Competition issues in pharmaceutical distribution Panos Kanavos, PhD LSE Health London School of Economics OECD, Paris, 28 February 2014
May 29, 2015
Competition issues in pharmaceutical distribution
Panos Kanavos, PhDLSE HealthLondon School of Economics
OECD, Paris, 28 February 2014
Outline
• Pharmaceutical supply chain: an important stakeholder• Issues in distribution and competition
• Market structure• Entry and exit• Remuneration and discounting• Horizontal and vertical integration• Additional services
The pharmaceutical supply chain: actors and channels
Manufacturer
Primary distribution
Wholesaling
Pharmacysupply
Consumption by medicine users
Direct manufacturerdistribution?
Doctor dispensing?
Direct pharmacysupply
Self supply and other options(Parallel) export*
(Parallel) export*
* If allowed; definition of IP rights exhaustion (national, regional, international)
High price country
Manufacturer Wholesaler
Distribution and parallel trade: How does it work?
Parallel trader (wholesaler) obtains PD license
Pharmacy
Low price country
Manufacturer Wholesaler Pharmacy
Impact of Distribution Margins: An exampleD S
DK
CH
IRL
B /
L N
NL
GB
FIN F P
GR E I
80
90
100
110
120
130
140
150
160
Eur
o
= Price that pharmaceutical companies charge directly to the local wholesalers (excl. VAT)
Ex-Factory Price (EFP)
Ex-Factory price (EUR), Zyprexa 28 tabl. 10mg Public Prices (EUR), Zyprexa 28 tabl. 10mg
Retail price
= Pharmacy selling price (incl. VAT)
Public Price (PP)
Similar Ex-Factory prices do not automatically lead to similar Public Prices
Δ = - 46.5%Δ = - 46%
Sweden / Denmark Δ = - 1% Sweden / Denmark Δ = - 24.7%
Presentation of branded expensive, mid-priced and low priced ex-factory price (EFP), wholesale (WS) margin/markup, pharmacy
(Ph) margin/markup
Price build up for a high volume generic molecule across EU countries; prices as of 15 June 2009.
Wholesale and retail
markups in Developing countries
Issues related to distribution and likely implications for competition
1. Market structure/Regulation Competition 2. Market entry and exit Regulation and
Competition 3. Remuneration Competition 4. Ability to substitute (Ph) 5. Discounting practices and competition6. Horizontal and vertical integration7. Additional services
1. Market structure: National and regional wholesaler presence in select EU member states (2010)
• The absolute number of wholesalers in a country varies significantly across the EU. Greece, Italy, Spain, Estonia, Romania and the Czech republic have the largest number of wholesalers, whether regional or national.
• By and large, wholesaling in Europe is fragmented, with over half of total market occupied by national wholesaling entities
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
UKSweden
SpainSloveniaSlovakiaRomaniaPortugal
NetherlandsLuxembourg
ItalyIreland
HungaryGreece*
GermanyFranceFinlandEstonia
DenmarkCzech Republic
BulgariaBelgiumAustria
National Wholesalers Regional Wholesalers
1. Market structure: Community pharmacy numbers in Europe per capita
population
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
16000
18000
20000
Country
Popu
latio
n (t
hous
ands
) se
rved
A
B
D
Fin
Fra
Ger
Gre
Ire
Ita
Lux
Neth
Nor
P
Spa
Swe
Switz
UK
• Percent in chains: Norway = 86%; the Netherlands = 50%+; UK = 50%+; Belgium = 12%; Italy = 10%
• In principle, a fragmented structure
2. Market entry and exit
• Geographical (minimum distances) and demographic (min number of population)criteria apply to the establishment of pharmacies
• Pharmacies in urban (overconcentration) vs rural (relative lack) areas
• Ownership regulation– Structure of pharmacies (pharmacists or other groups allowed)– Multiple ownership allowed or not– Trade in pharmacy licenses (allowed or not)
Pharmacy – Ownership regulationCountry Ownership structure of
pharmaciesMultiple ownership Trade in
pharmacy licensesPhar
macists
Other groups allowed
Allowed
Specifications
Ireland No Any individual or legal person bar prescribers in same area
Yes No limitation on number of pharmacies in a chain
Allowed
Netherlands
No Any individual or legal person
Yes No limitation on number of pharmacies in a chain
Not allowed
Norway No Any individual or legal person bar prescribers and mfg
Yes Limitation on No. of pharmacies in chain (max 40%)
-
Austria Yes - No No multiple ownership allowed – may run one branch pharmacy
Not allowed
Finland Yes - No No multiple ownership allowed – may run max 3 branch pharmacies
Not allowed
Spain Yes - No Allowed
Source: OBIG
3. Remuneration and terms: Wholesale distribution margin/markups, types, regulations and discounts/rebates for reimbursable medicines
in EU (2010) Regu-
lated Different Margins: Different
Drug Classes
Regressive ≤ 4
Categories
Regressive: 5-9
Categories
Regressive: ≥ 10
Categories
Linear Mark-
up
Average WS Margin† (% PPP)
Discounts, Rebates to
Health Insurance: Mandatory
Discounts, Rebates to
Pharmacies: Commercial
Austria A - - 6.5 - 13.4%2008 Belgium - - 8.45% T, 2007 Bulgaria PM - - 7-10% T, 2009 Cyprus PR B - - - na Czech Rep. + ph. - - 4.3% T, 2007 Denmark n.appl. Private Negotiations, Unregulated 6-7% T, 2009 Estonia - - na Finland n.appl. Private Negotiations, Unregulated 3.0% T, 2008 France + ACC - - 6.2% T, 2007 Germany - - 4-6.1% T, 2007 H Greece - - - 4% T, 2007 Hungary 6.04-6.36% T, 2007 Ireland C - - - Na Italy - - - 6.65% 2009, 1
3%August 2010
Latvia - - 3.34%2008 Lithuania - - 8-9% T, 2005 Luxembourg D - - - Na Malta PR E - - - 15% PR, 2009, 1 Netherlands n.appl. Private Negotiations, Unregulated 13-24% T, 2007 Poland - - - 9.78%2007 Portugal - - - 6.87% 2007 Romania - - 10-14% 2007 Slovakia - - n.appl. Slovenia - - 8-9% T, 2007 Spain - - 3.5% T, 2007 Sweden n.appl. Private Negotiations, Unregulated 2-3% T, 2009 UK F Private Negotiations, Unregulated 12.5% 2007
3. Remuneration and terms: Retail distribution margin/markups, types, regulations and discounts or rebates for reimbursable medicines in EU (2010)
Regu-lated
Different Margins: Different
Drug Classes
Regressive ≤ 4
Categories
Regressive: 5-9 Categories
Regressive: ≥ 10 Categories
Linear Mark Up: Flat Rate
Dispensing Fees
Other Fees
Average Pharmacy Margin† (%PRP)
Discount, Rebates: Manda-
tory
Discount, Rebates: Commer-
cial
Austria PR, SF - - - 15%PR DD 19.16%2008 Belgium - - - €3.88pp R, INN na Bulgaria - - - 18-22% T,2007 Cyprus / PR, P - - - na Czech Rep. +WS - - - na Denmark - - - AF 19.3% 2009 D Estonia - - - PROG 19% T,2009 Finland - - - €0.42pp 23.6% 2008 France B, G +ACC - - - €0.53pp H na Germany - - - 24% 2004 na Greece - - - na na Hungary - - - 19.46% 2005 Ireland S - - - V na na Italy - - - na C na Latvia - - - 19% 2008 na Lithuania - - - na Luxembourg I - - - 46.7-50.2%2007 Malta / PR, P - - - 20% PR Netherlands - - - - €7.28pp na C Poland - - - na Portugal - - - 18.25%2008 Romania - - 12-24% 2008 na Slovakia - - €0.48pp 21% 2007 Slovenia Points - - - - €1.4-2.8pp €2.10pp Spain - - na C Sweden Off-P - - OP 21.3%2008 UK / - - - €1.52pp HC na C
3. Pharmacy remuneration: discounts received from manufacturers on certain types of medicines
Simvastatin (2.12.0.0, statin), UK Drug Tariff Price, 2008
Dose Pack size Reimbursed (Drug Tariff)
Price (£)
Lowest available market price (£)
Potential Discount to pharmacy off
Drug Tariff price (%)
Simvastatin tabs 10mg 28 2.12 0.45 78.8%
Simvastatin tabs 20mg 28 2.26 0.59 73.9%
Simvastatin tabs 40mg 28 4.87 1.95 60%
Simvastatin tabs 80mg 28 26.79 13.50 49.6%
• Competition game at pharmacy level is often determined by the level of discount offered by manufacturers to pharmacists esp. in environments where pharmacists are allowed to substitute
• Discounting practices may be regulated (e.g. 3 for the price of 2); elsewhere they are disallowed, whereas in some settings they form part of pharmacy income (UK, NL); most often discounts are not visible or transparent
• Where they are allowed and form part of pharmacy income, a clawback maybe in operation
Kanavos, 2007.
4. Horizontal and vertical integration
Horizontal integration Extensive between 1990 and 2004 in EU-15 led to a
significant reduction of full-line wholesalers from around 600 to 141
Further consolidation expected in the new member states Limitations by EU Competition law
Vertical integration Limitations by national legislation and regulation on
pharmacy ownership Who are the right/attractive partners
4. Wholesaling: new business models
• Traditional model: F-L wholesaler acts on behalf of a number of manufacturers; bound by public service obligation
• New models– DTP or Agency: single wholesaler – manufacturer
agreement• for all or part of the latter’s portfolio • Wholesaler is a logistics provider• Wholesaler does not own the stock• Implications for wholesaler payment
– RWM: manufacturer contracts with a limited number of wholesalers, usually 2-3• For all or part of manufacturer’s portfolio• Wholesaler owns stock• Deviation from FL wholesaling
4. Proportion of Pharmacy market share as source of delivery, including Full Line Wholesalers, Short Line Wholesalers and direct from
Manufacturer
• Whereas the majority of pharmacy sales continue to originate from (full-line) wholesalers, in a number of countries the proportion of pharmacy sales originating directly from the manufacturer can be significant (Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, UK, Czech Republic, France, Italy)
0102030405060708090
100
Aust
ria
Belg
ium
Bulg
ari
aC
zech
Republic
Denm
ark
Est
onia
Finla
nd
France
Germ
any
Gre
ece
Hungary
Irela
nd
Italy
Luxe
mbourg
Neth
erl
ands
Port
ugal
Rom
ania
Slo
vakia
Slo
venia
Spain
Sw
eden
UK
%
Pharmacy sales via Full Line WS (%) Pharmacy sales via Short Line WS (%)
Pharmacy sales via Manufacturer (%)
Description of degree of regulation of wholesalers and pharmacies across EU27 countries, 2010
Pharmacist generic
substitution allowed
Pharmacist must sell at lowest
price
Wholesale rebate to
Pharmacies
Regulation of
Wholesale margins
Pharmacy chain
allowed
Pharmacy ownership
by non-pharmacist
Regulation of establishment
of new pharmacies
Pharmacy ownership Regulation
Internet Pharmacy allowed
Austria / Belgium Bulgaria Cyprus / - Czech Rep. / Denmark Estonia Finland / France Germany / Greece Hungary / / Ireland Italy Latvia - Lithuania - Luxembourg Malta - - - Netherlands Poland - / Portugal / / Romania Slovakia - Slovenia Spain / Sweden UK
5. Additional services: Description of additional services provided by pharmacies across the EU countries. Starred (*) services have a charge attached to the
service, services with a ‘S’ are only available at some pharmacies
Dis
pens
ing
Pres
crip
tion
s Re
peat
D
ispe
nsin
g D
ispo
sal W
aste
M
edic
ines
Med
icin
e U
se
Revi
ew
Emer
genc
y Co
ntra
cepti
on Bl
ood
Pres
sure
M
easu
rem
ent
Chol
este
rol
Mea
sure
men
t G
luco
se
Mea
sure
men
t W
eigh
t M
easu
rem
ent
Preg
nanc
y Te
st
Smok
ing
Cess
ation
D
iabe
tes
Man
agem
ent
Ast
hma
Man
agem
ent
Hyp
erte
nsio
n M
anag
emen
t V
acci
nati
on
Hom
ecar
e Se
rvic
es
Nig
ht S
ervi
ces
Oth
er
Austria - - - - S Belgium * * Cyprus / - Czech Rep. - Denmark * S S S S S S * S S - Finland * S S S France Germany * * * * * * * * * * * * - Ireland *S *S *S *S *S *S *S S S - Italy S S S S S - Netherlands * * * - Poland S S S S S - Portugal S S S Slovakia S S S S S S S S S - Slovenia S S S S S S S Spain - Sweden S S S S S S - UK * * * * * - - -
Overall remarks on distribution
• Highly regulated (Europe) vs not clear rules of the game (LMICs)
• Regulated – Remuneration– Entry
• Fragmented structures• Variability in horizontal and vertical integration• Variability in regulatory practices (e.g. discounting)
Issues that merit further reflection and/or work
• Data and understanding of operating structures and regulatory frameworks in LMICs and, less so, in OECD
• Market structure and concentration levels: population coverage and service availability at regional/rural level
• Horizontal/vertical integration and likely impact on availability of medicines and sufficient levels of service
• Approaches to remuneration to appropriate regulation in LMICs• Safety and quality assurance in the advent of e-pharmacies• Future role of distribution: logistics provider or adherence to
specific levels of service• Discount practices: competition-enhancing or competition-
reducing