Compromises of Representation: The Politics of …paperroom.ipsa.org/papers/paper_14418.pdfAssistant Professor of Political Science University of the Philippines Cebu Social Sciences,

Compromises of Representation:

The Politics of Diversity in Philippine Bureaucracy

Paper to be presented at the 22nd IPSA World Congress Madrid 2012 “Reordering Power, Shifting Boundaries” 8-12 July 2012

Panel: RC27 Structure and Organization of Government, “The Politics of Representative Bureaucracy” 9 July 2012

Weena Gera

Assistant Professor of Political Science

University of the Philippines Cebu

Social Sciences, Rm. 147 Arts and Sciences Bldg.

Tel/Fax: +63 32 233 4708

[email protected]

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Abstract

As an ethnically diverse country, the Philippines has taken various strategies to institutionalize inclusive representation in national bureaucratic governance. This paper explores the challenges and consequences of the country’s diversity management framework designed to create a more representative bureaucracy vis-à-vis the Philippines’ inherent political and societal dynamics. Proponents of diversity in civil service argue that representation lends legitimacy to the government by creating a more responsive bureaucracy that accommodates the voices of the diverse communities it serves. The main thrust of this paper is to look beyond the extent and the factors to which the diversity strategies in the Philippines help - or fail to - enhance bureaucratic efficiency and performance, toward an analysis of their political motivations and implications. It examines such strategies along the politics of ethnic identity, prevailing politico-ethnic conflicts, and patrimonial and patronage politics along with issues of proportionality, data constraints and merit principles. At its core, the paper demonstrates that in a societal context where underrepresented ethnic and indigenous groups are generally in position of dependency and vulnerability and caught in a struggle for their identity and self-determination, strategies to promoting diversity and representation in bureaucratic service prove to be challenging at best, if not mired and compromised in deeply embedded political structures.

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1.0 Introduction

Prevailing arguments for promoting inclusive representation in the bureaucracy stem from the framework that broader representation, be it ethnic, racial, cultural, sectoral, or gender lines, will result in more sensitive, responsive and effective governance (see Kingsley 1944; Levitan 1946; Krislov 1974; Thomas 1990; Meier et al. 1999, among others). Fundamental in the paradigm of representative bureaucracy is the assertion that diversity1 and representation in civil service structure lend legitimacy to the government by creating a more responsive bureaucracy that accommodates the voices and needs of the diverse communities it serves. Particularly in the modern context of global migration and resettlements, demographic changes and increasing diversity of ethnic and racial lines, along with the growing recognition of aboriginal rights, compel many developed societies to pursue series of affirmative actions and policy programs toward broader ethnic representation in public organizations. Thus, parallel with the growing assertions on the imperatives of inclusive participation in governance, is also a growing analysis in literature on how ethnic representation, or the lack thereof, affects organizational performance and its implications.

Yet, what become critical to examine are cases in developing societies wherein ethnic and indigenous identities remain to be contended, on one hand mired in anthropological and historical debates, and on the other entrenched in political and sovereignty battles. It has been asserted that the colonial experience of ‘third world’ societies in Asia, Africa and Latin America, “introduced a politics of difference that multiplied boundaries within and without, over and beyond the “us”/”them” binary: the subjugated communities were polarized internally and against one another” (San Juan 2008: 1). Characteristically, in many developing countries is a continuing struggle for identity and self-determination particularly among ethnic minorities and indigenous groups who have been differentiated by historical marginalization and discrimination. Such differentiation becomes muddled in the midst of their own cultural evolution within the context of changing social conditions.

Amid this backdrop, it becomes particularly crucial to examine how articulations of diversity and ethnic representation in bureaucracy shape or are shaped by the politics of identity and the struggle for political autonomy, along with ethnic tensions and patronage vis-à-vis authority over material resources at stake. With the enduring relevance of participatory and inclusive governance, it is important to understand whether ethnic representation in bureaucracy in a developing country context immediately fits in the framework. In attempts to institutionalize bureaucratic diversity in the Philippines, it is essential to know what are the key institutional and structural constraints to ethnic representation in a developing country setting. Yet most critical is the need to examine the consequences in terms of who actually benefits from representation and its social and political implications, as well as the motivations behind such policies. 1 Diversity is defined as any collective mixture of people set apart by similarities and differences. The focus is on acceptance and respect of the uniqueness of all groups, and the primary need, from a public management point of view, is for governance systems to embrace differences (Gonzalez 2005: 2)

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As an ethnically diverse country, the Philippines has taken strategies to institutionalize ethnic and indigenous representation in both political and bureaucratic governance across levels. The country’s diversity management framework, however, is noted to have been beset with limitations and challenges, if at all implemented, that in effect, could not effectively contribute to improving bureaucratic governance nor meaningfully empower marginalized and discriminated ethnic and indigenous groups. This paper brings an argument that in a societal context where underrepresented ethnic and indigenous groups are caught in a strife for identity and political autonomy/self-determination, representation policies become superficial tokens to redress political uncertainties. Tentative and ad hoc strategies to promoting diversity and representation in bureaucratic service could only be compromised by prevailing politico-ethnic tensions as well as by inherent structures of patronage and patrimonial politics. Ultimately, such diversity strategies could only heighten the disenfranchisement and vulnerability of ethnic minority and indigenous groups.

No institutional formula of bureaucratic representation could be meaningful unless the country’s diversity strategy is embedded in a comprehensive social and economic policy framework that directly addresses the structural roots of violence: poverty and marginalization of ethnic minorities and indigenous groups. What the Philippine case would demonstrate is that provisional attempts to bureaucratic representation become arbitrary acts of the government to assuage and pacify competing political factions and rival forces among minority ethnic communities of their share in national polity. These often end up perpetuating historical differentiation and mainstream resistance, fuelling ethnic tensions and ultimately holding indigenous and minority communities captive. At a stage where vulnerabilities and deprivation of underrepresented ethnic groups remain critical, particularly in the midst of continuing clamor for self-determination and self-governance, bureaucratic representation proves to be a delicate compromise that if divorced from a more wide-ranging diversity framework, could potentially exacerbate social and political instability.

2.0 The Ideals of Diverse and Representative Bureaucracy

Donald Kingsley (1944) first articulated the concept of representative bureaucracy to explain the effective implementation by the British civil service of the policies of the political party in power during World War II. He argued that the common middle-class economic background of the civil servants and the political party members led to shared values and leanings and that such similarities made it more likely that those working in bureaucracy would naturally implement the ideas of those elected officials. In 1946, David Levitan argued that the only way to ensure bureaucratic accountability was to make bureaucrats representative of the people they served since they would reflect the wants and needs of the people by proxy. Similar assertions by Krislov (1974) and Meier at al. (1999) argued that bureaucrats were more likely to fight for the rights and needs of those from similar backgrounds and use their discretion to make decisions that reflect their own values and norms (in Pitts 2005).

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The good governance argument for diversity and representation in bureaucracy is based on the notion that through participation of people from different backgrounds, culture, ethnicities, race or gender, broad potentials and creativity are tapped contributing to efficient and responsive public services. Promoting diverse representation in bureaucratic workforce could gain from the unique capacities and competencies that various groups bring to the work environment, in the process adding in a broader array of insights and knowledge into policy making, expanding the range of alternatives for consideration toward a more productive and responsive public service (Jemiai 2001).

Diversity and representation are seen as critical variables in a holistic development and policy process compatible with good governance principles of transparency, accountability and democratization (Gonzalez 2005). Recognizing and respecting peoples’ differences and similarities help government understand specific and unique as well as common needs. This pluralist system is also viewed to facilitate sensitivity and voice in public service delivery, particularly in favor of more marginalized and discriminated sectors of society. This ultimately redefines the nature of public service that is made more accessible to communities and facilitates mutual tolerance and political stability.

2.1 The Case of Ethnic Representation in Bureaucracy

Ethnic representation in bureaucracy is embedded in the broad paradigm of cultural diversity: it increases the available range of options for citizens across ethnic backgrounds; encourages a healthy exchange of ideas; respect and co-existence of different ways of life are upheld where there is no ascendancy of one culture over the other, engendering a climate of tolerance in which different ethnicities can have a mutually beneficial dialogue and collaboration on common nations goals (Jemiai 2001). It operates in the framework of mainstreaming diversity, which entails restructuring policy provisions and practices in government agencies in order to facilitate access to public services as well as decision-making for ethnic minorities (Gonzalez 2005). According to Rovillos and Morales (2002), mainstreaming is not assimilation or integration but respect for cultural diversity. It is also about changing the mindsets that promotes trust and acceptance of indigenous peoples as equal partners in the development process. Lastly they argued that mainstreaming means integrating viable indigenous sociopolitical structures into state structures and processes. There are a number of benefits perceived with ethnic minority and indigenous representation in the bureaucracy and policy-making. Indigenous peoples are noted to have important sources of ecological information, and indigenous knowledge and practical tools in the utilization and sustainable management of resources within their land. Revitalizing this knowledge helps to improve food security, raise household incomes and promote productivity (UNESCO 2010; Orticio 2006; World Bank 2004; IFAD 2003). Their indigenous ways are also minefield for those seeking models of alternative social structures and institutions in indigenous cultures (Barsh 1999). According to the UN Secretariat (2001) a really representative bureaucracy lends legitimacy to the government by broadening its own base, and intensifying the

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involvement of multiple stakeholders in delivering services that should reflect understanding of the cultures of the diverse communities served. It takes into account the need to change organization structures to facilitate a pluralist system that includes within it stakeholders from diverse experiences, cultures and sectors and the potential contributions they have to offer (Gonzalez 2005). In order for underrepresented groups to gain their share of the benefits and opportunities related to a civil service career, the bureaucracy must spearhead policy moves to encourage diverse recruitment. A more proactive approach would involve affirmative action - a quota - and compliance-driven method with statistical goals for the recruitment, training and promotion on the basis of membership in disadvantaged and underrepresented groups (Bruce 2002; Gonzalez 2005). Recruiting broadly from minority groups, in proportion to their numbers in the population is expected to facilitate fair treatment of groups, especially those that have been historically deprived. Amid cultural exclusion, it has been argued that affirmative action or preferential accommodation of minority groups becomes necessary. UNDP’s Human Development Report (2004) would note that to depend only on general policies to remove discrimination would create conditions for civil strife over time. These changes if adopted widely in the bureaucracy, can theoretically lead to improving the status of indigenous peoples and ethnic minorities, as well as the performance in governance and public administration (Gonzalez 2005). 2.2 It’s Not That Simple: Caveats of Ethnic Representation

The pursuit to ethnic representation is to ensure that public policies and decisions are based on objective criteria, and not on unlawful discrimination, prejudice or unfair assumptions. Essentially, promoting diversity in public management means making sure public services are provided in equal and non-discriminatory ways. However, amid the ideals of ethnic representation and diversity in bureaucracy, there are caveats that have been noted in terms of potential compromises in standards of performance and competence with preferential accommodation and affirmative action that are inconsistent with the principles of equality and non-discrimination. Preferential accommodation and recruitment based on proportionality, ethnic quotas and underrepresentation could potentially compromise merit principles. It might likewise create resistance from the mainstream society who believe that “proportionality” has unjustly deprived them of opportunities, which they think should be earned through individual merit. The UN Secretariat (2001) would note that while disproportionate representation is not in itself objectionable, it becomes contentious when procedures and practices that guarantee representation to some while denying it to most are institutionalized.

Moreover, taking into consideration realities of competition for political power and authority over decisions in governance systems, “ethnicization,” a situation where all initiatives and decisions are read mainly in ethnic terms could occur (Gonzalez 2005: 3). Schopflin (2001) would argue that in such situations, the public good character of diversity management is lost since policy decisions do not transcend ethnicities. It legitimizes institutional arrangements, which promote ethnicity-based majority rule in multiethnic contexts potentially dividing people along ethnic lines and create opportunities for exclusion (Dimitrijeviç and Kovacs 2004). Sometimes, marking out

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ethnic identities might, unintendedly, highlight differences between ethnic groups in the workplace, polarize them, produce conflict, and generate a worse situation than the one it sets out to do away with (Jemiai 2001).

Indigenous organizations may claim the right to represent indigenous peoples at the national level, but this may or may not be compatible with existing political structures (Stavenhagen 2005). It has been underscored that if managed unconstructively, diversity can quickly lead to instability within states, triggering civil conflict that takes development the wrong way (Human Development Report 2004). What is argued is that if diversity strategy is not carefully calibrated along the country’s political context (i.e. of inter-ethnic and politico-ethnic tensions and rivalries, corporate maneuvers and patronage), it will increase the social costs of discrimination, segregation and marginalization of certain groups. 2.3 Academic Contentions on the Concepts of Ethnic ‘Minority’ and Indigeneity Integral to discussions on ethnic representation in bureaucracy are the prevailing academic contentions over conceptual definitions. Doucet (2007) argues that those involved in the debate fall into two main categories: 1) those that employ the terms along recognizable collectivities of indigeneity or aboriginality, and viewing colonialism as starting point for recognition of an ethnic identity and; 2) those that use the terms from a social constructionist or ethno-genesis approach. Taking the former view, Orticio (2006) argued that indigeneity is anchored on factors such as historical continuity and collective identity. Historical continuity is characterized by prior occupation of land, having been in the land before the entry of a colonizing population. Collective identity is the awareness of the community’s difference, basing on shared experiences. The thread that weaves these elements together is the indigenous people’s attachment to their land and resources. On the other hand, many anthropologists and historians would argue along concepts such as ‘invented traditions’ or ‘imagined communities’ to grapple with the shifting nature of identity and history. In his hotly debated paper ‘The Return of the Natives,’ Adam Kuper (2003: 389) points out that the rhetoric of indigenous movements rests on widely accepted yet questionable premise. He suggests that the “ghostly category of ‘primitive peoples’ has been restored to life under a new label” – namely indigenous. He goes on to refer to some rhetorical threads in the indigenous movement as dogma. Moreover, while it is prevalent in literature to associate indigenous identity as a form of ethnic minority (Hanson 1997; Plaice 1989; Fiske 2006), Hirtz (2003) would however contend that the choice to evoke indigeneity is an important political decision. Many indigenous peoples do not see themselves as ‘minorities,’ but as ‘peoples’ because ‘peoples’ purportedly have a certain right to political determination, whereas ‘minorities’ might only have rights for self-expression and protection. There is a refusal to define indigeneity in the 2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples2 – because, “historically indigenous peoples have suffered from 2 http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf

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definitions imposed by others” (Daes 1995: 3). Self-definition and self-ascription have thus been adopted in conceptualizing who is indigenous, both in development and in academic discussions. Self-definition however has led to disputes over authenticity, especially when scarce resources are at stake. Alfred and Corntassel (2005) argue that the debate over the nature of identity becomes a perpetuation of colonialism. They assert that it is important to identify all of the old and new faces of colonialism that continue to distort and dehumanize indigenous peoples – often pitting us against each other in battles over authentic histories. It can thus be argued that a concrete definition of indigeneity is central to the process of diversity management and bureaucratic representation without which could trap indigenous peoples in the web of identity politics.

For purposes of this paper, it refers mainly to the Asian Development Bank’s working definition: indigenous peoples (and ethnic minorities) are those with social, cultural (and historical) identity (in a collective sense) distinct from the dominant or mainstream society making them vulnerable to being disadvantaged in the process of development (ADB 1998). They generally endure disproportionately in terms of denial of basic human rights, lack of basic service delivery and face systemic discrimination, inequality and exclusion particularly in the development and policy processes. They are the people with the least education and the least meaningful political and bureaucratic representation, and are rarely included in national decision-making (Tauli-Corpuz et al. 2006; Rovillos and Morales 2002; Orticio 2006; Wessendorf 2011). Indigenous peoples in particular are kinship-based who have attempted to maintain local self-sufficiency and resist assimilation. Yet, they have generally been regarded as backward and forced to assimilate in the process of nation-building (Barsh 1999; Gonzalez 2005).

3.0 Strategies toward Ethnic Representation in Philippine Bureaucracy

The Philippine islands are inhabited by a number of different ethno-linguistic groups. The dominant ethnic groups many of whom have converted to Christianity and adopted many foreign cultural elements include the Tagalog, Cebuano, Ilocano, Ilonggo, Pangasinense, Kapampangan, Bicolano and Waray. Outside these groups are ethnic minorities and indigenous peoples scattered across the archipelago who have distinct cultural characteristics as differentiated from historical marginalization. There is a wide range of about 90-140 indigenous ethno-linguistic groups approximated in the country. The northern mountain ranges of the Cordillera are the ancestral homeland of the Igorots. Lowland indigenous groups, principally the Aetas, inhabit the other regions in Luzon. Mangyan groups thrive in the island of Mindoro. In Mindanao, there are at least 13 Islamized ethno-linguistic groups and 18 other indigenous groups collectively called Lumads (highlander/born of the earth).3 Nationwide indigenous groups can be found in more than 50 of the country’s 80 provinces. Based on the National Commission of

3 The Lumad, a generic term for the non-Muslim and non-Christian indigenous peoples or cultural communities in Mindanao, include the Ata, Bagobo, Mamanua, Mandaya, Kamayo, Mangguwangan, Manobo, Mansaka, Matigsalog, Subanun, Tagakaolo, Tala-andig, T’boli, Tiruray and Ubo. Many of these groups are Christianized or partly Christianized today, and some are partly Islamicized. Moreover, there is some overlap, such as among the highland Christianized Maranao. These ethnic groups make up approximately five percent of the total Mindanao population, according to the 1990 census (Russell et al. 2006: 9)

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Indigenous People’s (NCIP) population data (2010), 52 percent of the indigenous peoples are found in Mindanao, about 45 percent resides in Luzon, while three percent are settled sparsely among the Visayas islands.4

There has been no accurate comprehensive count of Philippine indigenous peoples since 1915. In most government records, data collection and disaggregation on indigenous peoples and ethnic minorities are inadequate. Data from the NCIP as of 2010 would record about 8 million from 90 ethno-linguistic groups.5 In the National Statistical Coordination Board - accredited 2005 pilot study on the Diagnosis of Indigenous Peoples’ Rights to Ancestral Domains in the Philippines, the Office of Northern Cultural Communities (ONCC) & Office of Southern Cultural Communities (OSCC) would note that there was a higher estimate of around 12 million indigenous peoples found in various parts of the country.6 Yet, based on a recent study of the International Board Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (2011), there is an estimate of 9.4 million indigenous peoples or about 10 percent of the country’s current projected population of 94.01 million (as of 2010). Meanwhile, the 2010 Human Rights Report of the US Department of State noted there are 14 million indigenous peoples similar with that noted by the Institute for Autonomy and Governance as of 2012.7

The ethnic minorities and indigenous peoples in the country are known to live generally in geographically remote areas or rural communities with lack of access to basic social services and few opportunities for mainstream economic activities and employment. They are the poorest groups in the Philippines. Studies have shown high levels of infant mortality, lower than average nutritional levels. Indigenous people receive fewer health care inputs and have worse health outcomes than the average population. difficulty of access to social welfare institutions, and lower than average delivery of the services provided by government institutions (Stavenhagen 2005). They have lower education attainments and have serious difficulty in participating in the policy process than others. While there is no comprehensive study that captures the specific conditions of indigenous peoples across the archipelago, one study on Data Disaggregation Pilot Project in Nueva Vizcaya Province in northern Philippines in mid- 2005-2006 generated data that approximates the indigenous peoples’ level of satisfaction towards basic services provided by the government. It also measured political participation and the degree of cultural disintegration among indigenous peoples (Tauli-Corpuz et al. 2006). These people have continuously lived as communities in communally-bound and defined territories, which they have occupied long before European colonization (Stavenhagen 2003). Because of the indigenous peoples’ stewardship of their natural environment, this has become the base of their identity as people and their distinct collectivity. Ironically, such attachment to their land with commercially valuable natural resources such as 4 http://www.ncip.gov.ph/AgencyProfile/OurClient/IPPopulation.aspx

5 ibid

6 http://www.nscb.gov.ph/metagora/default.asp

7 Manila Bulletin, 7 May 2012 at http://ph.news.yahoo.com/empowering-indigenous-peoples-mindanao-091345625.html

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minerals, forests and rivers, make them continuously vulnerable to development aggression and intimidation (Orticio 2006). They suffer disproportionately from armed conflict as their lands were often the sites of armed encounters, resulting to displacement, with many indigenous peoples recruited by various parties to the fighting (Human Rights Reports 2011; Watanabi 2007). Until recently, they have had little security of tenure over their ancestral land. This is particularly true among peoples in war-torn Mindanao. Underlying the basis of the conflict in Mindanao are struggles among the Moro and indigenous non-Muslim peoples for greater socio-economic development, equal recognition and support for their cultural and religious identities, and social justice (Russell et al. 2006: 12). The historical past of the Mindanao problem is the systematic minoritization and marginalization of the Moros and Lumad in their own ancestral homeland (Santos 2001: 44; Russell et al. 2006; Lingga 2010).

There are multiple causes of the conflict in Mindanao… poverty, inequality, and environmental destruction; political corruption; negative images held by Christians, Moro, and Lumad peoples of each other; failure of the national government to integrate Moro peoples into a national Filipino identity; the economic exploitation of Mindanao’s resources and the migration of Filipinos from the north that led to a loss of ancestral lands; and the Moro struggle for self-rule. As he noted, all of these factors led to the reality today that many Moro and Lumad Filipinos are economically and politically marginalized; lack national recognition and respect for their unique cultural and religious identities; and feel a sense of insecurity, hopelessness, and resentment toward the national government…. The exploitation of Mindanao’s rich environment was easily captured first by American interests, later by more modernized, business-inclined capitalist Christian Filipinos, and also by multi-national corporations. Logging concessions, pasture land conversion, land titling through complex legal channels that Moro and Lumad Filipinos scarcely comprehended, and now mining concessions have led to an enormous loss of their homeland and resources upon which to develop their communities. Multi-national companies opened up plantations and went into partnerships with Christian Filipinos to develop Mindanao’s resources, with little regard for the livelihood problems of the Moro and Lumad peoples and the growing resentment among many local inhabitants. (Russell et al. 2006: 13)

The Bangsa Moro8 struggle (which broke out in the late 1960s with the armed rebellion headed by the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) constitutes a core concern in the

8 Bangsa Moro ("the Moro People") is the generic name for the 13 ethno-linguistic Muslim tribes in the Philippines which constitute a quarter of the population in Mindanao in the Southern Philippines. They number from 5-6 million and are found in every major island of the country. They share a distinct culture, speak different dialects, are varied in their social formation but share a common belief in Islam. This is a uniting factor among the different groups. Of the 13 groups, there are three major groups on the bases of population and their leadership. These are the Maguindanaons (the people of the flooded plains), the Maranaos (people living around the lake) and the Tausugs (people of the current). These major groups have rallied the support of the Bangsa Moro in their struggle for self-determination. (Alim 1995) at http://www.seasite.niu.edu/Tagalog/Modules/Modules/MuslimMindanao/bangsamoro_struggle_for_self.htm

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Mindanao conflict. It is characterized by decades of rebellion and war between two Muslim armed movements (the MNLF and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front- MILF), and the largely Christian government of the Philippines over struggles for self-governance and self-determination. It can be argued that a combination of factors including feelings of being discriminated in the mostly Christian Philippines, as well as the assertion to hold control over tracks of resource-rich lands they claim as their ancestral domains, define the roots of Muslim separatist movements in the southern Philippines. Taking however into consideration the complex reality of Mindanao with its tri-people9 demography, the equality and unity of these diverse peoples are aspirations necessitated by their co-existence. Amid such considerations, the Philippine government took steps in legislation to find workable compromises on issues such as access and sovereignty over lands, territorial integrity, inclusion and national unity. As part of the bigger goal to grant political space and decentralized powers to territorially concentrated ethnic groups within a framework of political autonomy, the government expanded bureaucratic representation for ethnic minorities and indigenous groups to be more responsive to their needs. 3.1 The Civil Service

Based on its Constitutional mandate, the Philippine Civil Service Commission (CSC) generally ensures that all appointments in the career service shall be made according to merit and fitness, to be determined as far as practicable by competitive examinations.10 Recruitment is mainly based on minimum qualification standards of education, training, eligibility and experience. Each agency is required to establish an Agency Merit Promotion Plan, which includes provisions for a definite screening process, which may include tests of fitness, in accordance with standards and guidelines set by the Commission.11 The CSC promotes equal representation of men and women in the bureaucracy and equal employment opportunity at all levels of position in the agency, provided they meet the minimum requirements of the position to be filled.

The CSC also promotes a policy of non-discrimination in the selection of employees on account of gender, civil status, disability, religion, ethnicity, or political affiliation. Nonetheless, as an attempt to promote a broader ethnic representation in the bureaucracy, the Philippine government provides for a policy to “facilitate the integration of the members of cultural communities and accelerate the development of the areas occupied by them, the Commission shall give special civil service examinations to qualify them for appointment in the civil service.”12

9 The three peoples in Mindanao consist of the Moros with 13 mostly Islamized ethno-linguistic groups; the Lumad, with 18 ethno-linguistic groups of highlanders which were not Islamicized; and the mainstream Christians composed mainly of migrant settlers of the 20th century (Santos 2001: 44-45).

10 Section 26, 32, Chapter 5, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of Executive Order No. 292; CSC MC No. 3, s. 2001 on the Revised Policies on Merit Promotion Plan 11 Memorandum Circular 3, Series of 2001, Merit Selection and Promotion Plan

12 Sec 25 (Personnel Policies and Standards) Chapter 5, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of Executive Order No. 292, Administrative Code of 1987

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3.2 The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA)

After decades of struggle for legal redress concerning ancient land rights, Republic Act 8371, the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) was passed by the Philippine Congress in 1997. It marked the first time that a state in Asia explicitly recognized the rights of indigenous people to their ancestral domain, to self-determination/self-governance and to the free exercise of their culture (Human Development Report 2004). IPRA is modeled on the 2007 United Nations Declaration on Indigenous Peoples’ Rights. The law calls for respect for indigenous peoples’ cultural integrity, right to their lands and right to self-directed development of these lands. Apart from the Philippine Constitution, the IPRA now constitutes the principal framework in which indigenous rights must be considered. Section 6 of the law provides for mandatory representation in all policy-making bodies and in local legislative councils. It mandates that indigenous peoples representation shall be proportionate to their population, and shall have the same privileges as the regular members of the legislative bodies and/or policy-making bodies. Indigenous peoples representatives shall be qualified and chosen by their own communities in accordance with a process to be determined by them. In consultation with indigenous peoples, the NCIP in close coordination with the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG)13 come up with appropriate measures to ensure the full participation of indigenous peoples in matters affecting their development. 3.2.1 Natural Resource Management The legal basis for indigenous peoples rights to participate meaningfully in natural resource management has been established in international agreements including the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Convention 169 of the International Labor Organization, adopted in 1989, Agenda 21, the OAS Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, the UN Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and the UN Convention on Biological Diversity. These declarations, which the Philippines has ratified, explicitly recognize indigenous land rights, traditional resource management, equal rights to participate in public affairs, the need to protect indigenous lands from environmental threats, and the need for free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) before making decisions affecting the rights and interests of indigenous peoples (Downing et al. 2002). IPRA specifically requires that communities be informed and consulted before any mining concessions or other projects are started (Perrot-Maître and Ellsworth 2003).

13 On October 20, 2010, the Department of Interior and Local Government issued Memorandum Circular MC2010-119 entitled: “Mandatory Representation of Indigenous Cultural Communities or Indigenous Peoples in Policy-Making Bodies and Other Local Legislative Councils directing all Local Chief Executives to strictly observe the mandate of Republic Act No. 8371.

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3.2.2 The National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) The NCIP was created by IPRA to become the primary government agency responsible for promoting the rights and well being of the indigenous cultural communities and the indigenous peoples in the Philippines. NCIP’s governing body is composed of seven commissioners, each one of whom belongs to an indigenous cultural community chosen from the different ethnographic areas in the Philippines were indigenous peoples reside. The functions of NCIP include: review and assess the conditions of indigenous peoples, including existing laws and policies regarding their situation, and propose relevant laws and policies to address their role in national development; issue certificates of ancestral land and ancestral domain title; enter into contracts, agreements, or arrangements with government or private agencies or entities; coordinate development programs and projects for the advancement of the indigenous peoples and oversee the proper implementation of these initiatives; and issue certification (as a precondition to the grant of a permit, lease, grant) for the disposition, use, management, and appropriation of any part of the ancestral domain, provided there is consensus approval of the indigenous peoples concerned (Bennagen 2000). To ensure the delivery of basic services to indigenous peoples, NCIP is also tasked to coordinate closely with ongoing national initiatives on anti-poverty reduction (Rovillos and Morales 2002). NCIP was tasked by the government to come up with the Medium-Term Philippine Development Plan (MTPDP) for 2012-16 for the country’s indigenous peoples, later referred to as the Indigenous Peoples Master Plan (IPMAP) (Wessendorf 2011). 3.3 Political Autonomy

Two subnational units among ethnic minorities are given special status as regional governments. The Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, covering five Muslim-dominated provinces, the outcome of arduous negotiations between the central government and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), has substantial autonomy in key areas such as education, agriculture, social development, health, and industry. It has been granted explicit tax and expenditure powers beyond those of other local government units. This power-sharing arrangement has somewhat proven to be crucial in resolving tensions in Southern Philippines, which continues to be negotiated by Muslim secessionist movements led by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).14 Cordillera in Northern Luzon, another territorially compact grouping, also negotiated for self-government, but it had to settle for less autonomy as a result of two failed plebiscites (Gonzalez 2005: 15).

Embedded in provisions for political autonomy are expanded mandates for bureaucratic representation. Republic Act 905415 also known as the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (2001), the Muslims in Mindanao are granted autonomy and powers for regional governance to enact its own regional administrative code and 14 MNLF (secular-nationalist-modernist) and MILF (radical Islamic revivalist) are two Moro streams in the Muslim Mindanao struggle for self-determination.

15 It strengthened and expanded Republic Act No. 6734 (1989), entitled “An Act Providing for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).” http://www.congress.gov.ph/download/ra_11/RA09054.pdf

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regional local government code consistent with the Constitution. Section 5 of such legislation mandates for Representation in Central Government or National Government Departments, Offices: “As far as practicable, the autonomous region shall be represented in the departments, offices, commissions, agencies, and bureaus of the central government or national government that implement and enforce policies, programs and projects of the central government or national government in the region.” In the same way, the 1996 Final Peace Agreement16 also mandates the Philippine government to appoint Muslim representation in national line agencies (Wadi 2012).

4.0 The Politics of Diversity in Philippine Bureaucracy: Interweaving Institutional and Structural Constraints to Ethnic Representation, Motives and Compromises

With all the legal provisions, these however could not be effectively implemented due to interweaving institutional and structural constraints. In the case of the civil service, given the reality of lack of access to education by many impoverished ethnic minorities and indigenous peoples in the Philippines, it can be expected that they would remain marginalized in a merit-based system of civil service recruitment. In this case, it can be argued that securing access to basic services like healthcare and education must precede any move to reduce bureaucratic underrepresentation. Thus, the Philippine Civil Service policy could be well justified in not pursuing an affirmative action in recruitment so as not to compromise standards. Nonetheless, the Civil Service Commission is mandated to give special examinations to qualify members of cultural communities for appointment in the bureaucracy, yet there is apparently no organizational infrastructure and specific enabling rules that concretely define policy actions to facilitate this. Notably, this lack of implementing rules is not so much defined by an insistence to meritocracy rather by patronage politics on one hand and on the other, the politics of identity.

4.1 Appointive Bureaucracy and Patronage Politics

The character of Philippine civil service is still very much defined by a culture of political appointments. The Civil Service Commission can only administer and make referrals from among the eligible candidates but the appointing authority (i.e. the President and other delegated executive heads) still exercise wide latitude of discretion in the final selections based on trust and confidence that are not covered in the rules of nepotism. The Supreme Court has ruled that “Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications 16 The 1996 Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) officially ended the 24-year old struggle waged by the MNLF for independence and later for autonomy. The Agreement contains two major sections. Phase I is a three-year transitional period which commits the GRP to a massive programme of socio-economic development for the region encompassed in the Zone of Peace and Development (ZOPAD), through the Southern Philippine Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD). Phase II of the Agreement envisions the consolidation and expansion of the ARMM beyond the present four provinces, subject to “approval” by the resident population of the provinces affected through a popular vote. During this phase, the economy of the region would be opened up in a more intensified scale to local and foreign developers, investors, and entrepreneurs under the GRP’s neo-liberal policies. Opposition to the Agreement particularly from within the Bangsa Moro community was symbolised by the militant struggle by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). (Julkipli Wadi 2012). The MILF has waged a rebellion for more than three decades, originally for the establishment of an independent state in Mindanao. In recent years it has dropped its bid for full independence in favour of autonomous control over large areas in Mindanao.

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required by law.”17 This practice undermines the constitutional notion of “merit and fitness”, leading to demoralization and the destruction of initiative in the regular civil service. The extent of the exercise of discretion in the Philippines is substantial. Approximately 10,000 positions (including those at the highest 3rd level career posts as well as highly technical posts) are subject to presidential prerogative, including positions that are based in provinces and cities far removed from the center, and create a wide venue for politicians to intervene in the appointment process. The problem emanates from what is called the ‘residual powers of the President’, which provides that when there is no stipulation in law as to who the appointing authority is for a certain position, the power redounds to the President. The CSC has no power, whether to veto or to protect, when the subject is a ‘presidential appointee’ (Monsod 2008/2009: 14). The Philippine state has been known to be highly patrimonial– “predominated by oligarchic forces whose access to the state is the major avenue to private accumulation... [where] extra-bureaucratic forces overshadow… [and] extract privilege from a largely incoherent bureaucracy” (Hutchcroft 1998: 234). In the Philippines, power and partisan politics are noted to hold a disproportionate influence upon the workings of public administration. The bureaucracy is a captive institution: co-opted and generally subservient to the control and influence of political/power structures dominated by ruling elite factions predisposed to protect narrow private interests. The intergovernmental political system in the country can be characterized as dichotomized sections of patrimonial powers: marked by contradictions/ a tug-of-war between the oligarchies from central and local political structures, often bound in strategic compromise and shifting loyalties depending on what is expedient to their immediate interests (Gera 2007). In a culture of appointive bureaucracy and politicization of the civil service, availability of affirmative program of actions for ethnic representation may be contested as breeding ground for patronage (Human Development Report 2004). Particularly amid a condition of dependence and vulnerability among ethnic minorities and indigenous peoples who have been bestowed by law the authority of consent over the use of natural resources within their ancestral domain, they are ripe for maneuvers to building tribal and ethnic loyalties. Such political culture of nepotism, familial, and patronage-based recruitment creates informal barriers whereby access to jobs or resources is made genuinely representative. This could potentially increase tensions among different ethnic groups who will battle for such patronage. 4.2 Lack of Data and the Politics of Identity

The invisibility and negligibility of indigenous peoples and ethnic minorities in Philippine bureaucracy is perpetuated by the lack of accurate demographic data at the national level as previously mentioned. The need for systematic disaggregated data on 17 Luego vs. CSC and Tuozo, G.R. No. NO. L-69137 August 5, 1986

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indigenous peoples is crucial for the implementation of policies and programs for them. Workforce data and demographics would be useful to each agency. That would make it easy to identify underrepresentation in plantilla positions and to establish goals to reduce it. Affirmative action can only be successful if agencies utilize more measurable criteria to rate their progress in managing diversity (Reichenberg 2001). Proportional representation in civil service or in policy-making bodies thus becomes moot in the Philippines where there is no real disaggregation of population data based on appropriate identification of ethnic minorities and indigenous groups who are most underrepresented sectors in the bureaucracy. As of the latest count in 2009, of some 1,700 local government units (LGUs) in the country, only 21 have complied with the requirement of the IPRA for the mandatory representation of indigenous peoples in policy-making bodies and local legislative councils. Nelson Mallari, spokesperson of the Kalipunan ng mga Katutubong Mamamayan ng Pilipinas, noted that so far the participation of indigenous peoples in governance is limited to having appointed representatives in local legislative councils or boards.18 As of 2010, NCIP recorded only 104 indigenous leaders who assumed posts in local governance across levels. This limitation speaks volumes in terms of the lack of seriousness of the Philippine government to promote ethnic representation. There would always be excuses, one of which is the lack of data. The determination of the required population of particular indigenous peoples in a locality to qualify them to a seat in their respective legislative bodies still has to be settled, along with LGU excuses on budgetary constraints in compliance with mandated personnel services budgetary ceiling (Catamco 2011).

The United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (UNPFII) already identified data disaggregation as an urgent need. International organizations working with or addressing indigenous peoples’ concerns expressed that there is generally a lack of systematic collection and documentation of disaggregated data on indigenous peoples on various concerns (UN State of the World’s Indigenous Peoples 2009). As a response, the Philippine National Statistics Office (NSO) worked closely with the NCIP on operationalizing an ethnicity variable in the government’s 2010 Census on Population and Housing (referred to as 2010 CPH). However, the ethnicity variable count which seeks to narrow down the demographic data gap among indigenous people’s communities, would essentially limit itself to identifying the “mainstream” and dominant ethnic groups of Tagalog, Cebuano, Ilocano, Bisaya, Hiligaynon/Ilonggo, Bicol and Waray and not the ethnic minorities and indigenous groups.19 The use of the “mother tongue” variable by the Philippine government’s National Statistics Office (NSO) in its surveys instead of asking how a person identify his or her ethnicity also remain contended (Tauli-Corpuz et al. 2006). Clearly, such constraints in systematic data collection and disaggregation have significant bearing on how the marginalization of such groups could not be properly addressed.

18 In Newsbreak (2009) at http://rp1.abs-cbnnews.com/special-report/08/12/09/indigenous-filipinos-have-voice-only-21-lgus

19 http://www.scribd.com/doc/52403589/NSO-Philippines-in-Figures-2010

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The lack of data also stems from prevailing disputes over definitions of ethnic identities (i.e. of indigeniety). It becomes very tricky to identify target “cultural communities” in a multi-ethnic population where identities and criteria are disputed. Establishing identities becomes a political process particularly as control over resources is at stake. One of the central tasks of NCIP is to identify criteria to decide who is indigenous and who is not for the purpose of the IPRA.20 The NCIP has initially defined ethnicity as a household member’s identity by blood relations and not by choice, adoption or confirmation. The adoption of this definition is aimed to prevent the inclusion of “fake” members of indigenous communities, or those who claim to be indigenous for selfish gains. Many however found a problem with this definition, believing it to be disrespectful of the right to cultural integrity as many indigenous groups do not consider consanguinal relations as the only or even primary determinant of their ethnicity (Jefremovas and Perez 2011).

Yet, viewing ethnicity as “self-ascription” or “by ascription of others,” could also pose some problems particularly when people identify themselves differently from what others call them. In the study on data disaggregation in Nueva Vizcaya, an indigenous ethnic group call themselves the Bugkalot while others historically know them as the Ilongot (Tauli-Corpuz et al. 2006). Some individuals declared two ethnicities, following either their maternal or their paternal origin. In a situation where scarce natural resources are at stake, self-definition has led to disputes over authenticity, fuelling ethnic tensions – often pitting different ethnic groups and individuals against each other in battles over authentic identities and triggering mainstream resistance which further disenfranchise indigenous peoples. Without a concrete definition of indigeneity, indigenous peoples and ethnic minorities are trapped in a web of identity politics which compromises decisions on bureaucratic representation. 4.2.1 Diaspora of Ethnic Minorities Another limiting factor to proportional ethnic representation is the diaspora of ethnic and indigenous groups who may have been displaced from their traditional domains or who may have resettled outside their land. One of the important reasons for the displacement of the population from the affected areas is the ongoing conflict in Mindanao (Watanabi 2007). For these ethnic groups who are territorially dispersed, their political participation and representation in governance at different levels is much more circumscribed. The ethnic fragmentation across the country, compromising their collective identity, means significantly lower multi-ethnic representation in bureaucratic governance. 20 Under the IPRA, Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples - refer to a group of people or homogenous societies identified by self-ascription and ascription by others, who have continuously lived as organized community on communally bounded and defined territory, and who have, under claims of ownership since time immemorial, occupied, possessed and utilized such territories, sharing common bonds of language, customs, traditions and other distinctive cultural traits, or who have, through resistance to political, social and cultural inroads of colonization, non-indigenous religions and cultures, became historically differentiated from the majority of Filipinos. ICCs/IPs shall likewise include peoples who are regarded as indigenous on account of their descent from the populations which inhabited the country, at the time of conquest or colonization, or at the time of inroads of non-indigenous religions and cultures, or the establishment of present state boundaries, who retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions, but who may have been displaced from their traditional domains or who may have resettled outside their land.

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4.3 Compromises of Representation: The Politics of Diversity in Bureaucracy

Tracing the history of how the mandates for ethnic representation in bureaucracy were conceptualized, it becomes apparent that it is a mere dividend of the government’s framework of political autonomy in its negotiations with ethnic minority and indigenous groups in their clamor for self-determination. Within the government’s paradigm, bureaucratic representation is designed to manifest government support to the legitimate aspirations of indigenous and minority groups for self-governance without having to give up effective hold over resource-based decisions. This can be gleaned from the case of the Mindanao problem particularly the Bangsa Moro struggle and the continuing peace process. The ongoing call for separatism and autonomy in Southern Philippines has much to do with desires to re-acquire the status of a separate, independent state, or Bangsa Moro, wherein Muslim Filipinos would have greater access to and control over social services so that they could actually benefit from economic development in Mindanao. They also wanted to be able to protect and regain their ancestral lands that were being taken over by Christian Filipino and other multi-national corporations and establish an Islamic way of life.

In this context, the Philippine government pursues negotiations on finding workable compromises on issues such as access and use of land and decisions over the distribution of the income generated from the natural resources. The Philippine government however negotiates mainly within the paradigm of enhanced autonomy along with economic development and cultural strengthening as the canvass of peace process. The 1996 Final Peace Agreement with the MNLF is reflective of this. Within such paradigm, it expanded political space for Muslim representation in national politics and also mandates Muslim representation in many national agencies. This has been followed through via the 1997 IPRA and the creation of NCIP. Clearly, bureaucratic representation becomes a by-product of the government’s political bargain. What becomes evident however is that the central government still asserts itself in administering the affairs of indigenous communities. Rather than institutionalizing various units of representation in the national administrative system, an ad hoc indigenous affairs commission (i.e. NCIP) has been mandated to that effect. While the government can argue that such arrangements are designed for the protection of indigenous people themselves, Stavenhagen (2005) calls this a situation that could potentially be a form of discrimination. In the case of the IPRA, while it grants indigenous peoples rights and authority over the use of their ancestral domains, making them accountable under the law for managing the resources imposes a potentially costly burden. Likewise, indigenous communities are still subject to the oversight and decisions of local government and the DENR (Perrot-Maître and Ellsworth 2003). This sets the contradictory position of the Philippines regarding diversity. On one hand, the Philippine government has pioneered initiatives to integrate minorities peacefully and articulated their civic rights, yet the fact that other laws (such as the Mining Act of 1995) are still operative, means that there are other stakes that are being protected, practically defeating its diversity pronouncements.

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The government’s framework of political autonomy is well justified especially when viewed along national unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as the complex character of tri-people demography in Mindanao. However, a deeper look into the geopolitical interests in resource-rich areas would reveal collusion within the peace process that is very much defined by control over land. Given the multiple interests and international forces that hold stake over the Moro areas, there is reason to be cynical of government strategies in its peace negotiations, including frameworks of representation. What becomes apparent is that a policy of stratified pluralism was needed in order to disintegrate formerly cohesive groups, nourish antagonisms between and among their members, and prevent any sense of unified resistance (Wolff 2006). Such strategy of pluralism is pursued in the framework of political autonomy upon which bureaucratic representation is integrated. This is a case where the basic problem of structural discrimination is not only not being resolved, ethnic representation in bureaucracy marks a contradiction that is meant to deflect underlying political schemes that the government is treading. Notably, there have been no meaningful results in actual implementation save for the much-needed patronage and cooptation among local political dynasties and feudal lords in the Moro areas. What also happened was that the failure to gain real or meaningful autonomy led to divisions within the MNLF, where disagreements between leaders of different ethno-linguistic and political factions existed.21 Rival secessionist groups including the MILF staunchly opposed any form of autonomy and were seeking some type of self-determination within a potentially shared political arrangement (i.e. a sub-state) with the Philippine government that is still being negotiated.22 Some political analysts would also note of a possibility that a separate faction within the MILF might become another breakaway rebel group as a result of disagreement with a new peace settlement (Russell et al. 2006). There is also the risk that the mainstream movement for Muslim autonomy and self-governance is taken over by radical Islamic extremists. It can be argued that the stakes in ethnic conflicts in the Philippines very much reflects what Wolff (2006: 5-6) would describe of ethnic conflicts as a whole: “extremely diverse and complex, ranging from legitimate political, social, cultural, and economic grievances of disadvantaged ethnic groups to agendas of the state and small cartels of elites, to so-called national security interests.” It is not simply a Christian and Muslim conflict, nor strictly indigenous versus trans-migrants/mainstream society resistance. It is a case of politicization and political exploitation of ethnic aspirations for control over land and resources that are intimately embedded in the lives of indigenous minorities. Power and material gain, specifically control over land resources, prove to be the strongest

21 In 1977, Hashim Salamat, with a group of primarily Maguindanao-Iranun followers, established the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). Nur Misuari, who was Tausug-Samal, remained the leader of the government-recognized MNLF. A second, mostly Maranao faction, the MNLF-Reformist Group, similarly revolted against the leadership of Nur Misuari (Russell et al. 2006: 10) 22 As of this writing, MILF chairman Murad Ebrahim acknowledged as a "breakthrough" an agreement signed in April 2012 where both sides committed to create a new autonomous political region in the troubled south, at http://www.rappler.com/nation/6757-muslim-rebel-leader-optimistic-over-philippines-deal, 10 June 2012.

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motivations among those involved, with ethnicity simply as an expedient justification. But as far as the Philippine government is concerned, violence in Mindanao is not an option due to pressures from the international community. Expansion of political space including bureaucratic representation become strategic compromises to pacify rebel and secessionist forces while the peace process proceeds indefinitely. Wadi (2012) would describe it as “throwing crumbs to desperate people from time to time, giving thus much time for foreign interest and international players to strengthen their foothold and increase their influence in the area as they arbitrarily enter into contracts with the Philippine government on the remaining resources of the Moros particularly strategic ones like the oil in the Sulu Sea.”23 It is in this framework of tokenism and conditional political autonomy upon which the government operates, that the whole agenda of ethnic representation in bureaucracy is pursued. The lack of sincerity to this intention is evident in the sheer lack of implementation. If at all implemented, they remain ad hoc strategies that could not effectively contribute to improving bureaucratic governance nor meaningfully empower marginalized and discriminated ethnic and indigenous groups, if not becoming a co-opted mouthpiece of the government. After all, political forces opposed to representation often have sufficient political clout to create technical and legalistic hoops to derail implementation.

4.3.1 Consequences and Implications

The indigenous communities caught in political battles over resources are placed in even more vulnerable positions and heightened disenfranchisement. The free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) afforded through the IPRA to indigenous peoples as a mechanism of voice and representation could only subject them to violence and intimidation amid powerful economic and political interests. In many instances transnational and mining corporations unleash conflicts by acquiring resources for minerals, oil deposits, and even patentable forest products. The poverty and vulnerability of indigenous communities are exploited by manipulating the FPIC either through subtle means of bribery or promises of financial and material benefits, or coercion through military or paramilitary means (Longid 2012). Bribery and cooptation of tribal leaders caught in structures of patronage and patrimonial politics, fuelled ethnic tensions which resulted to disintegration among otherwise peacefully co-existing multi-ethnic societies. State-sanctioned use of military and armed groups to quell opposition to mining operations has been reported. The Task Force for Indigenous People's Rights (TFIPR) reported extrajudicial killings of indigenous peoples who lobbied against encroachment by mining companies on indigenous land.24 Records indicate that there have been 20 (extrajudicial) killings of indigenous peoples from January 2008 - July 2010, and 14 more killings after that period – making a total of 34 extrajudicial killings of indigenous peoples. The latest victim, an indigenous church leader in Bukidnon, Mindanao has been killed by paramilitary troops on March 2012.25 23 http://www.sunstar.com.ph/cagayan-de-oro/opinion/2012/04/19/saving-rare-moment-peace-conclusion-217199

24 http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/eap/154399.htm 25 http://www.unpo.org/article/14135

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5.0 Conclusion Ethnic representation in the bureaucracy represents a quandary to ethnic minorities and indigenous peoples in the Philippines: the previous lack of legislation reflects a neglect that perpetuated their marginalization and discrimination; however, what minimum practice of bureaucratic representation we have entrenches differentiation in ways that could not meet the needs and aspirations of indigenous minorities, rather heighten their disenfranchisement and vulnerability. What the Philippine case would demonstrate is that representation policies merely become superficial tokens to redress political uncertainties and assuage rival political forces among minority ethnic communities of their share in national polity. Such tentative and ad hoc attempts to bureaucratic representation within a provisional framework of political autonomy, end up perpetuating mainstream resistance amid the politics of identity and fuelling ethnic tensions and violence amid bribery, patronage and coercion. Ultimately indigenous and minority communities are held captive, and indigenous leaders used as bureaucratic pawns (i.e. NCIP) amid multi-faceted battles of competing and conniving political factions. The prevailing ethnic conflict in the Philippines requires a more complex and comprehensive approach, which must go beyond existing ad hoc mechanisms for managing multiethnic concerns. Along the arguments of Stavenhagen (2005)─ there is a need for finding constructive arrangements between the legitimate concerns of the state regarding territorial integrity and national unity, and the equally legitimate concerns of indigenous peoples regarding their collective rights within a system that marginalizes then and threatens their domain. It becomes imperative to acknowledge that amid the politics of identity, conflict of paradigms, and political manipulations of ethnic concerns, there are real peoples of diverse cultures in the country experiencing real forms of discrimination and marginalization. Articulations of diversity however could only be feasible if embedded in a comprehensive social and economic policy framework that directly addresses the structural roots of violence: poverty and marginalization of ethnic minorities and indigenous groups. Bureaucratic representation proves to be a delicate compromise that if divorced from a more wide-ranging diversity framework, could only potentially exacerbate discrimination and consequently social and political instability.

Paradoxically, diversity management is more effective if it focuses on crosscutting issues not directly linked to differentiation of identities. Basic, non-controversial yet imperative life-sustaining issues include land tenure, livelihood and employment, housing, education, health care, and infrastructure, among other social services and investments. The overriding intent is to narrow the social and economic gap between ethnic minority/indigenous peoples and mainstream society, before hard issues of autonomy and representation can be brought to the negotiating table. The thrust to bureaucratic representation is best pursued by an expanded number of empowered and educated indigenous peoples themselves. Their emancipation from structural violence could make them viable counterparts in determining the terms of representation, rather than being helpless spectators of decisions made by forces trying to represent them. Only then can there be more meaningful representation in the bureaucracy, and only then, at least in the context of the Philippines, can real measures be done on whether ethnic representation facilitates a more effective bureaucratic governance.

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