Conference on Protection and Reparations for „Climate Refugees‟: Imperatives & Options 1 Chavannes-de-Bogis, Switzerland, May 3-4 2010 1 This compendium was produced with the friendly support of Jonas Schubert (Bread for the World). For further details, please contact Sophia Wirsching (Bread for the World) or Guillermo Kerber (World Council of Churches), whose email addresses you will find in the list of participants at the end of the document.
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Conference on Protection and Reparations for „Climate Refugees‟:
Imperatives & Options1
Chavannes-de-Bogis, Switzerland, May 3-4 2010
1 This compendium was produced with the friendly support of Jonas Schubert (Bread for the World). For
further details, please contact Sophia Wirsching (Bread for the World) or Guillermo Kerber (World Council of Churches), whose email addresses you will find in the list of participants at the end of the document.
Geneva, February 24, 2010
Invitation to a Conference on “climate refugees” Dear Madam or Sir, Bread for the World, the Pacific Conference of Churches and the World Council of Churches are inviting you to participate at the Conference on:
Protection and reparations for "climate refugees": imperatives and options to be held at the Hotel Chavannes de Bogis, near Geneva, Switzerland (http://www.hotel-chavannes.ch/e/index.php) on
May 3-4, 2010.
The conference shall stimulate and sustain discussion on climate displaced peoples, the challenges, responses so far and possibilities to respond to this phenomenon. Aware of the controversy around the concept of “climate refugees” the conference will explicitly discuss its legal, humanitarian and political implications. Looking and best practices and lessons learned so far, it will look to give incentives for stakeholder cooperation at national, bilateral, regional and global levels. Attached you will find a timetable of the conference. Looking forward to reading from you at your earliest convenience, we request you to send your response to Ms. Patricia Bruschweiler ([email protected]), who is taking care of logistical matters. Michael Windfuhr Fe'iloakitau Kaho Tevi Guillermo Kerber Bread for the World Pacific Conference of Churches World Council of Churches
Timetable
Monday, May 3rd 14:00 Opening: Welcome, rationale and purpose of the meeting
Mr. Guillermo Kerber (World Council of Churches) Mr. Michael Windfuhr (Bread for the World) Mr. Peter Emberson (Pacific Conference of Churches)
14:30 Keynote speech: Climate induced migration and “Climate Refugees”
Prof. Frank Biermann (VU University Amsterdam) Comments: Ms. Margit Ammer (Ludwig Boltzmann Institute of Human Rights, Austria)
Mr. Peter Emberson Discussion
15:30 Coffee Break 16:00 Regional and Country Case studies
Bangladesh (Prodipan) – Ms. Saudia Anwer & Md. Ferdausur Rahman Mozambique (COMCAD) – Ms. Jeanette Schade Pacific (PCC) – Mr. Peter Emberson Mr. Guillermo Kerber (Moderator) Discussion
17:30 Panel I: Challenges to International Law
Ms. Margit Ammer Mr. Peter Emberson Mr. Theodor Rathgeber (German Forum for Human Rights) Mr. Michael Windfuhr (Moderator)
18:45 Conclusion Day 1 19:00 Dinner 20:30 Informal discussion: Anthropological insights on resettlement in the Pacific
Ms. Jacqueline Ryle (NCCD - Denmark) Tuesday, May 4th 09:00 Panel 2: Humanitarian challenges
Ms. Marian Casey-Maslen (ACT Alliance) Ms. Saudia Anwer & Md. Ferdausur Rahman Ms. Sophia Wirsching (Moderator)
10:30 Coffee break 11:00 Panel 3: Political challenges
Ms Koko Warner (UNU – EHS) Ms. Rixa Schwartz (Germanwatch) Hon. Ghyas Uddin Ahmed (Member of Parliament, Bangladesh) Mr. Thomas Hirsch
12:30 Lunch 14:00 Conclusion: Michael Windfuhr, Peter Emberson and Guillermo Kerber 15:00 End of the conference Rapporteurs: Mr. Stephen Humphreys (London School of Economics) Ms. Kasia Snyder (International Council on Human Rights Policy)
Mr. Theodor Rathgeber
Table of Content
Conference Document
Kasia Snyder/Stephen Humphreys/ Theodor Rathgeber: Summary of Discussions
Keynote Speech
Prof. Frank Biermann/ Preparing for a Warmer World- Towards a Global Governance System to Protect Climate Refugees + Comment by Margit Ammer
Regional and Country Case Studies
Rosa Koian/ Preparedness for Displaced Populations as a result of climate change
Saudia Anwer/ Climate Migration in Bangladesh- A Case Study
Jeanette Schade/ Climate Change and the Challenge of Organized Resettlement- The Case of Mozambique + General Conclusions
Panel 2: Humanitarian Challenges
Marian Casey-Maslen/ Humanitarian Challenges
Panel 3: Political Challenges
Dr. Koko Warner/ Environmental Change & Migration: From COP 15 to COP 16
Gyas Uddin Ahmed/ Political Challenges after Copenhagen COP-15
Summary of discussions
Kasia Snyder, Theodor Rathgeber, Stephen Humphreys*
Among the many concerns raised by the phenomenon of climate change, the likelihood of mass population displacement is among the most pressing and worrisome. For small island states such as Tuvalu, the reality of land loss is already apparent. As to the broader phenomenon of climate-related migration, even conservative figures are daunting. However, there has been relatively little substantive discussion of this crucial issue at the international level, and there is as yet no clear international policy direction for addressing a problem of potentially immense magnitude.
There are a number of reasons for the relative lack of movement on this crucial topic. First, there are no solid estimates of the numbers of likely migrants or refugees, and little certainty as to who will be affected and where the affected are likely to take refuge. Available estimates range from hundreds of millions (according to the Stern Review) to a billion (Christian Aid). But all such estimates involve making choices about relevant timescales and climate scenarios, and also predictions of the likelihood of credible mitigation and adaptation action. This is a second reason for the tardy appreciation of this problem: mass migration, were it to happen, will signal the effective failure of policies to deal with climate change—mitigation efforts will have failed, and adaptive funding or activities will have failed to materialize, leaving migration as the adaptation policy of last resort. To begin to take mass migration seriously, for these reasons, may appear pessimistic or defeatist—but more to the point, such a discussion risks taking place in a relative vacuum. What is, in fact, the likely scenario for population displacement? The answer at present is: we barely know.
For similar reasons, third, climate change refugees are likely to prove extremely defiant in political negotiation. It may seem wiser to states not to engage with the issue as long as they are still grappling with so many other difficult sticking points, with these others at least known and, to a degree, quantifiable. Fourth, the bodies that might naturally be expected to think ahead on this issue—UNHCR and IOM—have signally failed to take the issue seriously, at least in public. These bodies deny the legitimacy of the term ―climate refugees‖ but have not put forward a credible alternative; they have dampened expectations of compensation for those needing to flee their homes even in advance of concrete cases appearing; they appear more comfortable referring to climate migration as largely concerning internally displaced persons (IDPs), thus obscuring the likelihood of cross-border migration. In general, they have failed to show leadership on a topic where they would appear the natural experts.
* This report was drafted by Kasia Snyder, intern at the International Council on Human Rights Policy, and Theodor
Rathgeber of the German Human Rights Forum. It was edited by Stephen Humphreys, London School of Economics.
And yet it is vital to begin to think through the policy implications of climate migration and climate refugees. As mentioned, some small island states are already preparing for the likelihood of the disappearance of their territories, and are negotiating deals with other countries to take on their populations. Those conversations are necessarily precarious and the international community as a whole should be paying attention, as precedents set today are likely to be of great importance in future. The islands in question are generally inhabited by relatively small populations, but in some parts of the world, large scale population moves are foreseeable. Bangladesh, for example, could lose 20 percent of its landmass if sea levels rise by 1m (as predicted by the IPCC for the end of the century). In such a scenario, up to 20 million people may lose their homes and need to move. What will happen? Again, the answer, at present, is: we barely know.
With this in view, Bread for the World, the Pacific Conference of Churches and the World Council of Churches organized a Conference on ―Protection and Reparation for Climate Refugees‖ on May 4-5, 2010 in Chavannes-de-Bogis near Geneva. The goal of the meeting was to stimulate discussion between academia, civil society, governments, intergovernmental institutions and churches on the phenomenon of climate displaced people, and to take stock of the challenges and possibilities for responding. The Conference explored the concepts of ―climate refugees‖ and ―compensation‖ as well as best practices and lessons learned from actions seeking to address the problem on national, regional and global levels.
In a first session, Prof. Frank Biermann presented his proposal for a sui generis regime for climate refugees under the UNFCCC, with comments from Ms. Margit Ammer of the Boltzmann Institute of Human Rights and Mr. Peter Emberson of the Pacific Conference of Churches. Three country case studies followed, focusing on Bangladesh, Mozambique and Papua New Guinea. Ms. Jacqueline Ryle then provided us with anthropological insights on resettlement in the Pacific – a topic she has dealt with in a recently published book („My God, My Land: Interwoven Paths of Christianity and Tradition in Fiji- Anthropology and Cultural History in Asia and the Indo-Pacific‟: http://www.amazon.de/God-Land-Christianity-Anthropology-Indo-Pacific/dp/0754679888 ). The remainder of the conference was taken up by three panels, discussing legal, humanitarian and political challenges respectively. These involved debates between representatives of the ACT Alliance, the United Nations University, Bread for the World, the World Council of Churches, the German Forum for Human Rights, Prodipan of Bangladesh and a member of the Bangladeshi parliament, the London School of Economics, the Mozambique Mission to the UN and global and regional church alliance2.
Rather than providing a chronological account of these discussions, this report rather gleans and summarizes common themes under the below headings:
1. Terminology 2. A climate refugee regime (new or amended). 3. Collective and individual rights 4. States‘ obligations (national and extraterritorial) 5. Best practices/lessons learned (participation, transparency, ownership) 6. Suggested strategies for further action (local, national, international levels)
1. Terminology
The 1951 Refugee Convention (United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees), as amended by a 1967 Protocol, defines a refugee as follows:
‗A person who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is
unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable
or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to It‘.
2 Please find below the different documents pertaining to the respective presentations.
The definition restricts coverage to those persecuted for their beliefs or their belonging to a particular group. It does not, as it stands, appear to cover ―climate refugees‖ because it is difficult to consider climate change as targeted persecution in the ordinary sense, even though it has a human origin. Although victims may suffer due to their lack of resources, poverty or other forms of vulnerability, it is not clear that such circumstances amount to ―membership of a social group‖.
The 1951 Refugee Convention, then, does not appear easily applicable to climate change migration. Does this mean that the term ―climate refugee‖ should be abandoned? Opinions at the conference diverged on this point, with some feeling the term should be retained, as it carries the moral authority necessary to convey the seriousness of the situation. This was particularly the view of representatives from countries that are expected, in fact, to experience significant population displacement. Others believed that, with the main international organizations apparently unwilling to countenance the term ―climate refugees‖, pursuing it was likely to absorb significant time and energy to little avail. Other terms coming into general use are ―Environmentally Displaced Persons‖ (EDPs) and ―Climate Change Displaced Persons‖. A number of participants voiced reservations concerning the focus on displacement inherent in all these terms. Such a focus is inherently limiting, excluding pre and post stages of the displacement. All three terms also forget persons who, despite being affected or impoverished because of (or exacerbated by) the effects of climate change, choose not to leave. At this point another suggestion surfaced: the term ―Climate Change Victims‖ within a broader framework of climate change adaptation.
These discussions illustrate a struggle between two modes of thinking about labeling: one is based on legalisms (refugees, persecution, 1951 Convention). A second prioritizes the humanitarian urge to make the victims‘ fates known to the world and to recognize their status such that they can be protected. And yet, these approaches are complementary rather than contradictory: victims presumably deserve protection whether or not they are displaced. From a legal perspective, a specific issue arises where people are forced to cross borders due to climate change. There are of course pressing issues for those forced to move within the borders of a given state (IDPs). Whereas international oversight of, and assistance in, such situations is indispensable, the relevant state does, or should remain the primary actor and is generally subject to clear human rights obligations under international law in any actions taken. However, protection of persons forced to cross borders raises quite specific concerns, where both state protection and international human rights law are weak, and voluntary documents such as the IDP Guidelines are less applicable. If cross-border migrants are unprotected by the 1951 Refugee Convention (as seems at least possible), then some other form of protection at international level is urgently needed to safeguard the rights, needs and human security of persons displaced by climate change. From this perspective, it will be useful for policy-making to have a term referring specifically and clearly to cross-border displacement. The term ―EDPs‖ may not be adequate to this task, as its natural resonance with IDPs (Internally Displaced Persons) will tend to downplay the degree to which such flows are likely to cross borders. Likewise, terms such as ―climate migrants‖ appear to assume a voluntary basis to movement which would not capture the degree to which movement, in these cases, is ―forced‖. The term ―climate refugees‖ therefore remains compelling as it accurately captures the relevant aspects of the scenario. Another possibility is ―forced climate migrants‖. At the same time, it is vital to draw attention to the wider effects of climate change and to ensure that the needs of victims, before, during, and after displacement are at the heart of adaptation policies. From this perspective ―Climate Change Victims‖ and ―Climate Refugees‖ (or ―Forced Climate Migrants‖) might be regarded as two complementary terms.
What appears clear at present is that, whatever the legal situation, the current guardians of the international refugee regime—the UNHCR and (less officially) the IOM appear unwilling to regard the issue as coming within their ordinary remit. This does not, of course, mean that the term ―climate refugee‖ should therefore be abandoned. Indeed, to the contrary: with the relevant policy space largely vacated by the key actors, others may need to step into the breach and, if so, forceful arguments and powerful terms will presumably be needed.
2. Regime
Much discussion focused on whether current solutions and regimes are sufficient to deal with the problem or not.
The keynote speaker, Frank Biermann, appealed for a sui generis regime for climate change migrants based on an Optional Protocol to UNFCCC and emphasized that climate change induced migration will constitute an unprecedented crisis in human history to which old (current) approaches of dealing with problems will not be able to find answers. The institutional development of the regime would be rooted in five principles concerned with resettlement (2), international assistance, collective rights and international burden sharing. Such a protocol could provide for an executive committee on the recognition, protection and resettlement of climate refugees. The committee could function under the authority of the Conference of the Parties (COP) (as in the Kyoto Protocol, through a discrete meeting of the parties (MOP). The Montreal Protocol provides a possibly useful example of how such a committee might function. The committee‘s task would be to receive applications from countries with a foreseeable climate refugee problem, and to seek solutions in advance, in cooperation with other relevant states. In order not to put climate refugees in competition for financing with other climate change victims, a sui generis regime for financing was suggested. The operational aspects of a Climate Refugee Protection and Resettlement Fund could be linked with other financial mechanisms to increase efficiency; the governance of the Fund should be independent and stand under the authority of the meeting of the Parties to the Protocol. Four principles would govern such a fund: a grant basis; the notion that funds would be ‗new and additional‘ to existing development disbursements; the principle that refugees needing relocation due to sea level rise would be fully reimbursed; and, the creation of an open list of designated populations as ―climate refugees in need of relocation‖. In a similar vein, some argued that a new instrument with human rights elements should be created under the UNFCCC umbrella. Others pointed out that new legal instruments of any kind will be politically difficult to achieve, will take many years to negotiate and enter into force, and that the final outcome is in any case unpredictable.
It was also argued that functioning regimes already exist to deal with the problem of internal displacement (i.e. IDPs/EDPs), which are supplemented by human rights obligations that need only be linked to climate change. However, it is quite doubtful that the IDP regime, which in itself is not very robust, will provide adequate protection for climate refugees needing to cross borders.
In conclusion, the suggestion to push for an Optional Protocol or a similar new international instrument was welcomed as a long term strategy. Although most participants agreed that such a process would be time-intensive and unpredictable, it would also (as a minimum) ensure that the problem garnered international recognition commensurate with its urgency, and alert the international community to the need for both interim and permanent measures to protect climate refugees.
3. Collective vs. Individual Rights
Climate change affects groups, communities, and even nations. Yet it is generally individuals who are the bearers of human rights. In this context, a recurring theme at the meeting concerned the extent to which forced climate migrants should be treated as collective or individual rights bearers.
Some argued that a collective rights approach was necessary since climate change effects do not in fact target individuals; that the issues (housing, settlement, emergency measures) arise in any case at the level of groups; and that broader collective rights, such as to cultural autonomy are also at stake in climate change. Indigenous peoples groups have already pursued collective rights aspects of climate change. Others pointed out that if rights are implemented collectively there is a great risk of overlooking individual cases, particularly of those most vulnerable within the vulnerable groups (i.e. women). Perhaps the issue is not so much between different kinds of rights, but different kinds of remedial action. Remedies, compensation, rehousing and other measures are perhaps best undertaken at the collective level, but this need not involve impinging upon the exercise of individual rights. One area where collective rights must surely be respected in treating mass migration from climate change is the preservation of ways of life (rights to culture) in the event of the entire disappearance of territories, a threat facing some Pacific islands. If whole peoples are forced to move, international support will be vital in ensuring their cultural ways are kept alive.
4. States’ Obligations
Under international human rights law a state bears human rights obligations towards all persons within its jurisdiction. In addition, it is often observed that certain extraterritorial obligations can be derived from human rights law provisions. Participants pointed out that some extraterritorial human rights obligations are apparently indicated in Article 2(1) of the ICESCR which refers to an obligation on states to utilize available ‗international assistance‘ towards the fulfillment of the relevant rights. Some subsequent interpretations of the Covenant, including by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, would appear to support this broad case, although states have been unwilling to accept any such duty as binding. If (extraterritorial) state obligations are still evolving in the area of human rights, they are somewhat clearer in other areas of international law. The principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) in the UNFCCC recognizes that developed countries are obliged to take the lead and help other states in dealing with climate change. International law also generally recognizes state responsibility for transboundary harms, environmental and otherwise. These are among several areas where the effective responsibility of some states for the likelihood of climate change migration may translate into a hard legal responsibility. How such responsibilities will play out when states are faced with the reality or inevitability of mass movements of people remains to be seen. But even where the legal case remains malleable, the moral and political case remains compelling.
Participants identified the phenomenon of securitization of the climate change migration issue as potentially problematic. Increasingly governments frame climate migration as a defense concern. When rich country governments approach climate change displacement from a national security angle, some participants pointed out, their interest in solving it may drop—especially if it appears they will not be directly affected. In fact, climate migration is likely to be worst between relatively poorer countries and ―climate change refugees" are overwhelmingly likely to be poor and lack mobility over great distances. If national security is a superior concern to the rich states the poor and vulnerable displaced will be forgotten.
5. Best Practices/Lessons Learned
Three country case studies concretized the issues and helped identify a number concerns that will need further refinement and elaboration if climate change migration is to be properly apprehended and treated. Each study concerned resettlement following the loss of housing due to flooding or sea level rise, in the past (Mozambique), present (Papua New Guinea) or future (Bangladesh). Throughout the discussions it was agreed that resettlements are a measure of last resort. There can be no automatic assumption that climate change gives rise to resettlement—which might provide governments with a cover to facilitate resettling populations for other reasons. Rather, any case for climate change resettlement must be well-founded and unavoidable. If resettlement must take place,
it should be closely monitored, international support should be forthcoming and may be vital, and international standards should be observed. Furthermore, the process must be owned by those to be resettled—requiring a transparent consultation process, the availability of relevant information for stakeholders, the rehabilitation of climate refugees in their new location, and due regard to traditional knowledge and local cultures throughout.
The people of Bangladesh are among the most vulnerable to climate change impacts, with predictions over the next century reaching truly catastrophic proportions. According to the fourth IPCC assessment report, Bangladesh is expected to lose about 8 percent of its rice and 32 percent of its wheat productivity by 2050. A one-metre rise in sea-level will put 20 percent of Bangladesh‘s landmass under water and inundate the whole of the Sundarbans national park, the world‘s largest mangrove forest. Up to 20 million people are at risk. Saudia Anwer of Prodipan Bangladesh argued that, given the unprecedented nature of this problem, the language of ―climate refugees‖ must be adopted in order to motivate action, and that some system of redress or compensation for those suffering losses due to climate change must be put in place. Bangladesh will need to account for climate refugees in its National Adaptation Plans and its Climate Change Strategy. It must also begin to seek international help in various ways, such as readying other countries to accept skilled and semi-skilled migrant workers at a minimum, as well as to accept climate refugees. Significant attention must be paid to infrastructural development and otherwise integrating relocation into development policy.
The Mozambique case study discussed the resettlement policy response by the government to the floods of 2000. The policy involved the construction of new modern housing for flood victims from low-lying regions, who themselves participated in the construction. Over time, however, the new housing was eventually abandoned. The project‘s relative lack of success was explained as being due a number of factors:
Little consultation with the beneficiaries, who did not ―own‖ the project
Disregard for local knowledge
Lack of access to agricultural land for beneficiaries
Disregard for people‘s livelihoods (distances from the workplaces were unsustainable)
Lack of basic infrastructure (water sewage, schools)
Degraded environment of the resettlement area,
Fear among beneficiaries of losing land in the fertile low lying areas
Lack of information. In response to this presentation a representative of the government of Mozambique noted the challenge facing the government at the time, as the primary duty of every government is to protect life. This is the main driver for resorting to resettlement.
A third case study related to Papua New Guinea / Bougainville. The inhabitants of the Carteret Islands, which are at serious risk of submersion due to climate change sea level rise, may need new homes in future, and the issue has become a live one on the islands. Resettlement was discussed as well as general adaptation matters taken in the Pacific region. A series of difficult questions arise if populations are to leave behind the territories upon which they have survived for countless generations. This is especially so for peoples for whom the link to the land is strong or constitutive, as is the case in many of the South Pacific islands. How are cultures and identities to be maintained if people are required to leave behind their homes?
6. Suggested strategy for Further Action
The discussions on further strategy for action regarding climate migration can be organized into three interdependent categories. Participants put forward a number of suggestions regarding strategy for action of the NGO community on the local, national and international level.
LOCAL LEVEL 1) People affected by climate disasters are themselves creative at finding ways to adapt. Further
work is needed to define how this potential can be explored, organized and channeled.
2) Big centralized humanitarian aid is often poorly targeted. More people could be helped if governments were committed to coordinating closely with civil society and local government. This approach would also foster acceptance and ownership of the implemented policies on the part of the affected people.
3) Work towards increasing local capacity, supporting communities and households. Educate and
build information-sharing networks. Encourage bigger engagement of the private sector with a focus on Corporate Social Responsibility. Work towards achieving balance between response, prevention and recovery strategies. Design ―shadow strategies‖ and lobby for them with local and national authorities.
4) Advocate for turning people into subjects and not objects of policies. Ownership of and
participation in the process is crucial for achieving any success. Victims need to be turned into agents of the process.
5) Encourage collective action and sense of community at the local level through:
Praying together, adopting a spirit of reference to creation and to one another.
Speaking and acting together
Creating awareness, which is a catalyst for a shared concern and action—workshops, media friendly information, dancing, story telling
Identifying the most vulnerable and providing platforms for them
Providing authoritative research
Lobbying in creative ways
Engaging the private sector
Knowledge-sharing in the grassroots
Organization building, organizing civil society and channeling the power of many voices to create impact
Awareness-building and trust-building
Fostering dialogue in the research process and documenting community concerns.
NATIONAL LEVEL 1) Engage the media proactively. Educate parliamentarians and support them in constructive
motions. The protection of human rights is a catchy subject. 2) Go to national authorities, representatives on a national level and decision makers and let them
know what works on a local scale. Connect them to on-the-ground experience and give them a clearer picture of who suffers and how problems can be prevented or remedied. Spearhead bottom-up action by bringing in actors ―from the field‖ and giving a high profile to traditional local knowledge. Show how traditional and modern technologies can be combined in national strategies.
3) Build national networks of organizations. Come up with a strategy on how to move forward in a
coordinated way. Identify leverage points and allies, and work together towards a common goal. 4) Build bridges between different policy communities. Approach policy communities to encourage
them to determine what role they can play in solving the puzzle. 5) Clarification of the terminology will help policymakers.
INTERNATIONAL LEVEL
1) Large humanitarian organizations often miss the link to local communities. Try to influence the agenda of the main humanitarian actors.
2) Catalogue and pursue the various different options for acquiring a recognized status for climate
change displaced persons. There was some discussion over whether the pursuit of a soft-law option was strategically smart—as it may be more easy to achieve than treaty law—or unwise, as states tend to agree to soft law instruments that they can then evade with impunity.
3) Explore the available routes towards granting people a recognized status. Then prepare
documentation and pursue campaigns that will convince states to follow a given route.
4) Bring more attention to human rights in the climate change regime. This must be done with caution, as some states will represent human rights as ―poisonous‖ to negotiations. But it is worth raising the point that state parties to the UNFCCC are also signatories to the human rights conventions and are bound by them.
5) Climate change raises significant problems for the classic notion of the nation state. This is one
of the reasons put forward by the participants not to pursue the ―responsibility to protect‖ (R2P) as an option for managing it. Other reservations included arguments that R2P will not work as it applies only to genocide and other serious violations and it is still an emerging international law norm.
6) Exert influence over the regional blocks through national decision-makers. This is particularly
true for the SIDS block where decision makers are close to the people.
7) Be careful in choosing messages. In addressing forced displacement it will be important to remain cautious about potentially volatile issues such as compensation or human rights text. While adopting a pragmatic approach with the UNFCCC, it is also possible to pursue climate change in Geneva with the Human Rights Council. Instead of importing human rights into climate change, import climate change into human rights.
8) Although human rights may be volatile in the negotiating rooms they can nevertheless be
effective ―in the corridors‖ by refocusing discussion on states‘ obligations. Persistence and determination will be needed.
9) Develop a strategy on how to develop and derive climate change victims' rights from civil and
political rights and how their participation in the decision-making process can be enhanced. Look into how the local communities can play a key role and have ownership over the response.
10) Emphasize the importance of ―vulnerable individuals‖ as well as, or rather than, ―vulnerable
states‖ in order to retain a human rights perspective.
11) Form NGO partnerships in key countries. Develop fundraising strategies in connection with concrete adaptation needs.
12) Climate change is a global problem, but we are not globally organized or represented, there is
no global public, global media or global governance. Seek ways to remedy this situation. Civil society is important but pragmatically we need to link local and global. For global-level advocacy we need global information.
13) Look into the role of social movements in transforming victims into agents of change.
Conclusion Wrapping up, it was stressed that the principal needs are for new thinking, for reform of the global governance system, for the nurturing of a ―global public‖ able to represent and address the global public interest. Two approaches were postulated in the course of the meeting. First, a ―visionary‖ approach, with a new Optional Protocol to the UNFCCC as a possible goal; second a ―pragmatic‖ approach exploring all existing avenues for a slow but sure progress in furthering the cause of human rights through the climate change process. Many participants saw an Optional Protocol as a good but far-fetched idea and stressed the need for solid interim measures. But it may also be necessary to keep a visionary ―horizon‖ in view even while pursuing solid practical steps. What is the role of the churches in addressing climate change refugees? The church can enhance the participation of local people(s), while pointing to human rights language and procedures, including complaint procedures and standard setting mechanisms, in order to ensure that victims become active stake holders. Invoking human rights language means foregrounding the protection of people suffering from the impacts of climate change. The churches must raise the urgency of victims‘ rights on each relevant occasion. They must also be ready to rock the boat occasionally, where complacency about the suffering of climate change victims becomes dominant, as is frequently the case. In addition, the churches can develop their role as a platform of exchange and exposure, reaching out, for example, to members of parliament or parliamentary committees and members of local communities; seeking cooperation among existing civil society organisation dealing with climate change. In addition, the churches are well positioned to enhance social mobilisation, resistance and empowerment among the suffering people and their supporters. Climate change for churches should mean seeking justice. From this perspective it is important to remember that climate change is not just about law and legal instruments; it is also about making governments change their policies and concepts on development. The churches might therefore aim to identify ―champions‖ among states and governments. Candidates might include, for example, the Arctic Council, the Pacific Islands Climate Change Cooperative (PICCC) and the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS). Climate change presents challenges at many levels, but it is above all a challenge to the imagination. In order to determine how to avoid immense population displacement, we need first to imagine the kind of world that will permit mass forced migration—and we must then imagine another kind of world. We need to imagine not only how to bring our carbon consumption down but also how to help our fellows in other parts of the world adapt to climate change. What kind of adaptation is relevant to migration? Sea walls? Cities on stilts? New canal systems? We need to start now to construct this future world. But we also need to imagine what it will mean if we fail. Indeed, it seems increasingly short-sighted to assume we will avoid sea-level rise or manage adaptive measures, given the tortuously slow progress of negotiations to date. We need to imagine that millions will, one day not too far away, be on the move, and we need to start thinking now about the appropriate way to manage this eventuality. Key words: climate change, state, role of civil society, international institutions, securitization of the problem, unpredictability and discrepancy of science, best practices and case studies, terminology, visionary vs. pragmatic approach, transparency, ownership, local communities, information sharing, collective vs. individual rights, competing agendas, financing and compensation, extraterritorial obligations, complaint procedures and social mobilization.
Keynote Speech Our conference began with a keynote speech by Prof. Frank Biermann, who elaborated on the scope of challenges posed by climate migration and outlined how political and legal solutions to the problem of ‗climate refugees‘ could look like. Below you can find the PowerPoint slides to his presentation as well as Margit Ammer‘s written comments on Mr. Biermann‘s speech.
An Emerging Discourse of Climate Crisis
• “Given that [the 2° target] is an ambitious target, … we
should be prepared to adapt to 4 degrees.” R. Watson, The Guardian, 2008
• “Society may be lulled into a false sense of security by
smooth projections of global change.” Lenton et al. 2009
• “Planetary boundaries” have been violated in the case
of climate change/global warming. Röckstrom et al. 2009
An Emerging Discourse of Climate Crisis (2)
• “Drastic climate change” – exceeding 2° warming – may
not be likely, but can no longer be ruled out.
• Most adaptation research has focussed on local and
national response programmes.
• Options for global policy responses are hardly
addressed, let alone understood.
• This includes, in particular, political and academic
debates on protection of climate refugees.
The Scope of the Challenge: Predictions
• 200-250 million by 2050 according to Myers
• “Hundreds of millions” according to Stern Report “even
though not tested”
• 300 million flooded each year by 3-4 degree temp
increase
• 1 billion according to Christian Aid
• 250 million at high risk in Ganges Brahmaputra
• 12 million from Egypt by 2050
• Etc.
Refugees Predictions and Reality
• Many studies
– build on long-term scenarios and modelling
– use broad concepts of (climate) refugees
– build on generalised assumptions about human
behaviour, often overestimating migration
– do not account for adaptation, from dikes to long-term
relocation of population centres
– do not account for multi-causality
• By and large, this favours a pessimistic bias.
• Nonetheless, the scope of the problem could well
surpass the number of all existing refugees/displaced
persons, possibly 10-20 times.
Concepts and Definitions
• Climate “refugees”?
• (Voluntary) “migrants” (or “emigrants”)?
• “Environmentally displaced persons”?
The Regime on Political Refugees
• The 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees protects individual refugees who flee their
country because of state-led persecution.
• “well-founded fear of persecution”
– Is global change a new type of persecution?
• “for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of
a particular social group or political opinion”
– Are climate victims members of a particular social group?
– Are climate-change impacts biased against a particular
race, religion, or ethnic group?
• Most climate refugees are unlikely to be covered by the
Geneva convention.
Concepts and Definitions (2)
• Refugees versus migrants/displaced persons
– Climate change does not (or: hardly) qualify for
protection under the 1951 Geneva Convention.
– Does this disqualify for the century-old general term
„refugee‟?
– Can general terms be monopolised by one convention
and/or one category of people?
• Internal versus transboundary
– Important for some legal distinctions
– No justification for separate protection regimes
Concepts and Definitions (3)
• Voluntary versus forced
– Anticipatory behaviour is likely
– Climate-related migration will never be fully voluntarily, but
can be planned and organised.
• Temporary versus permanent
– Not very helpful distinction for overall problem
• Mono- versus multi-causality
– Large variation depending on type of climate-change
impacts, but no clear-cut distinctions possible
– Analytical problems should not distract from protection
Interlinked Political Interests
• Bureaucratic Agendas
– Compartimentalising the problem, legalism,
bureaucratic conservatism, protecting turfs
• Environmentalist Agendas
– Highlight the problem of climate refugees to increase
support for climate mitigation
– “Tuvalu as canary in the mine”
• (Northern) state agendas– Avoid notions of compensation, liability, and refugees
First Conclusion
• According to current predictions and current policies,
global warming will cause the largest refugee crisis
in history
• Both the scope and the type of climate-related
migration will be unprecedented.
• Old approaches, norms and concepts cannot capture
this major humanitarian challenge.
• New thinking is needed.
Interlinked Political Interests (2)
• Interlinked Development Agendas
– Increase development co-operation and help for the
poor to increase adaptive capacity in the South
• Interlinked Security Agendas
– Mass migration as cause of conflict
– Mass migration as (immigration) threat to Northern
countries
– Mass migration as case for increased support for
military and intelligence
Political Solutions:
Towards a Global Governance System to
Protect Climate Refugees
A Working Definition....
Climate refugees are....
People who have to leave their habitat, immediately
or in the near future,
because of sudden or gradual alterations in their
natural environment related to at least one of three
impacts of climate change:
sea-level rise,
extreme weather events, and
drought and water scarcity.
Characteristics of Climate Refugees
Climate refugees ...
• ... are unable to return to their homelands.
• ... are likely to migrate in large numbers and
collectively
• ... are predictable within limits
• ... differ from political and war refugees through the
moral and legal embedding of their situation.
Shall the Geneva Convention Be Amended?
• Most climate refugees do not fall under the
interpretation of the convention on political refugees
• A broader interpretation or formal amendment is
unlikely to find support by (Northern) states.
• The political refugee regime does not fit the particular
problems of climate refugees, which are
– Likely to enjoy protection of their own government
– Likely to (want to) stay within their country
– Likely to migrate in (large) groups/communities
– Unlikely to be able to return
A sui generis Regime for Climate Refugees
Three questions need to be addressed:
1. What are the core governance principles?
2. What is the best institutional and organisational setting?
3. Who will pay the bill?
What Are The Core Principles?
1. Principle of planned relocation and resettlement
2. Principle of resettlement instead of temporary
asylum
3. Principle of collective rights for local populations
4. Principle of international assistance for domestic
measures
5. Principle of international burden-sharing
Institutional and Organisational Setting?
• Best option: Protocol to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change:
Protocol on Recognition, Protection, and
Resettlement of Climate Refugees
• The Protocol would provide for:
– Decision-making procedure on determination of local
populations affected by severe climate change
damages (e.g., islands, low-lying regions)
– Decision-making procedure on international
cooperation, including funding
– Respect of national sovereignty
Who Will Pay The Bill?
• Principle of full incremental cost reimbursement for
sea-level rise refugees
• Principle of additional funding for other climate
refugees
• Integration into funding mechanisms of climate
regime
• Automatic financial mechanisms, e.g. levies on air
transportation?
• Insurance schemes?
Organisational Setting
• (Probably) no need for a new international agency.
• Main responsibility with national agencies, with
support and funding of intergovernmental system
• Existing UN agencies could operate as implementing
agencies of climate refugee protocol.
• Main responsibility would lie with UN Development
Programme and the World Bank, which would
support long-term resettlement programmes
• A smaller mandate possibly for UNHCR, IOM, and
disaster relief agencies.
Hypothetical Example: A View from the Future
• In 2020, country “Lowtidia” lodges formal request for
support from UNFCCC climate refugee protocol for
certain submerging coastal areas and islands under its
jurisdiction.
• Protocol Executive Committee mandates scientific
review, including local participation
• Executive committee advises
– further adaptation programmes for some areas
– resettlement over 10 years of some islands and areas.
What Are the Loop-holes?
• What if ...
– ... China reclaims financial support for the “planned
resettlement” of Three-Gorges Dam “climate refugees”
– ... Sudan, or Niger, claim that half of their population is
threatened by becoming climate refugees – with the
need of (international) resettlement and funding
– ... neighbouring countries do not/cannot accept
climate refugees (e.g., will India accept millions of
Bangladeshi, and at what cost?)
• But what else ... to protect the coastal villages in
Bangladesh and the nation of Tuvalu?
More Information
More Information
More Information at
www.earthsystemgovernance.org
www.glogov.org
Thank you!
Ms. Margit Ammer from the Ludwig Boltzmann Institute of Human Rights commented on Mr. Biermann’s keynote speech:
The notion and definition of ‘climate refugees’
Usage of term ‘refugee’
Usage of the notion ‘climate refugee’/’environmental refugee’ is problematic (concerns by UNHCR). However, if you still use this notion you have to be aware that you talk about persons who leave their homes not voluntarily (forced migration) – however, Biermann/Boas use the term also for voluntary migration(see also core principles). Apart from that, it needs to be made clear whether internal or international movement is at stake – necessary because it is important to clarify to what extent persons are already covered by existing international instruments (different regimes apply depending on whether an international border was crossed or not).
Definition of ‘climate refugees’ by Biermann/Boas
In my view those persons covered by this definition are no ‘climate refugees’ – those are persons affected by the impacts of climate change, but some time before leaving a home becomes inevitable = some time before their basic human rights are seriously at risk and they see no other way than to leave their home [at this stage resettlement could be seen as an adaptation measures (voluntariness of movement), which is of utmost importance].
What about non-climate-induced ‘environmental refugees’?
While climate change is the main trigger of natural disasters nowadays and it is also easier from a legal point of view to deal with ‘climate refugees’ (a comprehensive international regime with regard to climate protection exists), in practice it could be difficult to distinguish between cases of climate- induced and non-climate-induced events/degradation (except for sea-level rise). From a protection and international human rights point of view: all deserve protection if basic needs of persons are not fulfilled and lives and livelihoods seriously threatened.
Core principles
Long-term planned voluntary relocation and resettlement of persons who have to leave their homes immediately or in the near future because of changes in natural environment related to at least 1 of 3 climate change impacts (instead of humanitarian aid) as climate-induced environmental change can be predicted to a large extent.
– In principle: yes, it is important to act as early as possible and not to wait until a disaster happens and humanitarian aid becomes necessary = it is important to prevent situations which threaten the lives and livelihoods of persons and trigger sudden-onset forced migration, i.e. that persons see no other way than to leave their homes
– In this context long-term planned voluntary resettlement measures are in my view ONE OF SEVERAL POSSIBLE adaptation measures; adaptation measures should in the first place aim at strengthening the resilience of persons and communities affected so that they do not have to leave their homes; if this is not possible another adaptation strategy would be voluntary resettlement; here it is of utmost importance to involve the persons affected: they have a right to be informed about their choices and to participate in decision-making; their voices need to be made heard ( human rights standards and principles need to underpin such processes; similar in Guiding Principles on internal displacement).
– It needs to be borne in mind that persons do not necessarily want to leave their homes – has to do with land ownership (see some of the cases studies of the EACH-FOR project); the most vulnerable affected by climate change = those who often cannot and do not want to leave (elderly, sick, mothers with small children, persons with disabilities). With regard to indigenous people - their life and livelihood, their culture depend on their land and healthy environment).
Resettlement instead of temporary asylum/protection:
– Biermann/Boas assume that ‘climate refugees’ cannot return – however, I would say that this is primarily true with regard to persons affected by sea-level rise BUT NOT necessarily with regard to persons affected by other climate-induced events. In certain cases there is a chance to return home and thus temporary protection is an option (here again it needs to be borne in mind that people do not necessarily want to leave their homes).
Granting of collective rights for regional defined groups e.g. islands, villages (in contrast to individual approach of GRC):
– Granting of collective rights could make sense in the case of ‘submerging’ island states (here problems also with regard to citizenship/statelessness arise). In other cases it may not be necessary: here it could be sufficient to grant individual rights (could be based on the membership in a certain group - compare prima facie refugee status recognition in cases of mass influx under GRC – no collective rights are granted).
International support with domestic measures:
– Support of the international community to the country of origin (and local communities) is important because most of persons affected will stay in their home state (which is primarily responsible to respect protect and fulfil human rights), which is due to climate change unable to fulfil human rights of its population. However, it is important to bear in mind that international support is not only a ‘moral duty’ – in particular in the context of climate change (a global challenge): there exist extraterritorial obligations of third states (while in particular the duty to fulfil is contested, following the authoritative interpretation of the monitoring body of the ICESCR in particular those countries should be targeted by the extraterritorial obligation to fulfil-provide which can be made responsible for non-fulfilment of human rights and which are in a position to assist )- in this context it is arguable that developed states with high per capita emissions and high per capita income are legally obliged to support the home state in fulfilling economic social and cultural rights of persons affected by the impacts of climate change.
– It needs to be borne in mind that there are and will be also persons leaving their home country but who will stay in neighbouring countries which are in a similar difficult situation as home states = international community needs to support also such third states in the region.
International burden distribution/sharing:
– responsibility of industrialised states for climate change and its consequences – principles in climate regime (principle of common but differentiated responsibilities; principle of reimbursement of full costs with regard to events which can be traced to climate change); is important – complements the international obligation to cooperation and assistance under human rights law regime (see above).
New instrument under umbrella of UNFCCC?
UNFCCC will remain primary comprehensive framework dealing with climate change (was also confirmed in a discussion in the Human Rights Council on the relationship between climate change and human rights in June 2009). Therefore it could make sense to use the framework of the UNFCCC. The advantage of such an approach would be to make use of the principles with regard to burden-sharing (principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and capabilities; principle of reimbursement of full costs). However, since the UNFCCC is an inter-state instrument and is not looking at human rights or humanitarian considerations, it would be necessary to integrate a ‘human dimension’, i.e. the principles; the needs of individuals; focus on most vulnerable parts of the population; ensure participation and access to information.
REGIONAL AND COUNTRY CASE STUDIES The following section contains regional and country case studies that were presented at the beginning of the conference and thus laid a good basis for the thematic panels that followed.
PREPAREDNESS FOR DISPLACED POPULATIONS AS A RESULT OF CLIMATE CHANGE
A Paper Presented3 at the
Bread for the World and World Council of Churches Meet in Geneva, May 2010
By Rosa Koian Bismarck Ramu Group, PAPUA NEW GUINEA
Ladies and Gentlemen, Greetings from Papua New Guinea, And thank you for giving me this opportunity to share with you my thoughts on climate change as it affects Papua New Guinea. I have read and watched events unfold in Papua New Guinea, and by now many of you have heard of the first Climate refugees from Papua New Guinea. Here, I will not dwell on the impacts, but will put forward some issues relating to relocation and or resettlement. This paper therefore will focus more on preparedness- thus the theme for this meeting. The Carterets Islanders story has been on discussion tables for the last five years and has become more urgent in the last three years. However, to date the islanders are still on the island faced with
3 Unfortunately, Mrs. Rosa Koian could not attend the conference. She was so kind as to forward to us the
paper she had planned to present.
food shortage, no safe drinking water, high risk of new diseases and are anxious. They see outsiders including government officers once every three or four months when a boat visits. The Caterets is made up of more than 2000 people. There are also the islands of Nissan, Mortlock and others. So in total a population of more than 6000 islanders are being displaced in Bouganville alone. Resettlement or Relocation Relocation or resettlement calls for a lot of work before hand. And climate change requires a lot of preparatory work in time before a population is left homeless, hungry and traumatized. I would like to briefly compare the Manam Island situation and the East Awin Refugee Camp. The latter was home for more than 20,000 political refugees from West Papua. UNHCR must be commended for a well designed camp that held a group of people together, who were able to maintain their origins. A road runs in the centre of the camp, with settlements on either side. Almost all camps were fitted with a school, an aid post and some sporting amenities. On each side of the road 20 hectares land was made available for food production. The Catholic Church became the on-the-ground support group that made sure the students were able to go to school, that there was medical care for these people and the community continued to receive pastoral care. However, Melanesians lead a lifestyle that depends on their forests and sea for food. For that reason the 20-hectare allocation on both sides of the road was not sufficient. Sago, one of the major staples, was often outside the 20 metre mark and therefore these people must cross into customary ground. This brought about conflict. In the Manam Island situation, due to the volcanic eruption in 1994 a population of more than 10,000 people had to be evacuated very quickly and so not a lot of thinking went into how these people were relocated. With the help of government officials five (5) old plantations were identified and the islanders were transferred from the island. NGOs and churches were quickly on site and emergency supplies were distributed. Over time the distribution of these goods also became an issue as the implementing NGOs could only do so much. In Papua New Guinean rural communities every adult is a food provider and therefore expected that gardening tools be distributed fairly. Unfortunately many of the young people missed out on this distribution. The placement of people is also important. On an island like Manam there are communities who are friends with others and enemies with others. In a haste situation it would be difficult to see this and therefore enemies can be settled with enemies, a potential for long term conflict in a given location. This situation is present in one camp in Madang. Furthermore there is also the issue of relocating large numbers of people to an area. As in the case of East Awin I believe there were no people in the vicinity when the camp was built. However, as the camp offered health and education services the local host communities were drawn to it but sitting on the outside. In the case of the Manam Islanders, up to 2000 people were placed in each of the camps. This figure outnumbers the local host community and therefore brings the feeling of invasion and resentment. A resettlement site has been identified in Madang for the Manam Islanders, however, lack of political will to drive this has meant the project shelved. This attitude did not help the two groups of people – the Manam Islanders and the people of Bogia. Fighting took place, people lost lives and eventually as I speak to you the Manam Islanders have been told to go back to their volcanic island, which is still spewing smoke. Land Acquisition Taking land into account, the relocation of the Cateret Islanders is taking longer as the acquisition of land is complex. Again proper negotiations must be entered into now and land must be made available for these displaced groups ahead of the time when they will be forced to leave in a hurry. While former church-owned plantations are available, the issue is many of these plantations‟ leases have expired and therefore are in question of title transfer. That is, many of these leases had a 99-year title on them; however, the transfer to local landowners or developers have not been happening or if they are happening are not done transparently.
Therefore many of the landowners as with the Madang people, have taken over their land. There are arguments that some of these people are not genuine landowners. These arguments need proper mediations, however, with the absence of proper land title commissioners these tasks often take longer than expected or if not eternity. As with the Manam Island Volcanic situation, ten thousand (10,000) people had to be evacuated quickly to the mainland of Bogia in 1994. The best place to put them temporarily was the old plantations along the north coast of Madang. Off course it didn‟t look like there were people on them then. However, as the emergency turned into normal, land issues emerged. This happens when emergency food supplies and other support phase out, and people are expected to fend for themselves. But without proper land negotiations, the Manam Islanders had no rights to use the land they were sitting on or go beyond the plantation boundaries. This calls for some work on the authorities‟ part. Income Generation As the islanders settle in they need more than just food. And therefore must take on some small economic activities to bring in some money. Because of the large numbers of people on one plantation, the coconuts for copra are often insufficient. The result is stealing from the local host communities. Recently some of the Manam Islanders took on jobs at the local fish cannery in Madang. This also proved to be a challenge as many of those who took this opportunity were women. The camps are also three hours away and the money made is often not enough to support their large families. Some NGOs did some basic skills training which helped empower women, who knew only a hierarchical system of governance on their island community. Here at the care centres, the women were able to bake and sew and sell at the local market. Housing For both East Awin and Manam Care Centres, building materials were always a problem. The sago palm provided the roofing material and as we talk about climate change, Madang, is now experiencing more rains than ever before. This makes the leaves rot quickly. Therefore groups of people had to walk out of their designated relocation areas into host communities‟ land to access building material. And yes, this often does not go without host communities confronting them. In the early days for the Manam Island situation, emergency funds were provided and therefore building materials were purchased from local communities. After a year or so, these funds were no longer available and houses were leaking already two years ago. Young People It is often a challenge to make everyone happy even in a situation of emergency. If we can learn from the East Awin situation, sporting facilities were provided early on and young people make good use of them. However, they are also food producers, fishermen and hunters. And therefore in the distribution of materials during an emergency, these people must be used as well. Many of these people also seek opportunities in education. While schools will be provided at primary level it is also important to consider these young people. Integration For a community to move into a new community it must be able to live with their new neighbours. This is usually facilitated by local (traditional) leaders. However, in an emergency there is no time for that. Therefore, some sort of relationship building must start happening now. This is where Tulele Peisa, a local NGO on Bouganville is working on at the moment with local host communities. Island communities have mastered skills in bringing in food from the sea. Bring them to land, it is a complete shift, or a 360 degree shift in their way of life. We have to be patient with them as they go
back to start in their lives. Time must be invested in assisting these people, as they will struggle to keep their traditional way of life while adjusting. It was heartening to hear a woman of Carterets tell about how a woman from Tinputz, Bouganville, who taught her how to grow sweet potato. For a person who lives on land, growing sweet potato is the simplest skill. For this island women growing sweet potato is a skill strange, but she was very happy when she saw her harvest. Tinputz is one of the relocation sites for the Carterets islands. Two women have become friends there. Climate change also puts more pressure on women. Traumatized as she is from the impact, she must get up, pull herself together without any help and go get food and water for her family. For the atolls in Bouganville, PNG, government boats visits once in three or four months. But experience has shown that packaged food supply help in times of need but will not sustain a community for a long period of time. Finance Management Last but not the least, funds will be sourced and held to help this people. I am very sorry to say that much tighter measures must be put in place so that the impacted groups of people are properly taken care of. Conclusion Once again thank you for this opportunity and I pray that as you make your decisions, you will consider working closely not only with the impacted community but also with the host communities. Remember while the impacted community have experienced something painful, just the act of resettlement is imposing another impact on another group of people. I would like to thank the churches and NGOs who have worked tirelessly to help those who have been impacted.
Warm Greetings from Bangladesh
Saudia AnwerResearch & Advocacy CoordinatorNetwork on Climate Change, Bangladesh
Climate Refugee –
To convey the urgency of the issue
The most vulnerable people of Bangladesh seek refuge who areaffected due to climate change impact
This terminology is quite able to express the seriousness of thesepeople‟s situation.
According to the 1951 Convention (relating to the Status of Refugeesarticle 1A)
“refugee” is “[…] any person who […] owing to a well-founded fear ofbeing persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membershipof a particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the countryof his nationality, and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling toavail himself of the protection of that country […]” (The 1967 Protocolhas removed a geographical and temporal restriction.)
The Term „Climate Refugee‟– Why ?
Overview on Internally Displaced Population in Bangladesh
Assessment of environmental, economic and social factors behind climate migration
Analysis on government reaction on the issue of climate induced migration
Measurement of the problem and its drivers
The prospect of cross-boundary migration
Consideration of policy recommendations
Objectives of the Study
Primary Data: Primary data has been collected through filed studyusing
1.Survey
2.Dialogues
3.Case studies
4.Observation at different „sending areas‟, „receiving areas‟
5. Key Informant Interview at some points of the migration routes ofthe climate refugees.
6.Interview with Opinion Leaders
Secondary Data: (i) international studies, documents and reportsfrom different international institutions, and (ii) National levelstudies, documents, newspaper clippings, interviews and otherreports.
Methodology
Slow Onset Disaster : The poor and ultra poor whose monthly income is almost near to 30 Euros in a month are always in the pipeline of climate migrations after slow onset disaster like flood, salinity et
Sudden Onset Disaster : Extreme climate change events like cyclones and river erosion can enforce migration on families with medium range of income and medium size of land
Combined Forces of Societal, Economical and Environmental factors:
Poverty, Failing ecosystem, Lack of infrastructure ,Lack of income opportunities
Key Drivers of Migration
Places of Origin
Hotspot for extreme climate change events
Lack of Infrastructure and communication facilities and
Inadequate post-disaster relief and rehabilitation measures.
Places of Destination (within the country or across the country)
Mega City - Dhaka, the capital of Bangladesh
Other metropolitan cities and fast growing towns
and possibly some to India.
Places of Origin & Places of Destination
Minto Mia lives in Dhaka with five family members. He is in hisforties and works as day laborer. Minto Mia hails from Bholadistrict. They lived there for generations and had enough wealth tolead a decent life in their village home. But he had to migrate toDhaka just a year back. The family lived by a river in Bhola andduring monsoon the bank of the river started eroding. The rivererosion reached two miles inside the village and engulfed all theassets and land of his family. Minto Mia tried to save his house butcouldn‟t.
Case Study
Increased frequency and intensity of cyclones
Increased salinity in inland areas( saline intrusion is taking place dueto sea level rise)
Increased severity of river floods
Heavier and more erratic rainfall during the monsoon season
Drier winters and wetter monsoon summers.
Peoples Perception on Climate Change
Bangladesh will loose about 8% of its rice and 32% wheat
production by the year 2050 ( IPCC; 2007)
IPCC (2007) forecasted that 1 metre rise in sea level (expected totake place by the end of the century) will inundate 20% of its landmass
A one-metre rise in the sea-level will inundate the whole of theSundarbans.
Embankment failure is a serious possibility to make migratorymovement
Climate Change Impact & Climate Refugees
Seeking official definition of “Climate Refugees"
Lobby for skilled and semi-skilled migration towards zero populationgrowth countries under UNFCCC framework
Advocacy and Lobby for Compensation and Insurance for climaterefugees under UNFCCC Framework
Development of structures and other adaptation measures againstnatural calamities
Right to climate resilient housings
Review of Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Planand National Adaptation Plan of Action
Relocation climate refugees through different development policiesof Bangladesh
International campaigning for rehabilitation of climate Refugees
Recommendations from Different Stakeholders
1
Climate Change and the Challenge
of Organized Resettlement
The Case of Mozambique
Jeanette Schade
Centre on Migration, Citizenship and Development
2
Content
1. Past Events of Environmental Stress
2. Climate Change Projections
3. Resettlement Measures as a Policy Response:
Challenges and Pitfalls
4. What to Learn out of the Experience of Mozambique
3
Topographic and Land Zoning Map
Source: INGC Synthesis Report on Climate Change (First Draft), February 2009
4
I.a. Natural Disasters (1956-2008)
Source: INGC Synthesis Report on Climate Change (First Draft), February 2009 / (Queface 2008)
5
I.b. Accumulative Impacts of Disasters
Source: INGC Synthesis Report on Climate Change (First Draft), February 2009 / (Queface 2008)
6
II.a. CC-Projection (2040-60): Temperature
• Increasing temperatures (median 2.5-3.0 °C) (7/7)
• Increasing rainfalls during DJF and MAM seasons
(average 10-25%), particularly towards the coast (large
spread)
• More unpredictable rainfalls, in particular JJA
• Increasing evaporation (greater than rainfalls Jun-N)
• Decreasing water availability
• Longer and hotter dry seasons and drought spells
7
II.b. CC-Projection (2040-60): Hydrology
• Average river flows: moderate to large increases in the S
(Limpopo and Save rivers); Minimal changes in the N
• Magnitude of floods: moderate to large increases in the S
(particularly for Limpopo); Minimal changes in other regions
• Frequency of floods: minimal changes
• Water availability: overall decrease (due to increases in
evaporation and in water demand of growing population)
overall water stress by 2050
• Saltwater intrusion: goes further inland due to tidal activity
8
II.c. Projection (2030-2100): Cycl. & SLR
Cyclones
• Increasing water surface temperature of the Indian Ocean
increasing frequency and intensity of cyclones
• But: Statistically significant trends cannot be observed
Sea level rise (general; source: INGC 2009)
9
Worst Case SLR Scenario
Sources: MICOA: NAPA (2007); INGC (2009)
Cabo Delgado
Nampula
Zambézia
Sofala
Niassa
Tete
Manica
Gaza
Maputo
Inhambane
10
Resettlement as a Policy Response
• April 2007: Strategy for resettlement and reconstruction is
approved (Estratégia de Reassentamento e Reconstrução)
• 2007 plan: resettlement of 30.700 families in the provinces
of Tete, Zambézia, Manica and Sofala
• 2008 plan: resettlement of an additional 28.000 families
• Basic idea: Offering modern infrastructure and houses;
Beneficiaries should participate in construction work
• Outcome (end 2008): Resettlement Centres not accepted
well by beneficiaries and lack of full implementation
11
GoM Resettlement Plans for Flood Victims
Table 1:
Construction
of houses
Table 2:
Construction
of
infrastructure
(schools,
sanitation,
water access)
12
What Went Wrong? (Evaluations)
• Mismatch between concepts and reality
• Lack of consultation of admin. sub-levels and beneficiaries
• Local knowledge dismissed / insensitivity to local contexts
• Lacking access to agricultural land and other sources for livelihood and income generation
• Lacking infrastructure
• Degradation of environment
• Fears to loose fertile low-lying areas (land grabbing)
• Alternative hypothesis: Logic of development programming
13
What to Learn?
• Resettlements should be a measure of last resort
• Climate change should not be abused as an argument
• Other options have to be assessed first
• Climate change predictions should be taken into account
• International support is needed
• If resettlements cannot be avoided international standards
have to be taken into account
“Climate change and the challenge of organized resettlement – the case of Mozambique: General conclusions" Resettlement measures are not an easy undertaking. In particular in the case of already vulnerable and poor communities, they shatter the fragile system of assets and networks livelihoods are based on. Therefore, they should always be a measure of last resort, and other options have to be assessed first. In the case of Mozambique for example, improving traditional and modern integrated water management might be the better option. But this often implies more costly adaptation investments such as building dams. Thus, reminding the ‗shared, but differentiated responsibility‘, the international community has to support such alternative options – politically, technically and financially. Resettlement measures should result in an improvement of livelihoods. Adherence to the procedural and substantive human rights of the affected communities during all phases of a relocation process (assessment, decision, planning, implementation, integration) is therefore indispensable. This includes participatory assessment whether other options might serve better the plight of the communities. Moreover, in cases where relocations cannot be avoided, participation and recognition of social rights help to improve feasibility, acceptance and sustainability of such measures. It also ensures that climate change or disaster related resettlements are not abused for political (e.g. shifting power balances) or commercial (e.g. major investment projects) interests. The so called Kothari guidelines on development-based evictions and displacement provide a valuable source, how such relocation processes can be designed mindfully. Beyond human rights also environmental concerns have to be taken into account. The environmental sustainability at the destination place has to be secured. In Mozambique, for example, the brig production for modern houses contributed to further degradation of the already arid relocation area. Moreover, adaptation to climate change goes beyond disaster management. This means, if we take climate change forecasts seriously, they have to be integrated into the planning. Unfortunately, the new settlement areas for the population of the Zambezi valley are said to become even more arid as they already are. Last, but not least, mobility itself has to be considered. The current discussions on ―climate change displacees‖ and the relocation option obscure the fact that most livelihoods – to varying degrees – are based on mobility. Accordingly, successful resettlement planning has to ensure and support the mobility of the relocated population to facilitate access to their former assets (e.g. pieces of land), to markets or to new job opportunities. The sedentary bias becomes particularly obvious in cases
where mobility is an intrinsic characteristic of community life, as it is with nomadic herders. Their situation differs significantly from that of settled communities. Climate change probably hinders them to take the routes and access the destinations they are used to. They might be ―forced to stay‖, not ―forced to flee‖. The resettlement option would imply a complete breakdown of their current livelihoods and life style. Other solutions have to be thought of. Panel I: Challenges to International Law4 (Moderator: Michael Windfuhr)
Global warming and extreme weather conditions may have dramatic consequences for the human rights of millions of people. They can be among the leading causes or contributing factors that trigger hunger, malnutrition, lack of access to water and adequate housing, exposure to disease, loss of livelihoods and permanent displacement. Climate change may even affect the right to life. Each and all of these factors and risks can lead to displacement and migration on an unprecedented scale. In turn, such climate-induced movements can also carry a wide range of implications for the enjoyment of human rights. Various human rights mechanisms have begun to address the linkages between displacement and the protection of the environment. E.g. the former Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants identified environmental degradation among the reasons that force people to leave their countries, while the current Representative of the Secretary-General on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons highlighted that natural disasters are among the leading causes of internal displacement. The definition of "internally displaced persons" has been expanded to include those individuals who in large numbers have been forced to flee their homes suddenly or unexpectedly as a result of natural disasters, as well as those relocated by environmental causes. Displacement in the context of climate change and disasters was not part of the 1951 Convention drafters‘ considerations when this definition was formulated. Nonetheless, some of the people who
4 The panel concept is mainly based on the paper „Environmental Migration Governance‟ by Jane McAdam,
University of New South Wales Faculty of Law Research Series, Paper 1, 2009, P. 7.
are displaced across borders in the context of climate change could qualify for refugee status and protection. People moving across international borders as a result of hazards events and subsequent designation of prohibited areas are protected by international human rights law, which however does not entitle them to admission and stay in another country. Those moving within existing boarders are protected by international human rights law (and the Guiding principles on IDPs if they are forcibly displaced) but there is a lack of criteria to distinguish between voluntary and forced movements in hazard related disaster settings. Should a state lose its entire territory, one of the constituent elements of statehood, it is not clear whether its statehood would continue to be recognized by the international community. If its population was to be treated as stateless, current legal regimes could not sufficiently address their needs. Whole state or island displacement as in the case of Kiribati or Tuvalu threatens self-determination. From a legal perspective there is no formal legal definition of environmental migrants or environmental refugees. Therefore, there is a need to develop a comprehensive, accepted and concrete definition of environmental forced migrants- without risking the erosion of current international refugee law. At the same time, there is a need to develop adequate and appropriate protection instruments to safeguard the rights, needs and human security of environmental displaced populations. The panel will raise the question if there is a need for a new organization with a specific mandate for the category of forced environmentally migrants. It will be asked how the international community should protect the environmentally displaced and who should fund the costs of protecting and assisting them. The issue of rights for those who are environmentally displaced and associated questions of human security are urgent matters of policy. For example, famine is frequently triggered by drought, but caused by the way political and economic systems deprive people of their entitlements to natural resources. In most areas of environmental change, recognizing the role of human agency and the need for States to articulate and address the protection of rights in relation to environmental stresses leading to displacement is a pressing issue. The protection of rights might be a more profitable route to follow than the problematic call for an international status. In support of a rights- based approach set within the context of multi-causality, the related concept of human security might also be a useful framework for policy development. The absence of a definition does not necessarily preclude international responses: it may allow for more flexible, ad hoc responses within a formalized framework. Do we then need a legally binding definition of those displaced by climate change? There is definitely the need to improve legislation: creation of a framework to recognize environmental migrants or refugees, climate displaced people, either through a new treaty or within environmental treaties.
PANEL II: HUMANITARIAN CHALLENGES5 (Moderator: Sophia Wirsching)
Environmentally forced migration is characterized by a multi-causality of social economic and political factors which lead to it. Slow onset migration with the possibility of return or leading to permanent displacement is frequently caused by depletion of resources (land and water), deforestation, desertification and pollution. But it is very difficult to predict because of the different types of migration (e.g. seasonal, repetitive, return), the variety of multi-causal intervening variables (socioeconomic status), and the complexity of environmental outcomes (e.g. deforestation and fisheries depletion). Even if natural disasters are a more obvious cause of forced migration than slow onset environmental change, we should still bear in mind that the impacts and the responses reflect a multiplicity of social, economic and political variables. However, a lot of people who are silently uprooted by gradual environmental change receive comparatively little support to cope and adapt, and are not recognized as either refugees or IDPs with the entitlements and expectations that these statuses bring. It is imperative to develop and adopt proactive development policies to address the potential migratory impacts of climate change which stress coping capacities, adaptation and sustainability and which facilitate the incorporation of resilience strategies in programs and projects. Not only the normative but also the operational framework for dealing with environmental induced migration is insufficient. Though precise typologies and mapping are necessary, they are not essential for comprehending and responding to future environmental migrations. Especially human adaptive capacity or resilience
5 The rationale for this panel is based on the following documents:
University of New South Wales (Ed.): “Environmental Migration Governance” Jane McAdam, University of New South Wales Faculty of Law Research Series, Paper 1, 2009 OCHA_IDMC Study: Monitoring forced displacement as a result of natural disasters in the context of climate change – June 2009. Working paper “Climate Change, Migration and Displacement: Who will be affected?” submitted by the informal group on Migration/Displacement and Climate Change of the IASC – 31 October 31 2008 Refugee Studies Centre: Environmentally displaced people – Understanding the linkages between environmental change, livelihoods and forced migration. November 2008.
in regard to the effects of climate change is very difficult to account for. External triggers do not necessarily lead to the same results when impacting people. Approximate prediction, indicating the world regions which are particularly vulnerable and estimating the magnitude of the number of people who may be forced out of these regions, could be a sufficient first step for planning concrete responses and raising more positive global awareness. Poorer people tend to be more exposed and more susceptible to hazards, suffer greater relative loss of assets and have a lower capacity to cope and recover. As disasters can induce poverty, reducing impoverishment and the potential migratory impacts of environmental change on poor people should be at the core of development strategies. These aims should also take into account the protection of rights and human security. Looking at the various drivers of human mobility in the context of climate change, sudden and slow onset disasters and environmental degradation, permanent loss of territory due to sea level rise, and possible conflict over dwindling natural resources the following issues must be addressed:
1. the reduction of climate related displacement through effective adaptation and disaster risk reduction,
2. the humanitarian and protection needs of those moving as a result of climate related phenomena
Our conference panel will deal in this sense with general questions of the following kind:
What are the most effective ways of preventing or mitigating this displacement? Which national and international forms of action will help minimize the adverse impacts of
such forced migration?
Guided by this general type of questions, we will also look at more specific issues: - How can strategies to prevent environment-induced migration and better anticipate support
requirements, similar to those of people fleeing other unviable situations, be developed? - What kind of resilience, sustainability and adaptation approaches are to be applied? - How do we increase adaptive capacity? - Who is going to play a lead role in giving the means for adequate humanitarian aid? How can
the process chain prevention-preparedness-mitigation-rehabilitation-resettlement be addressed through the coordination of agencies?
- How can environmental mapping and monitoring environmental hotspots in changing regional conditions and tracking migration trends be developed?
- How can we support national disaster preparedness and the respective response agencies? We have included the PowerPoint slides pertaining to the presentation of Marian Casey-Maslen who acquainted us with the international perspective of an alliance of churches and church-related organizations (ACT alliance) in regard to the humanitarian challenges posed by climate change.
Photos: Paul Jeffrey/ACT Alliance
Conference on protection and reparations for “climate refugees” - imperatives and options
Humanitarian challenges
4th May 2010
ACT Alliance Secretariat, Geneva
Photos: Paul Jeffrey/ACT Alliance
People affected by disasters
- In rich countries the average number of deaths per disaster is 23
- In the poorest countries it is 1,052
• After earthquakes, storms (22%) and extreme temperatures (11%) were the most deadly disasters between 2000 and 2009.
• Between 1999-2009, a total of 3,852 disasters killed more than 780,000 people and cost a minimum of 960 billion US$
• The number of catastrophic events has more than doubled since the 1980-1989 decade.
Sources: Oxfam 2009, IFRC 2007, CRED/UNISDR 2009
Photos: Paul Jeffrey/ACT Alliance
Climate-related events
• In a typical year between 1998 and 2007, 95-98 per cent of those affected suffered from climate-related disasters such as droughts and floods
• Environmental changes that affect crops, water supplies and grazing land may also precipitate violence.
• Changes in climate are altering hazard patterns related to many types of disaster.
Sources: Oxfam 2009 and UNISDR
Photos: Paul Jeffrey/ACT Alliance
Different challenges
Natural causes Human causes
Sudden shocks
(3 out of 10)
Flood, earthquakes, tsunami
War, invasion, ethnic cleansing, riots
Slow onset pressure
(7 out of 10)
Drought, changing typhoon patterns, changing monsoon timing
Migration away from danger/scarcity
Source: adapted from International Alert 2009
Photos: Paul Jeffrey/ACT Alliance
Progression of vulnerability
Source: Blaikie et al, 1994
Photos: Paul Jeffrey/ACT Alliance
What guides our work apart from IHL, HRL, RL? (among others)
• The IASC Operational Guidelines on Human Rights and Natural Disasters “Protecting persons affected by natural disasters’, June 2006
Operational principles…
1. Protection of life, security of the person, physical integrity and dignity
2. Protection of rights related to basic necessities of life
3. Protection of other economic, social and cultural rights
4. Protection of other civil and political rights
Crossing international border - a gap…
Photos: Paul Jeffrey/ACT Alliance
Concerns…
• Many of the 235,000 people killed by disasters in 2008 could have been saved by better government action
• Too often, international humanitarian agencies disregard national or local governments and local civil-society organisations
• The international humanitarian system can’t cope with the increasing number of local climate disasters (it’s largely centralised and cumbersome)
• Too much humanitarian aid is still inappropriate and poorly targeted.
• Protection of and accountability towards people affected by disasters is still poorly addressed in humanitarian responses.
Photos: Paul Jeffrey/ACT Alliance
Glimmers of hope
• “Cyclone Sidr killed around 3,000 people in Bangladesh in 2007, a tiny
fraction of the numbers killed by Cyclone Bhola in 1972 or even by Cyclone Gorky in 1991, storms of similar strength”.
• “In countries like India, where new legislation has created 900 million person-days of employment for rural poor people, the advent of ‘social protection’ mechanisms offers at least the hope that the cycle of disaster and poverty can be broken”.
• “In Chile in May 2008, the eruption of Mount Chaitén was met with a speedy response, including the evacuation of 8,000 people”.
Source: Oxfam 2009
Photos: Paul Jeffrey/ACT Alliance
Financing is one of the critical issues – who funds what and how it will be governed.
Photos: Paul Jeffrey/ACT Alliance
Resources for managing the impact of climate change (synergies between disaster risk reduction and climate adaptation)
The 2009 Global Platform on Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR) called for targeting equivalent of
- 10% of humanitarian relief funds to DRR work;
- 10% for post-disaster reconstruction and recovery projects and national preparedness and response plans;
- and at least 1% of all national development funding and all development assistance funding for risk reduction measures.
- call by governments at the meeting for 30% of adaptation financing to be allocated to DRR.
Source: UNISDR
Photos: Paul Jeffrey/ACT Alliance
What we know (roughly…)
• Humanitarian spending is up from an estimated US$15bn in 2007 to US$18bn in 2008 (10% of ODA)
• Only 1% of all humanitarian aid goes from government to government.
• An additional US$47 billion in humanitarian assistance will be needed as the number of climate-related humanitarian emergencies increase with growing numbers of affected people
Sources: ODI, Oxfam, IFRC,
Photos: Paul Jeffrey/ACT Alliance
Prevention IS more cost effective than cure
• 1US$ invested in prevention saves US$4-7 in response and recovery…
Photos: Paul Jeffrey/ACT Alliance
Imperatives
• Getting more governments to take greater responsibility for reducing people’s vulnerability to disaster and adapting to change
• Ensuring that States have the capacity to act and provide humanitarian support when sudden population displacement occurs
• Recognising and enabling national and local capacity as a critical prevention, response and recovery pillar
• Supporting disaster-prone and disaster-affected households and communities to meet their basic needs and claim their rights
• Having an international humanitarian system that acts quickly and impartially to provide effective and accountable assistance, reinforcing national and local capacity.
Photos: Paul Jeffrey/ACT Alliance
Focus at national prevention measures
• 45 (of 168 who signed) countries have national platforms for risk reduction based on the 2005 Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) - a legally non-binding agreement for the promotion of disaster reduction
• The 2006 Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery, managed by the World Bank, supports implementation of the HFA.
• Its mission is to mainstream disaster reduction and climate change adaptation in country development strategies to reduce vulnerabilities to natural hazards.
• UNDP seeks to bridge the gap between the humanitarian agencies that handle immediate needs and the long term development phase following recovery (via PRSP process, etc.).
Photos: Paul Jeffrey/ACT Alliance
Focus at national prevention measures
• The (UNFCCC) National Adaptation Programmes for Action (NAPA)
provide a process for Least Developed Countries to self-identify priority actions that respond to their most urgent and immediate needs those for which further delay could increase vulnerability or lead to increased costs at a later stage.
Photos: Paul Jeffrey/ACT Alliance
Focus at national prevention measures
• The UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) is the strategic programme framework for the UN Country Team.
It describes the collective response of the UN at country level to the priorities in the national development framework - priorities that may have been influenced by the UNCT’s analytical contribution.
Photos: Paul Jeffrey/ACT Alliance
A challenge at country level…
• Links between PRSP’s, NAPAs, HFA, and UNDAFs not always clear
• What are the synergies between World Bank, UNDP, UNFCCC, and UNISDR ways of working?
• Is protection and reparation addressed or does it fall between the cracks?
• Multiple mechanisms (?too many) for civil society engage with and where are entry points for lobbying on rights and protection – and what entity is worth the effort…?
Photos: Paul Jeffrey/ACT Alliance
A new business model?
The international community needs a new vulnerability and protection “business” model with six requirements:
• A comprehensive risk framework;
• A reworked balance of spending between response, prevention and recovery;
• A big investment in national and local capacity;
• Fuller engagement of the private sector;
• Linking of the humanitarian to broader social and economic development issues; and
• Regional and international readiness to address cross-border humanitarian issues.
Source: World Economic Forum Global Council on Humanitarian Assistance
Photos: Paul Jeffrey/ACT Alliance
Practical actions to reduce vulnerability to natural hazards
• Build institutions (policies, legislation, plans...) to actively contribute to a culture of prevention and resilience
• Identify risks (hazard & vulnerability assessments, mapping...) and avoid high risk zones
• Build hazard-resistant structures (schools, hospitals, houses...) Build back better
• Protect and develop hazard buffers (forests, reefs, mangroves..)
• Improve early warning, preparedness and response
UNISDR, etc…
Photos: Paul Jeffrey/ACT Alliance
Approach to climate change adaptation (Oxfam 2010)
Photos: Paul Jeffrey/ACT Alliance
The ACT Alliance largely seeks to address underlying risk drivers such as:
poverty and injustice;
ecosystem decline;
vulnerable rural livelihoods;
ACT is still learning from the Haiti ‘urban’ experience…
Photos: Paul Jeffrey/ACT Alliance
Substituting fossil fuels with renewable energy sources
Afghanistan: Solar electrification of 118 villages, 7,800 homes
Reducing the need for firewood and kerosene
Photos: Paul Jeffrey/ACT Alliance
Protecting homes and livelihoods
Bangladesh: Raising homesteads onto plinths to reduce exposure to floods
Cultivating crops on floating platforms ‘bairas’ or ‘floating gardens’
Photos: Paul Jeffrey/ACT Alliance
Preparing for drought and protecting pastoralist livelihoods
Ethiopia: Harvesting
rainwater in larger ponds for animal use and
cultivation. Roof water collection for household
use.
Photos: Paul Jeffrey/ACT Alliance
Adapting to a rise in sea level
Indonesia: Growing salt-tolerant rice varieties and using a rice intensification system that demands less
water.
Photos: Paul Jeffrey/ACT Alliance
Early warning, early action for landslides and floods
El Salvador: Monitoring rainfall and surface
movement – stabilisation efforts and a focus on building community
resilience
Photos: Paul Jeffrey/ACT Alliance
Integrated watershed management
Myanmar: Promoting the control of coastal soil erosion
(mangroves), terracing, contour planting and
agroforestry
Panel III: Political Challenges (Moderator: Thomas Hirsch)
Empirical experiences and scientific studies indicate the growing challenge posed by migration and people who are forced to flee their homes due to extreme weather events as well as slow onset impact of climate change like sea level rise, desertification and salinity encroachment. According to various studies up to 500 million people might be affected by 2050. However, climate-induced migration has not yet been addressed with the necessary urgency in international politics, as evidenced with regard to the UNFCCC process, the Copenhagen climate summit, and the Copenhagen Accord. The same seems to be true for the national policy level in many if not most affected countries.
The definition and clarification of institutional responsibilities and roles is crucial for a holistic policy response to climate change and forced migration at both, national and international levels. It is in particular complex and slow onset events like sea level rise which will pose a major challenge to governance frameworks, especially because responsibility and temporal limits are difficult to assign.
Policy coherence at national and international levels is particularly desirable when integrating environmental and climate change issues into migration management and humanitarian action. As for the mid and long term scenarios of climate change and how it might change the earth by 2050 and beyond, a comprehensive framework will require an assessment of the impact of environmental degradation and natural disasters on population dynamics. Furthermore, larger demographic and socio-economic factors that fundamentally influence global and regional population dynamics, need to be appreciated.
Governance institutions will have to adapt to the challenges posed by the impacts of climate change in order to be able to deal with those forced to migrate because of environmental change. States will need to examine the overall implications so as to incorporate appropriate measures into their mandate and their operational practice. Institutional adaptation is needed to bring together the realms of environmental change, migratory impacts and development.
The following issues will be central to the panel discussion:
Copenhagen and beyond – What can and shall be expected from the UNFCCC process regarding the compensation of unavoidable losses leading, in the extreme, to migration and displacement?
Referring to the principle of common but different responsibilities of States (Article 3 in the UNFCC) and given that political actors gain an understanding of how migration and displacement are related to climate change, the panel asked how the costs of protecting and assisting the environmentally displaced can be funded. Attention was drawn to political and financial instruments that need to be established in order to secure this funding. In this context also, the potential role of the new UN Adaptation Fund was discussed. Lastly, consideration was given to the relevance of the ―polluter-pays-principle‖ and respective questions of accountability for extraterritorial harm.
What institutional architecture – besides the UNFCCC- is needed to address the problem at the international level? What could be the roles of institutions like UNHCR, UNEP, IOM, OCHA, and others? Is a new institution needed and how should it be mandated?
How can a policy dialogue on the issue of climate induced migration and refugees be fostered? How do we ensure that affected communities and people become active stakeholders in this dialogue?6
Please see below the PowerPoint slides to Ms. Koko Warner‘s presentation as well as Mr. Gyas‘ written statement, both of which deal with the UNFCCC- process.
6 Background papers for this panel: „Environmental Migration Governance‟ by Jane McAdam, University of
New South Wales Faculty of Law Research Series, Paper 1, 2009; „Monitoring forced displacement as a result of natural disasters in the context of climate change‟ by OCHA_IDMC, 2009; „Environmentally displaced people – Understanding the linkages between environmental change, livelihoods and forced migration‟ by Refugee Studies Centre, 2008; “ „Climate Refugees‟ beyond Copenhagen. Legal concept, political implications, normative considerations” by Brot für die Welt (ed), Analysis Nb.12, 2010.
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Environmental Change & Migration:
From COP 15 to COP 16
Dr. Koko Warner
United Nations University
Institute for Environment & Human Security
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The EACH-FOR Project: Global fieldwork sites
Tajikistan
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Egypt
Turkey
Mozambique
Vietnam
Morocco
Ghana
Senegal
Niger
Dominican Republic, Haiti
Mexico
Ecuador
Argentina
Russia
China
Tuvalu
Bangladesh
Spain
The Balkans
WesternSahara
Tajikistan
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Egypt
Turkey
Mozambique
Vietnam
Morocco
Ghana
Senegal
Niger
Dominican Republic, Haiti
Mexico
Ecuador
Argentina
Russia
China
Tuvalu
Bangladesh
Spain
The Balkans
WesternSahara
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Rockefeller Foundation Donor Briefing
23 September 2009, New York City
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“The rains have changed and …we had no
way to feed our families, so we fled our
village.
Now in the new place we migrated to, we are
having the same problems. The desert is
devouring our cropland and water is scarce.
We will have to move again soon.
We have been forced to creep, bit by bit, in
search of survival and our living.”
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“Disasters occur so often - Flooding
sometimes threatened our lives. Life was
miserable.
We did not know what else to do other than
growing rice and fishing …but we lost
everything.
We had to migrate away. My children had to
stop school, and I sent my girls to [Phnum
Pénh] to work to help our family.”
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“My grandfather has worked on our lands, my
father—and so do I. But times have
changed…the rain is coming later now or not
at all, and our crops are declining.
The only solution is to go away, at least for a
while.
But leave my village forever? No. I was raised
here and here I will stay.”
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[email protected]@ehs.unu.edu
COP 16: What we would like to see
1.COP decision on para 4(f) and
more clarity on elements of para
4(f)
2.Resources to support para 4(f)
3.An entity to oversee the design
and implementation of activities
related to para 4(f)
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COP 16: What we would like to see
Strategic question: how to help the
seedling grow?
• Carefully consider (and perhaps at this
point avoid) linking issue to « hot
topics » or controversy –this could kill
para 4(f) and prevent migration and
displacement from even being
mentioned in the context of the
UNFCCC negotiations
• Carefully consider messages,
coalitions of the willing, new strategic
alliances, and DIALOGUE
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Dr. Koko Warner
United Nations University Institute of Environment & Human Security
UN Campus, Hermann-Ehlerstr. 10
53113 Bonn, Germany
Thank you.
List of Participants
Surname Last Name Organization E-mail address
1 Jordana Abdelbaky-Harris International Organization for Migration (IOM) [email protected]
2 Elias C. Abramides Ecumenical Patriarchate [email protected]
3 Ghyas Ahmed Bangladesh Parliament Jatiya Sangsad [email protected]
4 Margit Ammer Ludwig Boltzmann Institute of Human Rights [email protected]
5 Frank Biermann Institute for Environmental Studies (IVM) [email protected]
6 Philippe Boncour International Organization for Migration (IOM) [email protected]
7 Patricia Bruschweiler World Council of Churches [email protected]
8 Christine Campeau Caritas Internationalis [email protected]
9 Marian Casey-Maslen ACT Alliance [email protected]
10 Peter Emberson Pacific Conference of Churches [email protected]
11 Rahman Ferdausur Prodipan - Network on Climate Change [email protected]
12 Ani Ghazaryan Drissi World Council of Churches [email protected]
13 Katja Göbel Pazifik Informationsstelle [email protected]
14 Thomas Hirsch Bread for the World [email protected]
15 Stephen J.Humphreys London School of Economics & Political Science [email protected]
16 Türkan Karakurt Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung office in Geneva [email protected]
17 Guillermo Kerber World Council of Churches [email protected]
18 Felix Kirchmeier Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung office in Geneva [email protected]
19 Alina Narusova-Schmitz International Organization for Migration (IOM) [email protected]
20 Christina Papazoglou World Council of Churches [email protected]
21 Theodor Rathgeber German Forum for Human Rights [email protected]
22 JacquelineRyle National Council of Churches in Denmark [email protected]
23 Anwer Saudia Prodipan - Network on Climate Change [email protected]
24 Jeanette Schade Centre on Migration, Citizenship and Development [email protected]
25 Jonas Schubert Bread for the World [email protected]
26 Rixa Schwarz Germanwatch [email protected]
27 Kasia Snyder International Council on Human Rights Policy (ICHRP) [email protected]
28 Marion Struck-Garbe Greenpeace Germany [email protected]
29 Tori Timms Environmental Justice Foundation (EJF) [email protected]
30 Miguel Tungadza Permanent Mission of the Republic of Mozambique [email protected]
31 Koko Warner UNU-EHS Institute for Environment & Human Security [email protected]
32 Michael Windfuhr Bread for the World/Diakonisches Werk der EKD [email protected]
33 Sophia Wirsching Bread for the World/Diakonisches Werk der EKD [email protected]
34 Michelle Yonetani ACT Alliance [email protected]
35 Halyna Zalucky Independent [email protected]
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