ALFONSO MONTEBON vs.THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS
Facts: This is a petition forhabeas corpusby Alfonso Montebon on
behalf of Elpidio S. Cruz, a prisoner at the Iwahig Penal Colony. A
similar petition was filed with this Court by Felicisima Santiago
in the name of the same prisoner (Santiagovs.Director of Prisons,
77 Phil., 927), a petition which was denied by us in a decision
promulgated on January 30, 1947. The ground of the first petition
was the alleged illegality of one of the prisoner's three
convictions forestafa.The present application contests the validity
of the prisoner's recommitment decreed by the Commissioner of
Justice of the Philippine Executive Commission under date of June
3, 1943, for the unexpired portion of his (prisoner's) maximum
aggregate sentences in three cases in which he had been paroled by
the Board of Indeterminate Sentence on June 26, 1941, when he still
had over five years to serve. The commissioner of Justice's
recommitment order was made by virtue of Administrative Order No.
21, dated June 21, 1942, and approved by the Chairman of the
Executive Commission, which read: "The Board of Indeterminate
Sentence and the Board of Pardons having been abolished, the
powers, duties and functions thereof shall henceforth be assumed
and exercised by the Commissioner of Justice.
Issue: Won the recommitment order valid during the Japanese
Occupation?
Held: The petition is denied without costs.
Ruling: Enforcement of the criminal law by the forces of
occupation is not only valid and binding; it is imposed on them as
a high obligation by the Hague Convention and the theory of jus
postlimitinii on the international Law. That the legal truism in
political and international law that all acts and proceedings of
the legislative, executive and judicial departments of ade facto
government are good and valid."The reason underlying requirement is
thus stated in Williamvs.Bruffy (96 U.S., 176, 192), cited inCo Kim
Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, supra:
"The existence of a state of insurrection and war did not loosen
the bonds of society, or do away with civil government or the
regular administration of the laws. Order was to be preserved,
police regulations maintained, crime prosecuted, property
protected, contracts enforced, marriages celebrated, estates
settled, and the transfer and descent of property regulated,
precisely as in the time of peace. No one, that we are aware of,
seriously questions the validity of judicial or legislative Acts in
the
ROMANA LOCQUIAO VALENCIA and CONSTANCIA L. VALENCIA,petitioners,
vs. BENITO A. LOCQUIAO, now deceased and substituted byJIMMY
LOCQUIAO, TOMASA MARA and the REGISTRAR OF DEEDS OFPANGASINAN,
respondents.CONSTANCIA L. VALENCIA, petitioner, vs. BENITO A.
LOCQUIAO, nowdeceased and substituted by JIMMY LOCQUIAO,
respondent.
Facts: Locquiao spouses executed a deed of donation propter
nuptias written in Ilocano in favor of their son, Benito and his
soon-to-be bride, Tomasa Mara. By the terms of the agreement, the
donation consist of 4 parcels of land, one male cow and 1/3 of the
conjugal house of the spouses Locquiao. The marriage took place on
1944. The spouses died on 1962 and 1968, respectively leaving their
6 children as heirs. With the permission of Benito, Romana, one of
the heirs took over the possession of the donated lands and
cultivated it. When her husband got sick, her daughter, Constancia
took over the position in cultivating the land.
Meanwhie Benito and Tomasa registered the Inventario Ti Sagut
leaving the old title cancelled.
Later, the heirs of the Locquiao spouses, including respondent
Benito and petitioner Romana, executed a Deed of Partition with
Recognition of Rights, wherein they distributed among 3 out of the
12 parcels of land left by their common progenitors, excluding the
land in question and other lots disposed of by the Locquiao spouses
earlier. Contained in the deed is a statement that respondent
Benito and Marciano Locquiao, along with the heirs of Lucio
Locquiao, have already received our shares in the estates of our
parents, by virtue of previous donations and conveyances, and that
for that reason the heirs of Lucio Locquaio were not made parties
to the deed. All the living children of the Locquaio spouses at the
time, including petitioner Romana, confirmed the previous
dispositions and waived their rights to whomsoever the properties
covered by the deed of partition were adjudicated.
Subsequently, disagreements among the heirs surfaced leading to
execution of deed of compromise agreement. Benito, although not
directly involved, signed the agreement. Sometime in 1983,
Constancia filed for the annulment of the agreement. The lower
court dismissed the petition. This lead an ejectment case raised by
Benito in favor of Constancia. Petitioners Romana and Constancia
countered with a Complaint for the annulment of the donated and
registered land against respondents Benito and Tomasa. Petitioners
alleged that the issuance of the transfer certificate of title was
fraudulent; that the Inventario Ti Sagut is spurious; that the
notary public who notarized the document had no authority to do so,
and; that the donation did not observe the form required by law as
there was no written acceptance on the document itself or in a
separate public instrument.
Issue: (1) whether the donation propter nuptias is authentic;
(2) whether acceptance of the donation by the donees is required;
(3) if so, in what form should the acceptance appear, and; (4)
whether the action is barred by prescription and laches.
Held:- 1st Issue: To buttress their claim that the document was
falsified, the petitioners rely mainly on the Certification that
there was no notarial record for the year 1944 of Cipriano V.
Abenojar who notarized the document on May 22, 1944 and that
therefore a copy of the document was not available. The
certification is not sufficient to prove the alleged inexistence or
spuriousness of the challenged document. The mere absence of the
notarial record does not prove that the notary public does not have
a valid notarial commission and neither does the absence of a file
copy of the document with the archives effect evidence of the
falsification of the document. The failure of the notary public to
furnish a copy of the deed to the appropriate office is a ground
for disciplining him, but certainly not for invalidating the
document or for setting aside the transaction therein involved.
Moreover, the heirs of the Locquaio spouses, including
petitioner Romana, made reference in the deed of partition and the
compromise agreement to the previous donations made by the spouses
in favor of some of the heirs. Benito was not allotted any share in
the deed of partition precisely because he received his share by
virtue of previous donations. His name was mentioned in the deed of
partition only with respect to one parcel of land which is the
eleventh (11th) parcel in the deed but that is the same one-third
(1/3) portion of conjugal lot of their progenitors included in the
donation propter nuptias. Similarly, Marciano Locquiao and the
heirs of Lucio Locquiao were not allocated any more share in the
deed of partition since they received theirs by virtue of prior
donations or conveyances.
- 2nd Issue: No. Unlike ordinary donations, donations propter
nuptias or donations by reason of marriage are those made before
its celebration, in consideration of the same and in favor of one
or both of the future spouses. The distinction is crucial because
the two classes of donations are not governed by exactly the same
rules, especially as regards the formal essential requisites. Under
the Old Civil Code, donations propter nuptias must be made in a
public instrument in which the property donated must be
specifically described. However, Article 1330 of the same Code
provides that acceptance is not necessary to the validity of such
gifts. In other words, the celebration of the marriage between the
beneficiary couple, in tandem with compliance with the prescribed
form, was enough to effectuate the donation propter nuptias under
the Old Civil Code.
Under the New Civil Code, the rules are different. Article 127
thereof provides that the form of donations propter nuptias are
regulated by the Statute of Frauds. Article 1403, paragraph 2,
which contains the Statute of Frauds requires that the contracts
mentioned thereunder need be in writing only to be enforceable.
However, as provided in Article 129, express acceptance is not
necessary for the validity of these donations. Thus, implied
acceptance is sufficient.
It is settled that only laws existing at the time of the
execution of a contract are applicable thereto and not later
statutes, unless the latter are specifically intended to have
retroactive effect.
Consequently, it is the Old Civil Code which applies in this
case since the donation propter nuptias was executed in 1944 and
the New Civil Code took effect only on August 30, 1950. The fact
that in 1944 the Philippines was still under Japanese occupation is
of no consequence. It is a well-known rule of the Law of Nations
that municipal laws, as contra-distinguished from laws of political
nature, are not abrogated by a change of sovereignty. Thus, the Old
Civil Code was in force. As a consequence, applying Article 1330 of
the Old Civil Code in the determination of the validity of the
questioned donation, it does not matter whether or not the donees
had accepted the donation. The validity of the donation is
unaffected in either case. Even if the provisions of the New Civil
Code were to be applied, the case of the petitioners would collapse
just the same. As earlier shown, even implied acceptance of a
donation propter nuptias suffices under the New Civil Code.
- 3rd Issue: It is barred by prescription. Under the Old Code of
Civil Procedure, an action for recovery of the title to, or
possession of, real property, or an interest therein, can only be
brought within ten years after the cause of such action accrues.
Thus, petitioners action, which was filed on December 23, 1985, or
more than forty (40) years from the execution of the deed of
donation on May 22, 1944, was clearly time-barred. Even following
petitioners theory that the prescriptive period should commence
from the time of discovery of the alleged fraud, the conclusion
would still be the same. As early as May 15, 1970, when the deed of
donation was registered and the transfer certificate of title was
issued, petitioners were considered to have constructive knowledge
of the alleged fraud, following the jurisprudential rule that
registration of a deed in the public real estate registry is
constructive notice to the whole world of its contents, as well as
all interests, legal and equitable, included therein. As it is now
settled that the prescriptive period for the reconveyance of
property allegedly registered through fraud is ten (10) years,
reckoned from the date of the issuance of the certificate of title,
the action filed on December 23, 1985 has clearly prescribed.
The elements of laches are present in this case, viz:(1) conduct
on the part of the defendant, or one under whom he claims, giving
rise to the situation that led to the complaint and for which the
complainant seeks a remedy;(2) delay in asserting the complainants
rights, having had knowledge or notice of defendants conduct and
having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit;(3) lack of
knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the
complainant would assert the right on which he bases his suit,
and(4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is
accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held barred Of the
facts which support the finding of laches, stress should be made of
the following: (a) the petitioners Romana unquestionably gained
actual knowledge of the donation propter nuptias when the deed of
partition was executed in 1973 and the information must have
surfaced again when the compromise agreement was forged in 1976,
and; (b) as petitioner Romana was a party-signatory to the two
documents, she definitely had the opportunity to question the
donation propter nuptias on both occasions, and she should have
done so if she were of the mindset, given the fact that she was
still in possession of the land in dispute at the time. But she did
not make any move. She tarried for 11 more years from the execution
of the deed of partition until she, together with petitioner
Constancia, filed the annulment case in 1985.
in their purpose or mode of enforcement to the authority of the
National Government, and did not impair the rights of citizens
under the Constitution." The same doctrine has been asserted in
numerous other cases.
LAWYERS LEAGUE vs AQUINO
Facts:On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued
Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she and Vice President Laurel
were taking power.
On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the
basis of the Aquino government assumption of power by stating that
the "new government was installed through a direct exercise of the
power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed
Forces of the Philippines.
The petitioners claim that her government is illegal because it
was not established pursuant to the 1973 Constitution. Thus, the
legitimacy of the government of President Cory Aquino is being
questioned.
Issue:W/N the government of Aquino is legitimate
Held:Petitioners had no personality to sue and petition states
no cause of action.
Ruling:a.)Legitimacy of Aquino govt belongs to realm of politics
where only the people of the Philippines are the judge (not a
justiciable matter)b.) The people have made the judgment, accepting
the Aquino govt w/c is in effective control of the entire
country.c.) Aquino govt is not merely a de facto govt but in fact
and law a de jure govt..d.) Community of nations has recognized its
legitimacy.e.) All 11 members of SC have sworn to uphold the
fundamental law of the Republic under Aquino govt.
The legitimacy of the Aquino admimistration is not a justiciable
matter but a political one. It is political because it belongs to
the realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines are
the judge.
The Aquino government is a de jure and a de facto government for
the people have made the judgment and have accepted the government
of President Aquino which is in effective control of the entire
country.
The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the
present government and all the 11 members of the Supreme Court have
sworn to uphold the fundamental law of the Republic under her
government.
LETTER OF ASSOCIATE JUSTICE PUNO
Facts:Petitioner Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno, a member of
the Court of Appeals, wrote a letter dated 14 November 1990
addressed to this Court, seeking the correction of his seniority
ranking in the Court of Appeals.
The aftermath of the EDSA Revolution in February 1986 brought
about a reorganization of the entire government, including the
Judiciary. To effect the reorganization of the Intermediate
Appellate Court and other lower courts, a Screening Committee was
created. President Corazon C. Aquino, exercising legislative powers
by virtue of the revolution, issued Executive Order No. 33 to
govern the aforementioned reorganization of the Judiciary. When the
appointments were signed by President Aquino on 28 July 1986,
petitioners seniority ranking changed, however, from number eleven
(11) to number twenty six (26).
Petitioner now alleges that the change in his seniority ranking
could only be attributed to inadvertence for, otherwise, it would
run counter to the provisions of Section 2 of Executive Order No.
33, which reads:"SEC. 2. Organization. There is hereby created a
Court of Appeals which shall consist of a Presiding Justice and
fifty Associate Justices who shall be appointed by the President of
the Philippines
A motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the Court en
banc dated 29 November 1990 was later filed by Associate Justices
Jose C. Campos, Jr. and Luis A. Javellana, two (2) of the Associate
Justices affected by the ordered correction. They contend that the
present Court of Appeals is a new Court with fifty one (51) members
and that petitioner could not claim a reappointment to a prior
court; neither can he claim that he was returning to his former
court, for the courts where he had previously been appointed ceased
to exist at the date of his last appointment.
Issue:- WON the Executive Order No. 33 is questionable regarding
the reappointment and reconsideration of the ranking of Associate
Justice Reynato Puno.- WON the the B.P Blg 129 is effective in the
time of the new regime of President Corazon Aquino.
Ruling:The Court GRANTS the Motion for Reconsideration and the
seniority rankings of members of the Court of Appeals, including
that of the petitioner, at the time the appointments were made by
the President in 1986, are recognized and upheld.
Rationale:The Court holds that the Court of Appeals and
Intermediate Appellate Court existing prior to Executive Order No.
33 phased out as part of the legal system abolished by the
revolution and that the Court of Appeals established under
Executive Order No. 33 was an entirely new court with appointments
thereto having no relation to earlier appointments to the abolished
courts, and that the reference to precedence in rank contained in
the last sentence of Sec. 2, BP Blg. No. 129 as amended by
Executive Order No. 33 refers to prospective situations as
distinguished from retroactive ones.
It is to be noted that, at the time of the issuance of Executive
Order No. 33, President Aquino was still exercising the powers of a
revolutionary government, encompassing both executive and
legislative powers, such that she could, if she so desired, amend,
modify or repeal any part of B.P. Blg. 129 or her own Executive
Order No. 33. It should also be remembered that the same situation
was still in force when she issued the 1986 appointments to the
Court of Appeals. In other words, President Aquino, at the time of
the issuance of the 1986 appointments, modified or disregarded the
rule embodied in B.P. Blg. 129 as amended by Executive Order No.
33, on precedence or seniority in the case of the petitioner, for
reasons known only to her. Since the appointment extended by the
President to the petitioner in 1986 for membership in the new Court
of Appeals with its implicit ranking in the roster of justices, was
a valid appointment anchored on the Presidents exercise of her then
revolutionary powers, it is not for the Court at this time to
question or correct that exercise.
Taada vs. TuveraG.R. No. L-63915 (146 SCRA 446) April 24,
1985
FACTS: Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding
the disclosure or a number of presidential decrees, letters of
instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders,
letter of implementation and administrative orders, invoking the
right to be informed on matters of public concern as recognized by
the 1973 constitution, which they claimed had not been published as
required by law. The government argued that while publication was
necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was "otherwise
provided," as when the decrees themselves declared that they were
to become effective immediately upon their approval. The Court held
that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the
date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication
itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. The Court noted the
conclusive presumption that every person knows the law, which
presupposes that the law has been published if the presumption is
to have any legal justification.
ISSUE:Whether or not all laws shall be published in the official
gazette.
RULING:The court held that all statute including those of local
application shall be published as condition for their effectivity,
which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different
effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
The publication must be full or no publication at all since its
purpose is to inform the public of the content of the laws. The
clause unless otherwise provided in Article 2 of the new Civil Code
meant that the publication required therein was not always
imperative, that the publication when necessary, did not have to be
made in the official gazette.
RATIONALE:The clear object of the necessity of publication is to
give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which
are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such
notice and publication, there would be no basis for
theapplicationof the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would
be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen
for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice
whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public
nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law.
Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures
or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or
the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this
category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to
particular persons or class of persons such
asadministrativeandexecutive ordersneed not be published on the
assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned.
Tanada, et al. versus Angara, et al., G.R. No. 118295. May 2,
1997272 SCRA 18
EN BANC
THE FACTS
On April 15, 1994, the Secretary of the Department of Trade and
Industry (Rizalino Navarro), representing the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines, signed in the Final Act Embodying the
Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations. By
signing the Final Act, the Philippines, among other countries, was
put into WTO Agreement requiring the Philippines to place nationals
and products of member-countries on the same footing as Filipinos
and local products. As a consequence, the President sought for a
Senate concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the
Constitution. However, the petitioners assailed the WTO Agreement
for violating the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to develop a
self-reliant and independent national economy effectively
controlled by Filipinos, to give preference to qualified Filipinos
and to promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic
materials and locally produced goods.
THE ISSUES(1) DOES THE PETITION PRESENT A JUSTICIABLE
CONTROVERSY? OTHERWISE STATED, DOES THE PETITION INVOLVE A
POLITICAL QUESTION OVER WHICH THIS COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION?(2) DO
THE PROVISIONS OF THE WTO AGREEMENT AND ITS THREE ANNEXES
CONTRAVENE SEC. 19, ARTICLE II, AND SECS. 10 AND 12, ARTICLE XII,
OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION?(3) DO THE PROVISIONS OF SAID
AGREEMENT AND ITS ANNEXES LIMIT, RESTRICT, OR IMPAIR THE EXERCISE
OF LEGISLATIVE POWER BY CONGRESS?(4) DO SAID PROVISIONS UNDULY
IMPAIR OR INTERFERE WITH THE EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL POWER BY THIS
COURT IN PROMULGATING RULES ON EVIDENCE?(5) WAS THE CONCURRENCE OF
THE SENATE IN THE WTO AGREEMENT AND ITS ANNEXES SUFFICIENT AND/OR
VALID, CONSIDERING THAT IT DID NOT INCLUDE THE FINAL ACT,
MINISTERIAL DECLARATIONS AND DECISIONS, AND THE UNDERSTANDING ON
COMMITMENTS IN FINANCIAL SERVICES?
First Issue: JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSYThe Court responded that in
deciding to take jurisdiction over this petition, this Court will
not review the wisdom of the decision of the President and the
Senate in enlisting the country into the WTO, or pass upon the
merits of trade liberalization as a policy espoused by said
international body. Neither will it rule on the propriety of the
governments economic policy of reducing/removing tariffs, taxes,
subsidies, quantitative restrictions, and other import/trade
barriers. Rather, it will only exercise its constitutional duty to
determine whether or not there had been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the
Senate in ratifying the WTO Agreement and its three annexes.
Second Issue: WHETHER OR NOT THE CONSTITUTION CONTRAVENESThere
was no contravention of the Constitution specifically on the
provisions in Section 19, Article II, and Sections 10 and 12,
Article XII. These provisions read as follows:Article II, Sec. 19.
The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national
economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.
Article XII, Sec. 10. x x x. The Congress shall enact measures
that will encourage the formation and operation of enterprises
whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.
In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the
national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to
qualified Filipinos.
Article 12, Sec. 12. The State shall promote the preferential
use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced
goods, and adopt measures that help make them competitive.Article
II of the Constitution is a declaration of principles and state
policies. The principles in Article II are not intended to be
self-executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts.
They do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but
guidelines for legislation.
Third Issue: THE WTO AGREEMENT AND LEGISLATIVE POWERThe Court
stressed that, as shown by the foregoing treaties, a portion of
sovereignty may be waived without violating the Constitution, based
on the rationale that the Philippines adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land and
adheres to the policy of . . . cooperation and amity with all
nations.
Fourth Issue: The WTO AGREEMENT AND JUDICIAL POWERThe Court says
that:The requirement of Article 34 to provide a disputable
presumption applies only if (1) the product obtained by the
patented process is NEW or (2) there is a substantial likelihood
that the identical product was made by the process and the process
owner has not been able through reasonable effort to determine the
process used. Where either of these two provisos does not obtain,
members shall be free to determine the appropriate method of
implementing the provisions of TRIPS within their own internal
systems and processes.By and large, the arguments adduced in
connection with our disposition of the third issue -- derogation of
legislative power - will apply to this fourth issue also. Suffice
it to say that the reciprocity clause more than justifies such
intrusion, if any actually exists. Besides, Article 34 does not
contain an unreasonable burden, consistent as it is with due
process and the concept of adversarial dispute settlement inherent
in our judicial system.So too, since the Philippine is a signatory
to most international conventions on patents, trademarks and
copyrights, the adjustment in legislation and rules of procedure
will not be substantial.
Fifth Issue: CONCURRENCE ONLY IN THE WTO AGREEMENT AND NOT IN
OTHER DOCUMENTS CONTAINED IN THE FINAL ACTPetitioners allege that
the Senate concurrence in the WTO Agreement and its annexes -- but
not in the other documents referred to in the Final Act, namely the
Ministerial Declaration and Decisions and the Understanding on
Commitments in Financial Services -- is defective and insufficient
and thus constitutes abuse of discretion. They submit that such
concurrence in the WTO Agreement alone is flawed because it is in
effect a rejection of the Final Act, which in turn was the document
signed by Secretary Navarro, in representation of the Republic upon
authority of the President. They contend that the second letter of
the President to the Senate which enumerated what constitutes the
Final Act should have been the subject of concurrence of the
Senate.
THE RULINGThe Court DISMISSED the petition for LACK OF MERIT.
The concurrence of the Philippine Senate to the Presidents
ratification of the Agreement establishing the WTO is
sustained.
DOMINO vs. COMELEC
FACTS:On 25 March 1998, DOMINO filed his certificate of
candidacy for the position of Representative of the Province of
Sarangani indicating in his certificate that he had resided in the
constituency where he seeks to be elected for one (1) year and two
(2) months immediately preceding the election. On 6 May 1998, the
COMELEC 2nd Division promulgated a resolution declaring DOMINO
disqualified as candidate for the position of representative of
Sarangani for lack of the one-year residence requirement and
likewise ordered the cancellation of his certificate of
candidacy.
ISSUE/S:1. WON a summary proceeding for the exclusion or
inclusion of voters in the list of voters declaring DOMINO a
resident of the province of Sarangani and not of Quezon City
acquire the nature of res judicata.2. WON DOMINO was a resident of
the Province of Sarangani for at least one year immediately
preceding the election.3. Whether the COMELEC or the HRET has
jurisdiction over the present petition of DOMINO.4. WON, the
candidate who received the next highest number of votes can be
proclaimed as the winning candidate in the light of DOMINOs
disqualification?
RULING:1.No. The contention of DOMINO that the decision in the
exclusion proceedings declaring him a resident of the Province of
Sarangani and not of Quezon City is final and conclusive upon the
COMELEC cannot be sustained. It is not within the competence of the
trial court, in an exclusion proceeding, to declare the challenged
voter a resident of another municipality. The jurisdiction of the
lower court over exclusion cases is limited only to determining the
right of voter to remain in the list of voters or to declare that
the challenged voter is not qualified to vote in the precinct in
which he is registered, specifying the ground of the voter's
disqualification.
Finally, the application of the rule onres judicatais
unavailing.For the decision to be a basis for the dismissal by
reason ofres judicata, it is essential that there must be between
the first and the second action identity of parties, identity of
subject matter and identity of causes of action.
2. No. It is doctrinally settled that the term "residence," as
used in the law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for
elective office, means the same thing as "domicile," which imports
not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal
presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention.
A person's "domicile" once established is considered to continue
and will not be deemed lost until a new one is established.25To
successfully effect a change of domicile one must demonstrate an
actual removal or an actual change of domicile; abona fideintention
of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new
one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose.26In other
words, there must basically beanimusmanendicoupled withanimusnon
revertendi.
3. The COMELEC, has jurisdiction over the present petition. The
fact of obtaining the highest number of votes in an election does
not automatically vest the position in the winning candidate.41A
candidate must be proclaimed and must have taken his oath of office
before he can be considered a member of the House of
Representatives. Considering that DOMINO has not been proclaimed as
Congressman-elect in the Lone Congressional District of the
Province of Sarangani he cannot be deemed a member of the House of
Representatives. Hence, it is the COMELEC and not the Electoral
Tribunal which has jurisdiction over the issue of his ineligibility
as a candidate.
4. NO. The candidate who obtains the second highest number of
votes may not be proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is
disqualified.It would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept
of the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate
who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is
proclaimed a winner and imposed as the representative of a
constituency, the majority of which have positively declared
through their ballots that they do not choose him.
TONDO MEDICAL CENTER EMPLOYEES V. CA
Facts: President Estrada issued Executive Order No. 102,
entitled Redirecting the Functions and Operations of the Department
ofHealth, which provided for the changes in the roles, functions,
and organizational processes of the DOH. Under the assailed
executive order, the DOH refocused its mandate from being the sole
provider of health services to being a provider of specific health
services and technical assistance, as a result of the devolution of
basic services to local government units.
Petitioners questioned the first reform agenda involving the
fiscal autonomy of government hospitals, particularly the
collection of socialized user fees and the corporate restructuring
of government hospitals. The said provision under the HSRA
reads:Provide fiscal autonomy to government hospitals. Government
hospitals must be allowed to collect socialized user fees so they
can reduce the dependence on direct subsidies from the government.
Their critical capacities like diagnostic equipment, laboratory
facilities and medical staff capability must be upgraded to
effectively exercise fiscal autonomy. Such investment must be
cognizant of complimentary capacity provided by public-private
networks. Moreover such capacities will allow government hospitals
to supplement priority public health programs. Appropriate
institutional arrangement must be introduced such as allowing them
autonomy towards converting them into government corporations
without compromising their social responsibilities. As a result,
government hospitals are expected to be more competitive and
responsive to health needs.
Petitioners alleged that the implementation of the
aforementioned reforms had resulted in making free medicine and
free medical services inaccessible to economically disadvantaged
Filipinos. Thus, they alleged that the HSRA is void for being in
violation of the following constitutional provisions:ART. III, SEC.
1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without
due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the law.
ART II, SEC. 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the
protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the
general welfare are essential for the enjoyment of all the people
of the blessings of democracy.
ART II, SEC. 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic
social order that will ensure the prosperity and independence of
the nation and free the people from poverty through policies that
provide adequate social services, promote full employment, a rising
standard of living and an improved quality of life for all.ART II,
SEC. 10. The State shall promote social justice in all phases of
national development.ART II, SEC. 11. The State values the dignity
of every human person and guarantees full respect for human
rights.ART II, SEC. 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the
youth in nation-building and shall promote and protect their
physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual and social well-being x x
x.ART II, SEC. 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social
economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers and promote
their welfare.ART XV, SEC. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino
family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall
strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total
development.ART XV, SEC. 3. The State shall defend: (2) the right
of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and
special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty,
exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their
development.ART XIII, SEC. 14. The State shall protect working
women by providing safe and healthful working conditions, taking
into account their maternal functions, and such facilities and
opportunities that will enhance their welfare and enable them to
realize their full potential in the service of the nation.ART II,
SEC. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of
the people and instill health consciousness among them.ART XIII,
SEC. 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive
approach to health development which shall endeavor to make
essential goods, health and other social services available to all
people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of
the underprivileged sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children.
The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to
paupers.
Issue: Whether or not Executive Order 102 is constitutional?
Held: Yes. Petitioners allege that the HSRA should be declared
void, since it runs counter to the aspiration and ideals of the
Filipino people as embodied in the Constitution. They claim that
the HSRAs policies of fiscal autonomy, income generation, and
revenue enhancement violate Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15 and 18 of
Article II, Section 1 of Article III; Sections 11 and 14 ofArticle
XIII; and Sections 1 and 3 of Article XV of the 1987Constitution.
Such policies allegedly resulted in making inaccessible free
medicine and free medical services.
This contention is unfounded.As a general rule, the provisions
of the Constitution areconsidered self-executing, and do not
require future legislationfor their enforcement. For if they are
not treated as self-executing, the mandate of the fundamental law
can be easilynullified by the inaction of Congress. However, some
provisionshave already been categorically declared by this Court as
nonself-executing.
In Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation,this
Court declared that Sections 11, 12, and 13 of Article II; Section
13 of Article XIII; and Section 2 of Article XIV of the1987
Constitution are not self-executing provisions.
In Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, the Court referred to
Section 1 of Article XIII and Section 2 of Article XIV of the
Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not as judicially
enforceable rights. These provisions, which merely lay down a
general principle, are distinguished from other constitutional
provisions as non self-executing and, therefore, cannot give rise
to a cause ofaction in the courts; they do not embody judicially
enforceable constitutional rights.
Some of the constitutional provisions invoked in the present
case were taken from Article II of the Constitution --
specifically, Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15 and 18 -- the
provisions of which the Court categorically ruled to be non
self-executing in the aforecited case of Taada v. Angara. Moreover,
the records are devoid of any explanation of how the HSRA
supposedly violated the equal protection and due process clauses
that are embodied in Section 1 of Article III ofthe Constitution.
There were no allegations of discrimination orof the lack of due
process in connection with the HSRA. Since they failed to
substantiate how these constitutional guarantees were breached,
petitioners are unsuccessful in establishing the relevance of this
provision to the petition, and consequently, in annulling the HSRA.
In the remaining provisions, Sections 11 and 14 of Article XIII and
Sections 1 and 3 of Article XV, the State accords recognition to
the protection of working women and the provision for safe and
healthful working conditions; to the adoption of an integrated and
comprehensive approach to health; to the Filipino family; and to
the right of children to assistance and special protection,
including proper care and nutrition. Like the provisions that were
declared as non self-executory in the cases of Basco v. Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation and Tolentino v. Secretary of
Finance, they are mere statements of principles and policies. As
such, they are mere directives addressed to the executive and the
legislative departments. If unheeded, the remedy will not lie with
the courts; but rather, the electorates displeasure may be
manifested in their votes
ANTONIO M. SERRANO (Petitioner)vsGALLANT MARITIME SERVICES, INC.
AND MARLOW NAVIGATION CO., INC., (Respondents)G.R. No. 167614March
24, 2009
FACTS:Antonio Serrano (Petitioner), a Filipino seafarer, was
hired by Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co.,
Ltd. (Respondents) under a Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA)-approved Contract of Employment with the
following terms and conditions:
Duration of contract12 monthsPositionChief OfficerBasic monthly
salaryUS $1,400.00Hours of work48 hours/weekOvertimeUS
$700.00/monthVacation leave with pay7 days/month
On March 19, 1998, the date of his departure, petitioner was
constrained to accept a downgraded employment contract for the
position of Second Officer with a salary of US $1,000.00/month upon
the assurance and representation of respondents that he would be
made Chief Officer by the end of April 1998. However, the
respondents did not deliver on their promise to make the petitioner
Chief Officer. The petitioner refused to stay on as Second Officer
and he returned to the Philippines on May 26, 1998.
Since the petitioners employment contract was for a period of 12
months (March 19, 1998 to March 19, 1999), he had served for only 2
months and 7 days of his contract, leaving an unexpired portion of
9 months and 23 days. Petitioner filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA)
a complaint against respondents for constructive dismissal and for
payment of his money claims. LA rendered the dismissal of
petitioner illegal and awarding him monetary benefits. Respondents
appealed to the NLRC to question the finding of the LA. On the
other hand, the petitioner also appealed to the NLRC on the sole
issue that the LA erred in not applying the ruling of the Court in
Triple Integrated Services, Inc. vs NLRC that in case of illegal
dismissal, OFWs are entitled to their salaries for the unexpired
portion of their contracts. Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration. He questioned the constitutionality of the subject
clause. CA affirmed the NLRC ruling on the reduction of the
applicable salary rate however, the CA skirted the constitutional
issue raised by petitioner. The last clause in the 5th par. Of
Section 10, R.A. No. 8042 states that:
Sec. 10. Money Claims. In case of termination of overseas
employment without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by
law or contract, the workers shall be entitled to the full
reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of 12% per annum,
plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment
contract or for 3 months for every year of the unexpired term,
whichever is less.
The NLRC and the CA computed the lump-sum salary of petitioner
at the monthly rate of US $1,400.00 covering the period of 3 months
out of the 9 months and 23 days unexpired portion of his contract
or a total of US $4,200.00. Impugning the constitutionality of the
subject clause, petitioner contends that, in addition to the US
$4,200, he is entitled to US $21,182.33 more or a total US
$25,382.23 for his salaries for the entire 9 months and 23 days
left of his said contract.
ISSUES:
1. Is petitioner entitled to his monetary claim which is the
lump-sum salary for the entire unexpired portion of his employment
contract (12 months) and not just for a period of 3 months?
1. Should petitioners overtime and leave pay form part of the
salary basis in the computation of his monetary award, because
these are fixed benefit that have been stipulated into his
contract?
HELD:
1. Yes, the petitioner is awarded his salaries for the entire
unexpired portion of his contract (9 months and 23 days) at the
rate of US $1,400.00/month. The subject clause or for three months
for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less in the 5th
paragraph of Sec. 10 R.A. 8042 is declared unconstitutional.
Prior to R.A. No. 8042, OFWs and local workers with fixed-term
employment who were illegally discharged were treated alike in
terms of the computation of their money claims since they were
uniformly entitled to their salaries for the entire unexpired
portions of their contracts. But with the enactment of R.A. No.
8042, specifically the adoption of the subject clause, illegally
dismissed OFWs with an unexpired portion of 1 year or more in their
employment contract have since been differently treated in that
their money claims are subject to a 3-month cap, whereas no such
limitation is imposed on local workers with fixed-term employment.
The subject clause singles out one classification of OFWs and
burdens it with a peculiar disadvantage. The Court further holds
that the subject clause violates petitioner's right to substantive
due process, for it deprives him of property, consisting of
monetary benefits, without any existing valid governmental purpose.
The subject clause being unconstitutional, petitioner is entitled
to his salaries for the entire unexpired period of nine months and
23 days of his employment contract, pursuant to law and
jurisprudence prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 8042.
1. No, the word salaries in Section 10 (5) does not include
overtime and leave pay. For seafarers like the petitioner, DOLE
Department Order No. 33 series 1996 provides a Standard Employment
Contract of Seafarers, in which salary is understood as the basic
wage, exclusive of overtime, leave pay and other bonuses; whereas
overtime pay is compensation for all work performed in excess of
the regular 8 hours and holiday pay is compensation for any work
performed on designated rest days and holidays. With this
definition, there is no basis for the automatic inclusion of
overtime and holiday pay in the computation of petitioners monetary
rewards unless there is evidence that he performed during those
periods.
ABAS KIDA VS SENATE
FACTS:
Several laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao (ARMM) were enacted by Congress.
RA No. 6734 is the organic act that established the ARMM and
scheduled the first regular elections for the ARMM regional
officials.
RA No. 9054 amended the ARMM Charter and reset the regular
elections for the ARMM regional officials to the second Monday of
September 2001.
RA No. 9333 reset for the third time the ARMM regional elections
for the 2nd Monday of August 2005 and on the same date every 3
years thereafter. Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional
elections should have been held on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had
begun preparations for these elections and had accepted
certificates of candidacies for various regional offices to be
elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting
the next ARMM regular elections to May 2013 to coincide with the
regular national and local elections of the country. In these
consolidated petitions filed directly with the Supreme Court, the
petitioners assailed the constitutionality of RA No. 10153.
ISSUE:
-WON the passage of RA No. 10153 violate the
three-readings-on-separate-days rule under Section 26(2), Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution
-WON RA No. 10153 is unconstitutional
RULING:
No, the passage of RA No. 10153 does not violate the
three-readings-on-separate-days requirement in Section 26(2),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The general rule that before
bills passed by either the House or the Senate can become laws,
they pass through three readings on separate days, is subject to
the exception when the President certifies to the necessity of the
bills immediate enactment. In the present case, the records show
that the President wrote to the speaker of the House of
Representatives to certify the necessity of the immediate enactment
of a law synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and
local elections. The Presidents certification exempted both the
House and the Senate from having to comply with the three separate
readings requirement.
On the general claim that RA No. 10153 is unconstitutional, we
can only reiterate the established rule that every statute is
presumed valid.Congress, thus, has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality of its acts, and the party challenging the
validity of a statute has the onerous task of rebutting this
presumption. Any reasonable doubt about the validity of the law
should be resolved in favor of its constitutionality. As this Court
declared in Garcia v. Executive Secretary:94
The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional
questions and to presume that the acts of the political departments
are valid in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing to the
contrary. To doubt is to sustain. This presumption is based on the
doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon each department
a becoming respect for the acts of the other departments. The
theory is that as the joint act of Congress and the President of
the Philippines, a law has been carefully studied and determined to
be in accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally
enacted.95[Emphasis ours.]
Given the failure of the petitioners to rebut the presumption of
constitutionality in favor of RA No. 10153, we must support and
confirm its validity.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the consolidated
petitions assailing the validity of RA No. 10153 for lack of merit,
and UPHOLD the constitutionality of this law.
GR No. 177857-58 September 17, 2009 Philippine Coconut Producers
Federationa, Inc. (COCOFED), vs Republic of the Philippines
Facts:The motion for reconsideration of the Resolution of the
Court dated September 17, 2009, As may be recalled, the Court, in
its resolution adverted to, approved, upon motion of petitioner
Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED), the
conversion of the sequestered 753,848,312 Class "A" and "B" common
shares of San Miguel Corporation (SMC), registered in the name of
Coconut Industry Investment Fund (CIIF) Holding Companies
(hereunder referred to as SMC Common Shares), into 753,848,312 SMC
Series 1 Preferred Shares.
Oppositors-intervenors Salonga, et al. anchor their plea for
reconsideration on the submission or issue that:
The honorable court overlooks the value of the fact that the
government, as opposed to the current administration, is the
winning party in the case below and thus has no incentive to
convert.
In this recourse, it would appear that oppositors-intervenors
seem unable to accept, in particular, the soundness angle of the
conversion. But as we have explained, the conversion of the shares
along with the safeguards attached thereto will ensure that the
value of the shares will be preserved. In effect, due to the nature
of stocks in general and the prevailing business conditions, the
government, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG), chose not to speculate with the CIIF SMC shares, as prima
facie public property, in the hope that there would be a brighter
economy in the future, and that the value of the shares would
increase. We must respect the decision of the executive department,
absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion.
Issue:(1) WON the PCGG have the power to convert the sequestered
shares of stock.
Held:The PCGG thoroughly studied and considered the effects of
conversion and, based upon such study, concluded that it would best
serve the purpose of maintaining and preserving the value of the
shares of stock to convert the same.
It was proved that the PCGG had exercised proper diligence in
reviewing the pros and cons of the conversion. The efforts PCGG
have taken with respect to the desired stock conversion argue
against the notion of grave abuse of discretion.
Under the government established under the Constitution, it is
the executive branch, either pursuant to the residual power of the
President or by force of her enumerated powers under the laws, that
has control over all matters pertaining to the disposition of
government property or, in this case, sequestered assets under the
administration of the PCGG. Surely, such control is neither
legislative nor judicial.
Apropos the separation of powers doctrine and its relevance to
this case, it may well be appropriate to again quote the following
excerpts from the decision in JG Summit Holdings, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals,6 to wit:The role of the Courts is to ascertain whether a
branch or instrumentality of the Government has transgressed its
constitutional boundaries. But the Courts will not interfere with
executive or legislative discretion exercised within those
boundaries. Otherwise, it strays into the realm of policy
decision-making.
Zenon R. Perez, petitioner vs. People of the Philippines and
Sandiganbayan, respondents544 SCRA 532February 12, 2008
Facts:
The petitioner verbally admitted that part of the money from
public funds was used to pay for the loan of his late brother, a
portion of it was spent for food and the remaining was spent for
medicines. An administrative case was filed against the petitioner.
He filed an Answer reiterating his verbal admission. Petitioner was
charged before the Sandiganbayan with malversation of Public funds.
The petitioner, duly assisted by a counsel de parte entered a plea
of not guilty. A pre-trial was set but the petitioners counsel
moved for postponement. The Sandiganbayan proceeded to hear the
case due to the presence of witness Arlene R. Mandin. Sandiganbayan
dispensed the pre-trial and allowed the prosecution to present its
witness. The defense presented evidence through the petitioner
himself. He denied the contents of his first Answer to the
administrative case. He claimed it was prepared without assistance
of his counsel, and at the time of his counsel and at the time of
preparation, he was not in peak mental and physical condition.
Petitioner further alleged that the cash shortage was due to
oversight and argued that the government did not suffer any damage
or prejudice since alleged cash shortage was actually deposited
with the Office of the Provincial Treasurer.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the law relied upon in convicting the
petitioner and the sentence imposed is cruel and therefore violates
Section 19 Article III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution.
Ruling:
The law relied in convicting petitioner is not cruel and
unusual. It does not violate Section 19, Article III of the Bill of
Rights
There is strong presumption of Constitutionality accorded to
statutes. It is established doctrine that a statute should be
construed whenever possible in harmony with, rather than in
violation of, the Constitution.The presumption is that the
legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible and just law and
one which operates no further than may be necessary to effectuate
the specific purpose of the law.83It is presumed that the
legislature has acted within its constitutional powers. So, it is
the generally accepted rule that every statute, or regularly
accepted act, is, or will be, or should be, presumed to be valid
and constitutional. He who attacks the constitutionality of a law
has theonus probandito show why such law is repugnant to the
Constitution. Failing to overcome its presumption of
constitutionality, a claim that a law is cruel, unusual, or
inhuman, like the stance of petitioner, must fail.
Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar Council,G.R. No. 202242,July 17,
2012
Facts: In 1994, instead of having only seven members, an eighth
member was added to the JBC as two representatives from Congress
began sitting in the JBC one from the House of Representatives and
one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote.
Then, the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001,
decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the House
of Representatives one full vote each. At present, Senator Francis
Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents)
simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of the
legislature. It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in
this petition. Respondents argued that the crux of the controversy
is the phrase a representative of Congress. It is their theory that
the two houses, the Senate and the House of Representatives, are
permanent and mandatory components of Congress, such that the
absence of either divests the term of its substantive meaning as
expressed under the Constitution. Bicameralism, as the system of
choice by the Framers, requires that both houses exercise their
respective powers in the performance of its mandated duty which is
to legislate.Thus, when Section 8(1), Article VIII of the
Constitution speaks of a representative from Congress, it should
mean one representative each from both Houses which comprise the
entire Congress. Respondents further argue that petitioner has no
real interest in questioning the constitutionality of the JBCs
current composition. The respondents also question petitioners
belated filing of the petition.
Issues:(1) Whether or not the conditions sine qua non for the
exercise of the power of judicial review have been met in this
case; and(2) Whether or not the current practice of the JBC to
perform its functions with eight (8) members, two (2) of whom are
members of Congress, runs counter to the letter and spirit of the
1987 Constitution.
Held:(1) Yes. The Courts power of judicial review is subject to
several limitations, namely: (a) there must be an actual case or
controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the
person challenging the act must have standing to challenge; he must
have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that he
has sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised
at the earliest possible opportunity; and (d) the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. Generally,
a party will be allowed to litigate only when these conditions sine
qua non are present, especially when the constitutionality of an
act by a co-equal branch of government is put in issue. The Court
disagrees with the respondents contention that petitioner lost his
standing to sue because he is not an official nominee for the post
of Chief Justice. While it is true that a personal stake on the
case is imperative to have locus standi, this is not to say that
only official nominees for the post of Chief Justice can come to
the Court and question the JBC composition for being
unconstitutional. The JBC likewise screens and nominates other
members of the Judiciary. Albeit heavily publicized in this regard,
the JBCs duty is not at all limited to the nominations for the
highest magistrate in the land. A vast number of aspirants to
judicial posts all over the country may be affected by the Courts
ruling. More importantly, the legality of the very process of
nominations to the positions in the Judiciary is the nucleus of the
controversy. The claim that the composition of the JBC is illegal
and unconstitutional is an object of concern, not just for a
nominee to a judicial post, but for all citizens who have the right
to seek judicial intervention for rectification of legal
blunders.(2) Yes. The word Congress used in Article VIII, Section
8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic sense. No
particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the
House of Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either
case, only a singular representative may be allowed to sit in the
JBC. The seven-member composition of the JBC serves a practical
purpose, that is, to provide a solution should there be a stalemate
in voting. It is evident that the definition of Congress as a
bicameral body refers to its primary function in government to
legislate. In the passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit in
the distinction of the role of each house in the process. The same
holds true in Congress non-legislative powers. An inter-play
between the two houses is necessary in the realization of these
powers causing a vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot simply
discount. This, however, cannot be said in the case of JBC
representation because no liaison between the two houses exists in
the workings of the JBC. Hence, the term Congress must be taken to
mean the entire legislative department. The Constitution mandates
that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only. Notwithstanding
its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of
the JBC, all its prior official actions are nonetheless valid.
Under the doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to the
declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are
not nullified.
DELA LLANA VS THE CHAIRPERSON, COMMISSION ON AUDIT REYNATO A.
VILLAR____________________________________________________________
PROVISION:Conditions for the Exercise of Judicial ReviewSection
1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power
includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. -
Article VIII, 1987
Constitution.____________________________________________________________Sub
topic: The following must be avoided: (i) political questions, (ii)
advisory opinions, (iii) moot and academic issues, and (iv) no
standing.-FR.
BERNAS____________________________________________________________THE
CASE:This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order pursuant to Section 7, Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution,
seeking to annul and set aside Commission on Audit (COA) Circular
No. 89-299, which lifted its system of pre-audit of government
financial transactions.
FACTS: The rationale for the circular was, first, to reaffirm
the concept that fiscal responsibility resides in management as
embodied in the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines;
and,
second, to contribute to accelerating the delivery of public
services and improving government operations by curbing undue
bureaucratic red tape and ensuring facilitation of government
transactions, while continuing to preserve and protect the
integrity of these transactions.
As a taxpayer, Petitioner filed this Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65.
He alleges that the pre-audit duty on the part of the COA cannot
be lifted by a mere circular, considering that pre-audit is a
constitutional mandate enshrined in Section 2 of Article IX-D of
the 1987 Constitution. He further claims that, because of the lack
of pre-audit by COA, serious irregularities in government
transactions have been committed, such as the P728- million
fertilizer fund scam, irregularities in the P550-million call
center laboratory project of the Commission on Higher Education,
and many others.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing to raise
the constitutional issue.
HELD: Yes. This Petition has been filed as a taxpayers suit. A
taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a constitutional
issue when it is established that public funds from taxation have
been disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or the
Constitution.
Petitioner claims that the issuance of Circular No. 89-299 has
led to the dissipation of public funds through numerous
irregularities in government financial transactions. These
transactions have allegedly been left unchecked by the lifting of
the pre-audit performed by COA, which, petitioner argues, is its
Constitutional duty. Thus, petitioner has standing to file this
suit as a taxpayer, since he would be adversely affected by the
illegal use of public money.
DENNIS A. B. FUNA, Petitioner, vs. THE CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON
AUDIT, REYNALDO A. VILLAR,Respondent.G.R. No. 192791 |
2012-04-24
FACTS:Funa filed for a Petition for Certiorari that challenges
the constitutionality of the appointment of Reynaldo A. Villar as
Chairman of the Commission on Audit and accordingly prays that a
judgment issue declaring the unconstitutionality of the
appointment.
President Macapagal-Arroyo appointed Reynaldo A. Villar (Villar)
as the third member of the COA for a term of seven (7) years
starting February 2, 2004 until February 2, 2011. Villar was
nominated and appointed as Chairman of the COA. Shortly thereafter,
on June 11, 2008, the Commission on Appointments confirmed his
appointment. He was to serve as Chairman of COA, as expressly
indicated in the appointment papers, until the expiration of the
original term of his office as COA Commissioner or on February 2,
2011.
Challenged in this recourse, Villar, in an obvious bid to lend
color of title to his hold on the chairmanship, insists that his
appointment as COA Chairman accorded him a fresh term of seven (7)
years which is yet to lapse. He would argue, in fine, that his term
of office, as such chairman, is up to February 2, 2015, or 7 years
reckoned from February 2, 2008 when he was appointed to that
position.
Before the Court could resolve this petition, Villar, via a
letter dated February 22, 2011 addressed to President Benigno S.
Aquino III, signified his intention to step down from office upon
the appointment of his replacement.
ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the petition for certiorari that
challenges the constitutionality of the appointment of villar as
chairman of the commission on has been moot and academic.
Held: Yes. When Villar vacated his position and when President
Aquino III named Ma. Gracia Pulido-Tan as COA Chairman. This
development has rendered this petition and the main issue tendered
therein moot and academic.
A case is considered moot and academic when its purpose has
become stale,or when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy
owing to the onset of supervening events,so that a resolution of
the case or a declaration on the issue would be of no practical
value or use. In such instance, there is no actual substantial
relief which a petitioner would be entitled to, and which will
anyway be negated by the dismissal of the basic petition.
ISSUE:2. Whether or not the case at bar is an exception to the
principle of moot and academic which still needs for judicial
review.
HELD: Yes. As a general rule, it is not within the SC charge and
function to act upon and decide a moot case. However, in David v.
Macapagal-Arroyo,We acknowledged and accepted certain exceptions to
the issue of mootness, thus:
The moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that
can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts
will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is
a grave violation of the Constitution, second, the exceptional
character of the situation and the paramount public interest is
involved, third, when constitutional issue raised requires
formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar,
and the public, and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet
evading review.
In the present case, there is a grave violation of the
Constitution; the case involves a situation of exceptional
character and is of paramount public interest; the constitutional
issue raised requires the formulation of controlling principles to
guide the bench, the bar and the public; and the case is capable of
repetition yet evading review.
The situation presently obtaining is definitely of such
exceptional nature as to necessarily call for the promulgation of
principles that will henceforth guide the bench, the bar and the
public should like circumstance arise. Confusion in similar future
situations would be smoothed out if the contentious issues advanced
in the instant case are resolved straightaway and settled
definitely. There are times when although the dispute has
disappeared, as in this case, it nevertheless cries out to be
addressed.
WHEREFORE the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The appointment of
then Commissioner Reynaldo A. Villar to the position of Chairman of
the Commission on Audit to replace Guillermo N. Carague, whose term
of office as such chairman has expired, is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL for violation of Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the
Constitution. SO ORDERED.
Ynot vs. IACG.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987
Facts:The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat
from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they were
confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo,
Iloilo, for violation of Executive Order No. 626-A where the
President has given orders prohibiting the interprovincial movement
of carabaos and the slaughtering of carabaos. Petitioner filed the
present case claiming that the above-mentioned executive order is
unconstitutionalinsofar as it authorizes outright confiscation of
the carabao or carabeef being transported across provincial
boundaries. His claim is that the penalty is invalid because it is
imposed without according the owner a right to be heard before a
competent and impartial court as guaranteed by due process. RTC
declined to resolve on the constitutionality of the executive
orderfor lack of authority and also for its presumed validity. IAC
affirmed RTC decision.
Issue: Whether or not RTC and IAC has the authority to declare a
law unconstitutional?
Held:
This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe a
becoming modesty in examining constitutional questions, they are
nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same whenever
warranted, subject only to review by the highest tribunal.6We have
jurisdiction under the Constitution to "review, revise, reverse,
modify or affirm on appeal orcertiorari,as the law or rules of
court may provide," final judgments and orders of lower courts in,
among others, all cases involving the constitutionality of certain
measures.7This simply means that the resolution of such cases may
be made in the first instance by these lower courts.
And while it is true that laws are presumed to be
constitutional, that presumption is not by any means conclusive and
in fact may be rebutted. Indeed, if there be a clear showing of
their invalidity, and of the need to declare them so, then "will be
the time to make the hammer fall, and heavily,"8to recall Justice
Laurel's trenchant warning. Stated otherwise, courts should not
follow the path of least resistance by simply presuming the
constitutionality of a law when it is questioned. On the contrary,
they should probe the issue more deeply, to relieve the abscess,
paraphrasing another distinguished jurist,9and so heal the wound or
excise the affliction.