ALFEO D. VIVAS, ON HIS BEHALF AND ON BEHALF OF THE SHAREHOLDERS
OF EUROCREDIT COMMUNITY BANK, PETITIONER, vs. THE MONETARY BOARD OF
THE BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS AND THE PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT
INSURANCE CORPORATION, RESPONDENTS.The Case: This is a petition for
prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a status quo ante order
or writ of preliminary injunction ordering the respondents to
desist from closing EuroCredit Community Bank, Incorporated (ECBI)
and from pursuing the receivership thereof. The petition likewise
prays that the management and operation of ECBI be restored to its
Board of Directors (BOD) and its officers.FACTS: The Rural Bank of
Faire, Incorporated (RBFI) was a duly registered rural banking
institution. Record shows that the corporate life of RBFI expired
on May 31, 2005.Notwithstanding, petitioner Alfeo D. Vivas and his
principals acquired the controlling interest in RBFI sometime in
January 2006. At the initiative of Vivas and the new management
team, an internal audit was conducted on RBFI and the results
highlighted the dismal operation of the rural bank. On December 8,
2006, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas issued the Certificate of
Authority extending the corporate life of RBFI for another 50
years. The BSP also approved the change of its corporate name to
EuroCredit Community Bank, Incorporated.Pursuant to Section 28 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7653, otherwise known as The New Central
Bank Act, the Integrated Supervision Department II of the BSP
conducted a general examination on ECBI. Sometime in April 2008,
the examiners from the Department of Loans and Credit of the BSP
arrived at the ECBI and cancelled the rediscounting line of the
bank. Vivas appealed the cancellation to BSP. Thereafter, the
Monetary Board issued a resolution placing ECBI under Prompt
Corrective Action framework because of 1) negative capital of
?14.674 million and capital adequacy ratio of negative 18.42%; 2)
Capital Asset Management Earnings Liquidity composite rating of "2"
with a Management component rating of "1"; and 3) serious
supervisory concerns particularly on activities deemed unsafe or
unsound. Vivas moved for a reconsideration of the said resolution
on the grounds of non-observance of due process and arbitrariness.
The ISD II, on several instances, had invited the BOD of ECBI to
discuss matters pertaining to the placement of the bank under PCA
framework and other supervisory concerns before making the
appropriate recommendations to the MB. The proposed meeting,
however, did not materialize due to postponements sought by Vivas.
The BSP then directed ECBI to explain why it transferred the
majority shares of RBFI without securing the prior approval of the
MB in apparent violation of the Manual of Regulation for Banks.
Also, the scheduled general examination of the books, records and
general condition of ECBI did not push through. According to Vivas,
ECBI asked for the deferment of the examination pending resolution
of its appeal before the MB. Vivas believed that he was being
treated unfairly because the letter of authority to examine
allegedly contained a clause which pertained to the Anti-Money
Laundering Law and the Bank Secrecy Act.The MB, on the other hand,
posited that ECBI unjustly refused to allow the BSP examiners from
examining and inspecting its books and records, in violation of
Sections 25 and 34 of R.A. No. 7653.ECBI asked for another
deferment of the examination due to the pendency of certain
unresolved issues subject of its appeal before the MB, and because
Vivas was then out of the country. The ISD II denied ECBIs request
and ordered the general examination to proceed as previously
scheduled.Thereafter, the MB issued another resolution approving
the issuance of a cease and desist order against ECBI, which
enjoined it from pursuing certain acts and transactions that were
considered unsafe or unsound banking practices, and from doing such
other acts or transactions constituting fraud or might result in
the dissipation of its assets.On March 4, 2010, the MB issued
Resolution No. 276 placing ECBI under receivership.Vivas filed a
petition for prohibition ascribing grave abuse of discretion to the
MB for prohibiting ECBI from continuing its banking business and
for placing it under receivership assailing the legality of
Resolution no. 276.RULING: The Monetary Board (MB) may forbid a
bank from doing business and place it under receivership without
prior notice and hearing.It must be emphasized that R.A .No. 7653
is a later law and under said act, the power of the MB over banks,
including rural banks, was increased and expanded. The Court, in
several cases, upheld the power of the MB to take over banks
without need for prior hearing. It is not necessary inasmuch as the
law entrusts to the MB the appreciation and determination of
whether any or all of the statutory grounds for the closure and
receivership of the erring bank are present. The MB, under R.A. No.
7653, has been invested with more power of closure and placement of
a bank under receivership for insolvency or illiquidity, or because
the banks continuance in business would probably result in the loss
to depositors or creditors.Accordingly, the MB can immediately
implement its resolution prohibiting a banking institution to do
business in the Philippines and, thereafter, appoint the PDIC as
receiver. The procedure for the involuntary closure of a bank is
summary and expeditious in nature. Such action of the MB shall be
final and executory, but may be later subjected to a judicial
scrutiny via a petition for certiorari to be filed by the
stockholders of record of the bank representing a majority of the
capital stock. Obviously, this procedure is designed to protect the
interest of all concerned, that is, the depositors, creditors and
stockholders, the bank itself and the general public. The
protection afforded public interest warrants the exercise of a
summary closure.The Petition Should Have Been Filed in the CAEven
if treated as a petition for certiorari, the petition should have
been filed with the CA. Section 4 of Rule 65 reads:Section 4. When
and where petition filed. The petition shall be filed not later
than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or
resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is
timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty
(60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said
motion.The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it
relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a
corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court
exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the
Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether
or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the
Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. If it
involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, unless
otherwise provided by law or these Rules, the petition shall be
filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals. [Emphases
supplied]That the MB is a quasi-judicial agency was already settled
and reiterated in the case of Bank of Commerce v. Planters
Development Bank And Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas.30Doctrine of
Hierarchy of CourtsEven in the absence of such provision, the
petition is also dismissible because it simply ignored the doctrine
of hierarchy of courts. True, the Court, the CA and the RTC have
original concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus. The concurrence of jurisdiction, however,
does not grant the party seeking any of the extraordinary writs the
absolute freedom to file a petition in any court of his choice. The
petitioner has not advanced any special or important reason which
would allow a direct resort to this Court. Under the Rules of
Court, a party may directly appeal to this Court only on pure
questions of law.31 In the case at bench, there are certainly
factual issues as Vivas is questioning the findings of the
investigating team.Strict observance of the policy of judicial
hierarchy demands that where the issuance of the extraordinary
writs is also within the competence of the CA or the RTC, the
special action for the obtainment of such writ must be presented to
either court. As a rule, the Court will not entertain direct resort
to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the
appropriate lower courts; or where exceptional and compelling
circumstances, such as cases of national interest and with serious
implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of
writ of certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus calling for the
exercise of its primary jurisdiction.32 The judicial policy must be
observed to prevent an imposition on the precious time and
attention of the Court.No Undue Delegation of Legislative PowerIn
this case, under the two tests, there was no undue delegation of
legislative authority in the issuance of R.A. No. 7653. To address
the growing concerns in the banking industry, the legislature has
sufficiently empowered the MB to effectively monitor and supervise
banks and financial institutions and, if circumstances warrant, to
forbid them to do business, to take over their management or to
place them under receivership. The legislature has clearly spelled
out the reasonable parameters of the power entrusted to the MB and
assigned to it only the manner of enforcing said power. In other
words, the MB was given a wide discretion and latitude only as to
how the law should be implemented in order to attain its objective
of protecting the interest of the public, the banking industry and
the economy.WHEREFORE, the petition for prohibition is
DENIED.Pacific Ace Finance Ltd. (PAFIN) v. EjieYanagisawaG.R. No.
175303 (2012)
FACTS:Eiji, a Japanese, married Evelyn, Filipina, in 1989 at the
City Hall of Manila.On August 23, 1995, Evelyn purchased a
townhouse in Paranaque. The Registry of Deeds issued a title to
Evelyn P. Castaneda, Filipino, married to EjieYanagisawa, Japanese
citizen, both of legal age.In 1996, Eiji filed a complaint before
RTC Makati for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with
Evelyn on the ground of bigamy. During the pendency of the case, he
asked that Evelyn be enjoined from disposing or encumbering all of
the properties registered in her name. Evelyn and her lawyer
voluntarily undertook to acede to the motion of Eiji.In 1997,
Evelyn obtained a loan of P500,000 from petitioner PAFIN. To secure
the loan, Evelyn executed a real estate mortgage (the property
above-described). At the time of the mortgage, Eijis's appeal was
pending before the CA.Eiji filed an action before RTC Paranaque for
annulment of the real estate mortgage. PAFIN denied prior knowledge
of the Order in the first case. PAFIN admitted that it did not
conduct any verification of the title because Evelyn is good and
friendly. Moreover, PAFIN averred that Eiji has no personality to
seek the annulment of the REM because a foreign national cannot own
real properties located within the Philippines.The RTC Paranaque
dismissed the case for lack of cause of action. Eiji cannot
possibly own the property because he is a foreigner.Eiji appealed,
arguing that his inability to own a real estate does not
automatically deprive him of all his interest in the mortgaged
property, because the same was purchased with his money.The CA
reversed the ruling of the RTC. It ruled that the property should
be liquidated and divided between Eiji and Evelyn.The appellate
court determined that the Paraaque RTCs Decision was improper
because it violated the doctrine of non-interference. Courts of
equal jurisdiction, such as regional trial courts, have no
appellate jurisdiction over each other. For this reason, the CA
annulled and set aside the Paraaque RTCs decision to dismiss Eijis
complaint.
ISSUESWhether the RTC Paranaques decision was proper?
RULING:No. A review of the complaint shows that Eiji did not
claim ownership of the Paraaque townhouse unit or his right to
consent to the REM as his bases for seeking its annulment. Instead,
Eiji invoked his right to rely on Evelyns commitment not to dispose
of or encumber the property (as confirmed in the October 2, 1996
Order of the Makati RTC), and the annotation of the said commitment
on TCT No. 99791.The doctrine of judicial stability or
non-interference dictates that the assumption by the Makati RTC
over the issue operates as an insurmountable barrier to the
subsequent assumption by the Paraaque RTC. By insisting on ruling
on the same issue, the Paraaque RTC effectively interfered with the
Makati RTCs resolution of the issue and created the possibility of
conflicting decisions.Contrary to petitioners stance, the CA did
not make any disposition as to who between Eiji and Evelyn owns the
Paraaque townhouse unit. It simply ruled that the Makati RTC had
acquired jurisdiction over the said question and should not have
been interfered with by the Paraaque RTC. The CA only clarified
that it was improper for the Paraaque RTC to have reviewed the
ruling of a co-equal court.G.R. No. 176162 : October 9, 2012CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION,Petitioner,v.COURT OF APPEALS, DR. DANTE G. GUEV
ARRA and ATTY. AUGUSTUS F. CEZAR,Respondents.G.R. No. 178845ATTY.
HONESTO L. CUEVA,Petitioner,v.COURT OF APPEALS, DR. DANTE G. GUEV
ARRA and ATTY. AUGUSTUS F. CEZAR,Respondents.D E C I S I O
NMENDOZA,J.:These are consolidated petitions for review under Rule
45 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the December
29, 2006 Decisionof the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
95293, entitled"Dr. Dante G. Guevarra and Atty. Augustus Cezar v.
Civil Service Commission and Atty. Honesto L.
Cueva."FACTS:Respondents Dante G. Guevarra (Guevarra) and Augustus
F. Cezar (Cezar) were the Officer-in-Charge/President and the Vice
President for Administration, respectively, of the Polytechnic
University of the Philippines (PUPHonesto L. Cueva (Cueva), then
PUP Chief Legal Counsel, filed an administrative case against
Guevarra and Cezar for gross dishonesty, grave misconduct,
falsification of official documents, conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service, being notoriously undesirable, and
for violating Section 4 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713specifically
the Application for Bond of Accountable Officials and Employees of
the Republic of the Philippines, in which the latter denied the
existence of his pending criminal and administrative casesIn his
Application for Bond of Accountable Officials and Employees of the
Republic of the Philippines (General Form No. 58-A), he answered
Question No. 11 in this wise:11. Do you have any criminal or
administrative records? NO. If so, state briefly the nature thereof
NOThis was despite the undisputed fact that, at that time, both
Guevarra and Cezar admittedly had 17 pending cases for violation of
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 before the SandiganbayanThe
respondents explained that they believed "criminal or
administrative records" to mean final conviction in a criminal or
administrative casebecause their cases had not yet been decided by
the Sandiganbayan, they asserted that Guevarra responded to
Question No. 11 in General Form No. 58-A correctly and in good
faithMarch 24, 2006, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) issued
Resolution No. 060521formally charging Guevarra with Dishonesty and
Cezar with Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service
after a prima facie finding that they had committed acts punishable
under the Civil Service Law and Rules.the respondents filed their
Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Declare Absence of Prima
Facie Case.Cueva, on the other hand, filed an Urgent Ex-Parte
Motion for the Issuance of Preventive Suspension12rlland an Omnibus
Motion13rllseeking the issuance of an order of preventive
suspension against Guevarra and Cezar and the inclusion of the
following offenses in the formal charge against them: Grave
Misconduct, Falsification of Official Document, Conduct Prejudicial
to the Best Interest of the Service, Being Notoriously Undesirable,
and Violation of Section 4 of R.A. No. 6713.CSC denied the motion
for reconsideration filed by the respondents for being a
non-responsive pleading, akin to a motion to dismiss, which was a
prohibited pleading under Section 16 of the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service Commission.15rllIt also
denied Cuevas motion to include additional charges against the
respondents. The CSC, however, placed Guevarra under preventive
suspension for ninety (90) days, believing it to be necessary
because, as the officer-in-charge of PUP, he was in a position to
unduly influence possible witnesses against him.Guevarra and Cezar
filed a petition forcertiorariand prohibition before the CA
essentially questioning the jurisdiction of the CSC over the
administrative complaint filed against them by Cueva. CA rendered
its Decision granting the petition and nullifying and setting aside
the questioned resolutions of the CSC for having been rendered
without jurisdictionthe CA noted that the CSC erred in recognizing
the complaint filed by Cueva, reasoning out that the latter should
have exhausted all administrative remedies by first bringing his
grievances to the attention of the PUP Board of Regents.Hence,
these petitions.ISSUE:Whether or not the Civil Service Commission
has original concurrent jurisdiction over administrative cases
falling under the jurisdiction of heads of agencies.The Court
agrees that the only question which must be addressed in this case
is whether the CSC has jurisdiction over administrative cases filed
directly with it against officials of a chartered state
university.HELD:The petitions are meritorious.CSC has jurisdiction
over casesfiled directly with it, regardless ofwho initiated the
complaintSection 2(1), Article IX(B) of the 1987 Constitution
defines the scope of the civil service:The civil service embraces
all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the
Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations
with original charters.By virtue of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1341 PUP became a chartered state university, thereby making it a
government-owned or controlled corporation with an original charter
whose employees are part of the Civil Service and are subject to
the provisions of E.O. No. 292.The controversy, however, stems from
the interpretation of the disciplinary jurisdiction of the CSC as
specified in Section 47, Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of
E.O. No. 292:SECTION 47. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. (1) The
Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary
cases involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more
than thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days
salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or
dismissal from office. A complaint may be filed directly with the
Commission by a private citizen against a government official or
employee in which case it may hear and decide the case or it may
deputize any department or agency or official or group of officials
to conduct the investigation. The results of the investigation
shall be submitted to the Commission with recommendation as to the
penalty to be imposed or other action to be taken.(2) The
Secretaries and heads of agencies and instrumentalities, provinces,
cities and municipalities shall have jurisdiction to investigate
and decide matters involving disciplinary action against officers
and employees under their jurisdiction. Their decisions shall be
final in case the penalty imposed is suspension for not more than
thirty days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days salary.
In case the decision rendered by a bureau or office head is
appealable to the Commission, the same may be initially appealed to
the department and finally to the Commission and pending appeal,
the same shall be executory except when the penalty is removal, in
which case the same shall be executory only after confirmation by
the Secretary concerned.The understanding by the CA of Section 47,
Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of E.O. No. 292 which states
that "a complaint may be filed directly with the Commission by a
private citizen against a government official or employee" is that
the CSC can only take cognizance of a case filed directly before it
if the complaint was made by a private citizen.There is no cogent
reason to differentiate between a complaint filed by a private
citizen and one filed by a member of the civil service, especially
in light of Section 12(11), Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V
of the same E.O. No. 292 which confers upon the CSC the power to
"hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought
before it directly or on appeal" without any qualification.It
cannot be overemphasized that the identity of the complainant is
immaterial to the acquisition of jurisdiction over an
administrative case by the CSC. CSC has concurrent original
jurisdictionwith the Board of Regents overadministrative casesThe
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service(the
Uniform Rules) explicitly allows the CSC to hear and decide
administrative cases directly brought before it:Section 4.
Jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. The Civil Service
Commission shall hear and decide administrative cases instituted
by, or brought before it, directly or on appeal, including
contested appointments, and shall review decisions and actions of
its offices and of the agencies attached to it.Except as otherwise
provided by the Constitution or by law, the Civil Service
Commission shall have the final authority to pass upon the removal,
separation and suspension of all officers and employees in the
civil service and upon all matters relating to the conduct,
discipline and efficiency of such officers and employees. The CA
construed the phrase "the Civil Service Commission shall have the
final authority to pass upon the removal, separation and suspension
of all officers and employees in the civil service" to mean that
the CSC could only step in after the relevant disciplinary
authority, in this case the Board of Regents of PUP, had
investigated and decided on the charges against the respondents.
Regrettably, the CA failed to take into consideration the
succeeding section of the same rules which undeniably granted
original concurrent jurisdiction to the CSC and belied its
suggestion that the CSC could only take cognizance of cases on
appeal:Section 7. Jurisdiction of Heads of Agencies. Heads of
Departments, agencies, provinces, cities, municipalities and other
instrumentalities shall have original concurrent jurisdiction, with
the Commission, over their respective officers and employees.All
members of the civil service are under the jurisdiction of the CSC,
unless otherwise provided by law. Being a non-career civil servant
does not remove respondent from the ambit of the CSC.Career or
non-career, a civil service official or employee is within the
jurisdiction of the CSC.CSC has original concurrent jurisdiction
shared with the governing body in question, in this case, the Board
of Regents of PUP. This means that if the Board of Regents first
takes cognizance of the complaint, then it shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of the CSC.Thus, not all
administrative cases will fall directly under the CSC. Secondly,
Section 47, Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the
Administrative Code affords the CSC the option of whether to decide
the case or to deputize some other department, agency or official
to conduct an investigation into the matter, thereby considerably
easing the burden placed upon the CSC.WHEREFORE, the petitions
areGRANTED. The December 29, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals
is herebyREVERSEDandSET ASIDE. Resolution Nos. 060521 and 061141
dated March 24, 2006 and June 30, 2006, respectively, of the Civil
Service Commission areREINSTATED.FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS AND CARMELITA
C. LLAMAS VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, BRANCH 66 OF THE
REGIONALTRIALCOURTOF MAKATICITYAND THE PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES
NOTE: Di ko maintindihan to. Wala yung topic natin dito. Yung
decision na nilagay ko yan yun. Huhuhuhu!
FACTS
Petitioners were charged before the RTC ofMakatiwith the crime
of other forms of swindling for selling the mortgaged land. The
land was mortgaged to Rural Bank of Imus.On appeal, the CA affirmed
the decision of the trial court. The appellate court further denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Petitioners filed before this Court a petition for review,
however, denied the same for petitioners failure to state the
material dates. Since it subsequently denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration, the judgment of conviction became final and
executory.With the consequent issuance by the trial court of the
April 19, 2001 Warrant of Arrest, the police arrested, on April 27,
2001, petitioner Carmelita C. Llamas for her to serve her 2-month
jail term. The police, nevertheless, failed to arrest petitioner
Francisco R. Llamas because he was nowhere to be found.
Petitioner Francisco moved for the lifting or recall of the
warrant of arrest, raising for the first time the issue that the
trial court had no jurisdiction over the offense charged.
There being no action taken by the trial court on the said
motion, petitioners instituted, the instant proceedings for the
annulment of the trial and the appellate courts decisions.
The Court initially dismissed on technical grounds the petition
in the September 24, 2001 Resolution, but reinstated the same, on
motion for reconsideration, in the October 22, 2001 Resolution. In
its September 29, 2009 Decision, this Court held that, following
the ruling inPeople v. Bitanga the remedy of annulment of judgment
cannot be availed of in criminal cases. The Court likewise rejected
petitioners contention that the trial court had no jurisdiction
over the case.
ISSUE
1. Whether the ruling on PEOPLE VS BITANGA would apply to this
case?2. Whether the accused were guilty of other forms of
swindling?
RULING
1. No.
Petitioners took many procedural missteps in this case, from the
time it was pending in the trial court until it reached this Court,
all of which could serve as enough basis to dismiss the present
motion for reconsideration. However, considering petitioners
advanced age, the length of time this case has been pending, and
the imminent loss of personal liberty as a result of petitioners
conviction, the Court resolves to grantpro hac vicethe motion for
reconsideration.
This Court has, on occasion, suspended the application of
technical rules of procedure where matters of life, liberty, honor
or property, among other instances, are at stake. It has allowed
some meritorious cases to proceed despite inherent procedural
defects and lapses on the principle that rules of procedure are
mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. The
strict and rigid application of rules that tend to frustrate rather
than promote substantial justice must always be avoided.It is far
better and more prudent for the court to excuse a technical lapse
and afford the parties a review of the case to attain the ends of
justice, rather than dispose of the case on technicality and cause
grave injustice to the parties.
Thus, the Court, at the first instance, had recognized that the
petition, although captioned differently, was indeed one for
certiorari.
Since we have resolved to treat the petition as one
forcertiorari, the doctrine inPeople v. Bitangano longer finds
application in this case.
2. Article 316 (2) of the Revised Penal Code states:
ART. 316.Other forms of swindling. The penalty ofarresto mayorin
its minimum and medium periods and a fine of not less than the
value of the damage caused and not more than three times such
value, shall be imposed upon:
2. Any person who, knowing that real property is encumbered,
shall dispose of the same, although such encumbrance be not
recorded;
In every criminal prosecution, the State must prove beyond
reasonable doubt all the elements of the crime chargedandthe
complicity or participation of the accused.
For petitioners to be convicted of the crime of swindling under
Article 316 (2) of the Revised Penal Code, the prosecution had the
burden to prove the confluence of the following essential elements
of the crime:1.that the thing disposed of be real property;2.that
the offender knew that the real property was encumbered,whether the
encumbrance is recorded or not;3.that there must be express
representationby the offender that the real property is freefrom
encumbrance; and4.that the act of disposing of the real property be
made to the damage of another.
One of the essential elements of swindling underArticle 316,
paragraph 2, is that the act of disposing the encumbered real
property is made to the damage of another. In this case, neither
the trial court nor the CA made any finding of any damage to the
offended party. Nowhere in the Decision of the RTC or that of the
CA is there any discussion that there was damage suffered by
complainant, or any finding that his rights over the property were
prejudiced.
On the contrary, complainant had possession and control of the
land even as the cases were being heard. His possession and right
to exercise dominion over the property was not disturbed.
Admittedly, there was delay in the delivery of the title. This,
however, was the subject of a separate case, which was eventually
decided in petitioners favor.
If no damage should result from the sale, no crime of estafa
would have been committed by the vendor, as the element of damage
would then be lacking.The inevitable conclusion, therefore, is that
petitioners should be acquitted of the crime charged.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Motion for
Reconsideration isGRANTED. The assailed Decision dated September
29, 2009 isSETASIDEand a new one is enteredACQUITTINGpetitioners of
the crime charged on the ground of the prosecutions failure to
prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.SO ORDERED.
DIRECTOR GENERAL ROBERTO LASTIMOSO, ACTING CHIEF PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE (PNP), DIRECTORATE FOR PERSONNEL AND RECORDS
MANAGEMENT (DPRM), INSPECTOR GENERAL, P/CHIEF SUPT. RAMSEY OCAMPO
and P/SUPT. ELMER REJANO, petitioners, vs. P/SENIOR INSPECTOR JOSE
J. ASAYO, respondent.FACTS: The Court granted the petition, holding
that the Philippine National Police (PNP) Chief had jurisdiction to
take cognizance of the civilian complaint against respondent and
that the latter was accorded due process during the summary
hearing. Hence, this motion for reconsideration.
Respondent argues that the decision should be reconsidered for
the following reasons:1. Proceedings were null and void because no
hearing was conducted; and 2. The evidence does not prove that
respondent is guilty
ISSUES: 1. Whether the Summary Proceedings conducted were null
and void2. Whether the evidence presented is insufficient to prove
respondents guilt
RULING: 1. NO. The fact that there was no full-blown trial
before the summary hearing officer does not invalidate said
proceedings. In Samalio v. Court of Appeals, the Court reiterated
the time-honored principle that: Due process in an administrative
context does not require trial-type proceedings similar to those in
courts of justice. A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all
times and in all instances essential. In other words, it is not
legally objectionable for being violative of due process for an
administrative agency to resolve a case based solely on position
papers, affidavits or documentary evidence submitted by the parties
as affidavits of witnesses may take the place of their direct
testimony.
2. To resolve the second issue, respondent would have the Court
re-calibrate the weight of evidence presented before the summary
hearing officer, arguing that said evidence is insufficient to
prove respondent's guilt of the charges against him. However, it
must be emphasized that the action commenced by respondent before
the RTC is one for certiorari under Rule 65 of the ROC and as held
in People v. Court of Appeals,3 where the issue or question
involved affects the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision not
the jurisdiction of the court to render said decision the same is
beyond the province of a special civil action for certiorari.The
general rule is that the filing of a petition for certiorari does
not toll the running of the period to appeal. However, Section 1,
Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides that the Rules shall be
liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing
a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and
proceeding. In Ginete v. Court of Appeals5 and Sanchez v. Court of
Appeals,6 the Court saw it proper to suspend rules of procedure in
order to promote substantial justice where matters of life,
liberty, honor or property, among other instances, are at stake.
The present case clearly involves the honor of a police officer who
has rendered years of service to the country.
In addition, it is also understandable why respondent
immediately resorted to the remedy of certiorari instead of
pursuing his motion for reconsideration of the PNP Chiefs decision
as an appeal before the National Appellate Board (NAB). It was
quite easy to get confused as to which body had jurisdiction over
his case. The complaint filed against respondent could fall under
both Sections 41 (where it shall be filed in Peoples Law
Enforcement Board) and 42 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6975 (states
that it is the PNP Chief who has authority to immediately remove or
dismiss a PNP member who is guilty of conduct unbecoming a police
officer) or the Department of the Interior and Local Government Act
of 1990.It was only in Quiambao v. Court of Appeals, promulgated in
2005 or after respondent had already filed the petition for
certiorari with the trial court, when the Court resolved the issue
of jurisdiction. The Court held that the PLEB and the PNP Chief and
regional directors have concurrent jurisdiction over administrative
cases filed against members of the PNP which may warrant dismissal
from service, but once a complaint is filed with the PNP Chief or
regional directors, said authorities shall acquire exclusive
original jurisdiction over the case. With the foregoing peculiar
circumstances in this case, respondent should not be deprived of
the opportunity to fully ventilate his arguments against the
factual findings of the PNP Chief. He may file an appeal before the
NAB, pursuant to Section 45, R.A. No. 6925. It is a settled
jurisprudence that in administrative proceedings, technical rules
of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied.8 In Land Bank
of the Philippines v. Celada,9 the Court stressed thus: After all,
technical rules of procedure are not ends in themselves but are
primarily devised to help in the proper and expedient dispensation
of justice. In appropriate cases, therefore, the rules may be
construed liberally in order to meet and advance the cause of
substantial justice. Thus, the opportunity to pursue an appeal
before the NAB should be deemed available to respondent in the
higher interest of substantial justice.MR: Partly granted. Allowed
to file an appeal.GARCIA VS. SANDIGANBAYANG.R. NO. 165835
FACTS:Major General Carlos F. Garcia was the Deputy Chief of
Staff for Comptrollership of the AFP.On 27 September 2004, the
Ombudsman, after due investigation, filed a COMPLAINT before the
Sandiganbayan against Garcia for VIOLATION of the following:1.
SECTION 8 in relation to Section 11 of RA 6713 (Code of Conduct of
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees)2. Art 183,
RPC3. Sec52(A)(1), (3) & (20) of the Civil Service Law
His wife and 3 sons were impleaded for violation of RA 1379
insofar as they acted as conspirators, conduits, dummies and fronts
of petitioner in receiving, accumulating, using and disposing of
ill-gotten wealth.Also, a PETITION W/ VERIFIED URGENT EX PARTE
APPLICATION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT
was filed by Ombudsman before the SB vs. Garcia, his wife and 3
sons. Ombudsman has determined a prima facie case exists against
Maj. Gen Garcia since during his incumbency as a soldier and public
officer he acquired huge amounts of money and properties manifestly
out of proportion to his salary as such public officer and his
other lawful income. SB GRANTED PETITION, ISSUED WRIT OF
PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT
Garcia filedMotion to Dismiss and a Petition for
Certiorari:Garcia alleged that the Sandiganbayan has a LACK OF
JURISDICTION over forfeiture proceedings (CIVIL ACTION) under RA
1379. He claimed that RTC has the jurisdiction as provided under
Sec2(9) of the law.Moreover, the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction in
Civil Actions pertains only to separate actions for recovery of
unlawfully acquired property vs. Pres. Marcos etc.SB was intended
principally as a criminal court. This is supported by Presidential
issuances and laws, to wit:E.O. No. 1 creating the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) for the recovery of ill-gotten
wealth amassed by President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his family and
cronies,E.O. No. 14 which amended P.D. No. 1606 and R.A. No. 1379
by transferring to the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction over civil
actions filed against President Marcos, his family and cronies
based on R.A. No. 1379, the Civil Code and other existing laws,
andE.O. No. 14-A which further amended E.O. No. 14, P.D. No. 1606
and R.A. No. 1379 by providing that the civil action under R.A. No.
1379 which may be filed against President Marcos, his family and
cronies, may proceed independently of the criminal action. Even if
SB has jurisdiction, petition for forfeiture is fatally defective
for failing to comply with jurisdictional requirements under RA
1379, Sec. 2:i. inquiry similar to a Preliminary Investigationii.
Certification to Solicitor General of prima facie case (In this
case: there is no certification)iii. action filed by Solicitor
General. (In this case it is filed by Ombudsman)
COMMENT by SB:
In Republic v. SB the Court ruled that there is no issue that
jurisdiction over violations of [R.A.] Nos. 3019 and 1379 now rests
with the Sandiganbayan.Moreover, under Constitution and prevailing
statutes, SB is vested w/ authority and jurisdiction over the
petition for forfeiture under RA 1379.SBs jurisdiction based on PD
1606 encompasses all cases involving violations of RA 3019
IRRESPECTIVE OF WON THESE CASES ARE CIVIL OR CRIMINAL IN NATURE
COMMENT BY OMBUDSMAN:
1. Republic vs. SB2. Grant of jurisdiction over violations of RA
1379 did not change even under the amendments of RA7975 and RA
8294, though it came to be limited to cases involving high-ranking
public officials3. It has authority to investigate and initiate
forfeiture proceedings vs. petitioner based on Constitution and RA
6770: The constitutional power of investigation of the Office of
the Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified; its power to investigate
any act of a public official or employee which appears to be
illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient covers the unlawful
acquisition of wealth by public officials as defined under R.A. No.
13794. Section 15, RA 6770 expressly empowers Ombudsman to
investigate and prosecute such cases of unlawful acquisition of
wealth.5. ON REQUIREMENTS under RA 1379: inquiry was conducted
similar to PI + SOLGENs participation no longer required since
Ombudsman endowed w/ authority to investigate and prosecute6.
dismiss petition for forum shopping: MTD was already filed before
SB
REPLY by Garcia1. SBs criminal jurisdiction is separate and
distinct from its civil jurisdiction : SBs jurisdiction over
forfeiture cases had been removed w/o subsequent amendments
expressly restoring such civil jurisdiction2. Petition for
forfeiture is not an ancilliary action for the criminal action
against him, so not under jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan
ISSUES1. Whether SB has jurisdiction over petitions for
forfeiture under RA 13792. Whether Ombudsman has authority to
investigate, initiate and prosecute such petitions for forfeiture3.
Whether petitioner is guilty of forum shopping
HELDPetition without MERIT, dismissed
I. SB HAS JURISDICTIONUnder RA 8249, jurisdiction over
violations of RA 3019 and 1379 is lodged w Sandiganbayan.In
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, originally, the solicitor general was
authorized to initiate forfeiture proceedings before CFI of the
city or province where the public officer/employee resides or holds
office [RA 1379, SEC2]. However, upon the creation of the
Sandiganbayan [PD 1486], original and exclusive jurisdiction over
such violations was vested in SB.Eventually, PD 1606 repealed PD
1486 and modified jurisdiction of SB by removing its jurisdiction
over civil actions brought in connection w/ crimes within the
exclusive jurisdiction of SB, including:* Restitution or reparation
for damages;* Recovery of instruments and effects of the crime;*
Civil actions under Art32 and 34 of the Civil Code; and* Forfeiture
proceedings provided under RA 1379BP 129 abolished concurrent
jurisdiction of SB and regular courts, and expanded the exclusive
original jurisdiction of SB over offenses enumerated in Sec. 4 of
PD 1606 to embrace all such offenses irrespective of imposable
penalty.PD 1606 was later amended by PD 1869 and eventually by PD
1861 because of the proliferation of filing cases w/ penalty not
higher than Prision Coreccional or its equivalent and even such
cases not serious in nature.
ON CIVIL NATURE OF FORFEITURE ACTIONSForfeiture actions are
actions in rem, therefore, civil in nature BUT FORFEITURE OF AN
ILLEGALLY ACQUIRED PROPERTY PARTAKES THE NATURE OF A PENALTY [as
discussed in Cabal vs. Kapunan]
SB VESTED W/ JURISDICTION OVER VIOLATIONS OF RA 1379[An Act
Declaring Forfeiture In Favor of the State Any Property Found to
Have Been Unlawfully Acquired By Any Public Officer or Employee and
Providing For the Proceedings Therefor.]: the law provides a
procedure for forfeiture in case a public officer has acquired
during his incumbency an amount of property manifestly out of
proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to
his lawful income and income from legitimately acquired property.
No penalty for the public officer for unlawful acquisition but the
law imposes forfeiture as a penalty for unlawfully acquired
properties
2. YES, as resolved in Republic vs. SB (it was the main issue
there)
RA 6770 and Article XI, Sec. 13 of 1987 Constitution provides
for the POWERS OF OMBUDSMAN:
1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any
person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee,
office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal,
unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this
primary jurisdiction, may take over, at any stage, from any
investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such
cases;(11) Investigate and initiate the proper action for the
recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth amassed after 25
February 1986 and the prosecution of the parties involved
therein.
It is the Ombudsman who should file petition for forfeiture
under RA 1379BUT powers to investigate and initiate proper action
for recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth is restricted
only to cases for the recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained
wealth amassed AFTER FEB 1986.
3. ON FORUM SHOPPING: GUILTY!Garcia failed to inform the SC that
he had filed a Motion to Dismiss in relation to the petition for
forfeiture before the SB.A scrutiny of the Motion to Dismiss
reveals that petitioner raised substantially the same issues and
prayed for the same reliefs therein as it has in the instant
petition. In fact, the petitioners argument that the Sandiganbayan
has no jurisdiction over separate civil actions for forfeiture of
unlawfully acquired properties appears to be wholly lifted from the
Motion to Dismiss. The only difference between the two is that in
the Petition, petitioner raises the ground of failure of the
petition for forfeiture to comply with the procedural requirements
of R.A. No. 1379, and petitioner prays for the annulment of the
Sandiganbayans Resolution dated 29 October 2004 and Writ of
Preliminary Attachment dated 2 November 2004. Nevertheless, these
differences are only superficial. Both Petition and Motion to
Dismiss have the same intent of dismissing the case for forfeiture
filed against petitioner, his wife and their sons. It is undeniable
that petitioner had failed to fulfill his undertaking. This is
incontestably forum-shopping which is reason enough to dismiss the
petition outright, without prejudice to the taking of appropriate
action against the counsel and party concerned.G.R. No. 173121
April 3, 2013FRANKLlN ALEJANDRO, Petitioner, vs.OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN FACT-FINDING AND INTELLIGENCE BUREAU, represented by
Atty. Maria Olivia Elena A. Roxas, Respondent.D E C I S I O NBRION,
J.:We resolve the petition for review on certiorari,1 filed by
Franklin Alejanctro (petitioneJ), assailing the February 21, 2006
decision2 and the June 15, 2006 resolution3 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 88544. The CA dismissed for prematurity the
petitioner's appeal on the August 20, 2004 decision4 of the Office
of the Deputy Ombudsman in OMB-C-A-03-0310-I finding him
administratively liable for grave misconduct.
FACTS:On May 4, 2000, the Head of the Non-Revenue Water
Reduction Department of the Manila Water Services, Inc. (MWSI)
received a report from an Inspectorate and Special Projects team
that the Mico Car Wash (MICO), owned by Alfredo Rap Alejandro, has
been illegally opening an MWSI fire hydrant and using it to operate
its car-wash business in Binondo, Manila.5On May 10, 2000, PNP-CIDG
conducted an anti-water pilferage operation against MICO.During the
anti-water pilferage operation, the PNP-CIDG discovered that MICOs
car-wash boys indeed had been illegally getting water from an MWSI
fire hydrant. The PNP-CIDG arrested the car-wash boys and
confiscated the containers used in getting water. At this point,
the petitioner, Alfredos father and the Barangay Chairman or punong
barangay of Barangay 293, Zone 28, Binondo, Manila, interfered with
the PNP-CIDGs operation by ordering several men to unload the
confiscated containers. This intervention caused further commotion
and created an opportunity for the apprehended car-wash boys to
escape.Office of the Ombudsman Fact-Finding and Intelligence
Bureau, after conducting its initial investigation, filed with the
Office of the Overall Deputy Ombudsman an administrative complaint
against the petitioner for his blatant refusal to recognize a joint
legitimate police activity, and for his unwarranted intervention.In
its decision9 dated August 20, 2004, the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman found the petitioner guilty of grave misconduct and
ordered his dismissal from the service. The Deputy Ombudsman ruled
that the petitioner cannot overextend his authority as Barangay
Chairman and induce other people to disrespect proper authorities.
The Deputy Ombudsman also added that the petitioner had tolerated
the illegal acts of MICOs car-wash boys.10The petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration but it was denied.The petitioner
appealed to the CA via a petition for review under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court. But the CA dismissed the petition for premature
filing.The petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the CA
ruling-DENIED.Hence this petition.The petitioner argues that the
Office of the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction to order his dismissal
from the service since under Republic Act No. (RA) 7160 (otherwise
known as the Local Government Code of 1991), an elective local
official may be removed from office only by the order of a proper
court. Finally, he posits that the penalty of dismissal from the
service is not warranted under the available facts.
ISSUES:I.WHETHER THE PRINCIPLE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES REQUIRES A REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION FROM THE OFFICE OF
THE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN TO THE OMBUDSMAN FOR THE PURPOSE OF A RULE 43
REVIEW.II.WHETHER THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN HAS JURISDICTION OVER
ELECTIVE OFFICIALS AND HAS THE POWER TO ORDER THEIR DISMISSAL FROM
THE SERVICE.III.WHETHER PETITIONERS ACT CONSTITUTES GRAVE
MISCONDUCT TO WARRANT HIS DISMISSAL.
HELD:We deny the petition for lack of merit.No further need
exists to exhaust administrative remedies from the decision of the
Deputy Ombudsman because he was acting in behalf of the
OmbudsmanThe petitioner has fully exhausted all administrative
remedies when he filed his motion for reconsideration on the
decision of the Deputy Ombudsman. There is no further need to
review the case at the administrative level since the Deputy
Ombudsman has already acted on the case and he was acting for and
in behalf of the Office of the Ombudsman.The Ombudsman has
concurrent jurisdiction over administrative cases which are within
the jurisdiction of the regular courts or administrative
agenciesThe Office of the Ombudsman was created by no less than the
Constitution.18 It is tasked to exercise disciplinary authority
over all elective and appointive officials, save only for
impeachable officers. While Section 21 of The Ombudsman Act19 and
the Local Government Code both provide for the procedure to
discipline elective officials, the seeming conflicts between the
two laws have been resolved in cases decided by this Court.20The
Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction to investigate any act or
omission of a public officer or employee who is under the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. RA 6770 provides:Section 15.
Powers, Functions and Duties. The Office of the Ombudsman shall
have the following powers, functions and duties:(1) Investigate and
prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or
omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when
such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or
inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary
jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any
investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such
cases. [italics supplied; emphasis and underscore ours]The
Sandiganbayans jurisdiction extends only to public officials
occupying positions corresponding to salary grade 27 and
higher.22Since the complaint against the petitioner was initially
filed with the Office of the Ombudsman, the Ombudsman's exercise of
jurisdiction is to the exclusion of the sangguniang bayan whose
exercise of jurisdiction is concurrent.The Ombudsman has the power
to impose administrative sanctionsSection 15 of RA 677027 reveals
the manifest intent of the lawmakers to give the Office of the
Ombudsman full administrative disciplinary authority. These powers
unmistakably grant the Office of the Ombudsman the power to
directly impose administrative sanctions; its power is not merely
recommendatory. It is likewise apparent that under RA 6770, the
lawmakers intended to provide the Office of the Ombudsman with
sufficient muscle to ensure that it can effectively carry out its
mandate as protector of the people against inept and corrupt
government officers and employees. The Office was granted the power
to punish for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. It
was given disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive
officials of the government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities
and agencies (with the exception only of impeachable officers,
members of Congress and the Judiciary). Also, it can preventively
suspend any officer under its authority pending an investigation
when the case so warrants.Substantive IssueThe petitioner is liable
for grave misconductAfter the petitioner introduced himself and
inquired about the operation, the police officers immediately
showed their identifications and explained to him that they were
conducting an anti-water pilferage operation. However, instead of
assisting the PNP-CIDG, he actually ordered several bystanders to
defy the PNP-CIDGs whole operation. The petitioners act stirred
further commotion that unfortunately led to the escape of the
apprehended car-wash boys.Sufficient records exist to justify the
imposition of a higher penalty against the petitioner. His open
interference in a legitimate police activity. and defiance of the
police's authority only show his clear i1itent to violate the law;
in fact, he reneged on his first obligation as the grassroot
official tasked at the first level with the enforcement of the law.
The photographs, taken together with the investigation report of
the Police Superintendent and the testimonies of the witnesses,
even lead to conclusions beyond interference and defiance; the
petitioner himself could have been involved in corrupt activities,
although we cannot make this conclusive finding at this point.43 We
make this observation though as his son owns MICO whose car-wash
boys were engaged in water pilferage. What we can conclusively
confirm is that the petitioner violated the law by directly
interfering with a legitimate police activity where his own son
appeared to be involved. This act qualifies the misconduct as
grave. Section 52(A)(3), Rule IV of the Revised Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service provides that the penalty
for grave misconduct is dismissal from the service.WHEREFORE, in
view of the foregoing, we hereby DENY the petition for lack of
merit, and AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 88544.DARMA MASLAG VS ELIZABETH MONZON, WILLIAM GESTON, AND
REGISTRY OF DEEDS OF BENGUETFACTSThis is a Petition for Review on
Certiorari on the resolution of CA which dismissed petitioner Darma
Maslag's ordinary appeal to it for being an improper remedy. The
Petition also assails the CAs September 22, 2006 Resolution denying
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.The petitioner filed a
Complaint for reconveyance of real property with declaration of
nullity of original certificate of title against the respondents.
The Complaint was filed before the Municipal Trial Court.After
trial, the MTC found respondent Monzon guilty of fraud in obtaining
an OCT over petitioners property.Respondents appealed to the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) declaring the MTC without jurisdiction
over petitioners cause of action. The presiding judge declared that
it will take cognizance of the case pursuant to Section 8, Rule 40
of the Rules of Court which provides for appeal from orders
dismissing the case without trial; lack of jurisdiction. RTC
thereafter reversed the decision of the MTC, prompting the
petitioner to file a Notice of Appeal. The Court of Appeals
dismissed the said appeal and affirmed the respondents contention
that the proper remedy is a Petition for Review under Rule 42, and
not an ordinary appeal. Hence, the present Petition for Review on
Certiorari. ISSUE:1. Who has jurisdiction over the case?2. Whether
petioners appeal is the proper remedy?HELD:1. Under the present
state of the law, in cases involving title to real property,
original and exclusive jurisdiction belongs to either the RTC or
the MTC, depending on the assessed value of the subject property.
Pertinent provisions of Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 129,29as amended
by Republic Act (RA) No. 7691,30provides:Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in
civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction:(1) In all civil actions in which the subject
of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;(2) In all
civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the
property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for
civil actions in Metro Manila, where x x x the assessed value of
the property exceeds Fifty thousand pesos ([P]50,000.00) except
actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or
buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts;x x x xSEC. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts in Civil Cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:x x x x(3)
Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve
title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein
where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does
not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions
in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00).2. Yes. The CA is correct in holding
that the proper mode of appeal should have been a Petition for
Review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court, and not an ordinary
appeal under Rule 41.In fact and in law, the RTC Resolution was a
continuation of the proceedings that originated from the MTC. It
was a judgment issued by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction.It cannot be overemphasized that jurisdiction over the
subject matter is conferred only by law and it is not within the
courts, let alone the parties, to themselves determine or
conveniently set aside. Neither would the active participation of
the parties nor estoppel operate to confer original and exclusive
jurisdiction where the court or tribunal only wields appellate
jurisdiction over the case.The present court looks at what type of
jurisdiction was actually exercised by the RTC, and not into what
type of jurisdiction the RTC should have exercised.Inquiring into
what the RTC should have done in disposing of the case is a
question that already involves the merits of the appeal, but the
court obviously cannot go into that where the mode of appeal was
improper to begin with.Wherefore, Petition for Review is denied for
lack of merit. The Court affirms the decision of the Court of
Appeals. MARK JEROME S. MAGLALANG, Petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE
AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR), as represented by its
incumbent Chairman EFRAIM GENUINO, Respondent.FACTS: Petitioner was
a teller at the Casino Filipino, Angeles City Branch, Angeles City,
which was operated by respondent Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation (PAGCOR). While he was performing his functions as
teller, a lady customer identified later as one Cecilia Nakasato
(Cecilia) approached him in his booth and handed to him an
undetermined amount of cash consisting of mixed P1,000.00 and
P500.00 bills which in total amounts to P50,000.00. Following
casino procedure, petitioner laid the bills on the spreading board.
However, he erroneously spread the bills into only four clusters
instead of five clusters worth P10,000.00 per cluster. He then
placed markers for P10,000.00 each cluster of cash and declared the
total amount of P40,000.00 to Cecilia. Perplexed, Cecilia asked
petitioner why the latter only dished out P40,000.00. She then
pointed to the first cluster of bills and requested petitioner to
check the first cluster which she observed to be thicker than the
others. Petitioner performed a recount and found that the said
cluster contained 20 pieces of P1,000.00 bills. Petitioner
apologized to Cecilia and rectified the error by declaring the full
and correct amount handed to him by the latter. Petitioner,
however, averred that Cecilia accused him of trying to shortchange
her and that petitioner tried to deliberately fool her of her
money. Petitioner tried to explain, but Cecilia allegedly continued
to berate and curse him. To ease the tension, petitioner was asked
to take a break. After ten minutes, petitioner returned to his
booth. However, Cecilia allegedly showed up and continued to berate
petitioner. As a result, the two of them were invited to the
casinos Internal Security Office in order to air their respective
sides. Thereafter, petitioner was required to file an Incident
Report which he submitted on the same day of the incident.On
January 8, 2009, petitioner received a Memorandum issued by the
casino informing him that he was being charged with Discourtesy
towards a casino customer and directing him to explain within 72
hours.On March 31, 2009, petitioner received another Memorandum
dated March 19, 2009, stating that the Board of Directors of PAGCOR
found him guilty of Discourtesy towards a casino customer and
imposed. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration
seeking a reversal of the boards decision. During the pendency of
said motion, petitioner also filed a Motion for Production dated
April 20, 2009, praying that he be furnished with copies of
documents relative to the case including the recommendation of the
investigating committee and the Decision/Resolution of the Board
supposedly containing the latters factual findings.Subsequently, on
June 18, 2009, PAGCOR issued a Memorandum dated June 18, 2009
practically reiterating the contents of its March 19, 2009
Memorandum. It informed petitioner that the Board of Directors 2009
resolved to deny his appeal for reconsideration for lack of
merit.On August 17, 2009, petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, before the CA, averring that there is no evidence, much
less factual and legal basis to support the finding of guilt
against him. Moreover, petitioner ascribed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction to the acts
of PAGCOR in adjudging him guilty of the charge, in failing to
observe the proper procedure in the rendition of its decision and
in imposing the harsh penalty of a 30 -day suspension. Justifying
his recourse to the CA, petitioner explained that he did not appeal
to the Civil Service Commission (CSC) because the penalty imposed
on him was only a 30- day suspension which is not within the CSCs
appellate jurisdiction. He also claimed that discourtesy in the
performance of official duties is classified as a light offense
which is punishable only by reprimand.In its assailed Resolution
dated September 30, 2009, the CA outrightly dismissed the petition
for certiorari for being premature as petitioner failed to exhaust
administrative remedies before seeking recourse from the CA.
Invoking Section 2(1), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, the
CA held that the CSC has jurisdiction over issues involving the
employer-employee relationship in all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities and agencies of the Government, including
government- owned or controlled corporations with original charters
such as PAGCOR. Petitioner filed his Motion for Reconsideration
which the CA denied in the assailed Resolution. In denying the said
motion, the CA relied on this Courts ruling in Duty Free
Philippines v. Mojica citing Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corp.
v. CA, where this Court held as follows: It is now settled that,
conformably to Article IX-B, Section 2(1), [of the 1987
Constitution] government-owned or controlled corporations shall be
considered part of the Civil Service only if they have original
charters, as distinguished from those created under general law.
PAGCOR belongs to the Civil Service because it was created directly
by PD 1869 on July 11, 1983. Consequently, controversies concerning
the relations of the employee with the management of PAGCOR should
come under the jurisdiction of the Merit System Protection Board
and the Civil Service Commission, conformably to the Administrative
Code of 1987. Section 16(2) of the said Code vest[s] in the Merit
System Protection Board the power inter alia to: a) Hear and decide
on appeal administrative cases involving officials and employees of
the Civil Service. Its decision shall be final except those
involving dismissal or separation from the service which may be
appealed to the Commission.Hence, this petition where petitioner
argues that the CA committed grave and substantial error of
judgmentISSUE: Was the CA correct in outrightly dismissing the
petition for certiorari filed before it on the ground of
non-exhaustion of administrative remedies?RULING: Court of Appeals
decision reversed.Prior exhaustion of administrative remediesOur
ruling in Public Hearing Committee of the Laguna Lake Development
Authority v. SM Prime Holdings, Inc.on the doctrine of exhaustion
of administrative remedies is instructive, to wit: Under the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party
is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, he or she should
have availed himself or herself of all the means of administrative
processes afforded him or her. Hence, if resort to a remedy within
the administrative machinery can still be made by giving the
administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a
matter that comes within his or her jurisdiction, then such remedy
should be exhausted first before the court's judicial power can be
sought. The premature invocation of the intervention of the court
is fatal to ones cause of action. The doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies is based on practical and legal reasons.
The availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and
provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. Furthermore,
the courts of justice, for reasons of comity and convenience, will
shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress
has been completed and complied with, so as to give the
administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its
error and dispose of the case.Exception to prior exhaustion of
administrative remediesHowever, the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies is not absolute as it admits of the
following exceptions: (1) when there is a violation of due process;
(2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question; (3) when
the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction; (4) when there is estoppel on the part of
the administrative agency concerned; (5) when there is irreparable
injury; (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose
acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed
approval of the latter; (7) when to require exhaustion of
administrative remedies would be unreasonable; (8) when it would
amount to a nullification of a claim; (9) when the subject matter
is a private land in land case proceedings; (10) when the rule does
not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when
there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial
intervention, and unreasonable delay would greatly prejudice the
complainant; (12) where no administrative review is provided by
law; (13) where the rule of qualified political agency applies and
(14) where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies
has been rendered moot.The case before us falls squarely under
exception number 12 since the law per se provides no administrative
review for administrative cases whereby an employee like petitioner
is covered by Civil Service law, rules and regulations and
penalized with a suspension for not more than 30 days.Availability
of appeal in administrative disciplinary casesSection 37 (a) and
(b) of P.D. No. 807, otherwise known as the Civil Service Decree of
the Philippines,provides for the unavailability of any appeal: (a)
The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative
disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a penalty of
suspension for more than thirty days , or fine in an amount
exceeding thirty days salary, demotion in rank or salary or
transfer, removal or dismissal from Office. A complaint may be
filed directly with the Commission by a private citizen against a
government official or employee in which case it may hear and
decide the case or it may deputize any department or agency or
official or group of officials to conduct the investigation. The
results of the investigation shall be submitted to the Commission
with recommendation as to the penalty to be imposed or other action
to be taken. (b) The heads of departments, agencies and
instrumentalities, provinces, cities and municipalities shall have
jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving
disciplinary action against officers and employees under their
jurisdiction. Their decisions shall be final in case the penalty
imposed is suspension for not more than thirty days or fine in an
amount not exceeding thirty days salary. In case the decision
rendered by a bureau or office head is appealable to the
Commission, the same may be initially appealed to the department
and finally to the Commission and pending appeal, the same shall be
executory except when the penalty is removal, in which case the
same shall be executory only after confirmation by the department
head.Similar provisions are reiterated in the aforequoted Section
47 of E.O. No. 292 essentially providing that cases of this sort
are not appealable to the CSC.Judicial review in administrative
casesNevertheless, decisions of administrative agencies which are
declared final and unappealable by law are still subject to
judicial review. In Republic of the Phils. v. Francisco, we held:
Decisions of administrative or quasi-administrative agencies which
are declared by law final and unappealable are subject to judicial
review if they fail the test of arbitrariness, or upon proof of
gross abuse of discretion, fraud or error of law. When such
administrative or quasi-judicial bodies grossly misappreciate
evidence of such nature as to compel a contrary conclusion, the
Court will not hesitate to reverse the factual findings. Thus, the
decision of the Ombudsman may be reviewed, modified or reversed via
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, on a
finding that it had no jurisdiction over the complaint, or of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction.Distinction between ordinary appeal and petition for
certiorari under Rule 65It bears stressing that the judicial
recourse petitioner availed of in this case before the CA is a
special civil action for certiorari ascribing grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of PAGCOR, not an appeal. Suffice it to state that an appeal and a
special civil action such as certiorari under Rule 65 are entirely
distinct and separate from each other. One cannot file petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules where appeal is available,
even if the ground availed of is grave abuse of discretion. A
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 lies only when
there is no appeal, or plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. Certiorari cannot be allowed when a party
to a case fails to appeal a judgment despite the availability of
that remedy, as the same should not be a substitute for the lost
remedy of appeal. The remedies of appeal and certiorari are
mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive.In sum, there
being no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law in view of petitioner's allegation that
PAGCOR has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, the CA's outright dismissal of the petition for
certiorari on the basis of non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies is bereft of any legal standing and should therefore be
set aside.Finally, as a rule, a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 is valid only when the question involved is an error of
jurisdiction, or when there is grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the court or
tribunals exercising quasi-judicial functions. Hence, courts
exercising certiorari jurisdiction should refrain from reviewing
factual assessments of the respondent court or agency.
Occasionally, however, they are constrained to wade into factual
matters when the evidence on record does not support those factual
findings; or when too much is concluded, inferred or deduced from
the bare or incomplete facts appearing on record. Considering the
circumstances and since this Court is not a trier of facts, remand
of this case to the CA for its judicious resolution is in
order.Dipad v. OlivanG.R. No. 168771 (2012)
FACTS:The car of Dipad and passenger jeep of Olivan collided.
Dipad filed a civil action for damages. Dipad claimed that he is
entitled of damages because he was not able to use his car for his
buy-and-sell business. But when Dipad was being asked by the
defense to produce his Income Tax Return years 2001-2003, he
refused to do so on ground of confidentiality. He claimed that the
demand for his ITR was incriminatory and in the nature of a fishing
expedition. The MTC judge ordered the petitioners to show their
basis for invoking the confidentiality of the ITR's. Dipad invoked
the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) on the
rule on confidentiality of Income Tax return.[footnoteRef:1]
Moreover, in a commentary of the NIRC by Gonzales, there is a
general rule that despite a court order, copies of the income tax
returns cannot be furnished in view of the prohibition contained in
Section 332 (now Section 286) of the Tax Code. Eventually, the
court required the production of the ITR's. [1: Natinoal Internal
Revenue Code, Sec. 71: Disposition of Income Tax Returns,
Publication of Lists of Taxpayers and Filers - After the assessment
shall have been made, as provided in this Title, the returns,
together with any corrections thereof which may have been made by
the Commissioner, shall be filed in the Office of the Commissioner
and shall constitute public records and be open to inspection as
such upon the order of the President of the Philippines, under
rules and regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary of Finance,
upon recommendation of the Commissioner.]
Dipad filed a MR, but was denied. He instituted a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 before the RTC alleging
that the MTC issued the order with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The RTC dismissed the
case because the petition filed is an inappropriate remedy. The
error alleged to be committed is error of judgment. Errors of
judgment is correctible by appeal, and not by the extraordinary
writ of certiorari.
ISSUE:Whether the petition for certiorari is a proper remedy in
this case?Whether the ITR's sought to be produced are confidential
in nature?
RULING:INo. A petition for certiorari is not a mode of appeal.
This remedy only corrects errors of jurisdiction. If the issue
involves an error of judgment, it is correctible by an appeal via a
Rule 45 petition.Errors of jurisdiction occur when the court
exercises jurisdiction not conferred upon it by law.Errors of
judgment are those that the court may commit in the exercise of its
jurisdiction. They include errors of procedure or mistakes in the
court's findings20 based on a mistake of law or of fact.Here, it is
patently clear that petitioners do not question whether the MTC has
jurisdiction or authority to resolve the issue of confidentiality
of ITRs. Rather, they assail the wisdom of the MTC's very judgment
and appreciation of the ITR as not confidential. Specifically, they
claim that the ruling violated the provisions of the NIRC on the
alleged rule on confidentiality of ITRs.
IINo. The commentary was explaining Sec. 270. This provision
prohibits employees of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) from
divulging the trade secrets of taxpayers. The provision does not in
any way address the confidentiality of ITR's.Thus, petitioners
cannot rely on the inappropriate provision.Section 71 is an
excerption to the rule on unlawful divulgence of trade secrets.G.R.
No. 162757 December 11, 2013UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK,
Petitioner, vs.CHRISTOPHER LUMBO and MILAGROS LUMBO, Respondents.D
E C I S I O NBERSAMIN, J.:The implementation of a writ of
possession issued pursuant to Act No. 3135 at the instance of the
purchaser at the foreclosure sale of the mortgaged property in
whose name the title has been meanwhile consolidated cannot be
prevented by the injunctive writ.FACTS:Petitioner United Coconut
Planters Bank (UCPB) appeals the decision of Court of Appeals (CA)
reversed and set aside the order by the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 8,2 denying the motion of respondents
Christopher Lumbo and Milagros Lumbo for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction to prevent the implementation of the writ of
possession issued against them.The respondents borrowed the
aggregate amount of P12,000,000.00 from UCPB. Tosecure the
performance of their obligation, they constituteda real estate
mortgage on a parcel of land located in Boracay, Aklanand all the
improvements thereon that they owned and operated as abeach resort
known as Titays South Beach Resort.Upon theirfailure to settle the
obligation, UCPB appliedon November 11, 1998 for the extrajudicial
foreclosure of the mortgage, and emerged as the highest bidder at
the ensuing foreclosure sale held on January 12, 1999.
Thecertificate of sale was issued on the same day, andUCPB
registered the sale in its name on February 18, 1999. The title
over the mortgaged property was consolidated in the name of UCPB
after the respondents failed to redeem the property within the
redemption period.On January 7, 2000, the respondents
broughtagainst UCPB inthe RTC3 an action for the annulment of the
foreclosure, legal accounting, injunction against the consolidation
of title, and damages(Civil Case No. 5920).During the pendency of
Civil Case No. 5920, UCPB filed an ex parte petition for the
issuance of a writ of possession to recover possession of the
property (Special Proceedings No. 5884).-GRANTED and ISUUE the writ
of possession directing the sheriff of the Province of Aklan to
place UCPB in the actual possession of the property. The writ of
possession was served with a demand for them to peacefully vacate.
Although the possession of the property was turned over to UCPB on
February 1, 2002, they were allowed to temporarily remain on the
property for humanitarian reasons.On February 14, 2002, the
respondents filed inthe RTC handling Special Proceedings No. 5884 a
petition to cancel the writ of possession and to set aside the
foreclosure sale.Special Proceedings No. 5884 was consolidated with
Civil Case No. 5920 on March 1, 2002.On March 19, 2002, the RTC
denied the respondents application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction. Aggrieved by the denial, the respondents
brought a petition for certiorari and/or mandamus in the CA which
resolved C.A.-G.R. SP No. 70261 by granting the respondents
petition, setting aside the assailed orders,and enjoining the RTC
from implementing the writ of possession "pending the final
disposition of the petition for its cancellation and the annulment
of the foreclosure sale.UCPBsought thereconsiderationof the
decision, butthe CA denied itsmotion for reconsiderationon March 8,
2004.Hence, UCPB appeals by petition for review on
certiorari.ISSUES:UCPB asserts that the CA did not rule in
accordance with prevailing laws and jurisprudence when it granted
the respondents petition for certiorariand enjoined the
implementation of the writ of possession issued by the RTC in favor
of UCPB;that the respondents were not entitled to the issuance of
an injunctive writ;that the assailed decision and resolution were
tantamount to a pre-judgment of the respondents petition to cancel
the writ of possession; andthat the respondents were illegally
attempting to wrest away its possession of the property.HELD:The
petition is impressed with merit.It is necessary to explain the
nature of the writ of possession and the consequencesof its
implementation.A writ of possession commands the sheriff to place a
person in possession of real property. It may be issued inthe
following instances, namely: (1) Land registration proceedings
under Section 17 of Act No. 496; (2) judicial foreclosure, provided
the debtor is in possession of the mortgaged property, and no third
person, not a party to the foreclosure suit, had intervened; (3)
extrajudicial foreclosure of a real estate mortgage, pending
redemption under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No.
4118; and (4) Execution sales, pursuant to the last paragraph of
Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
The purchaser at the foreclosure sale may apply ex parte with
the RTC of the province or place where the property or any part of
itis situated, to give the purchaser possession thereof during the
redemption period, furnishing bond in an amount equivalent to the
useof the property for a period of twelve months, to indemnify the
debtor shouldit be shown that the sale was made without violating
the mortgage or without complying with the requirements of Act No.
3135.The RTC, upon approval of the bond, order that a writ of
possession be issued, addressed to the sheriff of the province in
which the property is situated, who shallthenexecute said order
immediately. The relief is granted even without giving an
opportunity to be heard to the person against whom the relief is
sought.Its natureas an ex partepetition under Act No. 3135, as
amended, renders the application for the issuance of a writ of
possessiona non-litigious proceeding.17 Indeed, thegrant of the
writ of possession is but a ministerial act on the part of the
issuing court, because its issuance is a matter of right on the
part of the purchaser.18 The judge issuing the orderforthegranting
of the writ of possession pursuant to the express provisions of Act
No. 3135cannot be charged with having acted without jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion.The property was sold at the public
auction on January 12, 1999, with UCPB as the highest bidder. The
sheriff issuedthe certificate of saleto UCPB on the same day of the
sale. Considering that UCPB registered the certificate of sale in
its name on February 18, 1999,the period of redemption was one year
from said date. By virtue of the non-redemption by the respondents
within said period, UCPB consolidated the title over the property
in its name.It isclear enough, therefore, that the RTC committed no
grave abuse of discretion but acted inaccordance withthe law and
jurisprudence indenying the respondents application for the
injunctive writ filed on February 14, 2002 in Special Proceedings
No. 5884 to prevent the implementation of the writ of possession
issued on December 4, 2001.Consequently, the CAgrossly erred in
granting the respondents petition for certiorariand/ormandamus, and
in enjoining the RTC from implementing thewrit of possession in
favor of UCPB.Otherweighty considerations justify resolvingthis
appeal in favor of UCPB.The first is that the CA did not properly
appreciate the nature of the supposed error attributed to the
RTC.Assuming, though not conceding, that the RTC did err in denying
the respondents applicationfor injunction to prevent the
implementation of the writ of possession, itserror related only to
the correctapplication of the law and jurisprudence relevant to the
application for injunction. As such, the error amounted only to one
of judgment, not of jurisdiction.An error of judgment is one that
the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and
sucherror is reviewable only throughan appealtaken in due course.In
contrast, an error of jurisdiction is committed where the act
complained of was issued by the court without or in excess of
jurisdiction, and sucherror is correctible only by the
extraordinary writ ofcertiorari.25Considering that there is no
question that the RTC had jurisdiction over bothCivil Case No. 5920
andSpecial Proceedings No. 5884, it should follow that its
consideration and resolution of the respondents application for the
injunctive writ filed in Special Proceedings No. 5884 were taken in
the exercise of that jurisdiction. As earlier made plain, UCPB as
the registered owner of the property was at that point
unquestionably entitled to thefull implementation of the writ of
possession. In the absence of any clear and persuasive showing that
itcapriciouslyor whimsicallydenied the respondents application,its
denial of the application did not constitute grave abuse of
discretion amounting to either lack or excess of jurisdiction.The
second concerns the CAs reversing and undoing the RTCs denial of
the respondents application for the injunctive writ, andenjoining
the RTC from implementing the writ of possession against the
respondents "pending the final disposition of the petition for its
cancellation and the annulment of the foreclosure sale."27 The CA
effectively thereby granted the respondents application for the
injunctive writ. In so doing, however, the CA ignored the essential
requirements for the grant of the injunctive writ, and disregarded
the patent fact that the respondents held noright in essence that
the injunctive writ they were seeking would protect. Thus, the CA
committed another serious error.A preliminary injunction is an
order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the
judgment or final order requiring a party or a court, an agency, or
a person to refrain from a particular a particular act or acts. It
may also require the performance of a particular act or acts, in
which case it is known as a preliminary mandatory injunction. Under
Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunctionmay be justified under any of the following
circumstances, namely:(a)Theapplicant is entitled to the relief
demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in
restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts
complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts,
either for a limited period or perpetually;(b)The commission,
continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of
during the litigation would probably work injustice to the
applicant; or(c)A party, court, agency or a person is doing,
threatening, or is attemptingto do, or is procuring or suffering to
bedone, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the
applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and
tending to render the judgment ineffectual.In the case of
injunction, the right sought to be protected should at least be
shown to exist prima facie. Unless such a showing is made, the
applicant is not entitled to an injunctive relief. The Court has
stressed the essential significance of the applicant for injunction
holding a right in ease to be protected, stating:As with all
equitable remedies, injunction must be issued only at the instance
of a party who possesses sufficient interest in or title to the
right or the property sought to be protectedAccordingly, the
conditions for the issuance of the injunctive writ arc: (a) that
the right to be protected exists prima facie; (b) that the act
sought to be enjoined is violative of that right; and (c) that
there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent
serious damage.The absence of a right in esse on their part
furnishes a compelling reason to undo the CA's reversal of the
RTC's denial of their application for injunction as well as to
strike down the injunctive relief the CA afforded to the
respondents. It cannot be otherwise, for they had no "right clearly
founded on or granted by law or is enforceable as a matter of
law".WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on
certiorari; REVERSES the decision promulgated on November 27, 2003
and the resolution promulgated on March 8, 2004 in C.A.-G.R. SP.
No. 70261; DISMISSES the petition in C.A.-G.R. SP. No. 70261 for
lack of factual and legal merits; DECLARES that there is now no
obstacle to the implementation of the writ of possession issued in
favor of the petitioner; and ORDERS the respondents to pay the
costs of suit.LIGOT VS REPUBLIC-Guys nalampasan ko. AilaG.R. No.
193261 April 24, 2012MEYNARDO SABILI, Petitioner, vs.COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and FLORENCIO LIBREA, Respondents.FACTS: COMELEC denied
Sabilis Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for mayor of Lipa due to
failure to comply with the one year residency requirement. When
petitioner filed his COC for mayor of Lipa City for the 2010
elections, he stated therein that he had been a resident of the
city for two (2) years and eight (8) months.However, it is
undisputed that when petitioner filed his COC during the 2007
elections, he and his family were then staying at his ancestral
home in Barangay (Brgy.) Sico, San Juan, Batangas. Respondent
Florencio Librea (private respondent) filed a "Petition to Deny Due
Course and to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and to Disqualify a
Candidate for Possessing Some Grounds for
Disqualification.Allegedly, petitioner falsely declared under oath
in his COC that he had already been a resident of Lipa City for two
years and eight months prior to the scheduled 10 May 2010 local
elections.In its Resolution dated 26 January 2010,41 the COMELEC
Second Division granted the Petition of private respondent,
declared petitioner as disqualified from seeking the mayoralty post
in Lipa City, and canceled his Certificate of Candidacy for his not
being a resident of Lipa City and for his failure to meet the
statutory one-year residency requirement under the law.Petitioner
moved for reconsideration of the 26 January 2010 Resolution of the
COMELEC, du