Comparative Study of Democracy in Sea

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UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONGCOMPARATIVE ASIAN STUDIES

M.A,DISSERTATION

An Exainination of the Failure of the Experiment inDemocratic Form of Government in Southeast Asia,1945 - 1962 : a Comparative Study of Burma,Thailand and Indonesia.

Wing-cheung SO, Daniel


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CONTENT

PREFACE P.IINTRODUCTION P . 3CHAPTER IDECAY OR CONTINUITY? P . 6CHAPTER IIAN ADOPTION OF CONVENIENCE P . 12CHAPTER IIIIDEAL S AND REAL ITY I P. 24CHAPTER IVIDEALS AND REAL ITY II P . 41CHAPTER VTHE DE FAC TO POWER S THAT BE P. 50CONCLUSION . . P. 53BIBLIOGRAPHY P.54APPENDIX


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PREFACE

The present dissertation is an attempt to examine themotivating forces behind the application of democratic form ofgovernment in post-war S.E. Asia and the factors that led to itsdemise. In order to understand the way this phenomenon was bornand moved, both the longitudinal axis (historical factors) andthe latitudinal axis (political, situational factors) arescrutinised. In short, a duo-disciplinary approach is adopted.

In the choice of approaches, presentation and frame ofreference, this writer has taken Professor Harry Benda's warningto heart and have tried his best to avoid presenting readers"highly sophisticated and persuasive answers to an intrinsicallymistaken, or irrelevant, question." Therefore, historical factorswill receive their due share of attention here and the focus ofour attention is as much on "why did constitutional democracyfail in post-war S.E. Asia?" as on "why had it been ever tried atall?11

Democratic form of government here means a politicalsystem the major components of which are a constitution, electedparliament(s), cabinet responsibility and political parties. Asthe present attempt is not political analysis, little effort ismade to compare forms of governments under examination withAnglo-American or French systems.1. Benda, Harry. "Democracy in Indonesia"

The Journal of Asian Studies, 23(1964) : 449-56

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As for the selection of specific areas of study, thesethree countries are chosen mainly because of their relativesignificance in the region. Thailand, however, very much servesas a foil in this study in view of its comparatively brieferexperience in adopting a democratic form within this period.Nevertheless, the democratic experiment in these three countriesshare striking similarities as well as a few basic differences.And this writer has found it rewarding to study them together forcomparative purposes. Yet, unfortunately, this also means thatthe volume of this study is exceptionally big for a dissertationof this nature and this writer is compelled to dispense withdetails whenever possible. And it is hoped that this could becompensated by the foot-notes, appendix and the bibliography.

It is the belief of this writer that the post war experi-ment of democracy in S.E. Asia had been tried at wrong time, failedbut not yet finished. The democratic form is still and will be apotential alternative to absolute monarchy, dictatorship of themilitary, the left or the right for the rulers in this region. Yetif it ever takes root here, it possibly means that it has foundits indigenous form.

May I take this opportunity to than>v Dr . B. Shaw, Dr. C M .Turnbull and Dr. L. Wright who have offered inevaluable assistanceto me during the preparation of this dissertation.


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INTRODUCTION

In 1947, it seems that in the post war scramble forpolitical and ideological disciples, the West had won a hand-some victory in S.E. Asia. Burma, Thailand and Indonesia had

2all promulgated constitutions which adopted a democraticpolitical form. Whilst all those who held the rein of power :U Nu of Burma; Pridi of Thailand and Sjahrir and Hatta ofIndonesia all showed democratic aspirations. This is amazing.And it is even puzzling in view of the western experience wherethe democratic tradition spans over its history for more thantwo thousand years and can only find its institutional expression2. The 1947 Constitution of Burma provided for a figure-head

President, a bicameral parliament consisting of the Chamberof Deputies and the Chamber of Nationalities. The former waselected on a popular basis while the latter racial ba sis.Executive power was vested with the prime minister and hiscabinet which was collectively responsible to the Chamber ofDeputies. The 1946 Constitution of Thailand provided for afigure-head monarch, a popularly elected Lower House, Executivepower was vested with the prime minister and his cabinet whichwas collectively responsible to the House of Representatives.The 1945 Constitution of Indonesia provided for deliberativebodies, a popularly elected congress which could determine themain lines of national policy and a parliament to legislate,a strong president which was chief executive as well as headof state. For the full text of these constitutions, pleaserefer to Appendix I, II and III.

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at the end of the eighteenth century. It is difficult to imaginethat such a political form, which has taken so many years toevolve and take root in the west, could have found its realisationin S.E. Asia in a few years time. This phenomenon becomes evenbaffling when, with a quick turn of fate, the democratic formwas abolished in a little more than a decade's time : in Burma,the army, led by Ne Win, seized power from U Nu on 2nd March, 196 2and the country was put under military dictatorship. In Thailand,Pridi was forced to resign in August, 1946 after the alleged4assassination of King Ananda in Switzerland. He wa s succeededby Luang Thamrong Nawasawat, a political ally, who managed tocarry Pridi's Free Thai government on for one more year. Then,in November, 1947, the army, led by Phibun, seized power and putthe country under military rule. The eclipse of democracy inIndonesia is less abrupt although the pattern is strikinglysimilar. In 1950, a new constitution was proclaimed. In thisnew constitution, the president became a figure-head, Indonesiabecame a unitary state and the cabinet was made responsible to

3. The democratic aspirations of these men were touched upon inthe following respectively :Butwell, R-, U Nu. Stanford University Pre ss, 1963 , P. 76Cady, J.F., The History of Post-war S,E. Asia

Ohio University Press, 1974, P.9Feith, H*, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia

Cornell University Press, 1962, P.6044. For a more detailed description of the incident, see :

/ J.F. op ^c i t. , pp. 87-91

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a unicameral parliament In the so-called Constitutional Era,there were five governments in less than seven years. Thepolitical situation was highly volatile and the election in 1955only accentuated the political crisis. In March, 1957, civil warwas imminent and Ali Sastroamidjojo, then the prime mi nister, wasforced to declare a state of emergence and placed the countryunder martial law. Henceforth, the country was under quasi-military rule under a competitive alliance of Sukarno and themilitary.

Thus, by 1962, the democratic form had entirely disappearedfrom the political horizon of S.E. Asia. Is it an example ofpolitical decay as postulated by scholars like H. Feith and S.P.Huntington or a case of a re-assertion of a not so distant past,a question of continuity and change as H. Benda lited to see it?These are the two principal question this writer addresseshimself to answer in this dissertation.

5. The five government were the Natsir Governm ent, Sept. 1950 toMarch 1951; the Sukiman Government, April 1951 to February1952; the Wilopo Government, April 1952 to June 1953 ; the AliSastroamidjojo Government, July 1953 to July 1955 and theBurhanuddin Harahap Government, August 19 55 to March 195 6.

6. See Feith, H. opcit. and Huntington, S."P., "PoliticalDevelopment and Political Decay, "World Pol itics, XVII (April1965), pp. 386-430 .

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CHAPTER ONEDECAY OR CONTINUITY ?

Generally speaking, there are two divergent interpreta-tions of the drift towards military autocracy in S.E. Asia inthe late 1950s* S.P, Huntington termed it political decay, S.N.

7Eisenstadt called it "modernisation breakdown". They arerepresentative of the school that views the adoption of democracyin the region as a "take-off" into modernity and sees the drifttowards autocracy primarily as an inability to continue to attainfurther progress. Using Indonesia as an example, H. Benda question-

oed this view on two fronts. Firstly, he argued that such a viewsmacked of automatic historical parallelism according to whicherroneous postulations like "had Indonesia been left free todevelop 'normally1, it would have more or less f naturally1developed not only into a wealthy and just nation state, but alsointo a bourgeois democracy," would be made* Secondly, Bendathought that it, as an interpretive framework, was at best partialbecause it largely ignored what had gone before. Benda warned usthat the modern era was a very short interlude in S.E* Asia and itwas unhistorical to see its post-war development primarily as a

7. Eisenstadt, S.N., "The Influence of Traditional and ColonialPolitical Systems on the Development of" Post-traditional Socialand Political Orders." in Evers, Hans-Di eter( ed*), Modernisationin South-east Asia, OUP, 1973 . pp. 3-18

8. Benda, H, op. cit.

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continuation of its most recent history. In a paper on "Decoloni-9zation in Indonesia", he saw the post-war development in

Indonesia as a problem of continuity and change, a case of anextension of the past into the present, and appeared to suggestthis as a more profitable frame of reference for students ofpost-war S.E. Asia.

A judgement on which of the above approaches is morelegitimate and profitable is reserved for a later chapter; here,we shall first take heed of Benda's advice and start ourinvestigation from a historical perspective. The pitfalls ofhistorical parallelism notwithstanding, a brief look at thecorresponding experiment in the West might, hopefully, shed somelight in our probe.

The institutionalisation of democratic ideals in the westin the late eighteenth century and early nineteenth century isthe culmination of a tradition of more than two thousand years.It started with Greek and Roman Constitutionalism, thencomplemented by Christian notions of human equality and derivationof power through service. After a long period of "incubation"through the Middle Ages, it became a potent force again with thesecularisation of the state, the Reformation, the birth of modernscience and the growth of Capitalism. It"gained an ideologicalform with the advent of democratic theories and appearance of

9. Benda, H. "Decolonization in Indonesia." in American HistoricalReview 70(1965), pp. 1058-73

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great theorists like Locke and Rousseau. While the IndustrialRevolution and the emergence of the nation-state served ascatalyst. The former led to urbanisation, popularisation ofeducation and improvement in spatial communication - all regardedby political scientists as prerequisites for a successful practiceof democracy. The latter made nationality a democratic ideal whichachieved its triumph at the Peace of Versailles. 1 0

Although, similarly, post-war S.E. Asian national leadersmade independence a democratic ideal, this is the only similarityone can find between the two experiments. In S.E. As ia , theadoption of democracy is a break, rather than a culmination, ofwhat has gone before. In S.E. Asia, the polity was more or less,authoritarian up to the Second World War. For example, precedingthe colonial era, there were two basic types of polities in thearea of our study. The first was the inland-agrarian hydraulicprototype such as the Konbaung Dynasty (1753 - 1885 A.D.) of Burma;the Ayuthyia Dynasty (1350 A,D. - the present) of Thailand and theMataram Dynasty (1520 - 1680 A.D.) of Java. The second was theriparian prototype such as the Srivijaya Dynasty (650 - 1350 A.D.)of Southern Sumatra. They were theocratic autocracies. The firsttwo were founded on Buddhism, the third Hindu-Buddhism and thelast Islam. Therefore, they shared similar socio-politicalcharacteristics which, in Weberian terms, were patrimonial. Interms of nature, what existed further before was fairly the same.There were hardly qualitative or structural changes. The traditional

10.For a more detailed account, see Lindsay, A.D.,The Modern Democratic State, OUP , 1943


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polity in this area is a static whole where there are from timeto time changes in name but seldom in content.

How about the attitude of the populace at large towardspolitical authority? H. J. Rubin's pan-Southeast Asian macro-level model on peasants' attitude towards state officials basingon his studies in Thailand might be helpful. Wi th the supportof case studies, H.J. Rubin showed that the Thai peasants lookedto their government as a source of gentle benevolent concern, asa body possessed ideally of the attributes of a strong, wise butindulgent father. To them, government officials enjoyed higherstatus because of cosmological justifications. Notions like"public servant", "human or citizen rights'1 were absent from theirvocabulary. Individual cultural distinctions notwithstanding, suchattitude is prevalent among peasant societies in S.E. Asia. The"democratic vision" is certainly not part of the Southeast Asianculture. (The question of whether the traditional society isinimical to the survival of democracy is reserved for a laterchapter.)

11A concise description of the traditional polity in this areacan be found in the following : Bastin, J. & Benda, H.,A History of Modern Southeast Asia, second edition, P.H.A.,1977, Chp. I; Steinberg, D. J., (ed.) In Search of Southeast Asia,OUP, 1971, Part I.

12.Rubin, H.J., "Will and Awe : Illustration of Thai VillagerDependency Upon Officials." in Journal of Asian Studies XXXIINo. 3 (May 1973), pp. 425-444


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Some scholars of S.E. Asia, notably H. Feith. saw theadoption of democratic systems as an outgrowth of political changein the colonial era. It is disputable whether the political changein the colonial era provided S.E. Asia with any significantfoundations for a "take-off1 to democracy. Although theocraticabsolute polities were abolished in Burma and Indonesia, they werereplaced by colonial autocracies. The 1932 Coup in Thailand was hardlya step towards democracy. In his classical study of the Thai polity,Fred Riggs observed that the coup of 193 2 brought forth no qualitativechange as it merely involved the substitution of one oligarchic elite

14for another. Constitutional changes and "representative" councilsintroduced in Colonial Burma and Colonial Indonesia in the 1910s and1920s, in spite of their proto-democratic features, were short-lived.

However, it would be too historicist to negate the applicabi-lity of the democratic form in S.E. Asia by saying it has aninadequate historical foundation. It seems to be too easy an answer.This writer believes that there is indeed some justification to seethe post-war democratic experiment against the immediate backdrop ofthe colonial era. For the Western intrusion had differentiated thehistory of Southeast Asia into two streams : on the one hand, therestill was the flow of that Hindu-Buddhist-Islamic Great Tradition inthe agrarian sector where over 90 % of the population w as; on theother hand, there flowed a new stream of a small tradition in thenew-born cities which became centres of east-west interaction and

13.Feith, H., op. cit.14.Riggs, F. W., Thailand, East-west Center Press, 1966, P.112

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where the democratic vision was born among a v^sternised elitewhich would become very influential, in spite of its size, inthe early phases of independence of their countries.

So, when we say "continuity", one has to question,"continuity" from which tradition? Or when we say "decay" or"breakdown", one has to ask "decay" and "breakdown" in whichstream? The answer to the question whether the failure of thedemocratic experiment was a matter of continuity of decay iscomplex Yet this writer believes that there is one major keyto the question : the democratic experiment was an extension ofthe small tradition as its belongers gained breif prominenceduring the post-war period. However, ushered by the internallogic of the experiment, the small tradition had to synchronisewith that grand old tradition. Incompatibility set in andeventually the small tradition had to give way. Is it aninevitability or just a matter of contingency? How could theadvocates of democracy assert themselves in spite of the lackof support from the Great Tradition? These questions bring usto the next chapters.

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CHAPTER TWOAN ADOPTION OF CONVENIENCE

B. Moore Jr., in his study of democracy and dictatorship,pointed out there were three major routes to the modern world :a revolution from above by a combined gentry and bureaucracyled to facism, a bourgeois revolution of the urban burgeoisieto westerm style democracy, and a peasant revolution tocommunism. This observation might throw some light on theadvent of democracy in post-war S.E. Asia, The urban bourgeoisiebegan to play an increasingly significant role in the leadershipof nationalist movements in Burma and Indonesia towards the1930s and political conditions immediately after the war gavethe westernised urban elite predominance in the politicalscene. The situation in Thailand was similar with the westernisedurban elite playing a leading role in the 1932 Coup. Thiswesternised urban elite were mainly intellectuals, professionalsand teachers, a group that was comparatively mo re exposed towestern thinking and had a propensity to democratic ideals.

Nai Pridi Panomyong of Thailand is a typical example.He was one of the central promoters of the 1932 coup, and studied

15. Moore Jr. , B., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy,Peguin University Books, 1966, pp. 413-414

16. A concise account of the change in leadership in nationalistmovements in this area can be found in : von der Mehden,Fred R., Religion and Nationalism in Southeast Asia/ Madison,Wis., 1963

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law and political science in France. Another promoter of thecoup, Nai Thawee Bunyaketu, described themselves as a groupwas greatly inspired by the democratic forms of government ofboth France and England. According to him, Pridi was a

18convinced democrat. After the success of the coup, Pridi waskept to the sideline of the power circle as Phibun Songgramruled Thailand in a form of military dictatorship. However,Pridifs turn came as Phibun's pro-Japanese policy fell intodiscredit when the fortune of the war turned against Japan andThailand was in the imminent danger of invasion and censure bythe Allies. In mid-1944, Phibun fell from power in disgrace. Ina time of ascendancy of the Allies, Pridi, as a founder of theanti-Japanese underground Free Thai Movement and his pro-Westoutlook, was chosen to become Phibun fs successor,

Pridis rise marks a new phase in Thai politics. Thearmy leadership, after a dominance of more than ten y ea rs , wasdiscredited and in the nadir of its power. Phibun, the militarystrongman, was made temporarily liable for trial as a warcriminal. Those were the heydays of the civilian politicians.The urgent need of negotiating with the Allied Forces broughtmore civilian politicians to power. For example, Khuang Aphaiwongand Mom Seni Pramoj took turns filling the role of premier underPridifs tutelege. Both of these men were also professed democrats,

17. Ray, J.K. (ed.) Portraits of Thai Politics, Orient L ongman,1972, p.63

18. Ibid, p.73

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It is under such circumstances that Pridi was able to takemeasures to transform the Thai oligarchic political system intoa democratic form : in the Thai 1932 Constitution, though therewere provisions which affirmed that sovereign power was vestedin the people and established a single legislative house and acabinet responsible to it, there was a crucial article whichdeclared that because the country needed a period of tutelegebefore entering full democracy, half of the parliament would beappointed by the government. Therefore, effective executivecontrol of the government was maintained and the country was

19still a long way from attaining a democratic form. In May,1946, through the effort of Pridi, the 1932 Constitution wasrevised. It provided the country with a bi-cameral parliamentwith a fully popularly elected lower house which was empoweredto select the newly created upper chamber, thus facilitating the20exclusion of both royalist supporters and army leaders

From 1944 to 1947, an attempt was made in Thailand tosubstitute civilian rule for that of the military under thebanner of democratisation. This attempt was very much urban-oriented as it merely involved an intra-elite struggle based inBangkok with the vast majority of the peasants in the ruralsector untouched. Pri di fs two main source of support were hisFree Thai army, which was then based in Bangkok and was numbered

19. Wilson, D.A., Politics in Thailand, Cornell University P res s,1962, pp.15-16

20. Ibid. pp.57-71

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21about 10,000. The other source was his newly founded Constitu-tional Front which was a loose coalition of naval and civilservice personnel, proroyalists and students from the ThammasatUniversity established by him. 2 2 The advent of democracy inThailand was not due to popular movement, it was an urbanphenomenon.

Similarly, the ascendancy of democracy in post-warIndonesia was also largely due to the assertion of a few. Thesefew were from Partai Sosialis Indonesia (PSI) and their leaderswere Mohammad Hatta and Soetan Sjahrir. Hatta was a Minan gkabau.After receiving his secondary education in local Du/tch languageschool, he went to the Netherlands in 1921 whe re he studied atthe economic faculty of the university of- Rotterdam from whichhe graduated with a Ph. D. in 193 2. Although he preserved hisIslamic faith, he was already a democrat with western outlook

23when he returned to Indonesia. Soetan Sjahrir was closely akinto Hatta fs political beliefs : a convinced Socialist and a strongbeliever in parliamentary democracy. He believed that the route24of Indonesia to modernity was through westernisation.

21. Ray, op , cit. p.11022. Cady, J.F., A History of Post-War Southeast As ia , Ohio

University Press, 1974, p.85; and Riggs/ op. cit. pp. 233-23423 . Penders, C.L.M., The Life and Times of Sukarno, OUP, 1974

pp. 28-2924- Ibid, p. 29


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As in the case of Pridi, political situational factorsmade both Hatta and Sjahrir political strongmen and this was outof proportion to the actual strength of their political base-What accounted for the powerful position of Hatta was that afterthe declaration of independence in August 194 5, the fate of therepublican cause was still very much uncertain as the Dutch wasnot prepared to give up so easily, In negotiating with the Dutchand winning sympathy from the Powers, Hatta !s diplomatic skilland knowledge of the West became an asset to the success of therepublican cause. This gave the lobby of democracy much strength.

25On the other hand, Sjahrir 1s underground anti-Japanese activitiesgave him much political capital as it was believed that the newlyfounded republic would gain wider international acceptance if itwas headed by a leader of an anti-Japanese undergroundorganisation. Sjahrir made good use of this political advantageand offered to join the republican cause only on the conditionthat a democratic form of government would be adopted. Suka rno,who advocated the adoption an indigenous formulae of muf akat-

2 f ixrtusjawarah type of "democracy", was forced to give way. On

25. Nationalist leaders like Sukarno and Hatta had jeopardizedtheir international image by apparently cooperating withthe Japanese during the War while Sjahrir set up an anti-Japanese underground movement.

26. Previous to this, during the drafting of the 1945 Constitution,proposal for a more liberal democratic form of government

was voted down in the Independence Investigation Committee,where Sukarnofs faction had a greater majority.

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16th October 1945, in the second session of the National CentralCommittee of Indonesia (KNIP), it was proclaimed that parliamen-tary democracy was adopted and the 1945 Constitution would beamended to this purpose accordingly. On 14th November 194 5,Sukarno's cabinet resigned and Sjahrir went ahead to compose hiscabinet. In late 1945, parties were founded, a multi-party systememerged. Democracy had left its embryo stage, for its advocates,in Indonesia. But its rise was not due to popular demand.

Unlike the adoption of democracy in Thailand which was,to a degree, a guise of a temporary victory of civilian ruleover military dictatorship or that in Indonesia which was theresult of "up-startf! dominance of a small western educated elite ,democracy in Burma was introduced by the founding fathers of theUnion, who had fairly strong political base. The democraticConstitution of 1947 was drafted under Aung San, who was theleader of the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL) TheAFPFL, unlike the PSI, which in 1952, only claimed 3,049 full

27members and 14,48 0 candidate memb ers, or the ConstitutionalFront, which was a loosely organised coalition hardly attained a

28party form, was fairly well organised and had grass-root support.

Although none of the members of the AFPFL leadership hadreceived education abroad, they nonetheless shared a westernoutlook as most of them, like Aung San, U Nu , kyaw Nyein, werestudents of the University of Rangoon. They were committed to

27. Feith, op.cit. p.13028. Wilson, op.cit. p.236

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the democratic form with varying degrees of faith, and as itturned out, the most convinced democrat among them, U Nu , becamethe ruler of the Union after Aung San and mos t of his ablestassociates were assassinated, U Nu, an Arts student withliterary ambitions, was overtly committed to the cause ofdemocracy. He had said that "democracy is man's inherent right,and there is no person or community in the world who can besaid to be not ready for it. A principal cause of democracy notworking effectively in some countries is the failure to adaptthe institutional forms of democracy to local conditions, andthis is the real threat that presents itself and we must try toavert. Democracy is one of the noblest id^as created byman, and there can be no compromise in its application to humansociety anywhere in the world."

However, simply attributing the rise of democracy inthis area to the democratic aspirations of those who happened tobe in power is inadequate. There must have been other factorswhich, combined with what has been said in the foregoingparagraphs, contributed to a force great enough to withstand theinertia of the Great Tradition, albeit temporarily, from assertingitself.

29. Due to his political activities, he neVer got his universitydegree.

30. Speech before World Conference on Religion and Freedom(Dallas, Texas), reported in The Nation, Ap r. 21 , 1959.Quoted in Butwell, R., U Nu of Burma, Stanford UniversityPress, 1963, p.75.

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These factors were largely circumstantial. Invariably,the men who came to power in this period had no bloodrelationship with the former rulers of the traditional polities.They were a new power elite- And unlike their predecessor w hoenjoyed a legitimacy christened by the divine right of kingship,the polities they created were secular in character. Thisgave rise to the problem of legitimacy, the solution to whichwas a prerequisite to any stable government. In a period whe nthe prestige of democracy was high, popular sovereignty, thatprincipal democratic article of faith, obviously provided thepost-war rulers in this area with a convenient substitute, ajure humano for the jure divino of the ancien regime. The refore,it is not accidental to find : the Article 3 of the Burmese 1947Constitution reads "The sovereignty of the Union resides in thepeople.11 The Article 1 of the Thai 1946 Constitution reads "Thesovereign power emanates from the Thai people ." And the Article 2fChapter One, of the Indonesian 1945 Constitution reads"Sovereignty is vested in the people "

31. During the drafting of the constitutions, both the Buddhistlobby in Burma and the Muslim lobby in Indonesia pushed forthe adoption of their religion as the state religion andthe creation of a theocratic state but to no avail. Underthe leadership of Aung San, no compromise was made in Burma.In Indonesia, however, a compromise was made* The constitutionof 1945 was put forward by Sukarno to include the "belief inGod" as the fifth principle of the Pantja Sil a, the FivePrinciples of the State.

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There was another practical factor which made it highlyexpedient for the post-war government in this area to adopt thedemocratic form. At the time of their inauguration, invariably,the governments of Aung San, Pridi and Sjahrir faced a crisisof survival. Not until the Attlee-Aung San Agreement signed inJanuary, 1947, the AFPFL had yet to gain full recognition ofthe British as the legitimate representative body of the Burmese

32nationalist movement. A democratic political platform wouldcertainly be helpful to their cause. In Thailand, at the requestof Pridi, Seni Pramoj undertook the task of negotiating a peacetreaty with a hostile British government who deemed Thailandlegally liable for damages arising from her pro-Japanesepolicy. Bangkok must therefore submit to temporary Alliedcontrol of her foreign trade, cooperate in the repatriation ofJapanese troops and surrender those who were directly responsiblefor the pro-Japanese policy to the Allied Forces to be tried aswar criminals. Apart from these, Thailand was also required toreturn all her territorial acquisition made since 194 0 andpledged not to construct a canal across the Kra isthmus withoutprior British and Indian consent. These were very harsh termsand Seni was fighting hard to reduce the severity of thepunishment meted out to Thailand by the British Again , ademocratic political outlook would help his government to winover international sympathy. Similarly, this IndonesianConstitution of 1945 was written under the uneasy expectationof Dutch belligerency. While the more democratic constitution

32. Donnison, F.S.V., Burma, Ernest Benn Ltd., 1970 , Chp. 833, Ray, op.cit. pp. 164-170

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of 194 9 was written in the shadow of the Round Table ConferenceAgreement, at a time when international support was mos t vital*An adoption of a western democratic form would certainly add"political chips" to the Indonesian bargaining power.

A further practical consideration was that of thenumber of options available and familiarity. Actually, therewere not many options open to the leaders. Apart from thewestern democratic model, the current options were the Sovietmodel; the Chinese model and the Nazis-Fascist model* Althoughin Indonesia, Sukarho was advocating an indigenous politicalform, his ideas were still in their primitive stage and in the

{ 35mid-1940 s, had to be further formulated, expounded and refined.Whereas in Thailand and Burma, native political theorists wereyet to be born. Meanwhile, the aforesaid options were hardlytimely choices : an adoption of the Soviet model would justprovide the army with an excuse to take over power. This wasespecially true for Thailand where the political enemies ofPridi had constantly alleged him of being a communist. Chiang'sKMT-Army dominated government was a hardly respectable formwhile to follow the heels of Hitler and Mussolini would simplymean political suicide.

And for all the uncertainties abput its workability,the democratic form had the advantage of familiarity. Invariably

34. Feith, op. cit. p. 4335. Sukarno called his political philosophy marhaenism. For a

description of it , see Pende rs, op. cit . pp. 46-48- 21 -


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in all these three countries, representative institutions hadbeen working for sometime. A halfly elected parliament wasintroduced in Thailand in 193 2; the Volksraad was introduced inIndonesia in 1916; and the Legislative Council was introducedin Burma in 1922. Although they were far from being trulydemocratic institutions, they were the only form of p roto-democratic systems the westernised power elite of the post-warperiod was acquainted with.

Alongside with the aforementioned practical considera-tions , there were also some "psychological" factors such asnational self-respect. Amidst the post-war liberal democratictide, it is indeed unthinkable for the political leaders toproclaim a retrogressive political form. Besides, just as it isimpossible in the twentieth century to begin industrial develo p-ment at seventeenth century levels, so it is impossible tobegin political development at ancient levels.

With the backdrop of a dominant Great Tradition whichwas being held dormant temporarily, the adoption of thedemocratic form, as shown above, could be seen as an extensionof a century-old westernisation centred in the cities whichreached its meridian heights at the immediate post-war yearsunder a number of favourable circumstantial factors. A lack ofdeep historical roots might not preclude the democraticexperiment from being successful. Howev er, it mea ns that thisexperiment has to accomodate itself in the continuity of theGreat Tradition of the lands as the internal logic of the

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experiment inevitably elevates the Great Tradition to a forceto be reckoned with as the politicians extend their mandatesfrom the cities to the villages, the non-metropolitan sector.

In the next chapter, we shall see how it foundered.

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CHAPTER THREEIDEALS AND REALITY (I)

In this chapter, we shall follow the travail ofdemocracy in these three countries. Theoretical interpretationsof its demise are reserved for the next chapter. Any viable andstable political system shares one characteristic : the abilityto resolve conflict and engineer consensus. Dahl, writing aboutthe western democratic experience, described the system as "aninstitution for encouraging consultation, negotiation, and theexploration of mutually beneficial solutions This was thenational parliament or legislature. The growth of a legislature,constitutionalism, and later, political parties has providedmodern polyarchies with a complex network of procedures,traditions, rituals, and pressures involving elected representa-tives, spokesmen for interest groups, and experts, who mediatethe innumerable conflicts among the manifold interest groups ofmodern society*11

What has just been quoted might be true, to a certainextent, for the West, but in the area of our study, it iswoefully inaccurate.

As mentioned in the last chapter/ Pridi came to powerlargely because of circumstantial factors rather than a strongpower base. And the adoption of a democratic form was chosen, on

36. Dahl, R.A., Modern Political Analysis, Second Edition,Prentice-Hall of India, 197 5, p.62

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the whole, because of the assertion of Pridi and politicalexpediency. This weakness in power and ideology became apparenrin the inability to resolve conflict by democratic means inpost-war Thailand. There were two major conflicts : that betweenPridi!s government and the Army, and the power struggle withinthe civilian sector. In most of the cases, the democraticinstitutions failed to resolve the tension among theseconflicting parties.

One important conflict Prid i!s government failed toresolve through democratic means was the estrangement of thesoldiers from his government- The nature of this, estrangementmight perhaps be illustrated by the attempt of Pridi fs govern-ment to reform the Army in 194 6, related by Thawee, then

37interior minister, in his memoir. The attempted reform wastriggered off by allegations of misdemeanour of soldiersreceived by Thawee who tabled them in a cabinet meeting. Thisaroused vigorous protest from the defence minister, a militaryman, who resigned subsequently. In order to bring disciplineback to the Army, Thawee suggested a partial demobilization ofthe military, and appointment of a smaller number of soldiersat a higher salary.

Thawee !s suggestion of demobilization was accepted bythe Cabinet. But the implementation of this scheme was utilizedby military politicians to discredit the ruling civilian

37. Ray, op. cit. pp. 111-114

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politicians, alienate them from soldiers, and thus set thestage for a coup to restore military predominance in Thaipolitics. For the purpose of demobilization, soldiers fromdifferent parts of the country were directed to assemble atBangkok with all their weapons. Soldiers in far off provincesrequired transport, and military officials approached theRailway authorities for necessary facilities. The Railwayauthorities at that time faced an acute shortage of wagons,because the delivery of hundreds of thousands of tons of riceto the British enjoyed top priority. Instead of trying toexplore ways to meet the needs of the Army, the Railwayauthorities, rather irresponsibly, rejected the request outright.Military politicians then got an opportunity to harass theruling civilian group. They ordered many soldiers to marchhundreds of miles on foot, intimidating and robbing people ontheir way. Soldiers were thus instilled with the feeling thatthe ruling civilian group was indifferent to their interestsand undeserving for their support. The cause to make the militarysubordinate to the civilian authority was lost. The survival ofdemocracy was therefore jeopardised.

Meanwhile, competitive politics engendered rivalriesamong the civilian politicians and depleted their strength. Thethree civilian political leaders failed to cooperate. BothKhuang and Seni favoured a re-assertion of royalist influenceand the selection of a kind of elder-statesman senate. Theyalso advocated qualified cabinet responsibility to the partlyelected lower house. Pridi, by contrast, favoured a morethoroughgoing liberalisation of electoral and governmental

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procedures as a means of widening his political base. The formertwo then formed the Democratic Party which adopted a policy ofaggressive opposition.

But even the civilian politicians in Thailand wereprepared to beat their political opponents by extra-constitu-tional means if it were proven to be expedient! The degree ofacceptance of democracy as a political norm was clearly reflectedwhen Khuang consented to collaborate with the "8 NovemberGroup" to overthrow Pridi's Free Thai government by a coup in1947.

It could really be said that it was doubtful whetherdemocracy had really been given a chance at all in Thailand inview of the brevity of the length of the experiment : a mere twoyears. But this cannot be apply to that in Burma, which surviveda period of some fifteen years.

Although the democratic experiment was introduced bythe leadership of the AFPFL which enjoyed a larger power basethan Pridi's, it faced far greater odds. Comparatively, Burmawas a far less homogenous country than Thailand. Politicalcleavages centred around an ethnic diversity and hostilitywhich had deep historical roots and were accentuated by thecolonial experience, and also around an ideological diversitywhich was directly related to the impact of western ideologies.Right at the inauguration of the constitutional government,these centrifugal forces were unprepared to resolve their

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differences among themselves through democratic means.Immediately after independence, Burma was in a state of civilwar following the armed revolts of the following groups :

Red Flag communistMuj ahidsThe People!s Voluntary OrganizationWhite Flag communistsThe Union Military PoliceThe Karen National Defence Organization

The above list obviously reflects the degree of racial mutualdistrust and ideological polarisation.

The fact that racial minority groups weretincluded inthe Union was largely due to the personal prestige and effortof Aung San and the guarantee of their rights in the 1947Constitution. State representation was provided in the Chamberof Nationalities. In it, apart from the two-fifths representationof majority Burman elements, membership was allocated roughly inproportion to population. The Shan and Karen contingents eachapproximated one-fifth of the total, roughly equal to thecombined Kachin, Chin, and Kaya representation. The minoritycontingents elected to the Lower House were also designated toconstitute their respective State Councils, whi ch were accordedlimited autonomy within the federal framework. The limitationsof power were that sessions staged by such councils must bepresided over by governors or ministers appointed by the primeminister and removable by him. State Council legislation wassubject to suspensive veto by the president of the Union andreview by the Supreme Court on constitutional grounds- The38. Donnison, opcit. p- 142

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separate state budgets were largely centrally controlled, sinceadditional revenues beyond local tax collections could beallocated only by central authority. It will be seen how theseminority groups made use of their votes to "trade" for greaterand greater "home-rule" which eventually threatened theintegrity of the Union,

In the first years of independence, the dominant AFPFLprovided a political centre for the nation and competitivepolitics did not emerge in a potent form until later but schismwithin the civilian leadership did. The AFPFL was not united bya single ideology and cohesion within the League derived for themost part from the long time personal association


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ideological reasons as the crucial question of power. By 19 58,U Nu became increasingly unsatisfied with the factional andcoalition character of the League and determined to transform itinto a distinct party with a single ideology. However, the Kyaw-Swe faction intended to retain their separate status andregarded U Nu's move as an excuse to eliminate their power baseinside the League. The conflict fell into struggle between theKyaw-Swe faction and Nu-Tin faction. Eventually, both groupsagreed to have a show-down in the Chamber of Deputies. So it wasthat an essentially intra-party quarrel came to be decided inthe national legislature. As both factions were roughly equal instrength, this struggle for power inevitably involved the M.P.'sfrom the minority groups whose political significance grew ascompetitive politics emerged. On 9th June, 1958, the Kyaw-Swefaction was out-voted and subsequently expelled from the League.Oppositional politics and a multi-party system emerged and theprice was proven to be too costly.

Before 1956, Burma was very much a single partydemocracy. In the 1951-1952 Election, the AFPFL won a sweepingvictory. Opposition in the parliament was weak as the radicalanti-government elements preferred* to make their fights in thejungles than in the parliament. There was no real party inopposition. The situation improved in 1956' with the emergenceof the National Unity Front , a pro-communist party but the AFPFLwas still able to achieve a decisive victory in the 1956Election. In spite of its internal cleav ages, therefore, theAFPFL government was fairly strong. After the 1958 split,however, the situation was entirely different. The half-year

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long struggle for power within the AFPFL made the already ineptcivil bureaucracy more inept, policy-making and policy-implementation were at a stand-still, the poor economicsituation became worse. The AFPFL government was no longerpopular . The power base of U Nu !s government was much weakened.This proved to be democracy fs undoing.

The insecurity of U Nu's support in the Chamber ofDeputies, where he had won the non-confidence vote of June 9 by

39only eight votes , led directly to a major constitutionalwrangle in August, 1958. The approaching end of Burma's officialfiscal year meant that U Nu needed a new bu dget, but defeat inthe legislature was imminent. Eventually, U Nu decided topromulgate the budget by executive decree. Obviously, even U Nuput his political survival before democratic prin ciples. Anothermajor crisis was engendered as U Nu, in order to show hisgratitude to the support of the NUF in the June 9 Vo te , openednew negotiations with the Communist rebels and offered themcomplete amnesty, partly legislation, and new elections. Thisoverstretched the patience of the Army, whi ch had so far

39. Of the attending 24 8 members , 246 voted. The vote was asfollows :AFPFL M.PNationalArakaneseShansKachinsChinsKayahsKarensSource :

. 'sUnity FrontNational United

Butwell, op.cit.

Nu-Tin5144Organisation 6163322127

p. 169

Kyaw-Swe971094305119

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remained politically neutral, and General Ne Win made the moveto take over the government, U Nu, in a face-saving measu re,took the initiative to "invite" Ne Win to organise a "care-taker" government to look after the affairs of the countryuntil new elections could be held in an orderly manner.

Anyway, democracy was given a second chance when newelections were really held in 1960 . The chief contestants werethe U Nu-led Union Party and the Kyaw-Swe-led "Stable" AFPFL,which enjoyed Army backing. The outcome was the restoration ofU Nu to power.

However, the victory of the Union party did not meanthat U Nu had achieved a strong power base. His Union Party wasa loose federation of highly disparate groups not directlyamenable to his control. On the other hand, in order to winover the support of the minority groups, which eventually puttheir stakes on U Nu during the election, U Nu had promised tomake greater concessions to their autonomy demands. This broughtup the age-old thorny Burman-minority relationship in Burmawhich again proved to be fatal to democracy. The immediate causeof Army re-intervention was the Shan question which wasparticularly sensitive because of General Ne Win's cancellationof the hereditary rights of the Sawbwa princes. Nu had enlistedShan election support by agreeing to reconsider both the roleof the princes and the constitutional permission for the ShanState to alter its status within the Burma Union after ten yearstime. Representatives of the approximately thirty units of theState administration were invited to assemble at Rangoon on


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1st March 1962, for conference on the subject. They includedthe respected Sao Shwe Thaike, the first president of the BurmaUnion. It was this move that precipitated the army coup of 2ndMarch. The excuse was to salvage the country from disintegration

Comparing with Indonesia, the centrifugal forces of Burmawere hardly serious. At the end of 1949, when it was declared aunitary state, Indonesia, more than Burma, was a state insearch of nationhood. There is in previous history, no recordof a nation that covered, even one third, of the areas it coversnow. And this in land of about one quarter the size of U.S.A.,there are roughly three thousand inhabited islands with possiblyseven thousand islets with a population of around 97 million

41in the period of our study. And among these 97 million peo ple,there are over three hundred different ethnic groups each withits own cultural identity, and more than two hundred and fifty

42distinct -languages. It is interesting to see how thedemocratic form fared amidst these historical centrifugalforces.

This diversity, unlike Burma's case, gave Indonesia awide range of parties, a fact that made it a foregone conclusion

40. This, and the preceding five paragraphs are based on Butwell,op. cit. Chapters 12-14; and Donnison, op.cit. Chapter 9

41. Fryer, D.W., Emerging Southeast Asia, George Philip and SonLtd., London. 1970, p.292

42. Geertz, H., "Indonesian Cultures and Communities.!t in McVey ,R.T., (ed.)f Indonesia, New Haven, HRAF Press, 1963, pp.24-96

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that proportional representation would be adopted as the basisof the country's electoral system, thus in turn ensuring thecontinuance of a multi-party system. Since November 1945, morethan twenty parties had responded to Sjahrir !s call for theestablishment of political groups. Seventeen of these wer erepresented in the new parliament by means of nomination asgeneral elections had not yet been held. 43 The following tableshows the composition of Parliament by parties in the earlydays of the unitary state :

Distribution of seats in the Indonesian Parliament,March 1951 4 4

Party No. of Date of (re-)Seats foundation

Madjelis Sjuro Muslimin Indonesia, (Masjumi) 49Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI) 36Partai Sosialis Indonesia (PSI) 17Persatuan Indonesia Raya (PIR) 17Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) 13Fraksi Democrat (BFO leaders) 13Partai Rakjat Nasional (PRN) 10Partai Katolik 9Partai Indonesia Raya (Parindra) 8Partai Buruh 7Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia (PSII) 5Partai Kristen Indonesia (Parkindo) 5Partai Murba 4Others 39TOTAL 232

1943 (Nov.1945)1927 (Jan.1946)Feb.1948Dec.19481920 (Nov.1945)July 19501925 (Nov.1945)1935 (Nov.1945)Dec.19491912 (July 1947)1930 (Nov.1945)Nov.1948

Among these parties, there were five notable ones, namely the

43. For a detailed account of events that delayed and then ledto the 1955 Election, see Feith, op.cit. pp.273-285;425-43 7

44. Dahm, B., History of Indonesia in the Twentieth Century,Praeger Publishers, 1971,p.151

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Masjumi, the Nahdatul Ulama, the Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI),the Partai Sosialis Indonesia (PSI) and Partai Komunis Indonesia(PKI).

Before the Nahdatul Ulama splited from its rank s, theMasjuxni was the strongest of all parties in the early fifties.As a Muslim party, its leadership was dominated by men wi th amodernist and socialist outlook, such as Mohammad Natsir.According to Feith !s classification, it was an administrators 1party, as against the Nahdatul Ulama, which he termed a

45solidarity-makers' party. The Nahdatul Ulama was thefundamentalist Muslims who insisted to base their politicaldoctrines on the four mazhabs, which modernists had called intoquestion. The Nahdatul Ulama also represented the Javanesesantri group whereas the main centres of influence of themodernists were in the Outer Islands.

The split between the Masjumi and the Nahdatul left thePNI as the largest Indonesian party. Its membership was drawnfrom adherents of Sukarn's old PNI and Partindo, such as Sartono,Ali Sastroamidjojo. As the successor to the first nationalistparty, PNI enjoyed great prestige. Its ideology was Sukarno's"marhaenisxn" It advocated and "Indonesian way11 to progress andrepresented the Javanese abangan interests. It wa s, according to

46Feith, a solidarity-makers' party.

The PSI, on the other hand, was an administrators 1

45. Feith, op.cit. pp. 113 ff.46. Ibid. - 3 J 5 -


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party par excellence. And as aforementioned, it was the principaladvocate of democracy* Committed to Fabian Socialism anddemocracy, its leadership included learned men like Sjahrir,Dr. Sumitro D]O]ohadikusumo and Sultan Hamemgkubuwono. Itsradical counterpart, the PKI , under the leadership of D.N. Ai dit,had formulated their Indonesian form of "historic compromise11and adopted a policy of "peaceful co-existence" with the otherparties since 1951. Its topmost concern seemed to be theincrease of its membership while aligning itself with the"national bourgeoisie" and the poor and "middle" peasants,which, according to its leadership, was the PNI.

However, despite their external ideological clothings,in fact, their real differences were not so much ideologicalbut rather rooted in the intrinsic division of the Indonesiansociety along socio-cultural groupings, in Geertz's term, alirans.This means that there was hardly sociological base for a develop-ment of national parties. The outcome was a cluster of partiesof similar strength with provincial character. This was clearlyreflected by the general elections of 1955 the result of whichwas :

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General elections, 1955 4 7

Party

PNIMasjumiNUPKIPSIIParkindoPartai KatolikPSIIPKIPertiPRNPartai BuruhMurbaPIR (Wongso-negoro)PIR (Hazairin)Others

TOTAL

Validvotes

received(29 Sept.)

8,434,6537,903,8866,955,1416,176,9141,091,1601,003,325770,740753,191541,306483,014242,125224,167199,588178,481

114,6442,712,96437,785,299

Per-centage

22.320.918.416.42.92.62.02.01.41.30.60.60.50.50.37.3

100.0

Seats innew

Parlia-ment

575745398865442221116

257

Seatsold

in

Parlia-ment

424481745814-113 ,6 '411846

233

97661

Votesreceived

4'(15 Dec.),070,218,789,619,989,333,232,512,059,922988,810748,591695,932544,803465,359220,652332,047248,633162,420101,509

From the Elections, the following socio-political lineage andalignment could be discerned :48

ReligionSantri

Christian

Alirans and Party IdentificationTraditionalist

NU

Secular/Muslim Non-Santri PNI

ModernistMasjumiParkindo

Partai KatolikPKIPSI

47. Dahm, op.cit. p. 17148. Hindley, D., "Alirans and the Fall of the Old Order"

i n Indonesia, Cornell Modern Indonesian Proj ect, 1970 , IX,pp. 23-66.


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The regional basis of power also became clear with theMasjumi getting most of its votes from Sumatra and the PN I, PKIand NU from Java. The elections not only demonstrated the extentof cleavage within Indonesia, it also failed to give any partya clear mandate, not even a significant plurality, to form astrong government. Since the inauguration of the so-calledConstitutional Era, Indonesia was tormented by a series ofweak coalition cabinets which led to an unbroken series ofcabinet crises. These cabinets may be tabulated as follows :

Governments in the time of Parliamentary democracy49up to 1956

Main Parties Prime Minister Dates

Masjumi, PSIMasjumi, PNIPNI ( Administrators f) ,Masjumi, PSIPNI ('Ideologists1)Nahdatul Ulama, PSIIMasjumi et al.

NatsirSukimanWilopoAli Sastro-amidjojoBurh'anuddinHarahap

Sept. 1950-March 1951Apr. 1951-Feb. 1952Apr. 1952-June 1953July 1953-July 1955Aug. 1955-March 1956

A brief summary of the immediate causes that led to the fall ofthese cabinets will suffice to show the nature of the problemswhich stood in the way of internal stability. Thus, Natsirsgovernment was forced to resign owing to its neglect of theWest Irian question; Sukiman1s, over the conclusion of asecurity pact with the U.S.A.; Wilopo's, over the dispossessionof squatters on planatations in east Sumatra'; Ali Sastroamidjojof s,because the army refused to accept a government nominee as chiefof staff; and Burhanuddin1 s, over the unilateral dissolution ofthe Dutch-Indonesian union on account of the West Irian problem,

49. Dahm, op.cit* p. 160- 38 -


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which remained unresolved* 50

The democratic form failed to provide Indonesia with adominant political centre to resolve conflicts arisen fromnation building and modernisation. One of these major problemswas the economic imbalance between the import-oriented economyof Java and the export-oriented economy of the Outer Islands.Since independence, leaders of the Outer Islands had longcomplained against exploitation by Java, The less thansuccessful performance of the Masjumi and PSI in the 1955Election further aggravated the feeling that the interests ofthe Outer Islands were under-represented in the Parliament andintensified tne regional tension. This induced extremity in theactions of the leaders in the Outer Islands,

Therefore, in spite of the fact that Ali Sastroamidjojoendeavoured to secure the strongest possible backing for hissecond cabinet in 1956, the centrifugal forces reinforced by theoutcome of the 1955 Election, was too strong for hxnu On theone hand, Sukarno intensified his campaign of anti-westerndemocratic form and put forward his konsepsi, in the name ofGuided Democracy- On the other hand, extra-legal economicactivities in the Outer Islands grew to uncontrollable scalewith the backing of the regional panglima. Subsequently, it ledto a vigorous power struggle within the military, with theNasution-Simatupeng faction, representing the Central HighCommand on the one side, and the Lubis-Simbolon-Supeno faction,

50- For a detailed discussion on the history of these cabinets,see Feith, opcit, Chapters 4, 5, 6, 8, 9.

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representing the regional panglima, on the other. Eventually,in the early days of 1957 it developed into a co-ordinatedrevolt of the military commands in the Outer I sl an ds . 51 Civilwar was imminent, failing to defuse the situation, AliSastroamidjojo was forced to resign and declared a state ofemergence and martial law, thus paving the way for Sukarnoand the Central High Command of the Military to take over therein of power. Democracy also ran aground in Indonesia after abrief history of twelve years.

51. An analytical account of the entire struggle can be foundin McVey, R.T., "The Post-Revolutionary Transformation ofthe Indonesian Army" Part I in Indonesia CHIP XI 1971pp. 131-176.


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CHAPTER FOURIDEALS AND REALITY II

In commenting the advent of the absolutist state inEurope in the sixteenth and seventeenth century, Lindsayobserved that this form of government arose as a protestagainst various restraints which limited efficiency at atime of increasing need of administration due to rapid tech-

52nical change. Similarly, James Bryce opined that "mendesire to be well governed before and more than they desireself-government." These two insightful observations havebeen helpful to this writer's understanding of the demise ofthe phenomenon in question.

In the following, we shall approach to analyse theeclipse of western democracy in these three countries onthree fronts : it was closely related to the displacement ofthe elite with western democratic outlook; its failure to meetthe needs of modernisation and nation-building; its inabilityto provide stable governments in the context of a traditional-ist type of politics.

In Chapter Two, it has been shown that the adoption ofthe political form was closely related to the advent of a small

52. Lindsay, op. cit., Chapter 353. Quoted in Sartori, G., Democratic Theory, Oxford and IBH

Publishing Co., 1962, p. 107

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elite personified by men like U Nu; Pridi; Sjahrir and Hatta.These men were, in varying degrees, committed democrats. Andthey closely identified their political prestige and fortunewith the democratic system. So, it is hardly surprising tosee the democratic form being abandoned following the fall ofthese leaders from power. As issues of nation-building andmodernisation took the place of the need for internationalrecognition as the most important issue, another elite grouprose to meet the needs of the times. This group, characterisedby men like Ne Win, Phibun, Sukarno and Nasution, was un -sympathetic to the democratic model and, consequently, thedemocratic form was dropped in their respective countries.This brings us back to the question of "decay or continuity".For people who identified modernisation and political progresswith the constitutional form of government based on the WesternEuropean model, the fall of the governments of Pridi; U Nu andAli Sastroamidjojo were obviously cases of political decaysand breakdowns. The progressive development from the smalltradition came to an end, people whose style of governmentshipwas more akin to that of the traditional leaders were now inpower.

However, with the easy manner in which the democraticform collapsed, two questions arise : Had it' justified itsexistence by its performance? Was it compatible with the cur -rent political reality which was the product of centuries oldhistorical developments?

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In answering the first question, we shall see thesort of "contribution11 made by the democratic form to theissue of nation-building, in Burma and Indonesia. Becauseof its minorities problem, national building had been bothpressing and difficult in Burma. The racial confrontation,which took a form of a Burman versus the Shan-Karen-Kachin-Arakanese anti-thesis, had deep historical root s. In view ofthese minorities 1 deep-seated desire for self-government,the minorities problem was one of the most potent centr i-fugal force of the country. Yet, electoral potentials of thesegroups made it very tempting for politicians to manipulatetheir desire for "home rule" in order to win over their votes.This was exactly what U Nu did in 1960 and this eventuallyled to the possible cessassion of the Shan State from theUnion. The question of whether it is morally desirable toallow the minorities the right of self-determination is out-side the scope of this paper, but it is difficult to imagineany political form, democratic or otherwise, that magnifieda nation!s centrifugal forces and placed national integrityin jeopardy could survive.

As for Indonesia, that state in search of nationhood,competitive politics also found to be detrimental to nationalunity. The aliran rooted multi-party system kept the histo-rically built-in regional differences alive in the nationals c e n e - The most dominant opposing poles were that of the

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Javanese-Aristocratic and the Islamic-Entrepreneurial, as54termed by Feith. This polarisation was deeply grounded in

the centuries old regional rivalry for dominance witnessed inthe changes in fortune of the competing empires of Old Mataram;Srivijaya and Majapahit. In the Constitutional Era, this con-frontation re-emerged in the form of the Outer-Islands basedMasjumi-PSI versus the Java based PNI-NU-PKI antithesis. How-ever, in the vote-counting system of government by majority,the less populated Outer Islands were banished into an unadvan-tageous position, a fact made obvious in the 1955 Election*This frustration was one of the major factor that led theregional panglima, in an attempt to assert interests of theOuter Islands, to demand the resignation of the Second A liSastroamidjojo Cabinet and requested the formation of a businesscabinet under the pro-Masjumi-PSI Hatta. And this inevitablybrought the country to the verge of civil war .

The democratic form had failed to accomodate historicaldifferences inside Burma and Indonesia, instead, it intensifiedthe centrifugal forces. It is interesting to note that boththe 1955 Election of Indonesia, and the 1960 Election of Burma,as mentioned, destabilised the already unstable politicalsituation further. This is entirely against the western think-ing that elections strengthen and serve as the basis of the

54* Feith, op.cit. p. 3055. Ibid, pp. 511-555

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democratic form. Here, obviously, Feith's approach to associatethe vicissitude of the democratic form with the outcome of thepower struggle between the "administrators" and "solidarity-makers" is inadequate. One really has to question whether thedemocratic form is applicable. This brings us to the natureof the historically related, traditionalist political contextin which democracy has to function. This is not so muc h a caseof the Great Tradition asserting itself, but rather the internallogic of the democratic form pushes itself on a collision coursewith it.

The crux of the current nature of politics in S. E. Asiain this period is the patron-client relationship. It is anexchange relationship between roles and can be defined as aspecial case of dyadic (two person) ties involving a largelyinstrumental friendship in which an individual of higher socio-econ9mic status (patron) uses his own influence and resourcesto provide protection or benefits, or both, for a person oflower status (client) wh o, for his' part, reciprocates byoffering general support and assistance, including personalservices, to the patron.

In the reciprocity demanded by the relationship each

56. This section on the current nature of the politics inS. E. Asia is based on Scott, J.C., "Patron-Client Politicsand Political Change in S.E. Asia." in American PoliticalScience Review, LXVI, 1972, No- 1, pp. 91-107

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partner provides a service that is valued by the other. Althoughthe balance of benefit may heavily favour the patron, same reci-procity is involved, and it is this quality which distinguishespatron-client dyads from relationships of pure coercion orformal authority that also may link individuals of differentstatus.

There are three features typical of this relationship :they are its basis in inequality, its face to face character, andits diffuse flexbility. In terms of the structural forms of thisrelationship, there are two : firstly, a patron-client clusterwhich means a group which includes a patron and his immediatefollowing. Secondly, a patron-client pyramid, which simply meansa vertical extension downward ,of the cluster in which linkagesare introduced beyond the first order. In terms of politicalgroupings, the former is a unit of a faction of a clique, thelatter the faction or the clique itself*

As units of political structure, patron-client clusterstypifies both local and national politics in preindustrialnations. And the socio-cultural pattern of the Post-War pre-modernised S.E. Asia still provides a base for the continuationof patron-client politics in a potent form. The Great Traditionremains still very much the same in this part of the world, andpatron-client networks still function as the main basis of allian-ce systems among nonkin throughout S.E. Asia. And in the period ofour study, Burma, Thailand and Indonesia were very patron-clientdemocracies.

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This perspective sheds much light on the question ofhow the mechanism of competitive politics destablised politicalsituations in Burma and Indonesia. In the following, we shallendeavour to explain how electoral pressures effected instabilityin the context of patron-client politics.

Firstly, nationwide elections made it necessary for anational party to establish a network of links extending downto local level. For the most part a party did this by takingadvantage of existing patron-client clusters and incorporatedthem into its structure. Working on voters individually or by classaffiliation made little sense when most of the electorate was d i-vided into patron-client clusters. This prevented or hinderedthe emergence of parties truly founded on ideologies and theparty's need for a powerful local base led to a certain locali-sation of power and in turn led to greater regionalism.

Secondly, elections also heightened factionalism andunless one cohesive party completely dominated, a case absentin the countries in question, tended to promote the survivalof local opposition factions. In most of the traditionalsettings, patron rivalry was largely limited to the local arenaso as not to invite external intervention. An electoral system,by contrast, creates rival national or regional parties whichneed allies at the local level. A weak faction that mig htpreviously have been forced to compose its differences with adominant faction, can now appeal for external support.Thus, the election-induced differences aforementioned in Burma


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and Indonesia were due to the effects of electoral competitionwhich exacerbated many of the latent factional differences amongpatron-client clusters and occasionally to buttress weak patronswhose position would have otherwise have disintegrated.

Finally, the introduction of competitive elections inthese patron-client democracies increased the pressures on theregimes for the downward distribution of tangible benefits. Inreturn for votes flowing up the verticle chain of patron-clientstructures, each patron depended upon the downward distributionof patronage in the form of administrative favours, land grants,public employment in order to keep his own pyramid of followersintact This did not only lead to widespread nepotism andcorruption, also, regimes under intensive pressures would beforced to spend beyond its means. Furthermore, their relianceon heavily instrumental and highly monetised patron-client tiesmade it difficult for them to avoid running down their foreignexchange reserves to maintain their strength at the polls.Comparative studies of budget policy and foreign exchange ex-penditures of the parliamentary period and non-parliamentaryperiod of Burma and Indonesia appeared to confirm this observa-tion.

From the above, one can see that working in such apolitical context, the democratic form could hardly producethe desirable effects of good and stable governments in thecountries in question.

57* Scott, loc. cit. p. 113- 48 -


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Moreover, although it is hard to say that the more welldeveloped a society is, the more likely it is to become demo-cratic, it might be fairly safe to conclude that extreme poor,traditional society characterised by illiterate, rural popula-tions in which inter-group communications are barely developedand national identification and institutions barely extantwill have considerable difficulty in establishing and maintain-

58ing political democracy. And apparently, in the period of ourstudy, the level of socio-economic development in Burma,Thailand and Indonesia is hardly conducive to the maintenanceof a democratic form.

However, both in Thailand and Indonesia, the demiseof western democracy did not 'lead the total abandoning ofdemocratic institutions although they were no long potentpolitical apparatus. This prompted Eisenstadt to term them

59"modern patrimonies" and "post-traditional polities".But probably, it was H. Benda who best described this phenomenonas a selective process of these countries in "adapting resurgentcontinuity to a changing reality."

Yet, our examination of the phenomenon is still incom-plete as there still remains one question untouched. Why,in all the countries in question, the demise of democracyinvariably led to military autocracy?58. Neubauer, D.E., "Some Conditions of Democracy." in American

Political Science Review, LXI No-4 pp.1002-100959. Evers, op.cit. p.360. Benda (1965), loc.cit. p.219

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CHAPTER FIVETHE DE FACTO POWERS THAT BE

In Chapter Twof it has been argued that one of thereasons for the adoption of the democratic form was thescarcity of available options at the time. So, if thissituation perpectuated, then in spite of what has beensaid in the last chapter, the democratic form should stillbe able to survive for want of a better alternative. However,as it turned out, an alternative was imposed by the Armiesof the three countries. And in this chapter, we shall examinethe relationship between the eclipse of democracy and the roleof the Army in this area.

In this area, differentiation between military andcivilian streams was a recent development in the officialdom.And the Armies in this area were all characterised by theirpolitical tradition, their readiness to participate in thepolitical arena. In the case of Thailand, more than half ofthe promoters of the 1932 Coup were army officers. And itwas also the army officers, under the leadership of ColonelPhibun that consolidated the gains of the Coup. Naturally,these army officers saw themselves as founding fathers of theConstitutional Monarchy and felt themselves having a stake inthe political arena. In fact, from 193 3-1944, Thailand was

61. Riggs, op.cit. Chapter 8

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ruled by the military clique under Phibun. Pridi's civiliangovernment was an interlude rather than the trend. In caseof both Burma and Indonesia, the Armies there saw themselves,rather than the politicians, as champion of the revolution oftheir respective countries. Therefore, military subservienceto civilian rule was unacceptable to the military as a whol e.Furthermore, the armies of these two countries had played asignificant role in maintaining the unity of their countriesat the early years of independence : putting down rebellionsand restoring order in areas ravished by war. These series ofwar efforts created among the Burmese and Indonesian officersan espirit de corps and they had good reasons to consider them-selves an important agent in the creation of the new state oftheir respective countries. Consequently, they regarded them-selves not so much executives but share-holders of the newlycreated independent nation.

The strength of this political ambition varied amongthese countries. It was the strongest in Thailand where themilitary took over power once they found themselves strongenough to do so. Whereas Burma and Indonesia, they intervenedwhen the civilian rulers failed to demonstrate effectiveleadership. And in the case of Indonesia, the Army first enteredinto a competitive alliance with Sukarno in 1958 and did nottake full control until 1965. However, this was due to anumber of comples factors rather than an unwillingness torule. One of the most important factor wa s, before 19 65, powerwas highly diffuse anong the heterogenous Indonesian military

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elite.

Apart from their political orientation, there are otherreasons why the Armies of these three countries saw themselvesas competing partners of the civilians in national politics.Under colonial rule, the army was among the earliest modernisedinstitutions in this area. Comparatively speaking, it was abureaucratic agency par excellance* It accumulated considerableamount of administrative and technological resources and couldboast of expertise in many areas of management. This, togetherwith its possession of modern fire arms, made it in many wayssuperior to other rival organisations such as the civil serviceand the political parties. And these qualities naturally madethe army leadership saw themselves as agent of modernisation,nation building arid source of stable government. In short, theydeemed themselves could succeed in where the civilians had failed.

In spite of its many limitations, the Army leadership inthis area posed as a strong rival to civilian rule which wasidentified with democracy in this period. Such military over-participation in politics would already have been a potent threatto any stable civilian government, not to say unstable patron-client democracies like the regimes of Pridi, U Nu and AliSastroamidjojo.

62. McVey, loc.cit. pp. 143-176

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CONCLUSION

Democracy had been experimented and then abandoned atthe intervention of a politically oriented military. But itmight be too soon to say the failure of this experiment isfinal. Although its short term prospect is still gloomy,there are two bases of hope. Firstly, experience tells us thatautocracies as a political form are very expensive to maintain.Secondly, the democratic ideal, after all, has left its markin this region. In spite of the demise of the experiment, nogovernment in this region can afford to openly reject the idealsof popular sovereignty and participation. As Lucian Pye onceremarked, one of the basic tensions that runs through S.E. Asianpolitics is the strain between democratic ideals and culturalrealities that favour authoritarian ways. Perhaps, after all,instead of looking to the West for an instant model, thedevelopment of democracy in this region has to run its own courseas well. Might be, given sufficient time, an Asian democraticform that is compatible with its socib-cultural conditons :the ways of that Great Tradition, will emerge.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

ARTICLES

1. Butwell, R., "The Four Failures of U Nu's Second Premier-ship." in Asian Survey Vol.11 1962, pp. 3-11

2. Dahl, R.A., "Further Reflections on the Elitist Theory ofDemocracy." in American Political Scientist Review Vol.L XNo- 2 p.296

3. Neubauer, D.E.f "Some Conditions of Democracy." in AmericanPolitical Scientist Review Vol.LX I No .4 , P.1002

4. Walker, J.L.f. "A Critique of the Elistist Theory of Democracy]1in American Political Scientist Review Vol.L X No .2 , P. 28 5

MONOGRAPHS

1. Abdulgani, R., Nationalism, Revolution and Guided Democracy.Monash University, 1972

2. Benda, ELJ., Continuity and Change in Southeast Aisa:CollectedJournal Articles of Harry Benda. New Haven, Conn. YaleUniversity Southeast Asia Studies, 1972.

3. Butwell, R., U Nu of Burma. Stanford, Ca. Stanford UniversityPress, 1963

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4. Cady, J.F., A History of Burma. Ithaca and London, CornellUniversity Press, 1958

5. Cady, J.F., The History of Post-War Southeast Ais a. At hens,Ohio, Ohio University Press, 1974

6. Dahm, D., History of Indonesia in the Twentieth Century.London- New York. Washington, Praeger Pub lishers, 1971

7. Donnison, F.S.V., Burma. London. Ernest Benn Ltd., 1970

8. Evers, Hans-Dieter, Modernisation in South-east Asi a.Singapore. Kuala Lumpur. Oxford University Press. 1973

9. Feith, H., The Decline of Constitutional Democracy inIndonesia. Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Pr ess. 1962

10. FeiLth, H. and Lance C. (eds.) , Indonesian Political Thinking,1945 - 1965. Ithaca, N.Y., C.U.P., 1970

11. Janowitz, M., Military Institutions and Coercion in theDeveloping Nations. Chicago and London, The University ofChicago Press. 1977

12. Johnson, J-J., (ed.) The Role of the Military in UnderdevelopedCountries. Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Pre ss, 1962

13 . Legge, J.D., Indonesia. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Pre ntice-Hall, Inc., 1964

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14. L ev, D.S., The Transition to Guided Democracy : IndonesianPolitics, 1957-1959. Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University.1966

15. Lindsay, A.D., The Modern Democratic State> London , OxfordUniversity Press. 1943

16. Maung , M., Burma and General Ne Win. London, Asia PublishingHouse. 1969

17. Maung, M. , Burma in the Family of Nations. Amsterdam.Djambatan Ltd. 1956

18. Maung, M. , Burma fs Constitution. The Hague. Martinus Nijhoff1961

19. Penders, C.L.M., The Life and Times of Sukarno. Singapore,Oxford University Press. 1974

20. Pye , L.W., Southeast Asia !s Political Systems. EnglewoodCliffs, New Jersey. Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1974

21. Pye , L.W., Politics, Personality, and Nation Building : Burma'sSearch for Identity. New Haven, 19 62

22. Ray, J.K., Portraits of Thai Politics. Orient Longman. 1972

23. Rig gs, F.R., Thailand : The Modernisation of a BureaucraticPolity. Honolulu. East-West Center Press . 1966

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24. Sartori, G., Democratic Theory, Detroit, Michi gan. Wayne StateUniversity Press. 1962

25. Spann, R.N., Constitutionalism in Asia, London, AsianPublishing House. 1963

26. Steinberg, D.J., (ed.) In Search of Southeast As ia.Singapore. Oxford University Press. 1971

27. Wheeler, Harvey, Democracy in a Revolutionary Era.Penguin Books. 1968

28. Wilson, D.A., Politics in Thailand. Ithaca, N.Y., C.U.P.1962

Addendum

1. Almond, G.A. & Coleman, J.S., The Politics of the DevelopingAreas. Princeton, New Jersey. Princeton University Press.1960

2. Bastin, J. & Benda, H.J., A History of Modern Southeast Asia.Sydney. Prentice-hall of Australia Pty. Ltd. Second Edition.1977

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APPENDIX I

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNION OF BURMA

PREA MBLE

WE, TkEPEOPLE OF BURMA including the Frontier Areas and the KarenniStates, Determined to establish in strength and unity a SOVEREIGN INDEPEND-ENT STATE, TO maintain social order on the basis of the eternal principles ofJUSTICE, LIBERTY AND EQUALITY AND To guarantee an d secure to allcitizens J USTICE social, economic and political) LIBERTY of thought, expression,belief, faith, worship, vocation, association and action', EQU ALITY of status, ofopportunity and before the law, IN OUR CONSTITUEN T ASSEMBLY thisTenth day ofThadingyut waxing, 1309 B.E. (Twenty-fourth day of September, 194.7A.D), DO HEREBY ADOPT, ENACT AND GIVE TO OURSELVES THISCONSTITUTION.CHAPTER I

FORM OF STATEI- Burma is a Sovereign Independent Republic to be known as 'the Union ofBurma*.2. The Union of Burma shall comprise the whole of Burma, including (i) all the territories that were heretofore governed byHis BritannicMajesty throug h the Governor of Burma, an d(ii) the Karenni States.3. The sovereignty of the Union resides in th e people.4. All powers, legislative, executive and judicial, are derived from the peopleand are exercisable on their behalf by, or on the authority of, the organs of theUnion or of its constituent units established by this Constitution.5. Hi'e territories that were heretofore known as the Federated Shan Statesand the Wa States shall form a constituent unit of the Union of Burma and behereafter known as 'the Shan State'.6. The territories that were heretofore known as the Myitkyina and BhamoDistricts shall form a constituent unit of the Union of Burma and be hereafterknown as 'the Kachin State'.y. The territories that were heretofore known'as theKarenni States, viz.,Kantarawaddy, Bawlake and Kyebogyi, shall form a constituent unit of th eUnion of Burma and be hereafter known as 'the Karenni State/ 18, Ail powers, legislative, executive and judicial, in relation to the remainingterritories of the Union of Burma shall, subject to the provisions of section 180be exercisable only by, or on the author ity of, the organs of the Union.*

1. The name is changed to 'Kayah', by s. 8 of The Constitution Amendment Act, 1951.2. Substituted: 'subject to the provisions of ss. 180 and 181'; the two sections as amendedby The Constitution Act, have established the Karen State.

Source -. Maung, M. BurffiaUJSBStltution. The Hague.Martinus Nijhoff.

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CHAPTER IIFUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

DEFINITION OF 'STATE*9. In this Chapter and in Chapters III and IV, the term 'State' means theexecutive or legislative auth ority of the Union or of the unit concerned accordingas the context may require.

CITIZENSHIP10. There shall be but one citizenship throughout the Union; that is to say,there shall be no citizenship of the unit as distinct from the citizenship of theUnion.11. (1) Every person, both of whose parents belong or belonged to any of theindigenous races of Burma;(ii) every person born in any of the territories included with in th e U nion,at least one of whose grand-parents belong or belonged to any of theindigenous races of Burma;(iii) every person b om in any of the territories included within the U nion,of parents both of whom are, or if they had been alive at t he comm ence-ment of this Constitution would have been, citizens of the Union;(iv) every person who was born in any of the territories which a t th e tim eof his birth was included within His Britannic Majesty's dominions andwho ha s resided in an y of the tern tones included within th e Union fora penod of not less than eight years in the ten years immediatelypreceding the date of the commencement of this Constitution orimmediately preceding the 1st January 1942 and who intends to) reside permanently therein and who signifies his election of citizen shipof the Union m the manner and within the time prescribed by law,shall be a citizen of the Union.12. Nothing contained in section n shall derog ate from the pow er of theParliam ent to make such laws as it thinks fit in respect of citizenship an d alienageand any such law may provide for the admission of new classes of citizens or forthe termination of the citizenship of any existing classes.

RIGHTS OF EQUALITY13. AH citizens irrespective of birth, religion, sex or race are equal before thelaw; that is to say, there shall not be any arbitrary discrimination between onecitizen or class of citizens and anoth er.14. There shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters of publicemployment and in the exercise or carrying on of any occupation, trade , businessor profession.15. Women shall be entitled to the same pay as that received by men inrespect of similar work.

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RIGHTS OF FREEDOM16. No citizen shall be deprived of his personal liberty, nor his dwelling

entered, nor his property confiscated, save in accordance with law.17. There shall be liberty for the exercise of the following rights subject to

law, public order and morality: -(i) The right of the citizens to express freely their convictions and

opinions.(ii) The right of the citizens to assemble peaceably and without arms,(iii) The right of the citizens to form associations and unions. Any

association or organization whose object or activity is intended orl

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