Concept of strategy in ir

The Concept of Strategy in International Relations

Dr. Sithara FernandoDepartment of Strategic Studies

Faculty of Defence and Strategic Studies

International RelationsFaculty of Law

Introduction

• The word ‘strategy’ is derived from the Greek words ‘strategia’ which means the office of a general, and ‘stratos’, which means an army.

• Dennis Drew and Donald Snow define the concept of strategy as “a plan of action that organizes efforts to achieve objectives”.

• This definition of strategy makes it applicable not only in military affairs but also in international relations.

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• The best way to explore the role of strategy in international relations is through the concept of ‘Grand Strategy’.

• Accordingly this lecture will be divided into the following sections:

1. The Concept of Grand Strategy2. The Grand Strategy of the United States3. The Grand Strategy of India4. The Grand Strategy of China5. The Strategic Objectives of Sri Lanka6. Analysis

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The Concept of Grand Strategy

• Based on the work of Dennis Drew and Donald Snow, the concept of Grand Strategy can be defined as:

“The art and science of coordinating the development and

use of the political, economic and military instruments of national power to achieve national security objectives”.

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The Grand Strategy Process

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• Some of the distinctive characteristics of the Grand Strategy process are the following:

1. The fundamental nature of security policy

2. External focus

3. Conservative inclination

4. Technological basis

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The Fundamental Nature of Security of Policy

• The most important objective of National Security Policy (NSP) is the protection of the country from threats to its existence and interests.

• This broad scope of NSP gives all citizens of the country a stake in it.

• The fact that NSP involves the survival and the safeguarding of the vital interests of the country gives it its fundamental character.

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External Focus

• Grand Strategy is directed at the international domain.

• This characteristic raises three issues which namely concern:

1. Knowledge

2. Adversarial relations

3. Control

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Knowledge

• The targets of Grand Strategy are foreign governments.• A country will have less information on what motivates and

influences other governments than it has of itself.• The way in which governments try to address this weakness is

through the collection and analysis of Intelligence.• In order to interpret accurately the Intelligence collected

governments need Intelligence Analysts who have a thorough knowledge of the countries concerned.

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Adversarial Relations

• Grand Strategies can be directed at countries which have adversarial relations with the home country.

• Which means that strategy is often discussed in an atmosphere of suspicion and mistrust which presumes hostile intentions on the part of adversaries.

• While good Intelligence can give a country accurate information about an adversary’s material capabilities, the intended use of these material capabilities can be much more difficult to ascertain.

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Control

• This issue arises from the difficulty that governments face in anticipating and deterring actions harmful to their interests.

• One purpose of Grand Strategy is to prevent foreign governments from undertaking actions that are harmful to the interest of the home country.

• But it is very difficult for governments to control the actions of other sovereign states.

• This weakness can only be rectified by augmenting a government’s capacity to influence other governments through actions or words.

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Conservative Inclination

• The Conservative Inclination arises because of two factors:

1. The uncertainty involved in ascertaining the intentions of other states.

2. The risk that this uncertainty poses to the survival and vital interests of the state.

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• The practical manifestation of the Conservative Inclination is planning for worst-case scenarios.

• The worst-case scenario is constructed by combining inflated estimates of the adversary’s capabilities with the most harmful potential intentions.

• The assumption is that the development of home country capabilities adequate to respond to the worst-case scenario would be effective in lesser situations.

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• There are however two weaknesses to be noted about the Conservative Inclination:

1. The worst-case preparations , which are meant to exceed the capability and intention of the adversary, can provoke the latter into taking counter measures.

2. Preparing for the worst-case will enable one to respond only to lesser but qualitatively similar contingencies but not to qualitatively different ones.

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• The first weakness of the Conservative Inclination can be illustrated with reference to a hypothetical situation at the Himalayan border between India and China.

• If India undertakes preparations for the worst possible Chinese incursions at the border, the Chinese can find this provocative and undertake their own countermeasures.

• The result can be a worsening of the security situation for both countries.

• This is why preparations for worst-case scenarios must always be accompanied by credible measures to reassure the other country of the home country’s defensive intentions.

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• The second weakness of the Conservative Inclination can be illustrated with reference to American Grand Strategy during the ‘Cold War’.

• American preparations for the worst-case scenario in the European theatre did not help them much in responding to the proxy war that arose in Vietnam.

• This weakness can be addressed by planning for a range of qualitatively different worst-case scenarios rather than for a single worst-case scenario.

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Technological Basis

• Technology can significantly augment a state’s capabilities and can be a formative influence on Grand Strategy.

• For example, the development of ‘drones’ by the US has augmented its capability to strike at enemies in distant locations without incurring any human casualties.

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• At the same time the impact of technology on Grand Strategy is complex and can be discussed under the following themes:

1. The effect of lethality on thinking about the usefulness of the military instrument.

2. The gap between declaratory strategy and capability.

3. The high costs associated with advanced weaponry.

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The Effect of Lethality on Strategic Thinking

• The lethality of nuclear weapons have made the military instrument of Grand Strategy more efficient in its destructiveness.

• However, this very destructiveness have deterred countries from actually using nuclear weapons.

• One of the primary reasons for their being no major war between US and the Soviet Union during the ‘Cold War’ was that had such a war occurred they would have run the risk of mutual annihilation.

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The Gap Between Declaratory Strategy and Capability

• The considerable time it takes from the decision to procure a new weapons system to its actual deployment can often result in a gap between declaratory strategy and capability.

• For example, while China has been articulating a ‘blue water’ maritime strategy since the late-1980s there is a gap between this declaratory strategy and its capabilities.

• China commissioned its first aircraft carrier, one of the hallmarks of ‘blue water’ capability, only in late-2012, and even then China stated that it would be used only for training purposes in naval aviation.

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High Costs

• The high costs of technologically advanced weapon systems can also influence strategy.

• When a particular weapon system is very expensive states become extremely cautious about using it in combat.

• For example, in the late-1980s the US was very cautious about using the expensive B-1 Bomber in combat.

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The Grand Strategy of the United States

• During the ‘Cold War’ between the US and Soviet Russia in the second half of the 20th century US Grand Strategy was based on the policy of containment.

• The policy of containment consisted of constructing a system of anti-Soviet alliances in Europe and Asia.

• In Europe this consisted of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) made up of the US and the Western European Countries.

• In Asia this consisted of US bilateral alliances with countries such as Japan, South Korea, Philippines and Australia.

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• With the end of the ‘Cold War’ in the early 1990s two schools of thought arose in US Grand Strategy:

1. The Unipolar School

2. The Multipolar School

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The Unipolar School

• The Unipolar School emphasizes the US position as the sole superpower.

• Hegemonic Stability Theory (HST) and Primacy Doctrine are two of the prominent ideas of this school.

• HST states that stability in the international system can be maintained by a world hegemon who acts as a provider of international public goods.

• The Primacy Doctrine justifies the imposition of the American will on other states.

• George W. Bush exemplified the Unipolar School.

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The Multipolar School

• This school recognizes that there are more than one power center in the world.

• The power centres that it recognizes are the United States, Europe, China, Russia, Japan and India.

• This school gives a lot of importance to partnership and coalition building.

• Bill Clinton exemplified the Multipolar School.

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• Staking a middle-ground between these two schools of thought the American scholar Charles Kupchan argues that:

“Although the current configuration of power is unipolar, American primacy is waning, and the United States’ continued role in the international system means engaging in collective security and adopting a multilateral approach to grand strategy”.

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• Although no new Great Powers are challenging the US through military balancing, they are engaging in non-traditional balancing such as:

1. Economic Pre-Balancing

2. Leash-Slipping

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• Economic Pre-Balancing aims to close the economic and technological gap.

• The establishment of the European Union’s economic and monetary union which by 2007 had a GDP of US$ 16.6 trillion amounting to 31% of the world output can be considered an example of Economic Pre-Balancing.

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• Leash-Slipping is the strengthening of military capabilities to promote an independent foreign policy.

• The adoption of the European Security and Defense Policy in 1999 and the creation of a 60,000 man EU Rapid Reaction Force in 2000 independent of NATO can be considered an example of Leash-Slipping.

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• Some of the different dimensions of the US Grand Strategy are:

1. Partnership and Cooperation

2. Maintaining the Transatlantic Alliance

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Partnership and Cooperation

• In a world with more than one power centre the US recognizes the importance of partnership and cooperation.

• The American scholar Charles Kupchan has argued that the US should use its prominent position in the international system to distribute power to regional actors through collective security policy.

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• Collective security involves depending on great power cooperation to manage the international system.

• It also entails conceding space to newly emergent power centres so that they will stand with rather than against the US.

• It also means the use of international institutions to bring the great powers together and the moderation of their behaviour through adherence to common norms.

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Maintaining the Transatlantic Alliance

• Between the early and the late 2000s the percentage of Europeans who approved of American leadership in world affairs declined from 64 to 37.

• However the leaders of major European countries at the time such as Tony Blair of Britain, Angela Merkel of Germany and Nicolas Sarkozy of France all displayed a keen interest in strong ties with the US.

• This latter fact displays the strength of the Transatlantic Alliance despite the fluctuation in American popularity.

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The Grand Strategy of India

• India’s population is expected to surpass China’s by 2050.

• Indian culture dominates in South Asia and spreads as far as the Middle East, Southeast and East Asia.

• India has one of the largest militaries in the world which is also technologically advanced up to a reasonable standard.

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• India’s Grand Strategic world view rests on the following assumptions:

1. The conquest of India by foreign powers was due to superior technology and internal divisions.

2. Indian civilization is inherently secular and insular and has not threatened adjacent regions.

3. India’s economy was crippled by imperial economic practices.

4. The Indian civilization can shape the international system by preventing aggressive state behaviour and supporting development.

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• The Grand Strategy of the Republic of India during the Cold War consisted of the following elements:

1. Reliance on the soft power of moral persuasion

2. Supporting the struggle for decolonization

3. The pursuit of insular economic policies

4. Playing a leadership role in multilateral institutions such as the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the United Nations.

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• Since India started liberalizing its economy and opening-up more to the outside world in the early 1990s its Nehruvian Grand Strategy has shown signs of moving in a liberal internationalist direction.

• The two drivers of this change are as follows:

1. Increased participation in the global economy

2. A more outward looking generation of leaders

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• The evolution of Indian Grand Strategy is also influenced by the following two factors:

1. China

2. Pakistan

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China

• India fought a war with China over their Himalayan border in 1962.

• As a result more than 90,000 square kilometres of territory in the Himalayas are in dispute between the two countries.

• The border dispute is the main obstacle to the normalization of relations between India and China.

• Because of the often tense relationship India considers China’s nuclear forces to be a significant threat.

• India is also suspicious of China’s close relationship with India’s arch rival Pakistan.

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• In recent years tension between India and China have been heightened due to the following reasons:

1. Chinese refusal to grant visas to Indian officials coming from the disputed territory of Kashmir.

2. Chinese insistence that Indians born in Arunachal Pradesh do not need visas to travel to China because they were born in Chinese territory.

3. Chinese military’s forays into disputed areas in the Himalayan border.

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• China’s growing dependence on oil from the Middle East and Africa and trade in general with India and Africa will give China an ever greater interest in the Indian Ocean Region.

• However India views China’s ties with the former’s smaller neighbours in South Asia as a geopolitical ‘encirclement’.

• One of the underlying reasons for this tendency is India’s troubled relations with most of its neighbours in South Asia.

• One of India’s strategic objectives is to minimize the military links between its smaller South Asian neighbours and China.

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Pakistan

• The main obstacle in the India-Pakistan relationship is the status of the Himalayan territory of Kashmir which is disputed by the two countries.

• The relationship between the two countries have been plagued by crises such as the terrorist attacks on Mumbai instigated by Pakistan in 2008.

• The Indian strategy here is to circumscribe Pakistan’s options without raising the risk of a major conventional or nuclear war to an unacceptable level.

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The Grand Strategy of China

• China’s Grand Strategy can be examined in terms of the following issue-areas:

1. Relations with Major Powers

2. Military Modernization

3. International Regimes

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Relations with Major Powers

• The powers that will be considered in this section are:

1. The United States2. Russia3. The European Powers: Britain and France4. The East Asian Powers: Japan and South Korea

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The United States

• The Chinese strategy towards the US consists of two elements:

1. Cooptation2. Prevention

• Cooptation consists of gaining US support for the growth of Chinese power.

• Prevention consists of minimizing US opposition to growth of Chinese power.

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• Cooptation aims to use China’s large market to obtain and maintain the support of the US business community for a strong US-China relationship.

• Such a relationship would inevitably involve a measure of US acceptance of the growth of Chinese power.

• Prevention aims to minimize US support to neighbors such as the Republic of China on Taiwan and Japan which have the potential to develop adversarial relations with China.

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Russia

• After the collapse of the Soviet Union Russian defence industries started scrambling for customers.

• In the meantime China’s high growth rates gave the Chinese government vast financial resources which could be used to purchase weapon systems.

• For example, China has purchased Soveremenny destroyers from Russia.

• China’s key strategic objective with Russia is the purchase of advanced weaponry.

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The European Powers: Britain and France

• China’s strategic objective in developing relations with Britain and France is ‘diversification’.

• By ‘diversification’ is meant the avoidance of too much dependence on one or two countries.

• Thus relations with Britain and France serve the purpose of giving China more options in its international relations.

• China also seeks to use the granting of access to its large market to prevent these countries from supporting Taiwan.

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The East Asian Powers: Japan and South Korea

• China’s objective with Japan and South Korea is to stimulate trade and attract investment.

• The strategy is to secure resources from these countries while giving these countries a stake in China’s continued growth.

• China also seeks to prevent these countries from recognizing Taiwan.

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Military Modernization

• The objectives of China’s military modernization are the following:

1. Securing Chinese sovereignty and territory from threats and attacks.

2. Acquiring the ability to counter or neutralize a range of potential security threats along China’s periphery.

3. Acquiring the ability to use military power as an instrument of diplomacy.

4. Developing power projection capabilities.

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• China’s military modernization depends to a significant extent on the development of indigenous scientific and technological capabilities.

• The availability of resources for such development depends in turn on China maintaining high levels of economic growth.

• Thus China’s military modernization is ultimately dependent on the achievement of high levels of economic growth.

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International Regimes

• International regimes are basically international regulatory frameworks .

• Examples of international regimes are the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).

• China adopts an ‘instrumental’ attitude towards international regimes.

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• China’s instrumental attitude entails that it possesses neither an intrinsic commitment nor an intrinsic antipathy towards international regimes.

• It approaches these international regulatory frameworks based on pragmatic calculation of the benefits and costs of participation and non-participation.

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• China’s Grand Strategy can be summarized as follows:1. Non-ideological, highly pragmatic, linked to market-led

economic growth and the maintenance of amicable international political relations with all states including the major powers.

2. A general restraint in the use of force combined with efforts to modernize the Chinese military at a relatively modest pace.

3. An expanded involvement in regional and global inter-state politics and multilateral fora aimed at realizing asymmetric gains.

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The Strategic Objectives of Sri Lanka

• Sri Lanka’s contemporary strategic objectives are encapsulated in the concept of a ‘dynamic global hub’ put forward by Mahinda Chinthana II.

• This concept consists of the following elements:1. Naval Hub2. Aviation Hub3. Commercial Hub4. Energy Hub5. Knowledge Hub

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Naval Hub

• In the Indian Ocean Sri Lanka is located at the crossroads of the sea lanes connecting the East with the West.

• During the era of King Parakramabahu the Great Sri Lanka had one of the best navies in the region.

• Thus through geography and history we have inherited a strong naval and maritime tradition.

• By Building on these strengths Sri Lanka is attempting to become a naval centre in the Indian Ocean in the next ten years.

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• The Indian Ocean’s main sea lane passes just south of Sri Lanka.

• Around 70,000-80,000 vessels annually and 200 vessels daily sail through this sea lane.

• By providing services such as ship repair and fuel replenishment Sri Lanka can attract may of these ships to Sri Lankan ports.

• These activities will create a large number of employment opportunities.

• The Hambantota and South Colombo Port Development projects have been key initiatives in this regard.

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Aviation Hub

• During the Second World War Britain chose Sri Lanka as the aviation headquarters of Southeast Asia.

• This fact highlights Sri Lanka’s strategic location in the region’s air routes.

• The Aviation Hub initiative is attempting to emulate the success of regional centres such as Dubai and Singapore.

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• The modernization of the Bandaranaike International Airport at Katunayake and the construction of the new international airport at Mattala are the key projects in this regard.

• The Aviation Hub initiative is also expected to facilitate the development of the aviation industry, aviation engineering and the assembly, maintenance and repair of aircraft.

• It is also expected to generate a significant number of employment opportunities.

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Commercial Hub

• This initiative is based on the development of physical infrastructure and human resources.

• It is expected to improve the stock market and the investment climate in the country.

• It aims to transform Sri Lanka into a centre for commercial services and banking.

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Energy Hub

• Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea (UNCLOS) Sri Lanka can claim a large area of the continental shelf that lies beneath the sea for resource exploitation purposes.

• These areas are thought to contain substantial resources of oil, gas and mineral sands which can be used to generate nuclear power.

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• This initiative also involves the construction of new oil refineries at Hambantota and Sapugaskanda.

• Locally produced oil is expected to fuel transport and electricity generation.

• The growth of the energy industry envisioned by this initiative will generate employment opportunities and increase our national income.

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Knowledge Hub

• In ancient times Sri Lanka’s Buddhist monasteries were seats learning that spread the teachings of Buddha to the rest of Asia.

• For example, the Chinese monk Fa Xian spent several years in the ancient monasteries of Sri Lanka and took much Buddhist learning back to China.

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• However in the past few decades there has been a ‘brain drain’ from Sri Lanka with many of our most talented people going abroad for employment.

• Moreover also in the same period an ineffective and insufficient education system gave rise to youth unemployment and unrest.

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• The Knowledge Hub initiative is an attempt to attract some of our most talented people who are working overseas back to Sri Lanka by providing high quality facilities.

• It also attempts to reform the education system so that it can cater better to the available employment opportunities.

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• It also seeks to put in place training programmes which can cater to an international market.

• A good example of such a programme is the one conducted by Rakna Araksha Pvt Ltd and the Sri Lanka Coast Guard for private armed guards onboard ships which is attempting attract interest from across the region.

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Analysis

• Sri Lanka is of strategic importance for the US, India and China.

• For the US, given its status as the guarantor of freedom of navigation globally, Sri Lanka is important because of its geographic location in the Indian Ocean astride the major sea lane.

• For India, Sri Lanka is strategically important in the defence of its southwestern and southeastern coastlines.

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• For China, Sri Lanka is strategically important for two reasons:

1. Most of China’s energy shipments from the Middle East and Africa are transported through the sea lane running just south of Sri Lanka.

2. Sri Lanka provides a convenient midway point for facilitating China’s growing trade with Africa which amounted to US$ 200 billion in 2012.

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• The fundamental strategic challenge for Sri Lanka has to do with the potential tendency of each of these three major powers to subordinate Sri Lanka to their grand strategic goals and interaction with each other and to use it as a pawn in their power plays.

• An example of this tendency is the negative publicity given to the Hambantota Port Development Project by the ‘string of pearls’ discourse which arose from the mistrust that the US and India have of China.

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• The fundamental strategic opportunity for Sri Lanka is that of turning its strategic importance to each of these three major powers to its own advantage.

• It must do this in a way that best serves its national interests and security without compromising its integrity and foreign policy autonomy.

• A good example here is Defence Secretary Mr. Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s efforts at the Galle Dialogue to convince the major powers to assist Sri Lanka in obtaining larger naval platforms to facilitate our strategic objective of becoming a Naval Hub.

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Conclusion

• Through Grand Strategy nations attempt to pursue their national objectives in the international arena.

• US Grand Strategy is essentially an effort to retain its primacy in the international system while conceding space to alternative power centres such as Europe, China and India.

• The Indian Grand Strategy is focused on dealing with the threat it perceives as coming from China and Pakistan while retaining its dominant position in South Asia.

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• China’s Grand Strategy consists of improving its position on the regional and global stages while minimizing the opposition from the globally dominant power, the US, and regional rivals such as India.

• Sri Lanka must have a sound understanding of, and a response to, the Grand Strategies of each of these three major powers in charting its own strategic path.

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DISCUSSION

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