Naval War College Review Volume 58 Number 4 Autumn Article 6 2005 Come the Revolution—Transforming the Asia- Pacific’s Militaries Richard A. Bitzinger Follow this and additional works at: hps://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review is Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Recommended Citation Bitzinger, Richard A. (2005) "Come the Revolution—Transforming the Asia-Pacific’s Militaries," Naval War College Review: Vol. 58 : No. 4 , Article 6. Available at: hps://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol58/iss4/6
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Naval War College ReviewVolume 58Number 4 Autumn Article 6
2005
Come the Revolution—Transforming the Asia-Pacific’s MilitariesRichard A. Bitzinger
Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion inNaval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please [email protected].
Recommended CitationBitzinger, Richard A. (2005) "Come the Revolution—Transforming the Asia-Pacific’s Militaries," Naval War College Review: Vol. 58 :No. 4 , Article 6.Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol58/iss4/6
possesses a nationwide secure C4I network, utilizing microwave and fiber-optic
channels linked to air and maritime surveillance systems.13
The acquisition of these new military capabilities has many implications for
militaries in the Asia-Pacific. At the very least, they promise to upgrade and
modernize war fighting in the region significantly. Certainly, Asia-Pacific mili-
taries are acquiring greater lethality and accuracy at greater ranges, improved
battlefield knowledge and command and control, and increased operational
maneuver and speed. Standoff precision-guided weapons, such as cruise and
ballistic missiles and terminal-homing (such as GPS or electro-optical) guided
munitions, have greatly increased combat firepower and effectiveness. The addi-
tion of modern submarines and surface combatants, amphibious assault ships,
air-refueled combat aircraft, and transport aircraft have extended these militar-
ies’ theoretical range of action. Advanced reconnaissance and surveillance plat-
forms have considerably expanded their capacities to look out over the horizon
above, below, and on the sea surface. Additionally, through increased stealth and
active defenses (such as missile defense and longer-range air-to-air missiles),
B I T Z I N G E R 4 3
Ultimately, “defense transformation” does notadequately describe current efforts by Asia-Pacificnations to upgrade and reform their militaries—“modernization-plus” is more apt.
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local militaries are adding substantially to their survivability and operational ef-
fectiveness. Consequently, conflict in the region, should it occur, would likely be
more “high-tech” than in the past—faster, longer in reach, and yet more precise
and perhaps more devastating in its effect.
More important, many Asia-Pacific militaries are acquiring military equip-
ment that, taken together, forms the kernel of what is required to transform their
militaries fundamentally. In particular, those systems related to precision strike,
stealth, and above all C4ISR constitute some of the key hardware ingredients es-
sential to a modern RMA. These emerging capabilities, in turn, have real poten-
tial to affect strategy and operations on tomorrow’s battlefield and hence to alter
the determinants of critical capabilities in modern warfare.
DEFENSE TRANSFORMATION IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION
If Asia-Pacific militaries have been amassing much of the hardware necessary
for defense transformation, “the acquisition of new technology is only the first
and often the easiest step” in realizing an RMA.14 It is necessary as well, therefore,
to develop the “software”—the doctrine, tactics, and organization—necessary
to take full advantage of these new technologies. Accordingly, many militaries
and governments in the Asia-Pacific region are studying, assessing, and even ex-
perimenting with such aspects of transformation.
Much of this speculation and experimentation has been driven by the current
debate over the future transformation of the U.S. armed forces. The United
States is recognized to be at the forefront, in terms of strategy, operations, and
technology, when it comes to conceptualizing and implementing transforma-
tion.15 Consequently, American models of the information technology–based
RMA and defense transformation have typically been the point of departure for
discussion and evaluation in the Asia-Pacific.
Talking the Talk . . .
Interoperability with U.S. forces has been a key factor, driving much of the cur-
rent thinking about defense transformation in the Asia-Pacific. U.S. allies and
friendly nations in the region—particularly Australia, Japan, South Korea, and
Taiwan—appear to be particularly keen on studying and possibly implementing
transformations of their respective militaries specifically in order to remain
compatible with U.S. forces, particularly as the likelihood of coalition opera-
tions with the United States—such as in Iraq or Afghanistan—is expanding.
This enhanced interoperability is especially crucial for regional allies as the
United States continues to transform its own armed forces, since it would permit
their militaries to tie into and take advantage of American progress in
transformational warfare. The Aegis combat system could enable Japanese and
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could only widen this gap and reduce these countries to “tool box” status, play-
ing only minor roles in coalition operations.
At the same time, the prophets and advocates of defense transformation need
to do a better job of translating their broad, abstract visions into tangible and
practical realities. What, for example, does network-centric warfare demand in
terms of both hardware and software? What do we mean, operationally speak-
ing, by jointness, interoperability, and networking? For that matter, what do we
mean by “disruptive” innovation, and how do we know when we have truly ar-
rived at a “paradigm shift” that “fundamentally alters” the character and con-
duct of warfare? If these questions cannot be answered in ways that are
meaningful to war planners, defense transformation will remain an empty
concept.
The issue of defense transformation in the Asia-Pacific region will likely re-
main a legitimate subject for discussion and debate for some time to come. In
particular, transformation will continue to be a contentious issue, as it is in-
creasingly linked to a number of already critical regional security concerns, in-
cluding alliance relationships and interoperability, regional competition and
cooperation, arms sales and arms procurement, civil-military relations, internal
security and stability, and the impact of technology and economic development
on comparative advantage. Despite the many challenges of implementation,
therefore, the enormous potential and promise of transformation will continue
to drive regional militaries to explore and experiment with concepts of the
emerging revolution in military affairs.
N O T E S
1. Robert Haffa, What Do We Mean by DefenseTransformation? (presented at “DefenseTransformation in the Asia-Pacific: Meetingthe Challenge” conference, Honolulu, Ha-waii, 30 March–1 April 2004 [hereafter“Meeting the Challenge”]), p. 2.
2. “Transformed: A Survey of the Defense In-dustry,” Economist, 20 July 2002, p. 7.
3. Andrew Krepinevich, “From Cavalry to Com-puter: The Pattern of Military Revolutions,”National Interest 37 (Fall 1994), p. 30.
4. Richard O. Hundley, Past Revolutions, FutureTransformations (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND,1999), quoted in “Transformed,” p. 7.
5. Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assess-ments [CSBA], The Emerging RMA
(Washington, D.C.: n.d.), available atwww.csbaonline.org/2Strategic_Studies/2Emerging_RMA/Emerging_RMA.html.
6. U.S. Defense Dept., Network-centric Warfare:Creating a Decisive Warfighting Advantage(Washington, D.C.: Office of Defense Trans-formation, 2003), p. 2.
7. Andrew Ross, Transformation: What Is It?What Does It Mean for Industry? (presented at“Meeting the Challenge”), p. 2.
8. Paul Dibb, “The Revolution in Military Af-fairs and Asian Security,” Survival 39, no. 4(Winter 1997/98), p. 2, text available onProquest.umi.com; Haffa, What Do We Meanby Defense Transformation? p. 3.
B I T Z I N G E R 5 7
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9. CSBA, Transformation Strategy (Washington,D.C.: n.d.), available at www.csbaonline.org/2Strategic_Studies/3Transformation_Strategy/Transformation_Strategy.html.
10. Jason Sherman, “Digital Drive: Focus,Funding Shifts to C4ISR, Precision Weap-onry,” Defense News, 16 February 2004, pp.23–24.
11. Ibid.; Jason Sherman, “Taiwan to BuildMilitary-Wide C4ISR Network,” DefenseNews, 7 October 2003.
12. U.S. Defense Dept., Annual Report on theMilitary Power of the People’s Republic ofChina (Washington, D.C.: 28 July 2003)[hereafter Annual Report], pp. 31–34.
13. Bernard Fook Weng Loo, Transforming theSingapore Armed Forces: Problems and Pros-pects (presented at “Meeting the Challenge”),p. 5.
14. Emily O. Goldman, Information Revolution inMilitary Affairs: Prospects for Asia (manu-script, prepared for the Office of Net Assess-ment, U.S. Defense Dept.), 2003, p. 11.
15. Ibid., pp. 1–4.
16. Australian Department of Defense, Defense2000: Our Future Defense Force (Canberra:Defense Publishing Service, 2000), p. 108;Michael Evans, Australia and Military Trans-formation: Perspectives (presented at “TheRMA for Small States: Theory and Applica-tion” conference, Singapore, 25–26 February2004).
17. National Intelligence Council (NIC), BuckRodgers or Rock Throwers? (Washington,D.C.: 2000), available at www.cia.gov/nic/confreports_buckrogers.html.
18. Aldo Borgu, Defense Transformation: Applica-tion and Relevance in Australia (presented at“Meeting the Challenge”), pp. 3–4.
19. Thomas G. Mahnken, “Conclusion: TheDiffusion of the Emerging Revolution in Mil-itary Affairs in Asia: A Preliminary Assess-ment,” in The Information Revolution inMilitary Affairs in Asia, ed. Emily O.Goldman and Thomas G. Mahnken (NewYork: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp. 212–14;“Asia’s Evolution in Military Affairs,” Strate-gic Comments 10, no. 3 (April 2004), p. 2.
20. Australia’s Strategic Policy 1997, quoted inMahnken, “Conclusion,” pp. 213–14.
21. “Asia’s Evolution in Military Affairs,” p. 2;“ADF to Focus on Network-centric Warfare,”Asia-Pacific Defense Reporter 29, no. 4 (June2003), p. 16.
22. “Asia’s Evolution in Military Affairs,” p. 2.
23. U.S. Defense Dept., Annual Report, pp. 18–21; Garret Albert et al., “China’s PreliminaryAssessment of Operation Iraqi Freedom,”Chinese Military Update 1, no. 2, July 2003,pp. 1–4; Senate Foreign Relations Committee,testimony of Richard P. Lawless, Deputy Un-der Secretary of Defense for International Se-curity Affairs (Asia-Pacific Region), 22 April2004, available at usinfo.state.gov/eap/Archive/2004/Jun/30-773974.html.
24. You Ji, “Learning and Catching Up: China’sRevolution in Military Affairs Initiative,” in TheInformation Revolution in Military Affairs inAsia, ed. Goldman and Mahnken, pp. 97–123.
25. U.S. Defense Dept., Annual Report, pp. 20–21.
26. U.S.-China Security Commission, “Chapter10: Technology Transfers and Military Acqui-sition Policy,” Report to the Congress of theU.S.-China Security Review Commission: TheNational Security Implications of the EconomicRelationship between the United States andChina (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Congress,July 2002), pp. 5–6; Annual Report on theMilitary Power of the People’s Republic ofChina, p. 21.
27. Annual Report on the Military Power of thePeople’s Republic of China, pp. 34–35; You,“Learning and Catching Up,” pp. 112–13;John Hill, “China’s Military ModernizationTakes Shape,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, 1February 2004 (Internet version).
28. U.S. Defense Dept., Annual Report, pp. 37–38.
29. Thomas G. Mahnken and Timothy D. Hoyt,“Indian Views of the Emerging Revolution inMilitary Affairs,” National Security StudiesQuarterly (Summer 2000), pp. 55–56, 63–68;NIC, Buck Rodgers or Rock Throwers? pp. 6–7.
30. Mahnken and Hoyt, “Indian Views of theEmerging Revolution in Military Affairs,” p. 64.
31. Timothy D. Hoyt, Indian Military Transfor-mation: Opportunities and Obstacles (pre-sented at “Meeting the Challenge”), p. 6.
32. Mahnken, “Conclusion,” pp. 214–15; JapanDefense Agency (JDA), Defense Policy
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Division, RMA and Japan Defense Agency(briefing to author, 2 March 2004), p. 18.
33. Masako Ikegami, Defense Transformation inJapan (presented at “Meeting the Challenge”),pp. 2–3.
34. Mahnken, “Conclusions,” p. 215.
35. JDA, RMA and Japan Defense Agency, pp. 6–13.
36. Ibid., p. 18.
37. Ikegami, Defense Transformation in Japan,pp. 19–20.
38. Tim Huxley, Singapore and Military Transfor-mation (presented at “The RMA for SmallStates”), p. 2.
39. Ibid., p. 5.
40. Ibid., p. 7.
41. Namhoon Cho, Defense Transformation andNew Acquisition Policy in Korea (presented at“Meeting the Challenge”), p. 2.
42. Ibid., p. 2.
43. “Asia’s Evolution in Military Affairs,” p. 2.
44. James Mulvenon, “Taiwan and the Revolu-tion in Military Affairs,” in The InformationRevolution in Military Affairs in Asia, ed.Goldman and Mahnken, pp. 141–42.
45. Arthur S. Ding, “Taiwan: From IntegratedMissile Defense to RMA,” in The InformationRevolution in Military Affairs in Asia, ed.Goldman and Mahnken, pp. 169–72.
46. Mulvenon, “Taiwan and the Revolution inMilitary Affairs,” pp. 140–41; Nina Hachigianand Lily Wu, The Information Revolution inAsia (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2003), pp.30–33.
47. Mattias Axelson and E. Anders Eriksson, To-wards an Industry for Network-Based Defense?Creating Information Age Defense Systems(Stockholm: Swedish Defense ResearchAgency, August 2002), p. 7.
48. Mahnken, “Conclusions,” table 10.1, p. 213.
49. Ibid., p. 215.
50. You, “Learning and Catching Up,” pp. 105–106, 111–12.
51. “Asia’s Evolution in Military Affairs,” pp. 1–2.
52. You, “Learning and Catching Up,” p. 100.
53. U.S. Defense Dept., Annual Report, p. 47.
54. U.S.-China Security Commission, “Chapter10,” p. 6.
55. Peter J. Dombrowski, Eugene Gholz, andAndrew L. Ross, Military Transformation andthe Defense Industry after Next: The DefenseIndustrial Implications of Network-centricWarfare, Newport Paper 18 (Newport, R.I.:Naval War College Press, 2002), pp. 14–16.
56. “Transformed: A Survey of the Defense In-dustry,” p. 9.
57. Dean Cheng, Dual-Use: Prospects and Pitfallsfor Products and Processes (presented at“Meeting the Challenge”), pp. 5–9.
58. Mahnken, “Conclusions,” pp. 218–20;“Transformed: A Survey of the Defense In-dustry,” p. 9; Dibb, “The Revolution in Mili-tary Affairs and Asian Security,” p. 3.
59. Mahnken and Hoyt, “Indian Views of theEmerging Revolution in Military Affairs,” p. 71.
60. Australian Defense Intelligence Organization,Defense Economic Trends in the Asia-Pacific2002 (Canberra: Department of Communica-tions, Information Technology, and the Arts,2003), pp. 31–32, 41–42.
61. Ibid.
62. Ikegami, Defense Transformation in Japan, p. 7.
63. Goldman, Information Revolution in MilitaryAffairs, pp. 26–27.
64. Huxley, Singapore and Military Transforma-tion, pp. 21–22; Masako Ikegami, “Japan,” inArms Procurement Decision Making, ed.Ravinder Singh (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford Univ.Press, 1998), pp. 169–71; Bates Gill andLonnie Henley, China and the Revolution inMilitary Affairs (Carlisle Barracks, Penna.:Strategic Studies Institute, 1996), pp. 18–22;Goldman, Information Revolution in MilitaryAffairs, pp. 21–22, 24.
65. The author is grateful to an anonymous re-viewer for pointing out this argument.
66. Mahnken, “Conclusions,” pp. 220–22; You,“Learning and Catching Up,” p. 116;Mahnken and Hoyt, “Indian Views of theEmerging Revolution in Military Affairs,” p.72; Barry Hsiung, Taiwan’s Defense Transfor-mation: Building Modern Forces (presented at“Meeting the Challenge”), p. 14.
67. Ikegami, “Japan,” pp. 168–69.
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68. The U.S. Department of Commerce estimatesthat arms sales, while accounting for less than1 percent of global trade, accounts for aroundhalf of all bribes paid in international busi-ness deals; “Transformed: A Survey of theDefense Industry,” p. 5.
69. Ding, “Taiwan,” pp. 172–73, also p. 180, table8.1; “Asia’s Evolution in Military Affairs,” p.2; Dibb, “The Revolution in Military Affairsand Asian Security,” pp. 8–9.
70. See Richard A. Bitzinger, Towards a BraveNew Arms Industry? (Oxford, U.K.: OxfordUniv. Press, 2003), pp. 27–29.
71. Gopal Ratnam, “The Rise of the Lead SystemsIntegrator,” Defense News, 21 July 2003, avail-able at www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=2127921&C=top100; Ikegami, DefenseTransformation in Japan, p. 21; Dibb, “TheRevolution in Military Affairs and Asian Se-curity,” pp. 10–11.
72. See Bitzinger, Towards a Brave New Arms In-dustry? pp. 30–31.
73. Gill and Henley, China and the Revolution inMilitary Affairs, pp. 8–9; Goldman, Informa-tion Revolution in Military Affairs, pp. 16–19;Mahnken and Hoyt, “Indian Views of theEmerging Revolution in Military Affairs,” p. 73.
74. Ding, “Taiwan,” p. 177. See Richard A.Bitzinger, “South Korea’s Defense Industry atthe Crossroads,” Korean Journal of DefenseAnalysis 7, no. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 244–45.
75. Dibb, “The Revolution in Military Affairs andAsian Security,” p. 11–12; “China: The Allureof Low Technology,” Economist, 18 Decem-ber 2003 (Internet version).
76. Ding, “Taiwan,” pp. 176–79; “China: The Al-lure of Low Technology.”
77. Ben Dolven, “Making the Whole World Lis-ten,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 26 Febru-ary 2004, available at www.feer.com/articles/2004/0402_26/p026china.htm.
78. Dibb, “The Revolution in Military Affairs andAsian Security,” p. 12.
79. Ding, “Taiwan,” p. 177; Richard A. Bitzingerand Steven M. Kosiak, Windows of Opportu-nity: The Potential Military Application of Jap-anese Advanced Commercial TechnologyTransfers to East Asia (Washington, D.C.: De-fense Budget Project, 1995), pp. 39–40.
80. Cheng, Dual-Use, pp. 8–9.
81. Martin Fackler, “Space Exploration: MissionImpossible for Japan,” Far Eastern EconomicReview, 6 May 2004, available at www.feer.com/articles/2004/0405_06/p032innov.html.
82. JDA, RMA and Japan Defense Agency, p. 9;“Asia’s Evolution in Military Affairs,” p. 2.
83. Mahnken and Hoyt, “Indian Views of theEmerging Revolution in Military Affairs,” pp.59–63.
84. Thomas G. Mahnken, Officer Attitudes to-ward the RMA (briefing to “The RMA ForSmall States”; for an earlier version of this re-search see Thomas G. Mahnken and James R.FitzSimonds, The Limits of Transformation:Officer Attitudes toward the Revolution in Mil-itary Affairs, Newport Paper 17 [Newport,R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2003], avail-able at www.nwc.navy.mil/press/npapers/np17/Newport%20Paper17.pdf); Andrew D.James, U.S. Military Transformation: Euro-pean Responses and Lessons for the Asia-PacificRegion (presented at “Meeting the Challenge”),pp. 1–4.
85. Goldman, Information Revolution in MilitaryAffairs, p. 10.
86. David Talbot, “How Technology Failed inIraq,” Technology Review (November 2004),available at www.technologyreview.com/articles/04/11/talbot1104.asp?p=1.
87. For a Canadian view, see Paul T. Mitchell,“Small Navies and Network-centric Warfare:Is There a Role?” Naval War College Review56, no. 2 (Spring 2003), pp. 83–99, availableat www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/2003/Spring/art5-sp3.htm.
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