C Complex Networks and Systems Dr Robert J. Bonneau Dr Robert J. Bonneau Program Manager AFOSR/RSL 1 Air Force Research Laboratory
CComplex Networksand Systems
Dr Robert J. BonneauDr Robert J. Bonneau Program Manager
AFOSR/RSL
1
Air Force Research Laboratory
Complex NetworksRoadmap
Complex networks uses the results of the mathematical quantification of critical information delivery to assure, manage, predict, and design Air Force networks
Local Network Research: Coding that assures information delivery and securityNetwork Management Research: Network protocol to maximize information flowGlobal Network Research: Predict network performance and design robustness
Dynamic, Heterogeneous, Unified Mission AssuredDesign
Local Network Research
Assure CriticalInformation Delivery
Network Management Research
Manage Information Flow
Raw NetworkData
Air Force Network
Critical
Design
MathematicalGuaranteed Delivery
Of Time Critical Information
CriticalInformation
Global Network Research
Predict Network
Characterization of Network
Information
CommunicationsNetworks
2
Predict Network PerformanceDiverse Types of
Networks(Fundamental
Principles)
Unified Mission Assured Architecture
• Current networks are managed with multiple protocols depending on their taxonomy • Air Force networks, particularly Airborne Networks are heterogeneous • A unified network approach should adapt to the conditions and provide design pp p p gprinciples
Design PrinciplesAccording
To Constraints
Less: Disruption Tolerant, Latency
More: Information Loss Under Interference,
Observable/Controllable
Less: Information Loss Under Interference,
Observable/ControllableMore: Disruption Tolerant,
Latency Adapt AccordingTo Measurements
3
Fundamental Network Principles
Units of information transfer do not have to be packets – generalizing this approach to other scientific areas allows generalized network design and analysis within constraints
- Taking this approach can lead to an integrated strategy of stable design formulationNetwork Design Principles
Content Deterministic
(1/informationtimescale)
FrequencyData
Network
Packet
WirelessNetwork
Hardware/Software
Register/
Social
Words
Biological
DNA
Basic Information Unit Scales
RandomHeterogeneous
Network Design Principles
DeterministicProtocol
Co te t(local)
Network Policy/Protocol(management)
Content
HeterogeneousProtocol
Packet
PacketGroups
ModulationUnit
Waveform
gVariable
Ram/Subroutine
Words
Phrases
DNA
ProteinSynth.
RandomProtocol
ContentContent
Distribution
Deterministic Heterogeneous Random
NetworkStructure
(global) HeterogeneousNetwork
DeterministicNetwork
PacketBlocks
SignalArray
Virtual Mem./
Program
NewsReports/
BlogsCell
Function
C i ti G l
RandomNetwork
CommunicationsNetworks
General Networks
DesignExcluded Properties
Resourced
DesignIncluded Properties
4
Time Evolution(Global
Properties)
Not Resourced,Not Stable,Not Secure
Resourced,Stable,Secure
Comprehensive Systems Modeling
- Model heterogeneous distributed systems using unified, modular, composable and scalable mathematical framework from previous measurement and system specification
- Use new statistical, algebraic, and geometric representations and theory for modularized representations and composable into a modeling frameworkframework
Unified RepresentationSystem of Interest
Mathematical ModelsResource Policy
Security Framework
Database Arch.Operating System
MissionApplications
Physical Environ.Resource Const.
Processing
Modular, Composable,
Scalable Model of Unified System
Prog. LanguagesDesign Tools
HardwareNetwork
Statistical, Algebraic, Geometric, …
5
Measurement-Based System Verification
- Verify the properties of a given unified system through measurement of a limitedset of parameters and calculate system risk of not meeting mission requirements
A i k b di t b t ti f d i d t ti- Assess risk by distance between properties of desired representation (model) and measured properties - Incorporate risk of sparse measurement
M d P ti
Desirable Properties:
Measurement
MissionRequirements Low
MissionRisk
Measured Properties
Desirable Properties:(Example)
Robustness to Disruption
Medium Mission
RiskRisk AssessmentDesired Properties
Undesirable Properties:(Examples)
Latency, Interference,Computational Overhead
Performance Verification
Risk
High Mission
Risk
p
6
pRisk
System Design Trade-space
- Define general application architectural and policy design principles through unified assessment of system operating riskg y p g
- Apply to existing architectures through policy implementation
System Operating Trade-space
Architecturally Included ModalitiesArchitecturally Excluded Modalities
7
Architecturally Included Modalities(low mission risk)
Architecturally Excluded Modalities(high mission risk)
Systems Engineering Framework
- Measure and Model, for Design using a comprehensive, modular,compositional, and scalable framework
- Models inform measurement based verification of system properties- Models inform measurement based verification of system properties- Strategy enables designs to quantifiably meet mission performanceobjectives in heterogeneous dynamic systems
Mission
Comprehensive System
Modeling
SystemDesign
System Measurement
PerformanceObjectives
VerificationSystem
8
VerificationOf System
Performance
SystemPerformanceTrade-space