COLLABORATION AMONG LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

Name: M.S.Y. van Leemput Bsc.

ANR: s925989

First supervisor: dr. M. K. Janowicz-Panjaitan

Second supervisor: dr. J. Raab

Professional supervisor: drs. S. Blair-Zuijderhoff

COLLABORATION AMONG LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

An inquiry into the effectiveness of collaborations designing Regional

Service Agencies

Document: Master Thesis - Extended Master Organization Studies

Title: Collaboration among local governments

Date: March 31, 2014

Author: M.S.Y. van Leemput Bsc.

ANR: s925989

First supervisor: dr. M. K. Janowicz-Panjaitan

Second supervisor: dr. J. Raab

In collaboration with: Twynstra-Gudde, Amersfoort, The Netherlands

Professional supervisor: drs. S. Blair-Zuijderhoff

PREFACE

Finalizing a master thesis marks a turningpoint in your life they once told me. A coming of age.

Only now do I realise what they ment. Not only does it signify the end of an adventurous and

interesting period in my life, it is also the hallbringer of a lifetime ahead. The world awaits and

calls out to me to embark on new adventures that hopefully prove as fulfilling as those in the past

6 years. I found the writing of the thesis every bit as challenging as they told it would be, even

though I wouldn’t believe it at first. The long hours in the library, the incessant reflections on

how to proceed with mastering the vastness of the qualitative data and many methodological

discussions added a new layer of my awe for social scientists.

It is clear that such a task couldn’t be handled alone. As a result I owe a great debt to everyone

who helped me writing the thesis. First, I owe my thanks to Martyna for her enthousiasm in

leading the circles and her sharp feedback during and well beyond the end of the circles. I also

wish to express my gratitude towards Sharon who helped me familiarize with Twynstra Gudde

during my internship during the last year. I have enjoyed our long hours on the road and the

many and wide ranging discussions we had. The on-the-job-learning under her guidance proved

invaluable for the conducting of this thesis as well as her support and feedback on various drafts.

My gratitude goes out Joerg for his strong theoretical focus and constructive feedback about the

transparency of the study during the defences. In addition, I want to thank Marlies for

introducing me with various RUD’s and discussing my findings. My parents Michel and Helam,

my sister Lisette and my friends Kaya and Kristian and Malong also proved invaluable during

the final months while finalizaing the thesis. Last, but certainly not the least, my love goes out to

Dorien, her support was at times the only thing that kept me going.

Finally, I wish to dedicate my thesis to my friend Wim who is no longer with us and is sorely

missed. Your music and loving memory gave me spirit when I needed it the most.

Mark van Leemput,

Tilburg, March 31th

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION......................................................................................................................... 9

1.1 Research Problem .................................................................................................................. 9 1.2 Research Goal and Question ............................................................................................... 13 1.3 Relevance of the Research .................................................................................................. 15

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ............................................................................................ 17

2.1 Governance & Collaboration .............................................................................................. 17 2.2 Collaborative Public Management ...................................................................................... 18

2.3 Formation Processes for RUD’s .......................................................................................... 21 2.4 Collaborative Capacity ........................................................................................................ 22

METHODS .................................................................................................................................. 33

3.1 Research Design .................................................................................................................. 33

3.2 Sampling Strategy ............................................................................................................... 34 3.3 Data Collection .................................................................................................................... 37 3.4 Data Analysis ...................................................................................................................... 38

RESULTS .................................................................................................................................... 39

4.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 39 4.2 Case Descriptions ................................................................................................................ 39

4.3 Findings existing Model ...................................................................................................... 42 4.4 Additional Findings ............................................................................................................. 65

CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATIONS ........................................................................... 66

DISCUSSION .............................................................................................................................. 68

6.1 Theoretical discussion ......................................................................................................... 68 6.2 Methodological limitations ................................................................................................. 72 6.3 Directions for future research .............................................................................................. 73

REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................ 75

APPENDICES

Appendix 1. Cross-case analysis table

Appendix 2. Within-case analysis tables

Appendix 3. Topic list

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INTRODUCTION

1.1 Research Problem

Since the Second World War, an important development within the domain of public

management is the increased focus on collaboration as a means to provide public services and

goods by local governments such as municipalities, fire departments, police schools, tourism

bureaus and other public agencies. The types of collaboration include, for example, emergency

management, public works, community and neighbourhood services and (Chen & Thurmaier,

2009). This observation of increased collaboration among these actors holds true according to the

respective literature for the United States of America, Denmark, Norway, Great-Britain and the

Netherlands, but is believed not to be exclusive for those countries.

A number of explanations have been proposed to explain this trend of increasing collaboration

among local governments. LeRoux, Brandenburger & Pandey (2010) state that municipalities

‘are increasingly confronted by policy problems that span the boundaries of their individual

political jurisdictions’ (p.268). A single municipality is therefore unable to meet these problems

because of the jurisdictional fragmentation ‘which complicates the management of boundary-

spanning public infrastructure, environmental pollution, crime, regional economies, and other

problems that spill over the borders of one city into the next’ (LeRoux et al., 2010, p.268).

Next to this rising interdependency among local governments decentralization, rapid

technological change and scarce resources are important drivers for the increasing levels of

collaboration (Thomson & Perry, 2006). For instance, decentralization of tasks from higher to

lower authorities adds to workload of individual municipalities for which they often lack the

resources to effectively execute. This factor is particularly salient for Dutch municipalities

because of the recent decentralization of Youthcare (Jeugdzorg), the Participation law

(Participatie Wet), the Law Societal Support (Wet Maatschappelijke Ondersteuning) (Dijken &

Schilder, 2013). Furthermore, the creation of Regional Service Agencies (Regionale

Uitvoeringsdiensten or RUD’s) for executing environmental policies and regulation leads to

10

increased collaboration among local governments. The viability to collaborate because of rapid

technological change is a result of the possibilities fostered by information and communication

technologies. This aspect is particularly relevant for emergency services such as fire departments,

police and medical services where information sharing enables them to operate more effectively

during crises. Other factors leading to collaboration among local governments include: increased

fiscal pressure, desire to reduce costs, recognition of other available delivery structures (rather

than the existing governmental bureaucracies), economies of scale or standardization of services

and a desire for increasing quality of service (Sonenblum, Kirlin & Ries, 1977; Morgan &

Hirlinger, 1991; Bartle & Swayze, 1997).

In addition to the above and specifically in relation to the Netherlands, Dutch municipalities also

experience difficulty in finding suitable employees to carry out the new and existing tasks

(Spijkerman, 2013). Collaboration thus seems a logical answer to meet these challenges since it

enables them to share resources such as personnel and knowledge.

That collaboration contributes to addressing some of the issues mentioned above is also

underscored by the general literature on inter-organizational relations. Gray (1985) for instance

explains that three circumstances are identified by scholars that warrant the collaboration

strategy: the existence of indivisible problems (e.g. pollution, unemployment, and economic

development), limitations of traditional adversarial methods of resolving conflicts and increasing

environmental turbulence (e.g. increasing pervasiveness of European law). For public

management, particularly in the Dutch context, the circumstances that primarily lead to

collaboration between municipalities are thus of the first and third type.

Collaboration is not the only strategy to tackle the aforementioned challenges. Other methods at

the disposal of local governments include: city-county consolidations, annexations, extra-

territorial jurisdiction and multi-tiered governments (Savitch & Vogel, 2000). When local

governments decide to collaborate however, they form a so called inter-local service agreement

(ILSA) which is also understood in the literature as the linked functions approach or functional

consolidation. The nature of these ILSA’s can vary to a high degree. There are instances where a

local government may perform services for other governments or where multiple governments

pool their resources for joint service production. The ILSA may also reflect a dyadic relationship

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or rather a complex network of multiple actors. Furthermore, ILSA’s can have varying degrees

of formality ranging from hand-shake agreements to detailed service contracts and can either be

short-term, project orientated or entail an ongoing relation between partners (Chen & Thurmaier,

2009). A final characteristic of ILSA’s is that they do not always require a new level of

government and that they ‘preserve local autonomy and the efficiency of a medium-sized central

city while being able to exploit economies of scale associated with larger counties’ (Savitch &

Vogel, 2000, p.163) in contrast to other alternatives (city-county consolidations, annexations,

extra-territorial jurisdiction and multi-tiered governments). This apparent flexibility of ILSA’s is

part of the reason why they are so widely adopted (LeRoux et al., 2010). Downsides of adopting

ILSA’s include: instability (particularly in cases characterized by a low degree of formality), the

perception of citizens of ILSA’s as a ‘band-aid’ solution due to a lack of comprehensiveness

(Savitch & Vogel, 2000) and difficulties with democratic legitimacy because authority is shared

between multiple city councils. ILSA’s are thus created for many purposes and municipalities

usually participate in dozens of them. Waste management or municipal shared service centers are

usually organized within an ILSA with neighboring municipalities for instance and constitute

actual organizations as a result, other ILSA’s may be more programmatic in nature en may focus

on developing a tourism or economic agenda for a given region.

Even so, the proliferation of ILSA’s across the world is somewhat surprising given the fact that

their performance and subsequent outcomes for the participating municipalities are unclear. This

study will not address the question whether ILSA’s are effective, but given their pervasiveness

asks what makes some ILSA’s more effective than others in relation to their to their design

process.

Some research suggests that the effectiveness of ILSA’s is largely a function of the motivations

of participants and the adoption of shared norms and values (Chen & Thurmaier, 2009). Others

state that the effectiveness of collaborations ‘depends upon the simultaneous interaction of

several conditions at appropriate phases in the process’ (Gray, 1985, p.932). Where ‘the inability

to achieve the appropriate conditions during each phase may be the best source of explanations

to date for why collaborative efforts fail’ (Gray, 1985, p.932). This stream of research suggests

that it is the formation process prior to the ILSA becoming operational that is decisive in whether

an ILSA is effective or not.

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This study focusses exclusively on RUD’s which are a specific type of ILSA which makes the

concepts interchangeable. Throughout the remainder of this research the concept of RUD’s will

be used rather than ILSA’s to denote the research object whenever appropriate. The creation of

RUD’s in the Netherlands has a history dating back to 2008 when the special committee ‘Mans’

concluded that the more than 500 organizations in the Netherlands working in the domain of

environmental policy and regulation collaborated poorly and yielded insufficient results (Mans,

Jansen, Michiels, Ridder, 2008). Furthermore, developments outlined above lead to increased

pressure to integrate the public service delivery in this domain. In response, the ministry of

Infrastructure & Environment (I&M) made a so called ‘package deal’ in 2009 with provincial

and municipal interest organizations Interprovinciaal Overleg (IPO) and Vereniging Nederlandse

Gemeenten (VNG). This deal included the establishment of RUD’s, its required task fields and

the quality criteria for service delivery among others.

The creation of RUD’s in the Netherlands constitutes the establishment of an organization that

produces the public services in the domain of environmental policy execution and regulation.

Before RUD’s were created, the tasks within this domain where perfomed by individual

municipalities and Provinces. Usually local governments are free to decide on what

organizational form to adopt to create organizations for ILSA’s, which has resulted in some

experimentation with creating organizations on the basis of private law. In most cases,

municipalities opt to for creating organizations as a legal entity known as ‘public bodies’

(openbaar lichamen) on the basis of the ‘Law communal arrangements’ (Wet

gemeenschappelijke regelingen, Wgr). This organizational form narrowly defines how mandate

is delegated from the municipalities onto the new organization, the way in which the operation is

democratically legitimized by aldermen taking seats in the board of directors and the financial

consequences for the involved municipalities. In this case, the ministry of I&M actually

stipulated in the ‘package deal’ that the RUD’s should be created on the basis of the communal

arrangements law.

Before RUD’s become operational and can actually begin producing public goods and services,

distinct formation phases precede its establishment where governments collaborate to create the

RUD. The RUD becomes operational when these phases are successfully completed, after which

the collaboration is “consummated” and effectively institutionalized between the participants.

13

Following Gray (1985), this research focuses on the formation process predating the

establishment of the RUD’s in order to identify the ‘appropriate conditions’ of effective

collaboration processes that ultimately lead to effective RUD’s. This process of RUD formation

has roughly three phases: preparation, designing, and implementation and are further clarified in

chapter two. As Gray (1985) explained, the ‘appropriate conditions’ may vary according to the

respective phase of the formation process. These conditions can be categorized under the

dimensions of ambition, interests, relation, organization and process according to Kaats &

Opheij (2013). These dimensions will be further clarified in chapter two.

1.2 Research Goal and Question

A study exploring the nature of an RUD formation process, by identifying conditions that affect

effective collaboration therein, is considered relevant to both the scientific and the practical

world. The literature indicates the dimensions of appropriate conditions for collaboration, but it

is unclear which factors exactly play a role during the formation process leading up to ILSA’s.

Please note that this study uses the words ‘conditions’ and ‘factors’ interchangeably for the

remainder of this study. Not all the aforementioned phases and dimensions can be effectively

researched within the limits of this study. This research therefore focuses on the second stage of

an RUD formation process: designing. Emphasis on the second phase is warranted because the

design phase is part of ‘a process that builds a solid foundation for working together and is

widely considered one of the most critical components of coalition success’ (Foster-Fishman,

Berkowitz & Lounsbury, 2001, p.252). Furthermore, this research awards attention to factors

identified by the literature dealing only with relation, process, and organization for pragmatic

reasons by effectively limiting the scope of this study and because the dimensions of ambition

and interests have already received considerable attention in the research about antecedents of

ILSA creation. In addition, it is also believed that these excluded dimensions are less feasible to

investigate in the context of RUD’s, because of their involuntaristic nature. This is true because

this involuntary form of collaboration impedes the formulation of an ambition since the goals of

the RUD’s are specified by the central government rather than the local governments

participating in the RUD. Also, the (political) sensitivity and subsequent omission of information

by respondents when discussing interests, makes this dimension of collaboration impractical to

investigate.

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This research thus investigates which factors play a role while collaborating during a specific

phase of the formation process of RUD’s. The research also aims to identify factors that may lay

outside of the aforementioned dimensions which renders this study an explorative nature. The

research question guiding the operation of this study reads thus as follows:

What factors have an impact on the effectiveness of collaboration during the design phase of

RUD’s?

As a result, this research addresses several gaps in the literature of public management. Prior

research seems to have primarily focused on the antecedents of ILSA’s while foregoing inquiries

into their effectiveness. The focus of this research on collaboration processes in the public sector,

which is a small but distinct section in the literature about organizational relations and public

management, is also warranted as Thomson & Perry (2006) indicate that ‘a more systematic

attention to understanding the process of collaboration will further the public value of this

emerging field of study’ (p.30). In addition, Chen & Thurmaier (2009) state that ‘less is known

about two or more units of government working together to deliver local public service that is

more typical for police, fire, emergency management, and public works’ (p.539). They go as far

as claiming that the focus of network management literature resides with specific public services

as public education, economic development and human services which limits the generalizability

of these findings in terms of management and policy prescriptions due to the ‘difference in

public services and the associated structural characteristics’ (Chen & Thurmaier, 2009, p.539).

Another reason – quoted by experts in the field – why the existing literature on organizational

relations falls short is because the processes of collaboration in the public sector are believed to

be distinct from those in the private sector. This, according to the experts, stems from the often

involuntaristic nature of the collaboration, the limited options to choose collaboration partners

and the added layer of the political dimension and democratic accountability. This study thus

addresses the call for more research on ILSA’s as ‘despite their long history and prevalence in

local governance, the academic community has been lax in studying IL[S]A’s, so we know little

about them’ (Chen & Thurmaier, 2009, p.536).

More specifically, this thesis investigates the ‘appropriate conditions’ as indicated by Gray (1985)

of the process leading to the creation of a specific type of ILSA, the so called ‘Regionale

15

Uitvoeringsdienst’ (RUD) in the Netherlands. As explained, these new regionally oriented

organizations are responsible for executing environmental policies and regulation, a task which

individual municipalities and Provinces were originally responsible. The RUD’s are involved

with the granting of building permits for civilians and companies and the inspection of

companies insofar their environmental impact is concerned. In short, they are responsible for

ensuring a safe and clean environment. The 28 RUD’s in the Netherlands have been brought into

existence primarily to increase the quality of enforcement of environmental policy and regulation.

This is done by separating these tasks from individual municipalities and Provinces and

integrating them within a new organization that thus exists outside the traditional borders of

municipalities. It is believed that the pooling of financial, human and knowledge resources of

municipalities and Provinces in this way allows public services in this domain to operate more

efficiently and on the desired regional level. It is important to note that the establishment of

RUD’s was not done voluntarily by municipalities; rather, their establishment was sanctioned by

the central government.

1.3 Relevance of the Research

Four groups can be defined for whom this research should be relevant. First, the practitioners

who are creating and operating ILSA’s in general or RUD’s in specific. This study will help

them to build organizations for ILSA’s by identifying relevant factors with respect to the design

phase during the formation process. Practitioners should be able to make more informed choices

and rely less on trial and error practices.

Next, politicians struggling with the balance between control and accountability with regards to

ILSA’s/RUD’s will benefit from the results of this study. These results should help them by

identifying new instruments for control so that they can be held accountable and the democratic

legitimacy of ILSA’s or RUD’s is not endangered1. The Dutch central government, or more

1The democratic legitimacy principle refers to the fact that citizens have an indirect control over their local

communities through a democratically elected city council. However, when municipalities collaborate some of that

delegated control is sacrificed and shared with another city council. The ILSA is then said not to be fully legitimized

since citizens are presented with an ILSA in which they only partly have a say through their own city council.

Practically, this may sometimes lead to an ILSA producing goods and services which do not (fully) satisfy the needs

of citizens.

16

specifically, the ministry of Infrastructuur & Milieu (I&M), should also benefit from this study.

The creation of RUD’s was ordered by its minister and an inquiry into factors related to the

formation process to create ILSA’s should therefore be informative for central governments that

seek to implement structural changes for public management.

A third group that can benefit from the results of the research is society itself. This may seem

overstated, but it is the taxpayer who suffers when the ILSA or RUD does not live up to its

requirements. The quality of public goods and services is under severe duress as a result of the

developments outlined above, and ILSA’s and RUD’s in particular are part of the answer to

retaining current levels of service. Also, ILSA formation usually requires large initial

investments of public money which is a prime cause for of political and societal problems if the

ILSA does not live up to its standards.

A final group to whom this thesis may appeal are academics of public management and

organization science that have an interest in inter-organizational collaboration in general or in

collaboration between municipalities in particular. By focussing on factors conducive for

collaboration during the design phase of RUD’s, this research aims to advance the knowledge by

complementing research on the antecedents of ILSA creation and addresses gaps in the literature

related to effectiveness of public collaboration.

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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The following chapter is devoted to the delineation and clarification of the concepts used in this

research. First, the current trend in public administration is discussed of which ILSA’s are part of.

Next, collaboration for public administration and some of its relevant intricacies concerning the

research context are presented. After that more information is provided on the formation process

of ILSA’s, the RUD’s themselves, and, finally, the conditions that foster collaboration with

respect to relation, process, and organization.

2.1 Governance & Collaboration

The increasing focus on collaboration in public administration, as indicated in the previous

chapter, is part of the wider movement in public administration from government to governance

(Peters & Pierre, 1998). While government focuses on traditional ways of controlling and

regulating the organization of society, governance is concerned with enhancing government’s

capacity to act by forging strategic inter-organizational coalitions with actors in the external

environment. As such government ‘is an elaborate machine that operates through hierarchical

layers of political authority and accountability’ whereas governance ‘conveys the notion that

existing institutions can be harnessed in new ways, that cooperation can be carried out on a fluid

and voluntary basis among localities, and that people can best regulate themselves through

horizontally linked organizations’ (Savitch & Vogel, 2000, p.161). The movement from

government to governance is an answer to the changing landscape of public administration as

reflected in the prevalence of networks in controlling policy (such as international capital

markets, supranational organizations as the European Union and an increasing self-regulating

private sector) and the increasing mutual resource dependency between public and private sector

(Peters & Pierre, 1998).

The changing role of the state as indicated by the shift from the government to governance

perspective has a number of implications. Arguably the most notable, is the realization that

‘public managers must come to terms with a more consultative and networked environment’

(Head, 2008, p.734). What follows is that the state is increasingly dependent on collaborations to

18

implement its policies. The concept of ILSA’s is there for a manifestation of collaboration that

take place between local governments.

For the sake of clarity, collaboration in the context of this research, is distinguished from

cooperation and co-ordination. Cooperation is usually ‘task-focussed, generally short-term,

participation is voluntary, participants maintain their organizational identities and they are not

forced to merge their independent goals and objectives’ (Head, 2008, p.735-736). When partners

are faced with increasing complexity an emphasis on co-ordination may become prevalent which

is about ‘some form of joint planning or an agreed joint programme, and a medium-term work

programme depending on the previous history of working relationships’ Head, 2008, p.736).

Collaboration encompasses both cooperation and co-ordination with the addition that the term is

exclusively used to characterize ‘robust longer-term multi stakeholder commitments’ (Head,

2008, p.736). As a consequence, collaborations have genuine inter-dependencies, sharing of

power risk and reward. An RUD is thus effectively an institutionalized form of collaboration

(Chen & Thurmaier, 2009). As indicated in chapter one, local governments first go through a

distinct formation process before the RUD is operational. This process is the focus for this study.

Collaboration in this sense is ‘a process in which autonomous actors interact through formal and

informal negotiation, jointly creating rules and structures governing their relationships and ways

to act or decide on the issues that brought them together; it is a process involving shared norms

and mutually beneficial interactions’ (Thomson & Perry, 2006, p.23). Before discussing this

process and ‘appropriate conditions’ with respect to relation, process, and organization as

identified by the literature, which is the starting point for the data collection measure, the concept

of collaborative public management is further elaborated on.

2.2 Collaborative Public Management

The research on ILSA’s as outlined in chapter one falls in the category of research on

collaborative public management which supplements the existing theory of public management.

In recent years, this particular field has received more attention as a result of the shift from

government to governance and the inherent reliance on collaboration by governments.

Specifically, the concept of collaborative public management ‘describes the process of

facilitating and operating in multi-organizational arrangements in order to remedy problems that

19

cannot be solved – or solved easily – by single organizations’ (McGuire, 2006, p.33). The

literature identifies four types of collaborative contexts: intermittent coordination, temporary task

force, permanent or regular coordination and, finally, coalitions and network structures (McGuire,

2006). Even though ILSA’s can exist in all of these contexts, this study exclusively investigates

RUD’s which falls in the collaborative context of network structures. Agranoff (2003) provides a

further classification of network structures by examining the scope and intensity of activities of

the networks. He states that there are four distinct network structures in collaborative public

management: informational networks, developmental networks, outreach networks and action

networks. The last type of network is the only one that engages in collective action and that

actually produces services. The particular ILSA studied in this research, the RUD, falls in this

category.

It is important to note that a traditional conceptualization of networks as flat and self-organizing

is not common for action networks. In fact, the existence of a lead or network administrative

organization is an important determinant of effectiveness in collaborative management as it

reduces transaction costs and complexity of self-governance and enhancing the legitimacy of the

network (Graddy & Chen 2006; McGuire, 2006). In effect, the RUD’s perform the role of lead

organizations when they are established and constitute one of the nodes in the network. The

functioning of the RUD as a lead or network administrative organization is however beyond the

scope of this study since the research efforts focus on the formation process of the RUD’s as

opposed to their actual operation.

2.2.1 Institutional Collective Action

Collaboration during the formation process of RUD’s requires institutional collective action

(ICA) of participants to overcome inherent social dilemmas. A social dilemma ‘refers to a large

number of situations in which individuals make independent choices in an interdependent

situation’ (Ostrom, 1998, p.3). In the case of RUD formation, these choices revolve around the

human and financial resources devoted to its establishment and are particularly salient during the

design phase of RUD’s since these choices are made during this phase (see 2.3 for more

information about formation processes of RUD’s). In the context of collaborative public

management, the social dilemmas are reflected in ‘situations in which the individual service

20

delivery choices of local governments lead to outcomes that are individually and collectively

inefficient and not particularly preferred by any of the actors’ (Kwon & Feiock, 2010, p.877).

Different municipalities may desire different products and services from the RUD’s for instance

due to differences in their respective environments (some municipalities may have some

industrial activity within their territory which requires specific knowledge of RUD’s whereas

other municipalities may lay close to a highway or airport and may demand services related to

noise regulation).

There seems to be a mutual reinforcing mechanism explaining the behavior of actors during the

occurrence of social dilemmas between reciprocity, reputation and trust which affects the level of

cooperation and the net benefits for individual participants. Research has demonstrated for

instance that collective action is enhanced when there is an equitable distribution of benefits and

costs and that actors believe that the commitment of others will match to their own in terms of

human and financial resources. This dynamic interplay is not only affected by structural

variables as ‘size of group, heterogeneity of participants, their dependence on the benefits

received, their discount rates, the type and predictability of transformation processes involved,

the nesting of organizational levels, monitoring techniques, and the information available to

participants’ (Ostrom, 1998, p.2), but also by the shared experiences among actors. This last

notion of shared experiences affecting the level of collective action by coalitions is related to the

reputation of actors. It is believed that reputation will play a critical role in explaining effective

collaboration during formation processes of RUD’s since municipalities often have a rich history

of collaboration with each other. Resolving the collective action problem is done by ‘developing

institutions (agreements, standardized behaviors or authorities) to improve joint outcomes’

(Kwon & Feiock, 2010, p.877). This effectively occurs though the operation of the work groups

tasked with the RUD establishment which thus forms the arena for the development of these

institutions.

It is important to note that the collective action problem is particularly salient during the design

and implementation phase of ILSA’s (Kwon & Feiock, 2010). It is thus crucial that the

conditions that foster collaboration during these phases address these issues, which is why the

collective action problem is discussed here. The conditions related to the development of

‘institutions to improve joint outcomes’ and trust to overcome the collective action problem are

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discussed below in section 2.4. A failure to address the collective action problem results in

undesired effects such as freeriding and ‘the tragedy of the commons’ and subsequent ineffective

service delivery of the RUD.

2.3 Formation Processes for RUD’s

The introduction mentioned the formation process to create RUD’s as a three phase process:

preparation, designing, and implementation. The first two phases can be explained by using the

domain development approach proposed by Gray (1985) that consists of three stages: problem-

setting, direction-setting, and structuring. This coherence between both conceptualizations is

captured graphically in figure 1:

preparation designing implementation

problem-setting direction-setting structuring *

Figure 1. Formation process of RUD’s.

The domain development approach is relevant when talking about RUD formation processes

because ‘domains can be thought of as the set of actors (individuals, groups, and/or organizations)

that become joined by a common problem or interest’ (Gray, 1985, p.912) which is the case with

the RUD establishment by local governments. As such it sheds insight into what happens during

the collaborations under study. As indicated, the development of a domain happens in a three

stage process and its disambiguation will be useful in discussing the results of this study in

chapter 5. The first stage is that of problem-setting, in which relevant stakeholders are identified

and they acknowledge the domain problems faced. The second stage is that of direction-setting,

where stakeholders express their operational values and develop a shared understanding and

purpose and, finally, structuring, during which stakeholders define goals, tasks and roles

(McCann, 1983). In the case of RUD’s the problem-setting/preparation stage included the

‘package deal’ between the ministry of I&M and IPO and VNG and the initiate negotiations

among local government about the task with which they were confronted. The formation of the

workgroups tasked with its subsequent execution then happens during the direction-setting and

structuring stage. The design phase as understood in this thesis thus encompasses both the

22

direction-setting and structuring stage and the actual efforts devoted to establishing the RUD or

‘lead organization’ by specifying the mission and vision of the RUD, task processes, HR,

financial planning and control-practices, ICT components among others. These efforts take place

in the formation process denominated with an asterisk in figure 1. Finally, implementation

involves the execution of these plans by workgroups and new appointed staff and the transfer of

personnel from the local governments to the new organization to constitute the operational RUD.

The next section specifies the relevant conditions to foster effective collaboration during the

design phase in line with the research question. As mentioned before, the focus lays with the

design phase because it is part of ‘a process that builds a solid foundation for working together

and is widely considered one of the most critical components of coalition success’ (Foster-

Fishman, Berkowitz & Lounsbury, 2001, p.252). The literature specifies generic factors that lead

to collaboration effectiveness and they will be stated below. The aim of this study, as already

mentioned, is to investigate which of these factors have an effect on the specific phase of design

as well as to explore other factors that can be of relevance for effective collaborations.

2.4 Collaborative Capacity

Basically collaborative capacity encompasses everything that actors need in order to collaborate

effectively. As such it is a complex and multi-dimensional concept that can be used to diagnose

and subsequently improve collaborations by researchers and practitioners alike. This study

employs the concept of collaborative capacity to investigate collaboration during the design

phase of RUD’s. In theoretical terms collaborative capacity (e.g. conditions that foster

collaboration) are defined by Foster-Fisherman et al. (2001). They state that: ‘collaborative

capacity refers to the conditions needed for coalitions to promote effective collaboration and

build sustainable community change’ (p.242). The community change refers to development of

the RUD that targets the domain level problem.

The ‘right’ conditions for collaboration is thus what makes up collaborative capacity. The

emphasis on collaborative capacity is useful when looking at collaboration during RUD

formation processes because ‘it reminds us that a coalition’s ability to affect change is: a)

dynamic, changing with shifts in coalition membership, focus and development stage; b)

adjustable, enhanced by technical assistance and capacity building efforts; c) transferable,

23

allowing the capacity developed within one coalition experience to carry over to other

community-based efforts’ (Foster-Fishman et al, 2001, p.242). The transferable nature of

collaborative capacity is especially important within the context of RUD formation processes

since local governments usually have a long history of collaboration with each other. The result

is that local governments do not enter the collaborative effort of establishing RUD’s ‘blanco’,

but actually have a reputation that affects the extent of collaborative behavior within the coalition

as explained in section 2.2.1.

So where should one search to identify collaborative capacity in collaborations? Literature

reviews/articles are instrumental in providing the necessary vantage points. First, Einbeinder,

Robertson, Garcia, Vuckovic & Patti (2000) propose that there are four categories of

‘prerequisites’ to effective inter-organizational collaboration and underscore their dynamic

nature as well. These are: a) incentive, b) willingness; c) ability, d) capacity. They authors thus

shed light on where collaborative capacity can be found within the coalition. The second article

by Foster-Fishman et al. (2001) explains that collaborative capacity operates at four critical

levels: a) within their members, b) within their relationships, c) within their organizational

structure, d) and within the programmes they sponsor. Their appreciation of collaborative

capacity also indicates where it manifests. The final ‘searchlight’ is provided by Kaats & Opheij

(2013) who state that: ‘collaboration is fruitful when people and organizations manage to

connect in a meaningful process that does justice to interests and is aimed at meaningful

ambition. It is a big challenge to shape the right conditions for this’ (p.7). They propose that

conditions can be clustered under the dimensions: ambition, interests, relation, organization and

process. The approach offered by these authors is more generic compared to the other two and

specifies what dimensions of collaborative capacity are. As such it provides the framework under

which to cluster the conditions as identified by the literature. In this way it is the dominant

perspective on collaborative capacity used in this study. As discussed in chapter one, the

dimensions ambition and interests are beyond the scope of this study and thus excluded.

Combining the perspectives on collaborative capacity of Einbeinder et al. (2000) and Kaats &

Opheij (2013) provides the necessary insight to review the literature on collaborative capacity,

whereas Foster-Fishman et al. (2001) reminds us to look within members and programmes (the

other ‘critical levels’ of relationships and organizational structure are included within the

24

dimensions of relation and organization specified by Kaats & Opheij). In sum, the resulting

model both indicates what the relevant dimensions of this research are (the three columns) and

where to search for them (the four rows). The 4x3 matrix also directs the research efforts as

described in the methodological chapter, will be elaborated below in sections 2.4.1-2.4.3 and is

graphically represented in figure 2:

relation organization process

incentive x x x

willingness x x x

ability x x x

capacity x x x

Figure 2. Integrated model collaborative capacity based on Einbeinder et al. (2000) and Kaats

& Opheij (2013).

The dimensions of collaborative capacity discussed below are not specific to any of the three

formation phases and are of a general nature as described in the literature. To find out which and

how they are relevant during the design phase is part of the research goal for this study.

However, the dimensions are discussed with respect the design phase whenever possible to shed

some light onto their operation in fostering collaboration during this specific phase of RUD

formation. This is in line with Foster-Fishman et al. (2001) who indicated that collaborative

capacity may vary according to the development phase of the RUD.

2.4.1 Collaborative Capacity: dimension Relation

A large part of the literature on collaborative capacity underscores the human nature of

collaboration and the importance of connecting among participants because ‘collaboration is

ultimately about developing the social relationships needed to achieve desired goals’ (Foster-

Fishman et al., 2001, p.251). Research has indicated that “healthier” relationships in

collaborations, ‘which directly involve managers and foster positive relationships’ ultimately

yield a higher perceived outcome of the collaboration (May & Winter, 2007, p29). Relationship

development and management is thus an important factor enhancing collaboration. As such it is

crucial that coalitions pay attention towards internal group dynamics ‘given that coalitions often

25

involve members who share a history of conflict, misunderstandings, benign neglect, or have

little experience working collaboratively with others’ (Foster-Fishman et al., 2001, p. 251).

Ideally, relations are initiated during the preparation phase among eldermen and elaborated on

and maintained during the design phase. During the design phase, when officials on the

workgroup level meet, often for the first time, attention should be awarded towards developing

their internal relations to achieve a stimulating and positive work climate to increase

performance.

Attention towards internal relationships is thus important, but the literature also states that ‘in

recognition of their interdependence with other community sectors, successful coalitions also

cultivate relationships with a wide range of external stakeholders’ (Foster-Fishman et al., 2001,

p.252). The development of external relations effectively expands the network structure of the

coalition which is important because it may provide ‘access to a broad array of resources (e.g.

money, people, information), and facilitating community support of programming efforts’

(Foster-Fishman et al., 2001, p.252). During the design phase of RUD’s the development of

external relations can primarily be viewed with respect to the ministry of I&M, IPO and VNG.

Keeping them informed and engaged with the collaborative effort could allow access to

resources from these external stakeholders.

A recurring concept within the dimension of relation is that of trust among actors. Its prevalence

can be appreciated since ‘trust is a central component of collaboration because it reduces

complexity and transaction costs more quickly than other forms of organization’ (Thomson &

Perry, 2006, p.28). As stated in section 2.2.1 on ICA, trust is part of a reinforcing mechanism

together with reciprocity and reputation, further stressing its importance. By itself, trust is

fostered among participants through internal relationships characterized by high levels of

reciprocity. Einbeinder et al. (2000) explain that reciprocity ‘reflects the basic belief that people

should help, and refrain from hurting, those who have helped them’ (p.124). According to the

authors the existence of reciprocity leads an equitable distribution of costs and benefits in the

long run. The mutually reinforcing mechanism between trust, reciprocity and reputation can be

skewed in a positive direction ‘by adopting a long-term perspective and acknowledging that

interactions will be on-going, [so that] collaborating parties can more readily agree to forego the

pursuit of their own interests at the expense of others’ (Einbeinder et al., 2000, p. 124). This

26

effect has been largely studied in the field of game theory and is known there as a reiterated

prisoners dilemma. Finally, it is beneficial for collaboration if coalitions manage to develop a

reputation of trustworthiness among participants which is required to engage in institutional

collective action (Ostrom, 1998). Trust is thus a necessary condition for collaboration during the

design phase since important choices about the investment of human and financial resources

committed to the RUD establishment lead to existence of social dilemmas during the design

phase. Trust among actors is then a necessary component to engage in ICA if the collaboration is

to succeed at all.

Trust among actors is also bolstered by open communication (e.g. access to information systems,

frequent communication, and provision of feedback). Open communication is enhanced by

employing an ‘internal communication system that promotes information sharing and problem

discussion and resolution’ (Foster-Fishman et al., 2001, p.255). By itself open communication

has positive effects on the levels of commitment, satisfaction en cohesiveness of coalitions

(Foster-Fishman et al., 2001). In addition, research demonstrates that informal communication

channels are important to enhance collaboration because it enables ‘multiple lateral information

flows which permeate organizational boundaries at several levels also facilitates collaboration'

(Einbeinder et al., 2000, p.127). Open communication is important during the design phase

because it allows for trust and, as a result, enables ICA. Specific at the workgroup level open

communication is important because it strengthens cohesiveness which could be argued to be

initially low since members stem from different organizations and often meet for the first time.

Leadership is another critical factor within the dimension of relation in order gain commitment

of actors and to ‘generate attachments to the IOR system and to implement mechanisms for

creating mutually reliant and self-enforcing agreements’ (Einbeinder et al., 2000, p.125). They

state that ‘organizational leaders should help generate a culture that supports a commitment to

joint problem solving, with a focus on improving system-level outcomes (i.e., improvements in

the lives of the target populations) rather than on maintaining efficient processes within the

separate organizations’ (Einbeinder et al., 2000, p.134). Commitment for problem solving is also

enhanced by open communication. It is important to note that commitment should be acquired

rather than coerced from participants. Literature suggests that participants display higher levels

of commitment when they hold positive attitudes about the value and need of the collaboration,

27

the targeted problem, other stakeholders and themselves (Foster-Fishman et al., 2001). This

suggests that leadership should engage in conversation with participants on these levels.

Furthermore, the commitment by participants should be credible, meaning that everyone acts in

the interests of the whole coalition rather than pursuing their own interests. Research shows that

face-to-face communication is an important determinant for the existence of credible

commitment (Thomson & Perry, 2006). Commitment is important during the design phase of

RUD’s since it would ensure larger investments of human and financial resources from

participating organizations towards during the formation of RUD’s. When commitment is

credible, it also enhances the possibility for the coaltion to engage in ICA which is so important

during the design phase. Displaying credible commitment can enhance the perceived reputation

of actors which has positive effects on the mutually reinforcing core explaining the levels of trust

and reciprocity among coalition members. This may prove invaluable when actors suffer from a

bad reputation as a result of other collaborative settings.

In order for the organizational leaders to succeed in gaining commitment, they need the right set

of skills related to: communication, conflict resolution, resource development, and

administration, internal en external relationships and vision. Sagawa & Segal (2000) underscore

the duality of these leadership skills which focus on relationship development as well as more

task oriented activities and state that roles focused on coordination should be supplemented by

roles focused on developing inter-organizational relationships.

A final factor related to leadership is identified by Foster-Fishman et al. (2001) who claim that

leadership is a critical aspect of coalition success and given that ‘the tenure of many coalition

leaders is relatively short, coalitions need to continually foster and build a cadre of emerging

leaders’ (Foster-Fishman et al., 2001, p.254). In sum, leadership has the potential to shape the

institutions of the collaboration and has a mediating effect on the concepts of connecting, trust,

and commitment discussed above. Leadership is thus crucial because these institutions enabling

collaborative capacity may be especially fragile during the early design phase since they still

need to developed (e.g. structuring) as explained by the domain development approach (Gray,

1985) as discussed in section 2.3.

28

2.4.2 Collaborative Capacity dimension: Organization

The following section specifies factors about the coalition infrastructure that enhance

collaboration. As such they refer to governance and the operation of workgroups and the daily

and general board within the research context of RUD formation.

First, governance whithin in this context of RUD formation is about the fit between the desired

relationships and the structure of the coalition (Kaats & Opheij, 2013). As such it refers to

hierarchical relationship between the workgroups and the daily and general board of the RUD

and the way in which the participating local governments are respresented in the daily and

general board. A proper governance structure should ensure the alignment of goals between the

participating local governments and the coalition as a whole as well as enhancing goal

acquisition and progress made in the workgroups. Implementing such a structure occurs during

the design phase (at the structuring stage) which is why the collaborative capacity harnessed by

factors related to governance are particularly salient within this research context.

Furthering progress is also enhanced by coordinating mechanisms which are an important aspect

for the operation of a workgroups. This is true since these groups often work parallel yet all

strive for the same goal of establishing the RUD. As such ‘the coordinating mechanisms

available dictate the extent to which participants have the means or the opportunity to engage in

collaborative behavior’ (Einbeinder et al, 2000, p.126). Coordination not only takes place within

or between workgroups, but also with respect to the daily and general board of the RUD in

formation. Finally, coordination takes place between the coalition directly concerned with the

establishment of the RUD and the respective parent organizations (e.g. the city councils). The

literature suggests that standardized coordinating mechanism in public management are widely

recognized and employed since ‘public managers are usually well acquainted with this

formalized way of working from other (internal) collaboration experiences (Thomson & Perry,

2006). Coordination is thus facilitated by both organizational leaders and systems that reflect the

disered relationship between and among workgroups, daily and general board and the various

city councils.as organizational leaders. Also, there seems to be a role for ‘brokers’ or informal

leaders to coordinate activities who can ‘aid in achieving overall system objectives by acting as

an intermediary (Einbeinder et al., 2000, p.126).

29

Support

Closely related to governance is the aspect identified by Kaats & Opheij (2013) as support.

Basically it is about the consideration of the coalition towards outcomes for the parent

organizations and the how they are involved with the efforts of the coalition. Kaats & Opheij

(2013) argue in favor of coalitions that display a high sense of sensitivity towards outcomes for

the parent organization since it would enhance commitment and trust for the collaborative effort.

Support is also about the way in which mandate is delegated from the parent organizations

towards the coalition which affects the degree of autonomy of the coalition. Within the context

of RUD’s however, the law Wgr clearly specifies how mandate is delegated during formation

processes of RUD’s so cases under investigation were not likely to display different results here.

Decisiveness

Factors related to the decisiveness of the collaboration revolve around a result driven orientation

of the coalition and its access to skilled members and the respective team compositions.

Establishing a result driven orientation within the coalition seems primarily to be resided at the

level of projectleaders and the president of the daily/general board and includes the provision of

feedback on performance of coalition members.

Second, the literature stresses the need of skilled members that operate at the administrative and

workgroup level. Einbeinder et al. (2000) state that if the coalition can employ members with

relevant knowledge and skills ‘the IOR system is more likely to have the ability to collaborate

effectively to accomplish its task’ (p.125). The second set of skills that enhance collaboration are

those necessary ‘to build an effective coalition infrastructure’ and refer result driven operation of

the workgroups and daily/general baord in general (Einbeinder et al., 2000, p.137). This last set

of skills is particularly relevant during the structuring stage of the design phase when goals,

tasks and roles are defined of actors as explained in section 2.3.

Team composition is another factor enhancing collaboration by improving the decisiveness of

the coalition at both the workgroup as well as the administrative level (daily and general board).

Einbeinder et al. (2000) state that a ‘greater range of backgrounds and perspectives will help to

insure that needed knowledge and skills are available for the benefit of the system as a whole’

30

(p.136). Foster-Fishman et al. (2001) also argue in favor of heterogeneous members and stress

the importance of the ‘incorporation of structures that facilitate the inclusion of all participants

which is critical to maintaining effective diversity’ (Foster-Fishman et al., 2001). Examples of

such ‘structures’ include the planning of meetings on locations and timeframes in such manner

that all members can attend and a reduced normal workload for employees who are active in the

work groups to name a few. A potential pitfall can arise if relationships among a taskforce

characterized by high levels of heterogeneity are poorly managed, since heterogeneity can also

impede the development of trust. Skills related to the development and management of

relationships among members seems largely to be resided for organizational leaders only.

Conscientiousness

The concept of conscientiousness is related to the documentation of agreements made by the

coaltion and carefull procedures for internal conflict management.Kaats & Opheij emphasize the

need to formalize agreements for the sake of clarity and so that progress can be marked. It also

reduces conflicts because coalition members can refer to previously agreed upen decisions.

Kaats & Opheij also urge coalitions to think about escalation models prior to when conflicts

actually arise.The law Wgr also clearly specifies how 'formal' conflicts should be handled, so

variance in findings among the RUD's investigated in this study related to this factor should be

limited. Usually the conflicts at the workgroup level are solved internally or require the

involvement of the projectleader. If he or she is unable to do so the conflict is escalated towards

the daily board and when the conflict still persists it is escalated onto the general board. Conflicts

should not be uncommon during the design phase of RUD's because of different interests held by

the participating members. These different interests may lead to different and sometimes

inconsistent views about the scope of the RUD and has an impact on important decisions that are

made in terms of financial and human resources which are tranferred from these parent

organizations onto the RUD.

31

2.4.3 Collaborative Capacity dimension: Process

The final dimension, that of process, cuts somewhat across the other dimensions discussed and is

concerned with how the collaboration itself operates. As such it has to do with timeframes,

clarity of roles and responsibilities by coalition members, and the formulation of quality criteria

for collaboration.

Phasing

Kaats & Opheij (2013) argue that coalitions can benefit substantially from outlining the whole

process of the collaboration. Respective phases throughout the process should be clearly

demarcated and accompanied with clear goals. This is relevant during the design phase of RUD's

because the important negotiations and re-negotiations during this phase may result in a lack of

direction within the coalition. Demarcating phases could then provide the necessary focus.

Thomson & Perry (2006) also argue that the ability to set boundaries and the formulation of

concrete and achievable goals enhance collaboration effectiveness by creating focus. The

boundaries and goals should be included in the project-planning and tracked and enforced by

leadership.

Casting

Einbeinder et al. (2000) find that the ‘capacity to collaborate is further enhanced by rules and

regulations instituted to govern the various activities comprising the collaborative effort’ (p.127).

As such it encompasses workplans and the adopting of a taskforce structure (the workguops in

this research context). This enhances collaboration because ‘such clarity and formality helps to

create a stable, predictable coalition structure and operating procedure, reduce conflicts and

competition and promote member satisfaction and commitment (Einbeinder et al., 2000, p.127).

Foster-Fishman et al. (2001) claim that it enhances collaboration because it ‘ultimately promotes

task accomplishment and program implementation’ (p.254). Clarity of roles among participating

members is also important to denote the residence of authority to make decisions. Coalitions

should identify at what level in the authority is most desirable (e.g. workgroups, project-leader or

the daily/general board).

32

The activities ideally undertaken related to casting are relevant during the structuring stage of the

design phase. Such clarity and formality thus instilled is particularly usefull here since the

coalition is still relatively young during this phase of the formation process and roles may be

unclear or conflicting.

Quality

Finally, Kaats & Opheij (2013) argue for the adoption and evaluation of quality criteria for the

collaboration itself. They propose that participants engage in a sort of ‘meta-discussion’ prior to

doing the actual collaborative work, to discuss norms and values as how to collaborate with each

other (e.g. response time on e-mails, how to address each other during meetings). In line with

Foster-Fishman et al. (2001), who argue that coalitions with attention towards organizational

learning, Kaats & Opheij (2013) state that formal and informal evaluation of leadership and goal

attainment is important in driving collaboration effectiveness.

33

METHODS

3.1 Research Design

A study about decisive factors of an inherently complex and social process as collaboration

during the formation of RUD's, was believed to be most successfully undertaken with the

adoption of qualitative research methods. A comparative case study design was chosen because it

does justice to the complexity and particular nature of the selected cases (Bryman, 2008).

Attention for the distinct nature of cases under study was important, because even though every

effort was made to ensure a minimum of contextual variance, every collaboration effort is unique

(Bremekamp, Kaats, Opheij & Vermeulen, 2010). The comparative nature allowed the

comparison of effective and less effective cases of collaboration, which was required to distil the

decisive factors conducive for collaboration during the design phase of RUD’s influencing the

eventual effectiveness of the operational RUD. As such, four cases were examined: two that are

characterized by high levels of effective collaboration and two that are identified by the

researcher as less effective. More information about the selection procedure of these cases can be

found in section 3.4.3.

An explorative approach was needed to answer the research question, in order to identify the

factors within the discussed dimensions that are relevant during the design phase of RUD’s. The

research can therefore be characterized as inductive. Sensitizing concepts for the interviews were

based on extant literature about collaboration processes in general as discussed in the previous

chapter.

3.1.1 Unit of Observation & Analysis

The unit of analysis in this study is the coalition establishing the RUD, and people responsible

for creating them are the units of observation. These are the ‘key informants’, as described by

Swanborn (2010). The unit of observation can be divided into three groups. The first group

consisted of project leaders/directors/quartermasters responsible for creating RUD’s. The second

group included the employees who were transferred from the various municipalities and

Province to take place in the workgroups tasked with the creation of the RUD’s. The third and

34

final group were the ‘owners’ of the organization, e.g. a delegation of aldermen (‘wethouders’)

from the municipalities and provinces involved which were selected after the first round of

interviews and take place in the daily/general board or both.

3.2 Sampling Strategy

3.2.1 Case Selection

Coalitions establishing RUD’s were chosen as the unit of analysis because of practical

considerations and since they are a prime example of ILSA’s with many stakeholders which

makes them all the more challenging to create. As such it was believed they provided an

interesting insight in the various ways in which practitioners tried to foster collaborative

capacity. Practical considerations stem from the fact RUD’s have, with a few exceptions, all

recently arrived at the final phase of the collaboration process, e.g. implementation. This meant

that access to respondents, who were involved in the design phase of RUD’s, was relatively easy

and that their memory was not obscured due to a history bias.

In order to make inferences about important factors enhancing collaboration during the design

phase of RUD’s, it was important that the cases displayed a high degree of contextual similarity.

In this way, differences in effectiveness could be argued to stem from differences in the

characteristics of the collaborations. This is in line with Swanborn (2008), who argues for the

adoption of several control variables for this purpose. In the context of this study, the following

variables were chosen as control variables: ‘task package’, ‘number of involved municipalities’,

‘organizational form’, ‘targeted FTE’, ‘project budget’ and ‘development stage’. Data was

collected with the help of document analysis of organization plans and ‘method plans’ (‘plan van

aanpak’) provided by the RUD’s, which were investigated for these indicators.

As already mentioned above, both effective and less effective RUD’s were included in the

analysis in order to answer the research question. To select both types of cases (effective and less

effective) a pre-selection was made by consulting experts at Twynstra Gudde, a management

consultancy firm with a large focus on public management. The pre-selection yielded seven

possible cases: Fryske Utfieringstsjinst Miljeu en Omjouwing (FUMO), Milieudienst IJmond

(MDIJ), Omgevingsdienst Flevoland & Gooi en Vechtstreek (OFGV), RUD Drenthe, RUD

35

IJsselland and RUD Zuidoost-Brabant (ODZOB). All of them were contacted to provide

additional information about organization and work plans to assess their respective contexts. On

the basis of this information, Milieudienst IJmond, OFGV, RUD Drenthe and RUD Zuidoost-

Brabant were asked to participate. Next, interviews were planned with the project leaders

accordingly. Even though the data analysis and the consultation of experts provided a tentatively

insight into the effectiveness of the collaborations, only after this first round of interviews were

the cases definitely classified as either effective or less effective and included for analysis. This

was done by combining the conceptualizations of both Lim & Mohamed (2002) and Shenhar,

Dvir, Levy & Maltz (2002).

The establishment of RUD’s can readily be understood as a project. It has a clear goal, which is

limited in both time and scope, and all the investigated cases adopted the use of workgroups that

were tasked with the creation of the RUD’s. Traditionally, the effectiveness of projects was

defined by examining the attainment of time, budget and performance goals. Nowadays, the

effectiveness of projects is perceived more with respect to relevant stakeholders. This means that

dimensions as ‘efficiency’, which is an adaption of the former definition (time, budget and

performance goals), ‘impact for the customer’ and ‘preparing for the future’ have become more

prevalent (Shenhar, Dvir, Levy & Maltz, 2002). Another perspective presented by Lim &

Mohamed (1999) explains that project effectiveness can be viewed from either a macro or micro

viewpoint. Their evaluation of the micro viewpoint is similar to the conceptualization of project

effectiveness provided by Shenhar et al. (2002) and is a perspective predominantly shared by

project team members. By contrast, the macro viewpoint then is related to the question ‘does the

original concept tick?’ (Lim & Mohamed, 2002, p.247) with is more relevant to users and

stakeholders who are concerned about the eventual production of goods and services by the

RUD. This question relates to the fact whether or not the RUD corresponds with the original

specified purpose. In order to classify the RUD formation processes as either effective or less

effective, the micro viewpoint was adopted in this study and information was derived during the

interviews with project leaders.

Below, table 1 provides an overview of the context variables included in this study, which are

specified per selected case. It becomes clear that the contexts are relatively similar, making it

possible to compare cases. The exception here is the relatively large difference in project budgets

36

allocated towards establishing the RUD between the case of the RUD Drenthe and the other

three. The difference can be appreciated since the coalition for the RUD Drenthe had to build an

organization from scratch, began earlier than the other cases and was marked by considerable

delays. Table 2 shows that the cases of OFGV and MDIJ are the two effective cases of

collaboration, as these RUD’s required no additional funding for their establishment and these

cases were not marked by delays. By contrast the less effective case of collaboration, RUD

Drenthe, had to cope with significant delay due to difficulties at the administrative level. The

other less effective case of collaboration, ODZOB, also saw its progress impeded due to

difficulties at the administrative level and because of spill-over problems resulting from a prior

collaboration within the domain of environmental policy and regulation. The interviews with the

project leaders and aldermen also revealed that the perceived effectiveness of the RUD’s once it

was operational (the macro viewpoint as described by Lim & Mohamed (2000)) was higher than

for the cases characterized by less effective collaboration during the formation process. This

seems to support the assumption that effective collaboration during the design phase leads to

higher performing RUD’s when they become operational.

Task package #

partners

Organizational

form

Targeted

fte

Organiza

tion

budget in

mln

Project

budget

x1.000

Development

stage

RUD Drenthe Basic package 13 Public Body 109,4 12,2 750 operational

OFGV* Basic package 16 Public Body 115 13,2 350 operational

MDIJ* Basic package 6+18 Public Body 69,73 17,7 250 operational

ODZOB Basic package 22 Public Body 90,4 15,4 550 operational

Table 1. Control variables per selected case, * marks effective collaboration

Additional

funding

required

Delays

RUD Drenthe Yes Yes

OFGV* No No

MDIJ* No No

ODZOB Yes Yes

Table 2. Collaboration effectiveness, * marks effective collaboration

37

Pre-selection with experts

Document study control

variables

First round of interviews

Second round of interviews

3.2.2. Experts

The first expert consulted to identify potential RUD’s for this research was drs. S. Blair-

Zuijderhoff, senior-consultant at Twynstra Gudde, with years of working experience in the field

of inter-organizational collaboration as a project leader. The other expert consulted was mr. ing.

M. Krul, partner at Twynstra Gudde, who was involved in the creation of several RUD’s. Both

experts provided valuable contacts in order to gain access to the RUD’s.

3.3 Data Collection

As a result of the sampling strategy described above, data collection was done in four steps. The

first step entailed the aforementioned pre-selection of potential cases with the help of experts.

During the second step, a document analysis was performed to assess the control variables of the

RUD’s in question. The third step entailed the interviewing of the project leaders with the help of

the topic list and the assessment of the effectiveness of the collaboration. The fourth step entailed

interviewing coalition members at the workgroup and administrative with the help of the topic

list to identify relevant factors with respect of collaborative capacity. The procedure is outlined

graphically below in figure 3.

Figure 3. Data collection procedure

The interviews per case were distributed as follows: one interview with project

leader/director/quartermaster, two interviews with workgroup members, and two interviews with

administrators or ‘owners’ from a municipality and Province. However, two interviews at the

administrative level were cancelled and could not be rescheduled. Also two interviews were held

with employees that did not participate within the project organization and were thus excluded

from data analysis. Unfortunately, one interview with the quarter master of the ODZOB case was

lost due to technical malfunction of the recording device. However the loss of data was believed

38

to be of limited consequence, because the interview displayed a high similarity with the

interview with the adjunct-director of the ODZOB case. An additional interview was planned

after conducting the second round of interviews at the RUD Drenthe case, to also include the

former project leader who was active during the early design phase (e.g. the direction-setting

stage). In the end, this yielded a total of 15 suitable interviews included for data analysis.

The data collected during the third and fourth step stems from conducting multiple semi-

structured interviews with the help of a topic list. The sensitizing concepts employed were a

combination factors (the conditions that foster collaborative capacity) listed in the articles

provided in the theoretical section. A final feature of the topic list was that it allowed

respondents to freely name and identify factors themselves. As such a short introduction into the

research goal was first be provided after which the respondent was invited to describe the design

phase of the collaboration. The topic list was then used to guide the interview and make sure all

aspects were covered. A further operationalization of the topic list can be found in appendix 3.

3.4 Data Analysis

The interviews were recorded, transcribed and codified to make analysis possible. Coding took

place using the theoretical sensitivity approach. This implied that the theory on collaborative

capacity was used as a lens to look at the data. This allowed the provision of meaningful

interpretations rather than labeling categories (Boeije, 2008). Furthermore, using the theoretical

sensitivity approach also implied that coding happened in three stages: open coding, axial coding

and selective coding. Computer-Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis (CAQDAS) was used in

order to reduce errors while transcribing and improve the efficiency. The program F4 Analyse

was used for this purpose.

Analysis happened in a two-step process. First, individual interviews were stored in within-case

analysis tables with relevant passages and quotes stored under the respective dimensions.

Second, the individual responses were aggregated into the cross-case analysis table in terms of

relevant issues and interventions to develop collaborative capacity. This rendered the drawing of

conclusions possible about decisive factors enhancing collaboration during the design phase of

RUD’s.

39

RESULTS

4.1 Introduction

The findings of this research are presented in the this chapter. Before these are introduced it

should be noted that this chapter is structured in a specific way as a result of the qualitative

research methods employed. As such the four cases will first be introduced in a narrative manner

so one can familiarize oneself with their context. What follows is the elaboration of the research

findings stemming from the data analysis. Consider appendix two for the within-case analysis

table on which the findings in this section are based. For easy reference, the cross-case analysis

table is provided after the case descriptions. For each theme within the dimensions of relation,

organization, and process the similarities are briefly discussed and, most importantly, the

consistent differences between cases with characterized by either effective or less effective

collaboraiton are reported.This is done in accordance with the research goal to identify the

factors that have effect on the effectiveness of collaboration during the design phase of RUD's.

4.2 Case Descriptions

4.2.1 Milieudienst IJmond (MDIJ)

The original partners, Heemskerk, Beverwijk and Velzen, have a substantial collaboration

history within the domain of environmental regulation and policy execution. This history dates

back to 1999 when these three municipalities decided to create an organization on the basis of

the Wgr which can be described as the ancestor of the current RUD. Ownership was expanded in

2001 when the municipality Uitgeest joined the coalition. That RUD was somewhat special

because it formally recognizes only these four owners on the basis of the Wgr, but it provides

services for 13 other municipalities in the region. These 13 ‘contract partners’ are not burdened

with governance and subsequent risks of operation of the RUD, but do pay a higher fee for its

services in return. This construction was considered preferable for all municipalities involved

because of prior experiences with inter-municipal collaborations which proved to be very costly

and were characterized by ineffective governance.

40

When the central government demanded the formation of RUD’s in 2009 the nature of the

service agreements had to be changed in order to meet the new quality criteria, these new service

agreements had to be reaffirmed with the 13 contract partners and both the Province Noord-

Holland and the municipality of Haarlem became co-owners of the ILSA. This last change

includes a legal change of the RUD in terms of governance and the transfer of personnel to the

new RUD.

4.2.2 Omgevingsdienst Flevoland & Gooi en Vechtstreek (OFGV)

Prior to the decision to create RUD’s the municipalities in Flevoland were, as in the rest of the

Netherlands, individually responsible for executing environmental policies and regulation. The

municipalities were loosely organized in a so called Seph (Servicepunt Handhaving) to ensure

conformity in execution. This form of collaboration was rather open-ended and did not require a

substantial commitment of its partners, but was perceived to be performing well. Five of these

partners, the Province Flevoland and the municipalities Almere, Lelystad, Noord-Oost Polder

and Zeewolde decided to intensify their collaboration in response to the call from the central

government and were relatively enthusiastic to create RUD’s. Initially not all the municipalities

in Flevoland were included in the formation of the OFGV because the municipalities of Urk and

Dronten believed they could meet the quality criteria on their own. When it became clear that

their initiative lacked the necessary resolve and commitment, they opted to join in the creation of

the OFGV. Similarly the nine municipalities in the Gooi & Vechtstreek entered this RUD

formation process at a later stage, because they did not wanted to participate in the neighboring

RUD Noord Zee Kanaal Gebied (NZKG) because of its industrial nature and because of the lack

of progress at the RUD Utrecht. All of these municipalities and the Province are owners of the

OFGV and are thus represented in the general board. Since the region of Flevoland and therefore

the Province and its municipalities are relatively young, the respective partners have only a

limited amount of collaboration experience. This also means that, even though the Province is

responsible for the process of creating RUD’s in their region, its position is considered less

dominant and subsequently less threatening.

41

4.2.3 RUD Drenthe

The thirteen municipalities in Drenthe were and still are very reluctant about the creation of a

RUD. They believed that their own municipal organizations were capable of execution tasks in

the domain of environmental policy execution and regulation. The fact that RUD’s had to be

created on the basis of the Wgr was not beneficial for collaboration either, because of prior bad

experiences with inter-municipal collaboration in this form which proved to be ineffective and

very costly. The ministry of I&M however threatened to intervene if some municipalities did not

participate with the RUD formation and exerted considerable pressure. This led to the signing of

a ‘declaration of intent’ in which municipalities consented with the creation of the RUD with the

caveat that they did not feel bounded by the deadline of January 1st of 2013. The dominant role

of the Province was poorly accepted in the ensuing process, the contrast between large and small

municipalities was considerable and the prior collaboration experiences hampered the progress

of the RUD formation. Halfway during the design phase external help was thus ordered in order

to help speed up the creation of the RUD and a new project leader was enlisted. Trust between

the collaborating partners was still not optimal and its development impeded by various forms of

behavior that can be considered as opportunistic.

4.2.4 Omgevingsdienst Zuid-Oost Brabant (ODZOB)

Similar to the Milieudienst IJmond, the ODZOB was the next step in an already established

organization. The 21 municipalities in this region were already collaborating in a number of

domains as part of the Samenwerkingsregio Eindhoven (SRE). This ILSA also included a branch

that was responsible for executing environmental policies and regulation and was cut loose and

further developed as a RUD. The municipalities regarded the SRE as a failure because it

operated too independently from its parent organizations and was consistently more expensive

than anticipated. Adding to the distrust between the partners is the ambivalent relationship

between the large number of small municipalities and the, in their eyes overtly dominant, large

neighbor of Eindhoven. The establishment of sub-regional forms of collaboration for tasks that

are outside the basic task package with regards to environmental policy execution and regulation

and various instances of opportunistic behavior are a prime example of this lack of trust.

42

Furthermore, the lead of the Province was poorly accepted by the municipalities because of other

bad collaboration experiences related to infrastructural projects among others.

4.3 Findings existing Model

The following sections reveals how the investigated cases engaged in efforts to achieve and

sustain an effective collaboration with respect to the specified dimensions relation, organization,

and process as identified from theory during the design phase. As such it highlights what

happened, how this came to be and what its subsequent effect was on the collaboration effort. As

mentioned before, the distinction will be made between the cases characterized by either

effective or less effective collaborations. For each theme the similarities and differences between

cases with either effective or less effective cases are discussed. First the cross-case analysis table

is provided on the following pages.

43

Dimension Theme OD IJmond OFGV RUD Drenthe ODZOB

Relation Connecting -no specific stimulation of

developing personal relations

-collaboration of the basis of

equality

-active feedback collection

-both formal and informal ways

of communication

-limited celebration of successes

-poor, unconstructive relation

-dominant role Province,

internally oriented

-no specific stimulation of

developing personal relations

-external communication is

client-oriented

-specific attention relationship

city councils

-distance between daily and

general board

-limited celebration of successes

-unconstructive relation

-pressure from ministry used to

further collaboration

-no dominant role Province due

to lack of authority

-no specific stimulation of

developing personal relations

-both formal and informal ways

of communication

-feedback in times of crises

-open internal communication,

but not at administrative level

-limited celebration of successes

-pressure from ministry used to

further collaboration

-personal contact with ministry

kept it interference at minimum

-dominant role Province

-no specific stimulation of

developing personal relations

-feedback in times of crises

-both formal and informal ways

of communication

-open internal communication,

but not always at administrative

level

-limited celebration of successes

-limited contact ministry,

neither positive or negative

effect

-at first dominant role Province

which evolved to a facilitative

one

Group Dynamics -formal, critical work climate at

administrative level

-critical, but positive internal

work climate

-former org. performed well

-former org. conducive creating

shared point of reference

-criticism governance Province

and ministry by expanding prior

org.

-negative experiences with

collaboration on basis Wgr in

other instances among

municipalities

-negative collaboration

experiences between Province

and municipalities

-underscores importance of

liking between key players

-attention for developing culture

-positive internal work climate

-limited collaboration

experience partner due to youth

region

-negative collaboration

experiences between Province

and municipalities

-positive collaboration

experiences administrative level

-tension between large and

small municipalities

-fear for surrendering power on

administrative level

-positive internal work climate

-negative experiences with

collaboration on basis Wgr in

other instances among

municipalities

-tension between large and

small municipalities

-collectivistic mindset

undermined through regional

representatives in board

-former org. performed poorly

-former director became

quartermaster for new org.

resulted in lack of trust

-negative collaboration

experiences between Province

and municipalities

-negative collaboration

experience between small and

large municipalities

Trust -lack of trust in org. form

-lack of trust between

municipalities and Province

-transparent discussions

-lack of trust in org. form

-lack of trust at administrative

level

-underscores importance of org.

performance and impression

management for developing

trust

-lack of trust in org. form

-developing trust through

transparency

-trust within project org. but not

at administrative level

-lack of trust in org. form

-examples of opportunistic

behavior at project org. and

administrative level

-underscores importance of org.

performance for developing

trust

Appendix 1. Cross-case analysis table

44

Leadership -usage of informal leadership

within project. org

-informal leadership evaluation

-complementarity internal

leadership

-uniting leadership president

board

-usage of informal leadership at

administrative level

-complementarity internal

leadership

-uniting leadership president

board

-usage of informal leadership

within project org. and

administrative level

-uniting leadership

representative Province

-complementarity internal

leadership

-informal leadership evaluation

Organization Governance -not all participants are owners

of the organization

-both aldermen and city council

members in general board

-short lines between officials

and aldermen

-all participants are owner of the

organization

-regional representation in daily

board

-rotating presidency boards

-all participants are owner of the

organization

-regional representation in daily

board

-distance aldermen and city

council

-positive work climate officials

spilled over to administrative

level

-all participants are owner of the

organization

-regional representation in daily

board

Support -not all participants represented

in project org.

-specific orientation towards

impact parent orgs.

-neutral stance administrative

discussions

-explicit focus for positive

outcomes parent org.

-closing of distance through

‘closeness principle’ and active

role org. informing parent orgs.

-explicit formulation of control

mechanisms for owners

-specific orientation towards

impact parent orgs.

-investing in political sensitivity

director

-explicit focus for positive

outcomes parent org.

-all participants represented in

project org.

-difficulty in identifying impact

parent organizations

-limited effort closing gap

between org. and parent orgs.

-no orientation towards impact

parent orgs.

-city councils were informed by

their aldermen represented in

the board, difficulty when only

represented in general board due

information gap

-neutral stance administrative

discussions

-limited focus positive outcomes

parent org.

-limited effort closing gap

between org. and parent orgs.

-sensitivity towards closing gap

daily and general board

Decisiveness -decisive project leader

-spillover effects from project

org. are mediated at the

administrative level

-project org. attracted

employees with stature and

authority within parent org.

-decisive project leader

-predominantly employees from

Province in project org.

-close interaction between

president boards and

representative Province for

developing common ground

-attention for selection project

org. members

-decisive project leader

-usage of external consultancy

-project org. attracted

employees with stature and

authority within parent org.

-selection board members on

basis of expertise

-project org. members selected

at management level led to a

lack of practical understanding

-usage of external consultancy

-lack of project management

skills at start

-selection board members on

basis of expertise

-project org. attracted

45

-project org. attracted

employees with stature and

authority within parent org.

employees with stature and

authority within parent org.

Conscientiousness -formal documentation of

agreements

-no formal work agreements,

rather focus on social control

-no formal escalation model

-conflicts are either directly

managed by project leader or

solved at board level

-formal documentation of

agreements

-no formal work agreements,

rather focus on social control

-no formal escalation model

-conflicts are either directly

managed by project leader or

solved at board level

-formal documentation of

agreements

-no formal work agreements,

rather focus on social control

-no formal escalation model

-conflicts are either directly

managed by project leader or

solved at board level

-formal documentation of

agreements

-no formal work agreements,

rather focus on social control

-no formal escalation model

-conflicts are either directly

managed by project leader or

solved at board level

Process Phasing -limited number of partners

conducive for progress

-board members responsible for

‘helicopter view’

-general process outlined

beforehand

-work in project org. organized

in parallel ways

-difference bottom-up process

and top-down enforcement led

to ambiguity about goal

-limited number of partners

conducive for progress

-work in project org. organized

in parallel ways

-clear delineation of roles and

responsibilities within project

org

-difference bottom-up process

and top-down enforcement led

to ambiguity about goal.

-limited outlining of process

-work in project org. organized

in parallel ways

-difference bottom-up process

and top-down enforcement led

to ambiguity about goal

-general process outlined

beforehand

-work in project org. organized

in parallel ways

-difference bottom-up process

and top-down enforcement led

to ambiguity about goal

Balance -sometimes lack of knowledge

members project org.

-attention towards uniting

capabilities management project

org.

-differences quality board

members between small and

larger municipalities

- -

Casting -role conflict Province

-potential role conflict president

daily/general board

-role conflict Province at start

-potential role conflict president

daily/general board mediated by

experience

-role conflict Province at start

-lack of role clarity

municipalities

-role conflict Province

-role conflict quartermaster

-role conflict president

daily/general board

-role conflict municipalites

Quality -result oriented project leader

-no quality criteria employed

-result oriented project leader

-no quality criteria employed

-result oriented project leader

-no quality criteria employed

-no quality criteria employed

46

Table 3. Cross-case analysis table

Parallel

developments

-disagreements about potential

fusion of org. with org. from

another region hampered

collaboration

-failed collaboration effort in

other instances frustrated

collaboration

-failed prior negotiations unions

and Province frustrated

negotiations in this instance

-parallel negotiations between

fire dept. hampered progress

-unions urged for province wide

arrangement which did not

occur and led to delays

47

4.3.1 Relation

4.3.1.1 Connecting

Developing external relationships

An important difference between effective and less effective cases of collaboration can be found

in the way by which the project leaders tried to establish relationships with the relevant city

councils. Eventhough projectleaders from all cases organized meetings to inform them about the

progress made, what the RUD would mean for their municipal organization in terms of costs and

their controlling role as councilmember with respect to the new organization, the extent of their

efforts differ considerably.

The MDIJ case of effective collaboration has invested the most in the relationships with their

respective city councils. Project leaders acted pro-actively and included a much larger range of

topics in their communication with city councils. These added topics involved the identification

of concerns of parent organizations and informing them about the possibility of other control

mechanisms. In addition, the projectleader indicated that she made herself available for adressing

questions by city council members outside of the organized meetings in order to close any

potential gap between the coalition building the RUD and the respective city councils:

“They are not that far away and when something is afoot we call or talk to them in

person within half an hour. An aldermen who e-mails me on Saturday has an answer on

Saturday evening. Short lines.” -Respondent #6

A workgroup member from the MDIJ claims that this mindset is part of the 'nearby-principle'

coined by the MDIJ and claims that it operates as follows:

“I believe that one of the things that has been crucial, is that this GR has never become

an inward looking organization. It is not expected from municipalties to be directive, or

that a directing role or ownership role is made explicit by municipalities. Rather, that

role has been made from the RUD towards the municipalities.” -Respondent #7

48

The other case of effective collaboration, the OFGV, acted in similar ways, but its project leaders

were less pro active in doing so. They intensified their relationships with their respective city

councils only half way during the design phase of the RUD in contrast to the MDIJ.

The cases of less effective collaborations, RUD Drenthe and ODZOB, only nominally invested

in their relationship with their respective city councils, operating at the basic level of informing

them and leaving the directing role with the municipalities. This differing finding indicates that

the establishment of relationships with relevant city councils by the coalition and its particular

nature coined as the 'near-by principle' is conducive for effective collaboration during the design

phase of RUD’s.

Developing internal relationships

In none of the four cases attention was explicitly awarded towards developing positive personal

relations among workgroup members or board members (the administrative level). Furthermore,

for the board members attention towards the stimulation of personal relations was considered

unnecessary because all cases reported they knew each other relatively well from prior

collaboration experiences or because they were member of the same political party. The lack of

focus on developing personal relations among all cases is surprising, because respondents

unanimously underscore the fact that collaborating is first and foremost a social affair which is

also illustrated by the following quote:

“In collaborations it is of the utmost importance that there is a spark between key players.

If there is none, it ends. Whatever the quality of your plans. (…) Collaborations are

always works of people.” -Respondent #4

Given the emphasis of the literature and respondents alike on the development of relationships

among collaborating members, it is hard to dismiss the factor of internal relationship

development as non-decisive in explaining the different levels of effectiveness of collaboration

among the cases. However, since the lack of internal relationship development is consistent

among both types of cases, it is not a decisive factor explaining collaboration effectivenss during

the design phase of RUD's.

49

Communication

Each of the four investigated cases had a workgroup ‘communication’ operating within the

coalition which, to a large extent, was responsible for coordinating the internal and external

formal communication. All cases reported high levels of open comminucation and the provision

of feedback at the workgroup level as indicated by the following quote:

“Internally a positive climate. Critical, but positive. (…) Look, it’s ok if things get

exciting once in a while.” -Respondent #1

These findings would suggest that formal communication mechanisms and open communication

at the workgroup level may be a factor that enhances collaboration effectiveness but is not

decisive in explaining the differences found in collaboration effectiveness among the cases.

The level of open communication and provision of feedback at the other level, that of

administrators, is inconsistent among the effective cases of collaboration. Only the MDIJ case

mentioned high levels of open communication and transparency at the administrative level

characterized by the following quote:

“So we pointed out from the beginning that we had an interest in keeping costs low and

that we wouldn't directly pay more for more FTE.” -Respondent #6

The other three cases, including the effective case of collaboration OFGV, reported low levels of

open communication at the administrative level. This suggests that open communication t the

administrative level is also not a decisive factor in explaining the different levels of collaboration

effectiveness during the design phase of RUD’s.

In sum, only one factor related to connecting is decisive in explaining differences between

effective and less effective cases of collaboration: the development and nature of relationships

with city councils.

50

4.3.1.2 Group Dynamics

All cases coped with bad collaboration experiences among participants. Most notably these bad

collaborationg experiences stem from prior collaborations on the basis of the Wgr due to the

aforementioned difficulties for control by parent organizations and the resulting excessive costs

related to this organizational form. As a consequence, the formation of RUD’s in all cases started

of poorly when it became clear they had to collaborate once more on the basis of the Wgr in this

instance because of the negative spill-over effects from the previous collaboration:

“Very different things suddenly arrive as out of nowhere where collaborations were

ineffective. That hinders the progress to come further in this collaboration, because of

old pains that exist.” -Respondent #12

However, the effective cases suffered considerably less from these negative spill-over effects

than less effective cases of collaborations for two reasons. The OFGV suffered less because

respondents from the OFGV indicated that because their province is relatively young,

collaboration experiences are far more limited than that at the other cases.

“The advantage here is that all the municipalities are relatively young and easily

communicate. Everyday we are all still pioneering and sorting things out together since

we have little history. So that goes actually always relatively easy.” -Respondent # 10

Given the ubiquity of negative collaboration experiences among local governments in the

Netherlands as reported by respondents, it was positive for the RUD establishment at the OFGV

to have a limited collaboration history among the coalition, because it usually turns out to be a

negative influence in the long run.

The other effective case of collaboration, MDIJ, suffered less from prior collaboration

experiences because its negative effect was offset by the already existing organization (that was

now being transformed to an RUD) that performed well. Respondents were satisfied with the

levels of service and quality of this prior organization and this success was leveraged by the

coalition to increase the levels of trust among partners which in turn facilitated open

communication and transparency conducive for collaboration at the administrative level.

51

Respondents at the MDIJ case also indicated that the prior organization helped create a shared

point of reference conducive for collaboration:

“That shared point of reference wasn’t a mirage, but an actual organization. In that way

you can very precisely say how it’s going to look in the end. Even until the point at which

chair an employee will be seated, rather than talking about a building, ICT or teams that

do not exist. That makes it completely different.” -Respondent #2

The case of less effective collaboration, ODZOB, also had an organization prior to the RUD as

part of the SRE ILSA that operated within the same domain, but since it was perceived to operate

below satisfactory levels the effect was negative on the current collaborative effort.

“We as management are still held accountable for the mistakes that were made by the

former management of the SRE 2-3 years ago. What can we do about that? Nothing. So

we very much suffer from it.” -Respondent #12

“There were many municipalities who said they never wanted another SRE. They felt that

it was a club who engaged on their behalf in matters they did no approve.”

-Respondent #13

Adding to this negative experience from the prior organization was the fact that the president of

the general and daily board of the ODZOB was the same person at the SRE. Even the

quartermaster responsible for the new RUD had a bad history among the coalition since he was

the former director from SRE. This seemed to make administrators even more wary to participate

in the collaboration devoted to formation of the new RUD.

At the other less effective case of collaboration, RUD Drenthe, the prior bad collaboration

experiences were substantial and could not be effectively addressed.

In sum, a limited negative collaboration experience or leveraging success from prior

collaborative efforts can explain the higher levels collaboration effectiveness of the MDIJ and

OFGV during the design phase of RUD’s. The existence of a prior organization operating within

52

the same domain with the same set of partners alone does not explain the difference in

collaboration effectiveness, since it depends on how well the organization performed.

Another difference between the effective and less effective cases of collaboration stems from the

contrast between smaller and larger municipalities. The respondents from the less effective cases

of RUD Drenthe and ODZOB indicated that smaller municipalities felt a sense of unequality

during decision making processes which were not reported by the effective cases of MDIJ and

OFGV. This effect is dubbed the ‘calimero effect’ and indicates the feeling of smaller

municipalties that their legitimacy and subsequent influence within the coalition was suboptimal

which hampered the collaborative mindset at the less effective cases of collaboration.

A similarity between all the cases is the difficulty experienced as a result of the political nature

of the RUD formation. This is particularly salient during the design phase when important

choices are made about the scope and intensity of the operation of the RUD that undermine the

autonomy of local governments. As a result all cases reported about actors trying to assert their

dominance which negatively affected the work climate.

“With aldermen, who are partly chosen because of their stubbornness, otherwise they

wouldn’t hold their office, this does not go well. The atmosphere was therefore not

always pleasant” -Respondent #4

“They become very sensitive when someone touches their throne. In general you are in

politics because you like to control something, to be the boss and wield power.”

-Respondent #10

All cases seem to have equally suffered from the political nature of the collaboration, so by itself

it does not explain the different levels of collaboration effectiveness between effective and less

effective cases. It does however emphasize the need to establish positive and extensive

relationships with the respective city councils, strengthening the claim that investing in these

relationships accounts for the different levels of collaboration effectiveness (the effective cases

MDIJ and OFGV invested considerably more in their relationships with city councils. See

4.3.1.1). By pro-actively explaining control mechanisms for city councils the adverse effects of

political office can thus be ameliorized.

53

Overall, the factors related to group dynamics that have a decisive effect in eplaining differences

between effecive and less effective cases are: a limited or positive collaboration history among

partners and a lack of perceived inequality among local governments.

4.3.1.3Trust

An important difference in trust between the effective and less effective cases of collaboration

resides with the perceived lack of legitimacy of projectleaders at the RUD Drenthe and ODZOB

not reported at the effective cases of collaboration. Initially the first project leader at the RUD

Drenthe found that the trust placed in him by the municipalities was adequate, even though he

was appointed by the Province. He felt that he could relate well with municipalities because of

his years of experience working for them. When the Province became more directive during the

design phase, he was mistrusted however which led to the appointment of an ‘external director’

who was deemed more independent from the Province and could therefore be more effective.

The quartermaster at the ODZOB case also suffered from a lack of trust by the municipalities. As

mentioned before, this happened because he was the director of the former SRE organization

operating within the same domain as the RUD in formation which had performed poorly.

“We suffered during the process because of that. Some municipalities would be sceptical

and wonder: he is from the old organization, is he capable?” -Respondent #14

This finding indicates that the perceived lack of legitimacy of projectleaders explains the lower

levels of trust and subsequent lower levels of collaboration effectiveness. This in contrast with

the effective cases of collaboration whose projectleaders were not pereceived as non-legitimate.

Another difference between effective and less effective cases of collaboration stems from having

the possibility and the actual leveraging of success. As indicated by the respondents of the MDIJ,

OFGV and RUD Drenthe, the most important tools for developing trust at both the

organizational as well as individual level are adequate organizational performance (most notably

the progress made in the design phase), consistency, integrity and sensitivity towards outcomes

for the parent organizations (sensitivity towards outcomes for the parent organizastions is

discussed further in section 4.3.2). These cases reported to be aware of the power of ‘image

building’:

54

“You have to be very much aware of imagebuilding. You can only do things once. (…) So

when all goes well you create a certain expectation. (…) That sort of stories are much

more important than the formal ones.” –Respondent #9

However, only the cases of effective collaboration MDIJ and OFGV could actually proceed to

leverage their success to facilitate the development of trust within the coalition. By contrast, the

RUD Drenthe and ODZOB cases were inherently unable to do so given the fact that their

collaborations were less effective, and thus could not profit from leveraging success to further

the development of trust. As a result, the effective cases were able to initiate a positive feedback

loop among trust and performance whereas the less effective cases could not which in turn

explains the different levels of collaboration effectiveness between the two groups of cases.

A similarity can be found across all in the suffering of various forms of opportunism displayed

by coalition members that hampered the development of inter-personal and inter-organizational

trust. The lack of trust at the administrative level of the less effective cases RUD Drenthe and

ODZOB was further aggrevated because of the perceived inequality mentioned above and the

resulting 'calimero effect'. The development of trust was also impeded at all cases because of the

perceived inequality between the Provinces and the municipalities. The inequality stems from the

Province’s role as ‘inter-administrative supervisor’ which specifies a hierarchical relationship

with municipalities even though it is only one actor among many in the coalition. The

asymmetrical power relation is bolstered even further because of their authorization by the

central government as a ‘process director’ for the establishment of the RUD’s in their region.

“What also had an effect perhaps was that municipalities feared for the dominance of the

Province. That they would dictate how things should run around here. That couldn’t be

true!” -Respondent #6

Even though all cases regarded the Province with distrust, the relationship between the Province

and the OFGV was characterized as being more horizontal than in other cases. This stemmed

from the aforementioned youth of the province which so that the Province could not assume a

dominant position as in the other cases where the Province is more powerful.

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Regarding the factors related to trust it can be concluded that the perceived legitimacy of

projectleaders and the leveraging of success can explain the different levels of collaboration

effectiveness between the two groups of cases.

4.3.1.4 Leadership

All cases are characterized by differentiated project leadership, either intentional or by chance,

with one leader focussing on maintaining relations at the administrative level and one leader

who was more internally focused towards the workgroups. This could suggest that differentiated

project leadership is conducive for collaboration, but since all cases displayed differentiated

leadership throughout most of the design phase it could not be concluded that differentiated

project leadership is decisive in explaining the different levels of collaboration effectiveness

among the two groups of cases.

Informal leadership was employed by the projectleaders at the effective cases MDIJ and OFGV

and the less effective cases of collaboration RUD Drenthe. This was done to provide necessary

expertise or continuity when project leaders left and entered the project organization. At the

administrative level, the president of the general and daily board at the OFGV approached the

director of the Province several times to get things done or make inquiries. The members of the

daily board at the OFGV case also act as informal leaders for the region they represented and

thus provided an effective tool for communication and the closing of organizational distance

between the OFGV and the parent organizations. No mentioning was made of informal

leadership at the less effective case of collaboration ODZOB.

The above indicates that the usage of informal leaders may be conducive for collaboration

effectiveness, but is not decisive in explaining the differences between the two groups.

In sum, no decisive factors related to leadership were found between the effective and less

effective cases of collaboration.

Regarding all the factors related to relation, the following were decisive in explaining the

different levels of collaboration effectiveness between the two groups of cases: the development

and nature of relationships with city councils, a limited or positive collaboration history among

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partners, a lack of perceived inequality among local governments, the perceived legitimacy of

projectleaders and the leveraging of success.

4.3.2 Organizing

4.3.2.1 Governance

No consistent differences between effective and less effective cases of collaboration were

identified with respect to factors related to governance. All cases, with the exception of MDIJ,

adopted the governance structure as specified by the law Wgr so that all the local governemnts

are represented in the general board who choose a daily board from their midst. By contrast, at

the effective case of collaboration, MDIJ, not all participating municipalities take place in the

general and daily board since they are ‘merely’ contractpartners as explained in section 4.2.1.

Furthermore, both city council members as well as aldermen take place within their daily and

general board unlike the other three cases where only aldermen reside within the boards.

Interestingly, the effective case of OFGV and the less effective cases of collaboration, RUD

Drenthe and ODZOB, have their daily boardmembers chosen in such a way that they represent a

specific sub-region of municipalities. This seems to undermine the development of a

collaborative mindset focused on system level outcomes. This is particularly salient when trust is

low at the administrative level, as indicated at the ODZOB:

“Within the region of Midden-West there is a larger focus towards the necessary

expertise within the daily board <than at the ODZOB>, whereas here it is more

important which region they represent. This leads to island forming. I believe it is a

chance for future daily boards to organize this differently.” -Respondent #13

However, given the fact that no consistent differences in factors related to governance were

found, it must be concluded that factors related to governance are not decisive in explaining the

different level of effective collaboration between the two groups of cases.

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4.3.2.2 Support

As a result of the limited control mechanisms for steering the RUD by individual municipalities

it is crucial for the collaboration effort that it is sensitive for the needs and outcomes for its

parent organizations. The effective cases of collaboration MDIJ and OFGV are particularly

successful at doing so. In addition MDIJ resolved the issue related to governance with the help of

their specific governance structure. The need for control formally lies with the owners, which are

limited in number and thus all represented in the daily board. The other participants at the MDIJ

collaborate on the basis of clearly delineated contracts which specify the costs and the services

they purchase and are thus not burdened with the operation of the organization itself. At the

OFGV case, even though their efforts towards the city councils not as extensive as with the

MDIJ case, as indicated in section 4.3.1.1, they seem to have satisfactory indicated the

mechanisms for control and the costs for participating in the RUD. Furthermore, they have

designed their organization in such a way that it helps their parent organizations realizing budget

custs while even claiming a higher quality of service. The above is captured by the following

quotes:

“Informing boards about progress and the steps ahead. Talking about the interests of

your own organization, but with an eye for the interests of the municipalities. That is the

essential point.” -Respondent #2

“You have to show that you are of value and constitute a serious partner die doesn’t

throw away money and just want to grow bigger. That you understand the choices that

administrators have to make.” –Respondent #10

By contrast, the less effective cases of RUD Drenthe and ODZOB were unable to do so.

Discussions there revolved around general issues for such a protracted amount of time that the

coalition failed to identify the effects in terms of costs and quality for their parent organizations.

In return, the already low level of trust in the collaboration was further damaged indicating a

downwards spiral. Efforts to stem the tide have been made though at the RUD Drenthe by

eliminating a proposed layer of management for the new organization but proved less effective:

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“At that moment they see that you are prepared to consider their finances. It was a small

gesture, which also made sense from a business operating standpoint, but it signals to

them that you are working in a good way. That yields trust, which is important.” -

Respondent #8

Being able to convey a consideration for the outcomes for the parent organizations seems to

explain the difference in effective collaboration between the two groups of cases and is therefor a

important factor enhancing collaboration effectiveness during the design phase of RUD’s.

4.3.2.3 Decisiveness

None of the project leaders in the investigated cases were free to select members from the parent

organizations to participate in the project organization. The municipal organizations selected

some of their willing staff towards the project organization. Their normal workload was then

reduced so that they could take on the extra work. In all cases, the quality of these transferred

employees was generally good even though their flexibility was sometimes a point of concern.

The voluntary nature of the participation seems to have positive effects for the collaboration:

“You are dependent on the people who raise their finger. As a result, you get a specific

type of people. People who are interested and are enthusiastic about trying something

new. Those are not risk averse; rather, they enjoy investigating new things, a new

collaboration. It gives a kind of mindset, a mentality that ensures some conformity and

singularity in the people that participate.” -Respondent #4

Furthermore, the officials at the lower echelons of the organization find it easy to collaborate

which is also illustrated by the high levels of open communication and transparency as indicated

before. This happened because they easily recognized that the added value that RUD’s could

offer in their daily jobs in terms of increased efficiency, job satisfaction and the pooling of

expertise which, from their point of view, outweighed potential drawbacks such as potential job

losses or increased distance towards city councils.

“It was good to see that at the employee level, people recognized the added value of an

RUD and the possibilities rather that the threats” -Respondent #10

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Also, the distinct type of employees yielded this way acted as ambassadors within their own

organization which enhanced their effectiveness.

“I consider myself lucky that the workgroups draw a type of people who are well

informed within their own organization and lay well with their colleagues. They

command respect and I believe it to be very crucial” -Respondent #8

Project leaders in all of the cases also had no say in the selection of boardmembers for the

general board. It is interesting that in none of the cases attention was awareded towards selecting

members of the daily or general board on the basis of their ability to cooperate or unite interests.

Furthemore, respondents from all cases indicate that the daily board is chosen by the general

board in a manner so that relevant expertise is present in the board, such as expertise in finance

or human resources.

However, given the fact that both the effective and less effective cases reported no consistent

differences in the factors related to the selection of members, it is not a decisive factor in

explaining the differences between the two groups of cases.

The existence of a result driven orientation is stressed and present among all cases, even if this

would lead to suboptimal decisions. This suggests that this is not a decisive factor explaining

collaboration effectiveness between both effective and less effective groups of cases.

Another factor impacting the decisiveness of the coalition is the link between the level of

officials at the workgroup level and aldermen at the administrative level existent in all cases. It

has been explained that a collaborative mindset comes more naturally for officials than for

administrators and it would seem that this effect spills over towards the administrative level as

indicated at the RUD Drenthe case:

“That means that when the budget plan which has a broad base of consensus among

officials is sent to the boardmembers for effectuation, these boardmembers are already

informed by their officials. That has worked, until now at least, very well.” -Respondent

#8

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The use of officials from the lower echelons of the municipal organizations is thus found to have

a positive effect for the effectiveness of the collaboration. However, given the fact that this factor

is consistent among both effective and less effective cases, it cannot be argued to be a decisive

factor explaining the differences in effectiveness between effective and less effective

collaborations.

In sum, no decisive factors with respect to decisiveness were identified that could explain the

different levels of collaboration effectiveness between the effective and less effectives cases of

collaboration.

4.3.2.4 Conscientiousness

All four cases displayed a high degree of similarity with respect to the conscientiousness of the

collaboration. Agreements made at the administrative level were always carefully documented

and used by project leaders to confront administrators when agreements were not followed

through.

“That meant that we made agreements at the process level. It allowed me, since I was

very transparent about that, toalways come back to that.” -Respondent #1

In a similar light, but in contrast, it is interesting to note that, no formal work agreements were

specified in any of the cases. All cases relied on social control to enforce the honoring of

agreements. This seems to have worked adequately since no issues were reported by respondents

as a result.

“When people were late for instance, very silly at a meeting, it was briefly noted in a

light manner” -Respondent #15

Even though all cases had, in principle, a board to resolve internal problems within the coalition,

no formal escalation model has been specified for personal conflicts. If any arose they were

handled at the lowest level possible with a minimum of interference by project leaders. When

conflicts arose at the administrative level the president usually acted as a mediator and conflicts

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were thus informally resolved. No major problems were reported by respondents as a result

which seems to downplay the need of formalization in these instances.

Since no differences were found between effective and less effective cases of collaboration with

respect to conscientiousness, the related factors are not a decisive factor explain the different

levels of collaboration effectiveness between the two groups of cases.

Regarding all the factors with respect to organizing, only the consideration for outcomes for the

parent organization is a decisive factor in explaining the different levels of collaboration

effectiveness between the the two groups of cases.

4.3.3 Process

4.3.3.1 Phasing

An important difference between the effective and less effective collaboration efforts is related to

the scope of the collaboration. Both effective collaborations, ODIJ and the OFGV, began as

relatively small collaboration efforts with a limited amount of partners. Only two partners were

added at the MDIJ and at the OFGV the northen municipalities and from the Gooi & Vechtstreek

participated halfway during the design phase. This made collaborating significantly easier than at

the RUD Drenthe where they started on the scale of the whole Province and at the ODZOB with

a large amount of owners. This is illustrated by a quote from the OFGV:

“You notice that progress was rapid with only 4 partners. In that respect it is clever to

start with a small group and expand it afterwards. You then stand on a riding train which

passed a few stations already. So others don’t have a say on those stations any longer

which makes it easier.” -Respondent #5

A coalition which characterized by a limited number of owners or a coalition that progressively

increases ownership thus seems to be highly conducive for the effectiveness of collaborations.

Negotiations with a limited number of participants are obviously easier due to an inherently

limited number of interests. As a result progress is faster which can be leveraged to increase the

levels of trust for the RUD itself and among partners as also indicated in section 4.3.1.3. In turn

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this makes it more likely for other to participate in the collaboration which happened at the

OFGV where ownership was thus progressively increased. Progressively expanding coalition

membership is thus a decisive factor explaining the different levels of collaboration effectiveness

during the design phase of RUD’s.

The adoption of a detailed planning clearly outlining the process and timetables has not been

found in any the investigated cases. This probably stems from the fact the the design phase of

organizations in this context is of a complex and ambiguous nature with a predominant focus on

negotiation processes which are hard to capture in time tables. As a result, the process was only

chartered in terms of milestones, rather than details. This tracking of progress was the

responsibility of projectleaders, and the general boards kept a keen watch by adopting a

‘helicopter view’.

Another consistent finding among cases is the fact that workgroups worked parallel on products.

Most notably while working on the organization plan where many areas of expertise coincide.

This was necessary due to time pressure and had only limited effect in some instance on the

effectiveness of the collaboration when work groups had to wait on each other.

The monitoring of progress and parallel operation of workgroups among all cases may seem

conducive for collaboration effectiveness, but given its consistent nature among both effective

and less effective cases of collaboration is not a decisive factor explaining the different levels of

collaboration effectiveness among both types of cases.

The only decisive factor explaining the different levels of collaboration effectiveness between

the two groups of cases with respect to phasing is a limited or progressively increasing amount of

ownership of the coalition.

4.3.3.2 Casting

The aspect related to the specification of roles and responsibilities seems to have been quite an

issue for all investigated cases. All cases reported role conflict at both the organizational and

personal level. Role conflict at the organizational level was displayed by the Provinces and

stemmed from the fact that they where positioned by the central government as ‘process director’

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but were at the same time a more or less equal partner in the collaboration effort. Both roles were

at first adopted by the same person from the Province in all cases, but this led to ambiguous

discussions and conflicts with the municipalties.

“I remember we had one person at the table in our talks with the Province and that I did

not work out well. On the one hand he talked as a fellow sufferer confronted with

something that he didn’t want, but there was also the chance that he took on the role of

director and became a lot more directive.” –Respondent #10

As a result, the interests of the Province suffered. At the effective case of collaboration, MDIJ,

the role conflict was resolved by dividing both roles among different persons. At the other

effective case of collaboration, OFGV, the role conflict was only partially resolved by making

the president of the general/daily board responsible for the interests of the Province as participant.

At the less effective case of collaboration, RUD Drenthe, the role conflict of the Province was

resolved similarly as the MDIJ case and split between two persons. The role conflict at the other

case of less effective collaboration, ODZOB, was not resolved; rather the role of ‘process

director’ was virtually eliminated under fierce pressure from the municipalities.

The other type of role conflict experienced at the organizational level is a result of the

organizational form ‘public body’ based on the Wgr. Since it specifies that municipalities should

own the organization which provides services for their own municipality, city councils are

effectively client and boss at the same time. As a client they desire the lowest cost possibly, but

in the role of owner they want would strive a much higher prices for the services provided to

ensure a smooth business operation. Officially both roles should be separated with the help of the

two boards where general board adopts the role of client and the daily board the role business

operator, but the paradox here is that members of the daily board are chosen from the general

board. This sometimes leads to the absurd situation where boardmembers vote against motions

they helped conceive.

“Something I struggle with, and that is related to the Wgr, is the presidency of the boards

and the fact that I am also a participant. This morning I was president and then it is very

hard to ask questions to yourself. (…) As a client you want to be tough, but as the owner

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you are presented with the bills. That could lead to tension. I noticed from my annotation.

On the one hand I would say this, and on the other hand I would say no.”

-Respondent #7

“There is tension within the system, as a daily board member our prime concern lies with

the organization itself. All five of us stand firmly for its interests. Sometimes however,

these are conflicting with the interests of those of you own municipality.” -Respondent #6

This type of role conflict was less salient for the effective case of collaboration at the MDIJ since

their adoption of the particular governance structure with a limited amount of owners. No

effective solutions have been proposed thusfar to resolve both the organizational and personal

types of role conflict. Both types of role conflict are somewhat lessened however when the work

climate allows for open and transparent communication so participants may inform what type of

role a person adopt.

Given the consistent finding of both types of role conflict, it would seem that it is factors related

to casting are not decisive in explaining the differences in collaboration effectiveness among the

two groups of cases.

4.3.3.3 Quality

None of the cases wondered about the nature of a high quality collaboration. As a result, no

quality criteria were formulated. A critical reflection on the nature of the collaboration in

question by the key players would maybe have led to intervention which would have been

welcome at the RUD Drenthe or ODZOB. The fact is however that all RUD’s were under severe

time pressure to meet the deadline and become operational as fast as possible. Faced with such

constraints and confronted with numerous problems, it comes as no surprise that none of the

cases could afford the time for reflection.

The consistent lack of ‘meta-thinking’ about the collaboration in all cases indicates that it is not a

factor decisive in explaining the differences among effective and less effective cases of

collaboration.

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Regarding all the factors with respect to process, only a limited or progressively increasing

amount of ownership of the coalition is a decisive factor in explaining the different levels of

collaboration effectiveness between the two groups of cases.

4.4 Additional Findings

Only one set of factors outside the specified model of of the dimensions relation, organization,

and process was found to affect the levels of collaboration effectiveness and is discussed below.

4.4.1 Parallel developments

All cases suffered from spill-over effects from other developments from the environment. At the

effective case of MDIJ the discussions about a potential fusion with the RUD from the NZKG

region led to a lot of ‘noise’ in the discussions with the Province who was very much in favor.

This seemed to have been a threat for the transparency and trust between the Province and the

involved municipalities at the MDIJ case. The project leaders tried to keep the discussions

separate from the discussion revoling around, what they saw, the prime task of establishing a

RUD in the first place. The other effective case of collaboration OFGV and the less effective

cases of collaboration ODZOB and RUD Drenthe suffered from parallel negotiations with trade

unions. These unions were unwilling to cooperate with the cases in question, because they failed

to get their way in other negotiations where only a few of the relevant participants were present

which led to delays in these cases. This considered in considerable delays that only the OFGV

could found not to be of a large impact on the overall project planning. Unfortunately, the less

effective cases of collaboration, RUD Drenthe and ODZOB, were unable to do so.

Given the inconsistent nature of negative impact of parallel developments across the effective

and less effective cases of collaboration, this factor is not decisive in explaining the differences

between the two types of cases.

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CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATIONS

The findings indicate that the decisive factors of collaborative capacity for promoting effective

collaboration among local governements during the design phase of RUD’s with respect to

relation are: the development and nature of relationships with city councils, a limited or positive

collaboration history among partners, a lack of perceived inequality among local governments,

the perceived legitimacy of project leaders and the leveraging of success. The decisive factor

with respect to organizing is the consideration for outcomes for the parent organizations. The

final decisive factor promoting effective collaboration during the design phase of RUD’s with

respect to process is that of a limited or progressively increasing amount of ownership of the

coalition.

The development and nature of relationships with city councils is important because it seems to

reduce anxiety experienced by the city council members with respect to costs and control issues.

Practitioners are thus strongly advised to develop these relationships on the basis of the ‘nearby

principle’.

A limited or positive collaboration history among partners has been found to promote

collaboration effectiveness because of the associated higher levels of trust between local

governements. Practitioners are thus advised to be aware of the shared collaboration history of

key players in the coalition. When this experience is positive is should be leveraged to further

facilitate the development of trust. When the collaboration experience is negative, one should

seek to make a clean break by trying to appoint different key players and heightened

transparency.

The lack of perceived inequality among collaborating partners also promotes effective

collaboration during the design phase. Practitioners are thus advised to recognize signs of the

‘calimero’ effect and to avoid dominance of a few larger local governments during decision

making processes.

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Collaboration effectiness is further enhanced during the design phase of RUD’s when

projectleaders are perceived as impartial and thus legitimate. When projectleaders find

themselves unable to work effectively because of a lack of perceived legitimacy, they are be

strongly advised to address the issue with relevant coalition members. It also indicates that

coalitions should constantly be building a new cadre of organizational leaders when the lack of

perceived legitimacy can not be effective solved and the projectleader has to be replaced.

When coalitions are in a position to leverage collaboration success, they are strongly advised to

do so to further the development of trust among coalition members and with respect to city

councils. In this light, practitioners should also be aware of the power of image building for

fostering trust among the coalition and with respect to the city councils.

The findings indicate that a consideration for the outcomes of the collaboration for the parent

organizations is an important factor affecting the levels of collaboration effectiveness during the

design phase of RUD’s. Together with relationship development towards city councils outlined

above it reduces the anxiety of city councils for the collaboration. Practitioners are thus

encouraged to display this sensitivity towards outcomes for the parent organizations to further

the development of trust for the coalition.

The final factor of limited ownership or progressively increasing ownership of the RUD in

formation also seems conducive for the effectiveness of collaboration during the design phase.

By doing so, it is easier to unite different interests and the much needed trust can develop easier

at the administrative level. Practitioners are thus advised to start with a limited number of

participants and add new coalition members during the design phase if possible. Simmilarly,

coaltions are urged to think of ways to implement governance structures with a limited amount

of owners when this is feasible.

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DISCUSSION

6.1 Theoretical Discussion

Reviewing the findings and conclusions in light of the theory specified in chapter two yields

some interesting insights. In order to facilitate discussing these insights the integrated model on

collaborative capacity is displayed below and the decisive factors that explain collaboration

effectiveness are placed within the right row and column. For the sake of clarity the factors are

numbered as follows in the model: 1) development and nature of relationships with city councils,

2) a limited or positive collaboration history among partners, 3) a lack of perceived inequality

among local governments, 4) the perceived legitimacy of project leaders, 5) the leveraging of

success, 6) consideration for outcomes for the parent organizations, and 7) limited or

progressively increasing amount of ownership of the coalition.

relation organization process

incentive 5 - -

willingness 1,2,3 6 -

ability 4 - 7

capacity - - -

Figure 4. Integrated and loaded model collaborative capacity based on Einbeinder et al. (2000)

and Kaats & Opheij (2013) and the research findings.

Three observations immediately come to mind. First, it is interesting that the capacity to

collaborate yields no decisive factors in explaining collaboration effectiveness during the design

phase of RUD’s. The factors related to the capacity to collaborate refer to ‘the coordination

mechanisms available [that] dictate the extent to which participants have the means or the

opportunity to engage in collaborative behavior’ (Einbeinder et al., 2000). That no decisive

factors on this level were found in this study can be explained by the fact that the coordinating

mechanisms are all relatively similar for all cases. The fact that all cases reflected collaborations

within the domain of public management which are closely regulated by laws such as the Wgr

that specify coordinating mechanisms, means that the cases could not display a significant

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amount of variation which impedes the existence of differences in operation between the

effective and less effective case of collaboration.

The second observation that can be made on the basis of figure 4, is that most factors reside

within the dimension of relation. This is not surprising given the emphasis in the literature of

developing collaborative capacity within the dimension of relation since a ‘collaboration is

ultimately about developing the social relationships needed to achieve desired goals’ (Foster-

Fishman et al., 2001, p.251). Respondent also stress the importance of relationship development

as illustrated by the following quote:

“In collaborations it is of the utmost importance that there is a spark between key players.

If there is none, it ends. Whatever the quality of your plans. (…) Collaborations are

always works of people.” -Respondent #4

Despite this importance, none of the cases specifically awarded attention towards developing

positive personal relations which seems highly surprising given the above statements. At the

administrative level, as indicated in the results section 4.3.1.1., the lack of relationship

development was explained by the fact that aldermen are usually well acquainted with each other

from prior collaboration experiences or through shared membership of a political party. This

notion of overlapping ties is better known as ‘multiplexity’ within the literature on social

networks. This concept refers to ‘the tendency for two or more ties to occur together’ (Carrington,

Scott & Wasserman, 2005, p.164). The concept of multiplexity has been offered as a predictor of

ILSA creation since research has showed that ILSA’s are more likely to be formed when

administrators are already connected. However, this is only true for voluntary collaborations and

when the prior collaborations/ties are positive. When collaborations are of a non-voluntary

nature, as with the formation of RUD’s, the concept of multiplexity actually backfires as

indicated by the results of this thesis given the fact that prior collaboration experiences are

usually negative and actually reduce the effectiveness of collaboration. Thus it seems crucial that

coalitions afford time and resources towards building positive relationships at the administrative

level.

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By contrast, the need for relationship development at the workgroup or official level seems much

less important given the reported high levels of open communication and provision of feedback

on this level. This finding can be explained with the theory of metropolitan governance by

Frederickson (1999). His theory explains that public officials are more likely to work together

than administrators because they operate on a larger time horizon and are not sensitive towards

electoral outcomes of collaboration which enhances open communication. He also states that

together with the shared norms, professional values, their training and nature of civil service of

public officials makes them the best actors for negotiating about the extent of the collaboration.

As it is, these negotiations actually occur during the design phase of RUD’s which confirms the

suitability of the metropolitan governance theory. The above also suggests that collaborations

should ideally be de-politicized and exclusively formed and operated by public managers and

invites administrators to look beyond the borders of their jurisdiction and become an

administrator for the whole of the region rather than their own municipality. How such behavior

could be institutionalized given the democratic legitimacy principle on which administrators

operate is however very much an open question and a prime source of continued debate within

the literature of public management and practitioners alike.

This debate revolves around the possibilities of the city council in steering the collaboration to

target both system level as well as individual outcomes. The problem however is that ‘network

governance may threaten and marginalize traditional elected officials’ (Zeemering, 2008, p.733).

The marginalization of their role is further aggravated since administrators often focus on

efficiency rather than democratic legitimacy of the collaboration (Sørensen, 2006). This last

author offers that city council members should engage in ‘metagovernance’ of the collaboration

which is about ‘an indirect form of governing that is exercised by influencing various processes

of self governance’ (Sørensen, 2006, p.100) in order to promote system level outcomes. The

important findings of relationship development with respect to city councils of this research adds

to this notion by claiming that the project leaders of coalition have an important role here in

helping identifying potential means for self governance without undermining the democratic

legitimacy of the collaboration.

A third and final interesting observation that stems from figure 4, is the fact that only one factor

related to the incentive to collaborate was decisive in explaining different levels of collaboration

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effectiveness: the leveraging of success. This is probably a result from the fact that the formation

of RUD’s was involuntary and sanctioned by the central government so factors related to

incentivizing coalition members were effectively rendered mute. The effect of this measure is

that the stage of the design phase known as problem-setting has been distorted in the context of

RUD formation. However, this stage has to be successfully concluded before the coalition can

effectively move to the next stages of direction-setting and structuring (Gray, 1985). Given the

fact that local governments were only included during the direction-setting stage they were

unable to develop a shard vision around the targeted domain problem of suboptimal and

inefficient service delivery with respect to environmental policy and regulation. Furthermore, all

the cases reported a low sense of urgency towards the supposed domain level problem as

identified by the central government. As a consequence, the possibilities to engage in

Institutional Collective Action (ICA) were much lower and which could have negatively affected

collaboration effectiveness among all cases.

A final remark in discussing the results, not specifically related to figure 4, is that around the

development of trust within the coalition. Theory explained that trust is part of a mutually

reinforcing core between reciprocity and reputation of coalition members. However, the

dynamics between these three concepts could be argued to be distorted. First, reciprocity could

not be wielded effectively because punishment of non-collaborative behavior was not possible.

Formally the Provinces were appointed by the central government to direct the collaboration but

it did not specify any measures for enforcement. Also, the Province was sort of an equal partner

which complicated their role as process-director. Furthermore, the predictability of

transformation processes during the collaboration was difficult to illustrate, particularly for the

less effective cases of collaboration which makes reciprocity a much less effective factor. The

final factor that complicates the operation of reciprocity within the mutually reinforcing

mechanism is the fact that there were large differences on the benefits received of the RUD

between small and larger municipalities whose contrast was salient for the less effective cases of

collaboration. Establishing a positive loop between trust, reciprocity, and reputation was there

for difficult for the coalitions under study. Especially when considering the initial low levels of

trust and the suffering through bad reputations stemming from prior collaborations.

72

Vangen & Huxham (2003) offer a way out of these difficulties however. They state that a

positive trust loop can be established even in situations characterized by the lack of a history of

trust. In order to do so, practitioners need ‘to have both the ability to form expectations about the

future outcomes of the collaboration and a willingness to take a risk’ (Vangen & Huxham, 2003,

p.16). When participants are able to do so and a trusting act is reciprocated by another ‘a durable

basis for cooperation can be erected’ (Calton and Lad, 1995, p. 281). Vangen & Huxham urge

for the initiation of modest and low-risk collaborations and progressively increase the level of

ambition when trust develops. This seems be consistent with the findings at the MDIJ and OFGV

which displayed higher levels of trust which seems, among other factors, to be a result of limited

or progressively increasing ownership of the RUD.

6.2 Methodological Limitations

A few limitations as a result of this study are noted. Since RUD’s are believed to be a typical

case of ILSA’s, transferability of research findings should be possible towards ILA’s in general,

with the caveat that this particular ILSA is not voluntary. Beyond that, transferability is seriously

impeded, but this is not in conflict with the research goal. In general, transferability of the

findings can be argued to be inherently low due to the nature of the comparative case study

design with a limited number of observations; which is a common drawback of qualitative

research. The limited number of cases investigated also had another important drawback in the

identification of decsive factors for collaboration effectiveness during the design phase of

collaboration. For the identification of decisive factors promoting effective collaboration during

the the design phase of RUD’s the factors had to be consistently present at both the effective

cases of collaboration and consistently absent at the less effective cases of collaboration. The

result is that some factors that may potentially have a decisive impact on collaboration

effectiveness were excluded. Increasing the number of cases, while upholding strict selection

criteria with the use of expanded control variables, could potentially make the findings of a

similar research more robust.

73

The credibility of this study was affirmed by using peer-reviewed articles and consultations by

experts in the field to construct the topic list. The thesis circle and both academic and

professional supervisor all acted in auditing roles to ensure a trustworthy research process. The

respondents, however, may have suffered from history bias because their collaboration efforts

dated untill two years back which may have impaired their memory. In addition, almost without

fail all the boardmembers interviewed for this study characterized the the RUD formation

process as effective, often confliting with the findings found at the level of officials. Whenever

this happened, the findings from the employee were used, because the the political nature of

board positions was believed to sometimes impair the truthfulness of respondents at this level.

The dependability of the research is ensured by carefully selecting cases using the provided

selection criteria and careful handling of data with the help of recording devices, CAQDAS F4

analyse and online data storage. Transcripts, within and cross case analysis tabels were provided

to make the replication of this study possible. Furthermore, respondents were being asked to

verify the transcripts in order to reduce interpretation errors. However, it is felt that since the

interviews with the experts for selecting the cases were not transcribed this study suffers with

respect to the case selection.

Every effort was taken to maximize the ‘confirmability’ of this research endeavor. One example

was the combination of literature provided by Twynstra Gudde and peer reviewed scientific

articles. Careful attention was also paid while interviewing respondents not to influence them

into a particular line of reasoning. Once more the thesis circle and supervisors had a critical role

here in monitoring the process as a scientific exercise.

6.3 Directions for Future Research

The first recommendation for future research is to expand both the width and depth of the

research on collaboration. The dimensions seem to be highly inter-related so future research

should embrace the concept of collaboration holistically. This means that the full model bij Kaats

& Opheij (2013) should preferably be investigated and not just factors related to relation,

organization, and process. Likewise, it would be interesting if all phases were investigated in

order to test the dynamic nature of collaborative capacity with respect to the development phase

of the collaboration as indicated by (Foster-Fishman et al., 2001). It should be interesting to see

74

how the nature of collaborative capacity develops throughout all the phases of collaboration.

Future research should also benefit by increasing the number of cases investigated to increase the

transferability of its findings. Also, future researchers on collaborative capacity are advised to

investigate voluntary collaborations within public management since these would like

lydifferentiate more in terms of collaborative capacity than involuntary collaborations.

Furthermore, it would be interesting to investigate the the factors conducive for collaboration for

the establishment of virtual or networked versions of ILSA’s given the possibilities fostered by

ICT and the increasing attention in public management for these types of collaborations.

Research on organizational forms and their suitability for public collaborations is also believed

to yield promising findings, especially when regarding the current dissatisfaction with the ‘public

body’ on the basis of the Wgr, the role conflict that boardmembers experience and the need for

collaborations that enhance system level outcomes. Some collaborating municipalities currently

experiment with ILSA’s on the basis of private organizational forms, but the paradox of

democratic legitimacy seems thusfar not to have been adequately resolved.

75

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78

79

Dimension Theme OD IJmond OFGV RUD Drenthe ODZOB

Relation Connecting -no specific stimulation of

developing personal relations

-collaboration of the basis of

equality

-active feedback collection

-both formal and informal ways

of communication

-limited celebration of successes

-poor, unconstructive relation

-dominant role Province,

internally oriented

-no specific stimulation of

developing personal relations

-external communication is

client-oriented

-specific attention relationship

city councils

-distance between daily and

general board

-limited celebration of successes

-unconstructive relation

-pressure from ministry used to

further collaboration

-no dominant role Province due

to lack of authority

-no specific stimulation of

developing personal relations

-both formal and informal ways

of communication

-feedback in times of crises

-open internal communication,

but not at administrative level

-limited celebration of successes

-pressure from ministry used to

further collaboration

-personal contact with ministry

kept it interference at minimum

-dominant role Province

-no specific stimulation of

developing personal relations

-feedback in times of crises

-both formal and informal ways

of communication

-open internal communication,

but not always at administrative

level

-limited celebration of successes

-limited contact ministry,

neither positive or negative

effect

-at first dominant role Province

which evolved to a facilitative

one

Group Dynamics -formal, critical work climate at

administrative level

-critical, but positive internal

work climate

-former org. performed well

-former org. conducive creating

shared point of reference

-criticism governance Province

and ministry by expanding prior

org.

-negative experiences with

collaboration on basis Wgr in

other instances among

municipalities

-negative collaboration

experiences between Province

and municipalities

-underscores importance of

liking between key players

-attention for developing culture

-positive internal work climate

-limited collaboration

experience partner due to youth

region

-negative collaboration

experiences between Province

and municipalities

-positive collaboration

experiences administrative level

-tension between large and

small municipalities

-fear for surrendering power on

administrative level

-positive internal work climate

-negative experiences with

collaboration on basis Wgr in

other instances among

municipalities

-tension between large and

small municipalities

-collectivistic mindset

undermined through regional

representatives in board

-former org. performed poorly

-former director became

quartermaster for new org.

resulted in lack of trust

-negative collaboration

experiences between Province

and municipalities

-negative collaboration

experience between small and

large municipalities

Trust -lack of trust in org. form

-lack of trust between

municipalities and Province

-transparent discussions

-lack of trust in org. form

-lack of trust at administrative

level

-underscores importance of org.

performance and impression

management for developing

trust

-lack of trust in org. form

-developing trust through

transparency

-trust within project org. but not

at administrative level

-lack of trust in org. form

-examples of opportunistic

behavior at project org. and

administrative level

-underscores importance of org.

performance for developing

trust

Appendix 1. Cross-case analysis table

Leadership -usage of informal leadership

within project. org

-informal leadership evaluation

-complementarity internal

leadership

-uniting leadership president

board

-usage of informal leadership at

administrative level

-complementarity internal

leadership

-uniting leadership president

board

-usage of informal leadership

within project org. and

administrative level

-uniting leadership

representative Province

-complementarity internal

leadership

-informal leadership evaluation

Organization Governance -not all participants are owners

of the organization

-both aldermen and city council

members in general board

-short lines between officials

and aldermen

-all participants are owner of the

organization

-regional representation in daily

board

-rotating presidency boards

-all participants are owner of the

organization

-regional representation in daily

board

-distance aldermen and city

council

-positive work climate officials

spilled over to administrative

level

-all participants are owner of the

organization

-regional representation in daily

board

Support -not all participants represented

in project org.

-specific orientation towards

impact parent orgs.

-neutral stance administrative

discussions

-explicit focus for positive

outcomes parent org.

-closing of distance through

‘closeness principle’ and active

role org. informing parent orgs.

-explicit formulation of control

mechanisms for owners

-specific orientation towards

impact parent orgs.

-investing in political sensitivity

director

-explicit focus for positive

outcomes parent org.

-all participants represented in

project org.

-difficulty in identifying impact

parent organizations

-limited effort closing gap

between org. and parent orgs.

-no orientation towards impact

parent orgs.

-city councils were informed by

their aldermen represented in

the board, difficulty when only

represented in general board due

information gap

-neutral stance administrative

discussions

-limited focus positive outcomes

parent org.

-limited effort closing gap

between org. and parent orgs.

-sensitivity towards closing gap

daily and general board

Decisiveness -decisive project leader

-spillover effects from project

org. are mediated at the

administrative level

-project org. attracted

employees with stature and

authority within parent org.

-decisive project leader

-predominantly employees from

Province in project org.

-close interaction between

president boards and

representative Province for

developing common ground

-attention for selection project

org. members

-decisive project leader

-usage of external consultancy

-project org. attracted

employees with stature and

authority within parent org.

-selection board members on

basis of expertise

-project org. members selected

at management level led to a

lack of practical understanding

-usage of external consultancy

-lack of project management

skills at start

-selection board members on

basis of expertise

-project org. attracted

-project org. attracted

employees with stature and

authority within parent org.

employees with stature and

authority within parent org.

Conscientiousness -formal documentation of

agreements

-no formal work agreements,

rather focus on social control

-no formal escalation model

-conflicts are either directly

managed by project leader or

solved at board level

-formal documentation of

agreements

-no formal work agreements,

rather focus on social control

-no formal escalation model

-conflicts are either directly

managed by project leader or

solved at board level

-formal documentation of

agreements

-no formal work agreements,

rather focus on social control

-no formal escalation model

-conflicts are either directly

managed by project leader or

solved at board level

-formal documentation of

agreements

-no formal work agreements,

rather focus on social control

-no formal escalation model

-conflicts are either directly

managed by project leader or

solved at board level

Process Phasing -limited number of partners

conducive for progress

-board members responsible for

‘helicopter view’

-general process outlined

beforehand

-work in project org. organized

in parallel ways

-difference bottom-up process

and top-down enforcement led

to ambiguity about goal

-limited number of partners

conducive for progress

-work in project org. organized

in parallel ways

-clear delineation of roles and

responsibilities within project

org

-difference bottom-up process

and top-down enforcement led

to ambiguity about goal.

-limited outlining of process

-work in project org. organized

in parallel ways

-difference bottom-up process

and top-down enforcement led

to ambiguity about goal

-general process outlined

beforehand

-work in project org. organized

in parallel ways

-difference bottom-up process

and top-down enforcement led

to ambiguity about goal

Balance -sometimes lack of knowledge

members project org.

-attention towards uniting

capabilities management project

org.

-differences quality board

members between small and

larger municipalities

- -

Casting -role conflict Province

-potential role conflict president

daily/general board

-role conflict Province at start

-potential role conflict president

daily/general board mediated by

experience

-role conflict Province at start

-lack of role clarity

municipalities

-role conflict Province

-role conflict quartermaster

-role conflict president

daily/general board

-role conflict municipalites

Quality -result oriented project leader

-no quality criteria employed

-result oriented project leader

-no quality criteria employed

-result oriented project leader

-no quality criteria employed

-no quality criteria employed

Parallel

developments

-disagreements about potential

fusion of org. with org. from

another region hampered

collaboration

-failed collaboration effort in

other instances frustrated

collaboration

-failed prior negotiations unions

and Province frustrated

negotiations in this instance

-parallel negotiations between

fire dept. hampered progress

-unions urged for province wide

arrangement which did not

occur and led to delays

Case

MDIJ

Dimension Projectleader #1 Employee #2 President board/aldermen #3

Relation Connecting -bestuurlijke binding creëren met

contractgemeenten blijft vraagstuk.

Dit wordt gedaan m.b.v.

nieuwsbrieven, aparte bijeenkomsten

en het bestuursplatform

-legitimiteit van partners is staat los

van afname taken

-er bestond een nieuwsbrief voor het

personeel en raadsleden

-naast geplande formele overleggen,

ook tussendoor veel overleg gehad.

-er wordt feedback gegeven op

bestuurlijk niveau en het wordt op

ambtelijk niveau actief opgehaald

'Als het ze niet aanstaan dan melden

ze het ook, of als ze er vragen over

hebben.'

'Ik organiseer ook regelmatig een

ambtelijke werkgroep om daar

mensen in mee te nemen. Wat we

aan het doen zijn. Als het gaat over

de hele discussie, de toetreding tot de

GR, wat vinden jullie daarvan. Wat

is voor jullie haalbaar? Dat moet je

toch ophalen, die informatie.'

-WABO taken naar de RUD levert

angst op bij gemeenten ambtenaren

-samenwerking op basis van

gelijkwaardigheid

-mijlpalen als tekenen sociaal plan

worden gevierd

-belangen van aanwezigen wordt

gerespecteerd

-Mensen werden niet altijd als legitiem

gezien tijdens het samenwerken door

platte organisatiecultuur terwijl ze een

hiërarchische cultuur gewend waren

-geen aandacht voor ontwikkelen

persoonlijke relaties. Dit is organisch

gegroeid.

-Er is vastgesteld dat er eigenlijk te

weinig successen gevierd worden.

-Heel slechte relatie. Rijk vaart vooral

op informatie vanuit Provincie en

heeft kritiek geuit op constructie.

Zonder effect hiervan na te gaan bij

contractgemeenten. 'En wat je ziet is

dat het ministerie vooral heeft

geluisterd naar signalen van de

Provincie, en dat het Rijk vanuit zijn

ivoren toren te weinig interesse heeft

getoond om te vragen hoe het hier echt

zit.'

-provincie is naar zichzelf ingekeerd te

werk gegaan bij het beschrijven van

haar verschillende rollen. Niet in

samenspraak met partners.

-Er wordt vaak en transparant

gesproken. ‘Ik houd van een open

en transparant proces en het

resultaat hiervan. Welk resultaat

dan ook. Ik wil dat resultaat, open

en transparant, met alle

betrokkenen doorlopen.’

-Gemeenten achten het

onwenselijk dat de Provincie ‘van

bovenop’ bepaalt hoe de dienst

eruit ziet en welke taken de

gemeenten daarin moeten

inbrengen.

Appendix 2. Within-case analysis tables

-Veel kritiek op constructie, weinig

interesse

'Ja, wat dat betreft kan ik niet zeggen

dat ze eens een keertje geïnteresseerd

langs zijn geweest om te vragen van

goh, hoe ziet dat eruit en wat is nou

eigenlijk jullie succesfactor. Wat

maakt nou dat al die gemeenten bij

jullie aan willen sluiten.'

Group

Dynamics

-formele, open sfeer in DB

-intern kritisch, maar positieve sfeer

'Het mag best wel eens een keertje

spannend worden'

-Sinds 1999 bestond er al een

milieudienst die goed draait daardoor

positieve effecten

'Er is wel een onderzoek geweest,

hier op deze regio, en daaruit komt

de milieudienst IJmond wel naar

voren als een van de succesvolle

gemeenschappelijke regelingen,

maar de gemeenten zijn niet gek van

gemeenschappelijke regelingen.'

'Ze kennen ons, ze vertrouwen ons,

en ze willen met ons door.'

-Ook negatieve effecten doordat

provincie en ministerie kritiek

hebben op bestaande constructie met

contractgemeenten

-Negatief v.w.b. GR'en

'Wat dat betreft hebben wij te maken

met wat ze wel eens zeggen, het

trauma van een VEK.

-Het is een bestaande GR met 4

eigenaren die ik de loop der tijd is

uitgebreid met contractpartners

-Oude dienst was succesvol

-Opdracht is makkelijker doordat de

dienst al bestond: 'Dat maakt het wel

makkelijke als je dus al vanuit een

bestaand concept wat werkt kunt

praten'.

-De dienst heeft een 'zware' GR

waaraan veel bevoegdheden zijn

overgedragen. Als deze dienst niet had

bestaan was het nooit op tijd gelukt

om een RUD te hebben. 'Dat hadden

we in dit tijdsgewricht, als er nog niets

was geweest, was dat denk ik niet

gelukt. Gemeentes zijn veel

terughoudender met het overgeven van

taken en bevoegdheden, en zich

verbinden aan partijen'.

-Werken vanuit een

gemeenschappelijk kader is

bevorderend geweest voor

samenwerking. 'En dat

-Er worden goede inhoudelijke

discussies gevoerd. Dat zegt niets

over de onderlinge verhoudingen.

‘Hard op de inhoud, zacht op de

relatie’ ‘Ik ben geen voorzitter die

nadrukkelijk aanwezig is of wil

zijn bij de formele en informele

overlegstructuur. Iedereen is

gelijk. In die zin hebben we geen

formele of informele leiderschap

binnen de dienst. (…) Dat is de

kracht van de Milieudienst

IJmond.’

Veiligheidsregio Kennemerland. Dat

is een dienst dat is opgericht,

verplicht op grond van de wet op

veiligheidsregio’s. En dat heeft de

gemeente veel geld gekost.'

-Negatief tussen RUD en Provincie

door juridisch geschil.

gemeenschappelijke kader was niet

een luchtkasteel, maar was gewoon

een organisatie die er al stond. Dus je

kunt heel precies zeggen hoe het eruit

gaat zien. Tot op welke stoel een

medewerker gaat zitten. In plaats dat

je praat over een pand wat niet bestaat,

met ICT dat niet bestaat en met teams

die niet bestaan. Dat maakt het heel

anders'.

-Negatieve ervaring door VEK.

'Sindsdien is er alleen maar het beeld

dat het bakken met geld kost en niks

meer uitkomt. En daar hebben wij ook

last van'.

Trust -Het vertouwen in GR'en is laag door

slechte ervaringen

-Onderlinge vertrouwen is laag door

opportunistische opstelling provincie

'Die onderbouwing hebben we niet

gezien, alleen we zijn toen wel gaan

praten intern, en dat heeft geleid tot

vier FTE minder.'

-Over inhoud wordt open en

transparant gesproken in AB/DB

Leadership -open communicatie

' Dus van het begin af aan hebben wij

aangegeven, wij hebben een belang

om niet te duur uit te zijn, wij hebben

een belang dat wij niet zo direct gaan

betalen voor teveel formatie.'

-directecommunicatiestijl

-differentiatie leiderschapsstijlen

projectleider en directeur

'Maar het kan ook wel eens handig

-Weinig hiërarchisch leiderschap

-Zeer resultaatgerichte projectleider

-stijlen projectleider en directeur zijn

complementair.

-Verantwoordelijkheid van vz

AB/DB is om verhoudingen goed

te laten verlopen en tegelijkertijd

voor ‘een goede, transparante,

open, eerlijke discussie te voeren

over de inhoudelijke punten’.

-Stijl VZ is gericht op goed

houden relatie, maar wel met

duidelijke focus op inhoud. ‘Ik

kijk niet alleen naar de blauwe

zijn, dat ik het even stevig neerzet,

hij vervolgens.. ook echte good cop

bad cop.'

-Informele leider wordt voor

inhoudelijke zaken ingeschakeld

-Leiderschap wordt informeel

geëvalueerd

ogen van mensen. (…) ‘De

verhouding zal altijd goed blijven,

want ik houd van mensen. Ik

vertrouw een mens ook. Alleen

ideeën worden beoordeeld op

basis van inhoud en kwaliteit.’ ‘Ik

ben verbinder. Ik geef graag de

mensen de ruimte, gelegenheid,

hun gevoelens, hun argumenten

hun vragen tot hun recht te laten

komen. Daarin zoek ik de gemene

deler, de kansen om bestuurders

bij elkaar te kunnen brengen.’

Organizati

on

Governance -zowel raadsleden als wethouders in

AB

-Niet alle deelnemers zijn eigenaar

van de RUD. van 4 naar 6 eigenaren,

andere deelnemingen o.b.v. DVO

-bestuurlijk overleg o.b.v.

gelijkwaardigheid

-zowel interne werkgroepen als brede

bestuurlijke werkgroepen

-Milieudienst IJmond 'zit heel dicht op

hun bestuurder'

Support -ambtelijke stuurgroep bestaande uit

provincie, Haarlem en RUD IJmond

neutrale houding t.a.v. bestuurlijke

discussies

'Maar ja dat is tussen de gemeenten

in he, daar willen wij vooral niet

tussen gaan zitten'

-voor niet wettelijke taken ook

beleidsvoorbereidend

-RUD voert ook non-rud taken uit.

'Zandvoort wil het liefst dat we alles

doen voor ze. (...). Is geen

basistakenpakket, is geen RUD taak

-Nadrukkelijk belang dat iedereen van

de dienst zou moeten kunnen

profiteren door constructie met

beperkt aantal eigenaren.

-afstand kort houden door: 'besturen,

informeren, bijhouden, van hoe het

proces ervoor staat, meenemen in de

stappen die worden genomen. Ook

weer die belangen, voor je eigen

organisatie, maar ook het oog hebben

voor die van de gemeenten. Dat is het

essentiële punt'

-Nabijheidsprincipe door: 'Ik denk een

Er is een platform waarbij

opdrachtgevers bij elkaar komen

om gewenste waar ze hun wensen

en bevindingen kenbaar kunnen

maken.

-Hoewel verantwoordelijkheid

van controle en democratische

legitimiteit bij de gemeenten ligt

neemt de dienst een actieve rol in

het verkennen van de

mogelijkheden en instrumenten

hiervoor.

maar is daar wel onwijs belangrijk.

Voor ze, om het gewoon goed

geregeld te hebben. Ja, die laten wij

dan niet zitten. Ik bedoel dat is

gewoon een hele belangrijke afnemer

van ons.

-Het nabijheidsprincipe is belangrijk

voor bestuurders

'Ze zitten niet op zoveel kilometer

afstand, als er iets is dan bellen, zijn

we bij wijze van spreken met een

half uur zijn we er. Een wethouder

die mailt me op een zaterdag en die

heeft gewoon zaterdagavond

antwoord. Korte lijnen.'

van de zaken die daarin cruciaal is

geweest, is dat deze

gemeenschappelijke regeling nooit een

in zichzelf gekeerde organisatie is

geworden. dat dus niet verwacht wordt

van de gemeenten om een regie op te

houden, dus dat er ergens een

regisseur in een gemeente, of de

opdrachtgever, of de eigenaarsrol

expliciet wordt gemaakt. Maar dat die

rol vanuit de milieudienst zelf naar de

gemeentes is gemaakt.'

Decisiveness -wanneer hobbels in de ene

werkgroep effect hadden op een

andere werkgroep werd dit

teruggekoppeld aan bestuurlijke team

-Er zit verschil soms tussen wat er

gezegd wordt op ambtelijk en

bestuurlijk niveau. Geen invloed

vanuit RUD hierop

Conscientiousn

ess

-uitgangspunten zijn in vroegtijdig

stadium vastgesteld

-Afspraken op bestuurlijk niveau

worden vastgelegd

'Dus dat betekent dat wij daar op

procesniveau afspraken over willen

maken. En dat betekent dat wij,

omdat ik vanaf het begin af aan daar

transparant over ben geweest, kan ik

daar ook altijd weer op terugkomen'

-Wanneer met er ambtelijk niet

uitkwam is opgeschaald naar de

verschillende besturen.

-Geen expliciete 'hygiëneafspraken',

wel sprake van sociale controle

-Als er een conflict speelt wordt

het bestuur z.s.m. bij elkaar

geroepen om daar over en

transparant over te spreken. Via

vergadering of telefonisch.

-Besluiten worden vastgelegd in

notulen en bekrachtigd door het

DB.

-officiele escalatiemodel conflicten

persoonlijke relatie ambtelijk niveau

wordt niet gehanteerd. Wordt

opgelost door projectleider/directeur

-Op bestuurlijk model is er geen

escalatiemodel en moeten conflicten

in het bestuur worden opgelost of

tijdens borrel

-vooraf geen werkafspraken. Gaat

per keer.

Process Phasing -Stuurgroep behoud helikopterview

op voortgang

-Verschil tussen toezegging bottom-

up mogelijkheden vormgeving maar

topdown benadering van ministerie,

zonder wettelijke grondslag. Geeft

veel onduidelijkheid en onrust.

-Hele proces is van tevoren in kaart

gebracht met de momenten waarop

bestuurlijke beslissingen genomen

moesten worden.

-Er is parallel aan dossiers gewerkt,

heeft nauwelijks tot vertraging geleid.

-Overleg met bonden is trager gegaan

dan verwacht.

-Dreiging AMVB doordat partners

niet altijd volwaardig eigenaar zijn van

de GR.

-Onduidelijkheid door bottom-up

voorstel ministerie en top-down

benadering: 'Het is zo top-down

geweest als het maar zijn kan. Want

hoe het eruit moet zien is bepaald,

waar het uit moet bestaan is bepaald

en wie er aan mee doen is bepaald.

Hoezo bottom-up proces?'

Balance -interne projectorganisatie kende

relevante medewerkers die voor hun

taakveld verantwoordelijkheid

hadden

-Soms gebrek aan kennis in de

werkgroepen

-Goede kwaliteit medewerkers, soms

niet altijd inhoudelijk echter en

krijgen ze opdrachten mee

Casting -Rolambiguïteit provincie door inter-

bestuurlijktoezichthouder én

deelnemer. Leidt soms tot

rolconflict.

'Waarvan niet altijd duidelijk is

welke rol ze innemen.'

-Rolconflict is dreiging als VZ

DB/AB. ‘Je moet het zelf goed in

de gaten houden, beide rollen

gescheiden houden, wanneer praat

ik waarover? Als ik over de

inhoud praat, moet ik toezien dat

dat gerealiseerd wordt. Klaar. Dan

ben ik geen voorzitter van de

milieudienst. Maar als ik daar bij

de milieudienst, bij het DB met de

AB bezig ben, dan moet ik zien

dat de organisatie de afgesproken

lijn uitgedragen heeft. Dat zijn de

lijnen die je scherp in de gaten

moet houden.’

-Rol scheiding Provincie als

deelnemer en procesregisseur is

niet altijd helder. ‘Soms is het

heel erg moeilijk om daar scherpe

lijnen in te zien, in welke

hoedanigheid de Provincie daar

bij de discussie welke rollen

insteekt en stimuleert. (..) En dan

moet je ongelooflijk scherp

toezien, zowel de regiefunctie als

de inhoudelijk betrokken

opdrachtgever en opdrachtnemer

rol uit elkaar te halen en om daar

een scherpe rol in te spelen. (…)

Dat is aan de Provincie de

aangelegenheid, of misschien gaat

de staatsecretaris erover, om te

kunnen zeggen de Provincie is

regievoerder, gaat niet over de

inhoud, zodat zij objectief,

transparant, het hele proces

kunnen begeleiden.’

Quality -resultaatgericht sturing leider

' Dus dat betekent dat er linksom of

rechtsom resultaat gehaald moet

worden. En ja, als dat niet lukt met

de een, dan met de ander. Dat ook

wel weer.

Parallel

developme

nts

-mogelijke samenwerking NZKG

levert bestuurlijke ruis op

-Onderhandelingen bonden NZKG

hadden geen effect bij RUD IJmond

-binding creëren door inhoud met

bestuurders is lastig doordat landelijk

een toezichtstrategie wordt

ontwikkeld

-samenwerking met NZKG was in het

belang van de Provincie, maar in dit

proces ontbrak vertrouwen. Hierdoor

werden belangen minder expliciet in

dit proces. Wel succesvol kunnen

scheiden.

-Wet dualisering bestuur heeft ervoor

gezorgd dat de raden meer op afstand

staan. Hier hebben ze echter nog een

oude GR waar dit niet het geval is en

raadsleden wel in ab/db zitten.

Case OFGV Dimension Projectleader/director #4 Employee #5 President

board/aldermen #6

Representative Province

#7

Relation Connecting -Door eerste projectleider

zijn de verschillende raden

uitvoerig bezocht om

vurig pleidooi te houden

vóór deelname in de RUD.

-Bij formele overleggen

spreekt met elkaar aan met

‘u’ of via de voorzitter

zodat ruzie maken gebeurt

in een veilige omgeving.

-Externe communicatie is

nadrukkelijk klantgericht.

-Verbinden door creëren

van gezamenlijk

referentiekader.

-Successen zijn gevierd bij

opleveren van mijlpalen

en het operationeel

worden van de dienst.

-Dwingend,

ongelijkwaardig karakter

van de relatie.

-Afstand tussen

noordelijke gemeenten en

zuidelijke gemeenten

zorgden aanvankelijk voor

een lage legitimiteit van

partners.

-Nauwelijks aandacht

voor ontwikkelen

persoonlijke relaties

binnen de

projectorganisatie.

-kwartiermaker heeft

rondes gemaakt ter

informeren bij de

verschillende raden. Zij

had moge mate van

bestuurlijke sensitiviteit.

-Interne communicatie

bestond uit projectgroep

overleggen,

klanbordgroep overleggen

en

medewerkersconferenties.

- Zonder het slechte weg

te poetsen ook positieve

verhalen delen op

bestuurlijk niveau.

-Er is geconcludeerd dat

successen te weinig zijn

gevierd.

-Geen dominante rol

-Er werd gesproken

tijdens formele

bestuurlijke overleggen

waaruit besluiten kwam

die de wethouders en

gedeputeerde door hun

eigen colleges moesten

krijgen.

-VZ betrachtte en open

en transparante houding

om relaties goed te

houden. ‘Er is een

moment geweest, toen

was er van alles en nog

wat over de begrotingen

te doen. Toen hebben

we ook echt met

excuses terug gemoeten

naar het AB, dat dat

proces niet goed was

gegaan. Dat heeft erg

geholpen, want tot dat

moment was er een

narrige sfeer in het AB.’

-Er is aandacht geweest

voor behalen van

mijlpalen met gebak,

trakteren en

complimenteren.

-Invulling rol van

Provincie werd

-Er bestaat een afstand

tussen DB en AB. Dit

komt met namelijk door

de frequentie waarmee

het DB bijeen kwam die

beduidend hoger ligt dan

dat van het AB.

-Op bestuurlijk niveau

komt men alleen mensen

tegen tijdens de beperkte

formele overleggen. In

andere gremia komt men

alleen bestuurders tegen

uit de eigen regio en is er

dus weinig interactie

tussen diegenen uit de

Gooi & Vechtstreek en

die uit Flevoland.

-Op ambtelijk niveau

ontstond de behoefte tot

meer overleg waarvoor

een speciaal

opdrachtgeversoverleg is

opgericht met alle

deelnemers.

-Het behalen en vieren

van succes is belangrijk

voor bestuurders om ze

‘te laten scoren’ naar hun

achterban en om

herkozen te worden

provincie in proces,

doordat gemeenten er

eerder waren dan de

Provincie zelf. ‘De

Provincie heft hier nog

lang niet zoveel autoriteit

al seen provincie Noord-

Holland of Zuid-Holland.

Dus daarmee is de

Provincie niet zo

bedreigend als die in

andere provincies is, is

mijn observatie.’

argwanend gevolgd

door gemeenten.

‘Misschien speelt ook

wel een beetje mee dat

een aantal gemeenten

bang was voor

dominantie van de

provincie. Dan gaat de

provincie dadelijk

uitmaken hoe het hier

moet. Dat kan toch niet

de werkelijkheid zijn!’

tijdens verkiezingen.

-Dwingende karakter was

positief voor

samenwerking. ‘De

dreiging van als je niet

meedoet, dan gaan wij

wel regelen dat jullie mee

moeten doen. Die heeft

daarbij wel geholpen. En

ook de rol die we vanuit

het ministerie, van

mevrouw Dekker, die

was de über-

kwartiermaker, die heeft

daar wel een positieve rol

in gehad.’

Group Dynamics -Het verkrijgen van een

‘klik’ is van grootste

belang tussen

sleutelfiguren. ‘Als het

niet klikt, dan stopt het.

Hoe goed je plannen ook

zijn. Samenwerkingen zijn

altijd mensenwerk’.

-Negatieve ervaringen in

het verleden zijn

beperkend voor de

samenwerkingsbereidheid

terwijl positieve

ervaringen dit verhogen.

‘Niet iedereen is blij met

de partners van de

samenwerking. Want er

-Sfeer in projectgroep was

positief. Voor deel te

verklaren doordat

sommige medewerkers

een toekomst voor

zichzelf zagen binnen de

dienst. Hierdoor soms wel

minder objectief.

-Discussie over geld en

formatie levert op zowel

ambtelijk als bestuurlijk

niveau altijd tot

meningsverschillen.

Discussie over inhoud

niet. ‘Het leuke is dat je

ziet dat als het over al dat

soort dingen gaat er altijd

-Eerste gedeputeerde

had een directieve stijl

van handelen die

daardoor weerstand

opriep bij wethouders.

‘Bij wethouders, die

voor een deel gekozen

zijn omdat ze eigenwijs

zijn, anders zit je niet op

deze stoel, valt dat niet

altijd even goed. Dus

sfeer was niet altijd

even plezierig.’

-Er is op bestuurlijk

niveau een groeiend

besef van eigenaarschap

voor de dienst.

-Er moest gewerkt

worden aan het vormen

van één cultuur door

verschillen tussen Gooi &

Vechtstreek en Flevoland.

zitten gemeentes

onderling en tussen

gemeentes en Provincie

animositeit. Dat kan

allerlei achtergronden

hebben.’ ‘Dan heb je nog

de bestuurders die elkaar

in verschillende

bestuurlijke gremia

waarschijnlijk eerder zijn

tegengekomen. (…) Als

dat heel plezierig was is

dat dat niet, maar als het

niet plezierig is geweest

dan zie je dat dus terug.’

gedoe is. Als je het over

de inhoud van het werk

hebt heb je elkaar altijd

getroffen. En is het altijd

leuk. Dat vinden mensen

altijd interessant.

-Inbrengen van

inhoudelijk punten in

AB/DB vergaderingen

werkt positief voor sfeer.

‘Het is altijd moeizaam

door allerlei meningen en

dat wordt heel vaak

stellingname en daar kom

je moeilijk tot elkaar. En

dan gaat het over inhoud

en dan vinden ze het

opeens allemaal gezellig.

En dan hebben we het heel

vaak over hetzelfde.

-Teleurstelling over

vroegere SepH

samenwerking door

vrijblijvende karakter.

-Eerste 5 partners hadden

een samenwerking die

goed liep. ‘Dat was een

club die stond als een huis

en dat stond niet ter

discussie en die deden hun

werk gewoon goed en

partijen namen af en

betaalden daar keurig hun

-Ervaringen met GR’en

zijn overwegend

positief op bestuurlijk

niveau.

bijdrage voor wat die

producten kostten. Dat

was een goede manier van

samenwerken. Dat is een

samenwerking die men

zelf heeft gewild. (…) Dat

is een hele andere basis

dan nu waar het toch

verplicht is geweest.’

-Doordat Flevoland een

relatief jonge provincie is

hebben de gemeenten

slechts een beperkte

onderlinge

samenwerkingservaring.

‘Het voordeel is hier, wij

zijn allemaal nog redelijk

nieuwe gemeenten,

iedereen is heel makkelijk

naar buiten. We zijn met

z’n allen nog aan het

pionieren elke dag en

dingen die uitgezocht

moeten worden, ook na

die 25 jaar dat we hier

zitten, dan die voor ons

nog relatief nieuw zijn,

omdat je weinig

geschiedenis hebt. Dus dat

gaat eigenlijk altijd wel

redelijk makkelijk.’

Trust -Soms sprake van

regelrechte animositeit

-Vertrouwen kweken door

delen positieve verhalen.

-Zolang onduidelijkheid

bestond over de mate

-Transparantie in de

samenwerking is

tussen bestuurders door

een laag vertrouwen.

-Vertrouwen is verworven

door dit te verdienen door

zaken goed voor elkaar te

hebben. Imago is hierbij

belangrijk. ‘Je moet je

heel erg bewust zijn van je

imagebuilding. Je kunt

alles maar 1 keer doen.

Als je een rapportage

geeft van wat je allemaal

gedaan hebt, dan moet je

wel zorgen dat die

helemaal klopt. Die eerste

keer dat je zo’n rapportage

geeft dan zet je een toon.

Als deze niet goed gaat

blijf je daar lang last van

houden, de volgende keer

zullen ze namelijk kijken

of het nu wel goed is, een

beetje die ondertoon. Dus

als het allemaal goed gaat

schep je een bepaald

verwachtingspatroon (…)

Dat soort verhalen zijn

eigenlijk veel belangrijker

dan het formele.’

-Impressiemanagement is

belangrijk voor

ontwikkelen van

vertrouwen.

‘Je merkt dat daardoor de

sfeer verandert en en er

meer begrip is van waar

wij voor bezig zijn. Dat

moet je heel voorzichtig

doen want vertrouwen

komt te voet en gaat te

paard.’

van het verplichtende

karakter vertoonde

wethouders

opportunistisch gedrag.

Toen hier meer

duidelijk in ontstond

nam dit af.

belangrijk voor het

ontwikkelen van

vertrouwen. Vooral op

momenten dat het minder

goed gaat met de

samenwerking.

-Ondanks het feit dat

gemeenten weten dat ze

tot elkaar veroordeeld zijn

proberen ze allemaal het

maximale voor hun

achterban te halen.

Leadership -Projectleider is vanaf

begin aangesteld als

kwartiermaker/directeur.

-Projectleider komt

nadrukkelijk op voor

belangen organisatie. ‘Ik

moet kunnen zeggen, dat

is goed dat u dat zegt als

bestuur, maar dat gaan we

dus niet doen. Dat is niet

verantwoord. Dus ook

daar probeer je

territorium, dat klinkt zo

fel, maar daar komt het

wel op neer, af te

bakenen.’

-Directieve stijl van

leiderschap. ‘Kijk wat ik

altijd zeg is: een

organisatie is niet een

democratisch iets. Het is

niet zo dat de meeste

stemmen gelden.

Uiteindelijk is er een

eindverantwoordelijke, er

is er ook één de baas.’

-Eerste projectleider had

verbindend leiderschap en

investeerde veel tijd in

relatie met bestuur en

verschillende raden.

Huidige

projectleider/directeur

heeft hier minder aandacht

voor en is meer gericht op

resultaat. Beschouwt als

complementariteit. ‘Zij

had een feilloos gevoel

voor bestuurders en wat

bestuurders willen horen.

En dat deed ze altijd op

een heel charmante

manier, altijd heel

welkom, heel voorkomend

en rustig. Wond zich

nergens over op, ook niet

als het heel serieus werd’

(…)‘Hij is wel iemand die

daar op den duur het

voortouw neemt en de

verantwoordelijkheid

neemt en stappen zet.’

-Directeur van Provincie

-Verbindend leiderschap

door vz. ‘Uitleggen dat

je begrip hebt voor het

argument, maar ook

proberen uit te leggen

waarom je er ook ander

naar kunt kijken. In

ieder geval wegblijven

van de macht. Wat echt

dodelijk zou zijn

geweest, is als we

gezegd zouden hebben,

jongens, qua

stemverhoudingen is als

de Provincie en de

gemeenten Lelystad en

Almere het eens zijn,

dan hebben we gewoon

een meerderheid klaar.

(…) Het belangrijkste

was wegblijven bij de

formele macht, want

dan was he besluit

weliswaar genomen,

maar was de sfeer

verziekt geraakt.’

-DB leden

Flevoland heeft

opgetreden als informeel

leider om raden mee te

krijgen. Geen formele

positie in

projectorganisatie hoewel

daar wel naar gezocht is.

‘Dat is natuurlijk een man

met kennis en invloed via

de gemeentesecretarissen

en op die manier heft hij

denk ik ook wel zitten

schaken. Wat niet altijd

iedereen zag, maar op de

achtergrond strategisch

bezig geweest om die

partijen bij elkaar te

krijgen.’

-Belangrijk om een

vaardige bestuurder als

voorzitter te hebben. ‘Het

helpt als je een vaardig

bestuurder hebt die ervoor

wil gaan. Die het dossier

zich toe-eigent en daar

slim me omgaat. (…) Die

vergadert handig en dat

helpt enorm.’

vertegenwoordigen rol

als informele leider naar

hun achterban vanuit de

verschillende regio’s.

Organization Governance -Individuele raden hebben

beperkte invloed op

vorming en inrichting van

de RUD, omdat ze

zeggenschap moeten delen

-Er zijn 5 DB leden. 2 uit

de Gooi & Vechstreek, 2

uit Flevoland en 1 van de

Provincie.

Voorzitterschap wordt

met andere gemeenten.

-Alle colleges van de

deelnemers zijn

vertegenwoordigd in het

AB Deze kiest vervolgens

het DB.

gerouleerd. Eerst was het

de Provincie en toen de

wethouder van Lelystad.

Support -RUD wordt met

argusogen bekeken voor

de kosten die gemaakt

worden. Omzichtig moet

de RUD hiermee omgaan.

‘Wij worden vooral gezien

als externe last en niet

zozeer als interne

aanwinst. Dat is een

politiek sentiment. Je kunt

alleen hopen dat dat je in

je houding en gedrag er

weinig aanleiding voor

geeft om dat te

bevestigen.’

-Dienst is niet puur alleen

voor uitvoering ook een

deel beleidsvormend.

‘Mijn ambitie is om de

uitvoering zo goed te doen

dat ze ook voor allerlei

beleidsvragen naar ons toe

komen. Hoe kunnen we

dit het beste insteken, hoe

moeten we ons beleid

formuleren om te zorgen

dat we altijd die kant

-Dienst heeft nadrukkelijk

duidelijk gemaakt op

welke manier gemeenten

controle hebben, wat hun

bijdrage kost en hoe ze

eventueel ook minder

producten kunnen

afnemen in de toekomst.

-Er is een klantgerichte

houding bij de dienst. ‘Je

moet laten zien dat je van

waarde bent en een

serieuze partner, die niet

geld over de balk gooit en

meer en groter wil, maar

die snapt waar de

bestuurders mee te maken

hebben in welke keuzes

zijn moeten maken, maar

ook wel staat voor het vak

waar wij voor staan.’

-Er is gewerkt aan het

bewustzijn van de dienst

voor de consequenties

die de vorming heeft

voor de gemeenten.

‘Ook daar geldt:

communicatie regelen

en proberen ook van de

OD een houding te

bewerkstelligen waarin

je open staat voor

opmerkingen en kritiek.

En dat was natuurlijk

niet altijd zo. Ze hadden

zoiets van: ze moeten

niet zeuren, we zijn een

nieuwe dienst, het gaat

allemaal anders, het

gaat om begrip voor het

verleden.’

-Ondanks het feit dat het

een opgelegde

samenwerking behelst,

wordt gekeken hoe de

RUD kwaliteits

verhogend en

kostenverlagend voor de

deelnemers kan werken.

-Het bestuur heeft moeten

werken aan het

bijbrengen van politieke

sensitiviteit van de

directeur. ‘We merken

dat hij nu ook wel op een

niveau is dat hij ook wel

beseft dat hij met

zeventien deelnemers te

maken heeft, die allemaal

verschillende

achtergronden hebben en

met verschillende

intenties en manieren

daarin zijn gestapt. Dat

gaat nu wel weer goed.’

opgaan, daar hebben we

een adviseursrol zeg maar.

Decisiveness -Projectgroep werd

voornamelijk bemenst

door mensen uit

Provincie.

-Geen keus wie deelneemt

in projectorganisatie,

daardoor bepaald type

mensen. ‘Je bent

afhankelijk van mensen

die hun vingertje

opsteken. Per saldo heb je

dan een bepaald type

mensen te pakken,

namelijk mensen die

denken, dat lijkt me wel

leuk, iets nieuws, iets

anders. Het zijn geen

mensen die risicomijdend

gedrag vertonen. Het zijn

mensen die bereid zijn om

nieuwe dingen te

onderzoeken, aan te gaan,

nieuw

samenwerkingsverband.

Het geeft een bepaalde

mindset, een bepaalde

mentaliteit die zorgt dat

er een mate van

eenduidigheid zit aan

mensen die daar in

stappen.

-Name samenwerking

tussen vz AB/DB met

gedeputeerde om

draagvlak te verkrijgen,

doordat ‘je als

gemeentebestuurder

makkelijker horizontaal

met andere

gemeentebestuurders

praat.’

-Dienst heeft uiteindelijk

zelf kunnen bepalen wie

plaats nam in management

team. Keuze op basis van

kwaliteit en niet op basis

van herkomst.

-Projectleider heeft bij

aankomst

programmastructuur

verandert naar

projectstructuur, was

belangrijk door gebrek

werkcultuur waardoor

spraakverwarring werd

gereduceerd.

-Aandacht voor welk type

mensen is verzameld in

projectorganisatie en hoe

deze met elkaar omgaan.

Conscientiousness -Oude projectsecretaris is

directiesecretaris

geworden voor behoud

collectief geheugen.

-Conflictmanagement

door formele opschaling

naar DB/AB. Het is nooit

zover gekomen door

interventie van de

kwartiermaker.

-Gedeeltelijk

werkafspraken gemaakt.

Niet zozeer hygiënische,

maar over inzet van

mensen.

-Op bestuurlijk niveau

zijn afspraken gemaakt

omtrent de termijnen

waarin reacties

verwacht werden.

-Door opstellen van

uitgangspunten worden

‘oude discussies’

gesmoord door terug te

grijpen op gemaakte

afspraken.

-Resultaat gericht

handelen is van belang

voor samenwerking. ‘Als

je samen wil gaan werken

moet je op een gegeven

moment ook zeggen: dit

is de lijn. Je kunt lang

met elkaar discussiëren,

maar je moet wel zorgen

dat je eruit komt.’

Process Phasing -Er is zoveel mogelijk

parallel gewerkt aan

dossiers door de

projectorganisatie.

-Aanvankelijk bottom-up

process, maar top-down

over de vorm. ‘Van

onderop betekent in dit

geval dat 408 gemeenten

en 12 Provincies moesten

kijken hoe ze dat vorm

zouden geven. Alleen de

vorm was gegeven, het

moest een openbaar

lichaam zijn volgens de

Wgr.’

-Door met een beperkt

aantal partners te beginnen

kun je veel sneller stappen

maken. ‘Je merkt wel dat

daar toen heel snel slagen

zijn gemaakt met zijn

vieren. Wat dat betreft is

het handig om eerst met

een kleine groep te

beginnen en dan

naderhand uit te breiden.

Je staat nu op een rijdende

trein en hebt al een paar

stations gehad. Dus ja, op

die stations kan jij niets

meer zeggen. Dus dat

maakt het makkelijker.’

-Er is gebruik gemaakt

van een plan dat helder

taken,

verantwoordelijkheden en

een planning beschreef

voor de werkgroepen van

de projectorganisatie.

-Door onduidelijkheid

verplichtende karakter zijn

enkele deelnemers uit de

oude samenwerking

teruggetrokken.

-Doordat de 1e kamer toch

pleitte voor bottom-up

-Het moest bottom-up

georganiseerd worden,

maar er zat toch een

vorm van dwang achter.

‘Dat is een hele cruciale

factor geweest. Want je

zag dat op dat het

moment dat die dwang

niet echt vertaald werd,

hoe gaat het er dan

uitzien? Toen ging het

alle kanten op. Er waren

gemeenten die zeiden:

wij zien de voordelen

van die schaalvergroting

niet.’

-Aanvankelijk waren er

geen sancties om de

vorming van RUD’s af te

dwingen, maar later werd

bekend dat deze toch

afgedwongen ging

worden.

proces tegen wens van 2e

kamer in. Wat tot een jaar

vertraging heeft gekost.

Balance -Aandacht geweest voor

vermogen tot verbinden

binnen management team.

-Bestuuders AB/DB zijn

niet gekozen op basis

van persoonlijke

kwaliteiten, maar op

basis van hun

portefeuilles.

-Er bestaat een verschil in

kwaliteit van bestuurders

van grote en kleine

gemeenten.

Casting -Rolconflict Provincie

door deelneming aan GR.

‘Het eerste waar je

tegenaan loopt, is dat er in

iedere GR een provinciale

overheid is

vertegenwoordigd en een

aantal gemeenten. Dat is

overheid van

verschillende niveaus. Dus

daar zit al een bepaalde

spanning op. Normaal

gesproken heeft de

provincie een

controlerende,

toezichthoudende rol op

de gemeentes. Als

bestuurslaag zitten ze nu

opeens samen. Dan blijkt

dat toezichthouden, dat

controleren van

Provinciaal naar

Rijksniveau gaat. Dat is

niet goed geregeld.’

-Selectie van

projectmedewerkers is

gebeurd op basis van

vakinhoud voor zover hier

in te kiezen was.

-Effect van rolconflict

wordt verzacht door

ervaren vz van AB/DB.

-Dubbele rol Provincie

maakte het lastig voor

ze om hun deelnemers

belang te behartigen en

deden dit via de vz

AB/DB. ‘Die

rolwisselingen kunnen

wel, maar de Provincie

moest doordat zij die

regisseursrol hadden

soms wel een omweg

zoeken om hun belang

goed te behartigen. Je

kunt die twee dingen

niet te erg door elkaar

halen.’

-Er is sprake van

rolconflict bij

bestuurders die

enerzijds het belang van

de organisatie

behartigen en anderzijds

die van hun eigen

gemeente. ‘Wat je ziet

-Provincie was

verantwoordelijk om

gemeenten aan te spreken

die niet wilden

deelnemen aan de

vorming van RUD’s.

Gecombineerd met feit

dat ze zelf ook deelnemen

is dat een dubbele rol. Dit

speelde tevens op

ambtelijk niveau.

-Het is de

verantwoordelijkheid van

de directeur om

bestuurders mee te

nemen, niet die van de

gedeputeerde.

-vz ervaart ook rolconflict

door constructie openbaar

lichaam/Wgr. ‘Waar ik

nog wel mee worstel is,

en dat heeft ook wel met

de Wgr te maken, het

voorzitterschap en het feit

is dat er spanning in het

systeem zit, want als

DB is ons voornaamste

belang het belang van

de omgevingsdienst.

(…) We staan alle vijf

pal voor de belangen

voor de

omgevingsdienst. En die

kunnen soms strijdig

zijn met het belang van

je gemeente.’

dat je ook deelnemer

bent. Ik was vanmorgen

voorzitter en dan is het

heel lastig om vragen aan

jezelf te stellen.’ (…)

‘Als opdrachtgever zou je

wel hard willen zijn, maar

als eigenaar krijg je de

rekening gewoon

gepresenteerd. Dat kan

ook spanning geven. Ik

merk dat in mijn

annotatie ook wel. Dan

denk ik ja, hmm. Met de

ene pet zou ik dit zeggen

en met de andere pet zeg

ik dat.’

Quality

Parallel

developments

-Vorming van de

veiligheidsregio’s is slecht

gevallen bij gemeenten

omdat ze nauwelijks

invloed op de vorm

hiervan konden uitoefenen

wat zijn effect heeft op de

vorming van RUD’s

‘Voor een deel heeft men

die frustratiewillen

botvieren op de vorming

van de gr’en in het kader

van de RUD’s. Dus je

krijgt met hele andere

sentimenten te maken die

-Doordat vakbonden er

niet met de Provincie een

akkoord hadden voor een

ander traject, wilden ze

ook niet onderhandelen

met de dienst over het

sociaal plan om druk op

deze eerste

onderhandelingen te

zetten. Hierdoor is

vertraging opgelopen.

misschien helemaal niets

met jou als organisatie te

maken hebben, maar die

wel meespelen in dat hele

bestuurlijke verhaal.’

-Landelijke

onderhandelingen CAO

omgevingsdiensten is

vastgelopen, waarna

iedere dienst zelf moest

onderhandelen.

Case RUD

Drenthe

Dimension Projectleader/director

#8

Former projectleader #9 Employee #10 Representative Province

#11

Relation Connecting -Werkgroepen zijn

bemenst door werknemers

van de latende

organisaties om zo

draagvlak te kweken. 'Ik

denk dat dat qua structuur

een hele goede is geweest,

want dan krijg je echt

draagvlak want

ambtenaren willen wel.

Die willen wel overleggen

en zijn niet dwars in

principe.'

-Vanuit de 3 gremia werd

ook teruggekoppeld naar

de ambtskring waarin alle

gemeentesecretarissen

zaten voor kweken van

draagvlak

-Bij aanstelling is

projectleider eerst gaan

praten met alle

gemeentesecretarissen,

provinciaal secretaris en

alle wethouders. 'Op dat

moment kom je niet van

iets van 'moet', maar kom

je met een vraag. Ze

worden gehoord. Dat is

een belangrijk iets

gewoon. Dat is overal zo.

-Oude projectleider heeft

ook een ronde gemaakt

langs alle raden

wethouders en

gemeentesecretarissen om

te peilen hoe men tegen

de vorming van de RUD

aankeek. Heeft veel

goodwill opgeleverd.

-projectleider werd als

legitieme partner ervaren.

'En die ronde, heeft heel

veel goodwill opgeleverd,

omdat ik ook vanuit de

gemeenten kwam. Dat

was een van de punten

waardoor zij het gevoel

hadden, terechte gevoel,

dat ik begreep waar wij

mee bezig waren. En wat

het voor hun betekende.

Want een maand daarvoor

was ik zelf nog aan de

andere kant.' 'Ja, ik ben

naar de gemeenten

gegaan, enerzijds om te

luisteren, en anderzijds

om heel duidelijk begrip

te tonen, want ik denk dat

dat heel erg nodig is in dit

soort processen. Als je

-Aanvankelijk alleen

overleg op ambtelijk

niveau, maar doordat

deze een gebrek aan

mandaat hadden is

daarna ook een overleg

opgestart op bestuurlijk

niveau met de

portefeuillehouders.

-Er is geïnvesteerd om

betrokken mensen van

de juiste informatie te

voorzien door extensieve

communicatie.

-Feedback is gegeven op

de rollen die deelnemers

hadden in het proces en

hun opstelling daarin.

Met name richting de

Provincie.

-Open communicatie

binnen de gremia was

goed, alleen wanneer er

overleg was met zowel

ambtenaren als

bestuurders lukte dit

minder goed. ‘Maar op

het moment dat daar een

wisselwerking of

uitwisseling was, een

gemêleerd gezelschap,

-Er is door heel intensief

te praten met de

betrokkenen getracht om

in kleine stapjes

voortgang te boeken

richting het tekenen van

de GR.

-Nauwelijks open

communicatie op

bestuurlijk niveau. ‘De

Drentse volksaard is over

het algemeen, dan

mensen niet alles heel erg

open en duidelijk tegen

elkaar zeggen. Dus dat

draait er eindeloos

omheen.’

-Geen specifieke

aandacht voor

ontwikkelen relaties. Men

kende elkaar al.

-Successen werden

beperkt gevierd. Het

vieren heeft geen

merkbare invloed gehad

op de samenwerking

-Gedeputeerde heeft

contact onderhouden en

aangedrongen bij

ministerie om meer druk

uit te oefenen om ervoor

Als mensen mopperen, ga

je in ieder geval luisteren

voordat je zegt het moet

zo en zo. Ik denk dat dat

een stuk goodwill

gegeven heeft.'

-Naast formele overleggen

zijn enkele speciale

bijeenkomsten

georganiseerd rondom een

specifiek dossier.

-Korte lijnen met vz

-Er is ruimte voor

feedback. ' De opstelling

is ook, ik maak ook

fouten, als er geen fouten

gemaakt worden, wordt er

niet gewerkt om het even

andersom te zeggen. Dus

we stellen ons in die zin

ook redelijk kwetsbaar op

en dat is ook prima.'

-Er is beperkte aandacht

voor het ontwikkelen van

persoonlijke relaties.

-Ministerie dreigde met

een AMVB om bevoegd

gezag af te pakken van

gemeenten. Deze druk is

ook gebruikt door

projectleider om

gemeenten mee te krijgen.

-Aanvankelijk sturende

ergens ingezogen wordt

waar je eigenlijk geen

behoefte aan hebt, dan is

het heel belangrijk dat er

iemand tegenover je zit

die daar oog en oor voor

heeft, van wat houdt jou

bezig als gemeente,

waarom vind je dit

moeilijk, en ik begrijp dat

jij, met name een

gemeenschappelijke

regeling, dat je daar rode

vlekken van in je nek

krijgt. Dat was, dat

aspect, heeft heel erg

geholpen. Om juist de

verbinding te leggen dat

we on speaking terms

kwamen met elkaar.'

-Gebruik van

nieuwsbrieven en een

werkgroep voor interne

communicatie.

-Geen bewuste aandacht

voor ontwikkelen van

persoonlijk relaties,

buiten de sensitiviteit van

de projectleider hiervoor.

-Er was sprake van open

communicatie en

ontspannen sfeer in de

projectorganisatie.

dan merk je dat met

name de onderste laag,

de ambtenaren zeg maar,

een stuk argwanender

waren omdat ze niet

goed wisten wat hun

bestuurder ervan vond of

hoe die er dan in zat.’

-De rol van de

medewerker als

informele leider werd

aanvankelijk niet

geaccepteerd door

bestuurders in het

overleg. Later wel. ‘Ik

denk dat dat te maken

heeft gehad met hoe ik

als persoon ben. Hoe ik

mijn rol oppak. Ik heb

hem daar heel

bescheiden opgepakt. Ik

ben vrij veel op de

achtergrond gebleven.

(…) Dus het was vooral

tijdig signaleren van he

wat zie ik hier en daar

gebeuren en hoe kan ik

daar tijdig op inspelen

dus heb vooral het toneel

gelaten voor de

secretarissen.’

-Beperkt succes gevierd

op ambtelijk niveau en

te zorgen dat gemeenten

voortgang gingen boeken

in de samenwerking.

rol Provincie om

deelnemers de

intentieverklaring tot

vorming RUD te laten

tekenen.

-Provincie heeft

dominante rol richting

gemeenten wat tot

weerstand leidt bij

gemeenten op

voornamelijk bestuurlijk

niveau. ' hoewel ik de

sfeer en opstelling toch

erg goed vind hoor, maar

toch ietsje meer zit in de

sfeer van: jongens wij

hebben het voor het

zeggen. Daar zit wel iets

in, hoewel in de

werkgroepen moet zeggen

dat ik dat op dat moment

niet terugvind. Maar dat

zit hem meer denk ik toch

in die bestuurlijke kant.'

-Er is bewust geëvalueerd

wanneer zaken niet goed

liepen.

-Door tijdsdruk slechts

beperkt successen

gevierd.

-Provincie wordt met

argwaan bekeken door

gemeenten.

niet op bestuurlijk

niveau omdat er daar

toen nog niets te vieren

was.

-Men was bang voor

ingrijpen minister

waardoor men

overgegaan is tot

vorming van de RUD.

-Na eerste aanvaring

geen incidenten gehad

met ministerie. Dit

kwam doordat de

gedeputeerde goede

connecties had op het

ministerie en hen kon

informeren over

voortgang, bijvoorbeeld

toen het bestuurlijk

vastliep.

-Geen gevoel van

gelijkwaardigheid tussen

Provincie en gemeenten

door toezichthouder rol

Provincie. ‘Toen hebben

we het probleem

benoemd en toen heeft

de provincie gelukkig

ook gezegd ja dat is ook

niet handig en het is

bovendien ook niet

prettig voor de persoon

die aan tafel zit. Dat je

continue als boeman

daar zit terwijl je

eigenlijk met zijn allen

een gezamenlijke

oplossing moet

bedenken. Dus daarom

dat we zeggen we gaan

de regie rol losweken

van de inhoudelijke rol.’

Group Dynamics -Directe en open manier

van leidinggeven leidde

niet tot weerstand in de

wat meer gesloten Drentse

cultuur.

-Verhoudingen binnen de

projectorganisatie en

richting de stuurgroepen

is goed

-Er is een speciaal

cultuurprogramma

opgezet om

samenwerking en binding

te verkrijgen.

-Er zit frictie tussen grote

en kleine gemeenten: het

Calimero effect.

-Men had negatieve

ervaringen met vorige

samenwerkingen o.b.v.

Wgr.

-Er was angst bij de

kleinere gemeenten om

opgeslokt te worden

door de groteren bij het

samengaan in een RUD

en dat de onderlinge

gelijkwaardigheid in het

geding was. ‘Daar zat

nog wel wat spanning.

Zo van wij worden

opgeslokt als kleine

gemeenten door grote

gemeenten of dan wel de

Provincie’.

-Bestuurders zijn

argwanend tegenover

samenwerking doordat

ze macht moeten

opofferen. ‘Als je aan

iemand troon komt

wordt men daar heel erg

gevoelig van. Over het

algemeen genomen zit je

-De eerste twee jaar werd

niet gesproken over de

inhoud van het

onderwerp, enkele over

macht en het kwijtraken

daarvan door het

overdragen van taken,

bevoegdheden en

personeel.

-Stemming werd getracht

goed te houden door een

ontspanning sfeer te

bewerkstelligen en een

kwetsbare opstelling van

de Provincie.

in de politiek omdat je

toch ook wel iets hebt

met aansturen, de baas

mogen zijn, macht en dat

begon natuurlijk wel een

beetje te wankelen bij

sommige organisaties.’

-Op ambtelijk niveau

vond men de voortgang

matig wat leidde tot

frustraties tussen

ambtelijk en bestuurlijk

niveau.

-Bestuurders hadden

hele slechte ervaringen

met vorige

samenwerkingen o.b.v.

Wgr waardoor onderling

vertrouwen laag was.

Trust -Transparantie wordt

betracht door openheid

van informatie.

-Problemen worden

benoemd.

-Vertrouwen richting

projectleider was goed,

richting externe

ingehuurde leider was dit

minder.

-Vertrouwen is door

projectleider gekweekt

door integere en

consistente werkwijze.

-Aanvankelijk geen sfeer

van openheid en

vertrouwen door

onduidelijke opdracht.

‘Men vond het niet

nodig dat een RUD zou

worden opgericht en

iedereen had het idee dat

ze het wel goed voor

elkaar hadden. Dus om

nu in een vorm van

openheid met elkaar om

de tafel van te gaan

zitten was absoluut geen

-Onderling vertrouwen

op bestuurlijk niveau was

niet optimaal, maar is in

de loop der tijd wel

verbeterd door positieve

ervaringen op andere

dossiers.

-Gedeputeerde had goede

relatie met bestuurders

wat positief was voor het

onderlinge vertrouwen.

sprake van.’

-Op ambtelijk niveau

ontstond al snel

onderling vertrouwen,

maar op bestuurlijk

niveau is dat gedurende

heel het proces matig tot

slecht geweest.

-Geen opportunistisch

gedrag, doordat in

openheid alle pijnpunten

besproken werden, wat

wel zorgde dat het

proces heel langzaam

ging.

Leadership -Projectleider heeft veel

ervaring met soortgelijke

processen en streeft naar

open communicatie.

-Directieve vorm van

leiderschap door

projectleider.

-Een externe

procesregisseur werd

ingehuurd, omdat

onafhankelijkheid van

projectleider in geding

was (hij was nadrukkelijk

vóór de vorming van 1

RUD en van de

Provincie). 'En die

gesprekken heeft hij

alleen gevoerd, ook

bewust voor gekozen, een

fris gezicht, die niet

behept is met een of

andere achtergrond in dit

dossier, dat gesprek

voeren.' Deze had een

directieve

-Rolconflict van

Provincie werd opgelost

door een externe

regisseur te huren die het

ambtelijke als

bestuurlijke proces

moest vlot trekken.

-Gemeentesecretarissen

van de twee grootste

gemeenten hebben

opgetreden als informele

leiders die gezag hadden

en het samen goed

konden vinden.

-Op ambtelijk niveau is

dat deze medewerker

zelf geweest doordat

deze door zijn houding

-Directe, open manier

van communiceren en

zaken bespreekbaar

maken.

-Stijl gericht op

verbinden, maar wel

duidelijk resultaatgericht.

-Informele leider van

grote gemeenten werd

ingeschakeld om zaken te

bewerkstelligen.

leiderschapsstijl wat

positief was voor

resultaat, maar leidde ook

tot weerstand.

-Mensgerichte, informele

stijl van leiderschap. 'En

ik heb wel het idee van

eerst die relatie, dan

confrontatie. Je moet eerst

elkaar wat beter kennen.

Hoe zit die ander in

elkaar? En daar heb ik dus

als persoon heel veel in

geïnvesteerd. Dat mensen

mij kenden, dat ik mensen

kende, weten wat speelt er

bij hen, wat is daar

gaande.'

-Type leiderschap is

afhankelijk van fase

waarin men zich bevindt.

Verbindend in het begin

en meer directief als er

stappen gezet moeten

worden. 'In de aanloop, in

de voorbereiding, tot en

met het ontwerp van hoe

gaan we het doen, moet je

heel erg een verbindend

iemand hebben. . de

volgende fase, in de zin

van de uitvoering, kun je

best een andere

naar voren geschoven

werd als behartiger van

gemeentebelangen en als

een van de weinigen het

hele proces heeft

meegemaakt.

-Verbindend leiderschap

van voormalig

projectleider was

noodzakelijk in het prille

eerste begin.

leiderschapsstijl

hebben.(...) Van als alle

knopen doorgehakt zijn,

en we weten precies wat

we gaan doen, dan zou je

best kunnen zeggen, we

hebben vooral iemand

nodig die heel structureel

dat vasthoud. Lijntje voor

lijntje, om de gang erin te

houden.'

-Leiderschap projectleider

is geevalueerd.

-Er is gebruik gemaakt

van informele leiders in

de projectorganisatie.

Organization Governance -Constructie van een

openbaarlichaam o.b.v.

Wgr is dusdanig dat

afstand ontstaat tussen de

organisatie en

portefeuillehouder en

college en richting de

raad. Wordt ervaren als

onwenselijk.

-Er zijn 3 gremia geweest:

bestuurlijke regiegroep

met een burgemeester,

gedeputeerde en twee

wethouders, een

stuurgroep met 3

gemeentesecretarissen en

provinciaal secretaris

-Alle deelnemers hebben

mensen geleverd voor de

werkgroepen voor

draagvlak en delen van

kosten.

-Toen duidelijk werd dat

de vorming van de

RUD’s impact zou

hebben op de

gemeentelijke

organisaties zijn ook de

gemeentesecretarissen

aangehaakt in het proces.

-Het is positief geweest

om eerst op het laagste

niveau samen te werken

omdat hier makkelijker

de meerwaarde gezien

kan worden van de RUD

wat weerslag heeft op

lagen daarboven. ‘Want

dat was het hele mooie,

(beide met regio

vertegenwoordiging) en

de ambtelijke

werkgroepen getrokken

door de projectleider.

-Ambtelijk is veel

afgestemd wat besluiten

maken op bestuurlijk

niveau vergemakkelijkte.

'En dat houd in dat er een

begroting komt die

ambtelijk een heel groot

draagvlak heeft en dan zie

je als die dan bestuurlijk

gaat, want bestuurders

worden altijd geadviseerd

door hun ambtenaren, dan

is die link al kortgesloten.

En dat werkt eigenlijk, tot

nog toe, heel goed.' 'Ik

denk dat ambtelijk die

wens tot samenwerking

veel beter was.

Ambtenaren kunnen

elkaar hier op een heel

hoop fronten wel goed

vinden toch wel weer

toch.'

wij op

medewerkersniveau qua

uitvoeringsniveau had

men op een gegeven

moment het gevoel dit

kan een meerwaarde

hebben de RUD en dat

zien we ook wel als een

kans en niet alleen als

bedreiging. Dan zie je

ook dat de laag

daarboven, adviseurs,

teamleiders,

afdelingshoofden, bereid

zijn om naast allerlei

organisatorische

standpunten en

dergelijke ook dat

inhoudelijk standpunt

mee te nemen, want dat

is ook belangrijk.’

Support -Er is voorgesteld een

managementlaag weg te

halen uit te vormen RUD

om zo kosten te verlagen

voor gemeenten. ' Op dat

-Doordat zaken alleen op

hoofdlijnen besproken

werden door een gebrek

aan vertrouwen kon de

projectorganisatie ook

-Gemeenteraden zijn

sporadisch geïnformeerd

over voortgang wanneer

dat nodig was. Zij waren

niet enthousiast over het

moment zien ze ook dat je

meedenkt in het

financiële. Dus een heel

klein gebaartje, wat ik ook

logisch vond vanuit de

bedrijfsvoering, maar

waarmee je ook laat zien,

deel dit met hen, dat je op

een goede manier bezig

bent. Dat geeft

vertrouwen, want dat is

belangrijk.'

moeilijk inzichtelijk

maken wat de effecten

van de RUD waren voor

de gemeenten. Dit

schaadde vervolgens

weer het vertrouwen van

bestuurders in het

proces.

-In begin fase werden

raden nauwelijks

betrokken omdat ze pas

actie werden op het

moment dat de GR

getekend moest worden.

dossier.

Decisiveness -Er is extern advies

ingewonnen om overhead

te berekenen en hoe deze

kosten over deelnemers

verdeeld kon worden.

Hierdoor werd discussie

afgekaderd. Tevens extern

advies ingewonnen voor

schrijven bedrijfsplan.

-Werkgroepen trekken

mensen aan die een

netwerk en gezag hebben

binnen eigen organisatie.

Ze werden niet betaald en

gekozen o.b.v. inhoud. '

En ik heb denk ik de

mazzel dat in die

werkgroepen toch over

het algemeen mensen

-Er is een

intentieverklaring

opgesteld om voortgang

in traject te behouden.

-Projectleider heeft

bewust mensen om zich

heen verzameld die

complementair aan hem

waren in de manier van

werken. Een klein team

waarin vertrouwen

makkelijk kon ontstaan.

-Mensen die deelnamen

aan de projectorganisatie

zijn de vak betrokkenen

zelf en is verder

organisch verder

gegroeid.

-Tweede projectleider

heeft sterke

resultaatgerichte

oriëntatie. ‘En Johan in

die zin ook respect

afdwingt richting

bestuurders waarbij hij

ook wel weet van hier is

mijn grens en daar

overschrijd ik hem en

daar overschrijd ik hem

ook bewust. Want dat hij

zichzelf ook nog wel

aantrekken die goed in de

organisatie zitten en ook

goed liggen bij de mensen

daaromheen. Dus wel een

soort respect afdwingen

en dat is heel cruciaal.'

permitteren.’

Conscientiousness -Bij conflicten treedt de

projectleider op en spreekt

de betreffende personen

persoonlijk aan.

-Conflicthantering via

normale opschaling van

gremia. Is niet

voorgekomen

-Opgeleverde stukken zijn

gedocumenteerd.

-Er zijn geen formele

werkafspraken gemaakt.

Wel sociale controle.

-Bij conflicten hebben

gemeentesecretarissen

elkaar onderling

benaderd. Dit ook op

initiatief vanuit de

projectorganisatie.

Meerdere malen

voorgekomen.

-Geen officieel escalatie

model gebruikt.

Geprobeerd het bij de

bron, zo laag mogelijk op

te lossen. Daarnaast

persoonlijk contact.

Process Phasing -Planning is gevoerd op

hoofdlijnen en in is in

begin stadium nooit

geformaliseerd. 'Die is

nooit echt van de grond

gekomen. Dat werkte dus

niet om dat gedetailleerd

uit te schrijven, omdat het

ook allemaal in te krappe

tijden zit. We hebben te

weinig tijd beschikbaar

gewoon, dat was vanaf

begin af aan bekend, dus

er worden heel veel ad

hoc oplossingen gedaan

om iets toch op tijd klaar

te krijgen. Dat is een

continu proces.'

-Geen formele fasering

aangebracht.

-Ministerie vond het goed

dat men sinds 2009 al

bottom-up bezig was met

vorming van de dienst,

maar stelde tegelijkertijd

dat de uitkomst één

regionaal dekkende dienst

zou zijn. Aanvankelijk

wilde men echter in de

verschillende regio's

werken en daarna wel

gezamenlijk maar als een

netwerk samenwerking.

-Aanvankelijk dacht men

dat het een vrijblijvende

ontwikkeling was. Pas

toen bleek dat hier druk

achter zat is men in

beweging gekomen.

-Aanvankelijk zou zelfs

het Rijk participeren in

de RUD’s, maar dit is

uiteindelijk niet gebeurd.

-Rijk heeft de Provincies

verantwoordelijk

gemaakt voor de

totstandkoming van

RUD’s in hun provincie.

Ze hebben hier echter

geen formele middelen

voor gegeven om dit af te

dwingen waardoor ze zelf

af en toe op ad hoc basis

druk moesten uitoefen via

een AMVB. ‘Ik moet ook

zeggen dat de constructie

een vreemde was. Want

provincies kregen dus

vanaf het begin de regie

over de vorming van die

RUDs, maar de

provincies hadden niets

in handen om te sturen.

(…)Want je kunt geen

regie voeren als je

gewoon niks in handen

hebt behalve praten. Dus

ik vind de rol van het rijk

had wel een stuk

krachtiger kunnen zijn.’

Balance -Kwaliteit van

projectmedewerkers was

goed.

-Hoewel de kwaliteit van

medewerkers voldoende

was is de flexibiliteit

minder omdat ze ook hun

'normale' werk moeten

uitvoeren. Mede hierdoor

is een extern bureau voor

het schrijven van het

bedrijfsplan ingehuurd.

-Betrokken persoon uit

grote gemeente Emmen

heeft gelijkwaardigheid

benadrukt in zijn manier

van handelen. ‘Ik op dat

moment wel een

geschikte persoon was

om dat aan de orde te

stellen en ik me niet heel

snel boven die andere

gemeente heb willen

plaatsen. En daar is het

gesprek heel snel en

gemakkelijk opgestart.

Ik denk wel dat dat heel

belangrijk is geweest in

het hele proces’

-In eerste instantie zaten

mensen uit lagere

niveaus in de

werkgroepen, maar later

is dat opgeschaald naar

managementniveau

omdat zij beter zicht

hebben in hun eigen

organisatie.

-Twee projectleiders

hebben complementair

gewerkt. ‘Maar toeval of

niet, toen kwam Jan tot

de conclusie om te

kijken of hij ook wat

anders kan en toen is hij

ook vrij vlot ergens

anders aan de slag

gegaan. Toen is Johan

Vogelaar

binnengekomen en dan

zie je dat Johan een heel

ander type persoon is,

maar ook een ander type

leidinggevende. Johan is

meer van het no-

nonsense, het zakelijke

en afspraak is afspraak.

Ik ga met jou een deal

maken en dan wil ik

geen discussie meer over

details en ik merk dat

wat dat betreft Johan ook

precies op het goede

moment is

binnengekomen.’

Casting -Provincie is zich goed

bewust van eigenaarsrol

in AB/DB en de

opdrachtgeversrol. Bij

gemeenten is dit

onderscheid minder

expliciet.

-Provincie is

nadrukkelijker naar voren

geschoven om gemeenten

op 1 lijn te krijgen toen

stappen gezet moesten

worden richting tekenen

intentieverklaring.

-In begin was dubbele rol

niet zo'n punt, maar later

wel. Toen is duidelijk

onderscheid aangebracht

door belangen door 2

verschillende personen te

laten behartigen. 'Dat je

gewoon weet, wie praat

vanuit welke pet. Dat

heeft wel zeker geholpen.

En dat heeft Raymond

ook erg geholpen. Dat hij

dus gewoon vrijuit kon

gaan, zeg maar.'

-Dubbele rol van

Provincie als regisseur

en als deelnemer

belemmerde

samenwerking met

gemeenten voordat

hierin een knip werd

gemaakt. ‘dat maakte het

in het begin erg lastig en

dat is ook waarom het

contact tussen de

gemeenten en de

provincie in het begin

niet goed liep. Want we

hadden, dat weet ik nog

goed te herinneren, in

begin 1 persoon om tafel

in de overleggen die we

hadden met ne provincie

en dan merkte je dat dit

niet goed werkte. Van de

ene kant praatte hij mee

als mede slachtoffer

want we moesten

allemaal naar de rud om

het zo even te noemen.

Maar aan andere kant

bestond ook de kans dat

hij daarmee de pet

opzette van regisseur en

dan was hij veel

dwingender.’

-Door aanhaken van

-Rolconflict is op

gegeven moment

opgelost door

gedeputeerde enkel

verantwoordelijk te

maken voor het proces en

de provinciesecretaris

inhoudelijk op te laten

komen voor het

provinciale belang.

‘hogere’ ambtelijke en

bestuurlijke gremia

kreeg het onderwerp de

aandacht die nodig was

en werden de

verschillende rollen

duidelijk.

-Eerste projectleider was

in feite kwartiermaker,

maar daarvoor was het

nog te vroeg omdat men

het nog niet eens was

met elkaar. Externe

adviseur is toen

gevraagd om een

regisseursrol te vervullen

om dit voor elkaar te

krijgen.

Quality

Parallel

developments

-Mislukte landelijk

overleg met bonden over

sociaal statuut.

-Soms negatieve invloed

doordat incidenten zoals

Moerdijk brand

aanleiding gaven voor

discussie rondom een

stelselwijziging waarin

minister veel meer directe

controle had die lopende

discussie in Drenthe

verstoorde. Soms ook

voordeel van landelijke

ontwikkelingen doordat

discussies dan elders

gevoerd werden.

-Parallelle

onderhandelingen met de

regionalisering van de

brandweer heeft voor

vertraging gezorgd

omdat men er niet over

eens was of deze

onderhandelingen over

het sociaal statuut samen

moesten worden

genomen.

Case

ODZOB

Dimension Projectleader/adjunct-

director #12

Employee #13 President

board/aldermen #14

Aldermen #15

Relation Connecting -Er is sprake van open

communicatie. Problemen

worden benoemt en

neergelegd op bestuurlijke

tafel waar men ze moet

oplossen.

-Feedback wordt veelvuldig

gegeven binnen het bestuur

naar naar de

projectorganisatie toe. ‘Of

ze vinden samen iets, van

wat de directie heeft

gedaan. Je krijgt

voortdurend van alles terug.

We liggen buitengewoon

onder een vergrootglas. En

dat krijgen we te horen

ook.’

-Beide directeuren

investeren in relatie met

gemeenten door rondes te

maken langs de

gemeentesecretarissen en

hen te helpen met het

omgaan met hun achterban.

Daarnaast worden rondes

ingepland rondom

belangrijke mijlpalen.

-Afdelingsmanagers van de

organisatie onderhouden

-Open communicatie

wordt gestimuleerd in

de projectgroep. ‘Dus

iedereen de ruimte

geven om zijn verhaal

te doen. En te laten

merken dat je luistert.

Dat is belangrijk en dat

doe je dus bij die groep

door ze regelmatig

bijeen te laten komen,

met elkaar ook te laten

discussiëren, mee te

nemen in het proces.’

-Sprake van open

communicatie en

feedback geven binnen

de werkgroepen.

-Geen focus op het

ontwikkelen van

persoonlijke relaties op

bestuurlijk niveau en

ambtelijk niveau.

-Opleveren van

mijlpalen is gevierd.

-Ministerie was goed

bereikbaar voor vragen

en waren bereid om te

luisteren naar de

gemeenten.

-Leiderschap van

Eindhoven in de

vorm van

voorzitterschap wordt

geaccepteerd doordat

van hen als grootste

deelnemer verwacht

wordt dat de kar door

hen getrokken wordt.

-Positieve sfeer in

DB gekenmerkt ook

door open

communicatie.

-in het AB was de

sfeer een stuk

sceptischer door

ervaringen in het

verleden waardoor

vertrouwen laag was.

-Aanvankelijk stroeve

relatie die in de loop

der tijd gegroeid is.

-Naast formele

overleggen stemmen

bestuursleden ook

informeel veel met

elkaar af.

-Geen bewuste

aandacht voor

ontwikkelen

persoonlijke relaties.

Men kende elkaar al

redelijk goed op

bestuurlijk niveau

door eerdere

ervaringen.

-Er is in goede sfeer

feedback gegeven op

elkaars handelen nadat

lastige gesprekken

gevoerd zijn geweest.

-Na een crisissituatie

is een officieel

perscommuniqué

georganiseerd.

-Geen sprake van

successen vieren

tijdens ontwerp fase

op bestuurlijk niveau.

-Geen sprake van

relatie of invloed in

positieve of negatieve

contact met hun

wederhelften bij de

deelnemende gemeenten

-Beperkt successen

gedeeld.

-Houding van Provincie

wordt door gemeenten niet

beschouwd als solidair

doordat ze niet willen

meebetalen aan tekorten.

-Aanvankelijk had de

Provincie een sturende

rol, maar toen dit

verkeerd viel, zijn ze

nog uitsluitend

faciliterend opgetreden.

Ze hadden de

regisseursrol steviger

kunnen oppakken.

zin. ‘Het rijk is hier

relatief ver weg. (…)

De centrale overheid

zit niet bij ons aan

tafel. Daar hebben we

geen lasten of lusten

van.’

Group

Dynamics

-Er bestaat een

tegenstelling tussen grote

en kleine gemeenten

waardoor men liever sub-

regionaal gaat

samenwerken. ‘Je ziet ook

dat de kleintjes vaak met de

rug naar Eindhoven gaan

staan en proberen

subregionaal, tot allerlei

kleinere oplossingen te

komen. Samenwerkingen in

de Peel, samenwerkingen in

de Kempen, et cetera. In

plaats van te proberen met

de grote broer Eindhoven te

gaan samenwerken. Dat is

natuurlijk jammer.’

-Uitgesproken negatieve

invloed omdat de

beeldvorming rondom SRE

zeer negatief was. ‘En daar

worden wij, als directie, of

-Er bestond een

tegenstelling tussen

grotere en kleinere

gemeenten waarbij deze

laatste groep vreesden

dat ze lijdzaam moesten

volgen in het pad van

de eerste groep.

Eindhoven heeft zich

echter constructief

opgesteld in dit dossier

door veel mensen te

leveren voor de

projectorganisatie.

-Vertegenwoordiging in

DB op basis van regio

afkomst werkt eiland

cultuur in de hand die

collectieve mindset

ondergraaft. ‘Er is <in

regio Midden-west>

veel meer gekeken naar

wat heb je als DB

-Kleinere gemeenten

zijn bang voor

samenwerking met

grotere gemeenten

Eindhoven door

verwachte scheve

machtsbalans

waardoor hun belang

onvoldoende gedekt

wordt.

-Brabantse karakter is

open en gemoedelijk,

maar heeft gevaar

voor de

resultaatgerichtheid

van de

samenwerking.

-Oude SRE milieutak

kenmerkte zich niet

door een

democratisch aard

waarin deelnemers

controle konden

-Constructieve sfeer in

AB/DB. Onderlinge

relatie is gegroeid ook

onder druk van crises.

‘De relaties zijn wel

dieper geworden.

Want zeg maar, dit

soort, moeilijke

opstartingssituaties,

dat creëert een band,

eigen

verantwoordelijkheid.

En naarmate het

moeilijker wordt, en je

elkaar harder nodig

hebt, verdiept de

relatie ook.’

Hendrik dan voornamelijk,

op het matje geroepen over

fouten die twee, drie jaar

geleden onder de leiding

van de toenmalige directie

van de milieudienst zijn

gemaakt. Ja, wat kunnen

wij daarmee? Niks. Dus

daar hebben we heel erg

veel last van.’

-Gemeenten hebben slechte

ervaringen met

samenwerking met de

Provincie vanuit andere

dossiers. ‘allerlei andere

dossiers komen dan ineens

uit de hoge hoed, waar in

het verleden ook niet goed

is samengewerkt. En die

hinderen dan de stappen om

tot verdere samenwerking

te komen. Vanwege al dat

oud zeer wat overal zit.’

-Samenwerking werd

beperkt door slechte

onderlinge ervaringen uit

het verleden op andere

dossiers. ‘Want ik gaf net

al, het is broos, de

samenwerking is broos, is

ingewikkeld, er spelen

allemaal andere oude

dossiers die vaak van ver

nodig, dan in deze

regio, dan wat zouden

we moeten hebben op

grond van de achterban

die ze

vertegenwoordigen.

Want daarmee creëer je

weer eilandjes. Ik denk

dat dat voor de

toekomstige DB een

kans is, om dat anders

in te richten.’

-Ervaringen met de

SRE gaven geen goede

basis om de vorming

van huidige dienst met

vertrouwen tegemoet te

zien. ‘Er waren ook

heel veel gemeenten die

zeiden, maar zoals de

SRE gewerkt heeft, zo

wil ik het nooit meer.

En een beetje het

gevoel van het clubje

die het altijd, die

namens ons dingen doet

waar we niet achter

staan.’

-Er werd gewerkt met

dezelfde vz van de oude

SRE die ook vz van de

stuurgroep wat scepsis

opleverde voor het

uitoefenen door te

stemmen.

-Oude SRE kende

financiële problemen

die werden

afgewenteld op de

nieuwe dienst, maar

waar deelnemers

geen

verantwoordelijkheid

voor wilde nemen.

-Oude directeur SRE

die als kwartiermaker

is aangesteld had niet

altijd vertrouwen van

de gemeenten. ‘In dat

hele proces hebben

we daar ook wel eens

last mee gehad. Dat

sommige gemeenten

zeiden, dat je toch

merkt dat daar na

enige scepsis was,

van ja maar die komt

van die oude dienst,

kan die dat wel?’

-Omliggende

gemeenten rondom

Eindhoven zijn altijd

bang geweest voor

annexatie door hun

‘grote broer’.

-Rondom andere

voor onze tijd zijn, die vaak

ook op een heel ander vlak

liggen. Die gewoon door

die samenwerkingsrelatie

heen fietsen. Ja, daar

hebben we gewoon last

van, dat vertrouwen.’

oprichten van de

nieuwe dienst. ‘Dus

daar hadden ze iets wat

niet lekker liep, en hier

moesten ze iets

opbouwen wat dan heel

erg goed zou moeten

gaan werken. Nou, dat

is natuurlijk heel lastig

als je dat ook nog eens

doet met dezelfde

voorzitter.’

-Gemeenten vonden dat

Eindhoven een groot

aandeel had voor het

slechte functioneren

van de SRE doordat zij

taken hieruit

terugtrokken waardoor

andere deelnemers

meer kosten moesten

maken. Hier waren

geen goede afspraken

voor gemaakt.

samenwerkingen is

men het altijd eens

geweest over het doel

en nut, maar

verzandde discussies

altijd in kosten

verdelingen.

Trust -Sommige deelnemers

hebben minder taken

ingebracht dan van te voren

was afgesproken waardoor

organisatie bleef zitten met

een negatief resultaat.

Leidde tot weerstand bij

deelnemers die wel

afgesproken taken

-Het collectieve belang

werd niet altijd gediend

door mensen in de

werkgroepen. ‘De

mensen die vonden het

soms lastig om ook te

schakelen tussen

algemeen belang en

eigen belang. En dat is

-Naast de formele

overleggen is er ook

een schaduw overleg

opgericht op

opdrachtgeversniveau

zodat deelnemers ook

op deze wijze

controle uit kunnen

oefenen. Getuigt van

-Sommige gemeenten

brachten de extra

taken vanuit de SRE

niet over naar de

ODZOB omdat ze dit

goedkoper konden

oplossen via externe

bureaus waardoor het

algemeen belang

overdroegen.

-Vertrouwen in de dienst

wordt geprobeerd te

ontwikkelen door goede

prestaties te leveren.

-Opportunistisch gedrag is

vertoond door minder taken

in te brengen dan

aanvankelijk afgesproken

was en door medewerkers

van een lage kwaliteit over

te dragen.

altijd wel wat je in zo’n

werkgroep zal zien.

Wat betekent iets voor

mij, dat is vaak

makkelijker te

beantwoorden dan wat

betekent het voor het

collectief.’

-Geen sprake van

volledig onderling

vertrouwen in de

werkgroepen.

-Weinig blijk van

vertrouwen in collega

bestuurders op basis

van voordracht

bestuurders voor DB.

‘Nou als er dan uit een

van die regio’s twee

vertegenwoordigers

naar voren komen, en

niet, volgens mij was

dat in twee gevallen zo,

dan zet dat al tot

denken. Want dat zijn

ze het kennenlijk in die

regio niet met elkaar

eens wie het dan moet

zijn. Dus zit daar

spanning in die regio,

en die spanning die

doorbreek je niet, maar

je gaat er gewoon een

laag vertrouwen. geschaad werd.

kiezen.’

Leadership -Directeur onderhoud

externe contacten op

bestuurlijk niveau en

adjunct-directeur is meer

intern gericht.

-Directeur geeft veel

vrijheid en adjunct

directeur heeft veel oog

voor details. Hun

samenwerking wordt als

positief en complementair

ervaren. ‘Maar onze

persoonlijke stijl is anders,

wij zijn in die zin gewoon

twee verschillende

persoonlijkheden. En ik

vind het wel knap van de

sollicitatiecommissie, want

die hebben ons in een ronde

aangenomen, zij hebben

moeten inschatten, gaat dat

matchen. En dat hebben ze

goed ingeschat want dat

matcht goed.’

-Formele leiders zijn tevens

informele leiders.

-Leiderschap van adjunct

directeur is 1x geëvalueerd

door directeur, verder

gebeurd dit niet in formele

zin.

-Verbindingen werden

onvoldoende gelegd

tussen projectgroep

leden.

-Hiërarchische stijl van

leidinggeven door

kwartiermaker werd

niet altijd positief

ontvangen.

-Directeur was

voornamelijk

verantwoordelijk voor

het maken van

verbinding met de

deelnemende partijen

en onderhouden van de

relatie terwijl adjunct-

directeur

resultaatgerichter is en

knopen doorhakt.

-Leiderschap is niet

formeel geëvalueerd.

-Directieve

resultaatgerichte

vorm van leiderschap,

weinig verbindend,

met focus en

waardering voor

bestuursleden die

positief bijdragen.

‘toch vooral

pragmatisch van

jongens, hoe gaan we

zorgen dat we

gewoon zaken op de

goede manier voor

elkaar krijgen, ik

noem mezelf per

definitie altijd

politiek ondernemer,

ik vind politiek leuk

maar ik ben nog

steeds in mijn wezen

ondernemer. Ik zit

niet te vergaderen om

te vergaderen, ik zit

te vergaderen om

uiteindelijk een doel

te bereiken.’

-Directeur heeft een

directe vorm van

communiceren ‘ik

wou ook iemand

hebben die in staat is,

-Directeur kon zich

directieve vorm van

leidinggeven

veroorloven doordat

hij voor beperkte tijd

is aangesteld.

die niet bang is om

daar hard in te gaan,

die mensen een

spiegel voor kan

houden, en die ook

mensen uit hun

comfortzone haalt, en

dat bereik je niet als

je bijvoorbeeld weer

iemand hebt die al

heel lang hier in de

regio meeloopt en

iedereen al weer

kent.’

Organization Governance -Ambtenaren houden hun

bestuurders goed op de

hoogte.

-Het meekrijgen van

ambtenaren heeft een

goede invloed op de

bereidwilligheid van

bestuurders om samen

te werken. ‘Als je dat

op die laag goed hebt,

dus op de laag van de

ambtenaren, de

afdelingshoofden, dan

nemen die die

bestuurders wel mee in

dat hele proces. (…) Ik

denk dat als je de flow

van de ambtenaren

goed hebt zitten, dat die

bestuurders mee gaan in

die flow.’

-bestuursleden in DB

vormen een

afvaardiging van de

regio’s en worden

gekozen vanuit het

AB waarin alle

deelnemers zijn

vertegenwoordigd.

-Alle 5 de regio’s

hebben een

afvaardiging in het DB

en alle deelnemers

zitten in het AB.

-Nadrukkelijke

samenwerking met

medewerkers van

eigen organisatie.

‘Maar daar wil ik goed

in voorbereid zijn en

back-up hebben. Dus

ik moet daarvan op

aan kunnen, en ik kan

daar, met degenen

waar ik zaken mee

doe, heel goed

schakelen. En dat is

echt nodig. Want als

de nood aan de man is

heb je elkaar nodig.

En dat hebben we

nodig gehad.’

Support -Dienst betracht

onafhankelijke,

faciliterende houding aan te

nemen door transparant te

handelen en slechts

gedeeltelijk eigenaarschap

te tonen voor problemen

die hun oorsprong bij de

deelnemers vinden.

-Kwartiermaker had

onvoldoende oog voor

gevolgen van vorming

van de dienst op de

deelnemende

gemeenten. ‘Dat hij

heel erg weinig luistert

naar gemeenten die

misschien wel juist de

eyeopener voor hem

kunnen zijn zoals de

gemeente Eindhoven,

daar zit wat frustratie.

En hij heeft dan niet de

kracht om dat om te

zetten naar hoe kan ik

met die signalen nou

zelf sterker uitkomen.’

-Bestuurders zijn te

weinig meegenomen in

de vorming van de

dienst.

-vz heeft ervoor

gewaakt dat men in

AB achterover leunt

om zo bestuurlijke

binding richting de

achterban te

behouden.

-Door veelvoud aan

ambtelijke

overleggen bestaat de

kans dat het AB niet

veel meer te doen

heeft dan afhameren

waardoor bestuurlijke

binding verloren gaat.

-Raden zijn op de

hoogte gehouden over

voortgang en gevolgen

voor de gemeente door

de wethouders. ‘Ook

ik in mijn

gemeenteraad en

college moest dat

natuurlijk ook elke

keer uitleggen. Het

komt goed, rustig nou,

we hebben een plan

van aanpak ik heb daar

vertrouwen in. dat

komt goed.’

-Doordat wethouder in

DB zit is de link naar

eigen gemeente en

raad kort en kan hij

hen makkelijk en

adequaat informeren

over lopende zaken.

Decisivenes

s

-De VTH managers van de

verschillende gemeenten

die gewerkt hebben binnen

de werkgroepen konden

goed strategisch denken,

maar waren minder goed in

het overzien van de

-Kwaliteit van

medewerkers in

projectorganisatie was

goed. Doordat hier veel

SRE mensen in zaten

dreigden de

opgeleverde stukken

-Selectie van

bestuursleden in DB

geschied o.b.v.

inhoud.

-Type mensen in DB

zijn gericht op de

toekomst en kijken

-DB leden worden

gekozen op basis van

inhoud en expertise.

-Er wordt gestuurd op

resultaat ook al leidt

dit mogelijk niet tot de

beste beslissing.

praktische consequenties

voor de dagelijkse praktijk.

‘Ik denk toch dat daar meer

mensen in hadden moeten

zitten, die ook beoogd

waren om over te gaan naar

de omgevingsdienst. Die

ook, laat ik maar zeggen,

met hun poten in de

modder staan, gewoon

slimme

vergunningverleners, en

zware niveau

toezichthouders, die

kunnen snappen van dit

hebben wij nodig om ons

werk goed te kunnen doen.’

wel veel op die van

SRE te lijken waarin

toen is bijgestuurd.

-Er is extern advies

ingewonnen voor het

berekenen van de

beoogde formatie van

de nieuwe dienst.

-Aanvankelijk was men

weinig resultaatgericht

en werd er te weinig

aan projectmanagement

gedaan. ‘Ze zaten graag

bij elkaar en waren fijn

aan het discussiëren van

er komt een RUD, maar

ik zag niet snel in dat

het al tot producten zou

leiden. En ik had wel

zoiets van ik moet wel

heel scherp gaan

zeggen, dit verwacht ik

van jullie en dan en dan

moet het klaar zijn.’

weinig terug naar het

verleden.

-Leider heeft geduld

voor deelnemers die

afwijken, maar stuurt

daarbij wel op

resultaat.

‘Omdat je niet kunt

blijven sollen moet

procedures en met

mensen. Soms moet je

niet het beste

besluiten, maar het een

na slechtste.’

-Directeur is van

buiten gehaald om de

verandering te

bewerkstelligen.

Conscientio

usness

-Conflicten op bestuurlijk

niveau zijn geprobeerd op

te lossen door persoonlijk

benaderen van relevante

wethouders door de

directeur. Op ambtelijk

niveau worden de relevante

afdelingsmanagers ingezet

om het niet gelijk op het

-Er zijn geen formele

werkafspraken

gemaakt, wel sprake

van sociale controle. ‘Ik

denk wel dat het goed is

om elkaar aan te

spreken en bij vragen

die je stelt ook helder te

communiceren wat je

-Persoonlijke relatie

wordt opgezocht bij

conflicten en er wordt

getracht weg te blijven

van formele middelen

voor conflict

oplossing.

-Geen formele

werkafspraken op

bordje van directie te

hebben.

-Er zijn geen vaste

werkafspraken. Dit wordt

per keer bepaald.

verwacht. En daar

mensen op aanspreken.

Dat is natuurlijk

cultuur, dus ik denk niet

dat je dat heel erg in

regels moet gieten.’

-Er is geen

escalatiemodel geweest

voor conflicten. Per

keer is gekeken welke

mensen die zouden

moeten oplossen.

bestuurlijk niveau.

‘Dus actie

puntenlijsten worden

snel geschoond, zo

snel als mogelijk, en

wij willen dat mensen

snel antwoord krijgen

van de ODZOB, en

ook van ons. En dat is

een soort van

onafgesproken

gedragscode die we

uitdragen.’ ‘Als

mensen bijvoorbeeld

te laat komen, heel

lullig, bij een

vergadering, dan

wordt dat wel even

gezegd, kom, dat

soort, ja, dat wordt wel

op een luchtige manier

verteld.’

Process Phasing -Onderscheid in fasen is

gemaakt op

hoofdlijnen.

-Er is gelijktijdig

gewerkt aan dossiers.

-Gedwongen karakter

heeft

samenwerkingsbereidhe

id ondermijnd. ‘Dat

maakt de

samenwerking wel

-Verplichtende

karakter is

noodzakelijk geweest

om samenwerking

van de grond te

krijgen. ‘dat we

überhaupt hier zijn

gekomen, en op dit

niveau en de boel

toch goed in elkaar

hebben gedraaid, is

-Opgelegde karakter

heeft tot weerstand

geleid. ‘De grootste

spanning is het feit dat

die milieudiensten

opgelegd zijn. En wat

je oplegt, kost kruim.

Wat je bottom-up laat

ontstaan, heeft al

draagvlak.’

moeilijker omdat je bij

samenwerking,

samenwerken ga je

doen als je daar het nut

van inziet. En niet als

het moet.’

-Er bestond

onduidelijkheid over

het minimum

basistakenpakket dat

overgedragen moest

worden naar de RUD’s

waar pas laat helderheid

in kwam. Tevens zijn

de spelregels

halverwege aangepast

door eerst te stellen dat

de vorming bottom-up

plaats zou moeten

vinden terwijl daarna

gedreigd werd met

ingrijpen.

het feit dat er een

verplichting onder

lag, dus we moesten

wel, en anders was

het echt misgegaan.’

Balance

Casting -Er is een opdrachtgevers

platform waarin de VTH

managers zijn

vertegenwoordigd vanuit de

gemeenten. Hun

bevoegdheid overlapt voor

een deel met die van de

directeuren. Dit moet nog

helder worden

weergegeven.

-Provincie worstelde

met de rol van regisseur

die ze vanuit het

ministerie kregen

opgedrongen.

-Sprake van rolconflict

bij vz oude SRE die

enerzijds een dienst

afbouwde en als vz van

de stuurgroep

-Wethouder ervaart

vrijwel geen last van

rolconflict. Hij heeft

meer informatie

waardoor de raad

informeren

makkelijker is, maar

het onderscheid

aanbrengen kost wel

meer tijd. Is geen

-Er bestaat een conflict van

rollen tussen de

opdrachtgeversrol en de

aandeelhoudersrol. Aan de

ene kant huren gemeenten

externe bureaus in voor

uitvoer van hun taken

waardoor kosten voor de

dienst hoger worden en

vanuit de aandeelhouders

rol willen ze deze kosten zo

laag mogelijk hebben.

verantwoordelijk was

voor de nieuwe dienst.

Hetzelfde geldt voor de

kwartiermaker die de

oude directeur was van

de SRE.

-Sprake van goede

rolverdeling tussen

directeur en adjunct-

directeur, hoewel het

voor de kwartiermaker

niet altijd duidelijk was

naar wie hij toe moest

voor vragen.

probleem.

-Rolconflict van

Provincie wordt goed

over gesproken en heft

niet geleid tot

problemen.

Quality

Parallel

development

s

-Vakbonden waren van

mening dat sociaal statuut

Brabant breed geregeld

moest worden, wat niet is

gebeurd en voor vertraging

heeft geleid.

Type

succesfactor

Dimensions Sensitizing

concepts

Questions

Relation Connecting Self and other

perceived

legitimacy,

external

stakeholders,

internal

communication,

feedback,

stimulation.

1. Did collaboration partners perceive each other’s presence at the negotiations

as legitimate?

2. How can the relation between external stakeholders and collaborating

partners be described? Did this have an effect on the establishment of the new

organization?

3. In what way was attention paid to internal communication within the

organization? And between collaborating partners?

4. Did collaborating partners give each other feedback?

5. Was there any emphasis on establishing personal connections? How was this

done?

Group dynamics Positive

working

climate,

psychology,

interaction

during crises.

6. Was there attention for establishing a positive working climate? Explain.

7. What is the nature of the connection between partners during crises?

8. Did group formation processes increase the effectiveness of collaborating?

Why yes/no?

Trust Inter-personal,

inter-

organizational,

open

communication,

questioning,

behavior.

9. How would you characterize the level of trust within the organization and

between its partners? How could this be explained?

10. How would you characterize the quality of internal communication?

Explain.

11. Is there a climate where people may pose questions? Why yes/no?

12. Were collaborating partners ever dishonest? Explain.

Leadership Ability to unite

interests,

initiative,

acceptance,

evaluation.

13. How was leadership formally organized while establishing the new

organization?

14. Was there an informal leader? What was his role?

15. How would you characterize the role of formal leadership in the

organization? (supportive, agenda setting, decisive). Explain.

16. Did both formal and informal leadership have the ability to unite interests?

Why yes/no?

17. Were both formal and informal leadership accepted? Why yes/no?

Appendix 3. Topic list

18. Were both formal and informal leadership evaluated? Why yes/no?

Organization Governance Fit between

structure and

desired

relationships,

evaluation

alignment

goals,

relationships

and structure.

19. Was attention rewarded at designing organizational structure that reflects

the desired relationships between partners? How was this achieved?

20. Has the alignment of organizational goals, relationships between partners

and structure been evaluated? Why yes/no?

Support Mandate,

consulting

parent

organization,

consideration of

outcomes for

parent

organization.

21. In what way was mandate organized between the organization and its

parent organizations?

22. Were parent organizations consulted in decision-making processes? How

was this achieved?

23. Was there consideration for the effect of organizational outcomes on the

parent organizations? Why yes/no?

Decisiveness Result driven,

monitoring

progress, team

composition.

24. In what way was a result driven orientation stimulated?

25. Was the progress monitored? Why yes/no?

26. Was there special attention awarded towards selecting decisive team

members?

Conscientiousness Documentation

of agreements,

social control,

conflict

management.

27. To what degree were agreements formally documented?

28. Do partners confront each other about the agreements they made?

29. Are there procedures for conflict management?

Process Phasing Clear

demarcation of

phases, timing

30. Was there a clear demarcation of phases? Why yes/no?

31. Were the relevant actions pursued during the designing phase?

Balance Content Vs

process,

available

32. How would you characterize the level of expertise for specific task

domains in your organization?

33. How would you characterize the level of expertise for building an effective

expertise. coalition infrastructure?

Casting Clarity, strategy

maker,

evaluation of

strategy maker.

34. Are different roles and responsibilities clearly delineated? How was this

achieved?

35. How was the role of strategy maker(s) implemented? Why in this way?

36. Were the policies implemented by the strategy maker(s) evaluated? How

was this achieved?

Quality Quality criteria,

focus on goals,

intervention.

37. Are there formulated quality criteria for the collaboration process? If yes,

how were they used?

38. Is the obtainment of goals matter of attention? If yes, does this attention

lead to intervention?