Commission on Defence Forces Submission

2021

19th of March 2021

Submitted by Captain Paul Edward Roche

on behalf of the Irish Institute of Master

Mariners

Commission on Defence Forces Submission

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The Irish Institute of Master Mariners (IIMM) is a non-political organisation of qualified mariners. Our aim is to promote safe, efficient and professional conduct in the public and commercial maritime sectors in Ireland and internationally. The IIMM is a member of the International Federation of Shipmasters’ Associations (IFSMA) and the Confederation of European Shipmasters’ Associations (CESMA).

The Institutes’ expertise in the global maritime sector will be reflected in this submission.

www.mastermariners.com

The Irish Institute of Master Mariners has made the following submissions to the Irish Government in:

2019 National Security Strategy

2018 Marine Spatial Planning

2017 RIA on Merchant Shipping Bill

2015 Maritime Taxation

2014 Maritime Safety Strategy

2013 White Paper on Defence

2012 Harnessing Our Oceans Wealth

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Irish Institute of Master Mariners ..................................................................................... 1

Contents .......................................................................................................................... 2

Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 3

Executive Summary ......................................................................................................... 4

Capabilities ...................................................................................................................... 5

Defence Attaché ............................................................................................................... 6

The Irish Naval Service (INS) ............................................................................................. 7

Maritime Risks to the State .............................................................................................. 8

Irish Naval Service Capability .......................................................................................... 10

Irish Merchant Marine .................................................................................................... 15

Army .............................................................................................................................. 16

Air Corps ........................................................................................................................ 17

Finance .......................................................................................................................... 18

Domestic Defence Industry ............................................................................................. 18

Structure ........................................................................................................................ 19

Navy Command .............................................................................................................. 19

Staffing .......................................................................................................................... 20

Reserve Defence Forces (RDF) ........................................................................................ 22

Irish Naval Service Reserve (NSR) .................................................................................... 24

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Introduction

The first duty of the Irish Government is the defence of the State and the protection of its citizens at home and abroad. To achieve this requires hard and soft power using a well trained and equipped military force backed by international treaties in defence and trade.

The Irish Government tasks Óglaigh na hÉireann to use hard power in defence of the State through continuous assessment of the security and defence environment1. Óglaigh na hÉireann also provides soft power through use of hard power assets such as in the United Nations mandated Operation Sophia in the Mediterranean where the Irish Naval Service (INS) rescued over 18,000 migrants in 4 years2.

Ireland must recognise a well-equipped and well-trained Defence Force is required to preserve a safe, secure and stable democracy. If the security situation in Northern Ireland rapidly destabilised would Ireland be able to cope with 100,000 refugees or more in a matter of weeks? Difficult to calculate but a strong and capable Óglaigh na hÉireann significantly improves the probability of a positive outcome. To define the capabilities, structure and staffing for Óglaigh na hÉireann through to 2030 requires an effective strategy, properly resourced to meet the objectives set. For Óglaigh na hÉireann to defend the State and its citizens successfully the Government needs to take bold and decisive action by delivering a National Security Strategy (NSS). The ‘Programme for Government: Our Shared Future’3 does not include this. The Office of the Taoiseach requested public submissions to develop the NSS between 5th – 31st December 2019. Many interested parties, including the IIMM, did so in a very tight time frame. The results of the consultation have not been published4. No doubt epistemic security will be a new chapter to add. The Government did publish a ‘National Risk Assessment 2019 - Overview of Strategic Risk5. This deals with the potential risks to the State, however, there is no plan or outline of how these risks will be managed or budgeted for to minimise the impact to the State.

In summary, to discuss the Capabilities, Structure and Staffing of Óglaigh na hÉireann up to and beyond 2030 requires a National Security Strategy that is properly resourced to meet the threats to the State and its citizens. In the absence of such a document, certain assumptions must be made for the purposes of this submission.

1 Department of Defence. 2021. White Paper Implementation Programme. Dublin: Government of Ireland. 2 Irish Times. 2019. EU ends migrant rescue mission in Mediterranean. 27 March. Accessed 18 March, 2021.

https://www.irishtimes.com/news/ireland/irish-news/eu-ends-migrant-rescue-mission-in-mediterranean 3 Department of the Taoiseach. 2020. Programme for Government: Our Shared Future. Dublin: Government of Ireland.

Accessed February 16, 2021. https://www.gov.ie/en/publication/7e05d-programme-for-government-our-shared-future/ 4 Department of the Taoiseach. 2019. Public Consultation on the development of a National Security Strategy. 05

December. Accessed February 16, 2021. https://www.gov.ie/en/consultation/8b3a62-public-consultation-on-the-development-of-a-national-security-strate/ 5 Department of the Taoiseach, 2019. National Risk Assessment 2019 – Overview of Strategic Risk. Dublin: Government of

Ireland. Accessed February 21, 2021.

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Executive Summary

A fit for purpose Óglaigh na hÉireann requires a National Security Strategy (NSS) which is properly resourced. The NSS should be reviewed annually and subject to inspection by the Oireachtas. Every 5 years a White Paper on Defence should be produced. This should have an oversight body independent of the Department of Defence and Óglaigh na hÉireann and be directly accountable to Dáil Éireann. Defined budgets should be agreed by all parties to ensure recommendations are met. The oversight body should have sufficient powers to hold either party accountable to Dáil Eireann if recommendations are not met or actioned. Óglaigh na hÉireann has suffered from chronic underinvestment for years. Having the right people is key to a strong and vibrant defence force. Retention and recruitment must be a priority and providing an attractive pay and conditions package to Óglaigh na hÉireann personnel is the first step. If Ireland is to overcome unplanned crises such as pandemics, political instability or security events in the State and meet its international obligations in regions that affect the stability and security of Europe, then it will need to increase investment substantially so as to enhance the probability of a positive outcome. At 0.3% GDP, Ireland continues to rank in the lower tiers in Western Europe in spend on Defence6.

6 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. 2020. SIPRI Military Expenditure Database. Stockholm: Stockholm

International Peace Research Institute, 13. Accessed February 16, 2021. https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/Data%20for%20all%20countries%20from%201988%E2%80%932019%20as%20a%20share%20of%20GDP.pdf

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Capabilities

The military capabilities presented in this submission may appear unrealistic particularly when viewed through the prism of present circumstances. The fact remains that in 10 years defending and protecting Ireland, the European Union (EU) as a responsible member state, and its citizens wherever they may be will require the military capability outlined in this submission. The threats faced today are very different from those of 10 years ago and will be different again in 10 years from now. The European migrant crisis in the Mediterranean, Brexit and the COVID-19 pandemic are unpredictable events which had a significant impact in the last decade. However, the efforts of the Department of Foreign Affairs and deployment of Irish military personnel and assets overseas provided the experience, knowledge and resilience to achieve the best possible outcome for the State.

This will not be possible in the near future if significant investment in Óglaigh na hÉireann is not made. It will be a high price to pay for the years of chronic underinvestment in not maintaining, or enhancing, the existing Defence Forces’ capabilities. There is a historical perception that defence was a luxury a poor country like Ireland could not afford. Ireland is ranked by the International Monetary Fund7 as the fourth richest in the world by GDP per capita. Allowing for skewed figures from multi-nationals, Ireland is still between the 8th and 12th richest country in the EU8. With an intelligent approach to investment, jobs can be created by supporting a domestic defence industry. In providing this investment, the Government should use all the financial instruments available to it such as accessing finance through the European Defence Fund9 to build the military capabilities required for future.

Ireland may become a victim of its own very successful soft power strategy in Europe10 and in the United States of America with a US President proud of his Irish heritage. As an EU member, this success will not have gone unnoticed by the EU’s adversaries. Ireland’s strategic policy of non-aligned military status and military neutrality11 will be tested and will require a strong Óglaigh na hÉireann to meet the challenges head on.

With an increasingly connected, contested and complex international maritime security climate, it is crucial that Ireland plans for and develops a capable and responsive military force in the maritime domain. This is crucial given that nearly 90 per cent of the EU’s external trade and more than 40 per cent of its internal trade is seaborne with nearly two billion tons of

7 International Monetary Fund. 2020. World Economic Outlook – GDP per capita. October. Accessed 12 March 2021.

https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2020/October 8 Irish Times. 2021. We’re not as rich as we have been told to think we are. 04 February. Accessed February 26, 2021.

https://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/we-re-not-as-rich-as-we-have-been-told-to-think-we-are-1.4476247 9 Council of the EU. 2020. Provisional agreement reached on setting-up the European Defence Fund. 14 December.

Accessed February 17, 2021. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2020/12/14/provisional-agreement-reached-on-setting-up-the-european-defence-fund/ 10 The Economist. 2020. How Ireland gets its way. 18 July. Accessed February 26, 2021.

https://www.economist.com/europe/2020/07/18/how-ireland-gets-its-way 11 Department of the Taoiseach. 2020. Programme for Government: Our Shared Future. Dublin: Government of Ireland, 114. Accessed February 16, 2021. https://www.gov.ie/en/publication/7e05d-programme-for-government-our-shared-future/

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freight loaded and unloaded in EU ports each year12. Ireland’s reliance on the maritime domain for its prosperity and a capable functioning economy is even greater, considering 99% of trade by volume is via the sea and 95% by value13.

Strategic capabilities should focus on improving situational awareness, building awareness and improving the ability of the State to identify and respond to threats and crisis’s (current and future). It should match and, where possible, align with the EU goals of improving the capacity to detect and understand malicious hybrid activities early and enhance the resilience of critical infrastructure to withstand and recover from hybrid attacks14. Ireland offers little or no deterrence to this type of warfare. The lack of a cyber-defence or intelligence cells both civilian or militarily should be worrying.

Building situational awareness domestically and internationally is fundamental to defence. Key to dealing with threats is early identification of their likelihood, effect and consequences and plan accordingly. Asymmetric warfare now known as hybrid warfare is considered the future of military engagement15 by some State Actors. Russia refined hybrid warfare in the annexation of Crimea. It combined the military, diplomatic, economic, cultural, technological, information and cyber capabilities, in order to achieve its tactical and strategic goals. This co-ordination of technological, information and cyber capabilities has allegedly changed the nature of warfare however, the major powers continue to invest heavily in hard power such as warships, heavy armour and combat aircraft including cyber capabilities. Interestingly the State does have a National Cyber Security Strategy since 201516. Ireland must be careful not to presume that investment in technology can be at the expense of hard power.

Defence Attaché

The Department of Foreign Affairs has an excellent track record in diplomacy and the Irish Defence Forces should capitalise on this by providing serving Officers of all three services of Óglaigh na hÉireann as Defence Attaches17, as considered in the White Paper on Defence. The Defence Attaché is a valuable tool in building international situational awareness by acquiring knowledge and awareness of the host country's defence activities and requirements. This includes knowledge of the country's military capabilities, operations, training and readiness,

12 Novo-Corti, Isabel, and Fernando Gonzalez-Laxe. 2009. “Maritime Transport and Trade: The Impact of European

Transport Policy. An Overview of Maritime Freight Transport Patterns.” European Research Studies 12, no. 1 (2009): 135. 13 Government of Ireland. 2012. Harnessing Our Ocean Wealth. Dublin: Government of Ireland, 15. 14 European Commission. 2018. Joint Report on the implementation of the Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats.

Brussels: European Commission, 5-6. Accessed February 17, 2021. https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/joint_report_on_the_implementation_of_the_joint_framework_on_countering_hybrid_threats_from_july_2017_to_june_2018.pdf 15 National Defence University Press. 2019. Countering Hybrid Warfare So What for the Future Joint Force? National

Defence University Press: Prism, Vol. 8. No.2pp 82-98. Accessed 19 March. https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/prism/prism_8-2/PRISM_8-2_Monaghan.pdf 16 Government of Ireland. 2019. National Cyber Security Strategy 2019-2024. National Cyber Security Centre, Dublin:

Government of Ireland. Accessed February 21, 2021. https://www.ncsc.gov.ie/pdfs/National_Cyber_Security_Strategy.pdf 17 Government of Ireland. 2015. White Paper on Defence. Dublin: Government of Ireland. 29.

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and equipment. International best military practice can be identified and applied to Óglaigh na hÉireann.

The Irish Naval Service (INS) The Irish Naval Service is the State’s principal seagoing agency and undertakes a broad range of maritime security tasks18. As an Island Nation the maritime environment is Ireland’s first line of defence against armed aggression and illegal activity that could threaten the State. This requires ongoing surveillance and patrolling of the State’s coastal and territorial waters including its Economic Exclusive Zone (EEZ) which extends over 200 nautical miles into the North Atlantic Ocean. The Irish Naval Service operates primarily in a constabulary role19. It has a restricted capability in a force protection/warfighting role as its current platforms have limited air surveillance, air & surface defence and no sub-surface capability (limited sub surface multibeam search on 2 hulls, complemented by side scan sonar and AUV capability within the NS Diving Section). In order to define the capabilities of the INS a Maritime Security Strategy (MSS) is necessary. This should be an integral part of the National Security Strategy. An effective MSS will require a thorough understanding of the value of the ocean economy in order to recognise maritime risks Ireland faces, as well as having the capabilities to respond to maritime security incidents. It should integrate with the EU Maritime Security Strategy20 and the INS should build working relationships with our regional neighbours to strengthen capability. The IIMM submission in 2019 to the Department of the Taoiseach on a National Security Strategy, detailed its position on the MSS21. Lacking a national maritime strategy, the EU MSS must be used as policy guidance with respects to the requirements of maritime security and the threats that the EU is facing in the maritime domain. The European Union Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS) describes Maritime Security as:

“a state of affairs of the global maritime domain, in which international law and national law are enforced, freedom of navigation is guaranteed and citizens, infrastructure,

transport, the environment and marine resources are protected.”22 The only way that Maritime Security can be enforced, guaranteed, and protected is by ensuring that that military maritime component of the State has the capability to build and establish domain awareness across Ireland’s area of responsibility and then has the capability to provide that maritime presence, which means suitably empowered law enforcement agents operating from suitably endowed and capable platforms – warships. However, this hard power also provides a soft power projection capability in the Humanitarian Assistance Disaster Relief (HADR) including non-combatant evacuation (NEO) missions. Without investment in these hard power assets, Ireland will find it difficult to assist as it did in Operation Sophia in the Mediterranean and other areas of national, regional and

18 Government of Ireland. 2015. White Paper on Defence. Dublin: Government of Ireland. 38. 19 Eric Grove, The Future of Sea Power (Annapolis, MD. Naval Institute Press, 1990) pp. 237–40. 20 Council of Europe. 2014. EU Maritime Security Strategy. Brussels: Council of Europe. 21 Irish Institute of Master Mariners. Submission on National Security Strategy, 3. Cork: Irish Institute of Master Mariners 22 Council of Europe. 2014. EU Maritime Security Strategy, 3. Brussels: Council of Europe.

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global interest. It gives the State the ability to form stronger and more durable international ties considerably enhancing the soft power of Ireland.

Maritime Risks to the State To outline the capabilities required by the INS the following are some of the risks to maritime security, as highlighted in the EU MSS23: a. Threat or use of force against Member States’ rights & jurisdictions over their maritime

zones b. Threats to the security of European citizens and to economic interests at sea following

acts of external aggression including those related to maritime disputes, threats to Member States’ sovereign rights or armed conflicts;

c. Trans-national organised crime, including Smuggling of Narcotics, weapons and human trafficking. o Self-Propelled Semi Submersibles (colloquially known as Narco-subs) are now a

risk24. Transnational organised criminal organisations are becoming more innovative with the means by which they are making illegal shipments in the maritime domain, the example being the interception of the SPSS off Spain in 201925. The use of navies to intercept narcotics at sea is essential and considered more efficient, with the volume that can be interdicted in a singular seizure26. Once ashore it is almost impossible to recover and gives huge financial power to gangs significantly impacting domestic security.

d. Subsea security of subsea communications and offshore energy cables/pipelines e. Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported (IUU) Fishing –

o Brexit will exacerbate this issue. Not only is there an increased risk of such IUU

fishing, but there will also be increased pressures on resources in Irish Waters

(EEZ) due to the displacement of EU fishing fleets from UK waters.

o IUU fishing is now considered a major threat by the EU and also by the United

States Coast Guard (USCG) , with global fisheries estimated to be worth $401

billion per annum and tens of billions of this revenue lost to IUU annually. It is also

considered that 93% of global fish stocks are now classed as exploited, over

exploited or significantly depleted27.

23 Council of Europe. 2014. EU Maritime Security Strategy, 7-8. Brussels: Council of Europe. 24 Forbes. 2020. Completely New Type of Narco Submarine Discovered in The Atlantic. 31 August. Accessed February 27,

2021. https://www.forbes.com/sites/hisutton/2020/08/31/completely-new-type-of-narco-submarine-discovered-in-the-atlantic/?sh=143aacb633be 25 Jones, Sam. 2019. Cocaine seized from 'narco-submarine' in Spain was likely headed for UK. 27 November. Accessed

February 21, 2021. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/nov/27/police-in-spain-find-three-tonnes-of-cocaine-in-narco-submarine 26 Germond, Basil. 2015. The Maritime Dimension of European Security. 1st. London: Palgrave McMillan. 27 Unites States Coast Guard. 2020. US Coast Guard Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing Strategic Outlook. US

Coast Guard Office of Law Enforcement, Washington DC: USCG HQ, 3. Accessed March 2021, 07 . https://www.mycg.uscg.mil/News/Article/2352693/coast-guard-announces-outlook-to-combat-illegal-unreported-and-unregulated-fish/

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f. The freedom of navigation and protection of international maritime trade (safe and secure maritime routes) and the smooth and timely flow of maritime trade (supply chain security). Such is the importance, that the EU has maintained an anti-piracy mission off Somalia since 200828 and has also launched a pilot case for coordinated maritime presence in the Gulf of Guinea to counter the increased piracy issues against maritime trade in this region29.

g. Maritime Port Security, threats to ports and sea lines of communication by maritime IED (mined) threats or threats of blockade. o Irish ports have been subject to blockade by fishers throughout the past 30 years.

Such blockades can have a detrimental effect on the Irish economy, consider over 95% of trade to and from the island of Ireland is sea borne trade30.

o Paramilitary groups have also shown a willingness to blockade ports by the sinking of vessels at harbour chokepoints, e.g., MV Nellie M (1981) and MV St Bedan (1982)31 – both in Lough Foyle. It should be noted that Ireland’s three TEN-T Core32 (Tier One) ports have entrances that are easily blocked (Dublin, Cork & Shannon-Foynes).

o One should be cognisant of recent use of maritime hybrid forces in the conflict in Crimea and their ability to cut off the Kerch Strait. This action cut off the Ukrainian Navy and the Ukrainian State’s use of the Azov Sea, thereby nullifying the Ukrainian Navy in any potential conflict and constraining Ukrainian maritime trade33.

28 EU Naval Force - Somalia. 2021. EU Naval Force - Somalia. Accessed March 07, 2021. https://eunavfor.eu/ 29 Council of the European Union. 2021. Gulf of Guinea: Council conclusions launching the pilot case for the Coordinated

Maritime Presences concept. 25 January. Accessed March 07, 2021. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2021/01/25/gulf-of-guinea-council-conclusions-launching-the-pilot-case-for-the-coordinated-maritime-presences-concept/ 30 Government of Ireland. 2012. Harnessing Our Ocean Wealth. Dublin: Government of Ireland, 15. 31 https://www.nytimes.com/1982/02/24/world/around-the-world-ira-guerrillas-destroy-a-british-cargo-ship.html#prof

Accessed 27 Feb 2021. 32 European Commission. 2021. Transport Modes - Ports. Accessed February 27, 2021.

https://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/maritime/ports/ports_en 33 Roth, Andrew. 2018. Kerch Strait confrontation: what happened and why does it matter? 27 November. Accessed

February 16, 2021. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/nov/27/kerch-strait-confrontation-what-happened-ukrainian-russia-crimea

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Irish Naval Service Capability The Naval Service must have a balanced fleet that is capable of dealing with the current and future threats identified. It must have an ability to respond with hard power/military action and the hulls must be future proofed to ensure that they can be suitable for future threats and scenarios that may be encountered over the lifetime of a warship (which is normally twenty to thirty years).

• 8 x Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs) for North-East Atlantic Area of Operations – necessary to provide a security presence in the North-Eastern Atlantic all year round. This is as a minimum to allow rotation for maintenance, crew relief/rest-off in winter and other operational deployments. The OPVs should be fitted with Autonomous Vertical Take Off and Landing (VTOL) Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) with an all-weather maritime surveillance system feeding into the Recognised Maritime Picture (RMP). The provision of UAV capability will enhance the remote sensing capability of the ships, providing more effective and efficient patrolling and increasing maritime situational awareness. A-TechSyn in Shannon is one such company that can provide such capability.

• 2 x Mine Counter Measure / Maritime Counter Improvised Explosive Device (MCM M/CIED) vessels with associated diving support capability. The White Paper 2015 identifies the requirement of the replacement of L.E. ORLA & L.E. CIARA with such a capability34. This capability is vital for the protection of Irish ports and our sea lines of communication (SLOCs) to ensure that we, as an island nation, have a means to counter any potential maritime threat to our trading economy35. A number of options are available to the State in this regard.

o Procure second user Offshore Support / Light Construction Vessels. The RNZDF recently procured a second user Offshore Light Construction Vessel, ex EDDA FONN, which has been commissioned as RNZN MANAWANUI, at a cost of NZD$103m, which equates to approximately €63m36.

o Procure new build hulls with remote capabilities (Unmanned Underwater Vehicles & Unmanned Surface Vessels) to allow the Navy to develop their counter mine / counter IED capability. Belgium and Netherlands have signed a €1.756Bn contract for twelve vessels, which would equate to €146m per hull, along with associated search equipment37.

o The Navy should be able to acquire synergies through involvement in such PESCO projects as the MAS MCM Project, to standardise equipment, training and flatten costs over the lifetime of such projects38.

34 Government of Ireland. 2015. White Paper on Defence. Dublin: Government of Ireland. 68. 35 Government of Ireland. 2012. Harnessing Our Ocean Wealth. Dublin: Government of Ireland, 15. 36 Naval Technology. 2019. HMNZS Manawanui Dive and Hydrographic Support Vessel. 09 July. Accessed February 16,

2021. https://www.naval-technology.com/projects/hmnzs-manawanui/ 37 Naval News. 2019. Naval Group & ECA Group Win Belgian-Dutch MCM Vessel Competition. 15 March. Accessed February

16, 2021. https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2019/03/naval-group-eca-group-win-belgian-dutch-mcm-vessel-competition/ 38 Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). 2019. Maritime (Semi-) Autonomous Systems for Mine Counter Measures

(MAS MCM). Accessed February 16, 2021. https://pesco.europa.eu/project/maritime-semi-autonomous-systems-for-mine-countermeasures/

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• 2 x Inshore Patrol Vessels (IPVs) for East Coast Area of Operations – with Brexit and a more benign AO these would be an efficient use of resources. The IPVs should have Mine Counter Measure/Maritime Counter IED capability to secure East Coast Ports. These will protect the ports and SLOCs by being able to counter such threats. The Damen MRAV39 is a potential example. This subsea capability could be enhanced with

hydrographic equipment to enable surveying activity appropriate to the essential interests of an island State and national coordination of Maritime Safety Information (MSI) consistent with Ireland's international obligations through the World-wide Navigational Warning Service40(WWNWS). As these vessels are unlikely to be deployed overseas as they would be required to secure Tier 1 ports these hulls could be fitted be equipped with an emergency tow capability (ETV) for commercial shipping. Capabilities should include VTOL UAV fitted to feed the RMP, to enhance the remote sensing capability of platforms and improve maritime domain awareness. The acquisition of an inshore patrol capability would negate the requirement for the Revenue Commissioners to procure new patrol cutters. As happens in other countries such as New Zealand41, the inshore patrol vessels could embark Revenue personnel to enforce their powers out to twelve nautical miles, while enhancing this capability with the international powers of enforcement bestowed to warships42 on the High Seas under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea43. This would provide better value for money for the State.

• 2 X Multi-Role Vessels built to NATO standard for Force Protection, to include Air, Surface & Sub-surface search capability, Electronic Warfare capability to counter cyber threats and threats across the whole electro-magnetic spectrum. These vessels should have a Command and Control (C2) for Fleet Headquarters (FHQ) and a lift capability for HADR including NEO operations which could have been very useful in Lebanon in 200644 and Libya in 201145. This C2 and Lift ability will provide significant support to a Land Component Commander for military operations, HADR and NEO both domestically and internationally which is not currently available. A long-range deployment capability with Replenishment at Sea (RAS) to better support the European Union (EU) and Regional Partners in defence overseas deployments on UN mandated CSDP operations (such as Operation Atalanta or Operation Irini). This capability is badly needed if the INS is to provide protected mobility for naval units,

39 Damen. 2021. Multi-Role Auxiliary Vessel. 05 March. Accessed March 12,2021.

https://products.damen.com/en/ranges/multi-role-auxiliary-vessel

40 International Maritime Organisation. 2016. World Wide Navigational Warning Service. Accessed 14 March, 2021.

https://iho.int/mtg_docs/com_wg/CPRNW/WWNWS_Publications_&_Documents/English/MSC_Circ1364.pdf 41 New Zealand Defence Forces. 2018. Lake Class Inshore Patrol Vessels HMNZS Hawea – P3571. Accessed March 07, 2021.

https://www.nzdf.mil.nz/navy/capability/hmnzs-hawea-p3571-and-hmnzs-taupo-p3570/ 42 United Nations. 1982. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. United Nations, Article 29, pg34-35. 43 United Nations. 1982. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. United Nations, Article 110, pg6 44 Irish Times, 2006. 100 Irish to be evacuated from danger zone today. Accessed 18 March, 2021. https://www.irishtimes.com/news/100-irish-to-be-evacuated-from-danger-zone-today-1.1031408 45 Government of Ireland. 2011. Taoiseach praises the successful evacuation of Irish citizens from Libya. 03 March.

Accessed 12 March 2021. https://www.dfa.ie/news-and-media/press-releases/press-release-

archive/2011/march/successful-evacuation-irish-citizens-from-libya/-taoiseach-praises-successful-evacuation-of-irish-

citizens-from-libya.php

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merchant shipping and be able to defend subsea assets. Ireland will also be able to meet its obligations as an EU nation and support its Regional Partners in maritime missions.

• 1 x Fleet Support Vessel of 3000GRT capable of supporting the INS Fleet at sea – with the increase in INS Fleet this class of vessel will be required to supply, repair and maintain OPVs and MRVs on long range deployment in support of EU and Regional partner operations. Will provide a continuous at sea capability which does yet exist in Ireland.

• 1 x Emergency Towing Vessel stationed on the South Coast – this would be required to provide emergency towing and search and rescue capability for shipping and to prevent an ecological disaster on the Irish coastline. Should have subsea capability of laying, servicing and recovery of subsea equipment including acoustic devices. Should the IPV’s have this capability then there would be no requirement for this vessel.

• 1 x Sail Training Vessel (Asgard III) – required for training the next generation of seafarers and can be used to promote the INS and the State without taking a warship off patrol. The long-term benefit of sail training from a recruitment perspective should not be underestimated. Also, there are potential diplomatic dividends to be harnessed by a State-owned sail training capability46. Such a crew could be manned and run by a NS crew along with 1st Line Reserve officers with specific maritime qualifications. The previous State-owned Sail Training Vessel, Asgard II, was run by Coiste an Asgard and funded through the Defence Vote, to an annual average cost of €800,000 per annum. A replacement vessel was estimated to cost €16 million by the Atlantic Youth Trust in 201547.

• 6 x Motor Launches for Port Security Operations (Naval Service Reserve) – tasked with providing maritime security and surveillance of the littorals & major ports of Ireland and support the INS in a surge or in high tempo operations.

• Naval Service Reserve (NSR) – should be used to augment the INS not just during a crisis. Should be expanded to 7 Units. There should be 6 NSR Port Units which will require the formation of 2 new Units, one for Galway and one for Rosslare. The 7th Unit which is Technical Support Unit should be significantly expanded but this is dealt with under Staffing. The formation of these two units would significantly add to the port security for these ports.

• Two Additional Naval Installations/Bases – one on the East Coast and West Coast of Ireland. These Installations will not require the full logistics support of the Haulbowline Naval Base, however, should be staffed and capable of providing substantial logistical support for Naval vessels including dedicated Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants (POL) Storage, workshops and minor repair facility. It should also include overnight accommodation for ship’s crew to rest-off in winter. One Installation should have a Command, Control & Communication (C3) capability should the Haulbowline Naval Base be compromised. The East Coast Installation should be considered for this capability to build Navy resilience. Suggested locations would be Dun Laoghaire Harbour which would be ideal for the East Coast and Galway for the West Coast. Dun

46 https://sailtraininginternational.org/life-onboard/value-sail-training/ Accessed 28 Feb 2021. 47 The Irish Times. 2015. Plan for all-island tall ship to replace Asgard II unveiled. Accessed 15 March 2021.

https://www.irishtimes.com/news/ireland/irish-news/plan-for-all-island-tall-ship-to-replace-asgard-ii-unveiled-1.2291517

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Laoghaire would require limited investment and could be operational within a year given the right investment. Dun Laoghaire – Rathdown Council have an ongoing consultation ongoing into their draft county development plan, which could provide dividend by engagement with them at a policy level48. Galway would be a long-term project requiring inter-departmental engagement with stakeholders such as Galway Port49 and Galway Co. Council (substantial resources to be operational). The long-term benefit of such additional bases will be an increased awareness of these communities of the Navy and their operations, hence providing a new source of future recruitment. It is also feasible that funding streams for such works (or considered expansions) may be available at an EU level from such projects as the EU Action Plan on Military Mobility50 or the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) Project on Military Mobility51.

• Marine Radar Surveillance Network (MRSN) – one of the challenges in the maritime domain is situational awareness. Information on the current situation in Irish waters can be managed and from this an explanation generated, estimate built and a strategy to achieve the best possible outcome. A MRSN managed by the INS will be another important sensor feed into the RMP. Not all vessels carry Automatic Identification Systems, or those that do may switch them off or as in the case of the derelict MV Alta not functioning at all. The Irish Marine Casualty Investigation Board (MCIB) estimated that the MV Alta could have been adrift in Irish Territorial waters for up to 43 days52. Had there been an operational MRSN this derelict and others will be detected much earlier. This MRSN can be achieved at relatively low cost by installing Marine Radar Units at each Lighthouse on the coast of Ireland. The location of lighthouse around the Irish coast makes the installation low cost as the infrastructure to support the equipment already exits. These units can then transmit the data to the Naval Operations Command Centre in Cork.

• Naval Aviation Squadron – This should consist of a squadron of land based maritime surveillance heavy UAVs capable of providing all weather maritime surveillance 365 days of the year in the Irish AO. This would be complimentary to the Irish Air Corps Maritime Reconnaissance missions. Costs for such capability have dropped significantly in the past number of years and co-operation with EU agencies could lower the cost significantly. Should be operated, maintained and under direct control of Naval Operations Command. The use of UAVs (short, medium & long range) provides key force enablers for the NS fleet by building and maintaining maritime domain awareness over a much larger area, thus providing for a more effective

48 Dun Laoghaire Rathdown County Council. 2021. Draft Dún Laoghaire-Rathdown County Development Plan 2022-2028.

Accessed March 05, 2021. https://dlrcoco.citizenspace.com/planning/draftcdp2022-2028 49 https://theportofgalway.ie/port-of-galway-redevelopment/ Accessed 28 Feb 2021. 50 European Commission. 2018. Join Communication to the European Parliament and Council on the Action Plan on Military

Mobility. Brussels: EU Commission. Accessed March 05, 2021. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_18_2521 51 Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). 2018. PESCO Project Military Mobility (MM). Accessed March 05, 2021.

https://pesco.europa.eu/project/military-mobility/ 52 Marine Casualty Investigation Board. 2021. Investigation into an incident involving the grounding of the vessel ‘MV Alta’

at Ballyandreen Bay, Ballycotton, Co. Cork 16 February 2020. Marine Casualty Investigation Board, pg8.

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patrolling and tasking of assets. The European Maritime Safety Agency are already utilising such remote capabilities effectively throughout Europe53.

• Subsea acoustic network – a special naval unit should be formed with the laying, servicing and monitoring of subsea activity in the Irish AO. The purpose is to monitor and thereby protect subsea infrastructure such as communication cables, offshore energy cables (wind/wave/kinetic energy recovery systems) and pipelines. There are several solutions from active to passive detection assets which are available commercially and full consideration should be given to partnerships with the EU and private companies. Unmanned systems54 are just one of a number of low-cost solutions for subsea monitoring and tracking of submarines. Sonardyne International55 based in the United Kingdom provide a range of commercial solutions from fixed to mobile sub surface detection of threats.

• Joint Maritime Security Centre (JMSC) - as an Island State Ireland needs better situational awareness in the maritime domain to understand the threats which exist in the Irish AO. The mission of the JMSC would be to co-ordinate maritime information from multiple sources of maritime surveillance throughout the State. The Minister for Defence can be briefed daily/weekly on the entirety of threats facing Ireland. Briefings will give Government an appreciation of the threats the State faces and the value of investment will become clear. The JMSC should be operated by the INS, continuously assessing the threats and co-ordinating a multi-agency response when required. The Irish Air Corps, public agencies such as the National Maritime Operations Centre (Irish Coast Guard), Customs and Excise, An Garda Siochána, the Ports, the Irish Army (has maritime assets), the Commissioners for Irish Lights and any other public organisation with maritime information gathering capability should all have an operations desk on site manned by their organisation. This co-operation of assets will create a very comprehensive maritime picture while each agency remains in control of the information it provides. This type of operation will build working relationships between the organisations fostering co-operation and trust for a common purpose, the security of the State. The United Kingdom has a JMSC56 and a working group should be established to determine whether this model would be effective in Ireland.

• Maritime Cyber Security Unit (MCSU)– Cyber security crucial to maintaining a safe, secure and resilient maritime transportation system which is critical to the economic and national security of the State. Cameron Naron, Director Office of Maritime Security, US Department of Transportation stated that sharing cyber security threats and information would make maritime companies appreciate the threat to financial and national security if they failed failing to invest adequately in cyber security57. The

53 European Maritime Safety Agency. 2021. Remote Piloted Aircraft Systems. 28 February, 2021. http://www.emsa.europa.eu/rpas-operations.html Accessed 16 March 2021. 54 Defence News. 2020. US Navy should turn to unmanned systems to track and destroy submarines. Accessed 16 March,

2021. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/04/13/us-navy-should-turn-to-unmanned-systems-to-track-and-destroy-submarines/ 55 Sonardyne International. 2021. Who we are. Accessed 12 March, 2021. https://www.sonardyne.com/who-are-we/ 56 Government of the United Kingdom. 2021. Joint Maritime Security Centre. Accessed 16 March, 2021.

https://www.gov.uk/government/groups/joint-maritime-security-centre 57 Atlantic Council. 2020. Trouble Underway: Seven Perspectives on maritime cybersecurity. Accessed 16 March, 2021.

https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/trouble-underway-seven-perspectives-on-maritime-cybersecurity/

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MSCU would be crucial in identifying potential Hybrid warfare threats and disseminating this information to protect against cyber attacks on ports, ships agents and shipping.

Irish Merchant Marine

We have no doubt that this section will be questioned as to where it fits in the Commission for the Defence Forces. Ireland is an island nation heavily dependent on commercial shipping and the INS is tasked with maintaining the sea lines of communication (SLOC). A regional conflict will threaten commercial shipping and foreign seafarers may be unwilling to risk their lives to transport essential supplies to Ireland. Yet little is being done to retain Irish merchant mariners in the State. Small changes to the Irish tax system will encourage them to continue their career at sea, leading to important maritime experience, and will encourage them to return to live in Ireland. They will take up jobs within the commercial maritime sector ashore in Ireland continuing an efficient port ship interface necessary for the continued economic security of the State. These personnel can be tasked with manning merchant vessels to support the State in a crisis. To enable this, a separate budget should be under the control of Flag Officer Commanding Naval Service (FOCNS) to encourage qualified Irish seafarers to crew Irish merchant ships in a crisis. This may be through a Merchant Marine Reserve list with suitable inducements to register.

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Army

Requires a National Security Strategy to provide the budget necessary to align training,

procurement and equipment to meet the tasks set.

• Ground Based Air Defence (GBAD) - Requires significant investment to provide protected mobility for army units in the field and strategic State assets including VIP security. It should be integrated into the Air Corps Air Defence network. The air superiority of friendly nations is no longer guaranteed with the era of great power competition returning. This will require ground-based radar systems with long range capability, anti-aircraft artillery supported by medium to high level missile systems.

• Fit suppressors on personal weapons of the Óglaigh na hÉireann – will provide tactical advantage in the battlefield through reducing sound profile and better communication58. This will also provide health benefits.

• Army Ranger Wing (ARW) – Double or treble the strength as this unit is tasked with direct action and therefore requires strength in depth to meet the challenges in the next decade. The White Paper of 201559 recommended that it be doubled, however, there is no confirmation this has occurred60. While numbers have never been released it is believed to be less than 100. It should have air mobile vehicles and have equipment suitable for transport by strategic heavy lift aircraft for rapid deployment worldwide at short notice.

• Army Aviation Squadron – This should consist of a squadron mix of light, medium and heavy UAVs capable of supporting intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance (ISTAR) on the battlefield and the Irish Border. Such capability should be deployable overseas and capable of deploying battlefield ordnance. ISTAR capability should be all-weather 365 days of the year in the Irish AO with emphasis on the Irish Border. This would be complimentary to the Air Corps support and not replace it. Costs for such capability have dropped significantly in the past number of years and co-operation with EU agencies could lower the cost significantly. Should be operated, maintained and under direct control of Army Command.

• Army Reserve (AR) – be used to augment the Army not just during a crisis as is currently the case. Focus should be on Combat Support Units, such as artillery etc. A Technical Support Unit should be formed and staffed with specialist skills as required by Army Command. Pay and conditions including overseas deployment are dealt with in Staffing.

• Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) – a large part of the work is currently Aid to the Civil Power (ATCP). Due to the high number of call outs consideration should be given to forming and training a Garda Síochána EOD to release Army EOD units for overseas duties.

58 Military.com. 2020. 29 December. The Marine Corps Has Started Fielding 30,000 Rifle Suppressors to Combat Units.

Accessed 02 March, 2021. https://www.military.com/daily-news/2020/12/29/marine-corps-has-started-fielding-30000-rifle-suppressors-combat-units.html 59 Government of Ireland. 2015. White Paper on Defence. Dublin: Government of Ireland. 60 Department of Defence. 2021. White Paper Implementation Programme. Dublin: Government of Ireland.

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Irish Air Corps

Should be renamed the Irish Air Force or Air Force of Ireland. The National Security Strategy should have an Aviation Security Strategy outlining the roles that the Air Corps be tasked with.

• Air Defence Command and Control Centre – the Air Corps should be tasked with the Air Defence of the State. It should be capable of co-ordinating Air Corps, Army and Naval Air Defence assets into a combined air defence network under Joint Forces Command.

• 1 x Jet Fighter Squadron – to provide fast air defence capability to the State

• 1 x Jet Fighter/Bomber Squadron – to provide air support to ground troops with a fighter capability

• 2 x Air-to-Air Refuelling aircraft – to extend fighter squadron range and capability for extended patrols and overseas deployment

• 2 x Strategic Heavy Lift Aircraft – multiple roles and would be first responders to any crisis regionally or globally including HADR and NEO. Capability should include deployment of the ARW, vehicles and equipment worldwide at short notice. Should have the capability to carry heavy lift helicopters. Additional uses would be the evacuation large number of Irish civilians at short notice from threat to life situations abroad. In 2011 the security situation in Libya required the evacuation of Irish citizens with some controversary as to how it was handled. The situation could easily have spiralled out of control which would have led to a more critical review of what assets were available to secure the safety of Irish citizens abroad (The Irish Independent, 2011).

• 2 x Strategic Heavy lift helicopters – multiple roles including support of the ARW and Army units on deployment overseas. Should be capable of transport by strategic heavy lift aircraft.

• Irish Air Corps UAV Squadron – this should consist of a squadron UAVs capable of providing all mission roles of the Air Corps including air defence and SAR in the Irish AO. This would be complimentary to the Air Corps crewed missions. Costs for such capability have dropped significantly in the past number of years and co-operation with EU agencies could lower the cost significantly. Should be operated maintained and under direct control of Air Corps.

• Air Corps Search and Rescue Squadron – the search and rescue role should be returned to the Air Corps. This unit should be composed of Fixed and Rotary wing assets.

• Air Corps Reserve (ACR) – should be formed and used to augment the Air Corps. Focus should be on attracting specialist skills sets from civilian aviation sector. Targeted recruitment for specific skill sets.

• Air Corps Force Infantry Protection Unit – Platoon plus of Infantry trained Air Corps service personnel who will be responsible for force protection of Casement Aerodrome, Baldonnel, and air assets overseas on deployment.

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Finance

If Óglaigh na hÉireann is to provide the protection the State needs it will need significant investment. This is affordable with a modest increase in the defence budget. Merchant vessels are large capital investments and are financed. The Irish Maritime Development Office promotes Ireland as a base in which to offer Ship Finance61. One solution would be to finance the vessels and equipment over a 20-year period. Properly managed the cost to the State to rebuild the INS as outlined will add approx. €50 million per annum to the Defence Vote. The IIMM are not finance experts and made general assumptions as an example of an affordable cost. The figure of €50 million per annum was arrived at using an estimate of €900 million over 20 years and was determined with an allowance for inflation and costs of financing included. The EU Defence Fund62 can provide the finance necessary to ensure the procurement cost is kept low.

Domestic Defence Industry

Smart investment would be to develop and expand the domestic defence industry. In 2018, Irish military exports were over €37 million63. An enhanced domestic defence industry will ensure this investment remains in the State boosting local economies through employment and tax receipts to the exchequer. One of the largest capital expenditures to the Defence Vote would be new vessels. Consideration should be given to building these vessels in Ireland ensuring the majority of capital expenditure remains in Ireland. While the State has no ship building capability it still retains the infrastructure in Cork Dockyard Limited which has a ship repair facility. One possible solution is to use international companies which provide turnkey projects. They provide the technical expertise to design and build vessels in the host country and support the project to completion. One such company is Damen Technical Cooperation64 which has a proven track record internationally. Additionally, the Naval Basin in Haulbowline could be converted to a dry dock facility and roofed to provide the INS with capability to dry dock its vessels and conduct ship repair all year round. It would also add security for the INS fleet as the recent COVID-19 pandemic impacted the ability of manufacturers contactors from attending INS vessels. The IIMM believes a feasibility study was conducted some years on this project but was not progressed on cost grounds. The IIMM were unable to locate a copy of this document and therefore cannot reference it.

61 Irish Maritime Development Office. 2015. Ship Finance Opportunities for International Shipping. Dublin. Government of

Ireland. 62 European Commission. 2021. European Defence Fund. Accessed 16 March, 2021.

https://ec.europa.eu/growth/sectors/defence/european-defence-fund_en 63 The Irish Times. 2019. Irish military exports now worth more than €37m. Accessed 18 March, 2021.

https://www.irishtimes.com/business/manufacturing/irish-military-exports-now-worth-more-than-37m-1.3993361 64 Damen International. 2021. Damen Technical Cooperation. Accessed 18 March, 2021.

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Structure

The Chief of Staff (CoS) should be appointed the Accounting Officer for the Defence Vote/Budget. This will transfer responsibility for the day-to-day management of expenditure of the Defence Vote leading to a timely and more effective use of limited resources. The CoS will be required to answer for the performance of the Defence Forces to the Dáil and to the Public Accounts Committee. The CoS will deliver agreed outcomes as safely, efficiently, sustainably and economically as possible. S/he will also be required to ensure that the Defence Forces stays within set financial limits. To assist the CoS in budget management, the Heads of Military Commands should be given budgetary control subject to oversight by CoS.

The Chief of Staff should be redesignated as the Chief Head of Defence, along with the requisite legal authority, command, control & governance over Óglaigh na hÉireann. The command-and-control structures should be reviewed in line with best practice in other European militaries (with the NATO Structures being considered the ‘ISO of the military world’65. As such, Óglaigh na hÉireann should have a Command-and-Control structure and a Joint Forces Command in line with the NATO standard international norms. Stemming from this should be a requirement for service parity between the Land, Air and Maritime Component Commanders, common among European nations (aligned and non-aligned).

Military Capability becomes hard power when the elements of military force are generated and combined by the Military Commands to prosecute the conduct of an operation or task. These Commands generate the military force elements to the required level of readiness to deploy when needed. These are tasked and controlled by the Joint Forces Command.

- Chief Head of Defence - Vice Chief Head of Defence - Joint Forces Command (JFC)

- Chief Head of Navy and Maritime Component Commander - Chief Head of Air Force and Air Component Commander - Chief Head of Army and Land Component Commander - Head of Cyber Command

Navy Command

• The Irish Naval Service should be renamed the Irish Navy.

• Flag Officer Commanding Naval Service (FOCNS) should have full budgetary control.

• As Maritime Component Commander should have parity with the Land and Air Component Commanders.

• A Navy aviation arm for maritime security and surveillance. See capability for a more detailed description of requirements.

65 Government of Ireland. 2015. White Paper on Defence. Dublin: Government of Ireland, 65.

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Staffing

Well trained and motivated personnel are critical to any organisation. Chronic under investment in the personnel of the Óglaigh na hÉireann in the past decade has led to poor morale and retention and will require immediate action.

Óglaigh na hÉireann is one of many organisations in Ireland competing for talent. In order to attract the best talent contracts of employment that reflect international best practice are required. Contracts must reflect work done and while it can be argued military service is unique that does not mean those who serve should be not be paid for work done. Contracts should be based on hours worked with provision for training, exercises and operational deployments specific to military service.

Members of Óglaigh na hÉireann have suffered the perfect storm in terms of pay and conditions. Since the Good Friday Agreement was signed in 1998 the security and defence environment on the Island of Ireland has improved dramatically and simultaneously a dramatic decline in the Óglaigh na hÉireann in both numbers and installations has occurred. An opinion piece by former Chief of Staff Lt Gen McMahon from 2000 is quite prophetic66 in that it predicts the terminal decline of the Defence Forces if Óglaigh na hÉireann is not consulted and its’ views on the first White Paper on Defence are ignored. Fast forward to 2021 and publication of the White Paper on Defence Implementation programme – February 202167 does not make for good reading. Closures of barracks and centralising military units in major population centres have led to unintended consequences for military personnel who cannot afford to live near their place of work. Cuts to pay and conditions to Óglaigh na hÉireann personnel therefore have made the cost of buying a home out of the reach of most of the rank and file. Ireland is the 13th most expensive country to live in out of 139 countries68 and the cost of housing has exacerbated the pay crisis. Reintroducing housing for military personnel may be one solution. The Department of Defence holds a considerable portfolio of land. A Public Private Partnership with the construction industry would be of enormous benefit and provide cheap housing. The housing program should reflect current society with housing available to single, married and cohabitating couples and families. This housing can be a mix of rent, leases, buy to live etc. A certain allocation should be made available to retired personnel under the management of Organisation of National Ex-Service Personnel.

Personnel Services and Support (PSS) – should be expanded and a new Family Support Unit created. The Family Support Unit would be responsible for providing childcare facilities at every major military installation (with 24/7 capability in a crisis) reflecting the unique requirements of military service. It should provide welfare services to spouses/guardians and the children of military personnel, particularly when they are deployed overseas or seagoing

66 Irish Times. 2000. Defence Paper presents appalling vista. 09 February. Accessed February 27, 2021.

https://www.irishtimes.com/culture/defence-paper-presents-appalling-vista-1.243129 67 Department of Defence. 2021. White Paper Implementation Programme. Dublin: Government of Ireland. 68 Irish Times. 2021. Ireland is the 13th most expensive country to live in, survey shows. 18 January. Accessed March 17,

2021. https://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/ireland-is-13th-most-expensive-place-to-live-survey-shows-1.4461101

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on Naval units. It should have professional financial advisors for military personnel and provide specialist advice in options for homes/housing etc.

Patrol Duty Allowance (PDA) should be boosted by at least 30% to recognise the challenges of seagoing in the Naval Service. The current bounty system of €10k has only attracted 71 applications out of 904 personnel69. While on patrol Naval personnel are on call 24/7 even when off duty. Their duties on patrol require them to available at ALL times for maritime security, maritime safety (when boarding fishing vessels conduct safety inspections) and identifying navigational hazards, fisheries protection, maritime pollution control, maritime firefighting, maritime first aiders, maritime search and rescue, drug interdiction, meteorologists, maritime conservationists while supporting An Garda Siochana, Sea Fisheries Protection Agency and Customs and Excise. To truly appreciate the work the men and women of the Irish Naval Service do the Commission should spend a week on an Off Shore Patrol Vessel (OPV) in the North East Atlantic in winter. The members of the Institute understand this, however few if any non-seafarers appreciate how difficult this is. The Irish Maritime AO is one of the most challenging on this planet and the PDA should reflect this. It is simple to implement and is only paid when the service personnel are on patrol. The DF and INS needs to consider use of technology and shore infrastructure to support ships when off patrol, to reduce the incidence of regimental duties, which are currently at a very high level and are considered detrimental to an adequate quality of life. Thus, such incidence of duties is considered a major factor when analysing voluntary retirements from the INS.

Key to retention should be the reinstatement of the 21-year pension to those who joined the Defence Forces after 2004. This should not be underestimated in encouraging personnel to stay on with vital skills and experience. It will also remove the current two-tier system of those who signed up before 2004 and after.

The IIMM also recommend that the Defence Forces should ensure that they have due consideration to such work-related legislation from the EU, the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) and other such bodies governing gender, work and rest hours, time off and other such social protection issues. These regulations apply to all commercial seagoing vessels and therefore can be implemented on Naval vessels without compromising on operational capability. These issues will be key, if the Defence Forces wishes to become an employer of choice into the future.

69 Irish Examiner. 2021. Naval Service lost more staff in the last year than signed up for €10k incentive. 11 February. Accessed 19

March, 2021. https://www.irishexaminer.com/news/arid-40225262.html

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Reserve Defence Forces (RDF)

Another unintended consequence of centralising units to urban areas is the lack of visible military presence in rural areas. Reorganisation and the closing of many Army and Reserve Units has reduced the overall visible presence and cut off another source of potential recruitment. If an organisation is to thrive it needs to attract the best talent.

The Reserve Defence Force has never been used to its full potential. Ireland has a young, well educated workforce with some very valuable skill sets to the military. This talent should be tapped into and maximised. The RDF mission should be able to support the Permanent Defence Force (PDF) in common with international norms and remove ‘in a crisis’. Legislation needs to be amended to provide job security to reservists who may be required to deploy overseas. There should be three reserve commands which will require the formation of an Air Corps Reserve Command. The Army and Air Corps Reserve Commands should form a Technical Support Unit (TSU), the Naval Service Reserve has an active TSU. These Technical Support Units should then target skill sets for specific roles to recruit.

• Army Reserve Command

• Navy Reserve Command

• Air Corp Reserve Command

• Tinder for Reservists: Technology should be used to match reservists to duties and training. One of the many challenges faced by Formations and Reservists is filling tasks. Getting the information to reservists in a timely manner is an issue and getting the right person in the right place at the right time can be very challenging for Formations. A key enabler would be for a secure smartphone application (APP) issued to reservists with a unique identifier and managed by RDF HQ. If a Formation requires a Reservist for a task it notifies RDF HQ which places the requirement on the APP. Only those reservists matching the criteria will see the task and can apply for it. RDF HQ reviews the applicants to determine which candidate is suitable, proximity, availability etc. The Formation and Reservist are then matched to the task, all in a matter of hours if necessary.

• Weekly Training should be voluntary, but all other duties should be paid.

• Pay should be based on hours worked.

• Time in service should be rewarded through pay increments. It is unjustifiable that a service person, NCO or Officer with say 15 years‘ service and experience is paid the same as those newly appointed or commissioned.

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• Reservists should receive a tax fee allowance of up to €5000 per annum to encourage recruitment. Many serving reservists are currently employed and lose almost 50% of their military pay to tax and deductions as it is taxed at the top rate.

• All Reserve Officers should be on a three-year short-term commission. Those that fail to meet the minimum standard expected of an officer can be suspended and then removed at the end of the three-year term. This will free up appointments otherwise blocked.

• For the reserve to be effective annual appraisals must be completed. Highlighting the positives and areas where additional training needs are identified are crucial in performance management. Those that fail to achieve minimum standards will be automatically discharged. Training should be initiated for all ranks on the purpose of appraisals and how to deliver them effectively.

• The 28-day rule per year for reservists completing active service should be increased to 50 days. The current process generates an excessive amount of administration on staff.

• Unit Commanders should be given full control of man day allocation for their Units up to and including the 50 days per person.

• PDF Cadre to support administration and training functions should be reintroduced. Current formations are severely burdened by the normal duties and reservist administration can be enormous.

• Reserve Officer Training Units in Colleges and Universities Consideration should be given to commencing a training program for training reserve officers for entry into Technical Support Units in third level institutions.

• Overseas Deployment – the number of a maximum of 850 troops overseas at any one time means that only very limited numbers of Reservists will be required to serve overseas and only those with specialist skills will be considered. Priority should be given to PDF personnel as Óglaigh na hÉireann is their primary career. Overseas deployment is essential for promotion, the experience gained is essential for personal development and is an opportunity to supplement their salary. One option to pay reservists on deployment overseas similar to that in the United Kingdom70. The State pays the employer who will pay the employee. This will ensure the employee suffers no loss in earnings, pension and health insurance contributions are maintained. Financial support is offered to businesses so no losses are incurred.

70 United Kingdom. 2018. Army Reserves Employer Guide. 21 November. Accessed 18 March, 2021

https://www.army.mod.uk/media/9192/20181121-army_reserves_employer_guide_2018.pdf

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Naval Service Reserve (NSR) The Technical Support Unit (TSU) should be significantly expanded with reservists who have maritime specialist skills. These skills and experience take years to attain. Officers take between 3 to 4 years to qualify subject to strict requirements. Promotion requires additional examinations and as a minimum it takes 10 years to qualify as a Master Mariner or Chief Engineer. It can then take an additional 6 years or more before appointment as a Ship’s Master or Chief Engineer. Members of the Irish Institute of Master Mariners hold a wide variety of roles in Ports, Shipping and Maritime Education which provides enormous potential to the INS. The Irish Merchant Marine should be targeted for filling specialist roles such as Executive and Technical Branch Officers with Watchkeeping Certification. Roles such as Electro Technical Officers, Maritime Electricians, Maritime Cybersecurity Officers should be recruited, and any other maritime skill set the INS requires. The Technical Support Unit should be responsible for the administration, training and personal welfare of these reservists. These personnel can be assigned to naval units for periods of 2 years and be required to spend a minimum of 4 weeks annually to complete service requirements. The naval unit would provide on board training only. All other requirements and administration functions will be conducted by the TSU. A PDF cadre unit should be assigned to administer these requirements. Each Naval unit should have 2 NSR Executive Branch Officers and 2 NSR Marine Engineer Officers assigned to it. These reservists should be made available via a roster where any other unit can request their service on board. Naval units should be able to draw on a reservist pool of maritime qualified personnel of approx. 10% of the core manning. In order to remain current these personnel will have to serve 4 weeks each year on board subject to operational requirements of the unit. The Irish Naval Service College is co-located with the National Maritime College of Ireland (NMCI). A Reserve Officer Training Unit should be set up in the NMCI to fill posts in the TSU. This training would parallel their maritime careers. The key for a functioning Naval Service Reserve (1st & 2nd Line) is to ensure that there are policies in place that will allow the expeditious use of such personnel and capabilities. The legislation and policies must be promulgated, to ensure that Reserve personnel can be called upon in times of crisis (such as COVID-19 pandemic) without undue administrative burden. There should also be employment and wage protection policies in place that will support reserve personnel and incentivise companies to release people to come up on Reserve. It is interesting that such protective and supportive measures are not fully in place in Ireland and are a hindrance to utilisation of reserve personnel. It is interesting to note that multinational companies (especially ones with American ties) operating in Ireland are the most supportive of reserve personnel, due to the fact that these companies have to comply with US legislation to support US Armed Forces Reserve personnel. It proves that when the policy environment (both internal departmental policy and external company policy) is supportive, much can be achieved.

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There should be flexibility within the Reserve structures, to allow the Flag Officer Commanding Naval Service to utilise the Reserve to bolster specific skill sets, as may be required from time to time. These could be as varied as requiring medical personnel with maritime experience, specialist maritime skillsets such as Marine Pilots, Master Mariners, Sail Training experts, ROV pilots, naval architect capability, etc. There is a wide and varied skills and experience pool of Irish Mariners, who could contribute greatly to the maritime security of Ireland (through the INS), if the policies and structures were in place to facilitate such. The requirement for NSR units in Ireland’s principal ports should be enhanced, with consideration of a new units in the Port of Galway and the Port of Rosslare. The benefits of such units, if properly utilised, are to enhance port security, support the DF in Aid To the Civil Power / Authorities taskings and also as a source of recruitment for the wider DF. End