuing racial justice

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and equality in Ecuador. Unfortunately, the reformed racial state that is the Correa administration

continue to perpetuate racial hierarchies and political dynamics that favor the unquestioned

supremacy of state power and the continued control of dominant racial groups.

These arguments are important for a further study of race and race-based movements in

the Americas, but they also contribute to a greater debate about the possibilities and limits of

state reformation and the expansion of democracy. As Winant claims, race and racism

demonstrate the limitations of democracy (2004: 111). This somewhat vague statement is taken

to mean that issues of race better highlight the failures of western-style democracy to empower

citizens and lead a more equitable society. In this thesis, I have scrutinized the limits of

Ecuador’s reformed racial state under Correa, which purports to be eliminating discrimination.

Unfortunately, the paternalism and perpetuation of unequal racial dynamics that are evident

within state institutions and in its dealings with civil society work against that goal of fighting

racism and discrimination. This is not to say that other forms of governance would be better

suited at eliminating such troubling dynamics, rather I simply aim to point out the constraints

that exist even in democratic and ostensibly inclusive regimes. In closing this argument, it is

useful to take one final look at the opportunities and constraints that Afro-Ecuadorians face, and

will continue to face, under the Correa administration’s governance.

Afro-Ecuadorians and Rafael Correa: Opportunities and Constraints Many scholars have argued that governments practicing a neoliberal form of

multiculturalism often adopt a practice of appointing representatives from social movements to

symbolic government positions in order to quite their protest and subdue organizations (Park and

Richards 2007, Cannon and Kirby 2012). As part of Correa’s Citizen’s Revolution, his

government has actively criticized this practice of neoliberal multiculturalism through hollow

appointments, and his administration has repeatedly expressed its desire to create inclusive and

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participative spaces within the government. However, many have accused his administration of

practicing a similar form of symbolic multiculturalism that he often derides, and thinly veiling it

with false rhetoric (Becker 2012). As is usual, the truth is probably somewhere in between.

The government has surely not done all it can to guarantee political participation and

social inclusion throughout the nation. However, especially considering the Afro-Ecuadorian

movement, progress has been made, and the government has not responded to Afro activism with

hostile action against Afro organizations. This is partially because Afro-Ecuadorian civil society

has not publicly opposed Correa’s regime, unlike other movements. Moreover, leaders in Afro

civil society have positioned their struggle as one for political participation, social inclusion, and

improving Ecuadorian society by eliminating racism, discrimination, and inequality. By doing

this, they have nominally aligned themselves with the ideals of the Citizen’s Revolution. This

allows activists and organizations to engage in forms of cooperative contention with government

ministries, in order to pressure them to act on the somewhat lofty rhetoric present in the

Constitution. However, this cooperative contention currently takes place on an ad hoc basis, and

without any defined channels through which to funnel civil society’s demands. Afro activists,

including the cohort that I spent time with, have gained access to channels of communication and

cooperation with government officials largely because of personal relationships and continuous

effort, which means that such channels could break down at any point and for a number of

reasons. Official structures or institutions bridging the gap between government and civil society

are needed for opportunities for advancement to be readily open and available.

The Consejos Nacionales para la Igualdad represent the most promising such

opportunity, partially because they are novel and unsullied by cynicism, and partially because the

government has billed them as a key and previously missing link to its goal of true citizen

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participation. What the future may hold in terms of the Consejos will depend on many factors,

among them: the Consejos proximity and influence on the executive, the government’s desire to

implement the demands of civil society and the capacity for Afros and Indigenous peoples to

work together on mutually beneficial proposals. Thus, it remains to be seen whether these

Consejos will represent a symbolic façade or a legitimate opportunity. No matter the form they

take, Afro-Ecuadorian activists and organizations must better exploit the political opportunities

that Correa’s administration presents.

Connecting Civil Society And State Even if the Consjeos do succeed and become a more effective interlocutor between the

state and civil society, they will not solve all the issues of political representation and

participation. The Consejos will still be run by the government, and as government institutions,

their capacity to critique and push state institutions will likely be limited. Therefore, Afro civil

society should not need to be completely dependent on them as mechanisms of voicing their

opinions and dissent. As Chapter IV showed, Afro activists have adapted to constraints that have

come with Correa’s form of governance by engaging in cooperative contention with government

ministries, most notably in the field of education. By pushing government administrators, but

also working within their established frameworks, activists have made important gains. These

achievements, such as those won at the Universidad Central by the cohort of activists (see

Chapter IV), are crucial but represent a slow and incremental process of change. Furthermore,

there is increasing evidence that Correa’s government is not as amenable and dedicated to

participation as it has led on (Becker 2012, de la Torre 2012, Antón Sánchez 2013b). This

process of cooperative contention depends largely on the government’s willingness to work with

Afro activists. If external or internal forces disrupt this willingness, then even incremental

change may prove too difficult to accomplish.

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For this reason, it is important that activists have other avenues through which to pursue

change. The most apparent and natural of these would seem to be a leveraging of the positions

that former activists have as officials in Correa’s government. However, it is surprising that few

professional connections exist between Afro activists and officials. Even where personal

connections do exist, little substantive policy change follows. This is largely a product of the

political environment of centralization and bureaucratization that have come to define Correa’s

administration. If Afro officials do not occupy decision-making positions or are isolated from

those who hold influence, then such relationships with activists are unlikely to be beneficial.

Nonetheless, bridging the divide between civil society to the state should not be

dependent on personal relationships, which can be unreliable and often change quickly. Most

officials, activists, and scholars that I spoke to agreed that Ecuador generally needs better official

interlocutors between the state and civil society. This issue is especially important for Afro civil

society because of its current lack of outside resources, such as significant funds or international

support. Although a significant part of such responsibility depends on activists and social

organizations, – who must be capable of presenting themselves to the state as a united front –

Alexandra Ocles, Zobeida Gudiño, and José Chalá Cruz – all of whom are prominent Afro-

Ecuadorian officials – agree that the government has a responsibility and an obligation to

strengthen and engage in dialogue with civil society. This may seem counterintuitive as these

sectors are usually cast as opponents; however, the Ecuadorian Constitution dictates a

relationship defined by collaboration between the two. Evidently, the state of racial equality has

not mirrored the idealism of this rhetoric, but as the key institutions of the Citizen’s Revolution

continue to take shape, ideally this disparity will shift towards a convergence of ideals and reality.

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Assessing Afro Mobilization: Present and Future All interviewees with some connection to civil society stressed that incorporating youth

voices into Afro civil society is one of the most pressing issues currently facing Afro-Ecuadorian

activists. However this is much easier said than done. Most of the current and former activists

leading organizations and institutions came of age during turbulent years of rapid social change

in Ecuador. They have seen the upfront racism and discrimination drastically reduced, and can in

many ways pat themselves on the back for having helped provide the next generation with a

more accepting and inclusive society. Just as importantly, Afro-Ecuadorians now have a

government that, at least nominally, recognizes and values the role that civil activism plays in

society. Thus, the battles that were fought in the 80s and 90s – and even those fought in the early

to mid 2000s – are not the same ones that must be fought now. Consequently, many of these

activists and former activists argue that their golden-era has past, that they can no longer be

expected to put in the hours and miles that they did in their younger days. To be certain, there are

those activists like Nivo Estuardo Delgado and Alodia Borja who maintain a consistent activism

in spite of the exhaustion and uncertainty, but this many be the exception.

As Oscar Chalá, a former minister himself, told me, it is time for a new generation of

Afro-Ecuadorian activists to take hold of the organizational process and make it their own. The

post-2008 Ecuador is not the Ecuador of the 80s in which many of the current Afro leaders got

their start. Essentially he and many others believe that a new era necessitates new perspectives

on issues of race, discrimination, and inequality in Ecuador. Naturally, it must be youths who

apply this new perspective toward finding proactive solutions to their generation’s unique issues

– as their minds are less influenced by bygone times. On one hand, this generational gap is an

issue in all democratic politics – the older, and purportedly wiser govern the younger generations,

which creates a natural rift and propels youth to mobilize for the society that they desire. On the

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other hand, herein lies one of the most salient issues for Afro-Ecuadorian civil society: a lack of

sustainability and young voices. As discussed in Chapter I, part of this issue lies in the success of

past activism in reducing widespread discrimination. Young Afro-Ecuadorians do not live in a

society that blatantly rejects their presence, and they do not deal with the daily reminders of

hostile racism. Thus, they are not as likely than their parents to see eliminating racial inequality

as a cause worthy of a life’s dedication. Moreover, since the youth experience less overt racism,

they are less likely to pick up on subtle acts of discrimination that are more abundant.

Sonia Viveros’ Fundación Azúcar seems to be working towards this goal by educating

and politicizing Afro youth. Viveros and other female Afro leaders also hosted a weekend

conference in Ibarra for young and older Afro-Ecuadorian women involved in social

organizations throughout the country to meet, exchange ideas and opinions, build networks, and

find common ground. These initiatives are designed to bridge the gap between age groups and

incorporate intergenerational knowledge and perspectives into Afro proposals, and to encourage

young Afro-Ecuadorians with spirits of activism to fill the holes in these social organizations and

form a new generation of civil society leadership. This process of youth engagement certainly

represents a significant challenge for Afro organizations, but if activists continue to take action

to attack it, then one of the largest obstacles in sustaining contention will be partially ameliorated.

This thesis has often taken a critical stance on the prospects of Afro-Ecuadorian civil

society. To a certain extent, an often-tumultuous political climate and internal struggles warrant

such a stance. Nonetheless, the future for Afro activism in Ecuador has promise. The first source

of optimism is that Afro civil society has learned from the mistakes of the past that caused it to

be unprepared by the political and social transformations brought on by Correa’s rapid ascension.

Alodia Borja specifically lists her primary focus as consolidating national networks is aimed at

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avoiding debilitation similar to that experienced in the past. The politicization and training of

Fundación Azúcar, as well as advanced degree scholarships offered at FLACSO through

CODAE, also contribute to a more sustainable Afro movement and a stronger civil society.

These actions are the consequences of the adoption of a more long-term and careful perspective

on Afro-Ecuadorian development and the struggle for racial justice. This long-term perspective

sees a need for Afro civil society to strengthen itself by enhancing its unity and expanding its

base, so that it can pressure the centralized Correa government to fulfill its progressive rhetoric.

The second source of this optimism is what I term a convergence of Afro civil society in

recent years. As mentioned in Chapter III, Afro-Ecuadorian civil society became more disperse

and disjointed after the achievements of the 2008 Constitution. As many of the promises of this

Constitution remain unfulfilled and lacking mechanisms to fulfill its guarantees, Afro activists

have been able to join together and present themselves in a united front – like the cohort seen in

Chapter IV. Both Alodia Borja and Sonia Viveros used the cohort, of which they are a part, as an

example of the ‘maturation’ of Afro activists and civil society. Even a couple years ago, they say,

all the members of their cohort would have been preoccupied with their specific ‘line’ or topic of

activism, but they have been able to come together and present a more or less united face to the

government on the topic of education. If this is indicative of a trend, then the best days of Afro-

Ecuadorian mobilization under Correa likely lie in the future.

Limits of the Racial State One important issue that this thesis has touched upon is the effectiveness, or lack thereof,

of seeking racial justice and equality through state channels. It is easy to assume that this is the

only way of seeking change, as it is the most practiced. The US Civil Rights Movement laid out

a formula of social protest, collaboration with, and pressure on national government, giving way

to legal rights and guarantees for Afro-descendant peoples. Such a model has been emulated

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throughout the Hemisphere, to varying degrees of success. However, the application of laws and

fulfillment of guarantees have largely been left up to the discretion of the governments in power,

which in a democracy can change quickly and often. As Omi and Winant (1986) argue, the racial

state has the lead role in dictating dominant racial ideologies, and establishing the status quo.

Therefore, reform through state means will only go as far as the state desires. Thus, state

dominance and paradigms are rarely challenged. Moreover, even in the United States, which

many see as the gold standard of racial reform, recent events– such as high profile killings by

police and legal rollbacks on Civil Rights era legislation – call into question how extensively

even well-meaning institutional changes have trickled down throughout society.

Thus, it seems probable that true racial equality will remain elusive without substantive

changes to institutions and forms of governance. As José Chalá Cruz expressed to me, and

describes in his book Afroecuatorianos (2013), racial equality necessitates an ‘epistemological

rupture’ from the colonial and racist structures that dominated the creation of the modern nation-

state in the Americas. This is an idea closely related to the ideals of the Bolivian model, which

claims to be working toward a decolonized and plurinational state. Even in Ecuador, Correa has

claimed to be eliminating the vestiges of colonialism that have marred the institutions of prior

governments. Unfortunately, these governments seem to better suited to reproduce historical

traditions of racialized state power than to eliminate them. Whether a decolonized and

epistemologically distinct form of governance can exist and be instituted anywhere remains to be

seen. Further research into this subject may illuminate how such a rupture would occur. For now,

Afro-Ecuadorians – and Afro-descendants throughout the Americas – must continue to work

with political opportunities and constraints that their government present, adapt to changes that

will inevitably arise, and contest the inertia of the racial state.

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APPENDIX A Interviewees

ALODIA BORJA is the President of the CNA, and political activist. CATHERINE CHALÁ, is a member of Despierta Negra and FOGNEP. She is currently employed at

the Defensoría del Pueblo, and has previously worked with the Correa government. JOSÉ CHALÁ CRUZ serves as the Secretary-General of CODAE. He is also a published

anthropologist. OSCAR CHALÁ CRUZ describes himself as an Afro-Ecuadorian professional and anthropologist.

He has previously served as an official in the Ministry of Culture. OLIVIA CORTEZ is a Professor of Law at the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Ecuador en Quito.

She has worked for CODAE in the past. NIVO ESTUARDO DELGADO works with the CNA, and is also an independent activist. FERNANDO GARCÍA is a Professor of Anthropology and researcher at FLACSO-Ecuador. ALEXANDRA OCLES is an Assemblywoman from Quito. She was previously involved in various

Afro-Ecuadorian and women’s groups, and served as the Minister of Communities, Social Movements and Citizenship Participation.

JUAN CARLOS OCLES is a member of FOGNEP, and is currently employed at the Defensoria del

Pueblo. ZOBEIDA GUDIÑO is an Assemblywoman from the province of Zamora-Chinchipe, and President

of the Commission for Collective and Community Rights, and Intercultural Affairs. She is serving her second consecutive term.

NIEVES MENDEZ works at the CCAE, and currently runs two radio shows dealing with topics

relating to the Afro-Ecuadorian community on Ecuador’s national public radio station. ORFA REINOSO currently serves as an Assistant Director at the Sub-Secretariat of Peoples and Nationalities, within the National Secretariat of Policy Management. BLANCA TADEO is currently the Director of Organizational Development of CODAE. She is also

a member of FECONIC. SONIA VIVEROS is the President of Fundación AZÚCAR. She was formerly employed by the

Ministry of Culture.

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APPENDIX B

Organizations and Abbreviations AZÚCAR – Fundación de Desarrollo Social Afroecuatoriano [Foundation for Afro-Ecuadorian

Social Development] CCAE – Centro Cultural Afroecuatoriano [Afro-Ecuadorian Cultural Center] CNA – Conferencia Nacional Afroecuatoriana [Afro-Ecuadorian National Conference] FECONIC – Federación de Comunidades y Organizaciones Negros de Imbabura y Carchí

[Federation of Black Communities and Organizaciones of Imbabura and Carchí] FOGNEP – Federación de Organizaciones y Grupos Negros de Pinchincha [Federation of Black

Organizations and Groups of Pichincha]

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APPENDIX C Original Spanish Quotations from Interviews

ch. 3, pg. 62 – Zobeida Gudiño

Estos Consejos para la Igualdad son instancias y institucionales que por primera vez en el país van a permitir coordinar la política pública desde el estado, desde el ejecutivo perdón, con las demás funciones del estado para que transversalicemos la política con los sectores sociales excluidos o minoritarios….Esto va a permitir por primera vez construir agendas para la igualdad que no son más que una cosa un instrumento recogido de las bases de la sociedad civil, para trabajarlo con el ejecutivo y las diferentes instancias del estado, de tal manera que hay una política publica diferenciada y exclusiva para estos sectores para llegar a tener la igualdad real en este país.

ch. 4, pg. 69 – Nivo Estuardo Delgado Sí hacemos cosas, pequeñas pero hacemos cosas. Que a la larga esas pequeñas cosas van a resultarse en un gran beneficio para la comunidad afro

ch. 4, pg. 72 – Nivo Estuardo Delgado Es que no tenemos los recursos económicos, esos recursos económicos no nos permiten reunir ni juntar, ni convocar congresos, ni hacer proyectos para tener una buena relación con organizaciones mulitlaterales.

ch.4, pg. 73 – Nivo Estuardo Delgado Nadie te da demasiado dinero. Entonces te da un dinero al máximo de un medio millón de dólares que te sirven para poder hacer trabajos puntuales de arte, de trabajo cultural, espacios agrícolas Al menos, tenemos cosas pequeñas para hacer, pero pequeñas cosas que a larga se van a convertir en una necesidad del pueblo y allí es donde haciendo esas pequeñas cosas podemos demonstrar que podemos hacer cosas más grandes. Entonces, allí es donde yo les digo a los hermanos negros que están en EEUU, más que nadie, ¡ayúdanos! Porque necesitamos recursos económicos acá.

ch. 4, pg. 74 – Alodia Borja Yo tengo mi agenda y mi agenda propia se llama pueblo afroecuatoriano reconstrucción de la CNA, por ejemplo jalar a algunos lideres y lideresas en espacio profesional, en espacio de imagen, en espacio de trabajo. Eso yo sí lo hago, y lo voy a hacer….Por cada provincia meto dos tres, pero me está significando de meter dos tres en cada provincia. Que yo, de miles tantos funcionarios lo…ingresar, meto 150, meto 200, eso ya pesan, pues.

ch. 4, pg. 76 – Nieves Mendez Estamos en esa crisis organizativa terrible, es así. Porque– qué te digo? Tampoco allí ese es otra parte que es la juventud afro, los jóvenes afro que deberían de ser los que estén ahora, que son los pensadores, los que están inquietos por lo que pasa y que no podemos lograrlo todavía.

ch. 4, pg. 77 – Sonia Viveros Y el tema político no se aparte del tema cultural porque el político partidista, ese que nos lleva a las urnas, es una forma de esa política; pero la política social–ese activismo social esa demanda ese ir como reconociendo ir como visibilizando los problemas sociales y a ir buscando alternativas para el cambio–ese también es a ser política. Entonces, desde ese mensaje que se lleva a través de la misma música o a través de un coro u a través de un encuentro u intercambio es una forma de hacer política, es una forma de incidencia para llevar el mensaje a ellos que están en este espacio de toma decisiones.

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ch. 4, pg. 78 – Sonia Viveros El problema ahora que yo veo es que mientras más organizaciones se dan más aislados nos ponemos y buscamos esos proyectos inmediatistas. O sea, me refiere a que tiene en principio, tiene en fin. Y en ese camino no buscamos esa auto sustentabilidad de los mismos de tal forma que nos podamos

ch. 4, pg. 79 – Nivo Estuardo Delgado No es que quiere atacar un sistema político o un sistema administrativo del gobierno. Simplemente, aquí a los funcionarios que están en indeterminados ministerios, si el presidente tiene la voluntad de hacer, de firmar un decreto, lo mínimo que tienen que hacer los ministros o los funcionarios de este ministerio es escogerlo y ponerlo es aplicar la ley, porque es un mandato del jefe. No está pidiendo un negro de la esquina, le está pidiendo la Presidente de la república. Pero no cumplen.

ch. 4, pg. 80 – Nivo Estuardo Delgado Más bien, fue una iniciativa de amistad.

ch. 4, pg. 84 – Catherine Chalá …como hay un evento significativo de racismo u de discriminación, se activan las organizaciones a favor de eso y luchar contra la situación…Entonces, ahí sí encontramos como momentos fuertes de reunión de trabajo conjunto de esfuerzos institucionales a través de los afroecuatorianos que están en las varias instituciones.

ch. 4, pg. 85 – Alodia Borja Es un juego de ellos. Nosotros no podemos hacer el juego a la historia política. Entonces nosotros que tenemos que hacer: aprovechamos los momentos políticos y meterse la gente y logra un espacio allí para que otros sigan caminando y subiendo.

ch. 4, pg. 88 – Sonia Viveros Políticas que no tienen fuerza suficiente para visibilizar todo o eliminar totalmente las situaciones de discriminación.

ch. 4, pg. 90 – Nivo Estuardo Delgado En la reunión todos somos dirigentes de alguna organización, pero no esta la máxima expresión organizativa del pueblo afro.

ch. 5, pg. 98 – Orfa Reinoso Y fue una noche yo pensaba y pensaba y llovió durísimo. Y yo tengo una casa muy pequeñita…no tengo piso así, tengo una casa que me entregó el banco, tengo una casa una habitación que todavía no podía poner la puerta. Y tengo un techo que se llama terni. Y con el tiempo de mi casa ya está vieja empezó llover en mi botera. Entonces yo me senté, dije ‘wow, me voy a inundar’. Entonces, digo, era la oportunidad porque como no podía trabajar. Yo me sostenía porque soy…porque también aproveché de los espacios de la comisión de vida agradable y de eso hice mi medio de vida. Y como jugaba entre mi dirigencia, y sostenerme porque era madre soltera…. Justo cuando tenía mis pacientes tenía que irme una reunión…ni a los paciente ni hacían caso. De esa sentía la necesidad, cuando vi el techo y el agua, dije ‘es cierto, necesito trabajar, necesito…. Y mi maestro organizativo JC Ocles me dijo ‘está hora de pensar en ti, terminas ese ciclo que vas a hacer porque las oportunidades no se dan. Acuérdate que esta esa una oportunidad que no siempre llega. Trabaja! Acepta ese trabajo’. Y ahí empezó.

ch. 5, pg. 100 – Orfa Reinoso Pero el hecho de que estos nos coincidencias donde estés, tienes que servir. Tienes que ser útil. Porque estos útiles le daban ayuda al colectivo y tu familia, la que es la nucleada. Nosotros siempre tenemos nuestra legada de que somos la familia empleada, que somos la familia grande donde quiere que– es ‘mira, yo te trato con familiaridad porque eres un niño lindo y me encanta que la gente como usted se preocupe de cómo ha sido la historia nivel nacional, al nivel del mundo porque esta es otra realidad de tu país’. Entonces, consideramos que es pertinente que hayan estos espacios. Nos merecemos estar en estos espacios.

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ch. 5, pg. 103 – Blanca Tadeo Entonces, diría he tenido la suerte para poder estar en estas instituciones que realmente me han permitido trabajar con gusto y hacer lo que realmente me gusta hacer, contribuía, diría, para con el pueblo.

ch. 5, pg. 106 – José Chalá Cruz Organización modela de trabajar entre el estado y la sociedad.

ch. 5, pg. 15 – José Chalá Cruz Y entonces yo creo que también tenemos que tener una ruptura epistemológica necesaria y ahora con todo ese pensamiento de saber occidental positiva.

ch. 5, pg. 111 – José Chalá Cruz Porque soy parte del régimen pero estoy peleando el régimen.

ch. 5, pg. 112 – Sonia Viveros Pero el tema es que mientras estaba allí nunca dejar de ser Azúcar. Me refiero, nunca desconocí el lugar de donde nací, el lugar donde me formé socialmente.

ch. 5, pg. 117 – Sonia Viveros También estuve en el ministerio en un proyecto que me supo completamente difícil de trabajarlo porque la gente no entiende qué es discriminación, qué es racismo. Todavía la gente no entiende qué es acción afirmativa, que es una reparación, no lo quieren entender y entonces el gerencia de esos proyectos es muy difícil. Porque en la gerencia no es un ministro o el presidente, está acá y entonces si no se logra cambiar la mentalidad de los que están más arriba entonces no se puede ser mayor voz.

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APPENDIX D Interview Guides

As I conducted in-depth interviews, these Interview Guides were not scripts, but rather frameworks that I used to direct the conversations. When possible, I tried to ask the questions in the same order, to make them as parallel to one another as possible. However, often times the interviewees answered certain questions without me needing to ask them. The first guide covers general questions that I asked each interviewee. The rest were specific questions that I asked to Activists, Officials, and Academics. There is also one section of questions that I asked specifically to the two officials at CODAE. The questions appear in their original Spanish.

1. General Questions Introduction

! ¿Cómo empieza a trabajar aquí? ! ¿Usted considera a sí mismo como parte del movimiento afroecuatoriano?

The Afro-Ecuadorian Movement ! ¿Cómo interpreta la historia del movimiento afro en Ecuador? ! ¿Cuáles son las metas de este movimiento? ! ¿En su opinión, cuál es el papel que deberían desempeñar las organizaciones de base en el movimiento

afro? ¿Cómo pueden seguir instituyendo cambios sociales? ! ¿Desde su perspectiva, cuál debería ser el objetivo de los movimientos afro en Ecuador y en América

Latina? Organization or Institution

! ¿Desde su perspectiva, ¿Cuáles son las metas de esta organización? o ¿Cómo se relacionan a sus metas personales? o ¿Cómo se relacionan a la lucha afroecuatoriana en general?

! ¿Cuáles son los métodos efectivos que utilizan esta organización? ¿Cuáles son inefectivos? About CODAE

! ¿En su opinión, qué es el papel y el propósito de CODAE en la lucha afroecuatoriana? ! ¿Usted piensa que CODAE representa bien los intereses de las organizaciones y las comunidades afro? ! ¿Cómo puede mejorar su misión para desarrollar las comunidades afroecuatorianas?

Personal ! ¿Cuáles son los problemas más grandes de raza en Ecuador? ! ¿Cuáles son sus aspiraciones o metas para su futura profesional con el tema de raza y los afroecuatorianos?

Government and Recognition

! ¿Cómo ha afectado el reconocimiento constitucional de las comunidades afro? ! ¿Después de los logros del pasado de los afroecuatorianos, ¿qué más se puede hacer? ! En su opinión, ¿Cuál es el papel del estado en el movimiento afro? ! ¿Piensa que hay la capacidad para cooperación entre el estado y las organizaciones de base?

2. Activists Specific Questions ! ¿Cómo contribuye esta organización y el trabajo que ustedes hacen aquí a la lucha por los derechos

afroecuatorianos? ! ¿Cuál era la motivación suya para hacerse un activista para los derechos afro? ! ¿Usted piensa que el estado verdaderamente quiere ayudar desarrollar la gente afro?

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! ¿Quieres trabajar un día en un cargo oficial del gobierno? ! ¿Dónde se ve a sí mismo y a su cargo en el movimiento afroecuatoriano?

3. Officials Specific Questions ! ¿Desde su perspectiva, ¿Cuáles son las metas de esta oficina?

o ¿Cómo se relacionan a sus metas personales? ! ¿Cuál es la relación entre su cargo y los pueblos afroecuatorianos? ! ¿Por qué usted escogió trabajar en el gobierno en vez de desde un cargo en la sociedad civil? ! ¿Para usted, que significa el reconocimiento constitucional para los afroecuatorianos?

a. CODAE Specific Questions

! ¿Cómo (la CODAE) tratan de representar los pueblos afroecuatorianos? ! ¿Cómo CODAE puede mejorar su misión para desarrollar las comunidades afroecuatorianas?

4. Academics Specific Questions ! ¿Cómo empieza a trabajar en estos temas? ! ¿Cómo contribuye el trabajo que ustedes hacen aquí a la lucha por los derechos afroecuatorianos? ! ¿Cómo diferencia al movimiento indígena u otros movimientos sociales en Ecuador? ! ¿Cómo compara el gobierno Correa a otros anteriores, en términos de su relación con la sociedad?

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