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Third World Quarterly
Coercive Diplomacy by the EU: The Iranian Nuclear Weapons CrisisAuthor(s): Tom SauerReviewed work(s):Source: Third World Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 3 (2007), pp. 613-633Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20454949 .
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ThirdWorld Quarterly,
Vol.
28,
No.
3, 2007, pp
613-633 Routledge
R
Taylor
Francis
roup
Coercive Diplomacy by the EU:
the Iranian nuclear weapons crisis
TOM SAUER
ABSTRACT The European Union has been the
main
international ctor trying
to contain
the
ranian
nuclear
programme.
In
2003, for
the
irst
time
ver,
the
EU-3
adopted
a coercive
diplomatic pproach
vis-a'-vis
ran. The
current
rticle
beginswithan analysis of the onceptof coercivediplomacy before applying it
to
the
ranian
case.
In so
doing,
the rticle
aims to
make
an interimssessment
of
the uropean
(EU-3)
effort.
The
EU
has
the
ambition
to
become
a
global player
and
2003 can
be
regarded
as a substantial step
in thatdirection.
Not
only did the U
set
up
its
first ilitary intervention, t also wrote a Security Strategy for the first ime
ever
and,
in a
separate
document,
a
Non-Proliferation
Strategy.1
But
the
event
that
year
which
probably
received
most
media attention
and
which
raisedmost expectationswas thecommon diplomatic demarche to Teheran
by
Dominique
de
Villepin,
Jack Straw
and
Joschka
Fischer,
the
ministers
of
foreign
affairs
of
the
'big Three',
on 21
October
2003.
The
EU-3
made
it
abundantly
clear that
they
would
do
everything hey
could
to
prevent
Iran
becoming
a nuclear
weapons
state.
The
objective
of this
paper
is to
make
an
interim
assessment
of the
European
effort
to
block
the Iranian
attempt
to
'go
nuclear'. Did
theEU
succeed
in
its
coercive
diplomacy
efforts? hat have been
the
difficulties?
What
lessons
can
be drawn?
In the first ection the
concept
of coercive
diplomacy
is
explained.What
are its key characteristics?Which factors determine whether coercive
diplomacy
in
general
succeeds or fails? In the
second
part
the
theory
is
applied
to the Iranian nuclear crisis.After a
chronological
overview of the
major events,
the
following uestions
are
considered: can theEU
attempt
be
regarded
as an
example
of
coercive
diplomacy?
Were the
conditions fulfilled
for
successfulcoercive
diplomacy
in this
specific ase?
Coercive
diplomacy
Diplomacy
is themain instrument f state
interaction.
ven if
thepositions
seem
very
opposed
to
each other and the
conflict
seems
unsolveable, states
Tom
Sauer
is in
the
Department
of
International
Politics, University
of
Antwerp, Belgium.
Email:
[email protected] .
ISSN
0143-6597
rint/ISSN
360-2241 nline/07/030613-21 2007 ThirdWorldQuarterly
DOI: 10. 080/01436590701200620 613
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THE
IRANIAN
NUCLEAR
WEAPONS
CRISIS
Is
the demand
legitimate?Here a
distinction can
be
made between
the
underlyingobjective
and the
specific
demand.
First, is the underlying objective legitimate?If public opinion in the
threatening tate(s)
believes that the final
goal
is
not
legitimate, hen t
will
be
hard for
decision makers in
the
threatening tate
to
maintain this
policy of
coercive
diplomacy
for
long,
especially
in
democratic states.6
Mutatis
mutandis,
if
public
opinion
in
the
threatened
state
does not
find the
underlying objective
legitimate,
twill
support
its
government
in
resisting
the
external pressure. The
result of the latter will
be that
the threat
ened
government will become
more
self-confident
nd
even
harder to
convince.
Second,
even
if
the
underlying objective
seems
legitimate,
the
specific
demandmay be (perceivedas) excessive. If thedemand isnot inproportion
to the
objective,
itwill not be
refarded
as
legitimate.
emands
should
to
a
certain
extent
always
be limited.
Does the
opponent believe that there
will be
more demands
turning p
in
the
future?
f
the
pponent believes that
more
demands
will
turn
p
in
the
future,
he will
not
be eager
to
give in in
the first
lace. The
threatening
tate
should
make clear
rightfrom the
beginning
what the overall
goals
are
and what
the
definitive olutionwill
look like.
Is the threatcredible?The credibilityof the threat is a major factor that
determines the
success rate
of
coercive
diplomacy.
The
credibility
f
a
threat
depends
in
its turn
on
four factors:
*
Is
the threat
proportional
to
the
demand? If
the
threat is
not
in
proportion to the
demand, than
itwill
not be
perceived as
credible. The
threat
may
eitherbe too
big
or too
small.
It
should be
proportional
to
the
specific emand,
the
underlying bjective
and the
available
means.
Where
military
action is
threatened,
Jakobsen
recommendsnever
excluding
the
use of
ground
troops.8
*
Does public
opinion
support
the threat
nd its
potential
consequences?
Sanctions, for instance,may also hurt the economy of the threatening
state,
which
may prevent
theuse of
coercive
diplomacy
in
the
first
lace.
*
Does
the
threatened
tate fear
some kind of
escalation? If
this is
the
case,
coercive
diplomacy becomes
easier.
*
What
is
the
reputation
of the
threatening
tate?
If
the
threatening
tate
has
a
reputation
of
making
credible
threats,
t
will be
easier
to
persuade
the
opponent.
Is
the
time
ressure
credible?The
demand may be
legitimate nd the
threat
credible,
but if
the time
pressure
is
too
tight r,
in
contrast,not
tight nough,
the odds are that the threatened tatewill not give in.
Which
actor
ismost
motivated to
win
the
negotiationgame?
Which
actor is
most
motivated
in
absolute
terms?
otivation basically
depends on
the size
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TOM SAUER
of
thenational interests nvolved.
If
there
re vital interests
t stake, theodds
are
that the
country
will be
extremelymotivated towin
the game.
Which actor is most motivated in relative terms?Even if there are
substantial
interests
nvolved forboth states, it is likely
that one of them is
more motivated than the other in relative terms.
Conclusion
To conclude
this
ection,
coercive
diplomacymay seem, and sometimes is, an
attractive alternative for both doing nothing and for going to war. On the
other hand,
as
Robert Art and Patrick
Cronin
state:
'coercive diplomacy is
difficult nd has
a
relatively
ow
success
rate'.9
It is
not
by chance that the
title f Alexander George's book is The Limits ofCoercive Diplomacy.
Regardless
of the final
outcome,
coercive
diplomacy
diminishes the
room
for
manoeuvre
of the
threatening
tate. It
restrains its
freedom of action.
More
fundamentally
the
strategy
f coercive
diplomacy
can
also fail.
In
this
case
there
are two
basic
scenarios left for the
threatening tate.
In
one the
threat
can
be carried
out. This
may
have
negative
consequences for the
threatening
tate as
well,
which
is
why
Art and
Cronin recommend: 'Do not
resort to coercive diplomacy unless,
should it
fail, you
are prepared to go
down the
path
of
war
or
you
have
prepared
a suitable
escape hatch'.10
The
risk exists
that the outcome of a war
may
not be
advantageous
for the
threatening tate.The alternativeapproach consists indoing nothing or in
trying
o
find nother
diplomatic
solution.
In
both cases the
credibility
nd
reputation of
the
threatening
tate is
undermined,
which may have further
negative consequences
if future threats
are
tried.As Jakobsen concludes:
'While
coercive
diplomacy
is a low-cost
strategy
when
it
succeeds,
failure is
unfortunately ery costly
as thecoercer
then faces the
grim
choice of
backing
down or
executing
his
threat'.11
Last, itmay be that
the threatened state
only partially agrees
with the
demand or that it sets
conditions.
In that
case,
the
strategymay
be
regarded
either as a
partial
success or
a
partial failure,depending
on where one sits.
Case-study:
the Iranian nuclear
weapons
crisis
Before
turning
to an assessment of the
EU's
attempt
at
coercive
diplomacy
vis-a-vis
Iran,
let
us
describe
the evolution of the
Iranian
nuclear
pro
gramme
and
the
reaction
of the international
ommunity,
nd
in
particular
the
EU.
EU
policy
vis-a-vis
Iran's
nuclear
programme
For
heuristic
purposes
the
four-year eriod
is
divided
into four sections:
1)
the initialphase starting n the summerof 2002; 2) a second phase that starts
with the first U-Iran
agreement
in
October 2003 until
the
break-up
of the
negotiations
in
August
2005;
3)
the escalation
phase
inside the International
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THE
IRANIAN NUCLEAR
WEAPONS CRISIS
Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA)
until the
beginning
of
February 2006;
and
4)
the involvement f theUN
Security
Council since
February
2006.
The initial
hase (summer 002- October
2003).While
Iran is a
signatory
f
the
Nuclear
Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT)
and is therefore
egally
bound
not to acquire nuclear
weapons,
rumours
circulated in
the
summer
of
2002
that it
was
working
on a
nuclear
weapons programme.
That
information
reportedly
came from the
National Council of
Resistance,
an
Iranian
opposition
movement
which,
surprisingly,
lso
figures
n
the terrorist
ist
of
the
US State Department.
It is
more
than
likely
that
Western
intelligence
agencies already had
access
to the
same
kind of
information.
Core
elementsof these
rumourswere
confirmed
hen the
IAEA
visited
Iran
in the second half of February 2003.12Most observers believe that Iran is
trying
o
acquire
nuclear
weapons
in
secret,
r at
least
trying
o
build
up
the
capabilities
that
are
needed
to
build
nuclear
weapons.13
While
Iran
has the
right
nder the
NPT
to
build
a
nuclear
programme
for
civilian
purposes,
it also
has
the
obligation
to
declaremost
of its
ctivities
to
the IAEA.The
problem is that
Iran
had
not
declared
everything
hat should
have been declared.
For
instance,Teheran admitted in
the
summer
of
2003
that it
had
experimented
in
the
past
with
uranium conversion.
The
difference etween
a
civilian and
a
military
programme
is that the
former ims
at
generating
electricity
while the
latter is
meant to
produce
nuclearweapons. An inherent ifficultynpreventing the spread of nuclear
weapons
is
that the
technology
sed for
building
civilian
reactors
can
also be
used for
military purposes.
While
in
the
past
the EU
may
have reacted
by making
a
non-binding
statement or
may
not
have
reacted at all
because
of internal
divisions,
it
now
reacted
promptly.
A
couple
of weeks
after IAEA
Director-General
Mohammed
El
Baradei
visited
Iran
and
confirmed the
existing
rumours
in
February 2003,
the Swedish
Minister of
Foreign
Affairs,
the
late Anna
Lindh, proposed
the establishment
of a new
EU
non-proliferation olicy in
the
EU General Affairs and
External Relations
Council
(GAERC)
in
March.
Most
observers
link
this
initiative,
which
was
later
complemented by
the
European Security Strategy, to the conflict in Iraq, and inparticular the
divisions
within the
EU and the absence of a
constructive
alternative to
the
belligerent plans
of the
neo-conservative
administration in
the
USA.
However,
it
cannot be denied that the
Iranian and
North Korean
nuclear
programmes
also
played
a
crucial
role.14
The
same
day
that the
Iraqi
war
started,
the EU
Political and
Security
Committee
(PsC)
held
a
seminar
about
weapons
of mass
destruction
in co
operation
with the
Swedish InternationalPeace
Research
Institute
SIPRI).
In
mid-April
the
GAERC
formally
aunched the
Non-Proliferation of
Weapons
of
Mass
Destruction initiative.
The draft
text
of this firstEU non
proliferation trategy ad already been approved at theThessaloniki Summit
in June
2003,
while the finaldraftwas
agreed upon
in
December 2003, in
parallel
with the overall
EU
security trategy.
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TOM SAUER
In
themeantime Iran had
secretly
proposed
a
deal
to
theUSA
in
May
2003. While
the
State Department showed
some interest, eo-conservatives
inside theWhite House immediately rejected the proposal.'5 Since the
Iranian revolution and
the
subsequent
hostage crisis in 1979, theUSA has
refused to have diplomatic contacts, let
alone negotiations,with Iran. Itwas
still
not
ready
to
change its policy. As
a
result, the EU had a clear
opportunity
to
step
in
as
themain negotiatorwith
Iran.
The EU was already negotiatingwith Iran on other issues. In December
2002 it had initiated negotiations with Iran for a trade and association
agreement.
Because
of the latter's
nuclear
programme, voices were raised in
the
EU to
halt these
negotiations.16
At the
same
time
states likeFrance (and
earlier the
USA)
had asked
Iran to
sign
theAdditional
Protocol
of the
IAEA.
The latter,which had been introduced in the 1990s on a voluntary basis,
provides the
IAEA
with more rightsto find ndeclaredmaterials and possible
violations. However,
Iran
declined the offer
to
sign theAdditional Protocol,
and the
EU
(despite
some
protests
inside the
European Commission)
took
action
against
Iran
by suspending
the
bilateral
negotiations
on a
trade and
association
agreement
in
June 2003.
The
IAEA
Board
Statement
of 19 June
2003 confirmed that
ran had failed
to
report
ertainnuclear
materials and
activities,
ut
did not
declare that
ran
was
in
non-compliance
with the
IAEA
Statute or the
NPT.17
The Board
also
asked
Iran to
sign
the
Additional Protocol.
In
August,
and
in
contrast
to
earlier
statements,
ran admitted
having
received
technological support
from
abroad. The IAEABoard Resolution of 12
September
2003 set another
ultimatum:
Iran had
to
provide
full
information bout its
programme
before
the
end of October
2003.18
The second
phase:
EU- Iranian
negotiations
nd
agreements
(October
2003
August 2005).
On
21
October
2003,
theMinisters of
Foreign
Affairs
of the
EU-3
France,
theUK
and Germany
flew toTeheran to
negotiate directly
with the
regime
inTeheran.
Dominique
de
Villepin,
Jack
Straw
and
Joschka
Fisher succeeded
in
signing
n
agreement
with Iran.
In
exchange
for further
negotiations
Iran
agreed
to
suspend
its enrichment
programme,
to
sign
the
Additional Protocol and to adhere to theProtocol in themeantime.' This
was
perceived
as a
major breakthrough.
Not
only
did the
EU-3 act
in
unity
(in
contrast to
the
Iraq
crisis),
their
ction was at
least
publicly
backed
by
theother
EU
member
states.Most
fundamentally
the
EU-3
succeeded
in
signing
n
agreement
with Teheran.
A
couple
of
days
later
Iran
submitted
a
'full'declaration about
its nuclear
programme
to
the
IAEA.
As
a
result,
the
IAEA resolution of
26 November
2003,
though
strongly deploring
Iran's
past
failures and
breaches,
did
not
declare that
Iran was
'in
non
compliance'.20
This
outcome was
basically
the result of
European diplo
macy,
which had to find
compromise
between the
positions
of Iran and the
USA. This bridge-building xercisewould be repeatedover and over again in
the
coming years.
In
December
2003
the
High Representative
for
common
foreign
and
security olicy (CFSP),
Javier
olana,
was
added
to
the
uropean
negotiating
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THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS
CRISIS
team.The
other
EU member
states
felt
ut of the
loop
to
a certain extent nd
had asked
Solana
to
play
the role
of
go-between.21
The first etback fortheEU happened at thebeginningof 2004.After the
USA had
made
clear that
ranwas
violating
theOctober
2003
agreement,
n
IAEA
report also
warned
in
March
2004
that
therewere
partsmissing
in
the
Iranian
declarations.22 Iran
in
its turn
felt
unhappy
with
the
'carrots'
obtained
from the
EU
and threatened to resumeuranium conversion
and to
build
a
heavy water plant.
El
Baradei,
the
Director-General
of
the
IAEA,
visited Teheran
at
the
beginning
of
April
and was able
to
convince
the
Iranians
to hand over a second 'full'
declaration on 20 May 2004.
Another
IAEA
report
a
couple
of weeks
later,
however,
talked
again
about
contradictory
information
provided
by
Iran.
The IAEA
Board Resolution
deplored the fact 'that Iran's cooperation has not been as full, timely nd
proactive as it should have
been'.2.
In
reaction Iran announced that it
would
start to
produce centrifuges
gain.
At the beginning of September
2004 Iran
started
to
convert
uranium
into
uranium gas. The EU raised the stakes:
Iranmust
co-operate
with
the IAEA
before the end
of
October 2004.
It
appears
that this
ultimatum had
an
effect.
Four
days later,
Iran
agreed
to
continue the
suspension
for
a
couple
of
months.
It
would
not be
the last
time
that
Iran
had tried
to
please the
IAEA
rightbefore theBoard of
Governor's
meeting. The Board agreed that
Iran
must provide
all the
necessary
information efore the
next
meeting
at the
nd
of November 2004, but without an automatic trigger o send the fileto the
UN
Security
Council
in
case
of
non-compliance.24
The
EU-3
proposed
a new
overall
deal
with
Iran on 21 October 2004
that
would include
the start of
broader
negotiations,
economic
benefits
and
the
delivery
of
light
water reactors.25This
second
EU-Iran
agreement
was
formally igned
in
Paris
on
14
November
2004,
and
included
a
renewal
of the
suspension of
the
Iranian
programme.26
Under
pressure fromRussia and
China,
10
days
later the IAEABoard even
agreed
that Iran's
suspensionwas
voluntarily
instead of
legally
binding.27
In
December
2004
three
EU-Iran
working groups
were
established
for
negotiating
the
following
tems:
1)
the
transfer
f
nuclear
technology; ) trade
and co-operation; and 3) security.Already in January 2005, however,
differences
merged
with
respect
to the
timing.
While Iran
expected
the
conclusion
of the
negotiations
withinweeks or
months,
the U did not
expect
these
talks to be
finished or
ne or two
years.
Teheran
evenwarned in
February
that the talks
had
to
be
concluded
by
mid-March
2005.
At the
nd
of
February
the
EU
succeeded
in
convincing
theUSA
to
come
up
with
new
'carrots':
membership
of
the
World
Trade
Organization
and
spare
parts
for
eroplanes.
But it
failed
to
convince the
USA
to
offer
ecurity
uarantees.
In
the
meantime
Iran
launcheddifferent
roposals
in the
working groups.
The
Iranian
leadership
became frustrated
because
of
a
lack of
co-operation
on
the
EU's side.
Consequently it threatenedtohalt its suspension again. In response theEU
threatened
o
halt
the
negotiationprocess
if
ran
restarted
ranium conversion.
The
shadow of the Iranian
presidential elections
in
June also
had
a
major
influence
n
the
negotiations. The EU and theUSA
expected that former
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TOM
SAUER
President Rafsjanjani, who
was regarded as a strongerfigurethan President
Khatami, would win the
elections and be able to take a more moderate view
on the nuclear issue. The EU promised to launch a new proposal at the
beginning of August 2005.
Instead of Rafsjanjani, and to the surpriseof the
restof theworld,
it
was the conservativeMahmoud
Ahmadinejad who won
the elections. Right from
the beginning he made it clear that Iran had the
right to have its own nuclear fuel cycle, including
enrichment and
reprocessing. twas therefore
ot surprisingthat Iran rejected theEuropean
proposal of
5
August 2004. Iran also started to convert
uranium. The EU
consequently broke off the negotiations.
The third hase.
escalation
within the
IAEA
(August 2005-February 2006).
The recommencement f uranium conversion by Iranwas regarded by the
EU
as
a transgression f
a
'red line'.
For
the first ime
ver
the
U
succeeded
in
convincing Russia and China not
to
use
their
veto
against
an
IAEA
resolution thatwould formally state that Iran was
in
non-compliance with
the
IAEA Statute.
The
24
September
2005
IAEA
Board
Resolution
was
supported by
the
EU,
the
USA
and
most
other
members;
Russia
and China
abstained; only
Venezuela voted
against.
The resolution also warned
Iran
that,
f t
did
not
comply
before thenext
meeting,
its file
ould be sent
to
the
UN
Security
Council.2
The EU made
it clear
that
itwould
only negotiate again
if ran
suspended
its enrichmentprogramme. Such a demand showed implicitacceptance of
Iran's uranium conversion,
something the EU had never accepted before.
Thanks to new documents provided by Iran to
the IAEA nOctober 2005, and
despite
the
extremist
eclarations
of President
Ahmadinejad
with
respect
to
Israel around
the same
time,
the
IAEA
Board of Governors did not
yet
send
the Iranian
file to the
Security
Council
in
November
2005.29
Again
theEU
member states
found
a
compromise between
the
American position
on
the
one
hand and the
Russian and Chinese views
on the
other.
InDecember 2005
a new round of
negotiations
between
the
U-3
and Iran
made
no
progress.
Iran
even threatened to resume uranium
enrichment.
When Iran
actually
carried out its threat n
9
January2006,
a new 'red line'
was crossed in the eyes of the EU and the USA. This time theywere
determined
to
send the Iranian
file
to
the
UN
Security
Council.
In reaction
Iran threatened
to
halt its voluntary co-operation
with
the IAEA and
to
accelerate
its
programme
from
the
level
of R&D
to an
industrial scale.
The fourthphase.
UN
Security
Council
engagement (since February 2006).
After three
years
the IAEA
sent
the
Iran
file
to
the
UN
Security
Council
during
a
specialmeeting
of theBoard
on
2-
3
February
2006.30
Itwas
again
the
EU
that
had drafted the resolution.
This time
not
only Venezuela,
but
also
Syria
and
Cuba
voted
against.
Russia and China
voted in
favour.
The
actual discussions inside the Security Council would only start at the
beginning
of
March
2006.
Nevertheless,
Iran
did
execute
what it
had
threatened
o do: it
suspended
its
voluntary
co-operation
with
the
IAEA
nd it
accelerated
its
enrichment
rogramme.
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THE
IRANIAN
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
CRISIS
On 29 March
2006,
after
weeks
of
negotiations,
the
Security Council
adopted
a so-called Declaration of the
Chairman,
which is not
legally
binding.This unanimously adopted document gave Iran anothermonth to
come
clean.31
But Iranwas not
impressed.
n
the
ontrary,
n
11
April
2006
Iran
proudly
announced that
it
had succeeded
in
enriching
uranium
up
to
3.5%
thanks to a cascade of
164
centrifuges.
The
next
IAEA
report
recommended that
the Security Council
agree on a formal
resolution
in
order
to
increase the
pressure
on
the
governmentof Iran.32
On
8
May
President
Ahmadinejad
made a
significant
ove
by
writing
a
letter
o
President
Bush,
which
was
later
published
in
the
media. While its
content can
easily
be
criticised,
the lack of
a
direct
response
from the
USA
further
ncouraged internal frictions nside theEU.
This
criticism, owever,
faded away thanksto two successesby theEU-3.34 First, at theend ofMay,
they ucceeded
in
convincing
the SA
to
negotiate
with
Iran,
something
thad
always
refused
to
do since
1979.
However,
the
USA,
set as a
condition for
multilateral talks that
Iran
first
ad
to
suspend
its
enrichment
rogramme.
Second,
the
U-3
also succeeded in
convincing
the
USA,
Russia and
China
to
agree
on a new common
package for
ran,
which was
offered
y Solana
to
the
decisionmakers
in
Teheran
on 5 June2006.
Orally
he also
explained
what
the
consequences
would be
if Iran
did
not
agree.
They
would include a UN
Security
Council Resolution that
would
open
the
door
to
sanctions.
While
therewas no
formal
deadline,
the
international
ommunityhoped
to
get
an
answer from ran before theG-8 summit inSt Petersburg inmid-July2006.
However,
Iran
immediately
ade it lear that
t
would
only respond
in
August.
At the
end of
June
Germany
appeared again
to
be
in
favour
of
a
proposal
thatwould
allow limited
nrichment. he
USA
immediately locked further
attempts
in that
direction.35When
it became
clear that Iran was not
interested n the
latest
proposal by the
international
community, theUN
Security
Council
started
to
draft
a
resolution.
After
two
weeks
of
negotiations,
the first
formal)
UN
Security
Council
resolutionwas
agreed
upon
on 31
July
2006.36
It
required
under
Chapter
7 of theUN
Charter
that
ran
suspended its
nrichment
rogramme
before
31
August 2006. It
also
threatened
to vote
through
a new
resolution that
would
open
the
door
to
'appropriatemeasures' read sanctions if ran did not comply.Only Qatar
voted
against.
Iran
immediatelyrejected
the
resolution
as
'illegitimate'.
On
22
August
Iran
also sent a
21-page
answer
to the
proposal made by
Solana at
the
beginning
of
June.37
As
everybody expected,
Iran
now
strengthened
y
theoutcome
of the
Lebanon war
did
not
complywith the
UN
Security
Council
Resolution's
deadline.
New
talks
between Solana
and
Larijani
on
10 September
raised the
possibility
of
a new
deal. Iran
would be
prepared
to
suspend
its
programme
on a
voluntary
basis forone or two
months,
as
it
had earlier
suggested
in
its
written answer on
22
August.38
French President
Chirac
even
went as
far
as
sayingthat formalnegotiationscould be setup, and that ran could thentake
a
reciprocal step
by suspending
its
enrichment
rogramme.39
But this
effort
y Solana also
failed.
The North
Korean nuclear
teston 9
October
2006 moved
the
spotlight,especially
in
the
UN
Security
Council,
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TOM
SAUER
from Iran toNorth Korea, but
only temporarily. he EU-25 ministers of
foreign ffairs greed
on 16
October
2006 to
continue talks inside theUN
Security Council about sanctions against Iran. Nevertheless, these talks
appeared
more
difficult than expected.
Not
only did Russia and China
continue to
oppose (large-scale) economic
sanctions, let lone military action,
therewas also friction etween the
USA and theEU with respect toRussian
support
for the
Iranian
Bushehr
reactor,
with
theUSA taking the hardest
position.40Again
theEU
found
itself n the
difficult osition of having to
mediate
not
only
between
Iran
and the
USA,
but
also
between
theUSA and
Russia.
At
the end ofNovember 2006 theBoard of the IAEA rejected Iran's
request for support
in
development of a heavy-waternuclear reactor atArak.
Despite
the
victory
of the
emocrats in
the
US
elections in
November and
thevictoryof themoderates in the Iranian elections inDecember 2006, and
despite
the recommendationof the
Iraqi Study Group
to
negotiatewith
Iran
(about Iraq),
there
are no
indications
at
least for the moment
that
President Bush is
willing
to
change
his
policy
vis-a-vis
ran.
On
the
contrary,
theUSA
sent a
second aircraft arrier
to
the
Persian
Gulf
in
January2007.41
Exactly twomonths after
the
UK,
France and
Germany
had
introduced
a draft
resolution,
the
UN
Security
Council was
finally able
to
agree
unanimously
on a
(second)
resolution
against
Iran on
23
December
2006.
For
the
first ime t
contained limited
conomic
sanctions, including ban on
the
import
and
export
of
nuclear-related
material,
and the
assets
of
10
Iranian companies and 12 individuals were frozen.The draft had been
watered down under
pressure
from Russia and China.
Iran
immediately
rejected the resolution.
Coercive
diplomacy by
the U
in
ran
This section will
make an
interim ssessment
of the
European attempt
to
convince
Iran, using
the instrument f coercive
diplomacy.
Our
hypothesis
is
that the U was not
completely
aware of thedifficulties f such an
approach,
and that
itwas
not
ready
to use this
diplomatic
instrument
uccessfully.
o
verify
hether this
hypothesis
is
correct,
the theoretical onditionsmentioned
above should be compared with the actual situation at the start of the
attempt
in
2003.
As the
attempt
could
in
theory
have been cancelled
at
any
given time,
and
as
it is
a
moving target,
one can in
principle
repeat
this
exercise for each
moment
during
the conflict.
A
legitimate nderlying bjective.
Is
preventing
ran
from
becoming
a
nuclear
weapons
state a
legitimate bjective?
At
first
ight,
this
seems a
reasonable
and
legitimate bjective.
The
spread
of nuclear
weapons
tomore
countries
should indeed
be
prevented.
There is however
a caveat.
The
cornerstone
of
thenuclear
non-proliferation
regime,
the
NPT,
consisted of a deal between the
nuclearweapons states and thenon-nuclearweapons states.The former ere
defined as those states that had
exploded
a nuclear device before
1
January
1967.42
All
other
signatory
states
agreed
to remain
non-nuclear
weapon
states.
The
IAEA is
responsible
for
verifying
ivilian
nuclear installations
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THE
IRANIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS
CRISIS
inside
thenon-nuclearweapon
states.Two
things,
owever,
were
promised
in
return
for non-nuclear weapons states' compliance.
First,
the
non-nuclear
weapon stateswould get support inestablishing civiliannuclearprogramme
(Article
4); second,
the
discriminatory
ature
of
the
regime
was
only
meant to
be
a
temporarymeasure,
as
thenuclear
weapons
states had
promised
to
get
rid of
theirnuclear weapons over time Article 6).
Iran
signed
the
IAEA
in
1970. It
therefore
romised
never to
acquire
nuclear
weapons.
If
Iran
is
now
trying
o
acquire
nuclear
weapons
in
secret,
which the
IAEA
has
stillnot been
able
to
confirm,
that
would be
illegal.
For
many
observers
preventing
Iran
from
becoming
a
nuclear
weapons
state
would
therefore e legitimate.
A
counter-argument that
cannot
easily
be
dismissed, however,
is that each
signatory
state
of the
NPT
should
fulfil
ts
obligations. Ifnot, the regimecan easily be criticised for double standards,
which would
rapidly
undermine thewhole
treaty.43
The
question
that is
immediately
raised is the
following:
are
the nuclear
weapons
states
in
compliance
with the
NPT
and,
more
particularly,
with
respect to nuclear disarmament
(Article 6)? Is itnormal that there re still
27
000
nuclear
weapons
on
earth
36
years
after the
treaty'sentry
into
force?
More
fundamentally,
re
thenuclear
weapons
states
willing
to
get
ridof their
nuclear
weapons?
If
that
is not
the
case,
which
seems to
correspond
with
reality,44 ne can question
how
legitimate t is
to
pressure
the
non-nuclear
weapons
states
to fulfil their
obligations.
If
France
believes that nuclear
weapons are vital to protect its national interests and apparentlymore
importantthan the legal obligation
to
get ridof
them),
how
can one credibly
convince
a
state
like
Iran
which is situated
in a
much
more
volatile
region,
surrounded by
the
USA
in
the
West (Iraq,
Turkey),
East
(Afghanistan,
Pakistan)
and South
(Persian
Gulf,
Gulf
states),
and
situated between
two
de
facto
nuclear
weapon
states
(Israel
and
Pakistan)
that
re
apparently
allowed
to
keep
theirnuclear
weapons
not to
acquire
nuclear
weapons?45
This 'double-standards'
critique
was
already
well
understood
by
2003.
The
fact
that
the
U
talks
with Iran
were
primarily resented by
nuclear
weapons
states France
and
the
UK may explain
the low
level
of
sensitivity o
this
kind of
criticism. ne can even
argue
that the
demands on
Iran
became even
more illegitimate ver time.As a result f the ranian crisis, in2004 theBush
administration
proposed
denying
access
to
a
complete
nuclear fuel
cycle
for
non-nuclearweapons states that
did not
yetpossess such far-reaching
ivilian
programmes. As
it is
quite
easy
for
states
with extensive civilian
nuclear
programmes
to convert
them
to
military programmes, such proposals
make
sense.
Indeed,
the
NPT
contains
a
loophole
in
this
regard.
On the
other
hand,
while this
proposal may
seem
opportune from
a
non-proliferationpoint
of
view, it
is in
contradiction of
Article
4
of
theNPT, which
states
that
non
nuclear weapons
states
have the
right to obtain support for their
civilian
nuclear
programmes. The adoption of thisUS
proposal would therefore
mean a fundamental limitation of the rightsof thenon-nuclearweapons
states
underArticle
4.
Countries
likeBrazil therefore
ppose
these
proposals
and link itwith
the
obligations
on the
nuclear
weapons
states to disarm. In
short, it
would not be
legitimate to strengthen
Article
4
in the absence
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TOM
SAUER
of
similarmeasures
with respect to
nuclear disarmament.
Nuclear prolifera
tion
and nuclear disarmament
are both
sides of the
same coin. It is
not by
chance that the NPT is both a nuclear non-proliferationand a nuclear
disarmament treaty.
The counter-argument
s that Iran
is not in good
standingwith the
NPT.
This argument
is correct, but
it is neutralised
by the fact that
the nuclear
weapons
states are
not in good standing
either (as
discussed
above). Worse,
India,
which has never signed
the
NPT
and
therefore
n
theory
has no rightto
receive support
for itscivilian
nuclear programme
is now being
helped by the
USA.46
This
is turning ogic
upside
down. It
further ighlights
the double
standards of
the nuclear
non-proliferation regime.
While this criticism
was
not problematic
in
the
first tages of escalation
with Iran, itwill probably be of crucial importance in the future, hen the
rest
of theworld may
be asked to
impose sanctions
or to use military
force
against
Iran.
While many
states
in theworld would
prefer to
see a
nuclear
weapons-free Iran,
they
lso
regard
the
existence
of two standards as
highly
problematic.
Many
of them
have criticised
the nuclear
weapons states
in
thepast,
in
particular
within
the framework
f the
NPT Review
Conferences.
The latest
NPT
Review Conference
in
2005
was a
fiasco
as
a
result of the
opposition
of the
non-nuclear weapons
states (with
Egypt as their
spokes
person)
vis-a-vis
the
nuclearweapons
states.
The creation of
theNew Agenda
Coalition
in 1998
should
also be
regarded
in this
light.47
t
is therefore
ighly
unlikely thatmany of thenon-nuclearweapons stateswill be able to support
the
nuclear weapons
states in their demand for
harsh measures
against
countries
like
Iran.
It
is also
not
by
chance thatGermany,
the only
non
nuclear
weapons state
in theEU-3, takes the
softest pproach.
The criticism
that theEU's
demand
is
not
legitimate
s
of
course used or
misused
by
Iran. President
Ahmadinejad
stated
in
an
interviewwith Der
Spiegel
in
May
2006:
'The
IAEA
was also
established
to
promote
the
disarmament
of those
powers
that
already possessed
nuclear
weapons'.48
And
in his
speech
at
the UN
General
Assembly
in
September 2006,
Ahmadinejad
wondered: 'Some
powers proudly
announce
the
production
of
second and third
generations
of nuclear
weapons.
What do
they
need these
weapons for?'.49 ut even ifthisdiscourse ismisused by Iran, there s a lot of
truth
n the
reasoning,
which makes
it
very
hard
for the
rest
of
theworld
to
enforce counter-proliferation,
ot
only
in
Iran
but also
in
general.50
A
legitimate
emand.
Iran has
never
disputed
the fact that
it is
not
allowed
to
have
nuclear weapons.
What
Iran
disputes
is the fact that
it is
not
allowed
to
enrich
uranium.
The latter
is the
right
of each
non-nuclear
weapons
state.
Moreover,
Iran is allowed
to
get technological
support
for
these activities
according
to
Article
4
of the
NPT.
One could
therefore
uestion
whether
it is a
reasonable
demand
to ask
Iran not to
enrichuranium.
The
counter-argument
is thattheNPT leavesa dangerous loophole thatmay be exploitedbymalicious
states.
States
that have
the
intention
f
secretly roducing
nuclear
weapons
may
try
o
acquire
a
very
sophisticated
civilian
programme
under
the
guise
of
Article
4
of
the
NPT,
and
at a certain
time
simply
withdraw from the
treaty,
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THE
IRANIAN NUCLEAR
WEAPONS
CRISIS
something that
is allowed
under
said
treaty.
his
scenario has
been
followed
byNorth
Korea.
Pyongyang
withdrew
from
the
NPT in
2003
and announced
twoyears later that tpossessed nuclearweapons. Iranmay inprincipledo the
same as
North
Korea.
The crucial
problem
in
this
regard
is to
understand
Iranian intentions. ased
on
the
apabilities
that the
IAEAhas
seen,
it an
still
not determine
whether Iran
is
building nuclear weapons. Even theUS inte
lligence gencies shrink from
making
such
statements.51
n the other hand,
the
AEA
did confirm hat
ran has not
always complied
with
the
IAEA
tatute.
In
addition,
the
same
criticism
as
before
pops up again.
Do
the nuclear
weapons
states
intend
to
get
rid of their
uclear weapons,
as
they
re
legally
supposed
to
do?
If
that is
not
the
case,
how
reasonable
or
legitimate s it
to
demand
that
Iran
not
enrich uranium? Of
course,
Iran
(mis)uses these
contradictions to defend itsposition. Iranian chiefnegotiator Larijani, for
instance,
stated at the
beginning
of May
2006:
'There
must
be
a
balance
between the
rights
nd the
obligations stemming
from the
NPT. It
is not
fair
that
we should have
all
the
obligations
but
not
enjoy
the
rights'.52 resident
Ahmadinejad pointed
out in
August
2006: 'How can
the
Iranian nation give
up
its
obvious
right
to
peaceful
nuclear
technology, hen America and some
other
countries test
new
atomic bombs each
year?'53
A
further
istinction
can be
made
with
respect
to
the
size
of the
civilian
nuclear
programme
that ran
should
be
allowed
to
possess.
On
this
oint there
exists
much debate.
The
USA
takes the
most
extreme
position: no enrichment
at all. Remarkably theUSA has been able to convince the European
negotiators
to
follow this
line
since
November
2004.54
In
theory,
ne
could
envisage
Iran
being
allowed
to
have
a
limited
(and delayed)
enrichment
programme, as this
would
not
allow
Iran
to
produce
nuclear weapons. This
was
proposed by
the International Crisis
Group, among others,
at
the
beginning
f
2006.55
The
idea
has
been
repeated
byRussia,
and
Germany
also
considered
the
roposal
at
the
beginning
ofMarch
2006.
But, again,
the
SA,
UK and France were
able
to
persuade Germany
and Russia to
withdraw
the
proposal.
One of theAmerican
counter-arguments
s
that
'you cannot
be a
little
it
pregnant'.
In
theend itwill be a
political
decision,
based on
trust
n
Iran, which allows
this
proposal to be further
onsidered or
not. The same
applies to anotherproposal by scientists,this time from theMassachusetts
Institute f
Technology (MIT),
to
build a
multinational
or
even supranational
enterprise
n
Iran
that
would allow
it to
build
quite
a
large-scale
enrichment
programme,
on
the condition that this
would
be
surveyedby international
monitors
24
hours
a
day.
The
enterprisewould consist both of
Iranian
and
international
ngineers
nd
employees.
Self-destruction
echanisms would
be
installed
to
prevent
break-out
in case Iran
cheated.56
When
Iran initiated
similar
roposal
at the
beginning
ofOctober
2006,
it
was
immediately ejected
by
the
international
ommunity, ncluding
Russia
and
France.
The
point
is
that
twill be hard to
maintain thedemand of
'no enrichment
t
all' forever. uch a demand seems excessive and is therefore ot altogether
legitimate.
t
is
normal thatthe
SA
and
possibly
others should
adopt it
s their
opening position
in the
negotiations,
but it should
also be normal to
relax
this
condition
over
time.
The
EU
and
theUSA
have
alreadymade
similar
moves
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TOM SAUER
before. At the beginning
of
the
negotiations,
theWestern
view
was 'no
conversion'.
However, when
Iran
did
convert
n2005, the U
and the SA had
to come back to their arlierposition. Inprinciple the ame could happen again
with respect to
enrichment. s
a
diplomat
in
Vienna stated:
'TheUS will push
veryhard until
the
ast
minute in thehope
of gettingthe
ranians to give
in
but
at
theend of theday they
will accept some form f enrichment ctivity'.57
Iranianfear of the lippery lope.
It
is very
likelythat ran is afraid that,once
it
agrees
with thedemands
of
the
U
(and
theUSA),
demands
with respect
to
other domains
will
follow, including
in the
domain
of
human rights, upport
for
terrorist
roups, recognition
f
Israel,
and
possibly regime hange.
If
that
fear
is
reallypresent,
it
may have
a
negative effect
n
the negotiations with
regardto thenuclear programme.More particularly ranwill try opostpone
possible
concessions
in
the nuclear domain
as
long
as
possible.
President
Ahmadinejad told his people:
'If
you
give
in
on the nuclear weapons
program, they'll ask about human
rights.
f
you give
in
on human rights,
they'll
ask about animal
rights.'58
possible
solution
to
prevent that logic
dominating
inside
Iran
is
to start
negotiations
on
all
these topics, except
of
course on
regime
change.
The
latter
will
also
have
to
include some sort
of
securityguarantees
from the
USA.59
Yet
security uarantees
were explicitly
rejected by
Under Secretary of
State
Nicholas Burns
at
the beginning of
October
2006.60
As the
USA
had
even
refused
to
talk
to
Iran
until
May 2006,
theEU was (and still is) basically hostage to theAmerican unwillingness to
talk,
let alone
to
provide security uarantees.
A
proportional
threat. he
problem
is
that the threat thatwill
impress
the
Iranian
decision
makers
most
is a
military
strike
y
the
USA.61
The
real effect
on the
ground, however,may
be
limited,
s not all the 'secret' facilities re
known and as
Iran
would
easily
be able to start
up
the
programme
again
later
on.
At
the same time
such attacks are
generally regarded
as
disproportionate
and therefore ot credible. This
is
because
the
underlying objective
is not
regarded
as
legitimateby
most
people
around
the
world, especially
in
the
Middle East.
A
military
action
by
theUSA
against
Iran
will
provoke
violent
reactions by Iran and Muslims in theMiddle East.62 Iran could retaliate in
different
ays.
It
possesses
intermediate allistic
missiles, possibly
laden
with
chemical
weapons,
which could be fired
against
Israel.
It
could further
destabilise
the
situation in
Iraq.
It
could ask
organisations
like
Hamas
and
Hezbollah
to
react. It
could also destabilise the
export
of
oil
from thePersian
Gulf
to
the
rest
f
the
world
by trying
o
close the trait
ofHormuz.
Muslim
terrorists
round
theworld
might
react as well.
These risks
do
not seem
proportional
to
the
possible
threat of
a nuclear Iran.
The
major point,
however,
is
that
ranian decisionmakers
are
also
making
this alculation and
therefore
o not seem afraid
of
such an attack. The end result
is a self
confident ran thatwill notmake (big) concessions at thenegotiating table.
A
threat
upportedbypublic opinion.
Another
threat
that
would
be
regarded
as
effective
by
Iranian decision
makers would
be
large-scale
economic
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THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS
CRISIS
sanctions.
The
problem, however,
with such sanctions is not so much
that
theywill
be
regarded
as
disproportionate by
world
public opinion,
but
that theywill not be considered credible because of the simple fact that
large-scale economic
sanctions
will hurt
the
rest
of
theworld
as well. As
Iran
produces
4.2 million
barrels
oil
a
day (out
of
84
million
world-wide),
it
is
highly likely
that theworld
oil
price
will further ncrease and reach
much higher than
it
already
is.63 his
may
have substantial
negative
effects
on
the world economy.
In
addition,
some
regional powers
like China
depend
a
great
deal
on
oil
and
gas
imports
from
ran.
China
imports
14%
of
its oil from
Iran, Italy
9%
and France
6%.
Most
major states, except
the USA, also have substantial non-energy trade
relations with
Iran.
Exporters
in
states
like
Italy,Germany and Austria would be substantially
hurt by a sanctions regime. It is thereforenot surprisingthat Italy, for
instance, has been very reluctant
to
back
sanctions. Russia, on the other
hand,
has been
promised
a
lot
of
money by Iran
to
construct nuclear
power
reactors
(like theBushehr
reactor
near the
Persian
Gulf)
and sells
a
lot of conventional weapons
to
Teheran.
In
short, public opinion
in
the
developed
world
is
not
eager
to
see their
governments impose large-scale
economic sanctions
on Iran. The main
point, however,
is
that Iranian
politicians
are
very
much aware
of
the
weaknesses
in the Western
approach.
Advocates
of
large-scale
economic sanctions argue
that
there
is a
chance
thatthebenefitswill outweigh thecosts,
in
thesense that the Iranian people
will
start to
grumble
before
public opinion
in
the
rest
of
theworld is fed
up
with the
negative consequences
of sanctions. While the latter is
highly
debatable,
an
additional
problem
is that
Iran
is
not a
country
with
a
good
reputationwith respect
to
human rights nd respect forpolitical opposition.
As
a
result,grumbling by
the Iranian
public
at
least
in
the early stages
could easily
be
suppressed by
the Iranian securityforces.The chances that
massive
protests
will
lead
to
regimechange
are not
regarded
as
particularl6y
likelyby
most
experts (although
one cannot rule it out
completely either).
5
The
cases of China
and Belarus are
probably
more relevant
than those of
Georgia
and
Ukraine. The former an be
regarded
as
'stronger'
tates
than
the latter. ran also belongs to the former ategory.
To
conclude
this
section,
both
large-scaleeconomic sanctions and military
action
are not
regarded
as
credible
threats nTeheran.
Small-scale economic
sanctions,
in
contrast,
are not
effective.
n
short,
t
is
unclear how
Iran can be
threatened n both
an
effective nd credible
way.
Fear
of
escalation.
As
explained
above,
Iran
does
not
fear
escalation.
Mutatis
mutandis,
the fear of
escalation
will
certainly
exist
in Iran's
neigh
bours. This
may
act as a
further restraint
on
possible military
actions
against
Iran.
Reputation.
The
EU
basically
has
no
reputation
of threatening anctions, let
alone
military
action. And the
only
international
actor
that has
such
a
reputation,
the
USA,
is
already
stretched
o its
imits y the
wars in
Iraq and
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TOM SAUER
Afghanistan. This is an additional reason why Iran does not
have much to
fear from theUSA.
Credible
time
ressure.
The
international
community has
set several
dead
lines, uch as the nd ofOctober 2003, theend ofOctober 2004, thebeginning
ofMarch
2006,
the
end
of
April 2006, mid-July 2006, and the end ofAugust
2006. It
has therefore
iven
Iran
enough
time
to
change itsposition if ithad
wanted
to do so.
Absolute motivation. The odds are that Iran's motivation for acquiring
nuclearweapons
is
very high.
In
general, there re threereasonswhy nations
obtain
nuclear
weapons: security, restige
and domestic
interests.66
or
Iran
thesecurity ituation iscertainlypart of the calculation. Iran is located in a
geostrategically mportant region thanks
to
scarce resources like oil and gas.
If it
wants
to limit
pressure from xternal states,nuclear
weapons may help,
or
at
least that
may
be
the
perception.
To
blackmail a nuclear
weapons state
may be more difficult than to blackmail a non-nuclear weapon state.
Ayatollah
Khomeini
only
revived
the
nuclear
programme
in the
second
half
of
the
1980s, very
much influenced
y
the
Iraqi
attack
against
Iran
in
1980
and
by
the lack of international condemnation
of
the
latter.
It was
also
common
knowledge
that
Israel
has
possessed nuclear weapons
since
the
end
of
the 1960s
and that
raq
was
involved
in a
similar
programme
in the 1970s
and 1980s.The pre-emptive ttack by Israel against the IraqiOsiraq reactor
in 1981
further ccelerated the
programme,
under
Saddam Hussein.67
The
1991
Gulf
war
in
turn increased the
US
military presence
in
the
region,
including
in
Saudi
Arabia. After
9/11
Iran was
categorised by
the Bush
administration as
part
of the 'axis of
evil',
which
further
eepened
Iranian
suspicions
of the
USA.
All
these factors
stimulated
Iran
in
its
quest
for
nuclear weapons.
One
could,
in
theory, rgue
that theUSA
has
released
Iran
from twomalicious
neighbours, namely
the
Taliban and
Saddam
Hussein.
While this is
true,
itmisses the
point
that Iran has felt
venmore encircled
by
the
USA
thereafter.
n
short,
f
ne
state
feels
insecure,
t
is
Iran. Last but
not
least,
the
Iranian
government
has
noticed
that
Iraq (without
nuclear
weapons) was attacked by theUSA, while North Korea (with nuclear
weapons)
was not.
This
may
have further
trengthened
the
position
of the
advocates
of a
nuclear
weapons programme
in
the
country.
Second,
Iran also
has
the ambition
to
become
a
regional power
in
the
Middle
East,
even more
than
it
already
is
today.
Iran
is
one of
the
biggest
countries
in
the
region,
with
nearly
70
million
inhabitants,
nd
is
proud
of
its
rich
culture.
Being
the
only
nuclear
weapons
state in
the
region
beside
Israel-will further
trengthen
ts
power
base.
Internally,
as
in
India,
the
nuclear
programme
is
regarded
as a
prestigious project by
the
public.
This is
true to
such an extent
that,
ven
if
ran becomes
a
democratic
state,
theodds
are that itwill continue itsnuclear programme.Third, as inPakistan (cfDr
Khan),
there
re also
groups
and individuals inside
ran
who
have
a
special
parochial
interest
n
acquiring
nuclear
weapons:
scientists,
niversities nd
the
military.
To
conclude,
Iran
is
highly
motivated
to
obtain nuclear
weapons.
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THE
IRANIAN NUCLEAR
WEAPONS CRISIS
Relative
motivation.While the
EU
and theUSA
are
also
very
determined
to
prevent Iran from cquiring nuclear weapons, it is unlikely that they re as
determinedas Iran is to acquire them. Iran iswilling to takemany risks in
this regard.
The
international ommunity,
n
contrast,
does not like the idea
of
a
nuclear Iran,
but it is
probably
unable to
pressure
Iran
very
hard to
give
up its programme.
This is a classic
example
of
asymmetrical
motivation.
History shows that smaller players
can
win when there is
a case
of
asymmetricalmotivation,
as
theVietnam
war
and the
recent
Lebanon
war
show.68 With respect
to 'hard'
proliferation cases,
the
international
community (including
the
USA)
does
not
have
a
very good reputation
either. Israel, India,
Pakistan and North Korea have become nuclear
weapons states,
while
the
West
made
every
effort
o
prevent
it.
Israel and
Pakistan have evenbecome close allies of theUSA. As mentioned above, the
USA is currently lso proposing
a new
agreement
with
India,
which not
only
goes against the spirit ut also the
letter
f the rules of theNuclear Suppliers
Group
and the
nuclear
non-proliferationregime
n
general.
The
message
for
Iran
is clear:
once
nuclear
weapons
have been
acquired,
the
situation
will
sooner
or
later
be
accepted,
and
perhaps
even
rewarded.
That,
at
least,
is
what
proponents
of
such
a
programme
inside
Iran
may
use as
arguments
to
convince
more
sceptical
voices.
The option of
coercive
diplomacy
revisited nno 2007
If
we
carefully
consider all the factors that
are
necessary
for
coercive
diplomacy
to
succeed,
one
could have
suggested lready
in
2003 that twould
be
extremelydifficult
o
convince
Iran. None
of the
factors, except one
credible
time
pressure-was
useful for effective oercive
diplomacy.
Last
but
not
least,
the nternational
ommunity
id
not
offer
ran a
substantial
package
of 'carrots',
including
some
kind of
security
uarantees
by
theUSA.
Critics
may argue
that
positive
incentives
will also not convince Iran to
give up
its
programme.That may be. But unless one tries, ne does not know for sure.
It is
difficult
ot to
conclude
that the EU took the
initiative
in
2003
unaware of thedifficulties.
he
political
circumstances in 2003
may
also
have
blinded it to a certain extent. First of all, since theTreaty of Maastricht
(1991)
and
especially
since
the
ummit
of
Saint
Malo
(1998),
the
U
has been
wanting
to
increase
its
profile
in the
realm of
foreign, security
and
even
defence
policy.
Second,
in
the
run-up
to the
Iraq
crisis in
2002-03, the
EU
was
perceived
as
divided and
without
much influence.
hird,
there
was
a
consensus in
the
EU
that itwould
not
be
too
difficult
o
provide
a more
constructive alternative
to
major problems
in
the
world than
the neo
conservative solutions
envisaged
in
theUSA since the
arrival
of
the
Bush
administration
in
2001.69
After the
Iraq
war
the
EU
really
tried
to
counterbalance its formerbehaviour.70
In
2003, for the first ime ever,
EU
member states had not only agreed towrite a Security Strategybut also a
Non-proliferation Strategy.
As
already
mentioned
above, they
lso succeeded
in
agreeing
and
editing
these
in
ust
a
few
months.
The
decision
to
'fight'
ran
was
taken
on
thebasis of thecombination of
a
kind
of
euphoria,
and
of
rash
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TOM SAUER
and naive
ambition
in
capitals
likeLondon,
Paris
and
Berlin.When
Libya
agreed
to
halt
itsweapons
of mass
destruction
programmes
in December
2003, theEU was evenmore convinced that itwas on the right track. In
short,
it seems that
theEU
has overestimated
its capabilities.
At the
same time,
and for
partially
the same
reasons,
the EU under
estimated
Iran's
motivation
and willingness
to
maintain
its
nuclear
programme.
The
EU stilldoes
not have
a very good
understanding
of
what
is going
on
inside
the
elite circles
in
Iran
with
respect to
thenuclear
weapons
issue.
In
addition,
the
few decision
makers and
EU
officials
nvolved
were
probably
unaware
of the
theoretical
ifficulties
f coercive
diplomacy.
A final
criticism
is that
the European
approach
was
probably
too
Eurocentric
as
well. The
EU
thought,
nd still
thinks, hat
itcould easily
persuade
Iranwith
'reasonable' arguments,and, ifnecessary, some 'carrotsand sticks'. In this
regard,
theEU
looks very
much like
the
USA.
There
seems
to
be a lack
of
empathy
for
the
feelings of prestige,
respect
and other
non-quantifiable
values
that
exist
in
other
parts
of theworld.7'
Once
the
negotiations
tarted,
he
U had the
dditional problem
of
being the
spokesperson
for
the rest
of the
world,
including the
USA, and
sometimes
Russia and
China
as well.
To
keep
this lliance
together
as,
and still
s,
very
difficult
ask.72
he
EU
had
to
make
too
many compromises
with
theUSA,
which
complicated
its
negotiations
with
Iran.The best
example
is the
ovember
2004 agreement
when
theUSA required
that
ran
not
be allowed any
levelof
enrichment,hile the uropeanswould have preferred obemore flexible.
Conclusion
Most
observers
believe
that
Iran is
trying
to
acquire
nuclear
weapons
in
secret,
r
is at least
trying
o
build
up
the
capabilities
that re
needed to build
nuclear
weapons.
For
more than
three
years
theEU has
taken the lead
in
trying
o convince
Iran
to
give up
its
efforts o
acquire
a
large-scale
civilian
nuclear programme.
It
did
not
succeed.
While
theEU could
in
theory
still
convince
Iran
to
give
up
thebulk
of itsnuclear
programme,
theodds are
that
Iran
will not
concede.
While Iran
may suspend
its nrichment rogramme
for
another (short) period, it is unlikely that itwill give up its rightto enrich
uranium.
The
most
likely
scenario
therefore
onsists
of
'muddling through'
until
Iran reaches
its
technological objectives.
The
world will
thenhave to
get
used
to
living
with
another
nuclear
weapons
state
in theMiddle
East. Some
observers
are
already
saying
that
the
latter
does
not
automatically
correspond
to
a
doomsday
scenario.73
Another
scenario
is a
military
action
by
the
US or Israel
to
prevent
Iran
acquiring
the
necessary
technology,
r at
least
to
buy
time.While
most
observers
regard
this
as the
least
likely
scenario,
it
cannot be
completely
dismissed
either,
taking
into
account
the
nature
of
the
current US
administration.The argument, spoused by the likesofUS SenatorMcCain,
is
that
everything
s better
than
a
nuclear Iran.74
The Iranian
case
supports
the theoretical
evidence
that
making
threats
does
not
always help.
Coercive
diplomacy
in
practice
is
more
complicated
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THE
IRANIAN NUCLEAR
WEAPONS CRISIS
than it seems.On thebasis of our analysis
we come to the onclusion that the
EU took the initiative
n
2003 without being fully ware
of the
fact
that its
efforts ould also fail, nd ofwhat theconsequences of such a failurewould
be for theEU's reputation.
On
the other
hand,
the
European
efforts
annot be dismissed as
having
been a complete failure. First
of
all,
the EU
took
a
lead.
It
acted
in
accordance with theUSA,
and tried to accommodate
thewishes of Russia
and China as well. It
is
very unlikely that any
other
regional power could
have played this role.This certainly nhanced
its
global prestige.Second, the
EU
acted
in a
more-or-less
united
fashion,
which also enhanced its
image
in
the rest f theworld. Internally
new
kind of decision-makingmodel saw the
light,with the EU-3 taking the lead and
Javier
Solana
as
the interlocutor
between theEU-3 and theotherEU member states.
On
the ther
hand,
theEU-3 also took a
major gamble.
The
longer
it takes
to
succeed, the
more
internal
riticism ithin the
EU
will
occur, as
is
already
happening today.
The
longer
t
takes,
themore thechance that theEU-3 will
try
to
blame theUSA for its lack
of
flexibility.
f
its
efforts
otally fail,
the
EU's reputationwill be damaged.
Notes
1
Basic
Principles
for
an
EU
Strategy
Against Proliferation of Weapons of
Mass
Destruction,
Brussels,
June
2003,
at
http://ue.eu.int/pressdata/EN/reports/76328.pdf;
Strategy Against Proliferation of
Weapons of
Mass
Destruction, Brussels,
December
2003,
at
http://ue.eu.int/pressData/en/misc/
78340.pdf;
and
European Security
Strategy:
A
Secure
Europe
in
a
Better
World, Brussels,
December
2003,
at
http://www.iss-eu.org/solana/solanae.pdf.
2
Alexander
George, Forceful
Persuasion: Coercive
Diplomacy
as
an
Alternative
to
War,
Washington
DC,
US Institute of
Peace, 1997;
Thomas
Schelling,
Arms and
Influence,
Newhaven,
CT: Yale
University
Press, 1966;
Peter
Jakobsen,
Western
Use
of
Coercive
Diplomacy
after
the Cold
War: A
Challenge
for
Theory
and
Practice,
London:
Macmillan,
1998;
and Bruce Jentleson &
Christopher
Whytock,
'Who
won
Libya?
The
force-diplomacy
debate and
its
implications
for
theory
and
policy',
International
Security,
30
(3),
2005-06,
pp
47-86.
3
George, Forecful
Persuasion,
p
7.
4
Ibid,
p
4.
5
Jakobsen,
Western Use
of
Coercive
Diplomacy
after
the Cold
War,
p
29.
6
Kenneth
Schultz,
Democracy
and
Coercive
Diplomacy, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press,
2001.
For
a
broader
theory
that
emphasises
the role of domestic
politics,
see
Andrew
Moravscik,
'Taking
preferences seriously: a liberal theory of international polities', International Organization, 51 (4), 1997,
pp
513-553.
7 Thomas
Schelling,
The
Strategy
of
Conflict,
Cambridge,
MA: Harvard
University
Press, 1960;
and
Morton
Halperin,
Limited
War in
theNuclear
Age,
New
York: John
Wiley,
1963.
8
Jakobsen,
Western Use
of
Coercive
Diplomacy after
the Cold
War.
9
Robert
Art
& Patrick
Cronin,
The United States and Coercive
Diplomacy,
Washington,
DC: US
Institute
of
Peace
Press, 2003,
pp
402-405.
10
Ibid,
pp
408-410.
11
Jakobsen,
Western
Use
of
Coercive
Diplomacy after
the Cold
War, p
1.
12
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-40.pdf.
13 Mark
Fitzpatrick,
'Assessing
Iran's nuclear
programme',
Survival,
48
(3),
2006,
pp
5-26.
14
Clara
P?rtela,
'The role of the EU in the
non-proliferation
of
nuclear
weapons',
prif
Report,
65, 2003;
Tom
Sauer,
'The
Americanization of
EU
nuclear
non-proliferation
policy',
Defense
and
Security
Analysis,
20
(2),
2004,
pp 113-131;
Eileen
Denza,
'Non-proliferation
of nuclear
weapons:
the EU and
Iran', European Foreign Affairs Review, 10, 2005, pp 289-311; and Milagros Alvarez-Verdugo,
'Mixing
tools
against
proliferation:
the EU's
strategy
for
dealing
with
weapons
of
mass
destruction',
European Foreign Affairs
Review,
11, 2006,
pp
417-438.
15
Gareth
Porter,
'Neo-con cabal
blocked 2003 nuclear
talks',
Asia Times
online,
30 March
2006,
at
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_east/HC30Ak01.html;
and
Porter,
'Iranian crisis
in
the
631
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TOM SAUER
wilderness',
Asia Times
online,
2
May
2006,
at
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/
HE02Ak04.html.
16
Steven
Everts,
'Iran
will be the
test
for
European foreign policy',
Financial
Times,
1
June 2003.
17
http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/MediaAdvisory/2003/medadvise200372.html.
18
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-69.pdf.
19 Iran
signed
the Additional Protocol of the
IAEA
on
18 December 2003.
20
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-81 .pdf.
21
Interview with EU official.
22
http://www.iaea.Org/NewsCenter/Statements/2004/ebsp2004n002.html#iran.
23
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2004/gov2004-49.pdf.
24
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2004/gov2004-79.pdf.
25
Light
water reactors
are
more
proliferation-resistant
than
heavily-enriched
uranium
reactors.
26
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2004/infcirc637.pdf.
27
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2004/gov2004-90.pdf.
28
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2005/gov2005-77.pdf.
29
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2005/gov2005-87.pdf.
30 http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2006/gov2006-14.pdf.
31
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8679.doc.htm.
32
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2006/gov2006-27.pdf.
33
http://edition.cnn.com/interactive/world/0605/transcript.lemonde.letter/.
34 Interview with
EU official.
35
'EU,
Iran
to
meet
on
nuclear
offer
next
week',
NTI
Global
Security
Newswire,
29 June 2006.
36
http://www.un.Org/News/Press/docs//2006/sc8792.doc.htm.
37
http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iran/iranresponse.pdf.
38 Ian
Traynor,
'Iran offers
to
freeze uranium enrichment
for
eight
weeks',
Guardian,
11
September
2006.
39 Elaine
Sciolino,
'Iran's freeze
on
enrichment
could
wait,
France
suggests',
New
York
Times,
19
September
2006;
and
Seymour
Hersh,
'The
next
act',
The New
Yorker,
20 November 2006.
40 Colum
Lynch
& Glenn
Kessler, 'US,
European
allies
at
odds
on
terms
of
Iran
resolution',
Washington
Post,
26
October
2006.
41
'Report:
US
to
boost
Persian
Gulf
force',
Jerusalem
Post,
19
December 2006.
42 The USA, the former USSR, theUK, France and China are the formal nuclear weapons states.
43 Mohamed El
Baradei,
Nobel
Lecture,
10 December
2005,
at
http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/
laureates/2005/elbaradei-lecture-en.html;
and
Tom
Sauer,
'The nuclear
non-proliferation
regime
in
crisis',
Peace
Review,
18
(3),
2006,
at
http://soc.kuleuven.be/iieb/docs/06-TS-peacereview.pdf.
44 For
the
case
of
the
USA,
see
Tom
Sauer,
Nuclear
Inertia:
US Nuclear
Weapons
Policy after
the Cold
War,
London: IB
Tauris,
2005.
45
While neither Israel
nor
Pakistan has
ever
signed
the
NPT,
they
acquired
nuclear
weapons
in
an
obscure
and
probably illegal
way.
46 'America's nuclear deal
with
India:
from bad
to
worse',
The
Economist,
20
July
2006,
at
http://
www.
economist.
com/opinion/PrinterFriendly.cfm?story_id=7193934.
47 Celso
Amorim
et
al,
'What does
not
exist
cannot
proliferate',
International Herald
Tribune,
2
May
2005.
48 Stefan
Aust
et
al,
' We
are
determined' ,
Der
Spiegel,
30
May
2006,
at
http://service.spiegel.de/cache/
international/spiegel/0,1518,418660,00.html.
49 'Bush, Ahmadinejad spar at UN', NTI Global Security Newswire, 20 September 2006.
50
Selig
Harrison,
'It
is
time
to
put
security
issues
on
the table with
Iran',
Financial
Times,
18
January
2006.
51 Dafna
Linzer,
'US
spy
agencies
criticized
on
Iran',
Washington
Post,
24
August
2006,
A01.
52 'Iran
to
remain
in
nuclear
treaty,
chief
negotiator
says',
NTI
Global
Security
Newswire,
9
May
2006.
53
'Iran
says
ready
to
discuss
suspending
enrichment',
NTI
Global
Security
Newswire,
17
August
2006.
54 Interview with
EU official.
55 International Crisis
Group
(ICG),
'Iran: is there
a
way
out
of the nuclear
impasse?',
ICG
Middle
East
Report,
51,
23
February
2006.
56
Geoffrey
F?rden
& John
Thomson,
'Iran
as
a
pioneer
case
formultilateral nuclear
arrangements',
MIT
Science,
Technology
and Global
Security Working Group,
16
June
2006.
57 Michael
Adler,
'IAEA
studies
enrichment
compromise
but
US
remains
unimpressed', Agence
France
Presse,
25
June
2006,
at
http://news.yahoo.eom/s/afp/20060625.
58
Quoted
by
Ray
Takeyh,
interviewed
by
Bernard
Gwertzman,
Council
on
Foreign
Relations,
31
January
2006,
at
http://www.cfr.org/publication/9718.
59
Harrison,
'It is time
to
put
security
issues
on
the table with
Iran';
and
Scott
Sagan,
'How
to
keep
the
bomb from
Iran',
Foreign
Affairs,
85
(5),
2006, pp
45-59.
60 'Iran
offers
new
nuclear
plan',
NTI
Global
Security
Newswire,
3 October 2006.
632
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THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS CRISIS
61 Joshua
Muravchik,
'Bomb
Iran',
Los
Angeles
Times,
19November
2006.
62 Paul
Rogers,
'Iran:
consequences
of
war',
Oxford
Research
Group
Briefing
Paper,
February
2006.
63 Charles
Krauthammer,
'The Iran charade: Part
II',
Washington
Post,
18
January
2006,
A17.
64 Dafna
Linzer,
'Europe trying
to
grease
wheels for US talks with
Iran',
Washington
Post,
18
September
2006.
65
Sam
Gardiner,
The
End
of
the 'Summer
of Diplomacy':
Assessing
US
Military
Options
on
Iran,
New
York:
Century
Foundation,
2006.
66 Scott
Sagan,
'Why
do
states
build nuclear
weapons?',
International
Security,
21, 1996-97,
pp
54-86.
67 Richard
Betts,
'The Osirak
fallacy',
The National
Interest,
Spring
2006,
pp
22-25.
68 Ivan
Arreguin-Toft,
How
the
Weak Win Wars:
A
Theory
of
Asymmetric
Conflict, Cambridge:
Cambridge University
Press,
2005.
69
Judy
Dempsey,
'EU
foreign
ministers
agree
WMD
policy',
Financial
Times,
17
June
2003,
p
9.
70 Interviews
with EU officials.
71
For the role
of
anthropology
in
strategy,
see
Ken
Booth,
Strategy
and
Ethnocentrism,
Teaneck,
NJ:
Holmes and
Meier,
1979.
72
Interview with EU officials.
73 William Pfaff, 'Iran's nukes
are
a
non-issue', International Herald Tribune, 27 January 2006; and Barry
Posen,
'We
can
live with
a
nuclear
Iran',
New York
Times,
27
February
2006.
74
Quoted
by
Jackson
Diehl,
'Bush's choice
on
Iran',
Washington
Post,
30
January
2006.
633