Communicating Quantum Processes Simon Gay Department of Computing Science University of Glasgow Rajagopal Nagarajan Department of Computer Science University of Warwick s work was presented at the Second International Workshop on Quantum gramming Languages, Turku, Finland, July 2004, and at the Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages (POPL), g Beach, California, January 2005.
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Communicating Quantum Processes Simon Gay Department of Computing Science University of Glasgow Rajagopal Nagarajan Department of Computer Science University.
Surrey Seminar: Communicating Quantum Processes3 Overview Quantum cryptographic techniques are secure even in the presence of quantum computers. Quantum cryptography is much easier to implement than quantum computing. City-scale demonstrations have taken place, and components are commercially available. Quantum cryptography (and other quantum communication systems) will definitely be an important practical technology in the near future.
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Communicating Quantum Processes
Simon GayDepartment of Computing Science
University of Glasgow
Rajagopal NagarajanDepartment of Computer Science
University of Warwick
This work was presented at the Second International Workshop on QuantumProgramming Languages, Turku, Finland, July 2004, and at the ACM Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages (POPL), Long Beach, California, January 2005.
Surrey Seminar: Communicating Quantum Processes 2
Overview
Quantum computing has the potential to solve some hardproblems efficiently.
Only a few algorithms are known and at present there are no techniquesfor generic improvement of algorithmic performance.
Physical implementations of quantum computers of useful size are along way in the future.
Shor’s algorithm (1994) can efficiently factorize large integers.
A practical implementation of Shor’s algorithm would kill much of ourpresent cryptographic technology.
)nloglognlogn(O 2
Surrey Seminar: Communicating Quantum Processes 3
Overview
Quantum cryptographic techniques are secure even in thepresence of quantum computers.
Quantum cryptography is much easier to implement thanquantum computing. City-scale demonstrations have takenplace, and components are commercially available.
Quantum cryptography (and other quantum communicationsystems) will definitely be an important practical technologyin the near future.
Surrey Seminar: Communicating Quantum Processes 4
Overview
Although quantum cryptographic protocols have been provedmathematically to be secure, we believe that there is a needfor verification of systems which combine quantumcommunication with classical computation and communication.
Computer science has a range of theories, techniques andtools which have been successfully used to verify classicalcommunication and cryptographic systems.
Our research programme: to apply these techniques tocombined quantum/classical systems.
Surrey Seminar: Communicating Quantum Processes 5
Outline
Background on quantum computing.
Quantum communication: dense coding.
The language CQP (pi calculus + quantum operations).
illustration through the above examplesformal semantics and type system
Future work.
Surrey Seminar: Communicating Quantum Processes 6
Qubits
In classical computing the fundamental unit of information is thebit. The value of a bit is either 0 or 1.
In quantum computing the fundamental unit of information is thequantum bit or qubit.
A qubit has two basis states: |0 and |1 (physics notation).
A general state of a qubit is |0 + |1 where and arecomplex numbers, usually normalized so that 122
If both and are non-zero then the state is said to be asuperposition.
Surrey Seminar: Communicating Quantum Processes 7
Measurement
A qubit can be measured to produce a classical value.
If a qubit is in state |0 + |1 then the outcome of ameasurement is probabilistic.
With probability the result is 0 and the qubit enters state |0. 2
With probability the result is 1 and the qubit enters state |1. 2
Example: measure a qubit which is in state 12
102
1
with probability 0.5 the result is 0 and the qubit enters state |0
with probability 0.5 the result is 1 and the qubit enters state |1
Surrey Seminar: Communicating Quantum Processes 8
Systems of Multiple Qubits
For example, consider a system of 2 qubits.
A general state is a superposition of the basis states:where 12222
A measurement of both qubits has the following outcome:
With probability the result is 0 and the new state is |0|0. 2With probability the result is 1 and the new state is |0|1. 2With probability the result is 2 and the new state is |1|0. 2With probability the result is 3 and the new state is |1|1. 2
There are 4 basis states: |0|0 |0|1 |1|0 |1|1
11011000
Surrey Seminar: Communicating Quantum Processes 9
Systems of Multiple Qubits
For example, consider a system of 2 qubits.
There are 4 basis states: |0|0 |0|1 |1|0 |1|1
A general state is a superposition of the basis states:11011000 where 12222
A measurement of the first qubit has the following outcome:
Suppose we have a function f : {0,1} {0,1} from which wecan derive a transformation F on qubits, such that
)1(f)0(f)10(F
For a function on n bits we can compute function applicationssimultaneously. Magic! This is quantum parallelism and is thebasis for the simplistic claim that quantum computing candeliver exponential efficiency gains for general problems.
n2
BUT the only way to extract information is to measure, so weget either f(0) or f(1) and we don’t even know which it is!
)0(f0F )1(f1F
Transformations extend linearly to superpositions, so
and now measuring the first qubit gives us the desiredinformation about f , and we only used the quantumblack box once.
Quantum parallelism was used to calculate f(0) and f(1) ;a global property of f ended up being encoded in a single placeso that it could be extracted by a measurement.
Developing quantum algorithms for interesting problems seemsto be very difficult.
A state of n qubits which is not of the form n21 is said to be entangled.
The simplest example: 2 qubits in state )1100(2
1
Suppose we measure the first qubit from this state:
With probability 0.5 the result is 0 and the new state is |0|0. With probability 0.5 the result is 1 and the new state is |1|1.
In both cases, the two qubits now have the same state.Measuring the second qubit is guaranteed to give the sameresult as the first measurement, even if the qubits arephysically separated by any distance.
Defining a formal language for describing protocols is avaluable step.
We have also defined a formal operational semantics.It is based on the pi calculus, with the addition of global state(for the qubits) and probabilistic reductions (arising frommeasurements).
CQP has a static type system which, in addition to checkingcorrect use of values and channels, guarantees that qubits arenot syntactically copied (because of the No Cloning Theorem).
Alice and Bob share an entangled pair x,y of qubits.
Alice has a qubit z in an unknown state, and she wishes totransmit this state to Bob (perhaps the physical form of z is notsuitable for a direct transfer).
Alice applies CNot to z,x and then applies H to z.
Then she measures z,x to yield a two-bit classical value whichshe sends to Bob on a channel c.
Bob uses this value to select a Pauli transformation and appliesit to y. The result is that the final state of y is the same as theinitial state of z.
There are several papers on quantum programming languagesand our syntax has been influenced in particular by Selinger’sQPL (2003).
Jorrand & Lalire (2004) have defined a quantum processalgebra (QPA), which is quite similar to CQP in several ways(there has now been considerable influence in both directions).The type system is one of our distinctive features.
The purpose of defining CQP is to support formal reasoningabout quantum systems. There are several directions to explore.
Verification tools: we are now working with PRISM modelsconstructed in its (low-level) language. In the future we aimto construct PRISM models by translation from CQP.
Translation into non-probabilistic model-checking systems mayalso be useful, for exploration of possibilities before analysis ofprobabilities.
Translation into some existing simulation framework may alsobe worthwhile.
Type-theoretic methods: can we get more from a type system?For example: can we develop type systems for high-levelproperties such as secrecy? (This is known for classical securityprotocols.)
Logics for specification: for both automatic and non-automaticverification.
Example: a group at Technical University of Lisbon isdeveloping a Hoare-style logic for quantum systems, butthey have no formal syntax for describing systems.