Conflict

Conflict Resolution&

Peace Studies

An Introductory Handbook

Editor

Jayadeva Uyangoda

Center for Policy Research and Analysis (CEPRA)University of Colombo

in association with

Eriedrich Ebert StiftungColombo office

December 2000

FES PUBLICATION 43

CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PEACE STUDIESAN INTRODUCTORY HANDBOOK

Editor : Jayadeva Uyangoda

Cover Design : Dietmar Kneitschel

Copyright © FES, 2000

The views and ideas expressed in this publication are those of the authorsand do not necessarily reflect those of FES.

ISBN 95-7-032-X

Publisher: F 4, Adams Avenue, Colombo 4

E Sri Lanka

STIFRJNG

Table of Contents

Contributors

Foreword

1. Introduction

2. Defining Negotiation

3. Negotiation in Conflicts

4. Mediation and Conflict Resolution

5. Peace Studies

6. Understanding the Ethnic Conflictand Peace Efforts in Sri Lanka:A Conflict Resolution Perspective

7. Negotiations for ConflictResolution: Lessons from Sri Lanka’sPast Experiences

8. Learning from Bangladesh’s PracticalApproach

9 . Lessons from Northern IrelandPeace Agreements

10. The Philippines: Key to Success inPeace Making

11. Constitution-Making in a PluralSociety: Conflict PreventionResolution

12. The South African Constitution of1996: Lessons for Sri Lanka

Appendix

A I. Bibliogruphy,A 2. Internet addresses

Dietmar Kneitschel

Jayadeva Uyangoda

Jayadeva UyangodaN. Selvakkumaran

Jayadeva Uyangoda

Jayadeva Uyangoda

Laksiri Fernando

S. I. Keethaponcalan

Jayadeva Uyangoda

Jehan Perera

Jehan Perera

Jehan Perera

N. Selmkkumran

Rohan Edrisinha

V

vi - viii

1

3

22

33

44

78

96

119

132

140

147

157

174184

Contributors

Rohan Edrisinha is a Lecturer at the Faculty of Law, University ofColombo and founder Co-Director, Center for Policy Research andAnalysis.

Laksiri Fernando is a Senior Lecturer in Political Science at the Dept.of History and Political Science, University of Colombo.

S. I. Keethaponcalan is a Lecturer at the Dept. of History and PoliticalScience, University of Colombo. He is presently a doctoral student inPeace Studies at Noa South Eastern University, Florida, USA.

Jehan Perera is the Media Director of the National Peace Council,Colombo and a member of the Presidential Task Force on Ethnic Affairsand National Integration.

N. Selvakkumaran is the Dean of the Faculty of Law, University ofColombo and until recently Co-Director, Center for Policy Researchand Analysis.

Jayadeva Uyangoda is a Senior Lecturer at the Dept. of PoliticalScience, University of Colombo and founder Co-Director, Center forPolicy Research and Analysis.

FOREWORD

Conflicts exist at all levels of society. They reflect differences ininterests, values, aims, needs and perceptions.

Therefore, conflicts are unavoidable in a pluralistic democratic society,and they can even be considered necessary elements of social changeand progress. So conflicts as such are not “bad”, but are legitimateexpressions of differing points of view and contending positions.

What really matters is how people deal with conflicts:

they can violently confront each other in a zero-sum contest,expressing maximast goals and intransigent demands, withoutthe readiness to compromise

or they can act in a flexible manner, by dialogue, negotiationand compromise, thus converting the win-lose -option of theviolent alternative of conflict resolution into a mutuallybeneficial win-win- perspective.

So conflicts can be fought out in a destructive manner - by the useof force, with arms and violence, or they can be handled constructivelyin a peaceful way, by non-violent procedures and the use of “softpower”

When conflicts have degenerated into deadly confrontation andeven armed struggle, the great challenge is to transform them againinto non-violent disputes by rebuilding broken relationships betweenthe antagonists and promoting dialogue and willingness for negotiatedsolutions between the conflicting parties.

vi.

Such solutions must be more than mere short- term orientedstopgap measures. To be sustainable, to be effective in the long-term,they have to be solidly based on the principles and practice of genuinedemocracy, fairness, equality, dignity and justice.

By its very nature, a democratic system of government, based onnorms of tolerance, co-operation and consensus, and with meaningfulinstitutions of power sharing and safeguards for minority rights, is thebest guarantee for the establishment of fair and harmonious socialstructures, and thus peace.

The present publication offers an introduction to the basic conceptsof peace, war and violence and of conflict management, -resolutionand -transformation. It further describes methods and procedures forregulating conflicts peacefully, particularly through negotiation andmediation.

In addition, the book analyzes the protracted ethno-politicalconflict in Sri Lanka and portrays the key features of the constitutionalreforms that could establish a basis for a just and sustainable politicalsolution of this conflict.

The book further documents how conflicts are managed in othercountries and which lessons could be drawn ‘from these foreignexperiences for constructive conflict transformation and resolution inSri Lanka.

Though the authors of the book are eminent social and politicalscientists, the book is not an indigestible academic textbook, and it isnot addressed towards scholars only.

It is addressed particularly towards practitioners, with or withoutan academic background, who want to practically contribute to theprocess of a peaceful regulation of the ethno- political conflict by activeparticipation in civil society organizations and initiatives that form thepeace constituency of Sri Lanka.

a s d

To make this so called Track Two-Diplomacy effective, possessing“good will” to work for peace is certainly a vital and indispensablepre-requisite, but it might not be sufficient of its own.

With only an emotional commitment towards peace, but withouttheoretical and practical knowledge about the different approaches,techniques and strategies for conflict resolution and peace-building,participation in peace initiatives may lack power of persuasion andefficiency.

Deeply convinced that a truly democratic and just society canonly be established and consolidated through constructive non-violentsolution of conflicts, FES hopes this publication will motivate andencourage its readers to contribute building sustainable peace.

May it help to develop a new CULTURE OF PEACE AND NON-VIOLENCE in Sri Lanka.

Dietmar KneitschelResident RepresentativeFriedrich-Ebert-Stif

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Introduction

This Handbook is prepared with the intention of introducingreaders to the basic ideas of conflict resolution and peace.

In many countries, conflict resolution and peace have now becomea branch of studies in social sciences and law. Many universities offerundergraduate and post-graduate programs of study as well as researchin this area. Similarly, in many countries, activist social groups offernon-formal learning and training programs in conflict resolution andpeace building. These are indeed responses to the growing recognitionthroughout the world that promoting cultures of non-violence and peaceis of paramount importance in achieving human progress in a universeof conflicts.

In a way, Sri Lanka, through its multiplicity of conflicts, providesvery useful insights into understanding conflicts, conflict resolution andpeace. It is perhaps a tragedy of Sri Lanka that with three decades ofviolent conflicts, a strong culture of peace has not yet come to changethe course of conflicts. It may be cynical to believe that conflicts cannotbe terminated and they have their natural life-cycles and life- spans.Creating conditions for peace is one useful way to intervene in bringingbloody and destructive conflicts to an end. A peace culture can bebest sustained through a community of peace advocates and peacepractitioners.

Although there is a vast body of experience and knowledge in thesphere of conflict resolution and peace-building, that knowledge is stillnot accessible to the Sri Lankan public. It is in order to fill this lacuna

CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PEACE STlJDIES AN INTRODUCTORY HANDBOOK

that the Center for Policy Research and Analysis (CEPRA) of Universityof Colombo began planning educational programs in this field. Thepresent handbook is a part of this pedagogical exercise.

CEPRA acknowledges with thanks the encouragement andsupport given to this initiative by the Colombo office of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. Ms. Rohini Peiris of FES and Ms. ShyamikaJayasundara of CEPRA deserve special thanks for their assistance inproducing this volume.

Jayadeva UyangodaDecember 2000.

2

2

Defining NegotiationJayadeva Uyangoda and N.Selvakkumaran

Introduction

We negotiate throughout our lives, exchanging commitments andpromises. Any time two people need to reach an agreement, they haveto negotiate if the terms are not yet clear. Negotiation is also whatbusiness is all about-arrangements for buying, selling or exchanginggoods and services. It is what human relationships are also about. Ineveryday life, the objective of a negotiation is generally not tocome out on top but to reach a balanced agreement that seemsfair to both parties. That is also an agreement the parties willstick to.

In conflict resolution processes, negotiation among parties is anaccepted practice. With experience in complex conflict negotiationexercises, the practice of negotiation has become a specialized art. Indispute resolution also, negotiations always play a key role. Forexample, in industrial disputes, labor unions and employers usually havedeveloped traditions of negotiation. Often, labor union leaders, whomay not have formal educational qualifications, are skillful negotiatorswho successfully bargain with lawyers and business leaders. As wewill learn in Chapter 3, negotiation is also an everyday skill which all ofus already possess with varying degrees of expertise. In negotiationsin armed conflicts or inter-state conflicts, many factors can affect theoutcome.

In this chapter, we will focus on the understanding of the conceptof negotiation. Let us begin by the definition of the term. (Doucest, 1996)

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CONFLICT RESOLlJTlON AND PEACE STUDIES AN INTRODlJCTORY HANDBOOK

Negotiation can be defined by contrasting it with arbitration. Inindustrial disputes, arbitration is a widespread practice in Sri Lanka.

Negotiations are talks between conflicting parties who discussideas, information and options in order to reach a mutuallyacceptable agreement. Initially at least, negotiations may not be face-to-face. The important point here is that parties directly communicate,or talk, to each other, attempting to work out an outcome.

Arbitration is when conflicting parties present their cases to athird party, who makes a judgement of the cases, which includes adecision on the rights and wrongs of the cases presented and how theconflict should be settled. Arbitration may be ‘binding’ (the partiesagree in advance to accept the third party’s judgement) or ‘non-binding’(where they agree only to consider it, sometimes as an aid tonegotiation). The third party is a person or organization whose authoritythe conflicting parties recognize. For example, the Commissioner ofLabor is the arbitrator in disputes between trade unions and employers.This arbitrating role of the third party is different from third-partyfacilitation, as explained later.

The difference between negotiation and arbitration may beillustrated as follows:

Arbitrator Facilitator

A AParty A Party B Party A - Party B

Arbitration Negotiation

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CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PEACE STlJDlES AN INTRODlJCTORY HANDBOOK

As the above illustration indicates, the essential difference is thatin arbitration the parties main or only communication is with the third-party arbitrator, on whose authority they rely. In contrast, negotiationinvolves the conjlict-parties discussing matters betweenthemselves, in a bi-polar relationship. Even if facilitators are present,communications are essentially between the conflict-parties.

Negotiation Types

A typology of negotiations can be presented according to strategicobjectives of the exercise of negotiation. They are:

l Problem Solving Negotiation: This involves efforts to find analternative that is acceptable to both sides. Here, negotiation has .the character of being a joint enterprise. In joint problem solving,the parties exchange accurate information about their underlyinginterests, and work jointly to identify possible alternatives. This isan excellent way to find mutually acceptable solutions, but notalways practical because one party may not be ready for it whenthe other party is.

l Contending: Negotiations of this type involve an effort to forceone party’s will on the other party. In this, one party may try topersuade the other to accept alternatives that favor one’s owninterests. This is also called ‘positional bargaining.’ Efforts are madeto dominate the other party by means of pressure tactics. In thistype, negotiation can be a rigid and inflexible exercise, partiesunwilling to make concessions.

l Yielding: This involves the reduction in one’s basic aspirations orgoals. Yielding is a straightforward operation. Therefore, anegotiator who chooses this strategy is not faced with inflexible orrigid situations. Yielding is good and advantageous to endnegotiations quickly, particularly when issues involved are not very

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CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PEACE STUDIES AN INTRODUCTORY HANDBOOK

important. Lighter yielding often makes problem solving moreeffective. However, there is a danger in yielding too far. This pointis obvious when one party yields and the other does not. Yieldingcan also be seen as a weakness. Therefore, the ideal is for partiesto yield to a point that is compatible with the potential for jointproblem solving.

l Inaction: In this type, a party might do as little as possible innegotiations. Parties sometimes opt for this strategy deliberately.Inaction wastes time and even sometimes temporarily suspendsthe negotiation. This, of course, tends to delay agreement and caneven contribute to breakdown in the negotiation if it leads the otherparty to become discouraged and break off.

l Withdrawal: This involves withdrawing from the negotiationexercise.

Negotiations can generally be long processes. They may go onfor a very long time, stopping and starting, whereas arbitration is usuallya time-limited process. There can also be a link between negotiationand arbitration in the sense that arbitration can enter into a long-drawnnegotiation exercise. Within negotiations, there may be a specific periodof arbitration, where parties pause in their negotiating with each otherin order to call in a third party to arbitrate. In such cases, non-bindingarbitration can usefully add an outside perspective to negotiatingprocesses. Such arbitration is useful when negotiations reach adeadlock. Where parties decide that negotiations have failed, turningto binding arbitration is often a ‘last-hope’ attempt to resolve the conflict.

FACTORS FAVORING NEGOTIATION

Certain things increase the chances of negotiations being successful.In other words, negotiations succeed when there are favorableconditions. It is important to ask whether these conditions are present

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or not present in conflict resolution attempts. Similarly, if the favorableconditions are not present, the question is how can they be broughtabout in the stages and processes of negotiation?

Experience shows that the chances of success in negotiation areincreased when the following favorable conditions are present:

Conflicting parties realize they are unlikely to get what theywant through unilateral action.

Early in conflicts, parties tend to believe they can get what theywant through force or the threat of it. This belief ignores the competinginterests and needs of the other parties.

The conflict is ‘ripe’ for negotiation.

Appropriate timing of negotiation processes is crucial. The authorI. William Zartman used the term ‘ripe’ to describe appropriate timing(Zartman, 1989). A conflict is ripe for negotiation when the partiesrealize that the alternatives to a negotiated agreement involveunacceptable costs (economically, politically, loss of life etc). But if theparties are unable or unwilling to foresee the costs of conflict oroptimistic that these will fall on other parties rather than on themselves,there will be little or no motivation necessary for successful negotiation.Preparatory conciliation processes can help the parties become morerealistic about the negotiation outcome. Often, negotiations are onlyconsidered when the conflict has escalated to the point where costsare already high. Preparation for negotiations may include third partieshelping the conflicting parties to foresee the likely costs of continuingconflict

Parties opt to seize on change.

Negotiations are also possible when propitious changes have takenplace. Therefore, the presence of changes that are favorable is an

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important precondition. This suggests changes in attitudes amongparties. Changes in attitude toward negotiation usually come aboutthrough a comparative evaluation ofpresent and future possibilities.

The moment ispropitious, orfavorable, for negotiation whenboth sidesperceive that they may be better off with an agreementthan without one.

The representatives of each party have enough authorityto speak for the whole party and commit it to a course of action.

This may be something which me negotiation process has to createand maintain. Often, parties to conflicts are not homogeneous. Eachparty may contain factions and rival leaders, and representatives maybe vary of appearing weak. The authority of representatives can bestrengthened or weakened by support from outside groups, or evenby pressure brought on by rival factions within the party. In armedconflicts, sometimes representatives to negotiation may come from thepolitical wing of the movement, whereas the armed, or guerilla, wingmay not be very enthusiastic about negotiations. In such situations,there is the likelihood of the position of the representative to negotiationbeing undermined. This requires that parties should prepare themselvesfor negotiation and its outcome. Preparations may involve findingconsensus within the party and authorizing acceptable representativesto conduct negotiations.

Other parties (in the region or globally) support, encourage andpress for negotiations.

Due to pressure from others, parties may come to the negotiationtable. Care must be taken with the role of other parties. The greatestinfluence can be exerted by regional and international parties acceptedas neutral in the issue over which there is conflict. Links of religion,ethnic origin, economics and trade between an external party and oneof the conflict-parties can make encouragement to negotiate sound to

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CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PEACE STUDIES AN INTRODUCTORY IIANDBOOK

the other conflicting parties like a taking of sides, and have the counter-productive effect of escalating the conflict. But pressure from friendlystates can provide conflicting parties with a face-saving way of movingaway from violent conflict towards negotiation.

WHEN TO NEGOTIATE?

As we have already noted, timing is extremely important fornegotiations to succeed.

But, when is negotiation an appropriate way ofhandling a conflict?The characteristics that lead parties to define issues as negotiable

can be described in a number of ways.Situations appropriate for negotiations have two characteristics:

the parties agree that they need a solution, and that their decision on asolution must be unanimous. In the first, parties may feel that “we can’tgo on like this any longer.” In the second, the parties might say: “Weare in this mess together, whether we like it or not.” Then the twoparties might feel : “We have to find a solution together.” This is whatmakes negotiations different from other decision-making processes.Now we can come to the following conclusion: negotiation isappropriate when decisions must be unanimous.

Negotiations involve above all the discovery of new alternativesrather than choices between existing, fixed and given options. Thus,negotiation is appropriate when new solutions have to be inventedto replace unacceptable old ones or new ones have to be createdwhen new problems arise.

The same can be restated as follows: negotiation is appropriatewhen there is a change in the structure of affairs and a new ordermust be created or problems managed in its absence.

LOCATION AND LEVELS OF NEGOTIATION

Location: The place of meeting can have important symbolicsignificance which may vary between the conflicting parties. The conflictmay be replayed around the issue of meeting location. To reach prior

9

agreement on the place of meeting, a third party may have tousemanyof the skills in relation to the main meeting between the contlict-parties.How conflict-parties respond to the need to agree on details of where(and when and how) to meet, can provide third parties with muchuseful information about their negotiating styles, the role of factions orrivals within each party, and the role of each party’s domestic audience.lnformation gathered and relationships formed between contlict partiesand third parties at this preparatory stage often strongly influence themain negotiations later

Open or closed locations may be more appropriate. Conductingmeetings at ‘closed’ locations, excluding observers, reporters etc., andpossibly even not informing them that the meeting is taking place, tendsto allow more honest and flexible negotiations between the parties.Choice of a closed location may include an agreement between partiesnot to report and comment publicly on the meeting until a later, agrcedtime. ‘Open’ locations, with outsiders present and public reporting ofthe meetings’ progress, tend to encourage the conflict-parties to adoptpostures designed for public consumption, particularly their home-audience. The public, therefore, becomes a sort of declared party tothenegotiations, influencing their course but largely beyond the influenceof third-party facilitators.

Levels of communication between parties should also beconsidered carefully. Negotiations (and mediation) may be conductedbetween the top level of each party, but it is important that there arecommunications between many of the levels of each party. Fornegotiators, multi level communication provides move informationon how the other party views the conflic-issues, adding depth andprobably more flexibility, to the official position declared by the party’sofiicial negotiators. For third parties involved as advisors, facilitatorsofnegotiations, or mediators, maintaining communication with manydifferent levels within a conflict-party can provide much usefulinformation, particularly in the preparation stages and ifobstacles occurwhich stalemate the negotiations.

IO


With fact-finding missions, shuttle-diplomacy, goodwill visits, unofficialconsultation etc., conciliation processes can help bring conflicting partiesto the point where they are ready to consider the possibility ofnegotiation, and where some factors conducive to successful negotiationhave developed.

GROUND RULES

Ground rules are similar in negotiations, facilitation, mediation andother meetings. These are the basic rules of conduct, which all partiesagree to as essentials for these meetings. Ground rules have theimmediate practical value of allowing the meetings to happen;and they also have a broaderpsychological value. Acceptance of,and then experiencing, these ground rules reveals what is needed forconstructive communication and mutuality in relationships. When theparties are in conflict, of course, such ground rules are not applicableat all. Efforts must be made to find ground rules which all participantscan agree to. Ground rules can include the following elements:

Allowing all the parties to participate fully, including to state theirviews and suggestions

Listening to each speaker without interruption or disrespect

Freedom to suggest ideas without commitment to them and withoutridicule

Confidentiality and non-attribution outside the meeting

Mutually constructing agenda and timetable to satisfy all parties

Commitment to reach an agreement

Acceptance of the role of the facilitator (or mediator etc.)

Freedom to ask for ‘time out’ (a pause in the main negotiationsfor any party to meet in private with or without the facilitator)

Punctuality

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STAGES OF NEGOTIATION

The five main stages of negotiation are the following:

0 Preparing for negotiations

0 Opening negotiations

o Developing strategies

l Making decisions/solving problems

l Making it work

These stages in the negotiating process can be illustrated as below,as if climbing a mountain and then coming down the other side.

Solve problems - Make decisions

(Implementation etc.post-agreement)

Preparing for Negotiations

Conflict-analysis methods provide tools for starting to understandthe conflict prior to getting involved in negotiations. It is important forpotential negotiators and facilitators to prepare themselves in severalstages, repeatedly tine-tuning their understanding of the conflict-situation. These stages of preparation include:

1 2


Analyzing the conflict: Identifying the parties, the problems andissues, deciding in principle whether to get involved;

Analyzing in more detail: What are other issues, other parties,the relationships between them, the history of these, the contextand alternatives to negotiation, and outcome-possibilities?

Checking the decision to get involved: If decide to get involved,decide when? how? with what/who?

Making initial contacts: Explore possible forums for discussionand consider possible convenors;

Designing the process: Deciding the appropriate style ofnegotiation; and

Reaching agreement on the negotiation process: Agreeingon ground rules and issues to be discussed, considering detailsneeded to create an appropriate climate for negotiation (agreementon process is important to reach agreement on substance).

Identifying all the parties involved in the conflict, including partiesinvolved or with an interest in the conflict in a secondary or indirectway, is particularly important. These secondary or indirect parties tothe conflict may influence the main parties, and may distort or sabotagethe negotiating process or its outcome. It is often not helpful to giveevery party ‘a seat at the negotiating table, ‘yet leaving them out ofthe process entirely may encourage them to exert unhelpful influence.Including secondary/indirect parties productively in the process mayinvolve third parties in consulting them before and during negotiationsbetween the main conflict-parties. Even in non-facilitated negotiations,third parties may play this useful background role.

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This initial stage is ‘negotiation about negotiation, ‘or ‘gettingthe parties to the table.’ This may also be described as @e-negotiationtalks ’ or ‘talks about talks. ’ Important matters which will help todecide if negotiations are possible and worthwhile include: which issuesare to be negotiated, who will participate, which outsiders, negotiatingprinciples, the agenda, duration and location. Reaching agreement ona negotiating process often involves increasing the conflicting parties’level of communication, trust and confidence, and developing a sharedunderstanding of the problem to be negotiated.

The practical matters discussed (for example, where negotiationsmight take place) are important for psychological, as well as practical,reasons. However speculative, such discussions are communicationbetween the parties (even if indirectly, through other people), and theyare constructive. The process of offering a suggestion, considering acounter-suggestion, responding to it and eventually reaching someagreement (about relatively unimportant things) enlarges the possibilityfor constructive communication about the real conflict-issues. Energygoing down this path is energy not going down the path of violence.Sometimes, the subjects discussed might seem trivial (the size of thetable, which side to sit, who will enter the room first), especially in thecontext of great suffering currently being caused by the conflict. Theparties’ discussion of even such apparently unimportant matters maywell be full of the sense of injustice, passion, intransigence, hate etcwhich characterizes the conflict itself This can be useful as a preparationfor negotiations, because it provides ‘practice-runs’ for the parties inexperiencing these upsurges of emotion which create non-negotiable‘positions,’ and then being able to go on to reach more reasonableagreements. Until the very last moment, parties may hold back fromcommitting to negotiations. Often, all the time that the practicalitiesand possibilities of negotiations are being discussed, the likelihood thatthey will happen is increasing. Pre-negotiation should be treated asseriously, and with as much time and care, as the main negotiationsthey lead to.

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As the process of helping the parties prepare for negotiation goeson, facilitators are also becoming more prepared - getting to know theparties better, and understanding the subtleties of the issues. Andcontinuously, negotiators and facilitators should be revising their analysisof the conflict.

A shared understanding of the problem or issue may result fromthe above processes. Parties in conflict often have very differentunderstandings of the situation. Before negotiations can start, all partiesmust recognize that there is a conflict, what the issues in conflict are -including knowing even if not accepting the other party’s descriptionsof the conflict-issues. Most of all, they must understand and acceptthat it is these issues which are the subject of negotiation. Throughforms of contlict-analysis, negotiators and facilitators can help to createa broad understanding of the conflict, which is shared by all the parties.

During this preparation stage, the parameters of negotiation maybe decided - what is and what is not to be negotiated over. Discussingand deciding this may take each party a long time. Privately, as well aswith each party, facilitators can map the various issues, to find a coreof negotiable issues.

When there is a core of agreement between the conflicting partiesabout what can be negotiated, the start of negotiations may be close.Even at this early stage, progress has been made - a complex conflicthas been processed into a series of definable issues, by the conflictingparties with the help of negotiators. This is already a considerableachievement. Before negotiations start, it may be worthwhile fornegotiators to reflect on the core of agreed negotiable issues with eachparty, making explicit the shared perceptions, interests, values and needswhich are behind this agreed basis for negotiation.

Pre-Negotiation Behavior

Our discussion above suggests that beginning negotiation in aconflict is usually a long process. It can even cover years of effort and

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CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PEACE STUDIES AN INTRODIJCTORY HANDBOOK

preparation, between the time when one party decides that the problemis appropriate for negotiation and the time when it convinces the otherparty. These attempts generally require a great deal of time, first inimplementing, then in communicating to the other party, and then stillmore time for the trial and error process of thinking up new alternativesand communicating them in turn. There can also bepre-negotiationtactics employed by the parties. Pre-negotiation tactics are effortsmade by parties to change the course of negotiation in favor of theirindividual interests.

Opening Negotiations

l To set the tone (how negotiations start is very important) and tactics

l To share thoughts on how the situation looks from the differentperspectives

l To agree on problem(s) to be solved, before seeking agreementon solutions

Negotiators and facilitators of negotiations both have to establishat the outset the previously agreed style and tone of the negotiations.Broadly, are they to be a contest of strength in bargaining for whichone party wins (though perhaps only in the short-term), or are theyintended to bring about mutual gains, in which all parties are reasonablysatisfied with an outcome which may endure in the long-term? Differenttactics will be used for each - and the tactics used are a good indicationof how each party is approaching the negotiations, in reality as apposedto what they say they are doing.

Contest-negotiating, the ‘hard’ styleofnegotiatingnoted earlier, ischaracterized by these tactics:

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l Starting with a surprise demand or precondition

l Insisting on setting out your party’s position first, and monopolizingthe time available

0 ‘Asking high’ -making high demands and forcing concessionsout of the other party

l Undermining the other party’s positions and/or its representatives,and its unity

0 ‘Stonewalling’ -refusing to change any detail, insisting everythingis linked, delaying, referring back to higher authorities or ‘thepeople’

0 Coercing-issuing ultimatums or threats or ‘faits accomplis’

If pursued for long, these tactics can undermine the good faithand trust which has brought the conflicting parties to the negotiatingtable. When deadlocks occur there is a temptation to resort to these‘hard’ tactics. But when there are deadlocks it is usually better to takeextra time to ease the pressure and find some shared form of conflictanalysis or problem-solving to discover what the deadlock is about.

Mutual-gain negotiating, in contrast, can be identified by thesetactics:

l Starting with non-threatening, constructive suggestions - aboutthe negotiating process rather than the substantive issue

l Starting by making sure both parties understand how the othersees the situation, and engage together in some analysis of theconflict (even if this has been done before)

l Starting with a ‘goodwill concession’ - something which one partycan afford to give

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Identifying the needs underlying each party’s position, and seekingsolutions which accommodate these adequately enough for allparties

Being explicit where one issue is being traded off against another,or where a compromise is needed

Separating off the most difficult issues for shared working groupsto study and report back

Suggesting new possibilities and asking how they suit the otherparty’s as well as one’s own party

Avoiding locking parties into agreements prematurely

Being thorough at the end instead of rushing, and agreeing waysof implementing and monitoring agreements, with mechanisms fordealing with non-compliance

Reframing the language in an overall problem-sharing and problem-solving spirit

Developing Strategies

Some of the tactics for mutual-gain negotiating, noted above, comeinto the later stages of the negotiation process. During this middle phase,negotiators are engaged in developing and refining their strategies, andputting them into practice, by:

l Conflict-mapping: analyzing the people and groups, processes andproblems involved

l Thinking through aims, needs, interests and potential solutions

l Getting from problems to causes to underlying needs; separatingpeople from problems, interests from positions

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l Considering what bargaining power they have, and how to use it;what strengths and weaknesses

l Exploring all the alternatives to negotiation

l Understanding the other party and using fair standards to supportideas; granting legitimacy to the ideas of others

A positive contribution is made to negotiations by focusing onwhat is wanted rather than what is not wanted. It is worth reflecting onwhat the alternatives to negotiating are, and deciding if they are better- so that one engages in negotiation because that is the best courseavailable at the time. Facilitators can help parties by costing out, in arealistic way, the various alternatives (violent conflict ofvarious forms,withdrawal from the conflict, arbitration etc.)

Making Decisions and Solving Problems

Be inventive about options - sometimes increase the optionsavailable.

Create criteria to evaluate negotiations which focus on the needsto be met.

Emphasize common ground.

Make decisions preliminary and provisional, fine-tune the details.

Decide if enough has been agreed; need everything be agreed?

Expanding the range of options being negotiated about meansthere is more to be divided up between the parties, and something foreveryone. If the options are few in number, negotiations may be badlyinfluenced by the fear of not getting enough and a win/lose situationdevelops.

Feeling free to consider the wide range of possibilities on eachissue can encourage a sense of productive shared effort. Parties are

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more likely to feel free in this way if a final commitment is not asked foruntil enough elements of a comprehensive package have been sketchedin, then reconsidered and revised as necessary. If agreement has provedimpossible on one or two issues, it may be best to make the limitedagreement which is possible at the time and remit the unresolved issuesto another forum at a later date. The negotiations may have beenattempting too much, and the experience of the limited agreementachieved may make the other issues resolvable later.

Making it Work

This final stage of negotiation and facilitated negotiation involves‘putting the pieces together to make peace’:

Preliminary decisions are combined to make a complete package;additional negotiations may be needed for unresolved issues.

Be concrete, specific and clear; who does what, when, where.

Work out monitoring and implementing procedures, or programmelater negotiations.

Formalize the agreement and get the necessary approvals orratification.

Schedule review-meetings; the agreement may need additions oradjustment.

Consider how to jointly ‘sell’ the agreement regionally,internationally and at home.

Consider ‘guarantors’ or ‘friends of the peace process’ to sell it,and ensure compliance.

A shared sense of pride and achievement accompanies successfulnegotiations, which facilitators, observers and outside parties shouldaffirm. This achievement should be marked in some celebratory waywhich is appropriate to the culture and the nature of the conflict resolved.


NOTE

In preparing this chapter, the following textbooks were extensivelyused:

Breslin J. William and Rubin, Jeffrey Z. (1993), Negotiation Theoryand practice, Cambridge, Massachusetts: the Program for Negotiationat Harvard Law school

Cornelius, Helena and Faire, Shoshana, (1994), Everyone Can Win,How to Resolve Conflict, Siman & Schuster Australia

Doucest, Ian (Ed.), (1996), Resource Pack for ConflictTransformation, International Alert, London

Zartrnan, William I. and Berman, Maureen R., ( 1982), The PracticalNegotiator, New Haven and London: Yale University Press

Zartman,William I. (1989), Ripe for Resolution: Conflict andIntervention in Africa, Oxford University Press, New York andOxford

21

3

Negotiation in ConflictsJayadeva Uyangoda

Introduction

In the field of conflict resolution, the idea of negotiation has gainedcurrency against a number of successful instances where conflicts havebeen settled or terminated through talks or discussions among partiesinvolved. Recent examples are Northern Ireland, South Africa, Israel-Palestine and Bangladesh. In all these instances, parties to the conflictcame to the ‘negotiation table’ for ‘peace talks.’ Through talks,they have arrived at agreements to settle the conflict and implement anagreement which they had worked out together. We generally describethese instances as ones of conflict settlement or termination by meansof negotiations.

But not all conflicts are terminated through negotiations. Nor areall conflict negotiations likely to end in a peace settlement Even whenan agreement is worked out, there is no guarantee that it will invariablybring a conflict to an end. Sri Lanka is a clear case in point in thisregard. Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam(LTTE) held talks twice, in 1989 and 1995, without producing anypeace agreement. In 1987, there was an agreement between Sri Lankanand Indian governments to solve Sri Lanka’s conflict, but the conflictdid not end.

However, both successful and failed negotiations offer usimportant lessons about negotiation and conflict resolution.Negotiations have succeeded under circumstances favorable to conflicttermination. When parties to the conflict are ready for a settlement andthere are political conditions to facilitate the option of peace, and when


the conflict itself is ripe for settlement, the negotiation option is morelikely to succeed. But when even one party to the conflict is not readyfor a settlement and when the conflict has still more energy to go on,negotiations are not possible; nor is there space for negotiations tosucceed.

Indeed, conflict negotiation is an extremely complex exercise.Merely because some conflicts are brought to an end by means ofnegotiations, it does not mean that all conflicts await negotiations.Similarly, merely because negotiations have failed to bring peace inone conflict, it does not mean that even that particular conflict defiesnegotiations. Therefore, in this module, we will discuss some of thecomplexities involved in conflict negotiation.

Negotiation as an Everyday Skill

At a preliminary level, negotiation is an everyday activity in whichwe ourselves are involved as a part of our regular life. Indeed, we areoften successful negotiators. Imagine a situation where a fish-vendorcomes to your doorstep on Sunday morning. You want to buy a kilo offish, but the vendor tells you that the price is Rs. 250. You are nothappy with that price and you begin to ‘bargain.’ You offer a lowerprice, knowing very well that the vendor is likely to come down on theprice and he was keen to sell off his merchandize. The fish-vendoralso knows that you need fish for your Sunday meal and you are mostlikely to buy fish. After several bargaining offers, you and the vendoragree to do the transaction at Rs. 225 a kilo. You may buy the fish withthe satisfaction that you got the price reduced through successfulbargaining. And of course, the vendor goes off with the satisfactionthat he made a profitable deal, although his profit margin was a littleless than what he initially aimed at.

When we analyze this situation, using theoretical tools ofnegotiation, we can identify how clever we indeed are at negotiation.

23


You and the fish-vendor entered into a negotiation exercise in theform of a business transaction. The two parties had two objectives tosatisfy theirrespective interests. When you refused to accept the pricequoted by the vendor, you initiated a bargaining exercise. You madea hard bargaining offer, when you offered to buy a kilo of fish for Rs.200 or else not to buy any fish at all. The vendor countered your initialbargaining offer by making a counter offer at Rs. 240 a kilo. You stillwent on bargaining by refusing to buy fish at that price. In the process,both you and the vendor retreated from your positions by working outa mutually acceptable price. In other words, the two of you movedawayfrompositional bargaining and accepted a compromise. Rs.225 is the compromise agreement reached through this process ofnegotiation. If both you and the vendor stuck to positional bargaining,a compromise may not have been worked out and there would nothave been a transaction at all. Similarly, in this example, there was anegotiation process, a willingness to bargain, and a will tocompromise. And the compromise brought out a mutually satisfyingoutcome.

Bargaining and compromise are elements of our everyday life ofnegotiations. Without us knowing it, we are negotiation practitioners athome, in the office, in the business field and in our relations with others.

But, negotiation in conflicts is slightly more difficult than negotiatingin a non-conflictual situation like buying fish. Bargaining in a politicalconflict involves not just two individuals, but thousands or millions ofpeople. There, the stakes placed at the negotiation table are very high.The stakes usually involved in such conflicts revolve around state power.Parties may not always be ready to compromise, even when theynegotiate. Even when a compromise is possible, the parties to the conflictmay not trust each other’s intentions. Then, there may be doubts aboutthe outcome of the compromise settlement. Even when the outcome isclear, there can be apprehensions about the implementation of thesettlement agreement. The conclusion we can arrive at is the following:

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Conflict termination through negotiation will have to take intoconsideration the complexities inherent in all stages of theprocess.

Defining ‘Negotiation’

According to some theorists, the concept ‘negotiation’ denotessomething specific in conflict situations. It does not refer to the resolutionof a conflict. Rather, it suggests the settlement or termination of aconflict. The idea here is that negotiation is a means to settle or terminatea conflict, rather than resolving conflict. Here, we need to recognizethe conceptual differences between ‘conflict resolution’ and ‘conflictsettlement. ’ Conflict resolution requires a change ofbeliefs and valuesamong parties, in order to address the causes that produced the conflict.Here, the conflict is resolved through resolving causes that led to thecontlict so that the same conflict may not arise again. Conflict settlementdoes not anticipate such a fundamental change among parties. It seeksonly a change of their behavior. Then “the focus of negotiation is notattitude change per se, but an agreement to change behavior in waysthat make settlement possible” (Rubin, 1993:3).

In this definition, negotiation is a means to an end. The end is thesettlement of the conflict. Let us take the example of an internal armedconflict, like in Sri Lanka. When the armed conflict is on, the parties tothe conflict operate within a specific pattern of behavior. When theycome to the negotiation table, they may have not changed their behavior.But, when they negotiate to settle or terminate the armed conflict, theywill be changing, or more precisely, agreeing to change, their conflictbehavior so that settlement is produced through that change. Of course,conflict settlement can lead to the resolution of the conflict. Butnegotiations are primarily aimed at changing the behavior of the partiesinvolved.

Negotiation is also a communicative action. It involves talking,talking in order to go beyond a conflict. In a conflict, parties may notcommunicate with each other at all. Or, they may actually be

2.5


communicating which results in conflict escalation. But negotiation is adifferent kind of talking. It presupposes, at the minimum level, thewillingness of parties to explore into the possibility of resolvingdisagreements. It is in this sense that Rubinstein defines negotiation inthe following way: “Negotiation is a set of communicative processesthrough which individuals or groups try to resolve disagreements thatexist among them” (Rubinstein, 1992: 116).

The definition of the concept ‘negotiation’ has gone through atransformation in recent years, due to many experiences in conflictnegotiation. A traditional definition is found in the InternationalEncyclopaedia of Social Sciences (1968). Negotiation is a “form ofinteraction through which [parties] . . . try to arrange . . . a newcombination of some of their common and conflicting interests.” Inmore contemporary definitions, negotiation is viewed as more than ‘aform of interaction’ among parties. Rather, it is a process. WilliamZartman, one of the leading theorists in the field of conflict resolution,defines negotiation as “a process of combining conflicting positionsinto a’ common position, under a decision rule of unanimity, aphenomenon in which the outcome is determined by the process”(Zartman,1993:147).

Why Negotiations are Difficult

In this discussion, we are focusing on negotiations in internal armedconflicts. Internal armed conflicts are the most difficult conflicts toterminate or settle. It has generally been the case that when an internalconflict is of the character of a revolutionary insurrection or having asits goal ethnic self-determination, such a conflict is more likely toprotract. That is why some of those who have studied conflicts makethe point that when the conflict is over identity - ethnic or religious- the room for compromise solutions becomes more constrained.

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Maximalism of Insurgents: Revolutionary or identity-based armedconflicts often have a tendency to generate maximalist goals. Whenan insurgent movement has set a maximalist goal - for example, thecapturing of state power, or establishing a separate state - there isusually reluctance on the part of that movement to revise its goal andto accept something less than the original, final objective. Such conflictsare also propelled by idealistic motivations. A slogan like “Motherlandor death, we shall win!” often characterizes the commitment of theinsurgent movement to make sacrifices, to withstand enormous humanlosses and to continue the struggle for years. In such an idealisticframework, compromise, or even talking to the ‘enemy’ to find acompromise, may be seen as incorrect, immoral and being harmful tothe final goal.

Inflexibility of the State: Similarly, the states that are involved ininternal contlicts can also be inflexible with regard to a settlement. Statesoften view insurgent challenges as law-and-order problems that shouldbe resolved by the use of military force. Once a state begins to usemilitary force in an internal conflict, it is usually difficult for that state toseek a solution outside a unilateral military victory. Any deviation fromthe military option by the state may be seen as a sign of weakness, anacceptance of the legality of the ‘enemy,’ and even a step towardsendangering national security. In such circumstances, negotiations maybe seen as (i) giving legitimacy to the enemy’s claims, and (ii) theadmission of the enemy’s strength vis- a-vis the weakness of the state.Therefore, states often tend to be intransigent and uncompromising,until such time that the conflict itself compels the state to seek a negotiatedoption.

Fear of a Settlement: Strangely enough, parties to internal conflictsmay sometimes feel afraid of a negotiated settlement. The fear elementis usually associated with rebels who are involved in a conflict with thestate. The fear of a settlement can be of different dimensions. Annihilationof the movement, as a result of a compromise with the enemy, is often


felt by rebels as a possible consequence of a settlement. They mightseenegotiation as a trap and settlement as capitulation. There can alsobe the fear that a negotiated compromise with the ‘enemy’ might resultin splitting the movement. There is always the possibility that in aninsurgent movement, there are hardliners who reject the idea of acompromise and any deviation from the original maximalist objectives.

Uncertainty of the Negotiation Outcome: The present state of SriLanka’s ethnic conflict demonstrates how the parties to the conflictare skeptical about negotiations. The LTTE walked out from thenegotiation table twice, on the argument that negotiation was notbringing about a useful outcome, or an outcome favorable to them.The government is reluctant to resume negotiations, because of theview that negotiations might not produce any positive result. There isalso the view, shared by both the government and the LTTE, thatnegotiation might be manipulated by one party as an exercise in buyingtime or obtaining some breathing space. Parties may not even placemuch trust on each other’s commitments. There is also the doubt abouthow genuine negotiations are. That is why sometimes one party to aconflict might lay down preconditions for negotiations that are patentlyunacceptable to the other.

Why Should One Negotiate with the ‘Enemy’?

One of the most commonplace objections to negotiations in asituation of conflict is that talking to the ‘enemy’ is a futile exercise.Particularly in identity-based conflicts, even the very idea of negotiationswith the enemy is considered by ‘hardliners’ as a sign ofweakness, agreat risk and even a prelude to capitulation. Some people have amental block about talking to the enemy. ‘We should destroy the enemy.Why should our people talk to them?’ is the question they often ask.

A fascinating reply to this kind of objections to negotiation isprovided by Simha Flapan, an Israeli intellectual. Flapan is a journalist

28


in Israel who advocated negotiations between Israeli government andthe PLO (Palestinian Liberation Organization) even in the seventiesand eighties when in Israel any suggestion of peace with PLO wastreated as sheer treachery. Flapan not only advocated a negotiatedsettlement between the two sides, but also maintained links with thePLO and communicated to the Israel public that the ‘enemy’ shouldbe treated as a ‘potential ally in peace.’ He wrote in 1982:

“There is a fundamental difference between strategy ofpeace and strategy of war. Unlike war, peace cannot beplanned in secrecy; it requires an appeal to the people,both its own and the adversary ‘s. It requires the recognitionof the enemy as a potential ally. It requiresdialogue." (Flapan, March 1982)

Why Negotiation is Necessary

The conclusion we must draw from the above is that negotiationsare difficult. But it should not mean that negotiations are not necessaryor are irrelevant to a conflict resolution process. In the contemporaryworld, it is difficult to imagine a situation where a conflict is resolvedby the total capitulation of one party through purely military meansused by the other side. Even if a conflict may protract itself for decades,like in Northern Ireland or Palestine, there may come a time when theparties realize that a settlement is more realistic than the conflict whichis likely to protract. That is why negotiation is considereda ‘rationalchoice. ’ It is rational to end the conflict than allowing it to protract,because a compromise serves one’s interests better. The experienceof successful negotiated settlement of conflicts tells us many things aboutwhy negotiation is necessary, rational and useful.

Irrelevance of Maximalist Goals: We noted above that parties to aconflict often begin their campaigns with maximalist goals. It may wellhappen in the course of a conflict that the parties begin to realize the

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CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PEACE S TUDIES AN INTRODUCTORY HANDBOOK

irrationality of sticking to original, maximalist objectives. When the worldsituation changes, the goals set up during the previous world situationmay not be realistic anymore. The Palestinians accepted this realitywhen they went to serious negotiations with the enemy, the Israeli state.This realization of the need to change the original goal was dramaticallystated by one of the PLO leaders:

“The past year has seen tumultuous and unforeseen changein the world order as it has stood since the end of WorldWar II. A new and as yet unpredictable global balance isin the making, with consequences that will be felteverywhere, including in the Middle East.

Turbulent as these times are, the Palestinian people andtheir representative, the Palestinian Liberation Organization(PLO), see new prospects for peace in the Middle East.As the tide of change in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe,South Africa and elsewhere has swept away obsoletenotions and structures, the Palestinian people are verymuch a part of this historical process.. . In this context,the PLO regards its own current political program offeringa two-state solution to the century-old conflict over theland of Palestine.. .as being entirely consonant with thespirit of the times. The PLO decision to recognize Israel. . . is rooted in pragmatism, openness, and the readinessto dissolve the long-standing presuppositions, attitudes andantagonisms of the past.” (Khalaf, 1990)

The Need to Search for Alternatives: It so happens in conflicts thatparties sometimes reach a situation in which original goals and strategiesneed to be revised. For example, a party to a conflict may realize thatits military strategy is no longer viable or even useful, because thecontinuing war would not serve any purpose. It may only further hurtthem in material, human and political terms. Then there is the possibility

K- CONFLICT,ICTRESO1.UTIONANDPEACESTIJDIESAN INTRODUCTORYHANDROOK

that either one party or both parties would want to seek alternativestrategies and solutions. It is often the case that alternatives have tobe worked out together. Negotiations are a useful devise in suchcircumstances for parties to find mutually acceptable alternatives.

In this lesson, you have learned the following :

Both successful and failed negotiations offer us important lessonsabout negotiation and conflict resolution.

Conflict resolution through negotiation is a complex exercise; it isa process.

Negotiation is also an everyday exercise. We often practicenegotiation successfully. Lessons we can learn from everydaynegotiations are useful to understand the dynamics of complexconflict negotiation.

In political/ identity conflicts, conflict termination through negotiationrequires the recognition that there can be many complexitiesthrough all its stages.

Conflict resolution and conflict settlement are different concepts.

Negotiation is a communication process.

Conflict negotiation can be difficult due to many reasons such as

(i) Parties find it difficult to change their ‘maximalist’ objectives.(ii) Parties are ‘inflexible.’

(iii) There is a ‘fear of settlement.’(iv) Uncertainty of the negotiation outcome.

Negotiation is a ‘rational choice. ’

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References/Readings

Doucest, Ian, (Ed)( 1996), “Resource pack for Conjlict Trans-formation “, London:Intemational Alert

Flapan, Simha, ‘New Outlook”, March 1982

Khalaf, Salah (Aby Iyad),( 199O),“Lowering the Sword” reprinted inIan S.Kustick, “Arab-Israeli Relations: A collection of ContendingPerspectives and Recent Research “, New York and London:GuarlanPublishers

Rubin, Jeffrey Z.,( 1993), “‘Some Wise and Mistaken AssumptionsAbout Conjlict and Negotiation” in J.William Breslin and JeffreyZ.Rubin, “Negotiation Theory and Practice “, Cambridge, Massa-chusetts, The Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School

Rubinstein, Robert A., (1992),“Culture and Negotiation” in ElizabethWamock Fernea and Mary Evelyn Hocking (Eds.), “The Strugglefor Peace ” , Austin : University of Texas Press

Zartman,William I.,( 1989), ‘Ripe for Resolution: Conflict andln terven tion in Africa ’ ‘, New York and Oxford University Press

Zartman, William I.,( 1993),“Common Elements in the Analysis ofthe Negotiation Process ” in Breslin and Rubin, ibid

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4

Mediation and Conflict ResolutionJayadeva Uyangoda

Introduction

When a conflict protracts itself with no possibility of resolution,like the one in Sri Lanka, there can emerge an argument for a ‘mediatedsettlement.’ The basic assumption of this argument is that direct partiesto the conflict are incapable of solving the conflict on their own.Therefore, as the argument further goes, ‘a third-party involvement ’is necessary to bring about a settlement. There is also a body ofinternational experience to support the claim that seemingly intractableconflicts can be terminated through third-party mediation.

Experience in conflict mediation also tells us that there is anotherside to the story. All attempts at mediation may not succeed. Similarly,the path of mediation can be a very difficult one. Mediation cannothappen merely because there is a conflict and that conflict needs to beresolved. It is a process with complexities and challenges. In thischapter, we will discuss mediation, trying to identify some of the majorcomplexities in the process and exercise of conflict mediation.

Mediation Defineded

Mediation can be defined as “an act of outside intervention toassist adversaries to resolve a shared conflict. It works to create apeace process to engage adversaries in a constructive politicaldialogue, or to transform an established dialogue process into a conflictresolution and peace-making one.” (Rabie : 132)

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CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PEACE STUDIES AN 1NTRODUCTORY HANDBOOK

In this definition, there are a number of elements involved in an actof mediation.

i. Mediation is an act of an outsider (Neutrality).

ii. Mediator assists adversaries to resolve a conflict (Facilitation).

iii. Mediation is a component of a conflict resolution and peaceprocess (Ripe Conditions).

iv. Through mediation, parties engage in a constructive dialogue(Compromise).

Mediator as an Outsider

Mediator in a conflict is by definition an outsider. The term ‘third-party mediation’ is derived from this inherent characteristic of the actof mediation. This notion of ‘outsider’ has a host of meanings. It doesnot simply mean that the mediator comes from abroad, or from othercountry. First, it means that the mediator is an outsider to the conflictand should not be a party involved in the conflict. Nor should themediator be seen as aligned with or supportive of one particular partyto the conflict. We may call this requisite ofmediation as the neutralityprinciple. Whenever one party to the conflict perceives the mediatoras non-neutral, or supportive of the adversary, successful mediationcannot take place, because the mediator’s role in the expectedsettlement too would be in doubt. Mediator’s neutrality is important tocreate an atmosphere and psychology of confidence and trust in thenegotiation process among the parties to the conflict. One of the crucialbarriers to a settlement in a conflict through negotiations is the possibilityof one party perceiving the negotiation exercise as likely to result in anoutcome unfavorable to its own interests. In such a situation, if thatparticular party perceives the mediator as partial or biased towardsthe adversary, mediation may not be possible. Neutrality, then, isimportant for the mediator to create confidence among conflicting partiesnot only on the exercise of mediation, but also the outcome ofnegotiations.

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Mediator’s Role

Sometimes, people tend to think that a mediator can bringconflicting parties to the negotiation table and impose a settlement onthem. As Sri Lanka’s own experience demonstrates, this belief is quitefar fi-om the realities of conflict negotiation. Perhaps, in a neighborhooddispute, a powerful or respected third party can do so and the disputantsmay accept the solution offered by the third party even though they arenot quite satisfied with the outcome. But in macro political conflicts,such compromises can be hardly made or can work, because in them,unlike in neighborhood conflicts, the stakes are very high. In high-stake political conflicts, often involving issues of state power, imposinga settlement by an outsider is quite different fi-om a referee separatingtwo boxers locked in a fight. The parties themselves should ultimatelymake the compromise within a mutually acceptable framework. Butthen, what is the role of the mediator?

Let us imagine a situation where the two parties, while they havebeen engaged in a war, want to settle their conflict. However muchthey are keen on arriving at a settlement, they don’t trust each other towork it out. In this situation, no party is willing to take the first steptowards negotiations, because any relaxation of the military campaignby that side may be seen by the other as a moment of the adversary’sweakness. Here, a third-party can play a constructive role byfacilitating communication between the two sides. In this situation,the mediator is the medium through which the two sides begin tocommunicate. In many armed conflicts, communication between partiesis one of the most challenging areas of interaction. They maycommunicate through military means, like one party giving signals tothe other through an extremely guarded and ambiguous language. Agood example is the LTTE leader’s speech on 26 November, 1998 inwhich he called for a mediated settlement. But that call was presentedin such a way that there was also a message continuing the armedstruggle to achieve the movement’s ultimate political goal. Some analysts

35


interpreted this speech as a call for mediation while others disagreed.What we can see in that speech of the LTTE’s leader is a deliberateambiguity in communication. In the absence of direct communicationbetween the government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE, there was nomechanism for the government to respond to the other side’s mediationsuggestion in any positive terms. As expected, the governmentresponded cautiously and negatively. In such an atmosphere ofambiguity and caution, the mediator can facilitate communicationbetween the parties so that their actual intentions can be explored.

Mediation can also mean a slightly greater role for the third party.Suppose that the two parties want to come to the negotiation table.Even though the parties agree to begin face-to-face talks, they maystill mistrust each other’s intentions, objectives, goals, strategies andtactics. There can also be a lot of disagreement over the timetable fortalks, the agenda, the venue, the level of representation and the time-frame within which talks should be concluded. Still more complexdisagreements may arise on issues of cease-fire and the behavior ofthe two sides during the negotiations. It is always the case that duringnegotiations, each party may try to seek advantage over the otherthrough bargaining. This is exactly where a mediator has a role to play.The mediator can consult the two sides, ascertain their respectiveconcerns and then assist the two sides to avoid disagreements inthe preparation to negotiations. When disagreements arise, themediator can propose solutions or alternatives.

Further, the mediator can assist the parties in working out thesettlement agreement, if negotiations progress towards a compromise.Formulating a settlement to terminate an armed conflict is not an easytask. The settlement has to be mutually acceptable to the parties. Theyshould feel satisfied and comfortable with the outcome. They shouldbe willing to make sacrifices and they should also be ready to acceptand implement the settlement. Parties may also seek mutual guarantees.Here, the mediators role is to facilitate the working out of thesettlement by being a referee, a neutral thinker and a constructiveplanner:


Mediation and Ripe Conditions

Can a mediator just walk into a conflict, organize a negotiationprocess and make the parties agree on a settlement? The plain answerto this question is ‘No,’ although people sometimes might think thatthe answer ought to be ‘Yes.’ Such an arbitrary act of mediation canbe a disaster, especially for the mediator. If a conflict involves a‘sovereign’ state, uninvited mediation by an outsider would beimmediately seen as an interference with the country’s internal affairsand an affront to its sovereignty. If the conflict is between the state anda rebel movement, uninvited mediation would be perceived by therebels as a part of a conspiracy against them by the state. Here, thelesson to be drawn is simple: Mediation in a conflict would requirethe consent by both parties to the conflict. Indeed, mediation works

better when there is bi-partisan willingness to negotiate.

This leads us to ask another important question about mediation:What is the best time for mediation in a conflict? Or, under whatcircumstances would parties to a conflict accept mediation? Here, themost important thing is that both parties should accept the utility ofmediation. If only one party calls for mediation, the other party is mostlikely to reject mediation, or even not respond to the call. Similarly, if apotential mediator calls upon the parties to accept mediation, the partiesmay ignore it altogether. The point, then, is that there should beconditionsfavorablefor mediation. In conflict theory, the notion of‘conflict ripeness ‘refers to the existence of conditions conducive toconflict resolution.

The notion of ‘conflict ripeness’ was developed by William Zartmanin his writings of the early eighties. According to Zartman, a conflict ora crisis, is ripe for resolution when the following three conditions arepresent:

37


(i). There exists a situation of deadlock and deadline.

(ii). Unilateral solutions are blocked and joint solutions areconceivable.

(iii). The party that previously had upper hand in the conflict has lostthe advantage and the weaker party has gained in strength.

In Zartman’s concept of ripeness, each side to the conflict perceivesthat it is unable to win the conflict by itself. In other words, parties feelthat there is a deadlock and the deadlock may go on indefinitely, eachparty still having the capacity to hurt the other. At the same time, eachparty perceives a moment when things will get worse unless anadvantage is secured through other means. It is a deadlock that hurts.Zartman describes such a situation as a ‘mutually hurting stalemate.’It is useful to quote Zartman to get his precise words:

“The point when conflict is ripe for resolution is associated withtwo different sorts of intensity-alled hereplateaus and theprecipice- which produce different sorts of pressure - called respectivelydeadlocks and deadlines. A plateau and its deadlock begin when oneside is unable to achieve its aims, to resolve the problem, or to win theconflict by itself, and they are completed when the other side arrives ata similar perception. Each party must begin to feel uncomfortable inthe costly dead-end into which it has gotten itself. A plateau must beperceived by both not as a momentary resting ground, but as a hurtingstalemate, a flat, unpleasant terrain stretching into the future providingno later possibilities for decisive escalation or for graceful escape.”(Zartman, 1989:267-268)

The recognition of this ripe moment is crucial for successful conflictmediation. In the ripe moment, the parties may find themselves lockedin a stalemate which brings to them only an unavoidable catastrophe.Or else, they no longer see the viability ofunilateral solutions. They areready to seek joint solutions. The important thing is that even when

38


parties realize this situation, they may not act towards a compromiseon their own. But a mediator can step in once the moment has come.And then, “the parties and mediator can turn to the more creative,meticulous, trial-and-error job of finding an acceptable way out of theconflict.” (Zartman, 1989: p. 273)

Mediation and Compromise Making

We noted above that a compromise solution to a conflict involvesthe seeking of joint solutions by parties and that mediator can play aconstructive role in such circumstances. In other words, the role ofthe mediator is to make compromise-making possible for parties thatare still locked in the conflict. Enabling parties to make compromisesrequires from the mediator a series of activities. Rabie, in his bookConflict Resolution and Ethnicity identifies six such activities for themediator:

(i). Initiate dialogue among adversaries and induce cooperationbetween competing groups.

(ii). Facilitate analysis of causes of conflict and prepare fornegotiations to end them.

(iii), Sustain and foster direct or indirect negotiations through improvedor added channels of communication.

(iv). Bridge gaps between adversaries through the establishment ofdirect human contacts and help antagonists discover commongoals that require joint actions.

(v). Enhance the chances of success in resolving conflict through theintroduction of fresh ideas and new creative proposals.

(vi). Simply provide a forum for declaring the acceptance ofcompromise settlements that could not otherwise be declared.

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CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PEACE STUDlES AN INTRODUCTORY HANDBOOK

Mediation as a Process

The above discussion tells us another important aspect ofmediation. Mediation as a means of conflict resolution is not a one-shot activity A mediator cannot just come into a conflict situation, tryhis hands at a settlement and then fly back. In real life, conflict resolutiondoes not happen in such fairytale manner. Mediation is a long, arduousand often a frustrating exercise. Mediation can suffer setbacks andeven total failure. In the process of mediation, negotiation betweenparties can break down and the conflict may even escalate.

Mediator will have to be prepared for complex and unforeseeneventualities. Mediation efforts in the Northern Ireland, or in thePalestine-Israel conflicts are good examples. In both instances, theUS played the role of the mediator. Mediation there involved along-drawn exercise of preparatory work for negotiations to begin. In thecourse of negotiations, there were times when parties withdrew fromnegotiations. There were threats of unilateral action, putting in jeopardythe whole mediation exercise. But the mediator did not give up. Ofcourse, the US had the advantage of being a powerful and influentialmediator. Nevertheless, the point here is that the mediator should haveperseverance to stay in the course amidst setbacks, until a settlementis reached.

Itisinrecognizingthecomplexityofmediationasapoliticalexerciseand the seriousness of the role of the mediator that scholars have calledmediation a process. It is a process with distinct and interrelatedstages. Some of the tasks involved in a mediation process are:

(i) Exploring the possibilities for mediation and negotiation

(ii) Preliminary communication with conflicting parties

(iii) Understanding the issues involved and exploring possible commong r o u n d s


(iv) Taking concrete action to bring parties to the table, assistingparties to overcome their fears and apprehensions

(v) Use of persuasion and threat wherever necessary

(vi) Envisioning of an acceptable framework of settlement andstrategizing the path to settlement

(vii) Monitoring the negotiation process, ensuring the parties agreeand sign the settlement document

(viii) Ensuring the implementation of the settlement

(ix) Acting as the guarantor of the settlement

Mediation and Intervention

There is sometimes confusion about the terms ‘mediation’ and‘intervention.’ In Sri Lanka, those who oppose a negotiated settlementto the ethnic conflict interpret mediation as foreign intervention.Sometimes, government officials also tend to dismiss ‘mediation’ bysaying, “We don’t want foreign intervention in our internal affairs.”These objections to mediation have two interesting elements. Firstly,mediation is identified as an activity of a foreign actor. Secondly,mediation is perceived as something undesirable. These are usualobjections to mediation in a conflict. They, to some extent, indicatethat in a conflict, there is no universal unanimity on mediation and thatmediation is not welcome under all circumstances of a conflict.

Mediation, in a way, is a form of intervention in a restricted senseof the term. The mediator indeed intervenes in a conflict, in order tobring it to an end through a settlement acceptable to the parties involved.This is intervention in a political sense. Mediation is not intervention inthe military sense of the term. Military intervention is also a third partyactivity, often aimed at changing the course of a conflict. American

41


intervention in Somalia and NATO intervention in Yugoslavia areexamples. These are not mediation efforts, but politico-military actionsin order to impose a settlement, as defined by the forces that intervene.

Intervention, meanwhile, refers to the use of force to change thecourse of a conflict, either on behalf of one party or to force bothparties to bring the conflict to an end. Intervention often involves militaryforce.

Mediation and Facilitation

In Sri Lanka’s political debate on conflict resolution, the term‘facilitation’ is preferred by some to ‘mediation.’ For example, the SriLankan government is of the view that they do not need ‘third partymediation’, but welcome ‘third party facilitation’. In fact, the Norwegianinitiative launched in February 2000 is described by the governmentas ‘facilitation,’ whereas the term ‘mediation’ is also used to characterizeit

Is there a real distinction between ‘mediation’ and ‘facilitation’?At least from the perspective of the Sri Lankan government, thereseems to be a clear distinction. They understand facilitation as the helpof a third party to facilitate communication between the governmentand the LTES. Once the communication is established and conditionsfor direct negotiations between the two sides are created, the role ofthe facilitator is over. When talks begin, there is probably no directrole for the facilitator, whereas in mediation there can be a direct rolefor the mediator.

In this lesson, you have learned some key concepts involved inmediation for conflict resolution.

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l Mediation is an outside intervention in a conflict. It seeks to assistadversaries to resolve a shared conflict through constructivepolitical dialogue.

l Mediator’s role can range from facilitating communication betweenparties to enable them to find a settlement and assisting them in theimplementation of the settlement.

l Mediation requires the consent of the parties to the conflict fornegotiation. Mediation works better with such consent andconsensus.

l Mediation also works better when conditions are ripe for conflictresolution.

l Mediation is not an one-act play. It is a long and complex process.

l Mediation, intervention and facilitation are distinct concepts, aswell as acts in conflict resolution.

Readings / References

Rabie, Mohamed, Conjlict Resolution and Ethnicity

Zartman,William 1.,(1989), Ripe for Resolution: Conflict andIntervention in Africa,Oxford University Press: New York and Oxford

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5

Peace StudiesLaksiri Fernando

Even in peacetime the world has anawful lot of problems.

Only in peacetime can we get on withsolving them.

Thinking about peace is the first steptowards achieving it.

Bill Oddie

1. What is Peace?

Peace is normally defined and studied in relation to war andviolence. There is merit in that, because peace is an urgent and pressingneed when there is war or violence. But there are other long-termneeds associated with peace. Development is one. Justice is another.Harmony with the environment is yet another. Therefore, people todaytend to study peace in its broadest and long-term meaning. This holisticapproach to peace is often called an ecopolitical approach. Ecopoliticsis a term to describe a cluster of economic, political, ecological andethical issues.

A more traditional view argued that “peace is the absence of war.”But this is not completely correct. War may be absent. But violencemay continue. There is a difference between war and violence. War isa large-scale conflict. Violence may be a state of small-scale conflict,yet inimical to peace. Electoral violence, for example, is not war. But itis a major threat to peace. War may end with a peace agreement. But

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peace thus achieved can be temporary. The reasons for war mightremain and continue. War might erupt again or transform into small-scale series of violence. Therefore, a broader definition is necessary tounderstand peace.

The traditional argument can be enlarged to define “peace as theabsence of war and violence.” It makes better sense, but does notfully cover our complete concern for peace. The definition still transpiresa negative meaning, the absence of war and violence. This is like whatis called “negative healthiness,” the mere absence of sickness. Buthealthiness should be a positive one. Not only the absence of sickness,but also the physical fitness and good muscle tone. Peace should belike that, a positive one.

Peace should end not only war, the symptom, but also injustice,the underlying causes. This does not mean that wars are waged againstinjustice. Onthecontrary, warsareusuallywagedtoperpetuateinjusticeor for injustice. Hitler waged war against other nations to dominatethem on the basis of race. The elimination of racism is thereforenecessary to avoid wars of the type of Hitler. Peace should not onlyend war through agreement, but also bring harmony between warringnations. Otherwise, peace will not be a lasting one.

Johan Galtung made the important distinction between what wenormally call violence, physical violence, and structural violence.Structural violence might not harm the victims directly. But the peopleare harmed, victimized and violated through institutional means andstructures. Poverty, malnutrition and hunger are some results of structuralviolence. If peace is the absence of violence, it should mean the absenceofviolence including structural violence as well. Peace means not onlythe absence of war and violence but also the absence of causes of warand violence. The study of peace not only encompasses the issue ofjustice but also the issue of ecology We may understand this connectionbetween peace and ecology better by discussing different approachesto peace or peace studies.

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2. Approaches to Peace

There are six main approaches to peace or peace studies. Theseapproaches are, more or less, similar to prevailing approaches in othersubjects. They are: (i) Conservative, (ii) Pragmatic, (iii) Social Justice,(iv) Personal Transformation, (v) World Order, and (vi) Ecological.

Conservative Approach. This is mainly an authoritarianapproach to peace, most often advocated by the established statesand super powers. This is an approach of buildingpeace throughstrength and authority This approach believes in crisis management.It is skeptical about total peace. A limited peace is its ideal. It is a kindof a “police” approach to peace. According to this approach, peace isequated with order; and a little bit of violence may be necessary tomaintain order. In respect of international order, proponents of thisapproach do not advocate complete disarmament. They say we mustlearn to live with nuclear weapons. Both the United States and theSoviet Union, during the Cold War period, based their policies onpeace on this approach. The advocates of this approach hardlybelieve that ordinary people could make a difference in buildingpeace. This is a big brother approach to world peace.

Pragmatic Approach. This approach assumes neutrality inideology and attempts to build peace through pragmatic andpractical means. It does not care much about philosophy, values orpoliticalideals. The best possible degree of peace is its ideal. Thetermination of war is one of its main objectives. In this approach,there is no much concern about structural violence in society. Theapproach is based on international diplomacy. It strongly assumesthat peace ultimately derives from effective negotiation andbargaining. These negotiations should be based on international lawand treaties. In achieving peace, the mediation by neutral parties couldplay a major role. Under this approach, there is an attempt to strengtheninternational standards and mechanisms for peace. Nucleardisarmament is a major objective of peace. The United Nations usually

46


bases its policies on pragmatism. There are merits and weaknesses inthis approach.

Social Justice Approach. This is an advocacy for positive peace.This approach analyzes long-term reasons for the breach of peace insociety. The main advocates of this approach are the followers of JohanGaltung. A Norwegian by nationality, Galtung was the founding fatherof the Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO). The main focus ofthis approach is on structural violence and its elimination. Socialinjustices such as poverty, hunger racism, chauvinism andeconomic exploitation are the results of structural violence. Tobuild peace in the long run these issues should be addressed positively.This approach is for a new social order that could foster equality, justiceand social harmony. The latter are attributes of what they mean bypositive peace.

Personal Transformation Approach. Preamble to theUNESCO Constitution states; “Since wars begin in the minds, it is inthe minds of men that the defenses of peace must be constructed.”The personal transformation approach has much to do with thisproposition. The roots of it, however, can be traced to many religiousphilosophies. This approach is concerned with the ultimategoal ofresolving contradictions within and between individuals. There isa psychological aspect to this approach. Advocacy of non-violence isa major method of this approach as advocated by Mahatma Gandhiand Martin Luther King. This approach finds something wrong withthe contemporary socialisation processes. There is much emphasis onpeace education as a means to peace. Educationists and socialpsychologists are the main advocates of this approach.

World Order Approach. This is popular among academics,particularly in the international relations field. Nevertheless, it is aninterdisciplinary approach of the global system and its problems ofpeace in a holistic fashion. It approaches theproblems of peace notin isolation but in relation to development, justice and human

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~~NFLICT~SOLUT~~NANDPE;ACE~T~IESAN~TROOUCT~RYHANDB~~K f

rights. The approach is systematic in character. It is normative in thesense that it values peace as a higher goal and attempts to achieve itthrough advocating necessary policies. It is value-oriented, non-elitistand rejects neutrality. It is by far the most comprehensive and coherentapproach to peace. Extensive research and investigation support thisapproach.

Ecological Approach. This is an approach developed particularlyby Professor Fred Knehnan. A natural scientist (Physicist) by training,he was the founding Director of the Vancouver Peace Council inCanada. He has tried to synthesize positive aspects of all earlierapproaches, mainly the last three and develop a new approach. It isvery close to the last approach, the world order model. The approachseeks to establish linkages between three sets of problems. They are:(i) Peace/War (ii) Development/Environment (iii) Human Rights/Justice.The approach argues that all these sets of issues are related andinterlinked. The objective of the approach is towards creating asustainable future in which peace will also be sustainable. Aconsiderable attention in this approach is paid for problem solving. Italso emphasises the importance of peace movements. Peace studiesand peace education are also considered to be of paramount importancein the peace movements.

Similarities and Differences. There are several similarities anddifferences between the above six approaches. The first twoapproaches, the conservative and the pragmatic, are very close innature. Both are elitist. They consider war and violence to be outcomesof power struggles. Therefore, the attempt is either to crush the newpower seekers or to bring agreement between them. While theconservative approach pursues the first, the pragmatic approach pursuesthe second. American policy towards Iraq is a good example for theconservative approach. Neutral countries and the UN, in contrast,pursue a more pragmatic approach to bring peace to various issues.Pragmatic approach has various merits in the short term in bringingpeace to various issues such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

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There are general similarities between the other four approaches.They are non-elitist in nature. They all consider people’s participationas important in building peace in the world. For all of them, peace is avalued normative goal. But they differ largely in emphasizing differentapproaches in achieving peace. The social justice and the personaltransformation are two complimentary approaches. Both are particularlyrelated to eliminating civil war or political violence due to ethnic andsocial disharmony. They have equal application in resolving domesticviolence as well. The main vision of the social justice approach is equityor distributive justice. The personal transformation approach tries tocapture the hearts and minds of human beings in building peace.

There are major similarities between the world order and theecological approaches. Both are applicable to civil wars, as well asregional/international wars. Particularly, the latter has a specificapplication in analyzing and resolving political violence in countrycontexts as well. These are well-developed academic models in studyingand analyzing issues of war, violence and peace. Both are holistic innature and take into account almost all the relevant variables for analysis.The ecological approach is more advanced. According to Knelman:

I1 Peace is not simply the absence of war or the mediation of conflict

1 but rather a dynamic balance between mutually reinforcingi elements of emotional, economic, political, cultural, natural, ethicalr and technological variables.i

; Here, peace is equated to harmony. This is philosophical.. Emotional disharmony in a person creates tension. So does injustice., It is the mother of personal frustration, depression, anger or aggression.

Harmony means free-from-harm and free-from-injustice. Social or: political disharmony and injustice create violence and war. This has

been the situation throughout history.

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3. The War Problem

There are two types of war: (i). internal or civil war, which occurswithin countries and, (ii). international war, which occurs betweencountries. Elimination or termination of war is a major challenge to thepeace problem. Before analyzing this problem we need to understandit. To understand it properly, we need a proper definition about war.We don’t call feuds, riots or small-scale violence war although theyare related to the peace problem. War is a major and a specific peaceproblem. Ronald J. Glossop in his Conznting War ( 1987), has offereda good definition about war, which says; “War is large scale violentconflict between organized groups that are or that aim to establishgovernments.”

War is large-scale violent conflict. The parties to the conflict areeither governments (e.g. in World War II) or organized groups thataim to establish government (e.g. civil war in Rwanda). Or one partycan be a government while the other party aims to establish agovernment. The latter is the case in Israel-PLO conflict or Sri Lanka-LTTE conflict.

Types of War. There are various types of war. There can be warbetween nations with equal power or unequal power A powerful nationmight wage war to conquer a poor or a weak nation. This is calledimperialist or colonial war. The reason for the war is obviouslyunjustified. There is no dispute here where both parties are equallyresponsible. Therefore, there is no question of mitigation. Peace in thiscase should be based on a complete withdrawal of armies and perhapswith compensation and war reparation.

On the other hand, when a colonized nation is trying to liberateitself from an imperialist master it is called a war of national liberation.This is popularly considered a just war, a justified one. There havebeen a series of national liberation wars in Asia and Africa after theend of the World War II. However, Mahatma Gandhi insisted that“war” of national liberation should be non-violent.


There are other types. A secessionist war is one in which someregions try to secede from the nation (e.g. Bangladesh against Pakistanor Eritrea against Ethiopia). Territorial civil war is another in whicheach of the opposing groups is seeking control of the whole nation(e.g. Rwanda or Angola). A revolutionary war is yet another, in whichan organized group (e.g. JVP) seeks to overthrow the existinggovernment and establish itself as the decision-maker for the wholenation. It should be noted, however, that a particular war mightexemplify more than one type that we have identified. For example,there can be a war between an established government and asecessionist group within a country where the secessionist groupreceives assistance from another country. In this case, the war is botha civil as well as an international one. This was the situation in Bangladeshin 1971.

Effects of War. War is a major problem for peace. Even alimited or negative peace is better than war In a negative peacesituation (in the absence of war) there may or may not be injustice. Butin a war situation there is definitely injustice. In a war, people are killedand maimed. Their property is destroyed. This is simply because theyare on the other side or sometimes simply because they just appear tobe there.

Bombs, missiles and machine guns do not always hit the targets.They most often hit other things. Even soldiers have little or no choiceabout participating in the war. They are conscripted or forced into warby power seekers. Most of them are innocent victims.

War always motivates people to be suspicious and spiteful ofpeople on the other side. Only peace makes it possible for people tobe more humane and sympathetic towards people in the other groups.This is common to civil wars as well as to international ones.

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4. A Peace Problem?

It is also possible for negative peace to be a bad thing. A societycan be a peaceful one, at least superficially, in which a ruthless dictatorrules with an iron fist. Freedom or rights will not prevail under thecircumstances. The decisions of the dictator will be arbitrary, ruthlessand oppressive. There can be resentment and opposition underneath.But no one would dare even to raise a voice against the dictator becauseof the fear of reprisal. Therefore, it is quite possible to think of a so-called peace situation where there is so much injustice. Even war wouldbe better, if it means a chance of getting rid of the dictator.

Even the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (of the UnitedNations) argued in its Preamble that “if man is not to be compelled tohave recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny andoppression, that human right should be protected by the rule of law.”

Here, rebellion was considered a recourse against tyranny andoppression although as a last resort.

Just War. The above is a basis for a “just war theory.” This theoryargues that under certain circumstances injustice is intolerably grossthat even violence and war seem to be justified. It is on a similar basisthat Marxists advocated revolutionary violence to overthrow what theycalled capitalist dictatorship. But the benefits of peace and horrors ofwar are such that it does not make sense to start a war over everyinjustice.

As Glossop explained:

An important part of the ‘just war’ theory is the notion that themeans must be proportional to the ends which can be expected.If a little violence, not too destructive, can get rid of a great dealofinjustice, then such violence may be justified. But if, like modemwar, it is likely to create more evil than it will remove, thenviolence is not justified. In view of the destructiveness of modemwar, “just war” theorists are tending towards the idea that thelarge-scale violence of war is virtually never justified.

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5. Is Violence Inherent?

Is violence inherent in human beings? Is it part of our naturalbiology? Some people say yes, not so openly but by implication anddiscretely. There are always lingering doubts about peace. Oneobjective of peace studies is to dispel them. This is the question thatwe are trying to investigate in this section. Our answer is an emphaticno. But we need to substantiate it scientifically.

In 1989, under the auspices of UNESCO, a group of wellrenowned scientists from different parts of the world met in Seville, avillage in Spain. They thoroughly investigated the question and cameup with a statement called The Seville Statement on Eolence. Thestatement was subtitled by the phrase “Preparing the Ground for theConstruction of Peace”. These scientists, in their Introduction to thestatement, declared:

Some people say that violence and war cannot be ended becausethey are part of our natural biology. We say that is not true.People used to say that slavery and domination by race and sexwere part of our biology. Some people even claimed they couldprovethesethings scientificahy. We now know they were wrong.Slavery has been ended and now the world is working to enddomination by race and sex.

That was a powerful declaration for peace, against violence andwar. The statement contained five propositions. These propositionsare worth summarizing for careful study.

First Proposition. It is not scientific to say that war cannot beended because animals make war and people are like animals. First, itis not true that animals make war. Although fighting occurs widely amongsome animal species, only a few cases of destructive fighting betweenorganized groups have ever been reported. The inter-colony conflictsof ants, wolves or monkeys do not involve the use of destructive toolsand institutionalization of conflict, which are common to human warfare.

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CONFLlCT RESOLUTION AND PEACE STUDIES AN INTRODUCTORY HANDBOOK

Second, it is not true that people are just like animals. (It might be aninsult to animals!) Unlike animals, people have human culture.

Second Proposition. It is not scientific to say that war cannot beended because it is part of our nature and genetic formation. Argumentsabout human nature cannot prove anything definitive. Because ourhuman culture gives us the ability to change and shape our nature fromone generation to another. It is not only the nature which determineshuman personality but its interaction with nature. The conditions ofnature involve both ecological and social environments. Darwin’s theoryis not about the survival of the strongest but the survival of the fittest.People that make war in certain circumstances may live in peace withneighboursunder other circumstances. The Vikings (in Denmark) werewarriors at one time. Their descendants are the most peaceful peopleat present.

Third Proposition. It is not scientific to say that aggression andviolence are necessary for the humans to survive better. Violence isnot in our evolutionary legacy. This view underestimates the importanceof cooperation in human survival. Cooperation shown by humansocieties in food gathering, hunting and food production are mostremarkable behavioral qualities of human beings. The traditionalaththam (giving hand to others) system in Sri Lankan village life is onegood example. Community practices in village life are almost universalin every society at the grass-roots level. Cooperation has been especiallyimportant to the survival of human species.

Fourth Proposition. It is not scientific to say that humans have a“violent brain.” While we do have neural apparatus to act violently, it isnot automatic. How we act is shaped by how we have been conditionedand socialized. It has been proved by scientific investigation that humanphenomena such as crime and war are not an inevitable result of any“neural cruelty.” The scientists that gathered in Seville concluded thatthere is nothing in our neurophysiology that compels us to react violently.


Fifth Proposition. It is not scientific to say that war is caused by“instinct” or any single motivation. The behavior of soldiers in modemwarfare has little to do with their perceived aggressiveness. Modernwarfare uses a number of personal characteristics for training of soldiers.It exaggerates characteristics associated with violence, both in thetraining of soldiers and generating support for war among the generalpopulation. This is despicable. These systematically generated violentcharacteristics are not the causes but the consequences of war.

The statement also had a conclusion. It stated that biology doesnot condemn humanity to war. Just as “war begins in the minds ofmen,” peace also begins in our minds. The same species that inventedwar is capable of inventing peace. The responsibility lies with eachof us.

6. A Historical Outlook

A historical outlook might be necessary to understand how warand peace developed in human society. These developments are linkedto the origins of the state and its evolution as a national state in moderntimes. It is also within the conflicts between national states and itsinternational system that many of the devices and mechanisms for peacehave been invented.

Origins of War and Peace. The origins of war and peace arerelated to the origins of the state. It is difficult to know with precisionwhen the state originated. Nomadic groups of people must have hadsome informal structures to make decisions for theirrespective societies.But the state in the sense of a permanent structure to control largecommunities by a small group of rulers, probably arose with permanentsettlements, agrarian and urban. This must have happened over sixthousand years ago. The known states were in the Tigris-EuphratesValley.

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The original states made war against each other for wealth andpower like in the present day warfare. They also made peace, althoughnot permanent. The first known peace treaty was inscribed in clayaround 300 B.C. War between small states became terminated whena powerful sovereign created an empire encompassing all small states.What they followed was, in a sense, the conservative approach forpeace (See our discussion on different approaches). Peace wasestablished under firm and ruthless authority. However, when the leaderwho created that empire died, a new cycle of warfare again erupted.Or there was warfare between empires.

Three of the powerful empires in the Middle East were Hittite,Egyptian and Assyrian. Around 1400 B.C., these three empires enteredinto a non-aggression pact. About a century later, the Hittites andEgyptians formed an alliance against the expanding Assyrian Empire.What is important in this ancient history is that it is very much similar towar and peace in the present day world.

A parallel violent development to war was class struggle. Thiswas clearly visible during the Roman Empire. Since the third centuryB.C., the Roman Empire spread into vast areas, internally suppressingclass stmggle and externally conquering other countries. It was theperiod of Pax Romana. Slaves and slave trade were extensively usedin building this empire.

Similar developments occurred in Asia. China and India weretwo major centres for state and empire building in Asia Burma Thailandand Cambodia were three other minor centres. The formation anddevelopment of Asian states and empires also involved war and internalviolence, though with intermittent peace.

National State. The development of a national state system fromthe beginning of the modem era (1 6th century A.D.) is generallyconsidered to be favorable to peace in the world. This considerationmight not be completely correct. However, it is assumed that a national

56


state system, compared to previous empires could contain internalviolence and external aggression. It is true that after the Peace Treatyof Westphalia in 1648 this objective was fairly achieved in WesternEurope. After that period, national boundaries were established forSpain, France, England, the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden,Switzerland, Poland, Austria, Hungary and Russia. The areas presentlymake up Germany and Italy consisted of many smaller states.

Before that, extreme violence and war marked the period between1350 and 1650. Peasants and townspeople fought feudal nobles, kingsfought Emperor and the Pope, Protestants fought Catholics and onenationality fought another The fighting came to a climax in the ThirtyYears War(1618-48).

National state is a stable state with a defined territory, a stablepopulation and a sovereign government. It is not like the unstable ancientstate systems of empires and precarious kingdoms. This is why aninternational system with well-defined national states is considered tobe more conducive to peace and stability.

Colonialism. But the above assumption was not completelycorrect. After the emergence of national states, war between Westerncountries became escalated in conquering and demarcating theterritories of Americas, Asia and Africa. The main victims were thepeople of these colonized continents. Now the game was “war andpeace.” After each war, there was a peace treaty. It was as if theywere following the pragmatic approach to peace (See our previousdiscussion on different approaches). The purpose of these treaties wasnot to bring peace to the inhabitants, but to demarcate and redemarcatethe colonial territories between them. For example, after the SevenYears War (1757-63) between France and Britain, the Treaty of Pariswas signed. It gave British control over North America and the EastCoast of India.

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CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PEACE STUDIES AN INTRODUCTORY HANDBOOK C

War in Europe also did not end just because of the Treaty ofWestphalia. There was continuous war after the French Revolution.But the West invented another mechanism, “international conferencing,”to resolve conflict. In a limited sense, “international conferencing” canbe considered as a way to peace. The Congress of Vienna ( I 8 14- 15)was such a conference. It redrew the map of Europe. Throughout thenineteenth century, the Western powers were competing for territory.Marxists analyzed war as a natural outcome of what they calledimperialism. The big powers negotiated their conflicts with each otherwhile using military force to subdue small powers and non-industrializedsocieties.

World War I. Power competition escalated in the early twentiethcentury as the race for colonies and military superiority became moreintense. Italy and Germany were very aggressive as late comers to thecompetition. The competing European nations formed differentalliances. Competition for influence was intense in the Balkan region(This is the area where ethnic conflicts and civil war are intense eventoday). The assassination of an Austrian prince by a Serbian insurgentsparked the world war. Even before the incident, the belligerent nationshad their war plans already made. The Treaty of Versailles (19 19)provided a settlement after the war Germany was punished. It lost alloverseas possessions and had to pay reparations to the victors. It hasbeen argued whether the punitive settlement was conducive to peacein the long run. New states were created (Czechoslovakia andYugoslavia). Some nations became independent.

The League of Nations. The Treaty of Versailles also providedfor the formation of the League of Nations. It was a new invention. Aninvention of a permanent international organization to promote andprotect peace. The US President Woodrow Wilson was the mainarchitect of the League. But he failed to persuade the US Senate toratify the treaty. As a consequence, the US could not become a memberof the League.

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One argument of the world order approach (that we have outlinedearlier) has been to emphasize the importance of a permanentinternational organization to preserve peace. The League achieved thesaid objective. But the international organization should be strong, andstrong enough to prevent new military build up. But the League couldnot achieve the second objective. The League was weak. It was noteffective in preventing military build up of many countries, particular1 yGermany, Japan and Italy. Therefore, it could not preserve peace inthe long run. In 193 1, Japan captured Manchuria from China. In 1935-36, Italy conquered Ethiopia. However, the League was helpless.

World War II. The German invasion of Poland in September1939 was considered to be the beginning of World War II. However,Japan had invaded China in 1937. The rise of Fascism in Germany,Japan, Italy and Spain was the background to the war. Fascism was aparticular authoritarian ideology based on the superiority of particularraces. This kind of ideology was proved to be extremely inimical topeace everywhere. It created both internal and external aggression. InGermany, the minority community of Jews was almost exterminated.Germany took over Denmark, Norway, Luxembourg, Belgium, theNetherlands and France, and attacked Britain and Russia.

The rise of Fascism occurred within a background of worldeconomic crisis and depression. The situation vindicated the argument(of the social justice approach) that war and peace are related to deep-rooted social, economic, political and ecological conditions. However,after the war had erupted into such worldwide proportions, only forcecould stop its further escalation. This is a tragedy in war and peace.After a strong assault by combined forces, Germany surrendered inMay 1945. But Japan surrendered in August of the same year afterthe Americans had dropped-newly developed atomic bombs onHiroshima and Nagasaki. It is arguable whether the atomic bomb wasnecessary or not. The consequences of the bomb was devastating forthe ordinary Japanese people for decades to come.

CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PEACE STUDIES AN INTRODUCTORY HANDBOOK C

Cold War. The Allied nations formed the United Nations topreserve the peace achieved at the end of World War II. However,within three years after the end of the war, the Cold War broke outbetween the Soviet Union and the Western powers. Quarrels developedover the terms of peace. Berlin was a major flashpoint. The Westernpowers formed a new military alliance, the North Atlantic TreatyOrganization (NATO). The Communist countries formed the WarsawPact in retaliation. There were revolutions, war and violence in China,Korea and Vietnam. Korea became divided. Eventually, Vietnam alsobecame divided. The country could unite itself only after 1975.

Another feature of the post-war period was the gaining ofindependence by many former colonies. Most of them achievedindependence only after military struggles. Algeria and Indonesia weretwo major examples. America gave independence to the Philippines in1946 and Britain to India, Pakistan, Burma and Sri Lanka in I947-48. There were widespread violence between Hindus and Muslimsbefore and after independence of India and Pakistan.

The decolonization process was generally considered to befavorable to world peace. Otherwise, more struggles and war wouldhave been the result. The decolonization of most of the African countriescame late - in the 1960s. The process of decolonization strengthenedthe UN membership, allowing a more equitable world order. The newly-independent countries, forming themselves under the Non-AlignedMovement (NAM), also played a balancing role in world affairs.

The Cold War was a discrete war. Most of the pawns were theformer colonies. For the Arab-Israeli conflict, there were reasons(the Palestinian question) other than the super-power rivalries. But thesuper-power rivalries reinforced them. There were wars in 1948, 1956,1967, 1973 and 1982. This situation also created continuous conflictsin Lebanon among various religious factions. There were internalconflicts in many African countries (Rwanda, Zaire, Zambia, Algeria,Sudan, Nigeria, Uganda, Burundi, Zimbabwe, Ghana, Chad, Angola,


Mozambique, Ethiopia, and Morocco), directly and indirectly fueledby external powers. Indochina (Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos) wasanother stage for the Cold War drama. Struggles were not restrictedto the newly independent countries. Especially after the CubanRevolution in 1959, the superpower rivahies became intensified throughvarious factions and regimes in Latin America.

As we could see from our historical overview, war between city-states has evolved through national states to super power rivalries.Growing military power has been the key ingredient in this development.Although the Cold War is now over, the growing military power ofdifferent nations still constitutes the major element in peace problem.

7. Need for Disarmament

The need for disarmament is a need for peace. This has beenproved through history. War is old as civilization. But wars fought todayare completely different to wars fought four or five thousand yearsago. The most obvious is the difference in the weapons used. Until thefourteenth century, there were only minor changes in the manner inwhich the wars were fought. The chiefweapons were bows and arrows,swords, shields, catapults and spears. Major changes occurred whengunpowder was introduced. As a result, cannons replaced catapults,while guns and bullets replaced bows and arrows.

New Changes. After the Industrial Revolution, new and moredestructive weapons becameinvented by new technology. Thedevelopment of weaponry first included the invention of landmines,torpedoes, grenades, machine guns, and tanks, submarines and bombsthat can be dropped from airplanes. Then came the mass destructiveweaponry such as nuclear and thermonuclear (hydrogen) bombs. Theywere accompanied by the invention of chemical and biologicalweaponry. War and war preparations have come to involve more andmore people in many ways.

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CONFLICT RESOLlJTION AND PEACE STUDIES AN INTRODUCTORY HANDBOOK

War has become an industry. There was a distinction betweenmilitary personnel and civilians earlier But this distinction has increasinglydisappeared. All are at stake and involved in a modem day war. Duringa war, the countries involved commit a great deal of human and financialresources to the fight. Even during peacetime, the top priority of manynations is on national security.

Consequences of War. The consequences of war, as a result ofadvanced weaponry, are a major challenge to peace. Quincy Wrightwho studied data from 1480 to 1940 in his A Study of War says:

It is clear that during the modem period there has been a trendtoward an increase in the absolute and relative size of armieswhether one considers the peace time army, the number mobilizedfor war, the number of combatants engaged in battle, or thenumber of military and civil populations devoting themselves towar work.

The proportion of the population engaged in the armies hastended to become larger, and the number of the battles has tendedincrease. As a result, the proportion of the population dying as adirect consequence of battle has tended to increase.

It is estimated that the number of battle deaths of military personnelalone was 9,000,OOO in World War I and 15,000,OOO in World WarII. Total deaths from warfare have been two to three times greater inthe 20th century than during the 19th century. During the Six-Day Warbetween Israel and Arab countries in 1967 there were about 19,600battle-related deaths, which was about 3,266 per day.

Costs of War. The worldwide expenditure for military purposesis now about three billion a day. Although the Cold War is over, thearms race is still on. As one superpower is gone, the other tries tomaintain a world hegemony; and new ones are emerging to replace thegone one. Nuclear race is extremely intense between the middle powers

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(e.g. India-Pakistan) than between the big ones. Arms expenditure isescalating in countries engulfed with civil wars. Guerrilla armies areamassing arms and war technology in so far unknown proportions.

The governments facing such threats are diverting money to themilitary from civilian purposes. The welfare and development of thepeople suffer. It is not correct to say that the danger of a Third WorldWar is over. If something goes wrong, the human costs will bedevastating. There are over 50,000 nuclear warheads in the worldtoday. Each is bigger than the bombs dropped in Hiroshima andNagasaki. Not only the blast and heat of each bomb, but the radiation,which the bombs unleash, can be devastating to the whole ofhumanity.Not only the countries at war, but also the whole world will suffer.

The argument that the countries will not use nuclear weapons evenif there is another world war is not correct. It is not consistent with thelogic of war. The aim of war is to win. In a war, if either side is facingdefeat, it will use nuclear weapons. If the winning side anticipates thelosing side to use nuclear weapons, they would want to use them before.If the losing side anticipates that the winning side would feel it that way,then they would prefer to use them before the winning side. The end ofthe logic would be that both sides will be forced to use nuclear weaponsas soon as the war begins.

If there was any rationality on the part ofbelligerents not to usenuclear weapons in a war, it would not allow a war to develop in thefirst place. The only way to prevent a nuclear holocaust is to preventany war between any nuclear power, small or big. But we cannot ignorethe possibility that a nuclear war might trigger by accident. CharlesOsgood reported the incident in October 1960 that the US was aboutto attack the Soviet Union, mistaking early warning signals about aSoviet attack on the US!

The debacle was prevented because the officer in charge knewthat the Soviet Prime Minister Khrushchev was in New York at that

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CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PEACE STUDIES AN INTRODUCTORY HANDBOOK C-

time and it was unlikely that the Soviets were to launch an attack at rsuch a time. After the above incident, a (Teletype) hotline was Eestablished between Moscow and Washington to prevent that kind of ran accident. However, now the Soviet Union is dissolved into various rrepublics, there are more nuclear powers in the region than before. i

There are also other nuclear powers, which have emerged during thelast decade or so. The latest additions to this list are India and Pakistan. ;

Progress in Disarmament. The picture is not completely gloomy.There has been some progress in the world’s disarmament efforts.However, the efforts started only after all major powers, the big five(US, Soviet Union, Britain, France and China), joined the nuclear club.The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was signed in 1968 and cameinto operation in 1970. A major objective of this treaty was to preventother countries becoming nuclear powers. This has not been to thesatisfaction of emerging powers although a large majority of countrieshave signed this treaty now.

’

The treaty also did not do anything to prevent the stockpiling ofstrategic weapons, including nuclear arms by the big powers. It was toaddress this issue that Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) wereinitiated. After series of talks, the SALT I treaty was concluded betweenthe two super powers in 1972. This was the first successful effort toconstrain the nuclear arms race. However, this was an interim agreementfor five years. After some dragging of feet, the SALT II was concludedin 1979. However, its implementation was impaired because ofsuperpower controversy. Apart from the new right wing administrationin the US under Ronald Reagan, the atmosphere for arms control wasalso spoiled by the Soviet invasion of Afghanstan.

The situation eased only after Mikhail Gorbachev came to powerin 1985. There has been much progress in the area of strategic armscontrol since then. The two super powers signed an agreement onIntermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) in 1987. It managed to


remove about one-fifth of the existing nuclear weapons in the worldand paved the way for more and more arms control and removal. Thenew way of looking at the problem was the Strategic Arms ReductionTalks (START). There have been several rounds of talk and theachievements are considerable. The latest addition to the disarmamenteffort is the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Although thishas made some progress, some countries, including India and Pakistan,have refused to sign this treaty.

8. Role of the UN

The role of the UN in ensuring world peace is a decisive one.Peace was the main objective of forming the UN in 1945. However,the powers and mechanisms it has under its disposal to ensure worldpeace are limited. Compounding this limitation, the organization is alsoengulfed with serious power rivalries. During the Cold War (1948-90)these rivalries were paramount. Although the atmosphere has nowchanged due to the supposed end of the Cold War, power rivalries stillcontinue and obstruct peace. It might be necessary to outline the basicstructure and development of this organization before evaluating itsrole in ensuring world peace. This will be done, however, with a viewon peace.

Membership. The UN started in 1945 with a membership of 48countries. The limited membership was mainly a reflection ofcolonialism. Many countries of the world, especially in the continentsof Africa and Asia, were under colonial masters. The United Nationsrightly considered this situation to be a threat to world peace. Therefore,decolonisation was one of its principal policies to promote world peace.Gradually, over a hundred countries have become independent underthe promotion of the UN. These countries eventually acquiredmembership of this august body. By 1990, there were 165 membercountries in the UN.

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Another threat for peace was considered to be the Russian (orcommunist) hegemony in Eastern Europe and Soviet Asia. This was amajor reason for the Cold War. This situation became diffused afterthe fall of the Soviet Union in 199 1. As a result, over 15 new nationshave emerged. At present, the UN membership amounts to 190. It isbelieved that when the world community consists of its organiccomponents (i.e. independent nations), there is a better balance in worldpolitics. This is one argument of the world order approach. However,the short-term result of these developments has been continuous unrest,violence and civil war in Eastern Europe.

Structure. The UN is not a world government. It is an internationalassociation of nation states for the protection and promotion of peace,among other things. It has six main bodies: the General Assembly, theSecurity Council, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), theTrusteeship Council, the International Court of Justice (ICI) and theSecretariat. All these are not dealing with peace.

The main body of the UN is its General Assembly. All membercountries sit in this assembly. One country has one vote. However, it isnot the most powerful body in the organization. It has an importantrole to play in the promotion of peace in the long run. This role has sofar been performed in developing policies and recommending guidelinesfor the member countries. It has also initiated many actions under theSecretariat towards the promotion of disarmament and arms control.

The use of child soldiers in armed conflict, the menace of land minesand the prevention of international terrorism are three major areas thatthe General Assembly has undertaken for its policy development inrecent times. Various committees and commissions of the GeneralAssembly also have played a major role in developing internationaltreaties with a view to prevent war and to promote peace. One of itsimportant functions is to approve the budget of the organization forvarious activities, including peace and disarmament.

Cl-


A major weakness of the General Assembly is that its decisionshave no binding power over the member countries. It conducts itsaffairs through statements and resolutions. The statements are largelyrhetoric. The resolutions are only recommendations. It is also helplessin preventing war or aggression in the short run. The General Assemblymeets only once a year. It has no executive arm of its own other thanthe Secretariat. The Security Council mainly controls the Secretariat.The member countries or the General Assembly has only an indirectinfIuence.

Security Council. The Security Council consists of 15 membernations. Five major countries (Russia, UK, France, China and US)are Permanent Members. Ten other nations are elected every twoyears by the General Assembly. The Security Council is a permanentbody ready to be convened at any hour of the day or night to handlethreats to international peace and security. Its resolutions are bindingon all member nations although there are instances that these decisionsare not respected.

The Security Council is a controversial body. It is not a democraticbody elected by the General Assembly. The permanent members haveveto power quite contrary to accepted democratic principles. TheCouncil is politically polarized. This polarization was a major reasonfor the Cold War before 1990. It is argued that because of politicalself-interests of major/super powers in the Security Council, the worldpeace is hampered than preserved by its decisions. Some memberssometimes prevent the Security Council from taking important decisionson peace because of the use of veto power. Whatever the weaknesses,however, the Security Council has been the only effective mechanismin preventing a Third World War so far.

Dispute Settlement? The role of the Security Council so far hasbeen not in line with the principles of dispute settlement or conflictresolution. There have been two major instances where the SecurityCouncil took firm action regarding war.

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First was in 1950, during the Korean civil war. America took thisinitiative during a boycott of the Council by the Soviet Union. Therefore,the decision was not vetoed. However, the decision was partisan andled to the division of Korea into two, North and South. Without settlingthe dispute, the division of the country exacerbated the conflict with amassive human cost and security risks for the decades to come.

The second was in 1990, against the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.Thanks to the end of the Cold War, there was a general agreementbetween major powers on the issue. However, the decision was notonly to impose sanctions against Iraq but also to force its withdrawalfrom Kuwait by military means. This was a decision initiated by theUS with complete support of Britain. The decision was implementedeven going well beyond the terms of the Security Council decisions.

There is no question that Iraq went against the acceptedinternational norms of national sovereignty by invading Kuwait. By itsmilitary action, Iraq fbrther threatened the regional peace in no uncertainterms. There was the possibility of war spreading into neighboringcountries like Saudi Arabia. However, it is a controversial questionwhether the actions so far taken against Iraq by the Security Councilwere proportionate and in line with the norms of international peace.Sanctions have hit hard on the ordinary people of Iraq. The wholeprocess of weapons inspection has been engulfed with dispute andcontroversy. The US has taken unilateral decisions to wage militaryaction quite contrary to the expected results of peace.

The Iraqi issue has raised questions about the reliability of theSecurity Council mechanism to ensure peace and prevent war. Duringthe period between 1950 and 1990, the Council has not been able totake any worthwhile decision on international disputes because of theCold War controversies. Now the Cold War is over, it is not clearwhether the Council is going in the right direction. It has been argued,therefore, that the UN and especially the Security Council has to bereformed if it is to meet the challenges of war and peace in the 2 1ststCentury.


ICJ. The International Court of Justice is an important bodyconstituted under the Charter of the UN. It is a specialized body oflegal luminaries to decide upon international disputes. It has a majorpotential for preventing disputes escalating into conflicts and war if theservices of this body are utilized and the decisions adhered to. However,very few nations take their international disputes before this court. Someothers refuse to appear before it even if their cases are being referredto this court. Also, there is no “world police” to enforce the decisionsof this court ofjustice.

Peace Keeping. This has been a very useful function of the UN.It is the deployment of a peacekeeping force (soldiers) with theassistance of police and civilian personnel in order to prevent conflictsor to bring them under a reasonable control. These peacekeepingsoldiers are popularly called “Blue Helmets.” Since 1945, the UN hasbeen involved in over thirty-five peace keeping operations until now.A total of over 600,000 military, police and civilian personnel havebeen deployed in these operations. Nearly 1,000 of them, unfortunately,have died in the service of their cause. Peacekeeping forces are normallydeployed with the consent of the respective governments.

The nature of peacekeeping operations has evolved considerablyover years. For example, the mandate of the peacekeeping operationin Cambodia in early 1990s vastly differed from the mandate of thepeacekeeping operation deployed when India and Pakistan fought overthe issue of Kashmir in early 1950s. The recent peace keepingoperations have been more forceful and forthright with a strong backingof the Security Council. Moreover, in the case of Cambodia, forexample, the UN peacekeepers were deployed after a peace agreementbetween the respective parties. Therefore, the mandate was strongerand involved the decommissioning of the existing armies of variousfactions to the conflict as well. Cambodia was one of the most successfulpeace keeping operations of the UN.

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A major weakness of UN peacekeeping operations is that thedeployments completely depend on the soldiers supplied by variousmember governments of the UN. The UN has no standing army of itsown. The units supplied by different countries differ largely in training,experience and cultural background. They do not have any training inpeace keeping as such. Therefore, the behavior of these soldiers isvery much similar to ordinary soldiers in a conflict situation. As a result,they invariably tend to fue1 the conflicts than appeasing them. This hasbeen a major criticism about the UN peacekeeping operations.

Although there are general commanders to various peacekeepingoperations, the army units from different countries generally operateunder their own commands. Therefore, most of the operations do nothave proper coordination required for the respective tasks. This hasbeen a major reason to propose that the UN should have its ownpeacekeeping army with proper training and coordination.

Another weakness has been financial. The costs of peacekeepingoperations have tremendously increased with the expansion ofdeployments. One year’s bill is something like $1 billion. However,the contributions for these operations do not match the actual costs.There has always been a considerable debt owed by the UN to thetroop-contributing countries. However, the UN’s peacekeepingoperations have been commendable. In 1988, the UN peacekeepingforces won the Nobel Peace Prize for “demanding and hazardousservices in the cause of peace.”

Other Activities. Another important area that the UN has beeninvolved in is peace making. Peace making means initiatives to bringhostile or conflicting parties to agreement and peace settlements. Thisis also what we mean by conflict resolution. Since the ManilaDeclaration on Peaceful Settlement in 1982, the UN, and moreparticularly the Secretary General and his Office, have been involvedin direct peace making activities. As a third party in conflict resolution,UN has demonstrated more credibility than any other source.

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The UN in 1988/89 successfully negotiated the Soviet Union’swithdrawal from Afghanistan. It took a major role in the formulationand the execution of the Paris Agreements on Cambodia. The UNfacilitated the independence in Namibia and the transfer of power inSouth Africa. The UN has been successful in negotiating settlements inGuatemala, El Salvador and several other conflict-tom Latin Americancountries.

The UN has been making arrangements to get involved in a bigway in what it has called Preventive Diplomacy as well. It means theaction to prevent disputes from arising between parties and to preventexisting disputes from escalating into major conflicts. The measuresfor fact finding have taken a major role in this endeavor since preventivesteps must be based on timely and accurate facts. Recently, the UNalso has been developing valuable networks of early warning systemsconcerning risks of nuclear accidents, natural disasters, environmentalthreats and mass movements of populations. These incidents withoutcontrol can impinge on peace directly in many areas.

Another area that the UN has been assisting its member countriesis peace building. Measures for peace building involves assistance torefugees, displaced persons, the construction and reconstruction ofinfrastructure facilities and peace education in conflict zones both beforeand after peace settlements. The idea of post-conflict peace building isto prevent conflicts recurring due to lack of confidence or for materialdifficulties.

Difficulties/Weaknesses. There are enormous difficulties in thepath of peace by the UN. Some are financial. The entire UN systemhas an annual budget only of about $7 billion. This is less than a week’sexpenditure worldwide on the arms race. It is also less than the budgetof New York City Council. Yet it is only a small fraction of that totalUN budget which is spent on disarmament and peace activities.

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The UN system has a comparatively small staff. To address theissues of nearly 6 billion people in the world, the whole UN systemwith its specialized agencies has only about 50,000 staff members.This is not even one staff member for every 100,000 human beings. Itis often said that the UN spends a lot of money on paper work. This ishighly exaggerated. Its use of paper for one year is less than what isused for one Sunday edition of The New York Times.

A major weakness of the UN in terms of peace building seems tobe its lack of mandate and incapacity to involve itself in peacesettlements in internal conflicts. This incapacity emerges out of theCharter itselfbecause it prohibits, in Article 2 (7), the UN to get involvedin disputes without agreement of the disputant governments or theparties to a conflict. Only exception is when the Security Councilconsiders that such a conflict would pose a serious threat to worldpeace and security. This is entirely a political judgement and not ahumanitarian one. What it means is that the UN can ignore someconflicts and intervene in some others.

Most of the political conflicts since World War II have been internalthan international. These conflicts have been mostly due to ethnic,religious or similar social rivalries. Others are of rebellious orrevolutionary nature based on ideology or political perspective. TheDepartment of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University inSweden annually reports on these conflicts. It has been continuouslyreported that internal armed conflicts are on the increase after the endof the Cold War and they are being dragged on with considerablehuman costs. There are about 150 conflicts of this nature in the worldat present. These conflicts involve more than one third of the membercountries of the UN, yet the organization has not been in a position toresolve or at least intervene in them due to internal weaknesses orrestrictions.


In our discussions on peace studies in this chapter we have nottouched upon internal conflicts and conflict resolution due to the factthat these themes are being discussed in other chapters. Students ofpeace studies, however, need to keep in mind that these subjects areclosely interconnected and the chapters on peace studies and conflictresolution are complimentary to each other.

9. Conclusion

What is the best way to conclude our discussion on peace studies?Perhaps by invoking some new thinking on the subject as a summary.The best person to draw some inspiration from, perhaps, is EdwardDe Bono. He is the author of Lateral Thinking and Conflicts: ABetter Way to Resolve Them. He invented the term ‘lateral thinking’to explain a new type of creative thinking. Now he has applied thisthinking to better understand and resolve conflicts. This is not to saythat all what he says is valid and true. But there is a lot to learn from histhinking.

Traditionally, people consider the “absence of war” as theirapproach to peace. But according to De Bono, the “absence of peace”is our problem. We need to discuss the problem of peace from thepoint of view of peace and not from the point of view of war. There issomething wrong in our traditional way of thinking! What is wrong isthat we think in arguments. Peace is not an argument. Peace cannot beachieved through argument. Peace is a social design, a creative one atthat.

Argument is the most venerated in the Western thinking tradition.We tend to approach peace and contlict resolution through this tradition.When we have disputes we either try to fight/litigate or negotiate/bargain.This has been the history of war and peace. This is what we havefound through our historical exploration in this chapter as well as in ourdiscussions on the UN activities. But disputes are due to different

73


interests or opinions. We never try to harmonize these interests andopinions. We may succeed in avoiding confhct or war in the short runthrough “argument thinking” i.e. negotiation and bargain. But we neverachieve peace in the long run.

De Bono tried to draw some clues from the Asian tradition.Referring to Japan he said: “It would be extremely bad manners to tella person that he was wrong or his idea incorrect. It might even havebeen criminal to suggest that something ought to be changed. [Instead,they say] that is wonderful and perfect and cannot be improved, nowlet’s explore.” This is the secret to design a way out for peace. Peaceis an exploration for social harmony. The approach of De Bono, whileunique in its own way, strengthens the positive elements of social justiceand ecological approaches that we have discussed at the beginning ofthis chapter.

Summary

In this chapter, you have learned the following:

On Peace

l Peace is not just the absence of war. Peace also means the absenceof causes and conditions for war and violence.

l If peace is absence of violence it should also mean the absence ofhidden, structural violence.

On Approaches to Peace

l There are six approaches to peace and peace studies:

1. Conservative Approach: An authoritarian approach, oftenadvocated by the states and super powers.

74

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2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

Pragmatic Approach: This looks at peace from a practicalpoint of view, focusing more on negotiations, diplomacy andpractical objectives than on ideals or philosophies.

Social Justice Approach: The main focus is on structuralviolence and its elimination.

Personal Transformation Approach: This approach believesin the ultimate goal of resolving contradictions within andbetween individuals.

World Order Approach: This approach peace in relation todevelopment, justice and human rights.

Ecological Approach: The focus is on building a sustainablefuture for peace also to be sustainable.

On War

l There are two types of war: internal or civil wars and internationalwars.

0 War is a large-scale violent conflict.

l War is a problem for peace. A limited peace is better than war.

On Violence

0 It is wrong to assume that violence is inherent in human beings.

0 There is nothing natural in violence.

References/Readings

David Adams, The Seville Statement on Violence: Preparingthe Groundfor the Construction of Peace, UNESCO, Paris, 199 1

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Sydney Bailey, Peaceful Settlement of Disputes: Ideas andProposals for Research, UN Institute for Training and Research, NewYork, 1970

Sydney Bailey, How Wars End: The United Nations and theTermination of Armed Conflicts, Oxford University Press, Oxford,1983 t

Frank Barnaby (Ed.), Building a More Democratic United Nations, iFrank Cass, London, 199 1

Edward De Bono, Conflicts: A Better Way to Resolve Them,Penguin, London, 199 1

Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, United Nations, NewYork, 1992

D. W. Bowett (Ed.), The Search for Peace, Routledge, London, 1972

Grenville Clark and Louis Sohn, World Peace Through World Law,Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1960

Brian Crozier, A Theory of Conflict, Hamish Hamilton, London, 1974

Richard Falk, Samuel S. Kim, Saul H. Mendlovitz (Eds.), Towards aJust World Order, Westview Press, Boulder, 1982

Mary L. Foster and Robert A. Rubinstein, Peace and War: CrossCultural Perspectives, Transaction Books, New Brunswick, 1986

Ed Garcia, War and Peace Making, Claretian Publications, Quezon,1994.

Ronald J. Glossop, Confrronting War, McFarland, Jefferson, N. C.,1987

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Sydney Bailey, Peaceful Settlement of Disputes: Ideas andProposals for Research, UN Institute for Training and Research, NewYork, 1970

Sydney Bailey, How Wars End: The United Nations and theTermination of Armed Conjlicts, Oxford University Press, Oxford,1983

Frank Bamaby (Ed.), Building a More Democratic United Nations,Frank Cass, London, 199 1

Edward De Bono, Conflicts: A Better Way to Resolve Them,Penguin, London, 199 1

Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, United Nations, NewYork, 1992

D. W. Bowett (Ed.), The Search for Peace, Routledge, London, 1972

Grenville Clark and Louis Sohn, World Peace Through World Law,Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1960

Brian Crozier, A Theory of Conflict, Hamish Hamilton, London, 1974

Richard Falk, Samuel S. Kim, Saul H. Mendlovitz (Eds.), Towards aJust World Order, Westview Press, Boulder, 1982

Mary L. Foster and Robert A. Rubinstein, Peace and War: CrossCultural Perspectives, Transaction Books, New Brunswick, 1986

Ed Garcia, War and Peace Making, Claretian Publications, Quezon,1994.

Ronald J. Glossop, Confronting War, McFarland, Jefferson, N. C.,1987

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Ei CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PEACE STUDIES AN INTRODUCTORY HANDBOOK

Max Habicht, The Abolition of War, Club Humaniste, Paris, 1986

I Shirley Hazzard, Defeat of an Ideal: A Study of the Self-Destructionof the United Nations, Macmillan, London, 1973

Signe Howell and Roy Willis, Societies at Peace, Routledge, London,1989

Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues,Common Security: A Programme for Disarmament, Pan Publishers,London, 1982

John Kettle and Stephanie Dowrick (Eds.), After the Gulf War: ForPeace in the Middle East, Pluto Press, Sydney, 199 1

Dennis Pirages, Managing Political Conflict, Praeger, New York,1976

Robert F. Randle, The Origins of Peace: A Study of Peacemakingand the Structure of Peace Settlement, The Free Press, New York,1973

Emery Reves, The Anatomy of Peace, Penguin, London, 1945

Keith Suter, A New International Order: Proposals for Making aBetter World, World Federalists, 198 1

Keith Suter, Alternative to War: Conflict Resolution and thePeaceful Settlement of International Disputes, Women’sInternational League, Sydney, 1986

Brian, Urquhart, “Conflict Resolution in 1988: the Role of UnitedNations, ” in SIPRI Year Book 1989, Oxford University Press, NewYork, 1989

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6

Understanding the Ethnic Conflict and PeaceEfforts in Sri Lanka:

A Conflict Resolution PerspectiveS. I. Keethaponcalan

Introduction

The conflict between the Sinhalese and the Tarnils in Sri Lankahas not only caused immense destruction to the social, economic andpolitical institutions, but it has also claimed approximately 60,000 lives.In that sense the conflict has become the major influencing factor ofthe modem history of the island nation. Although some analysts tracethe historical origins of the conflict to the pre-colonial period, the mid-20th century witnessed the beginnings of a direct confrontation betweenthese two communities. Then in the 198Os, the conflict that hadremained a peaceful, political one, transformed itself into a violentconflict and war. As the destructive nature of the conflict graduallyescalated, a number of efforts were made to resolve the conflict bypeaceful means. However, the peace-making efforts failed to produceany fruitful and lasting outcomes. In this chapter, we will attempt tounderstand some dimensions of the conflict, the peace efforts and mainreasons for the failure of those peace processes.

Nature of the Conflict

Sri Lanka’s present conflict is generally described as an ethnicconflict. What it means is that (i) there are demands or political goalsof ethnic communities at the core of the conflict, and (ii) ethnic


communities are involved in the conflict. The word ‘ethnic’ is the mostcontemporary expression to refer to communities who have distinctcultural, linguistic or religious identities. Therefore, an ethnic conflictcan also be described as an identity conflict, arising from groupidentity-based grievances, demands and aspirations.

Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict has entered the phase of an armedconflict between the state and militant political representatives of theTamil community. In this sense, the conflict is also an internal armedconflict. This internal armed conflict has now reached its eighteenthyear, a fairly long conflict in terms of its life span. In that sense, it canalso be called aprotracted conflict.

Parties to the Conflict

In understanding a conflict, it is important to identify the partiesinvolved in the conflict. Identifying parties involved also helps us to geta better understanding of the nature of the conflict. In intra-state conthctsthat involve ethnic identity groups, the state and political movements,identifying parties is not an easy task. The main reason is that althoughthere are direct and indirect parties to a conflict, sometimes thisdistinction gets blurred. This is particularly so in Sri Lanka’s conflict.What we can do is to try to identify parties to the conflict at differentlevels.

If we define Sri Lanka’s conflict as an ethnic conflict, then we cansee the majority Sinhalese and minority Tamils as main ethniccommunities in the conflict. According to the 198 1 Census, the majoritySinhalese community in the country comprise 74% of the totalpopulation. The Sri Lankan Tamils, the largest minority community ofSri Lanka concentrate mostly in the Northern and Eastern provincesand comprise nearly 13% of the total population. In a simple sense,these two communities are the main parties to the conflict. However,a complication begins when we realize that all members of these ethnic

79


communities are not probably parties to the conflict. Many of theSinhalese and Tamil people may not have wanted the conflict at all.Therefore, when we say that Sinhalese and Tamil communities areparties to the present ethnic conflict, we do so in a general, descriptivesense.

Then there is another ethnic community in Sri Lanka that can alsobe considered a party to the present ethnic conflict. They are Sri LankanMuslims who comprise about 7% of the country’s population. Theyare a party to the conflict in a different sense. Muslim community,particularly those living in the Northern and Eastern provinces, havebeen severely affected by the armed conflict. Many Muslim familieshave been displaced from the conflict region. In working out a solutionto Sri Lanka’s ethnic problem, their interests and demands, particularlyon the question of power-sharing in the Eastern province, cannot beignored. Indeed, they will have to be a party to the solution.

In the on-going war, there are two main parties directlyinvolved. The first is the Sri Lankan state and the other is the LiberationTigers of Tamil Eelam. They are the most direct parties in the conflict inthe sense that they are the regular participants in the war. With regardto the role of the state, we can even say that the state has been a partyto the conflict even before it took the character of an armed conflict. Inthe pre-war period of the conflict, the parties were the state and thepolitical representatives of the Tamil community.

Difficulties in exactly identifying the parties to the conflict wouldnot end there. Each ethnic community may have different political actorswith different degrees of involvement with the conflict and with differentperceptions and solutions. For example, in Sinhalesesociety, its twomain political parties, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party - People’s Allianceand the United National Party have, because of their being ruling parties,direct roles in the conflict. There are other political parties in Sinhalesesociety who have not held governmental power, but been indirect partiesby their advocacy of specific positions about ethnic relations and the

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/ CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PEACE STUDIES AN INTRODUCTORY HANDBOOK

conflict itself For example, a group that advocates the military optionin resolving the conflict and is opposed to a negotiated settlementbecomes a party to the conflict, although not in a direct sense.

In Tamil society too, a similar picture prevails. Presently, the LTTEis the most prominent and active Tamil party to the conflict and it wantsto be the sole representative of the Tamil people. Although variousTamil political groups have disputed this claim, the movement isundoubtedly the strongest among all Tamil political actors. The LTTEis waging a war against the Sri Lankan military forces in the Northernand Eastern part of the island and has the capacity to determine thepolitical trend of the country and disrupt any peace initiative. Therefore,it could be regarded as a major player of the conflict. Then there areother Tamil political parties who have been directly involved in theconflict in the past, but now play a role secondary to the LTTE. TheTamil United Liberation Front (TULF), the traditional parliamentaryparty of the Tamil community, represents an approach quite differentfrom the LTTE. While the LTTE implements a military strategy, theTULF prefers a negotiated political settlement. Then, there are formerTamil militant organizations like Eelam People’s Democratic Party(EPDP), and People’s Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam(PLOTE), Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF)and Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO) that have been partiesto the armed conflict in the past and have now adopted politicalstrategies.

In sum, we can say that there is a multiplicity ofparties to SriLanka's ethnic conflict. Some are direct while some others areindirect.

Goals

The modern conflict between the Sinhala and the Tamil communitiesbegan with the Tarnils’ demand for regional autonomy to the Northern

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and Eastern provinces. The Tamils, under the leadership of S.J:V.Chelvanayakam, transformed this vague idea of regional autonomyinto a demand for a federal state, immediately after the independencein 1948. The early 1980s show the escalation of violence and theemergence of the Tamil militant movements including the LT’TE, andthe cry became separate state very soon. The LTTE is still fighting forthe separate state of Tamil Eelam. Therefore, in a sense, the attainmentof a separate state could be described as the major goal of the Tamilsin this conflict. In reality, however, not all of the Tamil factions, especiallythose who joined the mainstream politics subscribe to the idea ofseparate state. They are prepared to settle for something less than aseparate state; for example, a federal state or a separate regional councilfor the Tamils in the Northern and Eastern provinces. In other words,there are factions within the Tamil community that are willing tocompromise for a constitutional arrangement that guarantees regionalautonomy to the Tamils.

The Sinhalese nationalist forces perceive this Tamil goal, be it aseparate state or regional autonomy, as a direct threat to their aspirationsand goal, which is the territorial integrity of the country. With theexception of a small minority, the Sinhalese community sees the territorialintegrity and the unitary status of the country as interdependent. TheSri Lankan military forces have been fighting a bitter war with the LTTEto preserve the territorial integrity and the unitary nature of the islandnation.

Sources of Conflict

Any meaningful effort at resolution ofprotracted conflicts,like in Sri Lanka 's present conflict, should aim at creating“sustainablepeace “as its fundamental objective. Sometimes, peopletend to think that “quick fixes” can bring conflicts to end, but rarelyhave they brought lasting peace. A sustainable peace endeavor must

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be able, among other things, to understand and address the causes ofthe conflict, which are usually deep rooted and may have remainedignored for quite a long time.

For the purpose of easy understanding, the causes of conflictbetween the Tarnil and Sinhalese communities in Sri Lanka could becategorized under two headings: (i) root causes, and (ii) immediatecauses.

Root Causes:

Three factors appear to be prominent in Sri Lanka’s conflict. Theyare: (a) historical, (b) psychological, and (c) economic factors. Thepolitical and military conflict are manifestations of these root causes.

With regard to historical roots, there are contending claims madeby the Sinhalese and Tamils on the question of the land and the territory.Both communities claim that their ancestors arrived in the Island first,from the Indian subcontinent some thousands of years ago and thereforethey have exclusive right to the land. In this, Sinhalese and Tamil claimsdiffer with regard to the area of territory for which their exclusivehistorical right of habitation is supposed to exist. While the Sinhalesesubscribe to the notions of Sinhaladeepa (‘Land of the Sinhalese’)and dammadeepa (‘Land of the Buddhist Doctrine’), the Tamils claimthat the Northern and Eastern provinces of the island are their thayagam(traditional homeland). This competing claim for land is reinforced withsome powerful historical memories, associated with the past of thetwo communities The Sinhalese historical memories ofmilitary invasionsby the Southern Indian kings, especially after the emergence of TamilKingdoms in India during 5th century AD, have been quite powerfulin sustaining the perception that the Tamils have been a constant sourceof threat to the political independence of the Sinhalese nation and theexistence of Buddhism in the island. It has created a sense ofinsecurityin the Sinhalese psyche which is sometimes described as minority

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complex of an ethnic majority. Although Sinhalese are the majoritywithin Sri Lanka, regionally they are a minority compared with theTamils, whose population is nearly 55 million in the southern Indianstate of Tamil Nadu. Meanwhile, Sri Lankan Tamils make the claimthat they were the first historical settlers in the island and they have hadan independent state in northern Sri Lanka, throughout history. Theyalso believe that Sri Lanka’s Northern and Eastern provinces are their‘traditional homeland’ and on that belief they claim territorial autonomywithin these two provinces.

In addition to these historical and psychological reasons, therewere economic factors that intensified the confrontation and tensionbetween the two communities. The Sinhalese perception that the Tamilshave been a privileged minority, and even the Tamil perception ofdiscrimination was largely due to economic factors. During the Britishcolonial rule, due to American missionary activities in the heartland ofJaffna, English school education expanded. As a result, there emergeda new English- educated class among the Tamils of Jaffna particularlyin clerical, legal, accounting, medical and technological professions.This group of professionals dominated the limited opportunities forpublic sector employment even in the south, to such an extent that theaverage Sinhalese educated felt left out in the competition foremployment. The Sinhalese, indeed, felt that the colonial rulediscriminated against them, while granting economic privileges to theTarnil minority. When the political power was transferred from the BritishEmpire to the local political leaders in 1948, the Sinhalese politicalleaders were naturally in a position to compensate themselves for thepast (perceived or real) grievances. Public policy in post-independencein Sri Lanka, under Sinhalese dominated governments, were fashionedto redress these grievances of economic victimization under colonialism.Paradoxically, this in turn led to new grievances of discrimination amongthe Tamils. They perceive the post-independence political order asone which not only imposed disabilities on their economic advancement- Official Language law is one such policy measure-but also neglected

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Northern and Eastern provinces from the mainstream of economicdevelopment.

Immediate Causes:

The immediate causes of Tamil ethnic resurgence are found in thepolitics of Sinhala-Tamil ethnic relations in the post-independenceperiod. They have been progressively developing until a sentiment fora separate and independent Tamil state took roots in Tamil politics inthe late seventies and early eighties. Many commentators on Sri Lanka’sethnic conflict have said that the ethnic violence of July-August 1983was the most crucial turning point in turning Tamil nationalist politicsinto the irreversible path of separatism.

Political causes of Tamil separatism have a history of their ownthroughout Sri Lanka’s post-independence years. The Tamils pointout that the governmental policy and actions immediately afterindependence were aimed at reducing the Tamil community into aposition of second class citizens. They became critical of such legislationas the Citizenship Act of 1948, the franchise law of 1949, the SinhalaOnly Act of 1956 and the policy of standardization in higher educationin the 1970s. Meanwhile, the Tamils became particularly suspiciousof the state-sponsored peasant colonization programs in the Easternprovince and alleged that the Sinhalese governments were attemptingto extend Sinhala domination into Tamil-majority provinces by settlingSinhalese in those areas. Similarly, the Tamils resisted the policy ofstandardization of university entrance, introduced in the 1970s claimingthat this policy was designed to prevent large sections of the Tamilyouth from receiving higher education and obtaining governmentemployment. Although these claims have been disputed by someSinhalese scholars, the net effect of the above-mentioned state policieswas the development of a psychology ofvictimization among the SriLankan Tamils and their loss of faith in the Sinhalese-led governments.

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Against this sense of victimization was the Tamil political sentimentthat some measure of political self-rule would enable the Tamils tosafeguard their rights and interests. From the early 1950s the Tamilpolitical leadership began to demand a federal system for Sri Lanka,on the argument that the Tamils constituted a distinct nation, similar tothe Sinhalese. It is on the basis of this federalist demand that theBandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact of 1957 and Senanayake-Chelvanayakam

Agreement of 1965 were signed. Both agreements envisagedadministrative autonomy to Tamil-majority provinces, but they werenot implemented due to the opposition from Sinhalese political partiesand the Buddhist leaders. Then, in 1972, when Sri Lanka was beingmade a Republic and a new constitution was drafted, the main Tamilpolitical party, the Federal Party, proposed a federal constitution forSri Lanka. But, the government totally rejected the Tamil proposaland enacted a unitary constitution with centralization of political andadministrative structures. In the 1972 constitutional reforms, the Senatewas abolished while the special constitutional safeguards for minorityprotection were removed. Thus the Tamil fear of their community beingfurther reduced to a politically powerless minority in a majoritydominated polity. It is in this context that the Tamil demand for self-determination and a separate state evolved.

The question ofpolitical insecurity in a majority-dominated unitarystate is another immediate cause which Tarnils point out as an immediatereason for the present conflict. The formation of this collective feelingof insecurity goes back to 1958 riots. These riots occurred against thebackdrop of Sinhalese-Tamil tension following the official languagelegislation of 1956. Then, inter-communal tension developed again in1977, 1978 and 1979, particularly in Sinhalese majority areas whereTamils also have been living. In these instances of tension, life andproperty of the Tamils were threatened, yet the state did not take actions

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CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PEACE STIIDIES AN INTRODUCTORY HANDBOOK-

to prevent the escalation of tension. The culmination of this processoccurred in July 1983 when, following the killing of 13 soldiers byTamil militants in Jaffna, large scale ethnic riots broke out. The 1983riots proved to be a turning point in Sinhalese-Tamil ethnic problem. Itgave legitimacy to the argument being made by small Tamil militantgroups that a war of national liberation was the only option availablefor Sri Lankan Tamils to secure their national rights.

Strategies/Tactics

In understanding an ethnic conflict, it is useful to examine howstrategies of the ethnic minority have evolved over the years of conflictformation. Politics of ethnic conflicts is usually formed over acomparatively long period of time. The evolution of minority strategiesis also linked to the politics of ethnic relations. In the history of Sinhalese-Tamil ethnic conflict, strategies adopted by Tamil political leadershiphave gone through a number of stages. These stages, through whichthe minority political goals evolved, are briefly described below.

i . United Action for Sinhalese-Tamil Rights: This was thestrategy advocated by Tamil leaders in the early part this century,when Sri Lanka’s national movement under colonialism wasbeginning to take shape. When the Ceylon National Congresswas formed in 19 19, Sir Ponnambalam Arunachalam advocatedthat all communities should unite to struggle for the rights of allSri Lankans. However, this idea did not survive long when theCongress split in 192 1 along communal lines.

ii. Weighted and Balanced Representation for Minorities:From the late 1920s onwards, Tamil political leaders agitatedfor balanced representation in the colonial legislature betweenthe majority Sinhalese and all minority communities. The famousfifty-fifty demand of G. G. Ponnambalam was made in this context.

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The argument behind the idea of balanced representation wasthat the legislature would not be dominated by the majoritycommunity.

iii. Regional Autonomy within a Federalist Constitution: Theformulation of this strategic goal was made after independence,in early 1950s. The formation of the Federal Party in 195 1 wasmeant to carry this demand in the political sphere.

iv. Cooperation with Sinhalese Majority Governments andNegotiations: From independence to the 1970s the mainstrategic course of action adopted by the Tamil political leadershipwas to work within the parliamentary system of government.Cooperation with governments was a result of this strategy. Whenthe first independence government was formed in 1947, the TamilCongress was a part of the ruling UNP coalition and in fact thecabinet of ministers had two Tamil representatives. But after thefranchise legislation was passed in 1949 they left the Government.Then, when the 1956 Mahajana Eksath Peramuna (MEP)government under Prime Minister S. W. R. D. Bandaranaikecame into power, the Federal Party negotiated with the PrimeMinister to grant regional administrative autonomy to Northernand Eastern provinces. Known as Bandaranaike- ChelvanayakamPact, this agreement was not however implemented due toSinhalese nationalist opposition. Then, in 1965, the Federal Partyjoined the United National Party Government coalition, led byPrime Minister Dudley Senanayake. The Federal Party leadershiponce again succeeded in negotiating an agreement with thegovernment to set up a system of Regional Councils in the Tamil-majority provinces. The Minister of local government in the 1945coalition was in fact a Federal Party representative. But this timearound too, the strategy of cooperation failed to achieve Tamilpolitical demands and the Federal Party quite the governmentin1969.

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v. Mass Agitation: Another strategy adopted by the Tamil politicalparties was mass agitation. The first time they launched a massagitation was in 1957 and 1958, in the context of theimplementation of the official language legislation. The Tamilleaders described their action as Gandhian sathyagraha. Againin 1960 they launched a series of sathyagraha protests inColombo and Jaffna demanding language rights of the Tamils.

The mass action strategy came to a high point in the 1970s. Whenthe United Front Government of 1970 refused to consider thefederalist constitutional proposal, the Tamil political leadershiporganized a series of mass protests in the Northern and Easternprovinces. These protests began in July 1972 when the newconstitution came into effect. When the government reactedangrily to these protests, Tamil nationalist sentiments also gatheredgreater momentum. It is in that context that a new united front forTamil political independence, Tamil United Liberation Front(TULF), was formed in 1976. The TULF shifted the strategy ofTamil political struggle from cooperation-negotiation to massmobilization for national self-determination. They contested the1977 parliamentary elections, seeking a mandate from the Tamilpeople in North-East provinces to form a separate andindependent Tamil state. When the TULF won the majority ofparliamentary seats in these two provinces, that election resultwas then interpreted as a mandate for working towards an Eelam,an independent Tamil state.

vi. Armed Struggle: The Tamil nationalist strategy of armed struggleoriginated in the late seventies with the radicalization of youthpolitics in Jaffna. Radical youth politics assumed greater intensitywhen the TULF leaders, after the 1977 election, could nottransform their concept of ‘national self-determination’ into aconcrete political outcome. A number of small guerillaorganizations emerged, with armed struggle as their strategic


course of action. Then, after 1983 riots and with the expulsion ofthe TULF from parliament, for not taking the oath of allegianceto the unitary state, the militant groups took control of Tamilpolitics. Since 1983 onwards, the ethnic conflict has beencharacterized by the armed struggle which has now developedinto a full scale internal war between the Sri Lankan state and theLTTE.

vii. Negotiations: While the ethnic war has been going on, therehave also been attempts to end the conflict through negotiations.Attempts at negotiations go as far back as 1984, but no successfulresults have yet been achieved. In the next section of this chapter,we will briefly discuss the history of negotiations.

Negotiations with the Help of Third Party

Sri Lanka’s ethnic comflict provides an extremely useful case studyin conflict negotiations. The fact that negotiations have not resulted inthe termination of the conflict does not mean at all that the student ofconflict resolution should disregard Sri Lanka’s experience innegotiations.

The initial impulses for a negotiated settlement in Sri Lanka’s conflictcame from India. India, Sri Lanka’s immediate neighbor, becameextremely interested in the conflict in Sri Lanka for its own reasons.After several rounds ofnegotiations between the Sri Lankan governmentrepresentatives and the Tamil political parties and militant movementsunder the auspices of the Indian government, an agreement called theIndo-Lanka Accord was signed in 1987. India had to employ hermilitary forces in the island in order to guarantee the implementation ofthe agreement. However with the withdrawal of the Indian PeaceKeeping Forces (IPKF), the agreement became a “dead letter” andthe provincial councils, created by the Indo-Lanka Accord, weredisfunctional.


The Indian role in Sri Lanka as a third party failed to produce aresolution owing to several factors. First of all, according to experts inthe regional politics, India’s decision to intervene was influenced by itsneed for (1) regional dominance, (2) national security, and (3) the Indiancentral government’s dependency on the government of Tamil Nadufor political support. Therefore, it was evident that the decision forintervention did not arise from the needs of the parties, as it should bein the case of an ideal and successful intervention. Meanwhile, Indiawas known for its support of the Tamil militancy called the “TamilTerrorism” by the Sri Lankan government. Therefore, India was seenessentially as a Tamil ally by the Sinhalese and not as a neutral thirdparty. Many conflict resolution scholars do not agree that the third-party neutrality is a crucial factor in intervention. In fact, scholars likeJohn Paul Lederach advocate an “inside partial” model of interventionin the conflicts in traditional societies. Whatever the debate, in order tobe successful, especially when the third party is from outside, theparticular intervenor should possess some elements of neutrality. Indiatotally lacked this aspect as it took different sides during the course ofits activities in Sri Lanka.

When the Sri Lankan government was forced to negotiate, it didnot have a choice but to go ahead with the Indian plans, because offear of punishment by the big neighbor. In other words, in order to beeffective the potential third party must have the consensus and invitationis not from all, at least from the major parties to the conflict. In thatsense the Indian intervention had seeds of failure from its inception.

Negotiations without Third Party

First, in 1990 the so-called “Hilton Talks” were held in Colombobetween President Premadasa’s government and the LTTE. Then in1994, immediately after the electoral victory of the newly formedPeople’s Alliance coalition, headed by the Sri Lanka Freedom Party,the government engaged in rounds of negotiations with the LTTE in

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Jaffha. One notable aspect of both these processes was the absenceof a third-party involvement. It could be argued that the parties involvedin a highly violent conflict, unless the condition is a ‘"hurting stalemate,”could not easily get to the negotiation table without the help of a third-party However, both in 1990 and 1994 the parties agreed to negotiatefor various other reasons. This strategy of negotiating for “side effect”was one fundamental reason for the failure of those peace processes.Once the purpose was achieved the parties duly withdrew from thepeace proceedings. For example, in 1990 the primary objective of theconsensus between the parties was to get the Indian Army out of theisland. Achieving peace through negotiation was not the driving forcebehind the process. The negotiations broke down immediately afterthe withdrawal of the IPKF.

In early 2000, there were initiatives to involve the Norwegiangovernment as a mediator in Sri Lanka’s conflict. The government ofSri Lanka, however, did not like the term ‘mediation’ to describe theNorway involvement. The government prefmed the role of a facilitator.While the government was careful about the role of Norway, the LTTEwanted third-party mediation. This debate in a way indicated twodifferent approaches to the role of a third party.

Present Trend

Since the unilateral withdrawal of the LITE from the negotiationsin 1994, the war continues on a high pace, claiming hundreds of livesfrom both sides, combatants as well as civilians. Disappointed by theattitude of the LTTE, the Sri Lankan government has been waging a"War for peace.” We may note here that the notion of war for peace is

only a myth, as war can hardly bring sustainable peace anywhere inthe world. Sri Lanka is no exception. When a conflict is terminated bymilitary means, one party loses and the other wins. We can call thisoutcome as a zero-sum situation. However, conflict resolution scholarsagree that real peace could be achieved only through a win-win

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agreement between theparties. And it should also be noted that theexperience of the long war in Sri Lanka suggests that bothmajor actorslack the power to impose a total defeat on the other.’ In other words, amilitary stalemate can continue for quite some time. At the same time italso looks like both parties are “entrapped” in their war cries. Therefore,they are unable to initiate any peace endeavors or at least to’sendsignals in that direction.

Alternatives

The political history of Sri Lanka proves that the leadership inboth sides of the ethnic spectrum has failed to handle the issue with avision and proper understanding of the long-term consequences of theconflict. One particular reason for this state of affairs is the toleranceshown by the general public of this country towards the war and itsoutcomes. Research that was carried out in Sri Lanka to determinethe perceptions of the Sri Lankan people pertaining to the war andpeace, proves that the majority of them want peace. It is also worthmentioning here that in 1994, the People’s Alliance Coalition won alandslide electoral victory on the peace platform. However, when theparties returned to warpath for one reason or the other, the peoplehave remained silent and passive. One of the striking features of theconflict in Sri Lanka is the absence of pressure on the leadership totake action to negotiate and seek peaceful solution through compromise,although the people themselves hope for peace. Some of us may arguethat this behavior of “silent majority” has been determined by theirnationalistic mentality or the unwillingness to compromise theirfundamental positions.

However, if the people believe in peace and are ready tocompromise their positions, this is the time to thinkabout alternatives.After all, peace can only be achieved by a win-win solution and awin-win solution is possible only when the parties compromisetheirpositions. It is possible for the conflicting parties to attain their

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interests even after compromising their positions. It is, for example,possible for the Tamils to safeguard and protect their long-term survival,culture and territorial needs and for the Sinhalese to preserve theterritorial integrity of the land and protection of Sinhala-Buddhist raceeven after they agree, say, to a federal form of government. Thefundamental obstacle to finding a compromised solution is mutualmistrust and fear. In eliminating mistrust and fear a civil society can domuch more than the state which, more often than not, fails to take intoconsideration the human relationship aspect of the conflict.

In building peace or taking other necessary steps towards peace,leadership does not necessarily have to emerge from political institutionsof the country. Civil society can also provide a formidable contributionto peace initiatives. John Paul Lederach (1997) identifies three majorcategories of leadership base in a conflict setting. They are: top level,middle range and the grass roots. Top level refers to the politicalleadership, whichincludeskeypolitical and military leaders. The middle-range leadership involves people like ethnic and religious leaders,academics, intellectuals and humanitarian leaders like NGO figures.Grass roots represent the masses and grassroots leadership includinglocal leaders, leaders of indigenous NGOs, community developers,local health officials and refugee camp leaders. Louise Diamond andJohn McDonald (1996) identify nine peace tracks. They are; (1)Government (peace making through diplomacy), (2) Non-governmentaland professional (peace making through professional conflict resolution),(3) Business (peace making through commerce) (4) Private citizen(peace making through personal involvement), (5) Research, trainingand education (peace making through learning), (6) Activism (peacemaking through advocacy), (7) Religion (peace making through faithand action), (8) Funding (peace making through providing resources),and (9) Communication and media (peace making through information).The point here is that there are several tracks and levels in a civilsociety that can be made use of in order to encourage peace. InSri Lanka, although there are peace activities undertaken by different


sectors of society, they are not forceful enough to pressure the partiesto try and achieve a negotiated settlement. Therefore, in an effort tomake peace in Sri Lanka it is essential to strengthen the civil societyand exploit the resources available in different levels and tracksin the society.

Summary

In this chapter, you have learned the following lessons;

l There are many ways to describe Sri Lanka’s present conflict.Some useful concepts are: ethnic conflict, identity conflict, internalarmed conflict and protracted conflict.

l Parties to a conflict can be both direct and indirect.

l Parties to Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict are many, and multiple.

l Any meaningful attempt at resolving conflicts should create‘sustainable peace.’ “Quick Fixes” cannot bring about lastingpeace.

l In conflicts, there are “root causes” and “immediate causes.”

0 “Root causes” have historical, psychological and economicdimensions.

0 “Immediate causes” are found in the politics of ethnic relations.

l Peace can only be achieved through a win-win solution.

l A win-win solution is possible only when parties compromise andseek joint solutions.

l Conflict resolution involves many tracks.

l Marshalling of civil society resources is crucial for conflict resolutionand peace building.

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7

Negotiations for Conflict Resolution:Lessons from Sri Lanka’s Past Experiences

Jayadeva Uyangoda

Introduction

From the early days of Sri Lanka’s ethnic armed conflict, therehave been attempts at ending the conflict through negotiations. But, allthese negotiation efforts have failed to terminate the conflict, or at leastdeescalate the war. Nonetheless, they provide a wealth of insights onwhich a future process of successful negotiations could be built. It iswrong to assume that an internal armed conflict can be brought to anend through one or few negotiation attempts. Once a conflict has started,its termination may become exceedingly difficult due to a variety offactors. Conflict resolution can be as complex a phenomenon as theconflict itself. Similarly, when negotiations fail once, twice or perhapsmany times, it does not mean that the negotiation option is totallyinvalidated, although some may argue to that effect. From a commonsense perspective, it is through failures that success ultimatelymaterializes itself What is important in this regard is to examine failuresas objectively as possible and draw necessary lessons.

In this chapter, we will make an attempt to look back at Sri Lanka’spast experiences of negotiations in order to draw some useful lessons.Our discussion will examine four negotiation attempts (i) the ThimpuTalks of 1985, (ii) Indo-Lanka Agreement of 1986, (iii) Governmento f S r i Lanka and LTTE t a lk s o f 198911990 , and(iv) Government-LTTE talks of 1994/l 995.

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ICONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PEACE STUDIES AN INTRODUCTORY HANDBOOK

Thimpu Talks

The first attempt at bringing together representatives of the SriLankan government and Tamil militant groups was mediated by theIndian government in July 1985. By this time, the ethnic war was twoyears old. Tamil militant groups were relatively small guerillaorganizations operating mainly in the Northern province. The talks wereheld in Thimpu, the capital of Bhutan. Thimpu was selected because ofthe perception that the two sides should meet at a neutral venue. Indiangovernment acted as the broker of the Thimpu meeting. The Indiangovernment also facilitated a cease-fire agreement between the SriLankan government and Tamil militant groups as a prelude tonegotiations. In order to present a common Tamil voice at negotiations,the Tamil militant groups formed a common front called Elam NationalLiberation Front (ENLF). Although the TULF, the main Tamilparliamentary party, also represented the Tamil side, the militant groupshad an upper hand in the talks. Dr. H. W. Jayewardene, President J.R. Jayewardene’s brother, led the Sri Lankan delegation.

During the talks that went on through two rounds, the Tamil sidehad insisted that the Sri Lankan govermnent should put forward itsown proposals for a settlement so that they could consider whetherthese proposals were acceptable. The government delegation presenteda set of political proposals and draft legislation for their implementation.These were basically the proposals that the government had alreadypresented before the All-Party Conference (APC) held in Colombothe previous year. Incidentally, they were the same proposals whichthe Tamil parties had rejected at the APC. The essence of theseproposals was to set up a system of District Development Councils(DDCs) in each district of Sri Lanka, with the provision of two ormore DDCs to amalgamate. The Tamil delegation at Thimpu talksrejected these proposals as inadequate and presented their ownframework for a settlement of the ethnic problem.

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Now known as ‘Thimpu principles’ these counter-proposals ofTamil parties contained the following four elements:

(i) Recognition of Tamils in Sri Lanka as a distinct nationality

(ii) Recognition of a Tamil homeland and its territorial sovereignty

(iii) Right of self-determination of Tami1 people

(iv) Right of citizenship and other democratic rights of Tamil people

The government delegation rejected the first three demands ofthe Tamil side as totally unacceptable. Their position was that thegovernment could consider only the citizenship demand. Thegovernment side also reiterated that any agreement reached at Thimputalks could be implemented only if the militant groups surrendered alltheir arms and dismantled their training camps located in Sri Lankaand abroad. When the round two of Thimpu talks began a few dayslater, the negotiations had reached a point of collapse. Both sidesaccused each other of intentional violation of the cease-fire agreementand the Tamil delegation walked out from the negotiation table.

However, the failed Thimpu talks provide some important lessonsconcerning ethnic conflict resolution and negotiations. The first lesson,which we may draw from retrospective insights, is that the situationprevailing at that time was too early for a negotiated settlement. Inother words, there were no favorableprerequisites for a negotiatedsettlement of the conflict. It is true that both sides publicly claimedthat they were for a negotiated settlement. But, that was only a rhetoricalcommitment. Behind the rhetoric ofnegotiations and the reality of failurewas indeed one important dynamic in conflict formation and conflictresolution: the Sri Lankan armed conflict had not reached a stageof settlement that can be worked out through negotiations at all.In other words, both sides had maintained their faith in the efficacy ofthe military strategy. It was too early for the Sri Lankan government to

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come to a compromise with Tamil militants, because the governmentstill believed that the guerilla war could be defeated by military means.It was too early for the Tamil militant groups, too, to abandon thearmed struggle in favor of a negotiated settlement, because they hadjust begun what they perceived as a ‘liberation war’ Indeed, the Thimputalks began within just two years of a ‘liberation struggle’ for a separateethnic state and the romanticism of a long-drawn, heroic war was stillafresh in the thinking of T&-nil militants. In the initial phase of a ‘war ofliberation,’ militant guerilla groups usually have little or no inclination tomake a compromise with the ‘enemy. ’ Their idealism was such thatany settlement with the state had to be on their own victorious terms.The point then is that the conflict had not reached a stage wherethe parties would pursue negotiations with seriousness of intentof its outcome.

The second important lesson emanates from the fact that thenegotiation positions adopted by the two sides were far too apart fromone another. A negotiated settlement means, in simple terms, theemergence of a compromise of contending positions, jointlypursued by the parties to the conflict. lt is a middle ground. Butfor a middle ground to emerge, the competing positions of negotiatingparties should be such that the meeting point should not be one thatdemands the parties to make fundamental revisions of their originalpositions. But, at Thimpu talks, there was no such possibility offlexibility of negotiation positions. On the contrary, they were hardand rigid bargainingpositions, in the sense that they representeda spirit of ‘take it or leave it. ’ Conflict resolution is hardlymaterialized when competing negotiation positions are designedto be rigid and inflexible.

The third lesson is linked to the second. That concerns the intentof parties to come to the negotiation table. In conflict negotiation, it isnot always the case that parties agree to negotiations to seek asettlement. They may have other intentions or agendas. Indeed, the

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govemment of Sri Lanka and the Tamil militant groups came to Thimpu,largely because of the pressure brought upon them by the Indiangovernment. It is clear that neither party had any appreciable measureof faith in a positive outcome of the negotiation exercise. Evidencepoints to an observation which is important for students of conflictresolution. The overriding objective of the two sides at Thimputalkss was not conflict settlement, but canvassing for their respectivepositions that left little or no room for a compromise.

There is a fourth lesson to be drawn from Thimpu talks. It centerson the question of terms of a settlement. The experience of Thimputells us that the two sides attempted to impose a settlement on oneanother on terms preferred and defined by either side. What it meantin practical terms is that, while the Sri Lankan government delegationpresented its settlement formula in terms of district-baseddecentralization of power, the Tamil side argued for the right of self-determination of the ‘nationality’ of Sri Lankan Tamils in a territorialhomeland. These were not negotiable terms, but mutually exclusivepositions which each side attempted to impose on the other.

Indo-Lanka Accord

On 27 July, 1987, Sri Lanka’s President J. R. Jayewardene andIndia’s Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi signed an inter-state agreement toend Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict and bring about a political settlement.The agreement envisaged all parties to the conflict, Sinhalese and Tamil,to accept the framework of settlement as proposed in the Accord.The main points of the Accord were for the Sri Lankan government tocreate a system of devolution of power through a constitutionalamendment. Once the provincial councils were created, elections wereto be held to elect representatives for these new bodies of devolution.Devolution was meant to grant a measure ofpolitical and administrativeautonomy to the periphery with the province as the unit of devolution.This was a significant improvement from the position earlier held by

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government of Sri Lanka and the Tamil militant groups come to Thimpu,

a s d


the Sri Lankan government in its proposal for a district-based systemof administrative decentralization. There was also a provision for aneventual merger of Northern and Eastern provinces through areferendum. The Accord also expected all Tamil parties to the conflictto accept the settlement, since the new system of province-baseddevolution was viewed as a suitable mechanism to meet the Tamildemand for autonomy. The Accord particularly envisaged that themilitant Tamil groups, who were waging a guerilla war for an independentstate, would accept the settlenient, surrender their arms and join themainstream of politics. On India’s part, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhicommitted the Indian state to be the guarantor of the implementationof the Accord.

However, the events that followed the signing of the Indo-LankaAccord belied the optimistic expectations of the Sri Lankan and Indianleaders and the well-wishers of the Accord. When the Accord wasbeing signed in Colombo, there was violent resistance mounted bySinhalese nationalist forces against what was termed as “Indianintervention in Sri Lanka.” The resistance, led by the Janatha VimukthiPeramuna (JVP) subsequently developed itself into an armed rebellionagainst the state, which went on for almost three years, bringing thegovemmentunderaseriouspoliticalcrisis. Theconstitutional amendmentto create provincial councils was passed in October 1987. Yet, whenthe elections for new councils were held, there was unprecedentedviolence against holding elections.

More importantly, in the immediate aftermath of the Indo-Lankajoint initiative, the conflict in the North-East entered a new phase ofcomplexity, which went totally against the expectations of the Accord.The new complexity centered on the non-cooperation of the LiberationTigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the main Tar-nil guerilla organization, toaccept and join in the process of implementing the Accord. While theother guerilla organizations directly or tacitly accepted the accord and

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decided to join the mainstream of politics, the LTTE did not. Except asymbolic surrender of few weapons, it did not disarm itself. When theLTTE refused to cooperate with the implementation of the Accord,President Jayewardene, in accordance with the provisions of theAccord, asked the Indian government to take steps to disarm the L’ITE.Then, in October 1987, the Indian government began to send its armyto Sri Lanka with the intention of disarming the LTTE. The LTTE beganto resist the Indian Army, or the Indian Peace Keeping Forces (IPKF),and soon the confrontation between the two sides developed into amajor war. After two years of fighting the LTTE, with about 85,000of its troops, the Indian army withdrew its forces from Sri Lanka in1990 with mission unaccomplished.

The experience of the Indo-Lanka Accord and its aftermathprovides some important lessons for conflict resolution. Let us identifyand briefly discuss the main lessons.

The Role of the Third Party

In the literature of conflict resolution and peacemaking, there is anextensive body of ideas about the role of the third party In this literature,the neutrality of the third party is often emphasized. The notion ofneutrality means that the mediator should not be seen as favoring oneparty over the other, because the mediator’s role should be acceptableto both parties. In Sri Lanka’s experience of India’s role in the proposedsettlement of July 1987, it was not clear whether India mediated orintervened in bringing about a settlement framework. In a pure case ofmediation, the third party may bring the conflicting parties together,facilitate negotiations between them, help them to work out a settlementon mutual acceptance and ultimately assist the parties to implement thesettlement. In this process, the mediator may use political, diplomaticand perhaps military coercion, but in a manner that will not jeopardizethe avowed principle of neutrality.

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It is on the question of neutrality that India’s role in 1987 can befirst examined. The Sinhalese people did not believe that India was aneutral outsider in Sri Lanka’s conflict. They believed that the Indiangovernment and its state government in Tamil Nadu had supportedand directly assisted the Tamil militant movement. As a result, therewas overwhelming Sinhalese suspicion about India’s intentions in SriLanka’s problem. Then in July 1987, when the Indian governmenttried to broker a peace settlement, the Sinhalese nationalist forcesthought that India had a hidden political agenda. The issue becamemore complicated when the Indian government sent the IPKF to disarmthe LTTE. This military intervention meant that India used its directmilitary power to implement the settlement. Then a full-scale war brokeout between the IPKF and the LTTE, running into about two years. Inthis process, India became a direct party to the conflict. This processindicates how India’s role in Sri Lanka’s conflict gradually changed

from mediation to military intervention and then to be a party tothe conflict.

Role of Multiple Parties in the Conflict

Acontlictisusuallyresolvedbytheactiveengagementofthedirectparties to the conflict. By agreeing to resolve the armed conflict, theparties are supposed to seek non-military options and work out politicalmeasures to address the causes of the conflict. But, the Indo-LankaAccord of 1987 and its implementation process raises many questionsabout the role of various indirect parties to the conflict in the exerciseof settlement. These questions can be clustered around two issues: (I)What was the role of direct parties in working out the settlementagreement? (II) What was the role of indirect parties in making thesettlement agreement unworkable?

On the question of the role of direct parties in formulating theframework of settlement, the Indian and Sri Lankan governments didthe negotiations between them while keeping Tamil militant groups away

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from the negotiation process. It appears that the Tamil groups were‘consulted’ by the Indian officials, yet there was no direct communicationbetween them and the Sri Lankan government. In fact, therepresentatives and leaders of the two governments decided the entireframework of settlement. In this sense, only one directparty to theconflict, the Sri Lankan government, played a direct role in theproposed settlement. Even that role was limited to negotiations withthe Indian government, an interested third party. This, fi-om a conflictresolution perspective, was a major weakness in the 1987 effort atconflict settlement in Sri Lanka. When one side of the conflict is excludedfi-om the negotiations, that side has no political responsibility to abideby the settlement. As the position taken by the LTTE clearlydemonstrated, such a peace effort can be interpreted as an attempt toimpose a solution by force. It is obvious that the Indian governmentoverestimated its own possible role in bringing a settlement in Sri Lanka

A settlement effort can also be undermined by the actions ofindirect parties to the conflict, as it was the case in Sri Lanka in 1987and after. The Sinhalese nationalist opposition led by the radical JanathaVimukthi Peramuna (JVP), opposed the Indo-Lanka Accord soviolently that the implementation of the agreement itselfbecame a majorpolitical challenge for the government. Indeed, the JVP derived muchpublic support for its anti-state rebellion primarily by appealing to anti-Indian nationalist sentiments of the Sinhalese community. The JVPdescribed India’s military intervention in the North-East as a preludeto a larger project of colonizing Sri Lanka. The JVP-led resistancealso became the rallying point for a variety of Sinhalese nationalistforces including the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), the nationalistBuddhist Sangha and the Sinhala nationalist intelligentsia. Utilizing thenew nationalist/patriotic political space opened up by the Indo-LankaAccord, these forces seized control of the political debate thereby de-legitimizing to a considerable extent the very concept of a politicalsolution to the ethnic question. The lesson to be learned from thatexperience is that there are both direct and indirectparties to the SriLankan conflict and their actions can shape the entire fate of thesettlement.

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This leads us to identify a much more fundamental lesson to bedrawn in conflict resolution. In an ethnic conflict, which has deeplydivided ethnic communities, a settlement can regenerate deeply heldfears of the majority ethnic group when that settlement intends torecognize the legitimacy ofminority ethnic demands. In other words, asettlement in the nature of compromise with a minority ethnic group, islikely to regenerate fears and anxieties among sections of the majoritycommunity whose majoritarian world view is shaped by a deep-seatedfeeling ofpolitical insecurity. Indeed, this is not unique to Sri Lanka Inplural societies where there is competition and tension between theethnic majority and minorities, the fear of the minorities gainingsupremacy is a deeply felt anxiety among nationalists of the majoritycommunity. In such a context, there is the ever-present possibility ofextremist groups within the majority community mobilizing those fearsin a campaign of militant resistance to compromise. They seecompromise with the ethnic ‘enemy’ as a betrayal, an act of treacherythat has to be resisted violently and as a matter of patriotic duty. Fora negotiated settlement to succeed, it is important to recognize thecrucial need to politically manage the post-agreement process in sucha way that extremist political groups, which are intrinsically opposedto peacemaking through compromise, are not allowed to occupy thepolitical centre stage.

Political Consensus

The point we just made above warrants some reflection, so thatwe can learn another lesson from the 1987 experience. In a societywhere an internal ethnic conflict has taken a violent and military form,the polity can become an intensely fragmented entity. Various politicalgroups can have different and competing understandings of the conflictand conflicting approaches as to what the solution should be. Whenone party works out a solution, say by the government, there is alwaysthe possibility of other forces in society radically opposing the

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government’s decision. Such a development can have unforeseen andcomplex consequences, as evidenced in Sri Lanka in 1987-89. It canpolitically isolate the government, thereby making the governmentincapable of properly implementing the settlement. It can also denylegitimacy to the settlement itself Without public support, no ethnicconflict settlement can be realistically implemented. And finally, therecan be fears among sections of society about the settlement itself Publicfear of the consequences of conflict settlement is a major barrier toany conflict resolution process. The lesson to be learned then is that ina deeply divided society, ethnic conflict resolution requiresconsensus among political actors as well as between thegovernment and thepeople. Bringing about such a broad consensusrequires political education of the masses of the people, redefining theterms of the political debate and providing intellectual and politicalleadership to society in a direction of ethnic reconciliation

UNP-LTTE Talks in 1989/1990

Two years after the failure of Indo-Lanka Accord to bring SriLanka’s conflict to an end, another round of talks was held in 1989-90 between the UNP government, headed by President Premadasa,and the LTTE leadership. The initiative for this round of talks wastaken by Mr. Premadasa, within a few months of his being elected tothe office of the President. In April 1989, he made an open call on theJVP and the LTTE to come to talks with the government. While theJVP, which was engaged in a rebellion to capture state power, rejectedMr. Premadasa’s offer, the LTTE, while fighting the IPKF, respondedpositively. The talks were held in Colombo. From the government’sside the President himself, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and seniorgovernment officials took part in the talks. The LTTE side wasrepresented by its political representatives and headed by AntonBalasingham. During the talks, which went on for about a year, therewas an understanding between the two sides to retrain from hostilities,although they did not sign a formal cease-fire agreement.

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The talks suddenly broke down in June 1990. The LTTE appearedto have unilaterally walked off negotiations with no public explanation.The breakdown of talks and the resumption ofhostilities were a violentevent. It was reported that the LTTE suddenly surrounded a policestation in Amparai, took nearly 200 policemen prisoners and some ofthem were executed. Although the government made an attempt toresume talks by sending the Minister of Foreign Affairs to Jaffna tomeet the LTTE leadership, the latter refused to engage in any furthertalks on the argument that the government had not been sincere in itsapproach to negotiations.

On government-LTTE talks of 1989/l 990, there is very littleinformation available. There are no records available to find out whatthe two parties discussed in these talks. The content of discussionswas not reported in the press either.

The main lessons to be drawn from 1989/l 990 talks concern theobjectives of participants. The available information suggests that thetwo parties did not have a commitment to resolution of the ethnic conflictas such. Instead, the two sides appeared to have had their own anddistinct strategic objectives to be achieved in an exercise of talks.For the Colombo government under President Premadasa, forcing Indiato withdraw the IPKF from Sri Lanka was an immediate issue in itspolitical agenda. During this time, the government was also fighting theJVP insurgency in the south, with all its armed forces and the policeand the state machinery involved in a massive counter-insurgencyoperation. Neutralizing one military front was obviously an objectivein real politics. In achieving that objective, the government perhapssought a strategic political alliance with the LTTE. From the LTTE’sown perspective, the removal of Indian military forces from the Northernand Eastern provinces was an immediate politico-military objective.They then found an ally in President Premadasa in whose agenda toothe Indian military presence in Sri Lanka was a factor of priority. Whentheir respective strategic objectives coincided, they began to talk and

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refrained from hostility. But when the Indian government withdrew theIPKF from Sri Lanka by March 1990, the need for further continuationof that strategic alliance was perhaps not there. In this sense, it is difficultto characterize the 1989/l 990 talks as negotiation for conflict resolutionas such.

Then, the overall lesson to be learned from UNP-LTTE talks in198911990 is that negotiation for conflict resolution requires avision and commitment to resolving the conflict. When short-termstrategic or tactical objectives are allowed to take precedence,no tangible outcome can emerge through talks. Yet, it is alsoimportant to recognize that in protracted conflicts, the occurrence ofsuch ‘negotiations’ for short-term gains cannot be totally ruled out.Indeed, parties might meet at the negotiation table in order to securespecific objectives that can be military or political. In such situations,when one party realizes that talks have served its objectives, or eventalks cannot serve its goals, that party will have no moral or politicalbarriers to withdraw from talks unilaterally and even giving no reasonsfor its action. Subjection ofnegotiations to tactical objectives ofpartiesdoes not serve the objectives of conflict resolution. Such action canresult in de-legitimizing the very concept of a negotiated settlement.Similarly, the party that suffered from the other’s unilateral terminationof talks is most likely to develop a deep mistrust of the outcome offuture talks. It can also strengthen the arguments against a negotiatedsettlement. And its most pernicious effect would be the possibility ofpublic cynicism concerning negotiations as well as a non-militarysettlement.

The 1989/l 990 talks also provide a lesson concerning the absenceof a facilitator or mediator in the negotiation process. The context inwhich President Premadasa made the offer for talks in 1989 wascharacterized by a deep crisis suddenly developed in the aftermath ofIndia’s mediation and involvement in Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict. India’sthird-party role had not only failed, but also had brought the conflict to‘

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a new stage of intensity. In that context, the suspicion of the role of athird party in conflict negotiation had gained ground in Sri Lanka. Theassumption developed at that time and publicly articulated by PresidentPremadasa was that Sri Lanka’s conflict was a purely internal matterthat required no outside involvement. However, what appears to beclear from the 1989/l 990 experience is that when parties meet attalks without a mediator, there is always the risk of the talks beingunilaterally terminated by oneparty with no possibility of their returnto the negotiation table. This experience was indeed to be repeatedsubsequently too, during 1994/l 995 peace talks.

PA-LTTE Negotiations of 1994/1995

The negotiations between the People’s Alliance government andthe LTTE in 1994/l 995 provide a host of important lessons innegotiation for conflict resolution, When this round of negotiationsbegan, there was a great deal of expectation and optimism about peacereturning to the country. This is the first time that the people in SriLanka and the international community took government-LTTEnegotiations seriously in the hope that at last the parties to negotiationswould manage to find and work out a lasting solution to the ethnicquestion.

In 1994/l 995, there were four rounds of talks between governmentand LTTE representatives. The talks were held in jaffna The last roundof talks was held on April 9- 10,1995. A few days after the last roundended, the LTTE unilaterally terminated the negotiation process byresuming military hostilities on 19 April, 1995. The main lessons to belearned from this experience of negotiations concern why the exerciseof peace making failed.

Preconditions for Compromise

A conflict settlement means that the parties to the conflict areready for a compromise. Willingness to compromise by both sides is

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an essential precondition for a successful negotiated settlement. Acompromise in a conflict involves the willingness of the major partiesto seekamiddleground from where they can seek a mutually acceptableframework of settlement. It requires from both parties to the conflictto abandon their maximum goals. Then, the question we can ask iswhether in 1994/l 995 the PA government and the LITE had reachedsuch a stage of middle ground and compromise. The PA governmentdeclared that it was willing to pursue a political settlement throughenhanced devolution, but it was not clear whether the LTTE was readyto accept devolution as an acceptable framework of settlement. Whenthe two sides went into negotiations, they have declared publicly thatthey were committed to a settlement, but what remained undeclaredwas the framework within which they could find a common ground.

Finding a common ground between two parties that have beenengaged in an internal armed conflict for years is usually not an easyexercise. However, this difficulty may be possible to overcome byparties if the following preconditions are also present:

(i) Parties to the conflict realize that the war is no longer useful,necessary or helpful to achieve their respective politicalobjectives.

(ii) There is also the realization that the ultimate goal that the partieshad set for themselves at the beginning of the conflict is no longerviable and a new goal, short of the initial goal, needs to be workedout.

(iii) The new goal can be achieved through negotiation andcompromise.

In the conflict resolution theory, the presence of this set ofpreconditions in a conflict is described as constituting a moment ofconflict ripeness. It means that the conflict has reached the stage of

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certainmaturityinthesensethatitisripeforresolution.WilliamZartmansays that a conflict is ripe when (i) there exists a situation of deadlockand deadline, and (ii) the parties realize that “unilateral solutions areblocked and joint solutions become conceivable” (Zartman, 1985).When we apply this concept to the situation in Sri Lanka’s conflict in1994/1995, it is difficult for us to see that the conflict had reached adangerous stalemate which could push both parties simultaneously tofinding a solution through the difficult path ofnegotiations.

Nevertheless, there existed some important preconditions fornegotiations. Most important among them was the public clamor for anegotiated settlement. In Sri Lankan society, among all ethnic groups,there had developed a sentiment in favor of a negotiated settlement.There were also many civil society groups that had actively campaignedfor ending the conflict through negotiations. The political change in1994 to a great extent gave expression to this change in the publicmood. The new leadership that came into power in 1994 -People’sAlliance led by President Chandrika Kumaratunga - also enjoyed auniquely favorable status for finding a settlement to the conflict, preciselybecause this leadership had not identified itself with the conduct of thewar. Rather, it had identified itself with the section of the political opinionin the country that opposed the war and stood for an early politicalsettlement. Consequently, the political leadership of the governmentenjoyed a considerable measure of confidence among the Tamil peopletoo.

But 1994/95 negotiation experience tells us that public supportfor a settlement and the political leadership’s commitment to findinga settlement by themselves are not sufficient conditions forsuccessful conflict resolution. Undoubtedly, they are importantconditions in the sense that they enabled the negotiation process tobegin. They were indeed enabling preconditions. But, when actualnegotiations started and new and complex challenges came on theway, the negotiation process entered into a period of crisis, ultimately

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resulting in the collapse of the entire negotiation exercise. We can drawanother lesson from this experience: the favoruble preconditions tobegin negotiations may not be sufficient enough to bring about asettlement. There is a long way to go from negotiations to anegotiated settlement.

Negotiations are a Process

When negotiations between the government and the LTTE beganin 1994 soon after the PA government came into power, there weremany expectations in Sri Lanka and abroad that the negotiations wouldsucceed and the success would come soon. There were also skepticswho repeatedly argued that the negotiations were doomed to fail,because a negotiated settlement was not possible or feasible with theLTTE. But, when we look back now at the experience of negotiationsfrom a somewhat detached point of view, with the benefit ofretrospective insights, we are more likely to see how complex the entirenegotiation exercise was. As we noted above, the negotiations beganwith a great deal of optimism. The two sides, the government and theLTTE, also initially demonstrated a positive, optimistic and result-oriented approach to negotiations. There were encouraging lettersexchanged by President Kumaratunga and Mr. Prabhakaran expressingtheir commitment to, and willingness of pursuing, an early settlement tothe conflict. In the first week of January 1995, the two parties signed acease-fire agreement. By this time, the government had announced anumber of initiatives that can be described in the language of conflictresolution as ‘confidencebuilding measures. ’ These included the liftingof the ban on many consumer items to Jaffna, a plan of rehabilitationand reconstruction, provision of electricity, the facilitation of civiliantravel from Jaffna to the rest of the country and the supply of food andmedicine to the civilian population in the north. But, in February 1995,there emerged some signs of the negotiation process beginning to facea crisis. It first manifested itself when the LTTE and the government

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developed a disagreement over the monitoring of the cease-fireagreement’s implementation. In the agreement, there was a provisionfor international monitoring of the working of the cease-fire agreement.While the government had invited a team of foreign monitors, the L T Edid not allow the monitors to enter into areas under their control.Ultimately, the monitoring exercise failed. It is still not clear why thishappened and what contributed to the LTTE’s thinking. But we candraw a general lesson from this experience: once negotiations begin,there can be unforeseen circumstances that have to be treated withcare, patience and prudence. If these unanticipated issues are nothandled prudently by both sides, the negotiation exercise itself maysuffer.

There were many other similar instances that brought thenegotiation exercise under pressure and stress. For example, the liftingon the ban of consumer commodities to Jaffna was hailed by thegovernment as an indication of its own commitment to the normalizationof civilian life in the north. But the LTTE repeatedly argued that althoughthe government made public statements to that effect, the commitmentswere not properly implemented. The LTTE even went to the extent ofsaying that the government was not sincere. An intense debate betweenthe government and the LTTE ensued. While the government, reiteratingits commitment to an early end to the ethnic conflict, demanded thatthe LTTE should engage the government in negotiating the politicaland constitutional framework for ethnic conflict resolution, the LTTEtook up the position that what was immediately important was theaddressing of the consequences of thirteen years of war and not theroot causes of the ethnic conflict. These were indeed two differentapproaches to the negotiation exercise. It is an approach that can bedescribed as root causes of the conflict vs. consequences of the conflict.The two sides indeed could not solve this issue.

What is the lesson we must draw from this and similar experiencesof the 1994/95 failed peace negotiations? A basic lesson is that conflict

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a s d

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negotiation is not a on-off affair. Rather, it is a complex exercise withunforeseen challenges and difficulties. Parties to negotiations shouldconsider negotiation as a longprocess that has to be rescued andsustained at every turn of complex events.

Negotiation Collapse and Fall Back Strategies

To treat negotiation for conflict resolution as a process, it isimportant thatparties have strategies to deal with crisis situations,like the crisis which Sri Lanka experienced in April 1995. The LTTE,accusing the government of dragging on negotiations disregarding itsdemands for ‘normalization of civilian life,’ issued an ultimatum to thegovernment in April and then within a week of that ultimatum resumedhostilities. Ever since, the two sides have been engaged in an intensewar with no effort being made to resume negotiations. The lesson tobe learnt from this is that apeaceprocess needs serious strategizing.Strategizingpeace is as important as strategizing war. Like in war,in negotiations too, there are inevitable setbacks while there may beoccasional successes. It does not mean that the peace process shouldbe abandoned. Northern Ireland negotiation process points to a lessonin contrast. There, the cease-fire agreement was broken a number oftimes, yet the US mediator and the parties continued with thenegotiation process, exploring new options and resuming the exerciseof talking. In Sri Lanka, there was no mediator to bring the partiesback to the negotiation table after the resumption ofhostilities. Neitherdid the parties appear to have any sustainable fall back plans toreactivate negotiations. The result was that the parties went back to anexclusively military strategy.

Cease-Fire and its Lessons

Another important lesson to be learnt from the breakdown of1994/95 negotiations concerns the question whether a cease-fire

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agreement is really necessary in negotiating peace in an armedconflict. In conflict resolution, a main argument in favor of cease-fireagreement is that a mutually-agreed ‘no war’ situation would helphumanize the conflict, strengthening the peace process. A cease-firemay also enable civilians to return to a normal life, after years of beingcaught up in the war. It can also create conditions for the parties totrust each other, enabling them to negotiate in an atmosphere not coloredby hostility. In this sense, a cease-fire agreement can be viewed as animportant confidence-building measure for conflict resolution. But, SriLanka’s experience demonstrated that although those favorableconditions were present at the beginning of the cease-fire agreementbetween the government and the LTTE, it also generated complexchallenges to both sides, challenges that had a negative impact on theentire peace process.

One lesson to be learned in the Sri Lankan experience is that acease-fire agreement can bring a lot ofpressure on the negotiationprocess itself. There can be many reasons for this possibility. There isalways the likelihood of the terms of the agreement being violated,intentionally or unintentionaIly. Combatants on the ground may, for purelylocal reasons, exchange fire at each other Parties who have signed theagreement also might violate the terms on tactical grounds, in order tobring pressure on the other side. There can also be groups among thenegotiating parties that are opposed to negotiations and therefore, mighttry to undermine the talks by internationally breaking the rules ofbehavioras specified under the agreement. These are contingencies that canmake the cease-fire situation unstable. Indeed, such a situation can befurther complicated by the fact that although the two sides have signeda pact to cease hostilities temporarily, they are deeply suspicious ofeach other’s strategies, motives and goals. Because of calculationsbased on mistrust, there is the likelihood of one party going back towar on the assessment that negotiations are useless.

Yet another crucial issue on cease-fire during negotiations emergedin the government-LTTE peace talks in 1994/95. It concerns the

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suspicion developed by both parties that each side utilized the cease-fire period to rearm and regroup themselves. The LTTE began to accusethe government, even within a month of the cease-fire agreement, thatthe government, behind the veil of cease-fire, began to rearm the armedforces, recruit new troops and then prepare for a major offensive inJaffna. The government also suspected that the LTTE was busy inrecruiting new guerillas, training them and acquiring new weapons. Infact, some critics of the peace-talks accused the government of fallinginto the LTTE trap of ceasefire. Their point was that the case-fire gavethe LTTE, which had been militarily weakened, much needed breathingspace to regroup and re-arm itself. This points to an important lesson:a cease-fire agreement, initially perceived as a confidence-buildingmeasure between two conflicting parties, may run the risk ofleading itself to greater mutual suspicion and new possibilities ofhostility.

The challenge then is, how to handle such unforeseen contingenciesthat may arise as direct consequence of the cease-fire agreement insuch a way that the negotiation process is not disrupted? There aretwo possible answers to this question. Firstly, a third-party mediationcan be of great help, as demonstrated in many peace negotiations inother countries. The mediator’s role is to help the two sides to overcomethose challenges and prevent them from walking out of the negotiationtable. The second response is that, perhaps, a cease-fire agreement asa precondition for talks between the two warring parties is not necessary.In this argument, what may be important is not the cessation ofhostilities, but a sustainable negotiation process that caneventually lead to a workable cease-fire agreement as a positivemeasure of conjlict deescalation. When two parties to an armedconflict begin talks, it is perhaps not necessary for them to establishmutual trust at the beginning of talks. Even if they want such mutualtrust to be established at the very beginning, a cease-fire agreement isperhaps not the best mechanism for that, because once the agreementbreaks down, there is every possibility for the negotiation process to

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collapse. There can be other, less strenuous confidence-buildingmeasures like a mutually agreed commitment to a framework fornegotiations, an agenda for negotiations and perhaps a time frame. Inthis process of pre-negotiation talks, once an exploration into issuesare jointly made by the two sides, the cease-fire option can also beexplored into. Then, a cease-fire arrangement can be worked out underconditions favorable to its sustainability.

Summaaryy

l For conflict negotiations to succeed, there should exist favorablepreconditions for a negotiated settlement.

l A negotiated settlement in a conflict would mean the emergence ofa compromise among contending positions. It is a ‘middle ground’which should be jointly pursued by the parties to the conflict.Negotiations often succeed when there are preconditions forpeace.

l When short-term objectives, political or military, of parties enterthe negotiation agenda, conflict resolution through negotiationbecomes difficult.

l In political conflicts, there are direct and indirect parties. For conflictsettlement, the role of indirect parties also needs to be considered.

0 Negotiation can be a long and complex process with setbacks.For a negotiation process to succeed, there need to be efforts tosustain the process.

l A peace process needs serious strategizing. Strategizing negotiationand peace is as important as strategizing war.

Readings/References

Dixit, J. N.,( 1998), Assignment Colombo, Vijitha Yapa:Colombo

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Rotberg, Robert I, (1999), Creating Peace in Sri Lanka, Civil Warand Reconciliation, Brookings Institution Press: Washington, DC

Rupesinghe, Kumar, (Ed.),( 1998), Negotiating Peace in Sri Lanka,Efforts, Failures and Lessons, International Alert; London

Uyangoda, Jayadeva, “Breakdown of Peace Talks, ” in Pravada, May/June, 1995

Loganathan, K.,( 1996), Sri Lanka: Lost Opportunities, PastAttempts at Resolving Ethnic Conflict, Center for Policy Researchand Analysis, University of Colombo, Colombo

Manikkalingam, Ram,( 1996), Prudently Negotiating a Moral Peace,Social Scientists’ Association: Colombo

Zartman,William,( 1985), Ripe for Resolution, Conflict andIntervention in Apica, Oxford University Press, New York

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8

Learning from Bangladesh’s Practical ApproachJehan Perera

When it is thought about from Sri Lanka’s distance, Bangladeshis usually an object of humanitarian concern. This densely populatedcountry of 120 million is often projected as the basket case of SouthAsia and Mother Nature’s step-child, plagued with floods and cyclones.But to at least some of the members of the Sri Lankan delegation whowere in Bangladesh to study the peace process in the country, theirvisit may have evoked memories of Sri Lanka’s own economic boomyears in the late 1970s when Colombo’s skyline changed with a startlingrapidity. Dhaka today may be polluted and chaotic, but there is adynamism that Sri Lanka lost a decade and a half ago, in its terribleethnic war.

If not for far-sighted political leadership on both sides of the divide,Bangladesh too may have got bogged down endlessly in its own ethnicwar. In 1976, even before the Sri Lankan conflict got under way, aguerilla movement calling itself the Shanti Bahini, and based in theChittagong Hill Tracts in the eastern extremity of the country borderingIndia, took up arms against the state.

It is easy to wax eloquent about the rights of others in othercountries, while violating the rights of people at home. For many years,Bangladesh was caught up in this dilemma. A small community ofpeople in Bangladesh wished to obtain autonomy and a protected statusfor themselves. The initial response of the state was to try and suppressthem by force of arms. Especially in the immediate aftermath of thesuccessful liberation war of 197 1, and independence, there was a strong


and fierce pride in Bengali nationalism. There was a sense thatBangladesh must have a centralized state and be one people and onecountry. But the realities in the Chittagong Hill Tracts called this notionof Bengali nationalism into question.

The example of Bangladesh shows that whatever may be theproportions of the majority and minority populations, when the minorityrises in protest, no amount of physical coercion can suppress them.They have to be dealt with politically. In Bangladesh, the right toautonomy has not become an issue of separation, but rather of ensuringequal rights to a smaller national community. Interestingly, due to thepragmatic nature of Bangladesh’s leaders, they did not become boggeddown in endless conceptual debates on the rights of “nations,”“homelands” and “self-determination,” but arrived at a solution by whichthese values could be protected.

“Anti-National”

The Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) is located at the eastern extremityof Bangladesh and borders India. It constitutes about 10 percent ofthe territory of the country and has a population of little over 1 million,which is less than 1 percent of the population. It is populated by anon-Bengali people. They are called “tribals.” But they prefer to beknown as hill people or “Jumma” people. The largest of the groups isthe Chakmas who are largely Buddhist by religion. Across the borderin India are a similar people in the states of Mizoram, Tripura etc.

During the partitioning of India, the middle classes of the hill peoplepreferred to join India as it was ethnically diverse and secular. But theBritish rulers gave the CHT to Pakistan. Hill leaders who protestedwere harassed and fled to India. From then on India became thedestination of refugee hill people, including the leaders of the militancy.They also became seen by the Bengali population as “pro-India” and‘anti-national.”

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The Liberation War of 197 1 in which Bangladesh was formed,saw certain key leaders of the hill people supporting Pakistan ratherthan the Bengali liberation movement. For a second time, at a keyjunction, the leadership of the hill people went against the sentiment ofthe people by whose side they lived. During and in the immediateaftermath of the war, many atrocities were perpetrated on the hill peoplein the name of getting rid of pro-Pakistan collaborators.

In June 1972, shortly after the liberation of Bangladesh, activistsamong the hill people formed the Purbatyo Chattagram JanaSumhati Sumiti (PCJSS). The armed wing of the PCJSS was calledthe Shanti Bahini. For a short time the leadership of the hill peopleworked together with the government of Bangladesh. But with theassassination of the Father of the Nation, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman inAugust 1975, they went underground and declared armed struggle tosecure a political solution to their problems.

The new leaders of Bangladesh were not happy with the positiontaken by the hill people during the Liberation War. They were also notprepared to respect the different identity of the hill people or give theregion a special status. In addition, the government sent in about400,000 Bengalis to settle down in the CHT, both to ease the pressureon the land in other parts of Bangladesh and to dilute the dominance ofthe hill people in the CHT. The population balance shifted dramatically.In the census of 195 1, Bengalis were only 9 percent of the population;in the census of 199 1 they were 49 percent of the population.

Someoftheinitialdemandsofthehillpeoplewerea)compensationfor the approximately 100,000 people who were displaced by theconstruction of a giant hydro-electric dam; b) expulsion of the newBengali settlers; c) reservation of 3 seats in the parliament; d)declaration of an exclusive region for the hill people; and, e) a regionalcouncil with autonomy.

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There are many parallels to be seen with Sri Lanka in thesubsequent events that unfolded in Bangladesh. For instance, in 1980,President (General) Ziaur Rahman termed the problem to be an“economic” one. He called for “unconditional surrender of themiscreants.” In 1987, President (General) Mohamed Ershad said“We may continue the fight but peace will not come.” He spoke of theneed for a political solution.

At peace talks held in December 1987, the government agreedto 26 points put forward by the Shanti Bahini, but refused to acceptthe following: a) to take back the Bengali settlers; b) to withdraw thearmy; c) to merge the three districts of the CHT to set up a singleregional council with autonomy; and d) to exclude from the peacetalks those whom it termed “national betrayers” (ie. those hill groupswho opposed the Shanti Bahini). Like the LTTE in Sri Lanka, theShanti Bahini saw themselves as the “sole representatives” of the hillpeople; the government of Bangladesh attempted to sideline the ShantiBahini by negotiating with the other hill groups.

Thus, in February 1989, the government of President Ershad signedan agreement with prominent leaders of the CHT who were not fromthe Shanti Bahini. The government established three district councilswith “limited autonomy.” This was rejected by the Shanti Bahini butaccepted by the other hill groups. Elections were held to these districtcouncils. Polls observers were not permitted and the elections wererigged.

The Shanti Bahini rejected the establishment of the three districtcouncils and called for their dissolution. They demanded the formationof a merged regional council with a guarantee clause in the constitution.The armed conflict continued. Soon it became clear that there couldbe no peace in the CHT without the Shanti Bahini coming into thepeace process.

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New Phase

The peace process entered a new phase with the formation of anon-military-based democratic government under Prime MinisterKhaleda Zia. In 1992, the BNP government of Khaleda Zia formed amulti-party “Committee for CHT” formed with members of allmainstream political parties in parliament, including the opposition AwamiLeague. The Shanti Bahini also declared a cease-fire. The ShantiBahini leader, Shantu Larma, came out in public for the first time since1975 to hold talks with the 7-member Committee for CHT which washeaded by a government minister. But despite several meetings, nofinal settlement was reached.

After a new government headed by Prime Minister Sheikh Hasinaof the Awami League came to power in 1995, they resumed talks withthe Shanti Bahini. The government set up a “National Committee forCHT” with other political parties joining it, but the main oppositionparty, the BNP, boycotted the committee.

What is invaluable for Sri Lankans to note is that the newgovernment under Sheikh Hasina did not proceed to throw awaywhat the old government had negotiated, like successive SriLankan governments have done. Instead it built on what had alreadybeen negotiated. The new government also appointed a multi-partyNational Committee which negotiated with the Shanti Bahini just as itspredecessor had done. This time the negotiations were successfullycompleted and the two parties signed a peace accord on 2 December,1997.

Due to the peace accord’s essential continuity with the past, theopposition protests against the accord would surely be seen as politicallymotivated by large sections of the population. This may partly explaintheir reluctance to be mobilized in street demonstrations against it. Inaddition, other influential segments of Bengali society are aware that apeace settlement in the Chittagong Hill Tracts will be crucial in enabling

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the port city of Chittagong to benefit from being a hub of SoutheastAsian commerce and an economic powerhouse of the Bangladeshieconomy.

The dire consequences that the opposition predicted would resultfrom the peace accord have not occurred. They include mass streetprotests against the Accord, the need for passports to travel to theChittagong Hill Tracts and massacres of Bengali settlers. The presentposition of the opposition is that the new legislation violates the ‘unitaryrynature of the Bangladesh constitution and, hence, is unconstitutional.

The reason for the failure of the opposition protests against thepeace accord is that the ordinary Bengali citizens prefer to live in acountry at peace than at war. Besides, the government did not have togo way out of the political mainstream in signing the peace accord.They built on what the former government under Mrs Khaleda Zia hadalready negotiated with the Shanti Bahini.

The peace accord has led to the formation of a single regionalcouncil for the CHT, which is an overarching body that coordinatesthe three district councils of the CHT. In addition, the governmentagreed to resettle the refugee hill people who had fled to India and toallocate them land and compensation. For its part, the Shanti Bahiniagreed to disarm. They also agreed to take over an interim regionalcouncil without elections until such time as elections could be held.

Model Process

What Sri Lanka has to learn from Bangladesh is not so much thecontent of the solution. The quantum of powers to be shared andreallocated between the centre and the regions will undoubtedly varyaccording to the specific circumstances in the two countries. Whatcan be emulated, however, is the process that the conflicting parties inBangladesh adopted in working out a political solution.

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I CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PEACE STUDIES AN INTRODUCTORY HANDBOOK

An important breakthrough was made when the government ofBangladesh stopped the futile task of attempting to militarily defeatand politically exclude the Shanti Bahini. They also did not try tomonopolize the negotiation process and hog all the political credit forthemselves. They formed multi-party committees to negotiate directlywith the Shanti Bahini. They accepted the fact that the ethnic problemwas specific to the Chittagong Hill Tracts, and so limited the devolutionof powers to that region only, instead of applying it symmetrically tothe whole country.

The Sri Lankan approach to peace making stands in contrast tothe Bangladesh approach in all these key areas. The government isstill trying to militarily defeat and isolate the LTTE. While severalgovernments have tried to negotiate with the LTTE, no governmenthas ever formed a multi-party committee to negotiate with the LTTE.Another albatross around the country’s neck is the notion that allprovinces should be granted an equal amount of devolved power. Thiswould leave the central government deprived of much of its powers,and entails such a fundamental restructuring of the state, that bothpoliticians and bureaucrats are nervous to countenance it. Even at thislate stage the idea of asymmetrical devolution put forward by theopposition leader Ranil Wickremesinghe should be seriously consideredinstead of stubbornly being rejected.

Another important feature of the Bangladesh agreement was thatthe parties to the conflict did not get bogged down in quibbling aboutthe meaning of divisive political terms such as “unitary,” “nation” and“self-determination.” Instead they got down to the discussions of apractical framework for governance. This appears to be the approachsuggested by the government’s leading thinker on the ethnic conflict,Minister Prof G.L. Peiris. In a speech he delivered at the MargaInstitute’s commemoration of the Nobel Peace Prize, Prof Peiris madea strong case against the two sides coming to agreement on a commonset of principles.

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CONFLICT KESOLIJTION AND PEACE STUDIES AN INTRODUCTORY HANDBOOK

It seems that Prof Peiris’ concern was that the debate overprinciples would revolve around the Thimpu Principles put forward byall the Tamil parties in 1985, which specified the issues of nation,homeland, self-determination and equality. However, it is necessarythat any political agreement should have a value-based vision underlyingit. Where Sri Lanka is concerned, the values that would have to underliea political solution would be democracy and the equality of all peopleswho live in the country, both as individuals and as members of distinctethnic, religious and language groups. This way of approaching theproblem can also be seen as integral to the Bangladesh approach topeace making.

If not for far-sighted political leadership on both sides of the divide,Bangladesh too may have got bogged down endlessly in its own ethnicwar. The sooner that Sri Lanka’s leaders emulate those of its SAARCneighbor, Bangladesh, the better it will be for its people.

The CHT Conflict: Main Events

1 ) The Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) is located at the easternextremity of Bangladesh and borders India. It constitutes about10 percent of the territory of the country and has a population oflittle over 1 million, which is less than 1 percent of the population.It is populated by anon-Bengali people. They are called “tribals.”But they prefer to be known as hill people or “Jumma” people.The largest of the groups is the Chakmas who are largely Buddhistby religion. Across the border in India are a similar people in thestates of Mizoram, Tripura etc.

( 2 ) During the partitioning of India, the middle classes of the hill peoplepreferred to join India as it was ethnically diverse and secular.But the British rulers gave the CHT to Pakistan. Hill leaderswho protested were harassed and fled to India. From then onIndia became the destination of refugee hill people, including the

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. CONFLICT RESOI,UTION AND PEACE STUDIES AN INTRODU(‘7‘ORY IIANDBOOK__-~

leaders of the militancy. They also became seen by the Bengalipopulation as “pro-India” and “anti-national.”

(3) During the Liberation War of 197 1 in which Bangladesh wasformed, certain key leaders of the hill people supported Pakistanrather than the Bengali liberation movement. For a second time,at a key junction the leadership of the hill people went against thesentiment of the people by whose side they lived. During and inthe immediate aftermath of the war, many atrocities wereperpetrated on the hill people in the name of getting rid of pro-Pakistan collaborators.

(4) In June 1972, shortly after the liberation of Bangladesh, activistsamong the hill people formed the Parbatyo Chattagram JanaSamhati Samiti (PCJSS). The armed wing of the PCJSS wascalled the Shanti Bahini. For a short time the leadership of thehill people worked together with the government of Bangladesh.But with the assassination of the Father of the Nation, SheikhMujibur Rahman in August 1975, they went underground anddeclared armed struggle to secure a political solution to theirproblems.

(5) The new leaders of Bangladesh were not happy with the positiontaken by the hill people during the Liberation War. They werealso not prepared to respect the different identity of the hill peopleor give the region a special status. In addition, the governmentsent in about 400,000 Bengalis to settle down in the CHT, bothto ease the pressure on the land in other parts of Bangladesh andto dilute the dominance of the hill people in the CHT. Thepopulation balance shifted dramatically. In the census of 195 1,Bengalis were only 9 percent of the population; in the census of199 1 they were 49 percent of the population.

(6) Some of the initial demands of the hill people were

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(a) Compensation for the approximately 100,000 people whowere displaced by the construction of a giant hydro- electric

(b) Expulsion of the new Bengali settlers

(c) Reservation of 3 seats in the Parliament

(d) Declaration of an exclusive region for the hill people

(e) A regional council with autonomy

(7) In 1980, President (General) Ziaur Rahman termed the problemto be an “economic” one. He called for “unconditional surrenderof the miscreants.” In 1987, President (General) MohamedErshad said “We may continue the fight but peace will not come.”He spoke of the need for a political solution.

(8) At peace talks held in December 1987, the government agreedto 26 points put forward by the PCJSS, but refused to acceptthe following:

(a) To take back the Bengali settlers

(b) To withdraw the army

(c) To merge the three districts of the CHT to set up a singleregional council with autonomy

(d) To exclude from the peace talks those whom it termed“national betrayers” (ie. those hill groups who opposed thePCJSS)

(9) In February 1989, the government of President Ershad signedan agreement with prominent leaders of the CHT who were notfrom the PCJSS. The government established three districtcouncils with “limited autonomy.” This was rejected by the PCJSS

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but accepted by the other hill groups. Elections were held tothese district councils. Polls observers were not permitted andthe elections were rigged.

( 10) The PCJSS rejected the establishment of the three district councilsand called for their dissolution. They demanded the formation ofa merged regional council with a guarantee clause in theconstitution. The armed conflict continued. Soon it became clearthat there could be no peace in the CHT without the PCJSS(Shanti Bahini) coming into the peace process.

(11) A new spirit entered the peace process with the formation of anon-military-based democratic government under Prime MinisterKhaleda Zia. In 1992 the BNP government of Khaleda Ziaformed a multi-party “Committee for CHT” formed with membersof all mainstream political parties in parliament, including theopposition Awami League. The Shanti Bahini also declared acease-fire. The PCJSS leader, Shantu Larma, came out in publicfor the first time since 1975 to hold talks with the 7-memberCommittee for CHT which was headed by a government minister.But despite several meetings, no final settlement was reached.

(12) Afler a new govemment headed by Prime Minister Sheikh Hasinaof the Awami League came to power in 1995, they resumedtalks with the PCJSS. The government set up a “NationalCommittee for CHT” with other political parties joining it, butthe main opposition party, the BNP, boycotted the committee.After several meetings, a peace accord was signed between thegovernment and PCJSS in December 1997.

(13) The peace accord has led to the formation of a single regionalcouncil for the CHT, which is an overarching body that

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coordinates the three district councils of the CHT. In addition,the government agreed to resettle the refugee hill people whohad fled to India and to allocate them land and compensation.For its part, the Shanti Bahini agreed to disarm. They also agreedto take over an interim regional council without elections untilsuch time as elections could be held.

( 14) The government passed the legislation based on the peace accordwith a simple majority only, as the main opposition parties refusedto support it and provide the necessary 2/3 majority forconstitutional amendment. The main opposition parties also triedto mobilize popular opposition to the peace accord but failed.Their warnings of an Indian takeover of the CHT and “passports”that would be required for travel there failed to mobilize thepeople. The opposition parties now say that the peace accord isillegal since it violates the ‘unitary” nature of the constitution, andtherefore requires a 2/3 majority to amend the constitution. Forits part, the PCJSS is also critical of the implementation of thepeace accord. They complain that the law that was passed inparliament was diluted and less than what was promised in thepeace accord.

l In peace negotiations, it is important that a government changedoes not result in a change of strategy. Even when the governmentschanged, the new government in Bangladesh in 1992 built on whathad already been achieved by the previous government.

l Although opposition parties tried to mobilize people against thepeace accord between the government and rebels, they failed.The main reason was that people in Bangladesh preferred a countryat peace, and not at war.

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CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PEACE STUDIES AN INTRODUCTORY HANDBOOKCONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PEACE STUDIES AN INTRODUCTORY HANDBOOK

ee Bangladesh had a successful process of negotiations. No singleBangladesh had a successful process of negotiations. No singleparty tried to get the political credit for peace.party tried to get the political credit for peace.

ee Government and rebels, instead of getting locking themselves intoGovernment and rebels, instead of getting locking themselves intodifficult issues, focussed on practical issues of governance anddifficult issues, focussed on practical issues of governance andworked out a mutually acceptable settlement.worked out a mutually acceptable settlement.

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9

Lessons from the Northern Ireland PeaceAgreementJehan Perera

The conflict in Northern Ireland is one that has had a longer historythan many other conflicts in the world. The partitioning and separationof Ireland from Great Britain in 1920 gave birth to Northern Ireland,with its Protestant majority and Catholic minority. The two communitieswere bitterly polarized and they failed to work together. Violence wasseen as the way to change. But, instead of generating change that wasconstructive, violence led to stalemate and to immense suffering. Theparallels to the Sri Lankan situation are clear.

Not so long ago, it seemed that there was no way out of theviolent conflict in Northern Ireland. The Protestant majority wantedto remain within the United Kingdom. The Catholic minority wantedto join with Ireland. The British wanted to defeat and disarm theguerillas on both sides, especially the Irish Republican Army (IRA),and so they had sent their army in, but to no avail. That is, until boththe British and the IRA were prepared to openly admit that they couldnot solve the problem and achieve their aspirations through warfare.

On the British side, there was a public acknowledgement that thearmy could only limit but not suppress IRA guerilla action. In mm, theIRA admitted that while they could fight on for another decade if needbe, at the end of the decade they would be nowhere near pushing theBritish army out of Northern Ireland. In the meantime, the people onwhose behalf they were fighting became the losers.

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Unfortunately, we in Sri Lanka have still to come to this stage ofrealization. For sure, the government has on many occasions said thata political solution is necessary to end the conflict. But it seems that intheir heart of hearts, many government leaders continue to believe thata military victory is possible. Instead, on and off we hear stories thatthe LTTE is on their last legs. These stories may firm up thedetermination of the government decision makers to hang tough, towait another six months, for the tide to turn decisively in the army’sfavor. So far, it never has.

The constant feature of the war in Sri Lanka is that the LTTE isaround and remains able to hit targets, especially in the north-east. Asfor the LITE, they have never conceded that they might not be able toachieve Tamil Eelam by force of arms. On the contrary, they keepalive the myth of invincibility of themselves and of their leadership, tokeep on going the way they are. The LTTE war machine may be well-oiled, but the people always pay the price.

Prerequisites

The Northern Ireland agreement shows that human ingenuitycan solve virtually anypoliticalproblem. A problem that seemedimpossible to resolve, is now in the process of resolution. But solvinglong drawn and major civil wars requires several prerequisites.The first prerequisite is that the two warring sides should acknowledge,both publicly and to themselves, that the war cannot be won. InNorthern Ireland there was an acknowledgement. In Sri Lanka, suchacknowledgment has yet to come, which is why we are still farawayfrom a peace agreement.

The second prerequisite for a peace agreement is that there shouldbe a bi-partisan consensus among the major political forces thatrepresent the state. In the United Kingdom there was this bi-partisanconsensus. Much of the spade work that led to the Northern Ireland

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peace agreement had been done by the Conservative government ofPrime Minister John Major. But when the man who succeeded himfrom the opposing political party clinched the deal, John Major did nottry to undermine the efforts of his successor, Prime Minister Tony Blair.Instead, he went along with him, and stood on the same platform andsupported the agreement that had been arrived at.

Needless to say, we in Sri Lanka are still far from seeing such abi-partisan agreement being honored by our two largest political parties.It is very unfortunate that to this day, years after the President andLeader of the Opposition signed a bi-partisan agreement, the leadingmembers of the government and opposition should be publiclysquabbling about who let down the other. The lack of consensus amongthe two major parties would indicate to the LTTE their lack ofseriousness in seeking an end to the ethnic conflict. By way of contrast,in the case of Northern Ireland, the bipartisan consensus in the UnitedKingdom reassured them that the talks were for real objectives ofconflict resolution and not mere election gimmicks.

In addition to these two prerequisites of a recognition of militarystalemate and the existence of a bi-partisan consensus, the NorthernIreland experience demonstrates that there are at least three otherprerequisites for a peace agreement that are needed. The first amongthem is the existence of a framework documentfor constitutionalreform on which there is basic agreement. In Northern Ireland a bigchallenge to be overcome was to devise a procedure by whichdemocracy and majority rule would prevail, but not simply rule by theethnic majority.

Majority Rule

A weakness of the Westminster system in general, which reliesupon the unitary form of government, is that in ethnically dividedsocieties, it permits the largest ethnic community to obtain the largest

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number of seats in parliament, and then take unilateral decisions thataffect the smaller ethnic communities. In Northern Ireland this systemenabled the Protestants to rule over the Catholics, and to discriminateagainst them. In Sri Lanka, the results of the Westminster system arewell known to us.

The peace agreement in Northern Ireland specifies that there willbe stringent protections of human rights that will prevent amajority riding rough shod over a minority. The agreement providesfor “arrangements to provide that key decisions and legislation areproofed to ensure that they do not infringe the European Conventionon Human Rights and any Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland.” It includessetting up of an “Equality Commission” to monitor the legal obligationto promote equality of opportunities and parity of esteem between thetwo main communities, and to investigate individual complaints againstpublic bodies.

The framework document that led to the Northern Ireland peaceagreement also has several novel mechanisms to ensure that bothProtestants and Catholics share equitably in the power to makedecisions that will bind both communities. This operates through themechanism of “Paralle1 Consent” and “Weighted Majorities.”

Certain key decisions requiring “cross-community” support (thatis, both Protestant and Catholic support) have been designated inadvance, to include the election of the Chairman of the Assembly, theFirst Minister, the Deputy First Minister, standing orders and budgetaryallocations. In other cases, such decisions could be triggered by apetition of concern brought by a significant minority (30 out of 108)members of the Assembly.

In the Northern Ireland context, the principle of parallel consentmeans that certain key decisions can only be taken if a majority ofboth unionists (Protestants) and nationalists (Catholics) vote for thedecision. The principle of weighted majority means that at least 60

13.5


percent of the assembly must vote in favor of the decision, togetherwith at least 40 percent of each of the unionist and nationalist membersvoting for the decision.

A further protection against the “winner takes all” mentality thatplagues Sri Lanka, and which drives the opposition to despair andeven revolution, has been developed in the Northern Ireland peaceagreement. It is to share ministerial positions on the proportional basisof the number of seats won by each party in the Assembly. Not onlydoes this permit the smaller communities to share executive authority,it also enables rival political parties to share power.

Open-ended Possibilities

The fourth prerequisite that had to be satisfied for the peaceagreement to work was the tacit agreement of the British governmentthat the IRA would not disarm at the outset of the peace agreementitself. After many years of fighting and breakdown of talks, the partiesto the conflict simply do not trust each other.

A guerilla group will not wish to lay down its arms, even if it isgenuine about seeking peace, until it is reasonably assured that thegovernment will deal with it, and implement the agreement, in anhonorable way. The Northern Ireland peace agreement has given theIRA and other paramilitary groups two years to disarm “followingendorsement in referendums North and South of the agreement and inthe context of the implementation of the overall settlement.”

Equally important is that a peace agreement must take care not toshut the door entirely to the ultimate goal for which a guerilla organizationhas taken to arms. The guerilla leadership has to be able to convinceits rank and file that all the sacrifces of the past have not been invain.

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The Northern Ireland peace agreement leaves the door open tothe IRA’s goal of achieving the reunion of Northern Ireland with theIrish Republic. It recognizes that at this time the majority of people ofNorthern Ireland desire to live as a part of Britain. But it also providesthat when a majority of the people of Northern Ireland freely give theirconsent to a united Ireland at a referendum, Northern Ireland mayleave Britain.

On the other hand, a similar solution may not be possible in SriLanka because the unit that should conduct such a referendum, whetherit is the north-east, or the north and east separately, or the whole island,is a matter of dispute. In the case of Northern Ireland, there was nodispute that the unit in question was that of Northern Ireland, whichhad been artificially partitionedby the British in 1920.

In Sri Lanka a “viable alternative to Tamil Eelam” which accordswith the four principles articulated at the Thimpu peace talks in 1985may still be able to satisfy the LTTE’s ultimate goal as it is a phrase thatthey have coined themselves.

Role of Mediation

The fifth prerequisite for a successful peace agreement in NorthernIreland was the skilful mediation done by Senator Mitchell from theUnited States. Senator Mitchell and his team of mediators did muchmore than facilitate the discussions between the British government,the IRA, the Northern Irish political parties and the other paramilitaryparties. They did not merely carry messages, arrange the tables andthe place to meet. In addition, they prepared documents, suggestedalternatives and counseled the different parties. This mediation workwas necessary because of the

mistrust that existed between the parties, and also becauseof the lack of negotiation skills of many of them.

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By way of contrast in Sri Lanka, both the government andopposition have balked at foreign mediation. The rather bad exampleof Indian mediation may account for this reluctance to accept foreignmediation. But it was plain to see that India was not an impartialmediator during its period of involvement. On the contrary, it was avery involved one, being a neighbor that had many interests in Sri Lankanot least of which was actively supporting some of the guerillaorganizations. At present in Sri Lanka, there appears to be a consensusthat is building up that third-party facilitation is acceptable. This is animprovement on the attitudes prevalent some time ago.

As much as the government needs to be rethinking its strategy onhow to end the war, and the sufferings of the people, so must theLTTE also engage in rethinking its strategy, so that both parties canmove away from war and killing to achievepolitical endsthroughpoliticalmeans.

Summary

Following lessons from the experience of Northern Ireland arerelevant to Sri Lanka:

l Human dignity can solve seemingly intractable political problems.

l Solving long-drawn civil wars require certain prerequisites:

- The warring sides should acknowledge that the war cannot bewon.

- There should be consensus among major political parties.

l In Northern Ireland, parties first negotiated a FrameworkDocument setting out principles for constitutional reform.

l The Framework Document introduced novel constitutional featuresto enable Protestants and Catholics to share power on the basisof equality.

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0 Steps are taken to prevent majority rule with provisions for stringentprotection of human rights.

l The settlement is not a closed one. It leaves room for open-endedpossibilities.

l The skilful mediation by a third-party mediator was a major reasonfor the success of Northern Ireland negotiations.

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10

The Philippines: Key to Success in Peace MakingJehan Perera

The Philippines is of interest to Sri Lanka due to the peaceagreement arrived at on the island of Mindanao, and its relevance toSri Lanka. The breakthrough to peace on Mindanao came after aquarter century of guerilla warfare that pitted the original Muslimmajority on the island against the government. The peace accord whichwas signed in 1996, now appears to be breaking down. There arelessons in both peace making and peace losing that are of greatrelevance to Sri Lanka.

Mindanao had been for many centuries a Muslim majority area.But successive waves of Christian colonization, some of which wasstate sponsored, led to a change in the demographic composition. Thenew Christian settlers came to be seen as the new elite, upsetting oldsocial relations. They became the owners of large tracts of land. Alongwith these changes came a transformation in the nature of the institutionsserving the public. They too tended to serve the Christian populationfirst, with the result that the Muslim population on Mindanao felt thatthey were being sidelined and had become second class citizens in theland of their birth. Thus, a clear parallel can be seen to the grievancesof Tamils in Sri Lanka’s formerly Tamil majority Eastern province inrelation to state-sponsored settlement of Sinhalese.

The guerilla war begun by organizations such as the Moro NationalLiberation Front (MNLF) became a protracted one with neither thegovernment nor the rebels able to defeat the other. Foreign supportfrom several Muslim countries, most notably Libya, led to a situationof stalemate. By the time of the peace agreement in 1996, an estimated

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125,000 people are believed to have died as a result of the conflict.Therefore, the peace settlement in the Philippines, the problems thatwere overcome and those that remain offer many lessons for peacemakers whether in Sri Lankaor in other countries facing ethnic conflicts,such as Bangladesh.

The success of peace making in the Philippines came after severalfailures. The most dramatic breakdown occurred in February 1987when the newly-elected president, Corazon Aquino, who was electedto power as the “peace” and “democracy” candidate, declared an allout campaign to militarily eradicate the rebels. The parallel to Sri Lankaand to the election of its own “peace” and “democracy” candidate,President Chandrika Kumaratunga, is striking. Both presidents, whowere widows of slain political leaders in whose shadows they hadlived, had not had experience of administering political office. Theyboth went into the peace talks with good intentions, but without havingdone the requisite hard work in planning.

Adequate Preparations

According to Professor Ed Garcia, “While the sincerity of thenew (Aquino) government to talk was widely acknowledged, it hasbeen recognized even by members of the peace panel that thegovernment was unprepared when it went into negotiations.” Therelevance of his observation becomes clearer when he further pointedout that. “What made the talks possible was the popular clamor for it,effectively overriding the military’s objections to peace talks. It wasthis support from a peace constituency, consisting principally of religiousleaders and non-governmental organizations, that provided the impetusfor the peace talks, but it was no substitute for the adequate preparationsnecessary to ensure a significant breakthrough into negotiations.”

In 1993 the newly elected president, Fidel Ramos, adopted amore sophisticated policy towards negotiations. He appointed a three-

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member National Unification Commission with wide ranging powersand with Cabinet status, so that they would not be subjected to anyform of political interference. Backed by a team of researchers andassistants, the Commissioners did their own investigations and madetheir recommendations directly to the President. This led to the muchacclaimed peace settlement between the Philippine government andthe MNLF, which is the largest of the Muslim rebel organizations.

Disillusionment

However, the situation today in Mindanao is growing precarious.There are two major reasons for this. The first problem is that thePhilippino government is not delivering on all that it promised to theMNLF when it obtained their acquiescence in the peace settlement.After President Ramos, President Estrada, who succeeded him, is notvery sympathetic to the aspirations of the Muslim people of Mindanaofor self-government. The second problem is that the MNLF leader,Nur Misuari, who became the Governor of Mindanao, has shownhimself to be a poor administrator. He has not been able to showresults in terms of eradicating corruption and promoting economicdevelopment. The more extremist Moro Islamic Liberation Front(MILF), which did not sighe devolution proposals made theirappearance in February 1996 the package had been substantiallydiluted.

Likewise, in the Philippines the first agreement signed by the Ramosgovernment and the MNLF rebels on a “transitional implementingstructure and mechanism” in June 1996 met with severe oppositionand public uproar in the country. This led to to the watering down ofthe peace agreement by the time it was finalized and signed into law inOctober 1996. In other words, the MNLF ended up getting quite abit less than it had been promised at the outset. But by entering into awatered down agreement, the MNLF is now in danger of losing groundto the much smaller and more extreme MILF, which has now become

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the main rebel organization. The MILF is making much of the “sellout” of Muslim interests by its rival which, it claims, wanted to getsome small share of governmental power.

Important Lessons

An important lesson from the Philippines is that, unless both thegovernment and the rebel organization with which it has signed thepeace agreement cooperate with each other, extremists on eitherside can gain in strength. They will try to undermine the peaceagreement. This is what can also be seen in the case of the Palestinian-Israeli peace agreement. The hardline stance taken by the new Israeligovernment has weakened President Arafat and also the moderatesamong the Israelis. But the structures of power are such that a weakeningof the moderates after peace may affect the rebel organization morethan it does the government. While the war rages the guerillas arestrong, because they can always hope to rely on their weapons to getwhat they want. But after peace comes they are not expected toresort to their weapons, but only to political negotiations. This is therealm of political intrigue and double talk where the advantage willtend to lie with established politicians rather than with guerillas in thebush.

Further, it is governments, and not the rebels, who have access tomassive resources, both local and international, available to legitimatestates and to the diplomatic power that being a legitimate state confers.In turn, the international community feels much more comfortable withdemocratically elected politicians than with rebels who have just leftthe jungles. Therefore, it is natural that the rebels will feel that the cardsare stacked against them once peace returns. This is why makingpeace with a guerilla organization calls for special mechanismsto build trust and confidence. Or else the guerillas will not be preparedto come out of the jungles to negotiate but will prefer to fight it outfrom the jungles, despite the misery that the war brings to everyone,including their own people.

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Thus, for peace making to be successful there are three importantlessons from the Philippines. First is the need to have carefulpreparations madeprior to negotiations. Second, is to ensure thatthe rebels do not feel cheated after the peace agreement has beensigned because of any watering down of the agreement. This can leadto a defection from the ranks of those who signed the peace accord,who will cross over and join more extreme rebel groups. Third, is tokeep in mind that a basic principle of conflict resolution by peacefulmeans is that both parties to a conflict should contribute towardsthe envisaged solution.

For instance, if only one side develops the solution, the chancesare that the benefits of the solution would accrue primarily to that side.Further, the other side would not feel a sense of ownership of thesolution. On the contrary they would probably feel that the solutionbelongs to the other side alone, and not to them also. Joint participationin the formulation of the solution to a problem is key to mutualacceptance of that solution,

The basic requirement in any negotiated political solution is thatthe two sides shouldjointly come up with the answers and therebyfeel that they own the solution. For instance, the peace accordsigned in the Philippines between the government and the Muslim rebels,was based on the 1976 Tripoli agreement. On that occasion, thePhilippine government, the rebel MNLF and the Organization of IslamicStates jointly came up with a mutually agreed framework of a politicalsolution. Twenty years later, after several failures, this framework wasfleshed out and given content as a result of a successful negotiation.

In Sri Lanka, on the other hand, there has been no commonlyagreed framework on which a solution may be reached. In 1985 theTamil parties, including the LTTE, met with the Sri Lankan governmentand came out with the Thimpu declaration and affirmed four principleson which they wished the solution to be based. But the Sri Lankangovernment did not agree to this framework which was unilaterallydecided on by the Tamil parties. The Indo-Lanka Accord of 1987

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brought together the Sri Lankan and Indian governments, and all theTamil parties, but not the LTTE. Both of these negotiations failedbecause they did not accommodate both parties to the conflict butsought to be unilateral impositions. Now in a continuation with pasttrends, there is the devolution package that excludes the LTTE. It tooseeks to be a unilateral imposition on one party to the conflict.

Devolution Package

Despite the best efforts of the government to obtain broad andnon-partisan support for the devolution package, this has not beenreadily forthcoming either from the rebel LTTE, the opposition UNP,or civic organizations. The reason seems to have less to do With thecontent of the package (for example, the “unitary state” versus “unionof regions” issue) than it has to do with the non-participation problem.The fact is the devolution package is one that was crafted by thegovernment acting more or less on its own, and only thereafterpresented to the larger society for their observations and amendments.

But whatever the shortcomings may be in the present set ofgovernment proposals, they do continue to deal directly with the greatestobstacle to the genuine devolution of powers. This is Article 2 of theconstitution which asserts that “Sri Lanka shall be a unitary state.” Interms of constitutional law while Article 2 remains the autonomy thatcan be granted is necessarily limited. Article 2 perpetuates centralizationand restricts devolution. It means that the central government canalways, by itself, either override or dissolve a regional body. Such apower is bound to be abused, if not for ethnic reasons, then for partypolitical reasons.

What is most noteworthy about the government’s devolutionproposals is that they seek to remove Article 2 from the constitution.This is certainly a courageous decision on the part of the governmentbecause it is the removal of Article 2 that necessitates a referendum. Inits willingness to go to the people with the most far-reaching devolution

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proposals ever made by a Sri Lankan government, the governmenthas given an indication of its sincerity to pursue a negotiated politicalsettlement. But for them to be really worthwhile, these proposals, aswe shall see, should be part of a strategy to bring the LTTE back tonegotiations. The unfortunate fact is, that even if the devolution packagemore or less meets Tamil aspirations, in its present formulation it willfail to be acceptable to the LTTE. The devolution package is anendeavor to squeeze the LTTE into a solution framed by others. Thisis a strategy that is unlikely to work if peace now is the goal.

Summary

In this lesson, you learned:

A breakthrough for peace in the Philippines came after a quartercentury of guerilla warfare and conflict.

Peace talks between the government and the rebels were madepossible when there was popular clamor for it. A peace constituencyis crucial to create conditions for peace talks.

If the government and the rebels that sign the peace agreement donot cooperate to implement the settlement extremists of either sidecan gain in strength.

Making peace with a guerilla organization calls for specialmechanisms.

Careful preparations for talk made before the talks can make peacetalks successful.

It is important that the rebels do not feel cheated after the peaceagreement is signed.

One key principle in conflict resolution by peaceful means is thatboth parties should contribute to the envisaged solution.

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Constitution-Making in a Plural Society:Conflict Prevention/Resolution

N. Selvakkumaran

Introduction

In countries where internal conflicts have defined the nature ofpolitical relations among communities, constitution-making is usually acomplex and difficult exercise. Sri Lanka’s experience during the pasttwo decades provides a lot of lessons concerning constitutional reformsin a society in conflict. However, constitution-making can also beapproached from a conflict resolution perspective. Constitutions maygenerate conflicts when they do not provide political structures andinstitutions suitable for the plural nature of society. Sri Lanka providesa good case in point. At the same time, constitutions can also beimagined as initiatives for conflict resolution. In this chapter, we willdiscuss some salient aspects of constitution-making for conflictresolution.

Aims of a Constitution

It is hardly imaginable that any country or state calling itself ademocracy can be without a constitution. Every state needs aconstitution. It has been said that a constitution is a necessity and everystate must and does in fact possess one. A constitution is necessaryeven in the case of despotism. A state without a constitution is not astate but a regime of anarchy. (Jellinek)

Why is a constitution essential for a state? A constitution of astate serves many a purpose. To name a few, it serves to enumerate

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the powers and functions of different organs of government; it describesthe relationship between the different organs of government; it enunciatesthe norms which underpin the exercise of powers by these organs; itdefines the relationship between the organs of government and thepeople of a country; it describes the relationship of a state with the restof the world; it curbs the government on behalf of the individuals andgroups; it also limits the vagaries of present and future generations.Due to a variety of these reasons, it may be observed that many writershave given different definitions to a constitution.

In the words of Woolsey, a constitution is “the collection ofprinciples according to which the powers of the government, rights ofthe governed and the relations between the two are adjusted.” Dr.Wheare, on the other hand, defines a constitution as “that body ofrules which regulates the ends for which and the organs through whichgovernmental power is exercised.” Similarly, Gilchrist states that aconstitution consists of “that body of rules or laws, written or unwritten,which determine the organization of government, the distribution ofpowers to the various organs of government and the general principleson which these powers are to be exercised.” Jellinek also sees aconstitution in the same light. To him a constitution is the body of “juridicalrules which determine the supreme organs of the state, which prescribestheir mode of creation, their mutual relation, their sphere of action andfinally the fundamental place of each of them in their relation to thestate.” There are others who give importance to some other aspects.For example, Charles Borgeaud envisions a constitution as “thefundamental law according to which the relations of individuals or moralpersons to the community are determined.” Lord Bryce states as oneof the definitions that a constitution is “the complex totality of lawsembodying the principles and rules whereby the community is organized,governed and held together.”

It is evident that the constitution of a state serves a variety ofpurposes. When making a constitution, different degrees of importance

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may be attached to different purposes depending on the experience astate has undergone or on the basis of emphasis placed by its peopleon certain matters. This may vary from country to country though someof the core values and norms may, of necessity, find a place in all theconstitutions. One of the objectives of the constitution in a democraticstate must be to maintain law and order and create an environmentwhere people can live happily andpeacefully, enjoy their peedomsand rights, and develop themselves and the country without causingany harm to others or infringing the peedoms and rights of o thers.

One cannot but agree that these concerns should, if not will, comeuppermost in the people who are concerned with making a satisfactoryand workable constitution which ensures peace and harmony amongstthe different peoples of the country. If the basic organic law of acountry which is plural in nature fails to provide the necessaryenvironment and space for diverse communities to coexist withamity and mutual respect, it will not take very long for the countryto disintegrate and go down the lane of destruction and distrust.No country can ever be capable of developing itself if there is mistrust,hatred and disunity among its various communities. Lack of unity, amonggoodwill and trust amongst a country’s different communities is a surerecipe for disintegration and disaster.

It is noteworthy that the fundamental law of any land should neitherconstitutionalize nor institutionalize disunity, suspicion andmistrust amongst the various communities inhabiting the country.Sri Lanka is not an exception to this general notion. Therefore, it isessential to know the constitutional structures and mechanisms thatshould be in place if a plural society can exist and let its different peopleslive peacefully and amicably for the good of themselves as well as thatof their country.

Constitution in a Plural Society

There are three main concerns, amongst others, which a pluralisticcountry should pay attention to when it embarks upon the task of making

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a new constitution for itself. These relate to (i) mechanics and mannerof preventing conflicts from arising between different communities, (ii)early warning signals of any potential conflicts, and (iii) if conflicts doarise, mechanisms for resolving or dealing with them in a manner thatwill engender harmony and peace as opposed to acrimony anddivisiveness.

Conflict prevention

It is essential that the constitution of a country should not be thevery source of creating conflicts amongst the various communities of aplural state. The structure of government formulated in the constitutioncan be a fertile ground generating disharmony and discord amongstvarious peoples of a country. For example, a country, composed ofmulti-ethnic or multi-religious societies needs a system of governmentwhich will not allow one ethnic community or religious majority totrarnplti over the rights and freedoms of other communities. The systemshould not facilitate and foster hegemony of one community over andabove the other communities. These concerns could be addressed byincorporating different mechanisms in the fundamental law of a country.

The constitutional structure of the government should be designedin such a way that it provides opportunity and space for each andevery community to manage their affairs without any interference fromthe other communities. In other words, the different communities mustenjoy relative autonomy when it comes to internal affairs of theirrespective communities, without allowing such autonomy to adverselyimpact on the general welfare and good of the country.Overcentralization of powers does not facilitate or provide such spaceor opportunity. A system of effective devolution of powers becomeshandy in this respect. Devolution of powers provides opportunities fordifferent groups or regions to look after and develop themselves withregard to matters which pertain to them exclusively without any impactor adverse effect on other people.

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I This will in other words permit different groups to mind their ownmatters without being minded by others. They will get a feeling thatthey are not subjected to the whims and fancies of people who do notshare their sense and sensibilities. This facilitates the enjoyment ofautonomy of individuals and groups. One may go to the extent of arguingthat this should be a fundamental human right of every person andgroup. A system which permits or perpetuates a person being dominatedor ruled by another, or a group being dominated or ruled by another,where the matter over which this happens is exclusively within the firstperson or group, is oppressive in nature. Such a system will be a surerecipe for generating conflicts and dissension. History shows that inmany a state, the unitary system of government has failed to providethe necessary space and autonomy to different groups to live in amityand harmony.

Having said that, one should also ensure that devolution of powers does not become the vehicle for disintegration of states or countries.This lurking fear, that when powers are devolved it provides the steppingstone for disintegration, bothers the minds of constitution makers. It isimperative that adequate and effective safeguards are incorporated inthe constitutional structure against such eventualities. This could beensured in different ways. The centre should enjoy swift and decisivepowers to deal with any potential attempt by periphery to break awayor endanger the integrity of the country. On the other hand, theconstitution should also ensure that the periphery is not alienated withregard to matters which are handled by the centre. There should beeffective power-sharing in the centre as well. This will be operative asan interlocking mechanism to ensure the active participation andinvolvement of the periphery in the national matters as well.Constitutional mechanisms providing for interdependency are welcomefeatures to foster unity, as against divisiveness amongst diverse groups.

Where constitutional structures do not permit space andopportunity for peripheries to share and involve in the national

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affairs, it becomes a difficult exercise, naturally, to hold themtogether. As such, the fundamental law of the country should providefor mechanisms which will truly require the active and necessaryparticipation and contribution to the decision-making as well asimplementation process of national matters. When these opportunitiesare availed of, the system becomes interlocking as well asinterdependent, which will ensure and engender togetherness ratherthan separateness.

It is also necessary that fundamental human rights of people, inparticular the right to life and integrity of a person, as well as the rightto equality, are well and meaningfilly fortified in the constitution. Thepromotion, protection and enjoyment of these rights by every persongo a long way in reducing conflicts amongst themselves. Effectivemechanisms against any violation of these rights by legislative, executiveorjudicial action, as well as by any private sector action, are essentialif these rights are to have any practical meaning. Efficient and easilyaccessible means of redress and enforcement provide these rightseffectiveness, and thus serve towards the prevention of conflicts. It ishardly necessary to stress the importance of an independent andimpartial judiciary, as well as other quasi-judicial fora, for upholdingand safeguarding these rights. Therefore, the basic law of the landshould contain provisions which establish and ensure such a set ofbodies.

Constitutions and Conflict Prevention

Early Warning Signals and Conflicts: It is impossible to providesystems which will fully prevent conflicts from arising. What has beendiscussed in the earlier section of this chapter is ways and means toprevent conflict from arising; however, that does not, and surely willnot, ensure a society free from all conflict. It is an attempt at reducingthe sources of conflicts. Conflicts can be said to be as old as mankind.Perhaps life will not be as good if there were to be no conflicts!

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Having said that, one needs to look for signals or indicators whichforewarn of a potential conflict. The constitutional fabric should includewithin itselfmechanics which will facilitate such early signals being given.People who have the facility of being forewarned of any disaster arebetter prepared to face them or could take prudent and proper stepsto avert such disaster beforehand. In this section, let us consider howthe fundamental law of the land can provide early warnings aboutpotential conflicts.

One of the important instruments which should be strengthened inthe fundamental law, is the right to freedom of speech, expression andinformation. If this right is protected and promoted in its varied forms,individuals and groups will be able to voice their concerns about matterswhich provide fertile sources of potential conflicts. When there is afear of persecution or oppression, if one were to express himself orherself, it leads to the suppression of information which may be vital toconflict prevention. Lack of freedom of speech and expressioncontributes in a great way to the bottling up of dissatisfaction anddissension until it becomes unbearable and bursts as a conflict. Freeflow of thought and ideas, viewpoints and counter-arguments areessential tools for harmonious coexistence. If these are not permittedor space is not provided for democratic dissent, conflicts cannot beidentified well in time.

Therefore, the fundamental human rights of people to enjoy thefreedom of speech, expression and information, coupled with thefreedom of association and assembly, are to be protected and promotedin a meaningful way in the constitution. As stated earlier, a nindependent and impartialjudiciary which is sensitive to thepluralcharacter of a society is a sine qua non for the protection andpromotion of this right us well. It is the responsibility of the constitutionmakers to enshrine in the constitution such provisions which will ensure,safeguard and promote such a judiciary.

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Apart from this mechanism, there should be a constitutionaldevice to periodically assess and report on the existing relationsbetween various communities in a plural society. Such a systemshould be institutionalized so that it meets regularly, and representativesbring to the fore the problems, or what they perceive as problems, andfind early solutions before they take the form of conflicts. This institutionor forum must be constitutionally provided for and mandated to meetregularly. This will provide a meaningful and effective space for peopleto air their concerns and fears which will act as a forewarning signal.

Constitutions and Conflict Resolution/Management

Early warning systems or indicators of potential conflicts do go along way to nib them in the bud. However, there are circumstanceswhere conflicts do flare up for one reason or other amongst variouscommunities. In such a situation, the constitutional mechanism, to dealwith such conflicts in order to resolve them or manage them, becomesvery important. There have been many non-constitutional and informalmethods adopted to deal with such situations. However, they mainlydepend on the goodwill and temperament of the people involved.Similarly, success or otherwise too depends on personalities and noton structures.

However, the constitutions provide a judicial system to deal withconflicts and disputes. Inter-personal conflicts are brought before suchjudicial bodies or quasi- judicial tribunals. Similarly, disputes betweenpersons and governmental institutions are also brought before suchbodies. The adversarial nature of the procedures adopted in theadjudication of these causes of action is not conducive in all cases tobring about harmonious future relations amongst the contesting parties.It has been found quite often, that the judicial system works in a mannerwhich favors the ‘winner takes all’ system. Such a system does nothelp in many cases to bring about a tranquil and harmonious atmospherewhich facilitates reconciliation between parties. The prevailing system

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divides the parties, rather than bringing them together, in a majority ofcases. Such a system is not at all suitable and advisable when dealingwith issues of conflicts between communities in a plural society, thoughin certain situations adversarial systems with penal sanctions are notruled out as inappropriate.

It is a challenging task for constitution makers to create andestablish institutional structures and systems which will provide fornegotiation, mediation and resolution of disputes instead of adjudicationon them. In this way, the chances are more for the resolution of conflictsby a process which facilitates ‘give and take’ rather than ‘winner takesall.’ Therefore, the constitution of a country with plural societyshould provide for high-level instruments for negotiation andmediation of disputes between communities. This will go a longway in keeping the relations between communities in a favorable way.

Conclusion

Constitution makers in a plural society have to be mindful thatinter-community conflicts are inevitable and that the constitution theymake should cater for this concern. They should draft the constitutionin a manner which will try to reduce the possibilities of conflict arising,which will contain indicators and signals which forewarn potentialconflicts, and which will provide effective and beneficial mechanismsto resolve such conflicts. Failure to address these issues when makinga constitution, will provide ample opportunities for conflicts to ariseand bedevil the country.

Summary

In this chapter, you learnt:

l Constitutions can provide mechanisms and structures for conflictmanagement and resolution.

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l Constitutions in plural societies should reflect the diversity of society.

l The constitutional fabric should include within itself mechanismsto facilitate early warning signals about possible conflicts.

l Constitutional devices can periodically assess the nature of inter-group relations in plural society to prevent conflicts.

l A strong fundamental rights chapter in the constitution and anindependent judiciary are effective mechanisms to prevent conflicts.

l Constitutions can provide for institutions and mechanisms forconflict resolution and management.

Works referred to:

Jellinek, Recht des modernen Staates, cited in J.W. Gamer,Political Science and Government

Wheare, KC., Modern Constitutions

Gilchrist, R.N., Principles of Political Science

Charles Borgeaud, Adoption and Amendment of Constitutions

Lord Bryce, J., Studies in Histow and Jurisprudence

Mahajan, V.D., Political Theory

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12

The South African Constitution of 1996Lessons for Sri Lanka

Rohan Edlrisinha

Introduction

The South African Constitution of 1996 is considered one of themost progressive constitutions in the modern world. Not only does theconstitution provide for the protection of human rights and imposeeffective restraints on the wielders of political power, but it also helpedheal the wounds of the nation’s bitter apartheid legacy.

The conflict between the white supremacist minority and the blackmajority had been violent for several years. The African NationalCongress(ANC) and its allies had been involved in a long armedstruggle for liberation. The apartheid rulers stubbornly refused tocountenance democratic reforms even in the wake of internationalsanctions and isolation. However, in the early 1990.54 a dramatic shifttook place which led eventually to a peaceful and negotiated settlementto the conflict. A peaceful transfer of power to the black majority witha restoration of democracy and basic human rights was the culminationof this unique process of conflict resolution in South Africa.

In this chapter we focus on the process of constitution making inSouth Africa. One cardinal lesson we can learn from South Africa isthat constitution making is not merely drafting and adopting aconstitution. More importantly it can be an integral component of aconflict resolution and peace-building initiative. In deeply dividedsocieties like South Africa and Sri Lanka, a new constitution should

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mean a qualitatively new phase in the political life of the state and itspeople. A new constitution should embody the consensus of all thosewho constitute the nation. It should give expression to the democraticaspirations of the people. It should be an instrument for nationalreconciliation and the healing of old wounds in the body politic. Itshould be a covenant that binds people with people and people withthe state. As Nelson Mandela has observed about the new South Africa:“We enter into a covenant that we will build a society in which allSouth Africans, both black and white, will be able to walk, talkwithout any fear in their hearts, assured of their inalienable rightto human dignity, a rainbow nation at peace with itself and theworld. ”

Beginnings

The adoption of the final constitution in South Africa was theculmination of a remarkable process of change or transformation whichbegan in February, 1990 when then President F. W. de Klerk in afamous speech took the whole of South Africa by surprise by launchingthe process of democratization. Since then, there had been ups anddowns and serious set backs, but, over the years there has beenprogress. South Africa is an example of a success story ofreconciliationand hope.

Before we focus on the details of the constitution, we need tomention the fact that the drafting of the final constitution took placewithin the political context of the amazing statesmanship of PresidentNelson Mandela, who personified the reconciliation and generosity ofspirit which the new constitution sought to enshrine. President Mandelaplayed a crucial role and that spirit of reconciliation and generosity ofspirit trickled down to the political leadership of the country and alsoto the main actors in the Constitution-drafting process. The relationshipbetween the President of the Constitutional Assembly, Cyril Ramaphosa,and the Minister of Constitutional Affairs, Rolf Meyer, and also the

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Deputy Chairman of the Assembly, Leon Wessels, both of whom wereleaders of the National Party, was crucial in bringing about the adoptionof the final constitution. The entire process gives us a lesson inconstitution making. The non-partisan approach, the people’sparticipation in the constitution-making process, the professionalismand competence displayed in drafting the constitution, attempts toaddress the aspirations of the different communities, to forgecompromise and consensus, and the emphasis on values and principleswhich has permeated the whole constitution-drafting process, aresignificant lessons for Sri Lanka. Unfortunately, in Sri Lanka we appearto lack some of these important values and principles in drafting a newconstitution and these values were sadly lacking even when the 1972and 1978 Constitutions were drafted.

Political Context

The road to change in South Africa began in February, 1990 anduntil December, 1993 there were a series of negotiations between theANC and the National Party Government. Various issues had to beresolved - the unbanning of the ANC, the Communist Party and thePan African Congress (PAC), the curbing of violence and the releaseofpolitical prisoners, notably President Mandela himself The complexprocess of political negotiations and constitutional reform was a keyelement in this project of achieving political liberation. There weredifferent attitudes among the main political actors towards the draftingof a constitution. The National Party, which was about to give uppower was very concerned that many of the traditional constitutionalsafeguards be incorporated in the constitution. There was a fear ofchange. They perceived the ANC as an undemocratic, communistand terrorist movement. There was a fear to let go of power and tohand over power to the ANC before adequate safeguards were inplace. The ANC, however, was steadfast in its commitment to the

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issue of legitimacy. They wanted a constitution which was to be draftedby the people or at least by the elected representatives of the people.There was a problem of how to bridge this gap, this difference ofattitude.

A compromise was reached whereby an interim constitution wasadopted. This was to be followed by a general election held under theinterim constitution, and then the newly- elected representatives of thepeople were to convene as a constituent assembly to draft the finalconstitution. The National Party and other white parties wanted evenmore safeguards. They were concerned that certain core principles ofgovernance and human rights be accepted and entrenched as acondition for the transfer of power. They therefore wanted as muchdetail as possible, as many safeguards for minorities as possible, in theinterim constitution itself. In contrast, the ANC wanted as few detailsas possible in that interim constitution, because to them it was atransitional document which was not meant to last very long. Therewas, therefore, a difference of minds. Because of this, the interimconstitution contained some unique features. The first was two veryimpressive sections in the interim constitution. They were the preambleat the beginning and the postamble. There was a postamble whichreferred to reconciliation right at the end of the constitution. Thesewere remarkable provisions in terms of their substance. The postamblestressed that the interim constitution was to be a bridge, a bridgebetween the past and the future.

Secondly, the interim constitution contained thirty four constitutionalprinciples. They were seen as a mechanism to address the concerns ofthe white community, in particular, that the final constitution mightpromote majoritarian democracy at the expense of the rights of thewhites and other minorities. They insisted that the interim constitutioncontained some basic principles which the final constitution could notdepart from. This was their security that there wouldn’t be total orradical change in the final constitution. Thirty four basic values or

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principles which the final constitution had to conform to were entrenchedin the interim constitution. For example, the first constitutional principleread as follows:

The Constitution of South Africa shall provide for the establishmentof one sovereign state, a common South African citizenship and ademocratic system of government committed to achieving equalitybetween men and women and people of all races.

The Constituent Assembly elected under the Interim Constitutionhad the mandate to draft and adopt a final constitution for South Africa.However, it had to fit within the frameworkd of a set of comprehensiveprinciples agreed upon through a process ofpolitical negotiationsand incorporated in the interim constitution itself. The ConstituentAssembly adopted the constitution on 8 May 1996. It was then reviewedby the Constitutional Court to ascertain whether it was consistent withthe thirty four principles. Public hearings were held for this purpose atwhich submissions were heard by the court. The court ordered thatcertain provisions be amended as they were inconsistent with severalprinciples and finally, at the end of the year, the Constitutional Courtgave its imprimatur to the final document.

The Constitution-Making Process

Sri Lanka can learn a lot from the Constituent Assembly processthat commenced in 1994. The first democratic election in South Africawas held in April, 1994 and a National Assembly or Parliamentconsisting of 400 MPs and the Senate consisting of 90 members wereelected. These 490 elected representatives together constituted theConstituent Assembly, and the interim constitution required that theydraft and adopt the final constitution within two years of the firstsitting of the Constituent Assembly. Now, the way in which this finalConstitution was drafted was quite remarkable. In August, 1994, theSecretariat was established by the Constituent Assembly to coordinate

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the whole process. A full-time Executive Director and several full-time members of staff were appointed. The Constituent Assemblythen divided itself into six, thirty- member theme committees to dealwith some of the main features of the constitution. The six themecommittees were: a committee dealing with the character of the state,the structure of government the relationship between the different levelsof government, fundamental rights, the judiciary and legal systems andspecialized structure of government. Each of these six themecommittees was assisted by a team of technical experts consisting oflawyers, legal academics, and drafting experts. In fact, they broughtdown a plain language expert from Canada to go through the entiredocument at the end of the process to ensure that the language usedwas as simple and as easily comprehensible by the ordinary person aspossible. To give an example, the fundamental rights team committeewas probably the most complicated. They had technical experts oneach fundamental right.

The report on the right to property, which was one of the mostcontroversial rights incorporated in the final constitution, is like a textbook. In a comprehensive survey, all the positions of the various partiesare recorded, the right to property provisions in all constitutions in theworld are tabulated, evaluated and critically analyzed. So you canimagine the documentation that went into this whole process. At theend of the process the Constituent Assembly appointed a 46 memberConstitutional Committee consisting of representatives from all theparties in parliament, which functioned like an Executive Committee.They had to put everything together, resolve the disputes and come upwith the final document. While this process unfolded, there was anotherparallel process that went on simultaneously, a massive publicparticipation and awareness raising campaign.

There was a concerted effort to involve the people in theconstitution-makingprocess. The Constituent Assembly was veryconscious that ultimately it was the people who were drafting a

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constitution for themselves. A media campaign which called forresponses from the people on specific issues - freedom of expression,what should the flag look like, what should the national anthem be -was designed every submission sent by every organization or individualwas acknowledged by the Secretariat of the Constituent Assembly.There were over two million signatories to the submissions and petitionsthat went before the Constituent Assembly. An official newsletter ofthe Constituent Assembly was published and distributed free to allcitizens of South Africa. It was published in eleven official languages.Every week there was a television discussion program on specificaspects of the constitution. The moderator was a Professor at theUniversity of the Witwatersrand. Representatives from all the politicalparties were invited. Each representative had to come out with his orher party’s respective position and be subject to hostile questions,criticism from the moderator and also from the representatives of otherpolitical parties. They had to explain, justify and defend. There wasthus a concerted attempt at making the whole constitutional draftingprocess open, transparent andparticipatory.

Basic Features

Concerning the basic features of the constitution, we may firstfocus on the first two articles of the South African Constitution. Theyshow vividly the difference between the South African and Sri Lankanapproaches. The first chapter is titled “Founding Provisions,” or thebasic principles. Article 1 states that the Republic of South Africa isone sovereign democratic state founded on the following values: humandignity, the achievement of equality, the advancement of human rightsand freedoms, non-racialism and non-sexism, the supremacy of theconstitution and the rule of law, universal adult suffrage regular elections,a multi-party system of democratic government and to ensureaccountability, responsiveness and openness.

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Article 2 unequivocally incorporates the principle of supremacyof the Constitution: This constitution is the supreme law of theRepublic, law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid and theobligations imposed by it must be fulfilled

The emphasis in the first few articles of the constitution is thereforeon principles that bind the South African nation. The concept of equalityis stressed which is understandable, given South Africa’s particularpolitical context. The supremacy of the constitution, the cornerstoneof constitutionalism, is doubly emphasized both in Article ( 1) and Article(2). It is not only law that has to be consistent with the constitution, butconduct too, which is broader in scope than the phrase ‘executiveaction’ which is found in the Sri Lankan constitution. The South Africanconstitution is absolutely clear. Parliamentary sovereignty was thecornerstone of the apartheid era. Parliament could do anything underapartheid. There were no norms in the constitution. There was novalue laden constitution. The judiciary was weak. As a result of that,this new South African constitution is categorical in its total rejectionof parliamentary sovereignty and its incorporation of the principle, thealternative principle, of the supremacy of the constitution.

Human Rights

The Bill of Rights is the Second Chapter in the constitution, afterthe founding provisions. The constitution recognizes the important linkbetween the Bill of Rights and democracy. The constitution declaresthat the Bill of Rights applies to all law. No law is immune from thescrutiny of the Bill of Rights which binds the legislature, executive andjudicial branches of government and all organs of the state. There isalso a liberal locus standi provision in the new South AfricanConstitution. Any person, not necessarily only a citizen, has the rightto petition the courts for constitutional protection with respect to mostmatters.


Thirdly, with regard to interpretation, the courts are required,when interpreting ,fundamental rights provisions, to give aninterpretation which promotes the values that underline and opena democratic society based on human dignity, equality andfreedom. The court must also consider international law, may considerforeign law, and must also adopt an interpretation which promotes thespirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. Given the legalism andtechnical approach to interpretation of many judges schooled in theBritish tradition of parliamentary supremacy and the fidelity to the letterof the law, such an interpretation clause is significant.

A word must be said about the substance of the rights becausethis is also very significant. The South African Bill of Rights does notonly recognize civil and political rights. It also recognizes the so-calledsecond and third generation rights - social, economic and cultural rightsare recognized in the constitution and are made justiciable. Secondly,it is perhaps one of the first constitutions to bar discrimination on thegrounds of sexual orientation. Thirdly, the state is secular. All religionsare treated equally, given equality. That is basically what a secularstate stands for. All religions are treated equally. It is significant thatthe campaign for a secular state was led by the Christian Church in acountry where over two thirds of its population is Christian. AnglicanArchbishop Tutu was at the forefront of insisting that Christianity shouldnot be made the state religion, and that South Africa should be a secularstate. The constitution provides that religious observances may beconducted at state functions provided the attendance is voluntary andthat religious activities are conducted on an equitable basis.

The way in which economic, social and cultural rights have beenmade justiciable addresses the concerns of more traditional legalscholars and human rights activists who fear giving the judiciary powerto determine matters involving complex questions of public andeconomic policy. There is a powerful argument that if a constitutionenunciates rights and thereby claims, which cannot be provided by the

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state, all rights, including civil and political rights, will be diluted overall.There was considerable debate about this among the legal scholars.The approach finally adopted was that while the state would be givena wide margin of appreciation when dealing with economic issues, thestate would be required to justify its economic decisions if a citizen feltthat the economic policy or the amount of money given for particularsubjects was unjust. Etienne Mureinik, one of the leading constitutionalacademics in South Africa, used the example of the legislature decidingto spend vast amounts of money on building a nuclear submarine or onconstructing a replica of St. Peter’s Church. He argued that it wouldthen be possible for an aggrieved person to challenge that before thecourts and for the courts to ask the government to justify its decisionto spend vast amounts of money on activities like that, rather than onprogressively realizing the attainment of economic, social and culturalrights recognized in the constitution.

The right to property was one of the most controversial provisionsin the new South African Constitution and again a very satisfactorycompromise was worked out. The African National Congress wasvery suspicious of the right to property as they thought it could obstructinitiatives to redistribute land, provide land to the landless and try toshift resources from the white elite to the black majority On the otherhand, the white community which feared large scale nationalizationand expropriation of their land, wanted a safeguard for private property.A compromise was reached. The right to property is recognized in theBill of Rights. There is a bar to arbitrary declaration of property, butproperty can be taken over by the state for public purposes. On thevexed question of compensation, the compensation payable to a personwould take into account how the property was acquired, how it wasused, and the court would have power to review the quantum ofcompensation determined upon, depending on the circumstances ofthe case and the type of land in question.

The right to property provision also included a sub-section whichmandated the state to take reasonable legislative and other measures

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to enable citizens to have access to land on an equitable basis. Thus,the right to property was not merely a negative right but also containedelements of a positive right as well.

Another important feature of the Bill of Rights was the limitationclause. The South African Constitution adopted a mechanism similarto the Canadian approach. Rights can only be restricted by law ofgeneral application. The limitation must be only to the extent as isreasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based onhuman dignity, equality and freedom, and the court can consider thelimitation, scrutinize it to ascertain the nature of the right and the natureof the restriction, the purpose of the limitation, the relationship betweenthe objective that the state wants to achieve and the restriction. Thecourt can also suggest less restrictive means to achieve the samepurpose that the state might want to achieve. There is, therefore,comprehensive judicial scrutiny on any attempts to curtail human rightswhich is quite a contrast with the position in Sri Lanka.

Devolution of Power

Another area which has posed enormous challenges to Sri Lanka’sconstitution makers and promoters of conflict resolution is the regionalautonomy and the devolution of power. The concept of federalism isvery controversial in South Africa as it is in Sri Lanka, but for differentreasons. In South Africa, the ANC and the parties of the left felt thatthe central government should have power to transform South Africansociety and they see federalism as a limitation on the power of thecentral government to effect such transformation. The Inkatha FreedomParty (IFP), the far right Freedom Front and even the National Partyare avowed federalists because they see it as a way of imposing limitson the power of the national government.

Even though the new South African Constitution does notdeclare expressly that it is afederalstate (it does not have a unitary

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label either), it contains many quasi-federal features. There issubstantial devolution of power to provinces, a division of powersbetween the centre and the provinces, provincial representation at thecentre, the constitution is supreme in South Africa. South Africa isdivided up into nine provinces which have several powers which theprovinces in Sri Lanka and even the regions under the proposed legaldraft do not have. Secondly, the South African provincial legislatureshave exclusive power over certain subjects. A provincial legislaturecan draft its own constitution which our provinces and our regionscannot; a provincial legislature cannot be dissolved by the President ofSouth Africa. Under the draft constitution of Sri Lanka, the Presidentcan dissolve a Provincial Council in certain circumstances. Bothdevolution of power and local government are constitutionallyrecognized.

Cooperative Government

Chapter 3 of the constitution describes the principle ofCooperative Government which declares that the government isconstituted as national, provincial and local spheres of governmentwhich are distinctive, interdependent and interrelated. In Sri Lanka,you cannot even refer to a provincial government as a provincialgovernment. In South Africa, it is absolutely clear that there areprovincial governments and there are local governments. All threetiers of government have constitutional status, their powers arerecognized and the other branches of government, the other organs ofgovernments have to respect the constitutional status of the otherspheres of government. In Sri Lanka the central government has takenback powers which were given to Provincial Councils under the 13thAmendment to the Constitution. This would be clearly unconstitutional,and therefore, void in South Africa. There is a concurrent list, likeunder our 13th Amendment. But the concurrent list mechanism isdrafted in a way which ensures that the provinces have far greater sayover concurrent list subjects than under the Sri Lankan Constitution.

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If the central Parliament introduces legislation on a concurrentsubject, the National Council of provinces has also to approve it. If itrejects it, the matter is sent to a Mediation Committee consisting ofnine people from the centre and nine people from the provinces. Theseeighteen people have to meet together and hammer out a compromise.If a compromise is reached it is enacted into law. If all attempts atcompromise fail, the central Parliament will have to pass that particularitem of legislation with a two-thirds majority. It is clear, therefore, thatprovincial interests with regard to concurrent list subjects are far betterprotected than under the Sri Lankan Constitution. With respect toordinary legislation, the Council of Provinces has a right to participatein the law-making process. If they reject a Bill it is sent back to theNational Assembly for re-consideration. The South AfricanConstitution is, therefore, in certain respects more federal thaneither the Draft Constitution of Sri Lanka or the Thirteenth Amendmentto the present Constitution of Sri Lanka.

In federal or quasi-federal states it is vital to have the devolvedunits or entities represented at the centre. The South AfricanConstitution has come up with an unusual way of protecting provincialautonomy. They have decided to do away with the traditional notionof a Senate, and they have introduced instead, an institution called theNational Council of Provinces. It functions very much like a Senate.Each of the nine provinces can send a ten-member delegation led bythe Provincial Prime Minister, equivalent to our Chief Minister, to thisNational Council of Provinces. Each province would have a ten-member delegation. Out of ten members, six arc permanent delegatesof the provinces, nominated by the political parties in the ProvincialCouncil, four are floating delegates. Thus, depending on the subjectmatter of the legislation that is coming up in parliament, the four membersof the delegation can be changed so that they can contribute to thedeliberations ofparliament.


The second interesting feature is that each province has only onevote. This compels the ten- member delegation from each province towork together, to cooperate, to cross party lines and decide on acommon provincial position with respect to voting in the council. Thispromotes a culture of consensus and compromise and encourages aprovincial rather than a partisan outlook on matters discussed in thenational parliament. This is a further example of the notion of cooperativegovernment which the new South African Constitution stresses.

There is a separate chapter on Local Government in theconstitution. Local Government authorities derive their powers fromthe constitution, not from the provincial legislature nor from the centralparliament. These powers are guaranteed by the constitution LocalGovernment is, therefore, betterprotected under the South AfricanConstitution.

An example of the imaginative and creative constitutionalprovisions that may be necessary to bridge the gap between opposingviewpoints, is Article 235 of the South African Constitution. Itaddresses the sensitive and difficult issue of self-determination ina plural society In Sri Lanka several Tamil parties and political groupshave advocated the Thimpu Principles as the basis of a political solutionto the island’s ethnic conflict. The Thimpu Principles generally evokea hostile response from the majority Sinhalese community and the mainpolitical parties in Sri Lanka. A compromise may have to be workedout, and the South African constitutional provision on self- determinationmay prove a useful reference point.

The right of the South African people as a whole to self-determination, as manifested in this constitution, does notpreclude,within the framework of this right, recognition of the notion ofthe right to self-determination of any community sharing a commoncultural and language heritage, within a territorial entity in theRepublic or in any other way, determined by national legislation.

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1 The Judiciary

The South African constitution provides that the judicial authorityis vested in the constitution. Parliament does not enter the scene atall. In our constitution, we have judicial power exercised by parliamentthrough courts. The Constitutional Court, the most important court inSouth Africa, consists of eleven persons, and if one examines thecomposition of the present court, it consists ofjudges, human rightsactivists, academics and practitioners and as required by theconstitution, it broadly reflects the gender and racial composition ofSouth Africa. The South African Constitutional Court is an amazingmix of eleven people from very different backgrounds and experiences.Any qualified man or woman can be a member of the South Africanjudiciary. Judges of the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court,the most important courts in South Afiiica, are appointed by the Presidenton the recommendations of the Judicial Services Commission. TheJudicial Services Commission is a large representative body consistingof the main stakeholders in an independent judiciary. It includes theChief Justice, President of the Constitutional Court, the Minister ofJustice, two advocates elected by the advocates, two attorneys electedby practicing attorneys, one teacher elected by all legal academics inSouth Africa, six MPs, three of whom have got to be Opposition MPs,four permanent delegates from the National Council of Provinces, sothat the provinces are also represented, four nominees of the Presidentappointed after consulting all the political parties in parliament. Judgescan be removed only when this body, the Judicial Services Commission,finds that they have been either grossly incompetent or have engagedin gross misconduct. It is only when they have been found guilty thatthe National Assembly can remove them with a two-thirds majority.

The provisions on the judiciary are better than the correspondingprovisions in the Sri Lankan constitution, which permit too muchlegislative and executive interference in the judicial branch ofgovernment. The Rule of Law and the independence of the judiciary

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are vital elements in a constitutional scheme for good governance, humanrights and conflict resolution. Constitutional arrangements often play apivotal role in political solutions for complex national problems involvingethnicity or religion. These arrangements need to be secure andguaranteed. The judiciary is the institution charged with such aresponsibility. If it is not independent then it will be unable to performits function effectively. In addition to independence, it must also displaysensitivity to the concerns of pluralism, devolution and the rights ofminorities. This is a particular problem in Sri Lanka.

Diversity and Language Rights

Recognition of diversity is one of the most important aspects ofthe South African Constitution. The linguistic diversity is a very goodcase in point. There are eleven official languages in South Africa. Thereis a language board which has to promote not only these officiallanguages but also other languages, including Tamil even though it isspoken by a very small minority, and even sign language. On the issueof language, the approach of the ANC and most political parties wasrefreshing: get the principle right, worry about the practical implicationslater. Sri Lankans think they have an enormous problem with just twoor three national languages. Customary international law is automaticallya part of the legal regime of South Africa and there is a provision thatwhenever a court interprets a law or a provision of the constitution, aninterpretation which is inconsistent with international law is to bepreferred over any other possible interpretation.

Conclusion

The South African Constitution of 1996 is an amazing documentfor many reasons. The process, the way in which it was drafted andadopted, the participation of so many people and constituencies, thesubstance, the commitment and professionalism displayed by all the

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main political parties, were truly remarkable. The constitution becamea consensus document that helped to bring the different communitiestogether, heal the wounds of a bitter and violent past and establish anew order of government which conformed to basic human rights normsand standards. Sri Lanka would do well to seek to emulate the process,substance and the generosity of spirit that permeated the process inSouth Africa. Perhaps then, constitution making for conflict resolutionwill be more successful in Sri Lanka.

In this lesson, we learnt the following from the South African experience:

Constitution making in a deeply divided society should be anexercise in conflict resolution.

Constitution making for conflict resolution requires imaginative andfresh approaches to rebuild the political system and structures.

The best approach to making a new constitution is throughconsensus. Consensus provides legitimacy as well as generalpolitical acceptance to the new constitution.

Political leadership can play a constructive role in conflict resolutionand constitution making.

The process of making the constitution is as important as thesubstance.

In consensus building for conflict resolution, it is better to startwith an agreement on general principles and then proceed fordetails.

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Appendix

A. 1. Bibliography

Mediation

Bercovich, Jacob and Rubin, Jeffrey, (Eds.) (1992) Mediation InInternational Relations, St. Martins Press Inc.:London

Folberg, Jay and Taylor, Alison (1984), Mediation, A ComprehensiveGuide to Resolving Conflicts Without Litigation, Jossey - BassPublishers:USA

Kegal, Sam and Kelly, Kathy (1989), The Anatomy of Mediation,What Makes it Work, The Bureau of National Affairs Inc.: Washington

Mitchell, C. R, (1981), Peacemaking and the Consultant 's Role,Nicholas Publishing Company:New York

Mitchell, C. R and Webb, K, (Eds.) (1988), New Approaches To

International Mediation, Greenwood Press 1nc: USA

Moore, Christopher W, (1986), The Mediation Process, Jossey-BassPublishers: San Francisco

Princen, Thomas, (1992), Intermediaries in International ConflictPrinceton University Press:USA

Yarrow, Mike CH, (1978) Qua err xk E periences in International

Conciliation, Murray Printing Corporation:USA

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Negotiations

Dutch Center for Conflict Prevention, (Ed.) (1996), Prevention andManagement of Conflicts, Dutch Center for Conflict Prevention TheNetherlands

Faure, G.O. and Rubin, J. Z. (Eds.) (1993), Culture and Negotiation,SAGE Publications Inc.:USA

Fisher, Roger and Ury, William (199 l), Getting to Yes, NegotiatingAgreement Without Giving In, Penguin Books:USA

Fisher, Roger and Brown, Scott (1988), Getting Together, BuildingRelationships as we Negotiate, Penguin Books:USA

Korzenny, Felipe and Toomey, Stella, (Eds.) (1990) Communicatingfor Peace, Diplomacy and Negotiation, SAGE Publications:USA

Kremenyuk, V. A. (Ed.) (199 l), Znternational Negotiation, Jossey-Bass Publishers: Oxford

Lax, A. David and Sebenius, James (1986), The Manager asNegotiator, The Free Press:USA

Manikkalingam, Ram (1994), Prudently Negotiating a Moral Peace,Social Scientists’ Association: Sri Lanka

Pillar, Paul R, Negotiating Peace, War Termination as BargainingProcess, Princeton University Press:USA

Pruitt, Dean G. and Camevale, Peter J. (1993), Negotiation in SocialConflict, Open University Press:Buckingham

Raiffa, Howard (1982), The Art and Science of Negotiation, TheBelknap Press of Harvard University Press:USA

175


Stein, Janice Gross, (Ed.) (1989), Getting to the Table, John HopkinsUniversity Press: Baltimore

Ury, William (1993), Getting Past No, Negotiating Your Way FromConfrontation to Cooperation, Bantom Books:USA

William J. and Rubin, Jeffrey Z. (1993), Negotiation Theory andPractice, Cambridge, Massachusette: The Program on Negotiation atHarvard Law School

Zartman, W. and Berman,. MR, (1982), The Practical Negotiator,Yale University Press: USA

Peace Processes

Azar, Edward E, (1990), The Management of Protracted SocialConflict, Dartmouth Publishing House: England

Bailey, Sydney D. (1993), Peace is a Process, Swarthmore LectureCommittee: London

Berridge, G. R. (199 l), Return to the UN, UN Diplomacy in RegionalConflict ts,

Macmillan Academic and Professional Ltd: London

Brown , Sheryl, J. and Schraub, Kimber M. (Eds.) (1992), ResolvingThird World Conflict, Challenges for a New Era, United StatesInstitute of Peace:USA

Boulding, Else, (1990), Building a Global Civic Culture, SyracuseUniversity Press: USA

Carnegie Cooperation, (1997), Preventing Deadly Conflict, CarnegieCooperation: New York

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Carter, April, (1992), Peace Movements , Longman GroupU.K.Ltd:London

Chatfield and Llukhina, (1994), Peace/Mir: An Anthology of HistoricAlternatives to War, Syracuse University Press New York

Curie, Adam (1987), True Justice, Peace makers and Peace making,Quaker Home Service:London

Doucest, Ian (Ed), Resource pack for Conflict Transformation,London:Intemational Alert

Femea, Elizabeth,Wamock and Hoching, Mary, Evelyn (Eds.) (1992),The Strugglefor Peace, Austin: University of Texas Press

Foster, Le Corn Mary and Rubinstein, A. Robert, (Eds) (1986), Peaceand War Cross Cultural Perspectives, Transaction Inc. :New Jersey

Folger, Joseph P., Poole, Marshall Scott and Stutman , Randall K,(Eds.) (1993), Working Through Conflict, Harper Collins CollegePublishers: New York

Holsti, J, Kalevi (1995), Peace and War: Armed Conflicts andInternational Order 1648 - 1989, Cambridge University Press:Cambridge

Hollins, Harry, Powers, Aver-ill and Sommer, Mark, (1989), TheConquest of War, Alternative Strategies for Global Security,Westview Press:USA

Isard, Walter, (1992), Understanding Conflict & the Science ofPeace, Blackwell Publishers: USA

Jones, Dorathy V. (199 l), Code of Peace, Ethics and Security inthe World of the Warlord States, University of Chicago Press: USA

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Klare, Michael T, (Ed.) ( 1994), Peace & World Security Studies, ACurriculum Guide, Lynne Reinners Publishers Inc.:USA

Kodama K and Vesa U., (Eds.), (l990), Towards a ComparativeAnalysis of Peace Movements, Billing & Sons Ltd:Great Britain

Kriesberg , Louis and Thorson, Stuart, (Eds.) (199 1), Timing theDe-escalation of Internationa1 Conflicts, Syracuse UniversityPress: New York

Kriesberg, L., Northrup, T. A. and Thorson, S. J, (Eds.) (1989)Intractable Conflicts and their Transformation, Syracuse UniversityPress: USA

Marullo, Sam and Lofland, John, (Eds.) (1990), Peace Action in theEighties, Rutgers University Press: New Brunswick

Miall, Hugh, (1992), The Peacemaker Macmillan Press: UK

Mitchell, CR, (1981), The Structure of International Conflict,Macmillan Press Ltd: London

PIOOM and the Berghof Research Institute for Constructive ConflictManagement, (1998), Prevention and Management of ViolentConflicts, European Platform for Conflict Prevention andTransformation: Netherlands

Rao, Bhaskara, D.,(Ed.) (1996), Global Perception on PeaceEducation, Discovery Publishing House: New Delhi

Rothman, Jay, (1992), From Confrontation to Cooperation, SagePublications Inc.: USA

Rupesinghe, Kumar and Kuroda Michiko, (Eds.) (1992), EarlyWarnings and Conflict Resolution, St.Martins Press, Inc.: New York

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Shellenberg, James A, (1982) The Science of Conflict, OxfordUniversity Press: Oxford

Ury, W. L, Brett, Jeanne M. and Goldberg S.B, (Eds.),( lSSS), GettingDisputes Resolved, Harvard Law School:Cambridge

Middle East

Aburish, Saaid K, (1993), Cry Palestine, Inside the West Bank,Westview Press: USA

Corbin Jane (1994), Gaza First, The Secret Norway Channel toPeace between Israel and the PLO, Bloomssburry PublishingLtd: London

Fisk. Robert, (1992), Pity the Nation, Lebanon at War, OxfordUniversity Press: USA

Kustick, Ian S. (1982), Arab - Israeli Relations: A Collection ofContending Perspectives and Recent Research, New York andLondon:Garlan Publications

Kellerman B. and Rubin J., eds., (1988), Leadership and Negotiationin the Middle East, Praeger Publishers:USA

Quandt, William B, (1986), Camp David; Peace Making andPolitics, The Brookings Institution:Washington

Quandt, William B, (1993), Peace Process: American Diplomacyand the Arab-Israeli Conjlict since I967, University of CaliforniaPress:Califomia

Sharoni, Simona, (1995), Gender and the Israeli-PalestinianConflict, Syracuse University press: USA

179


Saunders, Harold H., (1985), The Other Walls: The Arab -Israeli

Peace Process in a Global Perspective, Princeton UniversityPress New Jersey

Saunders, HaroldH., and Kipper, Judith, (Eds.) (199 l), The Middle

East in Global Perspective, Westview Press: USA

Speigel L. Stevened., (1992) Conflict Management in the MiddleEast, Westview Press: USA

Smith D, Charles (1988), Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict,

S t. Martin’s Press: New York

Africa

Davidow, Jefiey (1990), A Peace in Southern Apica: The LancasterHouse Conference on Rhodesia 1979, Programme on NegotiationBooks: Massachusetts

Deng, Francis M. and Zartman, William, (Eds.) (199 l), Conflict

Resolution in Africa The Brookings Institution: Washington

Jabri, William (1990), Mediating conflict; Decision -making andWestern Intervention in Namibia, Biddles Ltd:Great Britain

Stedman, Stephen John, (1991), Peace Making in Civil War,

International Mediation in Zimbabwe 1974-1980, Boulder: LynneReiner Publishers

Zartman, William I., (1989) Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and

Intervention in Africa New York and Oxford University Press

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Ethnic Conflict Resolution

Gurr, Ted Robert and Harft, Babara, (1994), Ethnic Conflict in WorldPolitics, Boulder: Westview Press

Hassall, Graham (1992), Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in thePacific Islands, Research Institute for the Study of Conflict andTerrorism

Horowitz, Donald, (1985), Ethnic Groups in Conflict, CaliforniaUniversity Press

McGarry, John and O’Leary, Brendan, (1995), The Politics of EthnicConflict Regulation, London and New York:Routledge

Tambiah, Stanley J. (1995), Leveling Crow&, University of CaliforniaPress.

Europe

Graubard, Stephen R.,(Ed.) (1991), Eastern Europe, CentralEurope, Europe, Westview Press:USA

Nelson, Sarah, (1984), Ulster 's Uncertain Defenders, Loyalists andthe Nothern Ireland Conflict, Appletree Press:Northern Ireland

Paterson, Thomas G., (Ed.), The Origins of the Cold War Heathand Company:USA

Silber, Laura and Little Allan (1995), The Death of Yugoslavia,Penguin Books:USA

Conflict Resolution

Barash, David, Introduction to Peace Studies, Wadsworth PublishingCompany: California

1 8 1


Bose, Anima, (Ed.) (199 l), Peace and Conflict Resolution in theWorld Community, Vikas Publishing House Ltd.:New Delhi

Boulding, Else, (Ed.) (1992), New Agenda for Peace Research, LynneReinner Publishers ,Inc.:USA

Burton, John and Dukes, Frank (Eds.) (1990), Conflict; Readings inManagement and Resolution, The MacMillan Press Ltd.:USA

Cornelius H. and Faire Shoshana, (1992) Everyone can Win Howto Resolve Conflict Simon Schuster:Australia

Elsthain, Jean B, (1995), Women and War, University of ChicagoPress: Chicago

Fisher J, Ronald (1990) The Social Psychology of Intergroup andInternational Conflict Resolution, Springer-Verlag 1nc: New Jersey

Gallie, W. B,( 1978), Philosophers of Peace and War, CambridgeUniversity Press: USA

Goldberg, Stephen .B., Green Eric D and Sander Frank EA, (Eds.)(1985), Dispute Resolution, Little, Brown and Company: Boston

Klare, Micheal T and Thomas, Daniel C, (1994), World Security,Challenges for a new Century, St.Martins Press: New York

Kriesberg, Louis, (1992), International Conflict Resolution, EdwardBrothers:USA

Larsen, Knud S.,(Ed) (1993), Conflict and Social Psychology, SagePublications: London

Lederach, John Paul (1995) Preparing for Peace, SyracuseUniversity Press: New York

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Rahim, Afzalur M, (Ed.) (1990), Theory and Research in ConflictManagement, Praeger Publishers: USA

Rao,P. C. and Shedfield, William, (Eds.) (1997), Alternative DisputeResolution, Universal Law Publishing Co.Pvt.Ltd.:New Delhi

Rappopart, Anatol, (1994), Fights, Games, and Debates, TheUniversity of Michigan Press:USA

Rieber, Robert. W. (199 l), The Psychology of War and Peace: TheImage of the Enemy, Plenum Press:New York

Rubin, Jeffrey, Pruitt ,Dean and Kim,Sung Hee (1994), Social ConflictEscalation, Stalemate and Settlement, Mc.Graw-Hill, Inc.:USA

Sandole, Dennis and Merwe, Hugo (Ed.), Conflict Resolution Theoryand Practice, Manchester University Press: Manchester

Siegel, D. David, (1982), Conflicts, West Publishing:USA

Smoker, P. & Davies, Ruth & Munske, Barbara, (1990), A Reader inPeace Studies, Pergamon Press:Exeter

Susskind, Lawrance and Cruikshank, Jeffrey, (1987), Breaking theImpasse, Basic Books:USA

Vayrynen Raimo, (Ed.) (1991), New Directions in ConflictTheory: Conflict Resolution and Conflict Transformation,International Social Science Council

Vayrynen, Raimo, (Ed.) (1987), The Quest for Peace, SAGEPublications: London

Williams, Colin and Kofman Eleonore, (Eds.) (1989), CommunityConflict, Partition and Nationalism, Routlegde: London

***

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A. 2. Internet Addresses

Some Internet Addresses of important institutions involved inconflict resolution and peace- building activities

Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management(Berlin Germany)

Center for Conflict Resolution University of Bradford (Bradford, U.K.)www.brad.ac.uk/acad/confres/es/dislearn/dislearn.html

Conflict Research Unit, Clingendael- Institute ( The Netherlands)www.clingendael .nl

European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation (Utrecht,The Netherlands)www.euconflict.org

Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy ( Washington, U.S.A.)www.igc.apc.org

International Alert (London, U.K.)www.international-alert.org

International Christian Service for Peace- EIRENE ( Neuwied,Germany)dd

International Fellowship of Reconciliation- IFOR (Alkmar, TheNetherlands)www.ifor.org

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www.berghof-center.org

http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/confres/es/dislearn/dislearn.html

http://www.clingendael.nl

http://www.euconflict.org

http://www.igc.apc.org

http://www.international-alert.org

http://www.eirene.org

http://www.eirene.org


International Peace Research Association ( Copenhagen, Denmark)www.copri.dk

International Peace Research Institute Oslo (Oslo, Norway)www.prio.no

National Peace Foundation (Washington, U.S.A.)www.nationalpeace.org

Oxfam (Oxford, U.K.)www.oxfam.org.uk

Stiftung Entwicklung und Frieden (Bonn, Germany)wwwsef-bonn.org

Schweizerische Friedensstiftung (Bern,Switzerland)www.swissneace.ch

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (Stockholm, Sweden)www.sipri.se

Transnational Foundation for Peace and Future Research (Lund,Sweden)www.transnational.org

UNESCO Culture of Peace Projectwww.unesco.org/cpp

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http://www.copri.dk

http://www.prio.np

http://www.nationalpeace.org

http://www.oxfam.org.uk

http://www.oxfam.org.uk

http://www.sipri.se

http://www.transnational.org

CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PEACE STUDIES AN INTRODUCTORY HANDBOOK___~

Note:

The Internet addresses which are given above represent only asmall selection out of hundreds of organizations and institutionsspecialized in the subject of conflict resolution which can be“visited” in the Internet. Most of the recommended addressesprovide further links so that organizations and institutions notmentioned here can be easily found.

We especially recommend to visit the pages of the “BerghofResearch Center for Constructive Conflict Management” (Berlin/Germany ) and of the “Center for Conflict Resolution” of theUniversity of Bradford (West Yorkshire/ U.K.).Both Institutes have produced their own Handbooks on ConflictTransformation which are presented in the Internet. Thesepublications would allow the interested reader to complementthe information given in our Handbook.

Dietmar Kneitschel

Conflict

Documents

sheikh mujibur

ziaur rahman

spend vast

khaleda zia

chittagong

sri lankan

nobel peace

termed national