-
Comprehensive Environmental Impact Assessmentfor Proposed
Rajasthan Atomic Power Project
Units 7 & 8 at Rawatbhata Near Kota, Rajasthan
Sponsor
Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited, Mumbai 400 094
National Environmental Engineering Research InstituteNehru Marg,
Nagpur 440 020 (India)
May, 2005
-
FOREWORDM/s Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd. (NPCIL)
proposes
to set up additional two units of Pressurized. Water
Reactors(PHWRS) (RAPP 7 & 8) of 700 MWe capacity each at the
site ofRawatbhata Atomic Power Project, Rajasthan. Presently four
PHWRunits (RAPS 1 to 4) are generating electricity and feeding to
theNorthern Grid and two units RAPS 5 & 6 are under
construction.
In order to assess the potential impacts arising out of
theproposed project activities, M/s NPCIL retained
NationalEnvironmental Engineering Research Institute (NEERI) to
undertakeEnvironmental Impact Assessment studies for various
environmentalcomponents and to prepare an Environmental Management
Plan forminimizing the adverse impacts.
This report presents baseline data collected for three
seasonsviz. summer 2003, post monsoon 2003 and winter 2003-04 for
air,noise, water, land, biological and socio-economic
environmentalcomponents including radiological parameters with a
view toidentifying, predicting and evaluating the potential impacts
due toproposed activities. An Environmental Management Plan has
alsobeen delineated in the report.
The cooperation and assistance rendered by the staff of NPCILin
preparation of this report is gratefully acknowledged.
Nagpur (Sukumar Devotta)May, 2005
-
Project PersonnelNEERI, Nagpur
Mr. Awatani, K. Ms. Lata, kumari Ms. Sunar, Rakhi
Ms. Ahuja, Rashmi Ms. Moharir, Ashwini Mr. Singh, Prabhat
Ms. Dongre, Rajashri Ms. Mukherjee, Deepali Ms. Sinha,
Rashmi
Ms. Baby, Rani Ms. Malik, Ruchi Mr. Sarmokadam, Ganesh
Ms. Jain, Monika Ms. Mukherjee, Manisha Mr. Shukla, Parth
Ms. Sahasrabudhe, Sunila Mr. Mudaliar, Ratankumar Ms. Suple, D.
Sonali
Mr. Ingle, Sourabh Ms. Mishra, Sandhya Mr. Satramwar, Sharad
Mr. Kumbhare, P. S. Mr. Pathak, S. K. Mr. Swamy, Aditya
Mr. Kamble, Rahul Mr. Pingale, A. Shrihari Ms. Mishra,
Pawanrekha
Ms Kumbhare, Prabha Ms. Puntambekar, Smita
Secretarial Assistance
Mr. Dhawale, A.H. Mrs. Srinivasan, P.C.Mr. Nair, P. Mr. Kale, S.
G.
Project Leaders
Dr. Chaudhari, P. R. Dr. Ramteke, D. S.
Dr. Wate, S. R.
Project Co-ordinatorDr. Devotta Sukumar
Director
-
Project Personnel-RAPS, Rawatbhata
NPCIL, RawatbhataShri. Mittal, Subhash(Site Director, RAPS 1 to
4)Shri. C. P. Jhamb,(Project Director RAPP 5 & 6)Shri. K. M.
Joshi,SD, RAPS 1 & 2Shri. P. K. Datta,SD, RAPS 3 & 4Dr.
Verma, P. C.(QIC, ESL, RAPS)
NPCIL, Head Quarter, Mumbai
Shri. Ramamirtham, B. Shri. Singh, S. K.(A CE (HPE)) (Engineer
(EM))
Engineer-in-Charge (EIA), NPCIL
Dr. Singh, Jitendra
Sr. Executive Director (Safety), NPCILShri. Bajaj, S. S.
-
ContentsItem No.
Chapter 1
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.3.1
1.3.2
1.4
1.4.1
1.4.2
1.4.3
1.4.4
1.4.5
1.4.6
1.4.7
1.4.8
1.4.9
1.4.10
1.4.11
1.4.12
1.5
1.5.1
1.5.2
1.5.3
1.5.4
Particulars
List of Plates and Figures
List of Tables
List of Annexures
Executive Summary
Introduction
Introduction
Project SettingSalient Features of 700 MWe Design
Safety Approach
Protection Against Common Mode IncidentsPlant Description
General
Layout ConsiderationsReactor SystemPrimary Heat Transport (PHT)
SystemModerator System
Instrumentation and Control System
Reactivity Control Reactor Shutdown System
On Power Re-fuelling
Shut Down Cooling SystemEmergency Core Cooling System
Reactor Auxiliary Systems
ContainmentServices/Conventional Systems
Active Process Water System and Service Water SystemFire Water
System
Turbine Generator SystemSecondary System
Page No.
(viii)(ix)(xiii)1-7
1.0-1.341.1
1.2
1.4
1.5
1.5
1.6
1.6
1.7
1.7
1.8
1.101.10
1.111.111.121.12
1.12
1.131.141.141.141.141.15
(i)
-
Item No.
1.5.5
1.5.6
1.6
1.6.1
1.7
1.8
1.9
1.9.1
1.9.2
1.9.3
1.10
1.11
1.11.1
1.11.1.1
1.11.1.2
1.11.2
1.11.3
1.11.4
1.11.5
1.11.6
Chapter 2
2.1
2.1.1
2.1.2
2.1.3
2.1.4
Particulars
Condenser Cooling Water (CCW) System
Electrical System
Safety Classification
Safety Classes
Seismic Classification
Quality Group Classification
Quality Assurance
Design
Manufacture, Construction, and Commissioning
Operation
Scope of EIA
Methodology for EIA
Air Environment
Data Collection
Baseline Background Radiation Data
Noise Environment
Water Environment
Land Environment
Biological Environment
Socio-economic Environment
Figure 1.1-1.5
Table
Baseline Environmental Status and Identification ofImpacts
Air Environment
Design of Network for Ambient Air Quality
MonitoringLocations
Micrometeorology
Reconnaissance
Ambient Air Quality Survey
Page No.
1.15
1.16
1.17
1.18
1.19
1.20
1.21
1.21
1.22
1.23
1.23
1.24
1.25
1.26
1.26
1.26
1.27
1.27
1.28
1.28
1.29-1.331.34
2.0 - 2.201
2.1
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.3
(ii)
-
Item No.
2.1.5
2.1.5.1
2.1.5.2
2.1.5.3
2.1.5.4
2.1.6
2.1.7
2.1.7.1
2.1.7.2
2.2
2.2.1
2.2.2
2.2.3
2.3
2.3.1
2.3.2
2.3.3
2.3.4
2.3.5
2.3.5.1
2.3.5.2
2.3.5.3
2.3.5.4
2.3.5.5
2.3.6
Particulars
Baseline Status
Suspended Particulate matter (SPM)
Repirable Suspended Particulate Matter (RSPN)
Sulphur Dioxide (SO2)
Oxides of Nitrogen (NOx)
Radiological Observations
Active Gases
GeneralDerived Discharge LimitsFigure 2.1.1-2.1.3Tables
2.1.1-2.1.21
Noise Environment
Reconnaissance
Identification of Existing Sources of Noise
Measurement of Baseline Noise Levels in the Study AreaFigure
2.2.1Tables 2.2.1 - 2.2.3
Water Environment
Reconnaissance Survey
Availability of Water SourceDrawal and DischargeGeohydrology
Baseline Water QualityPhysico-chemcial Characteristics of
Surface Water
Physico-chemcial Characteristics of GroundwaterBacteriological
Characteristics of Surface WaterBacteriological Characteristics of
GroundwaterBiological Quality of Fresh WaterRadioactivity in Water
Environment
Page No.
2.4
2.4
2.4
2.4
2.5
2.5
2.5
2.5
2.6
2.8-2.10
2.11-2.41
2.42
2.42
2.42
2.43
2.44
2.45-2.47
2.48
2.48
2.48
2.49
2.50
2.51
2.51
2.51
2.52
2.52
2.52
2.54
(iii)
-
Item No.
2.3.7
2.3.8
2.3.9
2.4
2.4.1
2.4.2
2.4.3
2.4.4
2.4.5
2.4.6
2.4.7
2.4.8
2.4.9
2.4.10
2.4.10.1
2.52.5.1
2.5.2
2.5.3
2.5.4
2.5.5
2.5.6
2.5.6.1
2.5.6.2
2.5.6.3
2.5.6.4
2.5.6.5
Particulars
Radio-Active Liquid Effluent Management
Thermal Pollution
Flood Analysis
Figure 2.3.1
Tables 2.3.1 - 2.3.29
Land Environment
Reconnaissance
Geology
Baseline Data
Physical Characteristics
Chemical Characteristics
Microbiological Characteristics
Radioactivity in Terrestrial Environment
Solid Wastes
Solid Waste Management
Land Use
Landuse Pattern Study Using Remote Sensing Data
Plant I - II
Figure 2.4.1 - 2.4.2
Tables 2.4.1-2.4.15
Biological Environment
Introduction
Study Area
Sampling Locations
Survey Methodology
Biodiversity in Study Area
Floristic Structure and Composition
Bhainsroadgarh
Jawahar Sagar
Borabas
Gandhi Sagar
Aklingpura
Page No.
2.54
2.56
2.56
2.57
2.58-2.84
2.85
2.85
2.86
2.87
2.87
2.87
2.88
2.89
2.89
2.92
2.92
2.92
2.98-2.99
2.100-2.101
2.102-2.116
2.117
2.117
2.117
2.117
2.118
2.119
2.120
2.120
2.121
2.122
2.123
2.124
(iv)
-
Item No.
2.5.6.6
2.5.6.7
2.5.7
2.5.8
2.5.8.1
2.5.8.2
2.5.8.3
2.5.9
2.5.9.1
2.5.10
2.6
2.6.1
2.6.2
2.6.2.1
2.6.2.2
2.6.2.3
2.6.2.4
2.6.2.5
2.6.3
2.6.3.1
2.6.3.2
Chapter 33.1
Particulars
Nalikheda
Padachar
Green Belt Exist in and Around Plant Area
Wildlife Sanctuaries Present in the Study Area
Darrah SanctuaryJawahar Sagar Sanctuary
Bhainsroadgarh Sanctuary
The Fauna
Vertebrates, Their Status, Distribution and Habitat of
MajorAnimals
Fishes
Figure 2.5.1Table 2.5.1-2.5.16
Socio Economic EnvironmentReconnaissance
Baseline StatusDemographic StructureInfrastructure Resource
Base
Economic Attributes
Health StatusCultural and Aesthetic Attributes
Socio-economic SurveySampling MethodQuality of LifeAnnexure -
A
Annexure - B
Annexure - CAnnexure - D
Figure 2.6.1 - 2.6.2Tables 2.6.1 - 2.6.6
Prediction of ImpactsAir Environment
Page No.
2.125
2.125
2.126
2.126
2.126
2.127
2.127
2.128
2.129
2.131
2.132
2.133-2.151
2.152
2.152
2.152
2.153
2.154
2.154
2.155
2.156
2.156
2.156
2.158
2.162
2.163
2.164
2.165
2.168-2.169
2.170-2.201
3.0-3.21
3.1
(v)
-
Item No.
3.1.1
3.1.2
3.1.3
3.1.4
3.1.5
3.1.6
3.2
3.2.1
3.2.2
3.2.3
3.2.4
3.3
3.3.1
3.3.2
3.3.3
3.4
3.5
3.6
Chapter 4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8
Chapter 5
5.1
Particulars
Radioactive Pollution
Radiation Dose and Public Health
Occupational Exposure: Radiation Monitoring and Alarms
Emissions of Radioactivity
Micro Meteorology
Conventional Air Pollution
Figure 3.1.1-3.1.3
Table 3.1.1
Noise Environment
Identification of Sources of Noise in the Proposed Plant
Residential Areas
Commercial Area
Impact on Occupational Health
Water Environment
Impact of Radioactive Pollutants
Impact of Thermal Discharge on Water QualityCompliance of NPP to
MoEF Stipulation
Land Environment
Biological Environment
Socio-economic Environment
Tables 3.6.1 - 3.6.3
Environmental Impact Statement
Air Environment
Noise Environment
Water Environment
Land Environment
Biological Environment
Aesthetics
Socio-economic Environment
Sensitive Habitats
Environmental Management Plan
Earthquake Design Basis for Construction
Page No.
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
3.4
3.5
3.6-3.8
3.9
3.11
3.11
3.11
3.11
3.12
3.12
3.13
3.13
3.14
3.15
3.15
3.16
3.19-3.21
4.0 - 4.4
4.1
4.2
4.2
4.3
4.3
4.3
4.4
4.4
5.0-5.38
5.1
(vi)
-
Item No.
5.25.3
5.3.15.3.25.3.3
5.3.45.3.4.15.3.4.2
5.3.55.3.5.15.3.5.25.3.5.3
5.45.5
5.5.15.5.1.15.5.1.25.5.1.35.5.1.4
5.5.25.5.3
5.5.3.15.5.3.25.5.3.3
5.5.45.5.55.5.6
Particulars
Table 5.1Construction PhaseOperational PhaseAir EnvironmentNoise
EnvironmentWater EnvironmentTable 5.3.1Land EnvironmentRadioactive
Solid WastesTownship Solid WastesBiological EnvironmentGuidelines
for PlantationSpecies SelectionBiological EnvironmentFigure 5.1 -
5,2Tables 5.2 - 5.6Socio-economic EnvironmentPost Project
Environmental MonitoringAir Quality Monitoring ProgrammeMonitoring
ParametersSampling StationsSampling FrequencyAir Quality Monitoring
- Equipments RequiredNoise EnvironmentWater Quality
MonitoringSampling FrequencyAnalysis MethodologyMonitoring
LaboratoryStaff Requirement for Environmental Quality
MonitoringBudgetary Provisions for EMPRadioactive Monitoring and
Surveillance ProgrammeFigure 5.3 - 5.4Bibliography
Page No.5.25.35.45.45.55.55.75.85.85.8
5.155.155.155.20
5.22-5.235.24-5.29
5.305.325.325.325.325.325.325.345.345.345.345.345.355.355.36
5.37-5.381.4
(vii)
-
List of Plates and Figures
Item No. Particulars Page No.Plate I False Color Composite
Having 25 km Radius Distance 2.98Plate II Landuse /Landcover Map
Having 25 km Radius Distance 2.99Figure 1.1 Location Map for
Rajasthan Atomic Power Station (RAPP) at 1.29
RawatbhataFigure 1.2 RAPP 7 & 8 Plant Layout 1.30Figure 1.3
Study area for EIA Studies of RAPP, Rawatbhata 1.31Figure 1.4
Exposure Pathways for Atmospheric Releases from NPP 1.32Figure 1.5
Exposure Pathways for Releases by NPP to Aquatic 1.33
EnvironmentFigure 2.1.1 Sampling Locations for Air Environment
2.8Figure 2.1.2 Windrose at Rawatbhata During October - November
2003 2.9Figure 2.1.3 Annual Wind Rose at RAPS Site for the Year
2001 2.10Figure 2.2.1 Sampling Locations for Noise Environment
2.44Figure 2.3.1 Sampling Locations for Water Environment
2.57Figure 2.4.1 Sampling Locations for Land Environment
2.100Figure 2.4.2 Textural Diagram for Soil Composition 2.101Figure
2.5.1 Sampling Locations for Biological Environment 2.132Figure
2.6.1 Sampling Locations for Socio-economic Environment 2.168Figure
2.6.2 Employment Pattern in the Study Area 2.169Figure 3.1.1 Annual
Gamma ISO Dose Curve Due to Argon - 4 1 and 3.6
FPNGFigure 3.1.2 Total effective Dose at 1.6 km During 1997 to
2001 3.7Figure 3.1.3 Dose to Members of the Public in Various
Anualr Zones 3.8
During 2001Figure 5.1 Green Belt Development Near the NPP Site
5.22Figure 5.2 Section of Green Belt Development 50 m Away from
Nuclear 5.23
Power PlantFigure 5.3 Components of Post Project Environmental
Monitoring 5.37
Programme for NPCILFigure 5.4 Recommended Organizational Set up
for Environmental 5.38
Quality Monitoring (For Non-Radiological Parameters)
forNPCIL
(viii)
-
List of Tables
Table No. Title Page No.
1.1 Operational performance Detail of RAPS 2 - 4 1.34
2.1.1 Details of Ambient Air Quality Monitoring Stations
2.11(Summer 2003)
2.1.2 Ambient Air Quality Status (Summer 2003) 2.122.1.3 Ambient
Air Quality Status (Post Monsoon 2003) 2.132.1.4 Ambient Air
Quality Status (Winter Season 2003-2004) 2.152.1.5 Cumulative
Percentile Values of SPM (Summer 2003) 2.172.1.6 Cumulative
Percentile Values of SPM (Post Monsoon 2003) 2.182.1.7 Cumulative
Percentile Values of SPM (Winter Season 2.20
2003-2004)2.1.8 Cumulative Percentile Values of RSPM (Summer
2003) 2.222.1.9 Cumulative Percentile Values of RSPM (Post Monsoon
2003) 2.23
2.1.10 Cumulative Percentile Values of RSPM (Winter Season
2.252003-2004)
2.1.11 Cumulative Percentile Values of SO2 (Summer 2003)
2.272.1.12 Cumulative Percentile Values of SO2 (Post Monsoon 2003)
2.282.1.13 Cumulative Percentile Values of SO2 (Winter Season
2.30
2003-2004)2.1.14 Cumulative Percentile Values of NOX (Summer
2003) 2.322.1.15 Cumulative Percentile Values of NOX (Post Monsoon
2003) 2.332.1.16 Cumulative Percentile Values of NOX (Winter Season
2.35
2003-2004)2.1.17 Concentration of H - 3 in Air Samples Collected
Around RAPP 2.37
Environment During 1998
2.1.18 Concentration of H - 3 in Air Samples Collected Around
RAPP 2.38Environment During 1999
2.1.19 Concentration of H - 3 in Air Samples Collected Around
RAPP 2.39Environment During 2000
2.1.20 Concentration of H - 3 in Air Samples Collected Around
RAPP 2.40Environment During 200f
2.1.21 Concentration of H - 3 in Air Samples Collected Around
RAPP 2.41Environment During 2002
2.2.1 Ambient Noise Level (Summer 2003) 2.452.2.2 Ambient Noise
Level at Rawatbhata (Summer 2003) 2.46
(ix)
-
Table No. Title Page No.
2.2.3 Noise Level at Environmental Survey Laboratory (ESL),
2.47Rawatbhata (Summer 2003)
2.3.1 Sampling Locations for Water Environment 2.58
2.3.2 Water Quality - Physical Parameters (Summer 2003)
2.592.3.3 Water Quality - Physical Parameters (Post Monsoon 2003)
2.602.3.4 Water Quality - Physical Parameters (Winter 2003-2004)
2.612.3.5 Water Quality - Inorganic Parameters (Summer 2003)
2.622.3.6 Water Quality - Inorganic Parameters (Post Monsoon 2003)
2.632.3.7 Water Quality - Inorganic Parameters (Winter 2003-2004)
2.642.3.8 Water Quality - Nutrients and Organic Parameters 2.65
(Summer 2003)2.3.9 Water Quality - Nutrients and Organic
Parameters 2.66
(Post Monsoon 2003)2.3.10 Water Quality - Nutrients and Organic
Parameters 2.67
(Winter 2003-2004)2.3.11 Water Quality - Heavy Metals (Summer
2003) 2.682.3.12 Water Quality - Heavy Metals (Post Monsoon 2003)
2.692.3.13 Water Quality - Heavy Metals (Winter 2003-2004)
2.702.3.14 Water Quality - Bacteriology (Summer 2003) 2.712.3.15
Water Quality - Bacteriology (Post Monsoon 2003) 2.722.3.16 Water
Quality - Bacteriology (Winter 2003) 2.732.3.17 Water Quality -
Phytoplankton (Summer 2003) 2.742.3.18 Water Quality -
Phytoplankton (Post Monsoon 2003) 2.752.3.19 Water Quality -
Phytoplankton (Winter 2003-2004) 2.762.3.20 List of Species
Identified (Phytoplanktons) 2.772.3.21 Water Quality - Zooplankton
(Summer 2003) 2.782.3.22 Water Quality - Zooplankton (Post Monsoon
2003) 2.792.3.23 Water Quality - Zooplankton (Winter 2003-2004)
2.802.3.24 List of Species Identified (Zooplankton) 2.812.3.25
Quantity of Wastewater Generation (Unite wise) and its 2.81
Characterization2.3.26 Specific Activity contained in Liquid
Waste 2.81
(x)
-
Table No. Title Page No.
2.3.27 Concentration of H-3 in Water Samples Collected Around
2.82RAPP Environment During 2002
2.3.28 Concentration of Sr- 89+90, I - 131 & Cs - 137 in
Water 2.83Samples Collected Around RAPP Environment during 2002
2.3.29 Concentration of H-3 in Well and Pond Water Samples
2.49Collected Around RAPP Environment During 2002
2.4.1 Details of Soil Sampling Locations within the Study Area
2.1022.4.2 Physical Characteristics of Soils Within Study Area
(Summer 2.103
2003)2.4.3 Chemical Characteristics of Soil-Water (1:1) Extract
(Summer 2.104
2003)2.4.4 Cation Exchange Capacity of Soil in Study Area
2.105
(Summer 2003)2.4.5 Fertility Status of Soils in Study Area
(Summer 2003) 2.1062.4.6 Heavy Metals in Soil Samples (Summer 2003)
2.1072.4.7 Microbiological Characteristics of Soil (Summer 2003)
2.1082.4.8 Concentration of Sr89+90 & Cs134+137 in Dietary
Items of Samples 2.109
Collected Around RAPP Environment During 1998
2.4.9 Concentration of Sr89*90 & Cs134+137 in Dietary Items
of Samples 2.110Collected Around RAPP Environment During 1999
2.4.10 Concentration of Sr89+90 & Cs134+137 in Dietary Items
of Samples 2.111Collected Around RAPP Environment During 2000
2.4.11 Concentration of Sr89+90 & Cs134+137 in Dietary Items
of Samples 2.112Collected Around RAPP Environment During 2001
2.4.12 Concentration of Sr89+90 & Cs134+137 in Dietary Items
of Samples 2.113Collected Around RAPP Environment During 2002
Characterization of Radioactive Solid Waste at SWAMP RAPS
2.114Landuse /Land Cover Classification System 2.115Landuse/
Landcover 2.116List of Sampling Locations for Biological
Environment 2.133
Formulae for Analysing Phytosociological Characteristic of
2.134Vegetation
List of Plant Species Recorded from Study Area 2.135List of
Family Members with Species Count 2.138Simpson's Diversity Index of
Plant Species in Study Area 2.139Density of Plant Species in Study
Area 2.139
(xi)
2.4.2.4.
1314
2.4.15
2.5
2.5
2.5
2.5.
2.5.
2.5.
.1
.2
3
4
5
6
-
Table No. Title Page No.
Floristic Characteristic of Dominant Flora of Bhainsroadgarh
2.140
Floristic Characteristic of Dominant Flora of Jawahar Sagar
2.142
Floristic Characteristic of Dominant Flora of Borabas 2.143
Floristic Characteristic of Dominant Flora of Gandhi Sagar
2.145
Floristic Characteristic of Dominant Flora of Aklingpura
2.146
Floristic Characteristic of Dominant Flora of Nalikheda
2.147
Floristic Characteristic of Dominant Flora of Padachar 2.148
Details of Plantation carried out by RAPP 2.149
List of Fauna Present in the Study Area 2.150
Major Carps Percentage in Total Fish Production 2.151Distance
and Direction of the Villages Surveyed 2.170
Demographic Structure in the Study Area 2.171
Summery of Demographic Structure at a Glance 2.185
Socio-economic Profile of the Study Area Basic Amenities
2.186Morbidity Status as Available in PHC at Bhaisrodgadh Period
2.200January 2002 to December 2002
Quality of life Existing in the Villages Surveyed 2.201Computed
external Dose Due to Ar-41 and FPNG Release from 3.9RAPS 1 to 4
3.6.1 Prediction of Qualitative Impacts on Socio-economic
3.19Environment
3.6.2 Expected Change in Cumulative Quality of Life 3.203.6.3
Expected Change in Subjective Quality of Life 3.215.1 Summary of
Impacts, Problems and Appropriate Management 5.2
Plan for their Mitigation
5.3.1 Details of Water Requirements/Waste Generation and Green
5.7Belt in Respect to DAE Residential Colonies at Rawatbhata
5.2 Species of Plants Suggested for Greenbelt Development
5.245.3 Drought Resistant Species for Greenbelt Design within the
NPP 5.25
Area
5.4 Species Selected for Plantation along the Road Side and
5.27Township
5.5 List of Trees Having Peak Flowering Season 5.285.6 Pollution
Attenuation Factor (Air) for Green Belt of Different 5.29
Widths
(xii)
2
2
2.
2.
2.
2.
2.
2.
I.5.7
!.5.8
I.5.9
5.10
5.11
5.12
5.13
5.14
5.15
2.5.16
2
2
.6.1
.6.2
2.6.3
2.
2.
2.
3.
6.4
65
6.6
1.1
-
List of Annexures
Annexure Title Page No.No.
I National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) 1II Indian
Standards/Specifications for Drinking Water IS: 10500- 2
1991
III Noise Standards 9
IV Indian Standards for Industrial and Sewage Effluents
10Discharge IS:2490-1982
Y Information About Various Nuclear Power Plants with Respect
13to Environmental Requirement for Discharge of CondenserCooling
Water System
(xiii)
-
Executive Summary
-
Executive Summary
M/s Nuclear Power Corporation of India (NPCIL) has proposed to
constructadditional two Pressurized Heavy Water Reactors (PHWRS)
(RAPP - 7 & 8) of 700 MWecapacities each at the site of
Rawatbhata Atomic Power Project, Rajasthan in theadjoining area of
the existing plant. Presently, four PHWR units (RAPS - 1 to 4)
aregenerating electricity and feeding to the Northern Grid and the
units RAPP 5 & 6 areunder construction.
The Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited retained National
EnvironmentalEngineering Research Institute (NEERI) with a view to
establish the baseline status withrespect to various environmental
components viz. air, noise, water, land, biological
andsocio-economic including parameters of human interest. The
present ComprehensiveEnvironmental Impact Assessment (CEIA) report
is based on environmental datacollected during three season i.e.
summer 2003, post monsoon (2003) and winter (2003-2004) seasons
with a view to assess the present baseline environmental status,
evaluateand predict the potential impacts due to the proposed
activities. An EnvironmentalManagement Plan incorporating control
measures has also been delineated in this report.
Project Setting
The RAPS (Latitude 24 52'N and Longitude 75 31 'E) is situated
on the upstreamon right bank of Rana Pratap Sagar (RPS) at a
distance of 6 km from the dam, inBegun Taluk of Chittorgarh
district
The study area of 25 km radial distance from RAPS consists of
Chambal Riverand its tributary, and lakes viz. Rana Pratap Sagar,
Gandhi Sagar, Jawahar Sagarand three sanctuaries.
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Executive Summary
NEERIBaseline Environmental Status
Ambient air quality was observed to be good with respect to SO2
and NOx.However, Suspended Particulate Matter (SPM) and Respirable
SuspendedParticulate Matter (RSPM) were found to be slightly higher
than the nationalstandards set up by CPCB.
Among radionuclides, the only significant radionuclides that are
likely to bereleased are tritium, fission product noble gases
(FPNG), radio iodines, andactivated particulates. The Geometric
Mean (GM) values for gross alpha and betaare 0.08 and 1.18 mBq/m3
and were below detection limits in quarterly cumulativesamples
analyzed by gamma spectrometry. The levels of activity for
radiocesiumand radiostrontium in annual cumulative rainwater
samples were below detectionlimit.
The noise levels were within the stipulated limits in
residential areas andcommercial areas except slightly higher in
commercial area in 5-10 km distancearound RAPP. The noise levels in
infrastructural buildings were slightly higherthan the
standards.
The physico-chemical characteristics of surface water sources
are within thepermissible limits for drinking water. The nutrients
were observed to be within thepermissible limits. Heavy metals like
iron, lead and chromium were found to behigher than standards at
some places in ground water.
The ground water samples collected from study area showed high
mineral contentand pH ranging from 6.5-8.5. The inorganic
constituents in groundwater(hardness, chlorides, sulphates) were
observed to be lower than the Indianstandards for drinking water in
most of the samples collected. Few water samplesalso showed higher
levels of heavy metals in them.
All the surface water samples showed contamination of water,
while 40% ofgroundwater samples were found to be contaminated as
evident from presence offaecal coliforms. Plankton population in
surface water showed slightly pollutedwater or 0- mesotrophic
quality of water.
Most of the surface and ground water samples showed the activity
of Sr8990, I 131,and Cs137 below detectable limits.
The project would be adopting cooling towers thus there will not
be the problem ofthermal pollution in Rana Pratap Sagar receiving
the cooling water discharge
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Executive Summary
NEERI Waste management centralized facility (WMCF) is planned to
cater to the
management of solid and liquid waste of RAPP 1 to 8
The values of radioactivity recorded in air, water, soil and
dietary items are muchbelow the permissible limits
The results of environmental surveillance programme, 2002 show
that the dosesreceived even by a hypothetical man staying at fence
post (1.6 km) is 37.1 uSvwhich is less than 4% of the dose limit of
1000uSv per year prescribed byAERB/ICRP
Flood analysis indicate that discharge capacity of Rana Pratap
Sagar is less thanprobable maximum flood. Hence, the guidelines
issued by Govt. of MadhyaPradesh in the Operation Manual of
upstream Gandhisagar dam should be strictlyfollowed
Soils are microbiologically active but cultivation of crops is
very much restricteddue to shallow soils with stones and their poor
productivity
Good biodiversity of flora and fauna is recorded in the forests
and sanctuaries instudy area.
Population density is less in study area. The main occupation of
local people isagriculture. Infrastructure facility with respect to
safe drinking water,communication and employment opportunities are
poor. The average QoL indexvalues are low i.e. 0.51-0.53
Assessment of Impacts
Conventional pollutants are given out in air and water from the
township area viz.dust, sewage and solid waste. Presently treated
sewage is discharged in nallahwhich is contaminating water bodies.
Solid waste needs treatment and recyclingto protect environment
The noise levels in study area are below stipulated limits
Most of the surface and ground water samples, air, soil and
dietary items showedthe activity of cesium and strontium far below
detectable limit. Therefore, there isno radiological hazard through
various routes
The wildlife sanctuaries especially Bhainsroadgarh Wildlife
Sanctuary is greatlyaffected by increasing anthropogenic and
grazing activity. Five tree species and
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Executive Summary
NEERIsix faunal species from the study area are included under
rare, threatened,
endangered, vulnerable and intermediate category
Quality of life (QoL) is poor due to poor infrastructure
facilities.
Prediction of impacts
The RAPP requires development of water source for its running.
The site falls inseismic zone II and development of reservoir may
pose threat with respect toseismic activity
Flood level in Rana Pratap Sagar at maximum rainfall may be
hazardous to RAPSand RAPP
Radiological pollution through various routes due to the
expansion programmewould be higher than the present level
Radiological hazard during operation or accident conditions
Increasing anthropogenic activity would lead to more production
of dust pollutionin study area
Increasing population with the increase in industrial activity
will lead tocontamination of environment due to disposal of
wastewater effluents and solidwaste, threatening ecology and public
health
Unless and until some preventive measures are undertaken,
increasing populationof man and cattle may affect the biodiversity
of flora and fauna in environmentallysensitive sanctuaries and
forest area
Discharge of heated coolant water will be responsible for
thermal pollution whichwould be detrimental to aquatic flora and
fauna in Rana Pratap Sagar
Radioactive liquid discharge in environment without proper
treatment may affectaquatic flora and fauna
Soil may be exposed to radionuclides fallout from atmosphere;
disposal ofhazardous radioactive waste would pose a threat to flora
and fauna
The geographical features would be altered due to construction
activity of RAPP
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Executive Summary
NEERIEnvironmental Management Plan
Salient features of environment management plan are given in
Table 1 and arediscussed below in brief.
Due consideration should be given to water retaining structures
such as waterreservoirs to account for induced seismicity and the
consequences of dam failureon the safety of RAPP
Considering the flood level of Chambal River of Rana Pratap
Sagar at maximumrainfall, the guidelines issued by Govt. of Madhya
Pradesh for the operation ofupstream Gandhisagar dam should be
followed strictly and selection of properelevation to RAPP 7 &
8 to keep maximum possible safety margin
Radiological emissions from stacks would be reduced by adoption
of propertechnology and compliance to the limits set by ICRP and
AERB.
Proper planning for safety approach and protection against
common modeincidents
Development of good quality roads and afforestation measures as
a social welfaremeasure would reduce dust pollution
Air emissions from solid waste dumping site would be reduced by
using improvedtechnology of composting and vermiculture with added
benefit of recycling andreuse of produced manure for green belt
development.
The domestic sewage would be treated in proper effluent
treatment plant and thestabilized effluent would be utilized for
irrigation of green belt, parks and gardens
The green belt development around plant site and township and
naturalvegetation in exclusion zone and sterilized zone (5 km
radial distance area) wouldact as sink not only for radionuclides
in air but also for conventional air pollutants,and would be
effective in reducing the noise levels produced during the
operationof the plant
There are 3 wild life sanctuaries in the study area which are
rich in biodiversity.These sanctuaries especially Bhainsroadgarh is
affected by anthropogenicactivity. Thus these sanctuaries need
protection from anthropogenic impact andconservation measures to
improve wildlife habitat viz. afforestation and
habitatimprovement
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Executive Summary
NEERI The impact of thermal discharge would be minimized by
compliance to
permissible limits set by MoEF by adopting cooling towers for
condenser coolingwater discharge
Adoption of proper disposal of radioactive waste: The
radioactive liquid wastewould be collected in holding tanks and
will be processed further to separatewater and highly concentrated
radioactivity residue. Highly concentrated (up to800 g/l) residue
would be solidified through cementation and sent for interimstorage
in solid waste depositary
The green belt development and plantations at plant site and
township wouldenhance the aesthetic value of the area
Socio-economic aspect is the important issue in the development
of NPP project.The negative feelings of local people, if any,
arisen due to propaganda by antinuclear lobby should be mitigated
by giving proper information to public andeducating them about the
benefits, and to create awareness about nuclear powerplant and
safety measures. The quality of life in surrounding villages can
beimproved by providing various welfare measures and recreational
facilities and jobopportunities to local people
Guidelines and recommendations are given in the report for post
projectenvironmental monitoring of air, noise, water and
radionuclides around the RAPParea.
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Executive Summary
NEERITable 1
Summary of Impacts, Problems and Appropriate Management Plan for
theirMitigation
EnvironmentalComponent
Impacts and Problems Inputs : Management Plan for Mitigation of
Impact
Earthquake DesignBasis forconstruction
Flooding of RAPS
Air Environment
The site falls in seismic zone II
Flood level at maximum rainfall may behazardous to nuclear power
plant
Radiological emissions from stacks
Radiological hazardaccident conditions
during operation or
Air emissions from solid waste dumping site
Dust pollution pose threat to arblic healthand wildlife
Noise Environment Marginal problems
Water Environment
Land Environment
BiologicalEnvironment
Pollution due to discharge of domesticwastewater from
township
Discharge of heated water to Rana PratapSagar would affect
aquatic flora and fauna
Radioactive liquid discharge in environmentmay affect aquatic
flora and fauna
Soil may be exposed to radionuclides dueto fall out from
atmosphere
Disposal of hazardous solid radioactivewaste
Accidental release of radionuclids would behazardous to
terrestrial ecosystem andhuman being
Exposure of flora and fauna to radionuclidsthrough different
routes
Ecologicallysensitive Areas
Rare andendangeredspecies of flora andfauna
Aesthetics
SocioeconomicEnvironment
RAPP is present very near to three wildlifesanctuaries
Deterioration of wildlife habitat
Topographical features will be altered dueto construction
activity of RAPP
Beneficial effects outweighs adverse effectson socio-economic
environment
Due consideration should be given to the water retaining
structure suchas reservoirs built around RAPP to account for
induced seismicity andthe consequences of dam failure units on the
safety of present andproposed Nuclear Power Plant
The elevation from MSL of different units should be decided on
thebasis of flood analysis
Appropriate technological measures to meet the limits set by
ICRP andAERB with respect to existing and proposed units.
Development of green belt around nuclear power plant and
townshipand natural vegetation growth in exclusive zone (within 2
km radialdistance) and sterilizing zone (2 km to 5 km radial
distance area) to actas sink for pollutants
Proper planning for safety approach and protection against
commonmode incidents
Adoption of improved treatment, recycling and reuse technology
viz.composting, vermicomposting etc.
Proper stabilization and maintenance of roads; Development of
greenbelt to reduce dust pollution
Development of green belt would reduce the noise levels in
surroundingarea
Development of effluent treatment plant (ETP) and reuse of
effluent forirrigation in parks and green belts
Compliance with permissible limits set by MoEF by adoption of
coolingtowers would be helpful in reducing thermal pollution.
Specific treatment of radioactive liquid waste to reduce its
volume andcontainment and secured deposition of concentrated
nuclear waste
Compliance to air quality standards related to radioactivity
(ICRP andAERB)Adoption of appropriate treatment to reduce the
volume of radioactivewaste and containment and secured deposition
of concentratedradioactive waste
Proper planning should be ready to handle emergency situations;
suchplanning is already implemented for existing units of RAPS 1 to
4
Compliance to radiological standards for air and
water;containment and secured deposition of radioactive waste
treatment,
Development of green belt around RAPP and natural vegetation
inexclusive zone and sterilizing zone (5 km radial distance area
aroundNPP) would act as sink for radionuclids as well as
conventional airpollutants
Compliance with regulation (ICRP, AERB & MoEF)Protection of
sanctuaries from anthropogenic actives
Protection of wildlife habitat in wildlife sanctuaries and
improvement intheir status with respect to food, feed and
shelter.
There will be improvement in the aesthetic quality of water, air
and landenvironment
Quality of Life (QoL) would be improved due to increase in
jobopportunities and improved facilities related to
transport,communication, medical, education, electricity and water
supply.
-
Chapter 1
Introduction
-
Chapter 1
Introduction1.1 Introduction
It is proposed to construct two pressurized heavy water Reactors
(PHWRs)(RAPP-7 & 8) of 700 MWe capacity each at Rawatbhata
Atomic Power Project site in theadjoining area of the existing
plant. The site is situated on the right bank of the RanaPratap
Sagar (RPS), upstream of the RPS dam, at a radial distance of 6 km
from thedam. The nearest village to the site is Tamlav. The site
lies within the property limits ofthe existing Rajasthan Atomic
Power Project (RAPP) in Begun taluk of Chittorgarhdistrict. The
approximate latitude and longitude of the site are as follows :
Latitude : 24 521 N
Longitude : 75 37' E
The existing Rajasthan Atomic Power Station consists of four
units as detailedbelow:
Present Capacity Commencement of Commercial operation
RAPS -1 1 x 100 MWe PHWR December 1973
RAPS-2 1 x 200 MWe PHWR April 1981
RAPS - 3&4 2 x 220 MWe PHWR June /December 2000
All these units are generating electricity and feeding to the
Northern Grid. Atpresent RAPS-5, 6 (2X220 MWe - PHWR) project is
under construction. The operationalperformance details of RAPS 2-4
is presented in Table 1.1.
The nearest thermal power station is at Kota, about 65 km away
from site, with aninstalled capacity of 850 MWe consisting of 2 x
110 MWe and 3 x 210 MWe units. The
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NEERI Chapter 1: Introduction
nearest hydro-electric power station is at RPS dam, with a total
installed generatingcapacity of 172 MWe (4 x 43 MWe).
Jaipur, the State capital, is about 300 km by road from the
site. Coal for Kotathermal power station is supplied by Nowrazabad
coalfields in M.P. at a distance of about700 km (by broad gauge
rail cum road route) from the site. The general location map ofthe
site is shown in Figure 1.1.
This site had earlier been cleared from safety angle by AERB and
environmentalangle by Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF)
for additional 4 x 500 MWe PHWRunits over and above the existing
four units (RAPS - 1 to 4). Subsequently, capacity ofRAPP - 5 &
6 was changed to 2 x 220 MWe instead of 2 x 500 MWe PHWRs
andnecessary clearances from MoEF and AERB were obtained. Present
report is forevaluating setting up of additional 2 x 700 MWe PHWRs
(RAPP - 7 & 8) instead of 2 x500 MWe PHWRs. The total power
potential of RAPP site is projected at 2580 MWe aftersuch
addition.
The Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited retained National
EnvironmentalEngineering Research Institute (NEERI), Nagpur with a
view to establish the baselinestatus with respect to various
environmental components viz. air, noise, water, land,biological
and socio-economic including parameters of human interest and to
evaluateand predict the potential impacts due to the proposed
activities. Environmental datacollected during summer (2003), post
monsoon (2003), and winter (2003-2004) seasonsare analyzed and
presented in the form of Comprehensive Environmental
ImpactAssessment (CEIA) with a view to assess the present baseline
environmental status, AnEnvironmental Management Plan incorporating
control measures has also beendelineated in this CEIA report.
1.2 Project Setting
The land required for locating buildings and structures of
additional four units ofPHWRs (RAPP - 5 to 8) has already been
acquired, fenced and is in the control of thestation authorities.
This is adequate to locate 2 x 220 MWe (RAPP - 5 & 6) and 2 x
700MWe PHWR (RAPP - 7 & 8). Additional land for exclusion zone,
where no publichabitation exists up to 1.6 km radius from the
proposed layout of Unit 8 (Centre line of theReactor Building of
RAPP - 8) admeasuring 326.81 ha of forestland has already
beenreleased by Rajasthan State Government. The legal status of the
land will remain
1.2
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NEERI Chapter 1: Introduction
unchanged and project has borne the cost of afforestation of the
area as per thegovernment order. This area will be allowed to be
fenced.
The ground elevation gradually rises away from the reservoir,
with elevationvarying from + 345 m to + 410 m. The grade level for
RAPP - 3 & 4 has been fixed at+384 m which is safe against
flooding. The area for additional units is south east of
theexisting units along the banks of the RPS. The grade elevation
for RAPP - 5 & 6 is fixedat 392.7 m. The same elevation as for
RAPP - 5 & 6 or above as per topography will holdgood for the
proposed additional units. Based on the topography, a grade level
of 400 m.appears probable. This could be fixed at the design stage
based on techno-economicconsiderations. There are three nullahs in
this area. Suitable site drainage scheme byproviding cut off drains
and diverting the flows to nearby major nullahs needs to
beengineered and implemented. This is feasible. Significant
leveling of the area is required.
The land around the site is barren with little topsoil.
Agriculture and fishing arecarried out on very small scale within
10 km radius of the site. An area of about 120 ha,around 6 km away
from the site has been identified and acquired as an extension of
theexisting housing colony. The land for colony is partly private
patta land and partlygovernment land. There is no forestland in the
colony area. As there is no residentpopulation in the exclusion
zone mentioned above, the problem of rehabilitation ofpopulation
does not arise.
The area is sparsely populated with the average population
distribution of 60persons/sq km in the 30 km radial distance of
RAPP. There is negligible population within5 km radial distance
from RAPP. Even upto 15 km the total population is only 60,000
asper 1991 census and majority of this, about 36,000 is in NNW
sector, comprising mainlyof Rawatbhata (Bhabha Nagar) at about 6 km
from RAPP. The population in the 5 to 10km zone consists mostly of
workers living in nearby townships and also the villagers.
Gaseous emissions are discharged through tall stacks. The main
components ofthese gaseous emissions are Ar-41 (Specially for RAPS
1 & 2), FPNG and tritium andmicro quantities of fission
products. The main radionuclide in liquid effluent is tritium
withmicro quantities of fission and activation products.
Keeping in view the dry climate at the Rawatbhata site, a solar
evaporation facilityhas been in operation since 1979 for the slow
evaporation of liquid effluents, therebyconcentrating fission and
activation products and reducing their discharge in the lake
1.3
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NEERI Chapter 1: Introduction
1.3 Salient Features of 700 MWe Design
The reactor size and the design features of 700 MWe units are
essentially sameas that 540 MWe TAPP 3 & 4 units, except that
partial boiling of the coolant, limited toabout 3% at the coolant
channel exit has been allowed. This limit on exit quality
isconsistent with the later version of PHWRs operating
satisfactorily elsewhere in the world.The process systems have been
suitably modified, over, that of 540 MWe design, forextracting the
enhanced power produced in the core. Similar to TAPP 3 & 4, the
reactorpower is controlled using lonization Chambers at low power
(less than 15%) and throughsignal derived from SPNDs (Slow Power
Neutron Detectors) in the power range (higherthan 15% FP). Both
signals are used in the range 5-15% FP. For the purpose of
controlof bulk and zonal power, the core is divided into 14 zones,
42 SPNDs are provided 3 ineach zone, for measurement of zonal and
bulk power. The flux mapping system is usedfor correcting zonal
power estimates derived from ZCDs. Bulk power estimates
arecorrected using selected channel temperature and flow
measurements made on theprimary side, upto 87% FP. Above this the
secondary side measurements are used toverify the thermal output of
the core. Double containment, as used now in all IndianPHWRs, has
been provided, to contain the radioactive nuclides. The primary
pressureand temperature at the Reactor headers are also nearly the
same as that of TAPP 3 & 4,though bigger size pressuriser, and
higher capacity Secondary system and auxiliarysystems are
involved.
Some of the salient differences from TAPP 3 & 4 units are as
follows:
> 2-4% boiling allowed in coolant channels
> About 6C higher primary coolant temperatures viz. 266C at
Reactor inlet and310C at outlet header
> Higher size pressuriser
> Enhanced capacity steam generator with modified process
parameters,
> Reduced number of pumps (i.e. 3 x 50%) in the moderator
system
> Higher capacity Turbine, generator, and condenser
1.4
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NEERI Chapter 1: Introduction
> Appropriate modifications/capacity increase in Reactor
Process Systems, ReactorAuxiliary Systems, Secondary System Process
Water and Cooling Water System,and Electrical System
> Improved and compact plant layout with better
segregation
1.3.1 Safety Approach
The objective of nuclear safety is the protection of the plant
personnel, public andthe environment from radiological hazards,
during operation as well as under accidentconditions by
incorporating and maintaining effective defenses against such
hazard byadopting the concept of defense in depth. This concept
implies a series of consecutivephysical barriers in the path of
release of ionizing radiation and radioactive substancesinto the
environment, and redundancy in equipment and control and other
complexengineering and managerial measures for protecting these
barriers and maintaining theireffectiveness. In addition there are
engineering safety features such as Emergency CoreCooling System,
Pressure Suppression System, Radionuclide clean-up system etc.
totake care of the accident situations.
The plant configuration is aimed to ensure that the radiation
impact on the plantpersonnel, general public and the environment
during operation, under anticipatedoperation occurrences, and
design basis accidents does not exceed the exposure limitsset forth
by AERB as well as the risk from beyond design basis accidents is
minimized.
1.3.2 Protection Against Common Mode Incidents
There are a number of postulated single events, which, if not
protected against,could lead to widespread damage of station
equipment. These initiating events arereferred to as common mode
incidents and can be caused by a common external event,failure of a
common process or a common environment.
The general philosophy to limit the consequences of these common
modeincidents requires that the following capabilities must be
maintained.
1. The capability to shut down the reactor
2. The capability to ensure that the reactor remains shut
down
3. The capability to remove decay heat from the reactor
1.5
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NEERI Chapter 1: Introduction
4. The capability to monitor the status of the nuclear steam
supply system
It is also a requirement that systems, other than the reactor
systems, containingsignificant amounts of radionuclides, e.g. the
irradiated fuel bays, not be unacceptablydamaged.
In providing the protection against postulated common mode
incidents, twogroups of systems have been identified such that each
group can meet the requiredcapabilities. In general, systems in
each group are sufficiently separated or hardenedsuch that no
common mode incident can cause the loss of any of the
requiredcapabilities.
The two-group approach is primarily designed to provide an
acceptable level ofprotection for a set of very low probability
events of known or unknown origin. With this inmind, an attempt has
been made to provide the greatest practical degree of separation
ofthose systems necessary to meet the required capabilities. To
meet this target of greatestpractical separation in a clear and
thorough manner, the number of systems in eachgroup have been
minimized.
Group 1 systems include the SDS#1 ECCS, SG cooling and shutdown
coolingsystem, main control center and their associated
services
Group 2 systems include SDS#2 containment system, decay heat
removal byinjecting fire water to SGs/moderator cooling, emergency
control room, emergencyservice water system and emergency power
supply system.
1.4 Plant Description
1.4.1 General
The plant (Figure 1.2) is accommodated in an area of
approximately 700 m x 700m. The two reactor buildings are of 56 m
outside diameter and are situated at 100 mcentre-to-centre
distance. For each reactor, a reactor auxiliary building (RAB) is
providedadjacent to the reactor building and accommodates vapour
recovery system and otherReactor Auxiliary systems such as
end-shield / calandria vault cooling systems etc. Eachunit has been
provided with two Natural Draught Cooling Towers (NDCTs) for
condensercooling and an IDCT for safety related loads. Each unit
will have its own emergencycontrol room, emergency power DG sets
and fuel oil day tank, SUT, UT, GT, SABS,
1.6
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NEERI Chapter 1: Introduction
turbine buildings, and CCW pump house. An emergency make up
water pond catering to7 days requirement is also provided for the
twin unit plant.
The Service Building, Spent Fuel Storage Bay, Safety Related
Pump House,Stack with Radiation Monitor room, Waste Management
Facility, D2O Upgrading Plant,F/M Maintenance facility, CW Intake
Structure, CW Discharge Channel, Switchyard, O &M Ware house,
Administrative Building and Technical Building etc, are common to
bothunits. Physical separation and redundancy have been provided
between the safetyrelated systems.
1.4.2 Layout Considerations
Following basic philosophy has been adopted
> Compact layout with due consideration to accessibility,
maintainability, and easeof construction, operation and
maintenance
> Avoid turbine missile zone for locating buildings
structures important to safety
> Personnel movement (walking) required to perform various
activities areminimized by suitably locating various facilities
> Locations are so chosen as to facilitate reduction in
operating personnel
> Minimize tunnels to ease maintenance
> Facilitate routing of major underground piping and cabling
within the building,largely eliminating underground trenches
> Seismic class of equipment is housed in seismic class
structures. Consistent withthis philosophy, Reactor Building (RB),
Control Building (CB), Reactor AuxiliaryBuilding (RAB), and Station
Auxiliary Buildings (SABs) are designed for SafeShutdown Earthquake
(SSE).
1.4.3 Reactor System
The reactor is of pressurized heavy water type using heavy water
as moderator,and heavy water as coolant and natural uranium dioxide
as fuel with zircaloy - 4 as acladding material. The reactor
consists of integral assembly of calandria vessel holds D2O
1.7
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NEERI Chapter 1: Introduction
moderator and Reflector. The reactor is having 392 coolant
channel assemblies.37element zircaloy claded natural uranium
dioxide (UO2) fuel bundles (10.24 cm dia x49.5 cm long) are
contained in pressure tubes (coolant tubes), which are made
ofZiroconium - 2.5% Niobium Alloy. Though the basic fuel is UO2,
some Thorium/Depletedfuel bundles may be used in fresh core for
initial flux flattening in order to operate athigher power level
even before equilibrium is attained. The pressure tubes are
arrangedin a square lattice of 286 mm pitch. At each end, pressure
tubes are rolled to AISI 403(Modified) stainless steel end
fittings, which penetrate the end shields and extend into
thefuelling machine vaults so as to facilitate on line re-fueling.
Feeders are connected to theend fittings by means of high-pressure
couplings for transport of coolant to the reactorheaders. The
pressure tube, calandria, end fittings, fuel bundles, and the
contained heavywater coolant together constitute the coolant
channel. Around each coolant tube, aconcentric calandria tube,
which is rolled into the end shield lattice tube, has beenprovided
with an annular gap. Each coolant channel is supported by the end
shield at theend fitting location and also supported partially by
the surrounding calandria tubesthrough 4 nos. garter springs
installed in the annulus between pressure tube andCalandria tube.
Carbon dioxide gas filled in this gap serves as thermal insulation
betweenthe high temperature primary coolant and low temperature
moderator. This annulus gasforms part of an advance sensing system
regarding pressure tube leak. Axial shielding tothe coolant channel
is provided by removable shield plugs fitted in the end fittings
oneither end. At the face of each end fitting, a seal plug is
installed which serves as a leaktight mechanical joint and can be
removed during refuelling operations.
1.4.4 Primary Heat Transport (PHT) System
The high-pressure high temperature primary heat transport (PHT)
system extractsheat from the fuel bundle and transports to the
steam generators, which generate steamto run the turbo-generator
and produce electricity. The PHT main system is essentiallytwo
independent pressurized heavy water (D2O) coolant closed loop
circuits circulatingcoolant through the coolant channels containing
fuel bundles, the outlet feeders, theoutlet reactor header, the
steam generators, the circulating pumps, the inlet reactorheader,
the inlet feeders and back into the coolant channels. Partial
boiling up to 4% atcoolant channel exit is permitted to extract
more heat (i.e. 2162 MWth) from the reactorcore to produce about
700 MWe instead of 540 MWe. The channel flows are matchedwith the
time averaged channel power pattern and Primary main circuit
pressure is
1.8
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NEERI Chapter 1: Introduction
controlled at Reactor Outlet header at a pressure corresponding
to saturation pressure at310 C. The pH and dissolved gases are kept
under control in the Primary circuit.
The PHT system includes a pressuriser and a feed and bleed
system for pressureand inventory control and pressure relief system
to protect the system pressure boundaryfrom over pressurization. It
also includes coolant purification system; high pressure heavywater
supply system for fueling machines, shutdown cooling system to
remove decayheat from the fuel, emergency core cooling system
(ECCS) and Inventory Addition andRecovery System (IARS) to maintain
core cooling following a loss of coolant Accident(LOCA) or
collecting and putting back small leakages back to PHT through
purification;and a leakage collection system to collect, contain
and transfer the collected heavy waterand to provide venting and
draining facility to the equipment.
Salient Features of the System
Ensures coolant circulation to remove core heat under all
anticipatedcircumstances. Core cooling is ensured by
> PHT main circulating loop coolant flow under normal
operation
> Primary circulating pump (PCP) flywheel inertia maintains
adequate coolantcirculation during short period of non-availability
of normal power to PCPs anddelay in establishing diesel driven
emergency power
> Shutdown cooling circuit pumps and heat exchangers ensure
cooling duringshutdown condition
> Thermo-syphon flow ensure cooling during station blackout
condition
> Emergency injection from H2O accumulators in the initial
phase of loss of coolantaccident (LOCA) followed by long term core
cooling phase using suppression poolwater re-circulation
PHT system is well instrumented to monitor and control
inventory, temperature,pressure and chemistry of the coolant. The
associated control and protection system isdesigned with adequate
margin and redundancy to ensure that the safe limits of
pressureboundary are not exceeded under any operational states.
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1.4.5 Moderator System
The purpose of heavy water moderator is to maintain criticality
in the reactor coreby slowing down the high-energy neutrons to low
energy thermal neutrons whereprobability for fission capture is
higher. The bulk of the space in the calandria i.e. thespace
available between the calandria tubes is filled with heavy water
moderator, which iscontinuously circulated with the help of two out
of three moderator pumps. Heavy watersued as moderator inside
calandria gets heated up due to neutron moderation andcapture,
attenuation of gamma radiation, as well as due to transfer of heat
from reactorcomponents in contact (total 123 MW). The moderator
temperature is controlled at about80 C at the outlet of calandria
by passing it through the two numbers of tube and shelltype
moderator heat exchangers.
1.4.6 Instrumentation and Control System
It encompasses monitoring and control of various plant
parameters. For protectionsystems, principle of redundancy,
diversity, testability and maintainability are given
primeconsideration. A high degree of automation is aimed at
promoting reliability. The safetysystems are designed to conform to
fail safe criteria. All visual indication and controls,which may be
required for operator's intervention during operation, are located
in a singlemain control room. The protection systems are
triplicated, the protection functions beingachieved by 2 out of 3
logic. Each channel is totally independent of other channels
withseparate sensors, signal processing instruments and power
supplies. This arrangementalso facilitates on power testing of
equipments of the triplicated channels. In cases wherethe
complexity of the system is likely to reduce reliability, as in
channel temperaturemonitoring system, only two channels are used
with a coincident logic of 2 out of 2. Theinstrumentation for the
control and protection systems is kept separate and independentof
each other. An extensive operator information system is provided.
CRT displays areused for information display and alarm parameter
signal on control panels. Also, a limitednumber of dedicated, hard
wired window annunciations are provided on control roompanels to
cover certain essential alarms. A separate control room is
provided, for theunlikely situation of inhabitability of main
control room, to enable safe shutdown of thereactor and to maintain
it in a prolonged sub critical state.
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1.4.7 Reactivity Control Reactor Shutdown System
Reactor control devices are required to regulate the reactor
power, to controlneutron flux tilt and for the reactor start up
process. These functions are achieved byLiquid Zone Control (LZC)
system, (light water absorber in 14 liquid zone
controlcompartments), 4 Control Rods (in 2 banks) and 17 Adjuster
Rods (in 8 banks).Automatic Liquid Poison Addition System (ALPAS)
is provided to supplement theregulating system, with controlled
addition of boron poison into the moderator. Boronconcentration in
moderator is also used for long-term reactivity control. Two fast
actingindependent shutdown systems are provided as part of the
protective system. Both thesehave adequate capability to suppress
any fast reactivity transient under various operatingand accident
conditions and to maintain reactor in sub critical condition for
long-termshutdown. Shut Down System#1 (SDS-1) contains 28 Shut off
Rods (Cadmiumsandwiched in SS), which are dropped into the core
when system is activated. ControlRods, which are normally parked
outside the core, are also dropped along with shut offrods. Shut
down system #2 (SDS-2) provides fast injection of liquid poison
(GadoliniumNitrate solution) directly into the moderator. SDS-1
activation is the preferred mode ofreactor shutdown, from economic
considerations due to poison outage and gadolimiumpoison removal
requirements, Set points for SDS-2 actuation are kept at a higher
levelnormally compared to SDS-1. Some set points are same for SDS -
1 & 2.
1.4.8 On Power Re-fuelling
Two fuelling machines (F/Ms) operating in conjunction at the two
ends of thereactor are provided to carry out on power fuelling. On
power fuelling is a characteristicfeature of Indian PHWR and is
required on a regular basis mainly in view of the use ofnatural
uranium fuel. New fuel bundles are inserted by one of the F/Ms at
one end of thereactor while the other machine at the other end
receives the spent fuel bundles. Bi-directional fuelling in
adjacent channels along the direction of flow is adopted to
smoothenaxial neutron flux pattern. By using F/M and fuel transfer
equipments, spent fuel bundlesare shifted to a shuttle which slides
inside a transport tube laid from Reactor Building tothe inspection
bay in the spent fuel building. Creating a hydraulic differential
pressureacross the shuttle causes this movement. The discharge fuel
if required, may beinspected in the inspection bay for any damage
before being transferred to the trays inthe storage bay. The
necessary inspection facility is provided. Spent fuel is stored
underwater in the trays for sufficient time period before it is
transferred out of the Station.
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1.4.9 Shut Down Cooling System
Shutdown cooling system is used for cooling the system below 150
C to about55C to facilitate maintenance.
Under planned shutdown of the reactor, PHT is cooled down with
the help ofsteam generators by controlled discharge of steam
through steam dump discharge valveson the secondary side of SG.
After the PHT system temperature comes to 150 C, S/Dsystem is
valved-in to cool the system further to about 55 C. Two single
stage centrifugalpumps along with two heat exchangers provide
cooling in each loop. Elevation wise, thelocation of the steam
generators in relation to the reactor core is so chosen that
duringclass IV power failure and consequent coasting down of the
main circulating pumps, heatremoval would be possible by
thermo-syphoning. This phase of the heat removal plays animportant
role in bringing down the temperature of the PHT system consequent
to a classIV failure to temperatures where shut down cooling can be
valved-in.
1.4.10 Emergency Core Cooling System
In the event of a loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA), as a
consequence of rupture inprimary coolant system pressure boundary,
the cooling of the fuel is ensured by utilizingECCS, a high
pressure light water coolant injection system followed by long term
re-circulation from suppression pool. Passive equipments like light
water accumulators,pressurized by N2 accumulator have been provided
for high-pressure coolant injection.Subsequently, emergency core
cooling pumps are used to re-circulate the suppressionpool water
through the core and remove decay heat. Decay heat is picked up by
the re-circulating water and is removed by passing the hot water
through the plate type heatexchangers. The system has been designed
to ensure safety under various postulatedconditions involving
different break sizes and locations.
1.4.11 Reactor Auxiliary Systems
> Reactor Vault Cooling System
Calandria is submerged inside a pool of water contained in the
calandria vault.The function of water is two fold, one to provide
shielding around the calandria andsecondly to cool down the vault
walls which serve as a biological shield. The heatgenerated in the
vault water and the concrete vault walls is removed by circulating
the
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vault water through heat exchangers SS Line. The peak concrete
temperature in thecalandria vault during worst scenario is expected
to be around 55 C.
> End Shield Cooling System
At each end of rector, steel balls filled end shields are used
as radiation shield tolimit the radiation dose in the F/M vaults.
The volume of circulating water in the end shieldand the steel
balls are arranged in such a ratio that they provide adequate
shieldingagainst neutrons and gamma rays. The recirculating water
removes the heat generated inthe end shields.
1.4.12 Containment
Double containment philosophy has been followed. The containment
systemconsists of an (Primary) inner containment enveloped by
(secondary) an outercontainment. The annulus between the inner and
outer containments is kept at a slightlynegative pressure with
respect to the atmosphere so as to minimize ground level
activityreleases to the environment during an accident
condition.
The containment serves basically three functions
1) Provide an envelope around the structure housing supporting
calandria, endshields, reactivity mechanisms, PHT and moderator
systems, fuelling system, andvarious associated systems
2) Provide shielding, and also to permit access to equipment
within the containmentbuilding under reactor operating/shutdown
conditions
3) It forms the last barrier in the path of radioactivity
release to the environmentfollowing a loss of coolant accident
(LOCA). The leak tightness integrity of thecontainment is therefore
important. The peak containment pressure following adouble ended
break in the main steam line (MSLB is higher than that
resultingfrom LOCA). Containment structural design is therefore,
based on MSLB and theleakage integrity specifications are based on
LOCA
4) The primary containment is of pre-stressed concrete and the
outer (secondary)containment is of reinforced concrete.
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5) During normal operation of the plant the primary and
secondary containmentsremain at a small negative pressure.
1.5 Services/Conventional Systems
1.5.1 Active Process Water System and Service Water System
The heat from different reactor process heat exchangers is
transferred to a closedloop active Process Water System. The plate
type heat exchangers located in thebasement of reactor auxiliary
building cools the active process water. The heat istransferred
here to SW (Service water) system, which in turn transfers it to
IDCT. Thissystem is safety related and the equipment pertaining to
these systems are qualified forSSE. Service water system also
absorbs heat from non-active water system and transfersthis heat to
IDCT.
1.5.2 Fire Water System
The main plant area is provided with extensive hydrant and
sprinkler systems forminimizing the consequences of any fire
hazard. Automatic sprinkler type protection isprovided for all
transformers and non-automatic sprinkler systems for main oil
tank,turbine oil tank and associated lubricating oil piping. In
door and out door hydrantslocated suitably will provide fire
protection within and around the plant buildings.
In case of process water failure, fire water supply will be
provided as back up toprocess water to meet, among other things,
reactor core cooling requirements. Underextreme emergencies
(station black out etc.) also, firewater will be available
throughdiesel driven pumps.
1.5.3 Turbine Generator System
The valve wide open rating of Turbine Generator is 695 MWe with
0.25% wetsteam flow of 3840 T/hr at 41.8 kg/cm2, before the
emergency stop valves (ESV), and acondenser pressure of 70 mm hg.
The Turbo-generator output may vary from 710 MWeto an assured
minimum of 690 MWe depending on the ambient condition.
The steam pressure in steam generator is 43.5 kg/cm2 (g). The
steam is deliveredto double flow H.P. turbine from steam generators
via two sets of ESV (emergency stopvalve) and governor valves.
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After expansion in HP cylinder, steam exhausts to the moisture
separator-reheaterwherein wetness is reduced and further reheated
in bled steam reheater and live steamreheater sections.
Subsequently steam enters the 2 nos. of LP double flow turbines
andexhausts to their respective surface condensers cooled by
condenser cooling water.Steam is extracted from suitable stages of
HP and LP turbine to provide regenerativefeed heating to about 180
C.
1.5.4 Secondary System
The main function of secondary system is to provide heat sink
for the heattransported from the reactor core by primary coolant
under various operating conditions.Secondary system consists of
steam generator (4 Nos.) HP and LP turbines, condenser,condenser
extraction pumps (CEPs), LP heaters, deaerator and storage tank,
boiler feedpumps (BFPs), feed pumps auxiliary boiler feed pumps
(ABRPs), HP heaters, etc.
The design pressure of steam system is 51 kg/sq. cm (g). The
steam pressure inthe steam generators is controlled at about 43.5
kg/sq cm (g) at full power. High-pressuretransients may be expected
due to sudden loss of demand of steam or by malfunctioningof
emergency stop valves (ESV). In such events, the pressure on the
secondary side islimited within the permissible value by using the
following devices.
1. Steam dump valves (SDVs) which discharge the steam into the
main condenser
2. Atmospheric steam discharge valves (ASDVs), which will be
actuated to relievethe steam to the atmosphere when required e.g.
loss of condenser vacuum,turbine trip etc.
3. Relief valves (RVs) which are provided as means of ultimate
safety to the steamgenerators and secondary side steam lines.
1.5.5 Condenser Cooling Water (CCW) System
A re-circulating type CCW system incorporating a Natural Draught
Cooling Tower(NDCT) has been adopted. The natural draught,
hyperbolic cooling tower has beendesigned for cooling 175000
Cu.m./hr of re-circulated water from 40 C to 32C.
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1.5.6 Electrical System
Various auxiliaries (i.e. various electrical loads) of the power
station are providedwith power supply from off-site and on-site
sources. The off site power supply is derivedfrom 400 KV and 220 KV
switchyards. The switchyard structures and equipment aredesignated
as codal category.
Start up transformers (SUTs) are connected to 220 KV switchyard.
These areused to derive start up power for the station generally.
Turbo-generators (TGs) areconnected to 400 KV switchyard through
generator transformer. Unit transformers (UTs)are connected to the
LV side of GTs and serve as an alternate off site source of
power.When a shutdown has to be taken up on TG, it is isolated by
means of generator circuitbreaker (GCB) and UTs will continue to be
available. The number of transmission linesconnected to the
switchyard is such that a double circuit line break and
maintenanceoutages of bus breakers etc will not impair the off site
power supply availability.
The station auxiliary power supply system is classified into
four classes dependingon the reliability requirements. These
are:
Class 1 system : 220V DC control power supplies from
batteries
Class 2 system : 415 V AC 3 phase system
Class 3 system : 6.6 KV and 415 V 3 phase system
Class 4 system : 6.6 KV and 415 V 3 phase system
Class 1 system (based on batteries) is most reliable. It is used
for the supply ofcontrol power to circuit breakers, diesel engine
control schematics, turbine controlschematics, static excitation
for turbo-generator, control schemes for diesel driven firefighting
pumps etc.
Class 2 power supply is derived from uninterruptible power
supply systemcomprising of rectifier, inverter and a dedicated
battery bank. The battery bank is capableof feeding inverter loads
for a period of at least 30 minutes after the failure of AC
supplyto the rectifier. Major loads on Class 2 include FM supply
pumps, emergency lights, sealoil pump and flushing oil pump.
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Class 3 power supply is connected to emergency diesel generators
to providepower supply in the event the class 4 power has failed.
Diesel generator sets aredesigned to provide power automatically to
the class 3 bus whenever class 4 has failed.Loads connected to the
class 3 supply can tolerate short interruptions in power
supply.
The class 3 power can be restored within two minutes after the
loss of class 4.The capacity of each on-site emergency diesel
generator is 3400 kW. Four nos of 50%diesel generator (DG) are
provided for each unit.
Major loads connected to class 3 power supply are primary feed
pumps, powerand control UPS, moderator circulating pumps, ECCS
pumps, air compressors, auxiliaryboiler feed pumps, shut down
cooling pumps and process water pumps.
Class 4 power supply is derived from 400kV and 220 kV
switchyards throughstart-up transformer and from the
turbo-generator unit transformer. The capacity of SUTis 80 MVA.
There are two Nos of UTs each rated 40 MVA per unit. Either SUT or
two UTsare capable of supplying the entire station load. Loads
connected to this system cantolerate prolonged power supply
interruption.
Electrical power supply system is grouped into two independent
divisions. One ofthe divisions is connected to startup transformer
and the other to the unit transformers.The capacity of each group,
their location and routing of the cables are such that commonmode
failures are minimized. The electrical power supply systems
catering to all safetyrelated loads are designed to meet the
requirement of single failure criterion.
1.6 Safety Classification
To ensure adequate safety to the public and plant site
personnel, the plant designmeets following general safety
requirements.
> The capability for safe shutdown of the reactor and
maintaining it in the safe shutdown condition during and after all
operational states and postulated accidentconditions.
> The capability to remove residual heat from the core after
reactor shut down, andduring and after all operational states and
postulated accident conditions andmaintain a coolable geometry.
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> The capability to reduce the potential for the release of
radioactive materials andensure that releases are within the
prescribed limits during and after alloperational states and
postulated accident conditions.
> To meet these requirements, systems, components and
structures have toperform certain safety functions. These safety
functions include those necessaryto prevent accident conditions as
well as those necessary to mitigate theconsequence of accident.
The relative importance of the safety function determines the
safety class of thesystems, components and structures performing
the safety function.
1.6.1 Safety Classes
Based on the above methodology, the following four different
safety classes(Class 1, 2, 3 & 4) are generally considered
appropriate in view of the design codes andstandards in vogue.
Safety Class 1:
Safety class 1 incorporates those safety functions, which are
necessary to preventthe release of substantial fraction of the core
fission product inventory to thecontainment/environment.
Safety Class 2:
Safety class 2 incorporates those safety functions necessary to
mitigate theconsequence of an accident, which would otherwise lead
to the release of substantialfraction of core fission product
inventory to the environment.
Safety class 2 also includes those safety functions necessary to
preventanticipated operational occurrences from leading to accident
conditions; and those safetyfunctions whose failure under certain
plant condition may result in severe consequencese.g. failure of
residual heat removal system.
Safety Class 3:
Safety class 3 incorporates those safety functions, which
perform a support role tosafety functions in safety classes 1, 2
and 3. It also includes:
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> Those safety function necessary to prevent radiation
exposure to the public or sitepersonnel from exceeding relevant
acceptable limits from sources outside reactorcoolant system.
> Those safety functions associated with reactivity control
on a slower time scalethan the reactivity control functions in
safety classes 1 and 2.
> Those safety functions associated with decay heat removal
from spent fueloutside reactor coolant system.
Safety Class 4:
Safety class 4 incorporates all those safety functions, which do
not fall withinsafety classes 1, 2 or 3.
Non-Nuclear Service (NNS)
This class includes all other systems, which are not associated
with any of thesafety functions.
1.7 Seismic Classification
To meet the requirement given in the previous section, a three
tier (or level)system has been adopted for the seismic
classification of systems, components,instruments and structures,
i.e.
(i) Safe Shut Down Earthquake (SSE) category,
(ii) Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) category and
(iii) General (Codal) category.
SSE Category:
SSE category incorporates all systems, components instruments
and structuresconforming to safety classes 1, 2 and 3 and shall be
designed for the maximum seismicground motion potential at site
(i.e. SSE) obtained through appropriate seismicevaluations based on
regional and local geology, seismology and soil
characteristics.
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SSE category corresponds to Category S2 of IAEA safety guide
50-SG-S1. Theequipment and systems that are required to be
qualified for SSE are classified as seismiccategory - 1 .
OBE Category
All systems, components, instruments and structures which are to
remainfunctional for continued operation of the plant without undue
risk fall under OBE categoryand the design basis shall be a lower
level seismic ground motion than SSE which mayreasonably be
expected during the plant life. A seismic event, exceeding OBE
level,would require a shut down of the plant and carrying out a
detailed inspection of the entireplant. OBE category corresponds to
category S1 of IAEA safety guide 50-SG-S1. Theequipment and systems
that are required to be qualified for OBE are classified as
seismiccategory -2.
General (Codal) Category
This category incorporates those systems, structures,
instruments andcomponents, the failure of which would not cause
undue radiological risk and includes allsystems, components,
instruments and structures which are not included in SSE or
OBEcategory. The seismic design basis shall be that prescribed by
the relevant Indianstandards (IS-1893, year 1984). The equipment
and systems that are required to bequalified for Codal requirements
are classified as seismic category - 3.
1.8 Quality Group Classification
Quality class of systems, components and structures generally
corresponds totheir respective safety class (i.e. quality class 1,
2, 3 & 4 corresponds to safety class 1, 2,3 & 4
respectively).
Quality class 1 shall meet the highest quality requirements.
Quality class 2, 3 & 4are of progressively lower quality
requirements. Quality class 4 will also include othersystems,
structures and components of the plant, which do not fall under any
on thesafety classes.
A few examples of the requirements of quality classes are as
under:
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> Pressure retaining components of quality classes 1, 2 and 3
shall meet therequirements of ASME B and PV code, section III sub
section NB, NC and NDrespectively.
> Pressure retaining components of quality class 4 (Safety
class 4) may bedesigned as per ASME Section VII Division 1
> Components supports under quality class 1, 2, & 3 shall
meet the designrequirements of ASME section III, sub section NF
> Electronic components used in class 1 and 2 I & C
systems are of MIL grade. TheI & C equipment and components are
also subjected to qualification testsincluding ageing and seismic
tests as required.
> For the purpose of performance qualification, the class EA
electrical equipmentare divided into three categories, depending on
the location inside or outside thecontainment and LOCA service. The
qualification is done by type tests onequipment components
/materials and further analysis wherever application.Quality
assurance is carried out as per AERB safety code AERB/SC/QA.
1.9 Quality Assurance
Quality Assurance in design, manufacture, construction,
commissioning andoperation is enforced in order to accomplish high
level of safety and reliability.
1.9.1 Design
The design adopts the concept of "Defense in depth" which
incorporatessuccessive and mutually reinforcing echelons of
equipment and systems provided toensure high reliability. The
single failure criteria have been uniformly adopted in thedesign of
safety related systems, which ensures desired function of all
safety relatedsystems even in case of a single component failure.
The principle is extended further incritical areas to systems as a
whole. For example, there are two independent shut downsystems
(Shut Down Systems #1 and Shut Down Systems #2). These SDSs get
actuatedon independent trip parameters. The design provides
multiple barriers against radioactivereleases. Dual failure events
are postulated and evaluated to ensure no undue risk ofradiation
hazards to public.
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Due consideration is given to avoid common cause failures in the
safety systems.Principle of independence and redundancy are adopted
in the design to achieve therequired reliability targets.
IAEA safety guides form the basis of Quality Assurance in
design. To ensurequality, safety related systems, structures and
components are first classified intodifferent safety classes (in
line with international practice) based on the relativeimportance
of their safety function. Each class of structures, systems and
componentsare then designed with the help of codes and standards
relevant to their safety class.Safety related equipment, components
and structures are generally designed as perASME Sec III whereas
Electrical and instrumentation systems are designed to meet theIEEE
standards.
All design and analysis is carried out through well established
practices and usingvalidated softwares, where ever necessary.
Validation of softwares are normally donethrough benchmark
problems, comparison of results using different
softwares,international exercises etc. The designs are reviewed
within the group and also subjectedto independent reviews depending
on their importance.
Safety related design and analysis reports are further reviewed
by the DesignSafety Committee before their submission to AERB.
1.9.2 Manufacture, Construction, and Commissioning
During the fabrication/construction of various components, stage
inspection andquality control are carried out by the manufactures
as per the procedures andrequirements laid down in the NPCIL
specifications. NPCIL quality SurveillanceEngineers or the
authorized outside third party AQ agencies oversee the Quality
ofproduct under manufacture. For this the QS engineer ensures that
the appropriateprocedures are followed during fabrication, by
carrying out stage inspection as well asrandom checks. After
completion of the manufacture, the quality surveillance
engineerissues shipping release after getting fully satisfied with
the product. Vital equipment maybe repeat tested to check their
operational capability in simulated experimental set ups.
At the construction site, field engineering cell operates
independently as arepresentative of the design office to overview
various construction activities to ensurethat the design intents
are fully met. Apart from the FE personnel, at the construction
site,quality surveillance engineers also work to ensure the quality
of construction.
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During the commissioning, proper functioning of al systems and
equipments areensured through written down procedures.
1.9.3 Operation
Engineers and operators undergo special training in plant
operation andradiological safety. They are qualified from time to
time to ensure the requisite level ofexpertise is maintained.
Written procedures duly cleared by competent authority are alsomade
available to the operating staff. Technical specifications for
operation approved byAtomic Energy Regulatory Board are adhered to
during operation. A strict control onoperating conditions and
periodic in service inspection of safety related components ofthe
plant ensure the health of the safety related systems. Appropriate
corrective actionsare taken on the basis of in service inspections.
The plant operation and maintenancestaff is also exposed to current
operational practices and trends during plant peer reviewsby
international bodies life WANO.
1.10 Scope of EIA
The scope of the study includes detailed characterization of
status of environmentin an area of 25 km radius around the proposed
RAPP 7 & 8 units. The basis for 30 kmradius for the study zone
is MoEF's recommendation that there should not be any majorurban
centre with population of more than one lakh within 30 km area. In
addition within10 km radius, there should not be any population
centre with more than 10,000population. The size of the study zone
is primarily based on topographic considerations.
The Scope of the Study Includes
i. To assess existing environmental status covering major
environmentalcomponents viz. air, noise, water, land, biological,
socio-economic and healthaspects.
ii. To identify potential impacts on various environmental
components during pre-construction and operational phases of the
project
iii. To predict significant impacts through identification,
calibration and validation ofappropriate mathematical / simulation
models
iv. To evaluate impacts of the project through appropriate
evaluation techniques
v. To prepare an Environmental Management Plan (EMP) outlining
control strategiesto be adopted for minimizing adverse impacts
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