Coming and Going: Understanding Changes in Turkish Foreign Policy through Migration

Turkey has become an undeniably powerful and visible actor in its neighbor-hood, be it the Balkans, the Black Sea, the Caucasus, or the Middle East. Onetraditional way to comprehend this regional power is to look at how strong (mil-itarily, economically, diplomatically) Turkey is compared to its neighbors. Butanother way to look at it is to understand how Turkey is anchored in the regionthrough the different flows of capital, goods, people, and ideas. The more dense,multiform, and multidirectional those flows are, the more central and indis-pensable Turkey becomes in its neighborhood.

Studying the movements of people in and out of Turkey offers a unique in-sight into a more subtle way in which Turkey exerts its influence abroad. Turkeyis now a country of emigration, immigration, and transit migration all at once,and that is having a significant impact on the country’s foreign relations. First,its foreign relations have grown beyond state-to-state relations and encompass anincreased number of nonstate, societal actors—migrants and their interlocutors—engaged in microlevel, daily interactions. Second, the nonstate actors themselveshave become increasingly eager to have a say on state policies regarding migra-tion and foreign policy. Third, the Turkish state itself has come to think of mi-gration increasingly as a foreign policy issue, and consequently foreign policyconcerns and migration concerns have become entangled.

Therefore, observing the recent changes in Turkey’s migration policiespresents an original way to understand some of the broader changes of Turkey’sforeign policy. It opens a window into areas of Turkish foreign policy that havebeen traditionally overlooked by internal and external observers. It also delvesinto some aspects of decisionmaking on migration that have been overlooked intraditional migration studies. In the past two decades, the Turkish government’sapproach to migration policies has evolved in parallel with the transformationobserved in the foreign policy arena. On the issues of asylum, irregular migra-tion, and visa policy, the three areas covered in this chapter, Turkish policy is inthe process of becoming more rule bound, less security oriented, and in someareas more liberal. What do these developments mean for the broader debates

119

6Coming and Going: Migration andChanges in Turkish Foreign Policy

Juliette Tolay

surrounding Turkish foreign policy? Do Turkish migration policies indicate aWestern orientation (i.e., a Europeanization of Turkish policies and values), anEastern one (i.e., a preference for relations with the Middle East), or some com-bination? Do these policies demonstrate a preference for a particular part of the“neighborhood”? What do they show about the way Turkey perceives its role inthe region? And what do they reveal regarding domestic mechanisms of foreignpolicy making? In sum, it is appropriate to ask: What does migration revealabout the nature of Turkey’s new foreign policy?

This chapter aims both at assessing the meaning of the changes in Turkishmigration policies in the last two decades, and at demonstrating the intimate linkexisting between migration and foreign policy in Turkey. The first section de-scribes the diversity of contemporary migration flows affecting Turkey and un-derlines how each of these flows creates a particular bilateral relation betweenTurkey and its neighboring countries and regions. The second section providesa short historical background of Turkish migration policies, highlighting theforeign policy dimension of some of these decisions. The third section presentsan overview of the recent radical changes that have occurred in migration poli-cies (on asylum, irregular migration, and visas) since the end of the Cold War.The fourth section offers an explanation for these changes, arguing that the trig-ger for change in policies was the dramatic changes in the global and regionalmigration landscape in the last 20 years. The direction for change was deter-mined by two main developments: the end of the Cold War, which promptedTurkey’s rediscovery of its immediate neighborhood, and the emergence of theEU as Turkey’s most influential international partner. The mechanism for changein migration policies, however, was a domestic transformation in the conceptualand institutional approach to foreign policy making. The last section offers somereflections on the broader implications of these findings for the migration situ-ation in Turkey and in the region, and for Turkey’s behavior on the internationalscene.

Migratory Flows: Turkey’s Thick Societal Foreign Relations

It has now become common to refer to Turkey as a country of emigration andimmigration, as well as transit migration.1 However, because Turkey does nothave an “immigration policy” in the sense that it does not actively and system-atically seek control over incoming and outgoing flows, the Turkish state doesnot gather reliable data on those flows. The informal nature of many migratoryflows also renders difficult the generation of precise data. Hence some of thenumbers available are estimates.

Regarding emigration, approximately 3 million Turkish citizens live abroad.During the 1960s and 1970s, Turkey’s emigration was very much oriented to-ward Western Europe. But starting with the late 1970s, there has been a cleardiversification of the destinations, with large numbers of Turkish migrants going

120 Juliette Tolay

to different places in the Middle East and, later on, to the area of the former So-viet Union (see Table 6.1).2

In terms of immigration, Turkey receives many different types of migrants,both on a regular and an informal basis. The large majority, about 200,000, ofregistered migrants each year come for employment or a long stay. These aremainly nationals from Europe and the former Soviet space. Another significantportion comes to Turkey as transit migrants on their way to Europe. On aver-age for the period 2000–2008, 35,000 irregular migrants were apprehended eachyear by the Turkish police. Most of the transit migrants enter the country at thesoutheastern borders with Iran, Iraq, and Syria and exit from the western gates(Istanbul, Aegean Sea, and the Bulgarian and Greek borders). Finally, a smallergroup comes to Turkey as asylum seekers, mainly from Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq,and Somalia (see Table 6.2).

These numbers, however, capture only a portion of the millions of peoplecrossing Turkish borders each year. As explained below, Turkey’s visa policy isrelatively liberal, allowing nationals from many countries to come and go “astourists” even if their activities in Turkey resemble those of migrants (employ-ment, institutionalized business relationships, etc.). Figure 6.1 presents the num-bers of entries into Turkey from 2000 to 2009; in that period, 183 millionforeigners entered Turkey, two and a half times the overall Turkish population.The largest numbers of entries come from the EU area, and those numbers

Migration and Changes in Turkish Foreign Policy 121

Table 6.1 Turkish Emigrants Abroad in 1985, 1995, 2005, and 2008

1985 1995 2005 2008

# (x 1,000) % # (x 1,000) % # (x 1,000) % # (x 1,000) %

Austria 75.0 3.1 147.0 4.4 127.0 3.8 120.0 3.5Belgium 72.5 3.1 79.5 2.4 45.9 1.4 42.3 1.2France 146.1 6.2 198.9 6.0 208.0 6.3 220.0 6.5Germany 1,400.1 59.6 2,049.9 62.0 1,912.0 57.9 1,890.0 55.9Netherlands 156.4 6.6 127.0 3.8 160.3 4.9 168.3 4.9ScandinavianCounties 41.2 1.7 73.0 2.2 51.6 1.6 56.1 1.6

Switzerland 51.0 2.2 79.0 2.4 79.5 2.4 77.5 2.2Other EuropeanCountries 42.0 1.8 87.0 2.6 130.0 3.9 160.7 4.7

Total Europe 1,984.6 84.0 2,841.3 85.9 2,714.3 82.1 2,734.9 80.9

Middle EasternCountries 200.0 8.5 127.0 3.8 105.0 3.2 110.7 3.2

Australia 35.0 1.5 45.0 1.4 60.0 1.8 67.1 1.9CIS Countries 0.0 0.0 50.0 1.4 75.0 2.3 77.3 2.2Other Countries 140.0 5.9 245.0 7.4 350.0 10.6 390.1 11.5

Total 2,359.6 100.0 3,308.3 100.0 3,304.3 100.0 3380.1 100.0

Source: ºçduygu, SOPEMI Report, p. 59.

Table6.2IndicativeNumberofImmigrantstoTurkey,2000–2008

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

Und

ocum

ente

dM

igra

tion

94,6

0092

,400

82,8

0056

,200

61,2

0057

,428

51,9

8364

,290

65,7

37Il

lega

lent

ries

51,4

0057

,300

44,2

0030

,348

34,7

4526

,046

18,8

7630

,120

45,4

62O

vers

tays

43,2

0035

,100

38,6

0025

,852

26,4

5531

,382

33,1

0734

,170

20,2

75

Asy

lum

appl

icat

ions

5,70

05,

200

3,79

43,

966

3,90

83,

914

4,54

87,

640

12,9

81of

whi

ch:A

fgha

n10

040

047

7734

136

533

942

71,

571

ofw

hich

:Ira

n3,

900

3,50

02,

505

3,10

82,

029

1,71

62,

297

1,66

82,

217

ofw

hich

:Ira

q1,

600

1,00

097

434

296

41,

047

724

3,47

06,

904

Res

iden

cePe

rmits

168,

100

161,

254

157,

670

152,

203

155,

500

131,

594

186,

586

183,

757

174,

926

ofw

hich

:wor

k24

,200

22,4

1422

,556

21,6

5027

,500

22,1

3022

,805

25,4

7518

,900

ofw

hich

:stu

dy24

,600

23,9

4621

,548

21,8

1015

,000

25,2

4024

,258

22,1

9728

,597

ofw

hich

:oth

er11

9,30

011

4,89

411

3,56

610

8,74

311

3,00

084

,224

139,

523

135,

365

127,

429

Tota

l26

8,40

025

8,85

424

4,26

421

2,36

922

0,60

819

2,93

624

3,17

725

5,68

725

3,64

4

Sour

ce:

ºçdu

ygu,

SOP

EM

IR

epor

t,p.

43.

mainly include tourism and family visits of European nationals of Turkish ori-gin. But entries of nationals from the immediate neighborhood also increasedsubstantially. The bulk of those are nationals of the Balkan and former SovietUnion neighboring countries. Those nationals tend to come for professionalreasons. Entries of nationals from the Middle Eastern neighboring countries re-main very low, even though the numbers are increasing; the large majority ofthose entries are from Iran.

At the bilateral level, Turkey’s relations with each of its immediate neigh-bors are influenced by the types of migratory flows linking them. With Greece,apart from a long history of exchanges of population in the first half of the twen-tieth century,3 migration relations are characterized by growing concerns andtensions over the irregular migration and irregular deportations of migrants.4

Relations with Bulgaria are shaped by the Turkish and Pomak minorities living inBulgaria, approximately 300,000 of which migrated en masse to Turkey in 1989.5


Figure 6.1 Regional Trends in Movement of People into Turkey, 2000–2009

Source: ºçduygu, SOPEMI Report, and data obtained from the Foreigners Department of MOI.Notes: 1. Data include Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Ireland, Luxem-

bourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom and after 2004 Czech Repub-lic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. About 70 percent of EU citizenscoming to Turkey come from countries such as Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium, which have a sig-nificant number of citizens of Turkish origin.

2. Data include Russia, Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan.3. Data include Greece, Bulgaria, and Romania.4. Data include Syria, Iraq, and Iran.

Two decades later, many of those people use their double passports, Turkishand Bulgarian (the Bulgarian passport being an EU passport since 2007), to en-gage in cross-border businesses. Georgia also has a strong migration relation-ship, with an increased number of domestic workers finding employment inTurkey’s big cities. A similar migration from Armenia is evident, with an esti-mated 50,000 irregular Armenian nationals working in Istanbul alone. This issueseems to be increasingly politicized, as it has been mentioned in several polit-ical discourses, especially by Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoÿan,6 but also as itseems to be one of the items on the agenda in the proposed rapprochement be-tween Turkey and Armenia that started in 2009.7

Alongside the Iranian border, a very active migration relationship is takingplace, which started with the Iranian revolution of 1979, after which about 1million Iranians chose Turkey as their country of first asylum.8 Today the Iran-ian border continues to be an important point of entry for migrants, with abouta million visitors from Iran every year, and intense cross-border trade. The Iran-ian border is also an important gate for migrants from Afghanistan, Pakistan,and Asian countries farther east. Since at least 1988, relations between Turkeyand Iraq have contained a strong migration component related to security con-cerns. In 1988 and 1991, two successive waves of mass migration came fromNorthern Iraq to Turkey. This tested the reception capacity of Turkey and in-creased Turkey’s fear over migration flows that would unsettle an already un-stable region (in the midst of the warfare against PKK insurgents).9 Even thoughno major flows have occurred since then (contrary to what was expected in 2003),the border remains closely controlled. Today the Iraqi border at the Habur gateis also the point of entry of “returnees” to Turkey, including refugees from theMahmur Camps and PKK insurgents from the Kandil Mountains.10 Finally, rela-tions with Syria have a very organic link to migration, as most families livingin the border area are split across the border and movements of population arecommon. The historic decision, in fall 2009, to remove visa requirements be-tween the two countries represents normalization of a cultural practice at the po-litical level.11

Migratory flows also link Turkey with countries and regions farther away.Each year millions of people from the Balkans and Black Sea littoral countries,including 3 million from Russia, enter Turkey for tourism, trade, or employ-ment. Turkey also seems to be increasingly a destination country for nationalsof Gulf countries and North Africa. This is creating professional and personalties between an increased number of nonstate actors in Turkey and abroad thatenhances Turkey’s interdependence with neighboring regions.12

But from a migration standpoint, the EU stands as the most important actorfor Turkey—not only because of the many flows and numbers of Turkish mi-grants in Europe, as well as some European migrants in Turkey, but also be-cause migration has become a central political issue in the EU-Turkey relationin the past twenty years. Once mainly about Turkish immigrants in Europe, is-sues of asylum, irregular migration, and visa policies have now become part of

124 Juliette Tolay

the ongoing dialogue between Turkey and the EU, operating mainly within theframework of Chapter 24 of the accession process.13 The United States, as well,has shown interest in the migration situation in Turkey, though at a much lowerlevel and confined to the aspects of human smuggling and trafficking, and in-ternational terrorism.14

In all of these issues, Turkey has policy options. Within the confines of po-litical and pragmatic limitations, the Turkish government can decide whether toencourage or discourage the flows, whether to discriminate or not between dif-ferent types of migrants or according to their geographical origin, whether tohave flexible and ad hoc measures or a comprehensive and systematic immi-gration policy, among other things. Of particular interest in this chapter is to seehow domestic and foreign policy concerns have influenced decisions amongmigration policy options. Historically, domestic policy concerns have been themain driver, but foreign policy concerns have also played a critical role.

Background: Migration Policies andForeign Policy in Turkey (1923–1990)

Traditional understandings of migration policies look at them mainly from adomestic policy perspective: regulation of the labor market, achieving a demo-graphic balance, management of a societal problem, cultivating a sense ofnational identity, and so forth. Few works have considered the foreign policy di-mension of migration policies, and those works have focused mainly on the USand European experiences.15 In those analyses, some relationships between mi-gration and foreign policy have been identified—for example, the impact ofpast migration on current foreign policy (via the lobbying actions of a diasporaor migrant group), the use of foreign policy to reduce or encourage migrationflows, the use of migration policy as an instrument to pursue foreign policygoals. In this chapter, the focus is mainly on the latter but redefined in a broadersense: How are foreign policy concerns taken into consideration when deci-sions on immigration policy are made?

In the case of Turkey, foreign policy concerns seem to have always playeda central role in the decisions made over migration policies. However, thoseconcerns would often be intermixed with domestic policy concerns or consid-ered to be at the margins of domestic politics. For the founding years of the re-public (1923–1946), the domestic politics part of the story has been told: Thenewly adopted migration policy was designed out of concerns for nation build-ing and national security.16 Indeed, the Law on Settlement (ºskan Kanunu),adopted in 1934, foresaw that only people of Turkish origin or culture17 couldcome and settle in Turkey. The selection of who fit that criterion, as well as howand where they would be settled, demonstrated the government’s willingness toreinforce the ethnic and religious “Turkish” character of the population andensured that only “Muslim-Turkish” (and not members of a “untrustworthy”


non-Muslim minority) would live in strategic places, such as the vicinity of rail-ways, highways, and natural resources.18

Yet Turkish migrants were settled in strategic places not only for internalsecurity reasons but also for external security reasons. Settlement of “Turkish”migrants in Thrace in the early 1930s seems to have been done as a defensivemove against the expansionist tendency of Italy and the Turkish fear of an Italo-Bulgarian alliance.19 During that period, the Turkish government welcomedmigration from the Balkans, whereas migration from the Soviet Union was dis-couraged. That can be seen as a foreign policy of maintaining good relationswith the Soviet Union by not allowing exiles to organize anti-Soviet activitiesfrom Turkey, a critical concern for the Soviet Union, as well as a way of pre-venting infiltration from Soviet elements.20 On the other hand, encouraging themigration of Muslims to Turkey may have been a way of signaling to the Balkancountries Turkey’s new renunciation of imperial claims in the area and thereforeworked as a tool for stabilization.21 The population exchange (mubadele) be-tween Greece and Turkey in 1923, as well as similar bilateral agreements withBulgaria, Romania, and Yugoslavia, meant, at the time, mutual recognition andwillingness to coexist as good neighbors.22 It was also a way to reduce the num-ber of Turkey’s non-Muslim minorities, which historically have been used as apretext for foreign (European) interventions in the Ottoman Empire or Turkey.23

Because some migration policy decisions were motivated by foreign pol-icy concerns, change in foreign relations meant a change in migration policy.Starting with the reconciliation process of 1930, immigrants from Greece werewelcomed to Turkey up to the late 1950s, when bilateral relations started to de-teriorate. After that, the Turkish government policy was to discourage immi-gration so as to keep a Turkish presence in western Thrace that could be usedas leverage in bilateral relations.24

With the end of World War II and the advent of the Cold War, the foreignpolicy environment for Turkey changed radically. In 1951, Turkey signed theUN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Geneva Convention), andthat decision was a way for Turkey to signal its membership in the Western camp.Turkey adopted the convention with a “geographical limitation,” meaning thatonly asylum seekers coming from Europe, usually understood as meaning fromeast Europe or the Soviet Union, could be granted the status of refugee.25 Beinga member of the convention was therefore a way for Turkey to signal three “be-longings”: first, that it was part of the Western bloc, as it was implicitly under-stood that only the “oppressive” Soviet Union could produce refugees; second,that it was part of the international law system; and third, that its identity was Eu-ropean and not Middle Eastern, as it was deemed possible to receive people fromEurope, while it would be a problem to receive people from the Middle East.

As can been seen from those two historical periods, migration policy wasclearly connected to the foreign policy of the time. It was used instrumentally togain leverage on a particular issue and to avoid migration becoming a liability inbilateral or multilateral relations. Migration policies were also used symbolically

126 Juliette Tolay

to signal to other countries which camp Turkey belonged to, which identity itembodied, and which values it embraced.

The Post–Cold War Changes in Migration Policies

By the late 1980s, the existing migration regulations had become mostly irrel-evant. Not only did the nature of migration change in Turkey, but the Turkishgovernment itself started to disregard existing regulations, preferring, for ex-ample, the use of ad hoc policies to deal with the arrival of Turkish migrants,rather than the existing Law on Settlement.26 By the end of the Cold War, theTurkish state regulation of migration issues overall was incomplete and incon-sistent. Pieces that made up Turkish immigration policy were to be found invarious places such as in the Law on Settlement, the Law on Foreigners (Ya-bancªlar Kanunu), the Citizenship Law (Vatanda≈slªk Kanunu), and in variousinstitutions, mainly the Ministry of Interior (especially in the Foreigners De-partment within the General Directorate of Security) and the Ministry of For-eign Affairs, as well as others.27 That situation has changed substantively in thelast twenty years, however, the general tendency being one of slow movementtoward the establishment of a comprehensive immigration policy.28 Yet thatmovement has occurred through radical and sometimes unexpected reversalsin three areas of Turkish immigration policy: asylum, irregular migration, andvisa policies.

Policies on Asylum Seeking and Refugees:Toward a Turkish Asylum System?

As of June 30, 2009, there were about eleven thousand refugees in Turkey andseven thousand asylum seekers registered in Turkey. From 1998 to 2006, thetotal number of asylum seekers and refugees in Turkey was always below ninethousand, but since 2007, the total number has been above twelve thousand. By2009, 45 percent of asylum seekers and refugees were Iraqis, 23 percent Irani-ans, 18 percent Afghans, and 7 percent Somalis.29 Since the Iranian revolutionin 1979 and the violent years in Iraq between 1988 and 1991, most asylum seek-ers have come from the southeast neighbors of Turkey.

Three different periods can be distinguished in the evolution of Turkishasylum policies in the past twenty years. The pre-1994 period is a time whenTurkish authorities were reluctant to provide any systematic assistance to refu-gees. As Turkey applied the geographical limitation of the Geneva Convention,non-European asylum seekers were not entitled to the status of refugee inTurkey. The rationale behind that position was that refugee flows to Turkeycould only be temporary, and that ad hoc measures were better suited to ad-dress those flows. That led to heightened tensions between Turkey and the in-ternational community, especially with the UN High Commissioner for


Refugees (UNHCR). As documented by Kiri≈sci, over time those tensions alsoforced both Turkish authorities and the UNHCR to soften their positions andfind compromises.30 That marks the beginning of the second period, duringwhich the reluctance of Turkish authorities to grant protection to refugees didnot change in theory, but the policies had to be softened in practice.

The second period started in 1994, when Turkey introduced a new regula-tion that opened the door for non-European asylum seekers to apply for asylumin Turkey. Turkey would not grant the status of refugees to non-Europeans butwould let them apply and receive temporary protection. Eventually though, suchasylum seekers had to be resettled in a third country. To remain in a regular sit-uation in Turkey and be considered for resettlement, they had to register withTurkish authorities within five days after their arrival in the territories, which ap-peared to be unrealistic, given that most asylum seekers were unaware of therule. By 1999, Turkey had softened that regulation by extending the five-daylimit to ten days. In 2006 the limit was lifted altogether.31 From 1994 to 2008,one can indeed see a gradual softening of the policies, even though the princi-ple stating that Turkey itself should not grant refugee status remained strongamong Turkish authorities.32 In the National Action Plan on Migration and Asy-lum of 2005, the idea of lifting the geographical limitation was considered butwas made conditional on Turkish membership in the EU. For Turkish officials,this was a way of saying that while they disagreed with the principle, the limi-tation could be lifted only if associated with guarantees on burden sharing andEU membership.

However, by 2009 another critical change, one of mindset, seemed to betaking place within the Turkish bureaucracy. A migration agency within theMinistry of Interior was set up to draft a new asylum law for Turkey.33 Eventhough that draft kept in place the geographical limitation,34 the possibility oflifting it was seriously considered and even supported by some actors within theagency.35 Given how strong and definitive the opposition in the Turkish bureau-cracy had been to changing the limitation, the fact that the bureaucracy is nowmore divided on the issue demonstrates a striking change of mindset.

Changes in Policies on Irregular Migrationand Trafficking: Increased Activism

Similarly, the past twenty years have witnessed changes in Turkish policies to-ward irregular migration and trafficking. The number of irregular migrants inTurkey overall is unknown, given the very nature of irregular migration. Thegeneral consensus is that it is a phenomenon that started with the collapse of theSoviet Union. The only data available are from the Turkish Ministry of Interior,which compiles the number of irregular migrants arrested by police forces ineach year. Between 2000 and 2008 the numbers fluctuated between 52,000 and94,600, with 65,700 individuals arrested in 2008 (see Table 6.2, under “undoc-umented migration”). These numbers include not only individuals apprehended

128 Juliette Tolay

when illegally entering or exiting Turkish territory, but also individuals thatoverstayed their visas. Irregular migrants in Turkey are indeed a compositegroup of clandestine migrants, transit migrants, trafficked persons, and rejectedasylum seekers.

Turkish policies toward irregular migration and trafficking were almostnonexistent throughout the 1990s. Important changes occurred in 2002–2003,when a series of regulations were adopted establishing stronger sanctions for il-legal workers and employers and adopting measures to fight against migrantsmuggling and human trafficking.36 Most of the work that remains to be doneconcerns the systematic implementation of the measures, especially in the caseof trafficking.37 All in all, in terms of the decisionmaking on irregular migration,Turkey today has fulfilled most of the requirements that were demanded by in-ternal and external actors such as national NGOs, the IOM (International Or-ganization for Migration), the EU, and the United States, except for one: thereadmission agreement.

The readmission agreement is the main issue that remains on the table inthe regulation of irregular migration. Such an agreement, whereby apprehendedirregular migrants are sent back to the country they came from, has been undernegotiation between the EU and Turkey since 2005. The slow evolution of thenegotiations has been attributed to Turkey’s concern to ensure its own read-mission agreement with the countries whose migrants transit through Turkey,such as Iran, Pakistan, and Moldova. Since 2001, Turkey has been able to signreadmission agreements (regarding nationals of the two parties and sometimesthird countries, as well) with six countries,38 while negotiations or prenegotia-tions are under way with eighteen others.39 Even though negotiations on thereadmission agreement with the EU had been stalemated for the past couple ofyears, it was announced in January 2010 that they had resumed. The readmis-sion agreement with the EU would be part of a broader agreement whereby visarequirements for Turkish citizens to access the Schengen area would be lifted.Yet by September 2010, the Turkish and European counterparts could not set-tle on an agreement.40

Changes in Visa Policy: Either Schengen or a Liberal Visa Policy

The practice of using visas as a means to control and regulate the flows of peo-ple entering a country is a relatively new practice for Turkey that evolved dur-ing the Cold War.41 By the end of the Cold War, Turkey had indeed enteredreciprocal visa agreements with most countries of eastern Europe and the So-viet Union, as well as Middle Eastern countries except for Iran.42 Starting withGreece in 1965, all EU countries had established visa requirements with Turkeyby 1991.43

By the end of the Cold War, Turkey had started to liberalize its visa policy.First, visa requirements were lifted with Greece in 1988. Then Turkey startedto develop a new practice: the “sticker visa” (bandrol), whereby a visa is issued


directly at the border (and not at the consulate), which is a facilitated procedurefor travelers. Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, that practice was appliedto Black Sea countries, as well to the new emerging states of the Caucasus andCentral Asia. In a less systematic manner, Turkey also relaxed visa requirementswith some Middle Eastern countries, especially Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Tunisia,and Morocco.44

Things changed again in the early 2000s, with the prospect of EU mem-bership and the adoption of the 2003 National Program for the Adoption of theAcquis, by which Turkey indicated it would align its visa policy with the Schen-gen regime. In practice, that meant reversing the liberal visa policy and adopt-ing the Schengen “negative list” of countries requiring visas. Turkey started toalign its policy, and by 2004, except for six countries, Turkey was approachingfull alignment.45

But starting in 2005 yet another reversal occurred, and Turkey started to undosome of the visa requirements for countries of the negative Schengen list, such asSaudi Arabia. By 2009 and 2010, the Turkish government had actively acceler-ated that policy and looked for full-scale visa-free agreements, without consider-ation for the Schengen requirements. By April 2010, Turkey seemed to have reachvisa-free agreements with Syria, Pakistan, Albania, Libya, Jordan, Lebanon, andQatar, and was engaged in discussions in this regard with Russia and Egypt.46

On the three areas of asylum, irregular migration, and visas, there havebeen some clear changes between the early 1990s and the late 2000s. Almost allthe regulations that were in place in 1990 have been (or are about to be) re-moved, and new regulations have replaced the old ones. From the perspectiveof a comprehensive policy, the overall tendency is one of greater coverage of themultiple facets of migration. Moreover, by summer 2009, a new Agency onAsylum and Migration had been created within the Ministry of Interior. It iscurrently composed mainly of a task force in charge of drafting a new law onasylum and refugees and a new Law on Foreigners, as well as drafting the re-sponsibilities of this new agency. If the new laws come into effect, Turkey wouldcome close to having a comprehensive immigration policy.

Explaining Change in Migration PoliciesThrough Changes in Foreign Policy

The movement toward a more comprehensive coverage of migration issues inthe past twenty years in Turkey has proceeded through uneven and sometimescontradictory developments. Some of the changes are moving in a more liberaldirection. On asylum, on the fight against trafficking, and on visa policies, thetendency has been toward becoming more welcoming to migrants and moreaware of the humanitarian side of the issue. However, on other issues the move-ment has been toward more restriction and control. On irregular migration andborder control, most measures have ensured a higher level of apprehension, de-

130 Juliette Tolay

portation, and restrictions on the movement of irregular migrants in Turkey.This contradiction could be explained by the role of the European Union, whichhas been placing contradictory demands on Turkey regarding asylum and mi-gration, asking it to be both more restrictive and more humanitarian at the sametime. However, the EU alone cannot explain the changes in Turkey’s visa pol-icy that have been moving away from the Schengen system. How then to explainthem?

There is a complex set of factors explaining why Turkish migration poli-cies have changed over the past twenty years, why they have changed the waythey have, and what the broader meaning is of those changes. As demonstratedbelow, external factors (regional and international), and often foreign policyconsiderations, play an essential role in this explanatory framework. Morespecifically, three sets of reasons can account for change: (1) changes in the mi-gration landscape surrounding Turkey, (2) changes in the foreign policy envi-ronment, and (3) changes in the way decisions on foreign policy and migrationpolicy are made in Turkey.

Trigger: Change in the Migration Landscape

The striking changes that have occurred in Turkish migration policies are fore-most a result of the changes in migration patterns surrounding Turkey. The Is-lamic Revolution in Iran, the repression and wars in Iraq starting in 1988, theanti-Turkish policies of the Bulgarian government, and the disintegration ofYu-goslavia throughout the 1990s all created sudden mass movements of refugeesinto Turkey. The collapse of the Soviet Union also unleashed new movementsof population across the East-West divide, and Turkey became a major desti-nation country for many of those flows.47 Moreover, the broader forces of glob-alization, the easier means of transportation, and the internationalization of labormarkets facilitated the movement of the labor force across the globe.48 Turkeyitself became both a sending and a receiving country, and it became a majorcountry of transit migration. Finally, the buildup of a “fortress Europe,” in-creasingly reluctant to receive migration from beyond the EU borders and im-plementing restrictive policies, has strengthened and reoriented the flows ofirregular migration, which rely more on Turkey as a place of transit.49 The com-bination of all of these factors compelled Turkey to eventually take measures toaddress its new challenges.

Direction: Change in the Foreign Policy Environment

These important changes in the migration landscape constituted a significanttrigger for changes in Turkish policies, but by themselves they do not explainthe nature and direction of the changes adopted. For that, one must look at thechanges in Turkey’s foreign policy environment. Those changes have compelledTurkey to incorporate migration issues and policies into a broader new foreign


policy vision. With the end of the Cold War, the foreign policy environment ofTurkey was practically reset. The rationale behind the long Turkish isolationand nonengagement in the region disappeared, and under the initial leadershipof Prime Minister and then President Turgut Özal, a new foreign policy of open-ing toward the country’s immediate neighborhood was put into place. WithinÖzal’s foreign policy vision, migration policies played an important role in im-proving relations with neighbors by encouraging political stability and by open-ing up to new markets. The decision to lift visa requirements with Greece in1986, for example, had a clear goal of encouraging public contacts as a meansto rapprochement with Greece and played a key part in the historic rapproche-ment with Greece in 1999.50 The decision to open the border with Iraq duringthe influx of Iraqi Kurds in 1991, which Turkey had been very hesitant to do in1988, was also signaling Turkey’s emergent feeling of connection with the de-velopments in the region.51 But the most important decision was made with re-gard to the countries of the former Soviet Union, with the decision to adopt a“soft” visa policy (the sticker visa system). By doing that, Turkey was able toabsorb immediately some of the major benefits of the opening of this new areaand benefited in terms of both trade and friendly relations with those countries,especially Russia.52

Yet the measures taken during Özal’s time, while very important and re-vealing, remained limited and sporadic. For instance, Özal was not able to applythe same liberal visa policy with the neighbors of the south as he did with thenorth.53 Indeed, the general foreign policy outlook of most state institutions ofthe time remained very much framed within a realist view of balance of powerand zero-sum understanding of the relations with most neighbors. Conflictualand tension-ridden relations with Greece, Armenia, Iraq, and Syria remainedthe norm during the 1990s.

However, toward the end of the decade, a second major change withinthe foreign policy environment occurred: the opening up of prospective EUmembership with the recognition of Turkey’s candidate status in 1999 andthe improved relations with the EU in the following six years. Through the ap-plication of the Copenhagen criteria and the acquis communautaire, the EUgained a unique leverage over Turkish policies. In the areas of asylum, mi-gration, and visa policy, clear criteria were set and adapted to the Turkish con-text through the National Action Plan on Migration and Asylum in 2005.54

That led to the Turkish effort to think comprehensively about its immigrationpolicy and to stimulate a more systematic approach to the migration issue.The National Action Plan was also in the background of the creation of thenew Agency on Asylum and Migration within the Ministry of Interior. Morebroadly, Turkey’s improvement in immigration policy became at the sametime both a substantial burden for Turkey and a useful foreign policy tool inkeeping in good relations with the EU. On the one hand, Turkey feels com-pelled to institute a lot of changes, some of which are considered costly.55 Onthe other hand, the timing and unfolding of those changes can be used both

132 Juliette Tolay

symbolically, proving the compliance of Turkey with EU rules, and as a bar-gaining chip for a more friendly policy toward Turkey. The case of the read-mission agreement between Turkey and Europe is a case in point: Turkey usedit as a bargaining tool with other countries to sign readmission agreements, aswell as with the EU to negotiate easier access to Schengen visas for Turkishcitizens. The negotiations should not be seen only as strategic, however, butalso as steps toward confidence building and credibility in an EU-Turkey re-lationship that often lacks both of those.

Mechanism: Conceptual and Procedural Changesin Policymaking Within Turkey

Both the end of the Cold War and the EU accession process explain why Turkeyhas wanted to use migration policies as a way to be more engaged in its newneighborhood and to comply with EU demands and policies. However, a closerlook at changes within the domestic structure can help us understand how thosenew policies became possible. Three recent developments in Turkey’s deci-sionmaking processes, especially on issues of migration and foreign policy,were responsible: a change in foreign policy outlook, a change in the distribu-tion of power within the Turkish bureaucracy and government, and an increasein the role played by nonstate actors.

First, there was a radical change of outlook regarding the way foreign pol-icy should be conducted. This could occur only as the result of a new state ofmind and openings undertaken by Turgut Özal in the early 1990s and by otherpersonalities such as Ismail Cem at the turn of the millennium. Those key per-sonalities started a process of creating a more open foreign policy. Subsequently,the victory of the AKP in 2002 opened the possibility to apply more consis-tently and directly such a liberal and outward-looking foreign policy. For ex-ample, the idea of opening toward and having interdependence with othercountries, developed initially by Özal, and the idea that Turkey’s strength in theregion would need to be pursued through engagement, trade, and peaceful re-lations with all neighbors, are now applied by the AKP through a liberal visapolicy. As a high-ranking official from the prime minister’s office put it, the de-cision of September 2009 to remove visa requirements between Turkey andSyria was made out of three concerns: improving the local economy, present-ing a goodwill gesture in the policy of rapprochement with Syria, and taking ameasure of confidence building.56 The decision on visa policy was thus used asan instrument for broader goals of foreign policy. Because openings toward thenorth (former Soviet countries) were already made throughout the 1990s, mostof the remaining work is being done with countries of the south (Syria, Jordan,Lebanon, Libya, etc.). This also fits conveniently with the AKP’s willingness toreengage the Middle East57 and revive the good days of pax Ottomana.58 Ac-cepting migration is also a way of becoming linked with the fate of other coun-tries’ citizens and a means to signal goodwill. As Prime Minister Erdoÿan said


regarding the presence of irregular Armenian workers in Turkey, “They [Armen-ian workers] fled the country, they could not sustain themselves in their home-land, and we opened our doors. We could deport them, but we are not doingso.”59 As was often mentioned by interlocutors, being a country receiving mi-gration and having the possibility to create liberal policies toward that migra-tion is a kind of “soft power” for Turkey.60

Beyond the need for friendly foreign relations with neighbors, the new for-eign policy outlook hinges on a broader idea: the ideal conception of a post-modern and borderless world, with equalities between people and equal accessto wealth and knowledge.61 Even though it is unclear how important this con-ception is in decisions that are made, it is often used as an explanatory andlegitimizing tool for some actions, such as the potential reversal of the geo-graphical limitation. That limitation has not yet been lifted, for institutional andpragmatic reasons, but the idea that it could and should be done is often justi-fied in terms of the universalist values of nondiscrimination against asylumseekers, wherever they come from.62

Finally, the new foreign policy outlook practiced by the AKP also entailsa certain expression of frustration toward the West, in general, and the perceivednormative arrogance of the EU, in particular. The AKP government, and espe-cially Prime Minister Erdoÿan, is able to capitalize on that frustration by puttingforth a foreign policy that is more independent, critical, and sometimes evenprovocative to a European (or US) audience.63 The idea of developing a “Sham-gen system,”64 contrasting to the Schengen system, or a Middle Eastern regionalSchengen zone,65 for example, uses European norms and practices in a regionwhere Europeans have failed to introduce them.66 The very idea of visa has anegative connotation in Turkey, as well as other countries that are listed on theSchengen negative list.67 Because the visa is perceived as a problem or a sourceof tension in Turkey, it has become easy to associate agreements on “zero visa”as a subset of the policy of “zero problems” with neighbors. Several Turkish of-ficials are indeed officially arguing that they are pursuing a policy of removingvisa requirements with all of Turkey’s neighbors.68 As a consequence of thatnew outlook in foreign policy, the AKP government is much less tied by oldunderstandings and is even proud of utilizing new and innovative policies. Thishas created a window of opportunity for change.

A second development has also been necessary for this conceptual changeto be realized: a change in the balance of power within key Turkish political in-stitutions and the ability of the AKP and other actors in favor of change to usethose institutions. The decline of the political power of the military has allowedthe political authorities to adopt a less securitized approach to foreign policy.69

One interlocutor has even advanced the idea that opening the borders with for-merly sensitive countries such as Syria, while in line with the spirit of the AdanaProcess, might also be a way for the government to further weaken the militarybranch by proving wrong the enemy image that the army has constructed throughthe years.70

134 Juliette Tolay

One of the most significant developments regarding migration issues is theshift of responsibilities between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministryof Interior. Even though both ministries have always coordinated and are stillcoordinating their actions, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had the most lever-age on migration issues in the 1990s, while it is now the Ministry of Interior thatcarries most responsibility. This does not mean that migration is now consideredmore a concern for domestic policy than foreign policy, but rather that foreignpolicy–related issues such as migration have been transferred to different min-istries beyond the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Consequently, decisions on mi-gration that have important foreign policy implications can be decided by theMinistry of Interior. This can be considered as a strategic move, as the Ministryof Foreign Affairs is often considered a more traditional actor, close to the vi-sion of the army and its security approach to migration, while the Ministry ofInterior could be more easily molded to fit the government’s views and proj-ects.71 This dynamic has also created some level of competition between thetwo ministries, as both consider themselves more liberal and inclined to usesoft power on migration issues, while reciprocally accusing the other of beingall about hard-power politics.72

But even within the Ministry of Interior there has been a strategic reshuf-fling. Some of the high-level bureaucrats within the Foreigners Department inthe General Directorate of Security who have been in their positions for decades,and were resistant to changes, have been moved to positions remote from theirformer responsibilities. Moreover, the new agency on migration and asylumcreated within the Ministry of Interior has been located directly under the un-dersecretary, rather than within the Security Directorate. The staff of that taskforce also seems to have been selected according to their openness to changeand new practices in immigration.73 There, indeed, seems to be a tendency to dif-fuse foreign policy responsibilities within a plurality of institutions and agen-cies, so that the government can empower people more in agreement with itspolicy vision.

Those changes are not necessarily orchestrated by the highest-level deci-sionmakers in the government. Rather, the change in foreign policy outlook ren-dered possible by the AKP’s government opened the possibility for motivatedindividuals within the government to interpret the meaning of this new outlookand exert influence over the bureaucracy. For instance, one former official whoworked for the Office of the Prime Minister and feels strongly about the fate ofrefugees and asylum seekers in Turkey, mentioned in a meeting that he wroteletters to different ministries requiring them to have a more rights-based ap-proach toward refugees. He did that in the name of Prime Minister Erdoπan,without Erdoÿan even being aware of the letters, and therefore was able to gaina lot of leverage on the issue. His actions may have been instrumental in thedecision to create the new migration and asylum agency. Other influential in-dividuals who have demonstrated an interest in issues of migration, such as In-terior Minister Be≈sir Atalay and Minister for EU Affairs and Chief Negotiator


Egemen Baπª≈s, have also been instrumental in encouraging change in migrationpolicies.74

The third main development in the way foreign and migration policies aredecided has been the increased role played by nonstate actors, especially inter-national organizations, civil society organizations, and business organizations.The two main international organizations dealing with migration issues, theUNHCR and IOM, have over time become relatively successful in establishingregular contacts with the government. Since the 1990s the UNHCR, and morerecently the IOM, have become important actors pushing for reforms in policiesin their respective domains. There has also been an explosion in the number ofNGOs working with migration-related issues. In the early 1990s, there were al-most none working with refugees and migrants apart from some local churchesrunning small-scale assistance programs. Now several NGOs work exclusivelyon rights and assistance to refugees, asylum seekers, and irregular migrants.These include ASAM (Association for Solidarity with Asylum Seekers and Mi-grants), Multeci-Der (Association for Solidarity with Refugees), and Multeci-Net(Refugees-Network). Many other established NGOs, such as the Turkish branchof HCA (Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly), MazlumDer (Association for HumanRights and Solidarity for Oppressed People), Amnesty International, the HumanRights Association, IHH (Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and Hu-manitarian relief), and Deniz Feneri, among others, have also created special mi-grant and refugee programs. Besides providing relief on the ground, the mainachievements of such organizations has been to bring international pressure onthe Turkish government by publishing “embarrassing” public reports75 or byopening and often winning cases against Turkey at the ECHR (European Courtof Human Rights).76 Some officials have recognized the importance of theseorganizations and are willing to change policies in order to stop the constant fin-ger pointing.77 Although the relations between the government and civil societyorganizations are still often tense, a change seems to be occurring within the bu-reaucracy that might indicate a new era of cooperation between civil societyorganizations and the government. The new agency on migration and asylumhas decided to institutionalize consultations with the UNHCR, NGOs, and aca-demicians in its deliberation over the design of new policies. Consideration hasalso been given to delegating some responsibilities, such as the management ofthe future reception centers for asylum seekers, to local NGOs.78

On visa policies, there is also evidence that some business organizationshave played an active role. While Ankara’s Chamber of Industry, for instance,has been very vocal and critical toward European actors regarding the unfairvisa requirements for Turkish businessmen going to Europe, the Istanbul Cham-ber of Commerce was apparently able, in February 2010, to strike a deal withItaly and France to facilitate the visa procedure for its members.79 While theAnkara and Istanbul chambers were putting pressure on European visa policies,the Diyarbakir Chamber of Commerce was pressuring the Turkish governmentto facilitate visa procedures for Iraqi businessmen.80 Interestingly, one of the

136 Juliette Tolay

rationales presented by government officials behind the decision to remove visarequirements for Syria is to open more space for “Turkish non-state actors, NGOs,businessmen, journalists, so that it is their demands that will lead the relationswith Syria,” as opposed to solely the demands of the Turkish government.81

One of the reasons decisions on migration issues are so closely related tothe evolution of foreign policy is that there are no real domestic debates on im-migration in Turkey. It is not a highly politicized issue within public opinion,and therefore policymakers face little internal pressure. Even the civil societyorganizations use international public opinion, rather than national public opin-ion, to make their voices heard. And on the visa issues, the mobilized businessand student associations are mainly trying to pressure the European states ratherthan the Turkish government itself. As such, foreign policy considerations pre-vail when decisions on migration issues are made. Within the Turkish politicalsystem, that seems to have empowered more liberal voices on migration issues.

Conclusions: The Migratory Link BetweenTurkey, Its Neighborhood, and Beyond

The movement of people coming in and going out of Turkey has become animportant aspect of Turkish foreign policy. Not only has it created a multitudeof actors engaged in Turkish foreign relations, it has also created important ac-tors at home influencing decisionmaking on migration and foreign policy, andit has diversified the number of issues on which and through which the Turkishgovernment can act. Today, as yesterday, Turkey uses migration both instru-mentally and symbolically to further foreign policy goals: Migration policies areused as a bargaining chip with the EU to pressure accession negotiations but alsoto signal to the EU its commitment to the EU project and to its neighborhoodthe sincerity of new friendly relations. But beyond that, migration and foreignpolicy concerns have become closely entangled with one another so that it isoften difficult to distinguish them. What does this analysis of Turkish migrationpolicy reveal about Turkey’s new foreign policy?

The main implications are threefold. First, from the perspective of migra-tion issues, there is an obvious trend of continuous Europeanization of Turkishnorms and policies. The overall story is one of gradual compliance with thestandards set by the EU in terms of migration and asylum policy. Critical changesoccurred in 2009, especially with the establishment of the new agency on mi-gration and asylum. Beyond the public impression of and discourse on thestalled implementation of the EU acquis in Turkey, less-visible but important re-forms have been made in the migration field. These changes seem to reveal amore profound and genuine adoption of the norms of the EU asylum and mi-gration regime. Ankara’s visa policy, which apparently contradicts the require-ments of the Schengen system and European demands, seems to have internalizedthe very European norm of freedom of movement as a tool for prosperity and


friendship, which was behind the idea of the European project. At a time whenthe EU is having a hard time diffusing the benefits of free movement beyond theexternal borders of the EU and seems to be locked into a restrictive, security-driven understanding of migration, Turkey is the country that is attempting tospread and apply those values in the Black Sea and Middle East regions.82

Second, because Turkey has learned a lot from Europe in terms of migra-tion issues, it is also becoming more self-confident. Not only did it internalizesome of the European norms, but Turkish officials have also become acquaintedwith the politics of those norms, as well as the weaknesses of the European sys-tem. It is not uncommon for officials in Turkey to mention how the new Turk-ish migration and asylum systems are better, or will be better, than the Europeanones.83 This has also led to a rise in self-confidence among Turkish officials,who have gained a better understanding of how to negotiate the adoption of theacquis. They now know how to negotiate over the timing and how to attach con-ditionality requirements to some of the changes. For example, the asylum geo-graphical limitation will be adopted only once Turkey is a member of the EU;the readmission agreement with the EU can be signed only if visa requirementsfor some categories of Turkish citizens are facilitated. As to future reversals ofthe implementation of the Schengen visa system, high-ranking officials are say-ing not that they gave up on the Schengen visa system, but rather that it can beapplied later, at which point there will be, in principle, a change in the visa-freeagreements with most Middle Eastern countries. Some officials even believethat by then Turkey will have succeeded in convincing its European partnersthat a liberal external visa policy would also be beneficial to the EU.84 Moregenerally in the negotiations with the EU, Turkish authorities want the processto be “open-ended” on their side, as well.85

This combination of Europeanization and self-confidence has clear advan-tages as well as risks. The fact that some segments of the Turkish bureaucracyhave internalized the idea of having a more systematic and rule-based policy to-ward migration will ease the path of reform in the future by decreasing the fearthat EU demands will go against Turkish interests. It might also have a positiveimpact on the EU side, with Turkish counterparts better able to present their ar-guments (using EU norms), and might help the EU learn from the Turkish ex-perience. However, if Turkey becomes a more difficult partner in negotiations,it also risks alienating some EU actors, already skeptical toward Turkey’s placein the EU.

Finally, the role played by Turkey in the region is still incomplete in the areaof migration but promises to have a positive impact on the region. Improve-ments are needed in terms of the consistency of some policies regarding thefight against human trafficking, the recognition of non-European refugees, andthe conditions of apprehension and detention of irregular migrants. But ifTurkey keeps implementing those reforms, it might become an important modelin a region where other countries tend to have underdeveloped immigrationpolicies. Already, with the domino effect of the readmission agreement, Turkey

138 Juliette Tolay

has contributed, in parallel with Europe, to the politicization of the question ofirregular migration farther south and east. But more important, by opening bor-ders and encouraging flows of people, trade, and ideas, Turkey is encouragingthe development of a zone of peace and collaboration in the traditionally un-stable regions of the Middle East, Balkans, Black Sea, and Caucasus. Given theserious political hurdles that are preventing peace in those regions, it is unlikelythat visa-free agreements alone can achieve stability, but it clearly represents astep in the right direction.

Turkish foreign policy has entered a new era. Even though in some otherareas this new paradigm is raising questions in the West, in the field of migra-tion changes are critical and positive overall. Promoting Turkey as a hub formigration will benefit both Turkey and its neighborhood at the political andeconomic levels. It is important for Turkey’s transatlantic partner to recognizeand encourage it.

Notes

1. There is also a massive movement of internal migration within Turkey, fromvillage to towns, from smaller towns to large cities, and overall from the east to the westof the country. Kiri≈sci, “Migration and Turkey,” pp. 175–198. However the internal mi-gration dimension will not be covered in this chapter as it is not as strongly related to for-eign policy as international migration flows.

2. See also Chapter 8 in this volume.3. Arª, Bµyµk Mübadele; Clark, Twice a Stranger.4. Irregular deportation refers to the documented practice of apparently both Greek

and Turkish authorities to “dump” apprehended irregular migrants on the other side ofthe border without due deportation process or informing the authorities of the other side.Human Rights Watch, “Stuck in a Revolving Door.”

5. Vasileva, “Bulgarian Turkish Emigration and Return.”6. Bozkurt, “Armenian Workers May Boost Turkey’s Hand in Foreign Policy”;

Anadolu Ajansª, “Gerekirse 100 bin Ermeniyi gönderebiliriz.”7. Remarks made by Armenian foreign policy official during an interview with

the author in Washington, DC, Nov. 2009.8. Akçapar, “Conversion as a Migration Strategy in Transit Country,” p. 825.9. Danª≈s, Taraghi, and Perouse, “Integration in Limbo,” p. 491.

10. The Mahmur Camps is a refugee camp set up in the 1990s in northern Iraq shel-tering individuals who had been displaced during the Turkish military practice of “emp-tying” security-sensitive villages of the Kurdish-populated areas of southeast Turkey.≈Safak, “Kurdish Initiative Crosses a Border.”

11. Özgen, “Sªnªrªn Iktisadi Antropolojisi.”12. Bulut, “Friends, Balkans, Statesmen Lend Us Your Ears.”13. See, among others, Kiri≈sci, Harmonization of Migration Policy and Turkey’s Se-

curity Challenges.14. US Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report, pp. 286–288; and in-

terview, Turkish police official, Oct. 2009.15. Teitelbaum, “Immigration, Refugees, and Foreign Policy”; Mitchell, “Interna-

tional Migration, International Relations and Foreign Policy”; Teitelbaum and Weiner,Threatened Peoples, Threatened Borders; Van Selm, ”Immigration and Asylum or Foreign


Policy”; Geddes, “Europe’s Border Relationships and International Migration Rela-tions”; Lavenex, “Shifting Up and Out.”

16. Kiri≈sci, “Disaggregating Turkish Citizenship and Immigration Practices”; Aktar,“Homogenising the Nation, Turkifying the Economy”; Çaπaptay, “Race, Assimilationand Kemalism”; ºçduygu, Tokta≈s, and Soner, “The Politics of Population in a Nation-Building Process”; ˜lker, “Assimilation of the Muslim Communities in the First Decadeof the Turkish Republic”; ˜lker, “Assimilation, Security and Geographical National-ization in Interwar Turkey.”

17. “Tµrk soyundan” or “Tµrk kültürüne baπlª,” Iskan Kanunu.18. ˜lker, “Assimilation, Security and Geographical Nationalization in Interwar

Turkey.”19. Aktar, “Homogenising the Nation, Turkifying the Economy”; Ibid.20. Kiri≈sci, “Disaggregating Turkish Citizenship and Immigration Practices,” p. 16.21. Özcan, “Continuity and Change in Turkish Foreign Policy.”22. Aktar, “Homogenising the Nation, Turkifying the Economy,” p. 83; Kiri≈sci,

“Disaggregating Turkish Citizenship and Immigration Policy,” p. 17.23. Aktar, “Homogenising the Nation, Turkifying the Economy,” p. 87.24. Kiri≈sci, “Disaggregating Turkish Citizenship and Immigration Policy,” p. 9;

Antonious, “Western Thracian Muslims in Athens,” p. 85.25. This option is offered in Article I B 1 of the Convention. Most signatories of the

convention lifted the geographical limitation, but Turkey, to this day, retains the geo-graphical limitation.

26. By the 1970s, Turkey had started to avoid receiving refugees or migrants as“groups” (ºskanli yerle≈sim) but rather receive them as “individuals” (serbest yerle≈sim),under which less state involvement and assistance is required. Danª≈s and Parla, “NafileSoyda≈slªk,” p. 4.

27. The Gendarmerie, the Coastal Guard, the Ministry of Health, and the Ministryof Labor and Social Security are also involved in migration issues. Kiri≈sci, Asylum, Im-migration, Irregular Migration and Internal Displacement in Turkey, pp. 4–9.

28. The term of “immigration policy” is used in the immigration literature with acertain level of ambiguity. It often relates to the fact that a country has a comprehensiveand coordinated body of regulations and institutions dealing with the different facets ofmigration. It is in this sense that I use this concept. However, the concept of immigra-tion policy is also sometimes used to mean the policy through which a country activelyimport labor force from abroad, as most Western European countries did in the 1960s.Turkey however never resorted to such a policy and is unlikely to do so in the near future.

29. United Nations High Commisioner for Refugees, Republic of Turkey Since1960, pp. 9–10. See also Table 6.2 for data on asylum in Turkey.

30. Kiri≈sci, “Is Turkey Lifting the ‘Geographical Limitation?’”; Kiri≈sci, “UNHCRand Turkey.”

31. The situation today is that asylum seekers are supposed to inform the Turkishauthorities as soon as possible after their entry into the territory, but the number of daysthat passed since the entry into the territory are not taken into consideration in the asy-lum application. However, if they get arrested by the police before they registered, theywill be considered illegal migrants and will not be given a chance to apply for asylum.Interview, police officer, Oct. 2009.

32. Kiri≈sci, Harmonization of Migration Policy and Turkey’s Security Challenges.33. “Mµste≈sarlªk ºltica ve Göç Mevzuatª ve ºdari Kapasitesini Geli≈stirme ve Uygu-

lama Bµrosu” (translation).34. As of Sept. 2010.35. Interview, officials from Ministry of Interior, Oct. 2009.36. Such as the amendments made to the penal code to criminalize human smug-

140 Juliette Tolay

gling and trafficking in women, the additional protocols against migrant smuggling andhuman trafficking of the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, theLaw on Work Permits for Aliens, and an amendment to the Turkish Citizenship Law.Kaya, Legal Aspects of Irregular Migration in Turkey; Erder and Ka≈ska, Irregular Mi-gration and Trafficking in Women.

37. According to the US State Department report on trafficking, Turkey moved fromTier 3 to Tier 2 between 2003 and 2005. This suggests that Turkey still needs to makesome improvements, especially regarding the assistance to victims of trafficking. USDepartment of State, Trafficking in Persons Report, pp. 286–288.

38. Syria, Greece, Kyrgyzstan, Romania, Ukraine, and a similar agreement withthe UK. Interview, official from the Ministry of Interior, Oct. 2009.

39. Russia, Bulgaria, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, and prenegotiations with Iraq,Azerbaijan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bangladesh, Georgia, Lebanon, Uzbekistan, Sri Lanka,Belarus, Hungary, Macedonia, Moldava, and Libya. Interview, official from the Min-istry of Interior, Oct. 2009.

40. Interview, high-ranking EU official, Sept. 2009 and May 2010; Özcan, “Read-mission Agreement.”

41. Torpey, The Invention of the Passport; Doπan, Impact of Visa Regimes overTravel Decisions and Patterns of Turkish Citizens.

42. Since 1964, there is a visa-free regime between Turkey and Iran. Kiri≈sci, “AFriendlier Schengen Visa System as a Tool of ‘Soft Power,’” pp. 351–353.

43. Doπan, Impact of Visa Regimes over Travel Decisions and Patterns of TurkishCitizens, p. 11.

44. Kiri≈sci “A Friendlier Schengen Visa System as a Tool of ‘Soft Power,’” p. 353.45. The six countries were: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Iran, Kyrgyzstan, Macedonia,

Morocco, and Tunisia. Kiri≈sci “A Friendlier Schengen Visa System as a Tool of ‘SoftPower,’” p. 348.

46. Anka Haber Ajansi, “58 ˜lke.”47. Kiri≈sci, “Turkey”; Erder, “Uluslararasª Göçte Yeni Eπilimler.”48. Castles and Miller, The Age of Migration, pp. 7–12.49. Geddes, Immigration and European Integration; Içduygu, “The Politics of In-

ternational Migratory Regimes.”50. Kiri≈sci, “A Friendlier Schengen Visa System as a Tool of ‘Soft Power.’”51. The influx of Iraqi refugees in 1991 immediately overwhelmed the border au-

thorities, who could not contain these populations. The “decision to open” the border wastherefore made out of necessity more than political vision. Subsequently, however, Özalwas able to successfully frame the decision as act of “brotherhood.”

52. See Chapter 7 in this volume.53. Except for Iran, with which Turkey has had a visa-free agreement since 1964.54. In 2004, Turkish authorities started a twinning project with the EU so as to put

together a National Action Plan on Migration and Asylum. The objective of this projectwas to compare and contrast the dispositions existing in Turkish laws to the ones exist-ing in the EU legal framework and envision how the Turkish regulations could be alignedwith the EU ones. This exercise was mainly a technical and intellectual work, but itforced authorities to consider all of the existing immigration policies at once and re-sulted in a published document on what needs to be done and how. Accessible at http://www.egm.gov.tr/hizmet.iltica.asp

55. Kiri≈sci, Harmonization of Migration Policy and Turkey’s Security Challenges.56. Interview, high-ranking official from the prime minister’s office, Oct. 2009.57. See Chapter 3 in this volume.58. See Chapter 2 in this volume.59. Cited in Bozkurt, “Armenian Workers May Boost Turkey’s Hand in Foreign


Policy.” Of course, the argument can also be reversed. A year after that declaration, inMarch 2010, Erdoÿan made a statement regarding the possibility “to deport the 100,000illegal Armenians” living in Turkey (Anadolu Ajansª, “Gerekirse 100 bin Ermeniyi gön-derebiliriz”). Following this statement, the Turkish government immediately had to en-gage in damage control to discount Erdoÿan’s remarks.

60. Interview, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oct. 2009. See also Bozkurt, “Armen-ian Workers May Boost Turkey’s Hand in Foreign Policy.”

61. Interview, high-ranking official from the prime minister’s office, Oct. 2009.62. Interview, Ministry of Interior, October 2009.63. See Chapter 9 in this volume.64. “Sham” (≈Sam) is the Turkish name for Damascus. Mentioned during an inter-

view with a high-ranking official in the government, Oct. 2009.65. Cited in Moubayed, “Turkey’s ‘Regional Schengen’ System.”66. Most Middle Eastern countries are indeed on the negative list of Schengen,

meaning that it is particularly difficult for citizens of these countries to have access toEuropean territories. The lifting of visa requirements between Turkey and many of thesecountries stands in sharp contrast to the European practice.

67. In November 2009, a hotline designed to receive the complaints of Schengenvisa applicants in Turkey was put in place, demonstrating the negative connotations withwhich visas are associated. See Altªnta≈s, “Hotline Highlights Anti-Turkish Practices inEU Visa Issuance.”

68. Meeting with high-ranking officials of the government, Oct. 2009.69. Özcan, “Facing Its Waterloo in Diplomacy”; Cizre, “Ideology, Context and

Interest.”70. Interview, civil society leader, Izmir, Oct. 2009.71. Interview, UNHCR official, Ankara, Dec. 2009. That person mentioned how, as

an international organization, they are supposed to communicate with the bureaucracythrough the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but because they can find more agreeable voiceswithin the Ministry of Interior, they try to establish direct contacts there.

72. Interview, Ministry of Foreign Affairs official; Interview, Ministry of Interior of-ficial, Ankara, Oct. 2009.

73. Interviews, Ministry of Interior, Oct. and Dec. 2009.74. Interview with a high ranking official in the government, Oct. 2009.75. See especially Helsinki Citizens Assembly, “Unwelcome Guests”; Human

Rights Watch, “Stuck in a Revolving Door.”76. There have been many cases, starting with the Jabari v. Turkey case in 2000; the

most recent was Abdolkhani and Karimnia v. Turkey in September 2009. HCA andMazlumDer in particular have developed experience bringing cases to the ECHR (andwinning).

77. Interview, Ministry of Interior, Oct. 2009.78. Interview, Ministry of Interior, Oct. 2009.79. Anadolu Ajansª, “Turkish Chamber to Sign Visa Simplification Agreement with

Italy.” There are also talks about a similar agreement with Spain. Izmir’s Chamber ofCommerce is also said to have had agreement with the Netherlands to facilitate the de-livery of visas for their members.

80. Turkey’s current visa policy toward Iraqi nationals is indeed peculiar. Iraqi na-tionals coming by plane to Istanbul or Antalya can easily get a sticker visa upon entrance.However, Iraqi nationals entering Turkey from a land border (especially through the Haburgate), need to have obtained a visa beforehand at one of the Turkish consulates, and visasare not easily granted there. Military and security reasons seem to explain this measure.According to the Diyarbakir Chamber of Commerce, this approach is creating a sub-stantial trade loss. Interview, Diyarbakir Chamber of Commerce official, Oct. 2009.

142 Juliette Tolay

81. Interview, high-ranking official at the prime minister’s office, Oct. 2009.82. Davutoπlu, “Turkish Foreign Policy and the EU in 2010”; Düzgit and Tocci,

“Transforming Turkish Foreign Policy.”83. Interview, Ministry of Interior, Oct. 2009.84. Interview, high-ranking official in the prime minister’s office.85. Kiri≈sci, Harmonisation of Migration Policy and Turkey’s Security Challenges,

p. 10.


Coming and Going: Understanding Changes in Turkish Foreign Policy through Migration

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