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The Effectiveness of Coercive and Persuasive Counterinsurgency
Approaches since 1945
Stephen Pampinella
Based on the case selection discussed at the end of this
document, 47 conflicts include the
universe of relevant cases for this study. These are:
Case # Case Name Year Started
1 f!hanistan "antiSoviet$ 1%7&
' l!erian (nde)endence 1%*4
+ l!eria "($ 1%%'
4 n!olan (nde)endence 1%-1
* Ban!ladesh 1%71
- Yu!oslavia 1%%1
7 Burma/yanmar 1%4&
& Burundi 1%%1
% Chechnya ( 1%%4
10 Chechnya (( 1%%%
11 Colomia "23C$ 1%-4
1' aire "anti/outu$ 1%%-
1+ Cua 1%*+
14 5ast Timor 1%7*
1* 5ritrea 1%74
1- uatemala 1%-0
17 uineaBissau (nde)endence 1%-'
1& (ndia "Na6alites$ 1%&0
1% (ndia "ashmir$ 1%&%
'0 (ndochina 1%4-'1 (ndonesia "ceh$ 1%7-
'' (ndonesia "8aru (slam$ 1%*&
'+ (ra9 "urdistan$ 1%-1
'4 enya "/au /au$ 1%*'
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"2eifer '00', 10'10+$,@elmand in 2all 1%&1 "(id. 1--$, @erat
in )ril 1%&+, @elmand in 1%&+
"aeef '00%, '+'4$.
- Eemplary 2orce present"03e!ular use of intimidation, torture,
and murder of ordinary
f!hans "2eifer '010, 104$.
C *esettlement a(sent"0 no evidence of resettlement.
, Amnesty3+egotiations present"0 Soviet nion did ne!otiate ?ith
s)ecific commanders
"such as /assoud$ to declare ceasefires in s)ecific areas. Fhile
conducted in !ood faith
initially, hostilities resumed over time and these ne!otiations
did not ever lead to
counterinsur!ent victory. Soviets and 83 en!a!ed in a
reconciliation initiative after Ganuary
1%&7 that sou!ht ne!otiations ?ith the mujahideen durin! the
Soviet ?ithdra?al. These
ne!otiations led to the Bilateral !reement et?een f!hanistan and
;aAistan, ?hich the S and
Soviet nion si!ned as interested )arties "rau '00', +04+0*$.
E ,evelopment Assistance present"0 The Soviets )rovided
si!nificant economic assistance to
the 83 in su))ort of the military effort to su))ress the
mujahideen. These efforts at forced
moderni=ation ?ere consistent ?ith the socialist ideolo!y of the
Soviet nion and military.
Soviet develo)ment )ersonnel conducted mass )roEects aimed at
im)rovin! infrastructure
"alinovsAy, '010$.
2 Elite ocal *elationships a(sent"0 no evidence found.
. Algerian 'ndependence# start $ 1954
'ncum(ent loss Arreguin!Toft $ loss) *A+, $ loss"
A-C,E2
A /assacres present"0 ccordin! to @orne, mass murder and the
elimination of entire
villa!ers did ha))en, althou!h it ?asnHt official !overnment
)olicy. Fhen Soustelle comes to
)o?er, he says ITo send in tanA units, to destroy villa!es, to
omard certain =ones, that is no
lon!er the fine comJ it is usin! a sled!ehammer to Aill fleas.K
"Duoted in @orne 1%77, 107$ The
SaAiet massacre "2eruary 1%*&$ a))ears to e the ?orst case,
?here 2rench omers ?i)ed out
the villa!e after a neary amush and then shots fired at overhead
aircraft "@orne 1%77, '4%
'*0$. @o?ever, 8e aulle ?as adamantly o))osed to all forms of
such rutal o))ression and
reiterated in 1%*& that no such atrocities ?ere to taAe
)lace. 3etaliatory, not official )olicy, ut
no )unishment a))ears to follo? massacres.
- Eemplary 2orce present"0ServanSchreier "1%*7$ discusses the
Aillin! of l!erians
drivin! a trucA sus)ected of su))ortin! the 2
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it ?as nonetheless effective. This method effectively comatted
the 2
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lose faith in the 2rench over time. Fhile the )rotests callin!
for the end of the 2ourth 3e)ulic in
1%*& include loyalist l!erians, the riots at Barricades FeeA
includes no l!ierans "@orne
1%77$.
6. Algeria 7'A"# start $ 199
'ncum(ent 8in Arreguin!Toft $ +3A) *A+, $ 8in"
a-c,E2
A /assacres a(sent"0 ?hile there are re)eated lar!escale
massacres durin! the 1%%-%7
)eriod, these are attriuted to ( and the (slamist reels "alyvas
'000$. There is some
sus)icion that reels committin! massacres may in fact have een
colludin! ?ith the re!ime
since the military did not intervene. Yet there is no direct
evidence that the re!ime did actually
direct or commit such atrocities "3oerts '00+, '07, +11$. 2or
e6am)le, ervyn and =e "'004,
4+$ discuss massacres committed y the army, ut do not )rovide
any s)ecific e6am)les.
- Eemplary 2orce present"0 there are re)eated instances of
e6traEudicial murder, torture,
and intimidation y the re!ime "see 3oerts '00+, +1* for an
e6am)le$. This re)ressive )olicy
?as )ushed y one faction in the military Ano?n as Othe
eradicatorsO, they included smallerscale
massacres of 10 to 14 )eo)le "3oerts '00+,1*01*7$.
C! *esettlement a(sent"0 no evidence of resettlement of
civilians.
, Amnesty3+egotiations present"0 ;resident eroual and other
moderates did seeA to
ne!otiate ?ith the (slamist reels and find some ?ay to
reincor)orate 2(S acA into the )olitical
system. These talAs and other initiatives lead to some o)enin!s
for )eace includin! the 1%%%Civil 8iscord
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;ress.
3oerts, @u!h. '00+. The Battlefield Algeria, 1988-00.
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enou!h educationhealthcare to I)roduce any marAed chan!e in the
9uality of life.K fricans are
really chea) laor for coffee )lantations. "Bender 1%7', ++&$
(n 5ast, none of the services
)romised y the !ovHt ?ere )rovided, at least y 1%70. "Bender
1%7', ++%$
, Amnesty3+egotiations a(sent"0No evidence of ne!otiations.
@o?ever, ;ortu!uese sou!htto turn ca)tured insur!ents and recruit
them into their military forces. This is offered as an
alternative to )unishment, not as a form of for!iveness
follo?in! voluntary surrender, so ( do not
code this as amnesty.
E ,evelopment Assistance present"0 ;ortu!uese seeA to moderni=e
n!ola throu!h
resettlements and )rovide health and educational services. rmy
em)loyed as teachers in many
cases, su))orted uildin! schools, health clinics. ccordin! to
Cann "1%%7, RR$, ;ortu!al ado)ts
F@> standards for doctor)o)ulation and meets them. @o?ever,
accordin! to Bender "1%7'J
1%7&, 1-7$, economic develo)ment )ro!rams fail c of social
disru)tions to ordinary life.
fricans livin! in settlements faced declinin! standards of
livin!, not im)rovn!. So, efforts atdevelo)ment ?ere incom)lete at
est.
2 ocal Elite *elationships a(sent"0lthou!h ;ortu!uese
incor)orate fricans into military
forces, there is no evidence that they ally or su))ort local
indi!enous leadershi) amon! tries
contested y insur!ents. @eavyhanded tactics involvin! mass use
of air)o?er as ?ell as
resettlements a))ear to )revent any move to?ard elite
coo)tion.
5. -angladesh# start $ 19%1
'ncum(ent loss Arreguin!Toft $ 8in:override;") *A+, $ loss"
A-cdef
A /assacres present"0 ;aAistani rmy committed multi)le massacres
of unarmed civilians. These
include massacres at 8haAa niversity and at villa!es ?hich had
een the site of insur!ent attacA. The
latter involve the Aillin! of all men from some villa!ers, ?hose
odies are then immolated. "Bose '00*$.
These acts of violence are considered !enocide y some scholars
"Amam '00'$.
- Eemplary 2orce present"0 ;aAistani rmy and sym)athi=ers use
e6traEudicial murder, torture, and
harassment a!ainst sus)ected )roinde)endence Ben!alis. These
uses of e6em)lary force also include
se6ual violence a!ainst ?omen "/ooAherEee '00-$.
C *esettlement a(sent"0 no clear )olicy of resettlement.
, Amnesty3+egotiations0 a(sent"0 no evidence durin! the
conflict, althou!h military and
?ami f course, these reaA
do?n.
E ,evelopment Assistance a(sent"0 no evidence of develo)ment
assistance.
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2 Elite ocal *elationships a(sent"0 ?hile there ?ere ;aAistani
loyalists in Ban!ladesh, the
;aAistani rmy failed to cultivate these relationshi)s amid the
massacres of Ban!ali civilians and
conventional comat ?ith the (ndian rmy and ir 2orce.
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- Eemplary 2orce present"0Burmese forces have re!ularly )ressed
the )o)ulation into
service as )orters. Beatin!s and intimidation of civilians are
common, as ?ell as ra)es and se6ual
crimes a!ainst ethnic minorities.
C *esettlement present"0 Burmese military begins to forcibly
resettle ethnic minorities in
1996 in its campaign against the Karenni National Progressive
Party, continues for several yearswith thousands resettled.
D Amnesty/Negotiations (absent): Burmese military is constantly
negotiating with different
rebel groups, leading to many cease-fires. Yet, many of these
fail (like the cease-fire prior to the
1996 offensive) and as a result, fighting recommences.
E Development Assistance (absent): No evidence of development
assistance or civic action to
win over ethnic minorities.
F Elite Local Relationships (present):The Burmese military has
co-opted some rebel groups
to fight others, like the 20,000 strong United Wa State
Army.
References
Cline, Lawrence, E. 2009. Insurgency in amber: ethnic opposition
groups in Myanmar. Small
Wars and Insurgencies. 20(3-4), 574-591.
&. -urundi# start $ 1991
stalemate3dra8 Arreguin!Toft $ +3A) *A+, $ mied"
A /assacres present"0 follo?in! @utu massacres of Tutsis ?ho
?ere an!ry that the Tutsidominatedarmy held a cou) a!ainst the
first democratically elected )resident in 1%%+ "a @utu$, the army
Ailled
et?een *0,000100,000 @utus to restore order "vin 1%%%, '-'$.
- Eemplary 2orce present"0 liAely to e )resent !iven e6treme
nature of violence in the civil ?ar.
C *esettlement a(sent"0 no clear attem)ts at resettlement, oth
sides o)t for very lar!e massacres
instead comined ?ith ethnic cleansin!, liAe the clearin! out of
@utus y Tutsis around the ca)ital.
, Amnesty3+egotiations present"0Ne!otiations et?een loyalists of
the elected @utu )resident and
the army continued follo?in! the )ostcou) massacres. But ?hen
ne? @utu )resident dies in )lane crash
?hich also Ailled @ayarimana, ne!otations follo? re!ardin! a ne?
!overnment, and cainet )ositions
are s)lit et?een @utu and Tutsi factions "vin 1%%%, '-'$.
E ,evelopment Assistance a(sent"0 no evidence of develo)ment
assistance.
2 Elite ocal *elationships a(sent"0 no evidence of elite local
relationshi)s, althou!h elite factions of
each ethnic !rou) moili=e their o?n militias.
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*eferences
vin, ;eter. 1%%%. I5thnicity and ;o?er in Burundi and 3?anda:
8ifferent ;aths to iolence.K
Com*arative +olitics +1"+$: '*+'71.
9. Chechnya '# start $ 1994incum(ent loss Arreguin!Toft
:*usso!Chechen; $ loss) *A+, $ mied"
A-c,ef
A /assacres present"0 Russian used of heavy firepower
(artillery) against Chechen
communities, attacking civilian targets. Led to widespread
civilian casualties, eventually
alienated the civilian population as well (Kramer 2005, Renaud
2010).
B Exemplary Force (present): Russian forces treated Chechen
civilians harshly. MVD used
cordon-and-sweep ops to harass Chechen civilians, even
kidnapping some for ransom (Kramer
2005).
C Resettlement (absent): No active policy of resettlement of
entire regions, although refugees
were created by the fighting.
, +egotiations3Amnesty present"0 hasavYurt ccord si!ned et?een
3ussian and
Chechen reels in u!ust 1%%-, )rovidin! for a ceasefire and the
end of the ?ar, ut also
allo?ed for de facto inde)endence until ne? delierations in '001
"3enaud '010$.
E ,evelopment Assistance a(sent"0No maEor )olicy of develo)ment
assistance or civic
action.
2 ocal Elite *elationships a(sent"0 1%%4 3ussian invasion of
Chechnya alienates e6istin!
Chechen allies and leads all Chechens to turn a!ainst the
!overnment "3enaud '010$.
References
Kramer, Mark. 2005. Guerrilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and
Terrorism in the North
Caucasus: The Military Dimension of the Russian-Chechen
Conflict,Europe-Asia Studies
57(2), 209-290.
Renaud, Sean. 2010. A View from Chechnya: An Assessment of
Russian Counterinsurgency
During the two Chechen Wars and Future Implications. Massey
University, unpublished
Master's Thesis.
10. Chechnya II, start = 1999
incum(ent 8in Arreguin!Toft $ +3A) *A+, $ ongoing :override $
*ussian state 8in;"
A-cdE2
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A /assacres present"0 3ussian military attacAs ro=ny in >ct
1%%% and nearly levels the
entire city ?ith air and artillery omardments, taAes full
control in 2eruary '000. 3ussian
military re!ains control over most of Chechnya y mid'000, ut
causin! immense destruction
?ith indiscriminate violence "3enaud '010$.
- Eemplary 2orce present"0;ro3ussian Chechen !overnment
estalished after 3ussian
invasion ruled mainly throu!h violent coercion, re!ularly
rutali=ed the )o)ulation "3enaud
'010$.
C *esettlement a(sent"0 Fhile refu!ees ?ere created durin! the
?ar, no evidence of a
focused resettlement )olicy.
, Amnesty3+egotiations a(sent"0 Several amnesties occur durin!
3ussian attem)ts to
estalish !overnance. 7,000 taAe amnesty y '00*.
E ! ,evelopment Assistance present"0 3econstruction occurred
durin! the initial second
invasion in '000, ut slo?ed after this. reas in southern
Chechnya that ?ere destroyed in the
fi!htin! ?ere necessarily reuilt. So, this is incom)lete
reconstruction "3enaud '010, ramer
'00*$.
2 Elite ocal *elationships present"0 3ussia identifies ne?
)ro3ussian allies ?ho
successfully uild local su))ort, )articularly the adyrov family.
8es)ite the assassination of the
father, the son tooA over as the re!ionOs )ro3ussian leader and
!uided the end of the
counterinsur!ency "3enaud '010$.
*eferences
ramer, /arA. '00*. Iuerrilla Farfare, Counterinsur!ency, and
Terrorism in the North
Caucasus: The /ilitary 8imension of the 3ussianChechen
Conflict,Kuro*e-Asia "tudies
*7"'$, '0%'%0.
3enaud, Sean. '010. I ie? from Chechnya: n ssessment of 3ussian
Counterinsur!ency
8urin! the t?o Chechen Fars and 2uture (m)lications.K /assey
niversity, un)ulished
/asterOs Thesis.
11. Colom(ia# start $ 194
incum(ent 8inArreguin!Toft $ +3A) *A+, $ ongoing) override (y
=14# 2A*C is very
8ea>"
A-c,E2
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A /assacres present"0 /ilitary does not )ur)osely use mass
fire)o?er to ?i)e out villa!ers
or )o)ulation centers. @o?ever, air)o?er is used alon!side
military o)erations, and there are
incidents ?here air)o?er is used on individual
homes.;aramilitaries that ?orA closely ?ith the
!overnment do commit lar!escale massacres in the 1%%0s,
includin! the /a)ri)ian /assacre in
1%%7 involvin! +0 civilian deaths, the lto Naya massacre in '001
involvin! at least 40 civilians
deaths, and others.
- Eemplary 2orce present"0 56em)lary force is common throu!hout
the ?ar. S military
advisors instruct Colomian military to develo) )aramilitary
or!ani=ations in late 1%*0s to
intimidate sus)ected insur!ents, includin! memers of le!al
)olitical )arties, unions, other civil
society or!ani=ations "StoAes '00*$. /ilitary or )aramilitary
forces re!ularly intimidate, torture,
and murder civilians sus)ected of insur!ent su))ort. !ain,
!ro?th of massacres due to
)aramilitaries. 1' deaths at
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E ,evelopment Assistance present"0 8evelo)ment assistance ?as
common durin! the
counterinsur!ency efforts s)earheaded y ;lan
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*rovincial $econstruction Teams in #ra7./asterOs Thesis.
/onterrey: Naval ;ost!raduate
School.
1. ?aire anti!/o(utu"# start $ 199
incum(ent loss Arreguin!Toft $ +3A) *A+, $ loss"a-cdef
A ! /assacres a(sent"0 massacres ?ere committed y the 3; and
28< a!ainst @utu
refu!ees ?ho fled into Con!o from 3?anda follo?in! 3;2Hs defeat
of @utu re!ime. 2urther, the
2orces rmees airoises "23$ is so ureaucratically ine)t that it
is seen as not even fi!htin! the
?ar. >nly com)osed of 7*,000 troo)s. "10&$
@o?ever, /outu does hire merceneries to fi!ht that do commit
atrocities. These include
Serian mercenaries ?ho commit atrocities a!ainst civilians at
isan!ani, ut then they leave the
country "no additional details )rovided$ "3eyntEens '00%, 11*$.
No other evidence.
- Eemplary 2orce present"0 airean military does )rey on
civilians, en!a!es in lootin! and
harmin! civilians. (n oma at the end of >ctoer 1%%-, Tutsi
?ere Ivictims of ause y certain
LautochthonesH ?ith the a))roval, if not u)on the incitement of,
local authoritiesK "3eynEtens
'00%, 1+1$.
C *esettlement a(sent"0 no evidence of resettlement y airean
re!ime. /ost (8;s created
y 28< and 3?andan military ?hich attacA @utu refu!ees ?hich
had )reviously fled 3?anda
after their defeat y 3;2.
, ! Amnesty3+egotiations a(sent"0 N and > seeA to foster
ne!otiations throu!hout the
?ar, ut these never really come to fruition. The /arch '7
ne!otiations that start follo?in! the
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Thom, Filliam. 1%%%. ICon!oaireHs 1%%-%7 Civil Far in the
Conte6t of 5volvin! ;atterns of
/ilitary Conflict in frica in the 5ra of (nde)endence.K The
!ournal of Conflict "tudiesR(R"'$.
htt):Eournals.hil.un.cainde6.)h)GCSarticlevie?rticle4+*&*01*,last
accessed 2eruary
10, '014.
/cNulty, /el. 1%%%. IThe Colla)se of aire: (m)losion, 3evolution
or 56ternal Saota!eQK The
!ournal of odern African "tudies+7"1$: *+&'.
16. Cu(a# start $ 1956
incum(ent loss Arreguin!Toft $ loss) *A+, $ loss"
a-c,ef
A /assacres a(sent"0No evidence of massacres, mass atrocities,
destruction of )o)ulationcenters.
- ! Eemplary 2orce present"0 BatistiaOs relatively
un)rofessional army re!ularly harassed and
rutali=ed civilians, ultimately alienatin! them "Goes '010,
1411-4$.
C *esettlement a(sent"0No evidence of resettlement, the
insur!ency ?as initially or!ani=ed
in the already de)o)ulated Sierra /aestra mountain ran!e.
, ! Amnesty3+egotiations present"0 Batista does offer an amnesty
early on in his rule to reels
includin! Castro in 1%**. @e himself is )ardoned, ut then ecomes
an insur!ent yet a!ain "Goes
'010, 1411-4$.
E ! ,evelopment Assistance a(sent"0No evidence that Batista
!overnment ever offers civic
action or develo)ment aid to ?in over rural Cuan )easants.
2 ! Elite ocal *elationships a(sent"0 Batista never ?ins the
loyalty of )easant leadershi) in
Cua, leavin! them to e coo)ted or controlled y Castro and the
insur!ency.
*eferences
Goes, nthony Games. '010. /ictorious #nsurgencies) our
$e(ellions that "ha*ed :ur World.
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A /assacres present"0 Searchanddestroy o)erations Aill thousands
of civilians from 1%77
1%&1. /ore than 100 Ailled in Santa Cru= massacre at funeral
in 1%%1. ;aramilitaries commit
massacres leadin! u) to vote for inde)endence in 1%%% and
after.
- ! Eemplary 2orce present"0 (ntimidation, Aidna))in!,
e6traEudicial murder ?as common
in the 1%%0s amon! )ro!ovOt militias and )aramilitaries a!ainst
anti(ndonesian activists, )ro235T
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C Resettlement (present): Civilians were cleared from a six-mile
area running alongside the
Keren-Asmara road in 1970 to reduce attacks, cleared from other
areas as well (Tareke 2002).
D Negotiations/Amnesty (present): Ethiopian military government
held talks with the EPLF
in 1977 in Berlin, but then broke them off as they instead
launched a new military offensive.
Negotiations between mid-level officers guided by Jimmy Carter
also begin in 1989 (Pateman
1990).
E Development Assistance (absent): no evidence of development
assistance.
F Elite Local Relationships (absent): no evidence of local
relationships.
References
De Waal. Alexander. 1991.Evil Days: 30 Years of War and Famine
In Ethiopia.New York:
Human Rights Watch.
Pateman, Roy. 1990. The Eritrean War.Armed Forces and Society
17(1): 81-98.
Tareke, Gebru. 2002. From Lash to Red Star: the pitfalls of
counter-insurgency in Ethiopia,
1980-82.Journal of Modern Africa Studies 40(3), 465-498.
1. 7uatemala# start $ 19=
'ncum(ent 8in Arreguin!Toft $ +3A) *A+, $ 8in"
A-C,Ef
A Massacres (present): military resorted to annihilation of at
least 450 villages and
inhabitants in 1981-1983.
B - Exemplary Force (present): Intimidation, harassment,
torture, and murder of individual
suspects was common practice by military.
C - Resettlement (present): More than 1 million Gualemalans
forcibly displaced during the
period from 1981-1983 in a deliberate policy of removal and
displacement, then reorganized in
'model villages' controlled by gov't (Streeter 2006).
17
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D - Amnesty/Negotiations (present): Amnesty offered in 1982 for
those returning from Mexico,
or other insurgents, who had to sign an appeal for amnesty
(Streeter 2006).
E - Development Assistance (present): Much assistance available
via USAID and the Alliance
for Progress, but the Guatemalan gov't never adopts a firm
policy of development to implement
programs. Oligarchy always shirked from supporting socioeconomic
reform. Military doesimplement its own civil affairs program known
as the National Plan for Security and
Development, offering both guns and beans.
Elite Relationships (absent): Military doesn't build new
alliances among local elites, 'model
villages' enable complete surveillance and monitoring of the
population. No move to use local
elites for control. More direct form of intervention in civil
society (Streeter 2006).
References
Streeter, Stephen M. 2006. Nation-Building in the Land of
Eternal Counter-Insurgency:
Guatemala and the contradictions of the Alliance for Progress.
Third World Quarterly 27(1): 57-
68.
1%. 7uinea!-issau 'ndependence# start $ 19
'ncum(ent loss Arreguin!Toft $ loss) *A+, $ loss"
A-C,Ef
A ! /assacres present"0 ;ortu!uese use heavy air)o?er in areas
controlled y ;(C,
omin! villa!ers and usin! na)alm a!ainst reelheld villa!es
"8hada 1%%&, *&'$. /ilitary
under S)inola innovates heliorne attacAs in freefire =ones,
Aillin! scores of villa!ers and
destroyin! villa!es, destroyin! livestocA "Chaal 1%&0,
&+$.
- ! Eemplary 2orce present"0 3e!ular use of violence a!ainst
civilians in raids and
o)erations.
C *esettlement present"0 (N in other countries, ;ortu!al
uses
aldeamentosto resettle )o)ulation and distriute economic
assistance and develo)ment. These
?ere increased after S)inola came to )o?er, ut ?ere used in the
first )hase as ?ell "8hada
1%%&, *&4$.
, ! Amnesty3+egotiations present"0 /ilitary and ;(C ne!otiate
inde)endence follo?in! the
1%74 cou) to end the conflict.
E ! ,evelopment Assistance present"0 Fhen S)inola ecomes
overnoreneralmilitary
commander in 1%-%, he enacts a develo)ment )ro!ram called O
Better uineaO y increasin!
food )roduction, uildin! infrastructures "hos)itals, schools$,
etc. "Chaal 1%&1, &+$.
2 ! Elite ocal *elationships a(sent"0
1&
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lthou!h fricans are incor)orated into ;ortu!uese military
forces, no evidence e6ists that the
;ortu!uese form allies amon! local elites. This is consistent
?ith direct rule throu!hout the
colonial )eriod.
*eferences
8hada, /, 1%%&. IThe
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Misra, Amalendu. 2002. Subaltern and the civil war: An
assessment of left-wing insurgency in
South Asia. Civil Wars, 5(4): 56-76.
Andhra Pradesh/Naxalite. GlobalSecurity.org, accessed December
12, 2012.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/naxalite.htm
19. 'ndia @ashmir"# start $ 19&9
stalemate3dra8 Arreguin!Toft $ +3A) ongoing"
A-cdef
A ! /assacres present"0 multi)le lar!escale massacres have een
committed y (ndian forces
follo?in! attacAs a!ainst them ?ithin )o)ulated areas. These
include *0 deaths in So)ore to?n
in Ganuary - 1%%+, +1 deaths in BiEehara to?n on >ctoer ''
1%%+, +* SiAh deaths in
Chattisin!h)ura on /arch '0,'000. @o?ever, BS2 court of
in9uiries have held some of those
res)onsile for these attacAs. But not for all. 2ire has also een
directed at cro?ds of mourners at
funerals of those slain y security forces. Thus, the !ovHt Eust
)unish all instances of massacres
leadin! to char!es of state terrorism "Gafa '00*$.
- ! Eemplary 2orce present"0 security forces have used
intimidation, ra)e, torture and
e6traEudicial murder on civilians and sus)ected insur!ents
re!ularly "Gafa '00*, Bhatt '00*$.
C ! *esettlement a(sent"0 maEor dis)laced )o)ulations have
included ;andits from ashmir,
driven out y /uslim militants. "
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Bhatt, ShaAti. '00+. IState Terrorism vs. Gihad in
ashmir.K!ournal of Contem*orar% Asia
++"'$: '1*''4.
Telford, @amish. '001. ICounter(nsur!ency in (ndia:
>servations from ;unEa and ashmir.H
The !ournal of Conflict "tudies RR("1$:
htt):Eournals.hil.un.cainde6.)h)Ecsarticlevie?4'%+4&&&,
last accessed 2eruary 14, '014.
an!uly, 3aEat. '001. I(ndia, ;aAistan and the ashmir (nsur!ency:
Causes, 8ynamics and;ros)ects for 3esolution.KAsian "tudies
$evie2'*"+$: +0%++4.
Gafa, Yateendra Sin!h. '00*. I8efeatin! Terrorism: Study of
>)erational Strate!y and Tacticsof ;olice 2orces in Gammu ashmir
"(ndia$.K+olice +ractice and $esearch-"1$: 1411-4.
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alliances ?ith Cao 8ai and @oa @ao sects, they form militias to
defend a!ainst iet /inh. But
no local elites in North ietna. ">OBallance 1%-4,
&+&4$
*eferences
>OBallance, 5d?ard. 1%-4. The #ndochina War, 19;
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incum(ent 8in Arreguin!Toft $ +3A) *A+, $ 8in
a-Cdef
A /assacres a(sent"0 No evidence of massacres by Indonesian
military.
B - Exemplary Force (present): Indonesian military pressed
civilians into militia service andparticipation in cordon-and-sweep
operaitons known aspagar betiswhile under threat.
C Resettlement (present): Indonesian military does evacuate and
resettle villagers who live in
Zone C, whose villages were then destroyed.
D - Amnesty/Negotiations (absent): No evidence of amnesty or
negotiations, DI insurgency
ends with decapitation.
E - Development Assistance (absent): No evidence found.
F - Elite Relationships (absent): Few elite relationships,
Kilcullen (2000) argues that local
military commanders were the real powerbrokers and exercised de
facto control over civil
administration and civil society.
References
Kilcullen, David. 2000. The Political Consequences of Military
Operations in Indonesia, 1945-
1999. Dissertation. Syndey: University of New South Wales.
----. 2006. Globalisation and the Devleopment of Indonesian
Counterinsurgency Tactics. Small
Wars and Insurgencies. 17(1). 44-64.
----. 2010. Counterinsurgency. London: Oxford University
Press.
6. @urdistan# start $ 191
incum(ent 8in Arreguin!Toft $ 8in) *A+, $ 8in"
A-C,ef
A ! /assacres present"0 (ra9i re!ime has a lon! history of
indiscriminately attacAin! urdish
civilians from 1%-1 on?ard. This includes omin! of urdish
villa!es follo?in! 1%-1 u)risin!
">HBallance '00', 1&*$.
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urdistan Ano?n as mujamma?at, or collectivities that (ra9is
referred to as modern villa!es.
"@3F 1%%'$
, ! Amnesty3+egotiations present"0 (ra9i re!ime and urds si!n a
ceasefire in 1%70 that
!rants urdish autonomy in four years. @o?ever, a!reement doesnHt
really hold as order
dis)utes and conflicts are endemic.
E ! ,evelopment Assistance a(sent"0 no evidence of develo)ment
assistance )rovided y (ra9
to urdish )o)ulations.
2 ! Elite ocal *elationships a(sent"0 no evidence that (ra9i
re!ime uilds local urdish
allies.
*eferences
>HHBallance, 5d!er. '00'. I(ra9.K (nAra(s at War) ilitar%
ffectiveness, 19;8-1991.@ ed. y
enneth >. ;ollacA.
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- ! Eemplary 2orce present"0 Bennett "'007a$ ar!ues that
rutality ?as re!ularly used
indiscriminately a!ainst the civilian )o)ulation. These included
eatin!s, torture, and murder. @e
ar!ues that these )ractices ?ere mostly committed y the enya
;olice 3eserve "civilian
settlers$, in!Hs frican 3ifles, @ome uard. 2ormer modeled on rmy
attalions, latter used in
Eoint o)s ?ith the rmy. "(id., 1**$ British strate!y used
)unitive force, fear and intimidation.
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E ! ,evelopment Assistance present"0 8evelo)ment assistance
a))eared to e used selectively,
and not all iAuyu received the same enefits from ne? schools,
infrastructure, and other ne?
services. !ain, )atrona!e ?as used to uild net?orAs of clients,
and British assistance ?as
funneled throu!h their loyalists.
2 Elite ocal *elationships present"0 British ties to enyan
loyalists ?ere dee), local chiefshad een incor)orated into selfrule
throu!hout the colonial )eriod, they favored their clients. (n
fact, these relationshi)s to local elites are ?hat drove the
reellion, as many fricans ?ere
e6cluded and ecame tenants ?ho lost their land and suffered
under lo? ?a!es. /au /au led the
cause of the dis)ossessed "nderson '00+, **$ These loyalists
?ere recruited into the @ome
uard as ?ell, they ?ere the tar!ets of /au /au. @o?ever, British
res)ond y )rotectin! and
)rovidin! iAuyu loyalists ?ith resources to uild their o?n
)atrona!e throu!h ne? local
institutions: Ilthou!h not usur)ed entirely, chiefs and headmen
?ere demoted and re)laced in
the u))er echelons of )atronclient net?orAs y frican le!islators
and administrators a))ointed
as enya e!an to )re)are for decoloni=ation.K "Branch '007, +14$
Thus, there is the erosion of
the old net?orA throu!h /au /au attacAs and the construction of
a ne? one in the emer!in!
edifice of the enyan state.
*eferences
nderson, 8avid. '00*.=istories of the =anged) The irt% War in
en%a and the nd of
m*ire.
Bennett, @u?. '007"a$. IThe /au /au 5mer!ency as ;art of the
British rmyOs ;ostFar
Counterinsur!ency 56)erience.Kefense "ecurit% Anal%sis. '+"'$:
14+1-+.
Bennett, @u?. '007"$. IThe >therSide of the C>(N: /inimum
and 56em)lary 2orce in British
rmy Counterinsur!ency in enya.K 1&"4$: -+&--4.
Branch, 8aniel. '007. IThe 5nemy Fithin:
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- ! Eemplary 2orce present"0 C(funded and trained Lsecret armyH
of @mon! troo)s ?orAed?ith C( to neutrali=e ;athet
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initially settin! out s)ecific !uideliens on the use of force.K
"Bennett '00%, 4+1$. 2orms of
re)ression used descries sus)ects as Oshot ?hilst attem)tin! to
esca)eO, liAe at the Batan! ali
massacre in 8ecemer 1%4&. lso mass arrests in cordonands?ee)
o)s. "Bennett '00%, 4+-$.
Nonetheless,these actions alienated the )o)ulation from
counterinsur!ents "@acA '007$.
C *esettlement present"01&,*00 resettled y /arch 1%*0. 8one
in an adhoc asis. /aEor
resettlement )ro!rams e!in after that "Bennett '00%, 4+&%$.
enerally occurred follo?in!
insur!nt attacAs )re1%*0, follo?ed y urnin! of homes, )ro)erty
destruction "Bennett '00%,
4+%$. Bri!!s ;lan of )ril 1%*0 resettles over *00,000 s9uatters,
re!rou)s -00,000 laorers.
Starts in Gune, done y 1%*1. 3esettlements involve food
controls, denyin! resources to
)o)ulation. By the end of the 5mer!ency, almost onetenth of
entire )o)ulation ?ere resettled in
Ne? illa!es "omer 1%7', *--1$.
, ! Amnesty3+egotiations present"0 re?ard for defection )ro!ram
e6ists after 1%4&, offers
)ayment to /N$ and /alayan Chinese
ssociation "/C, )reviously formed in 1%4% ?ith su))ort from
urney and /ac8onald
"Smith '001, -*J omer 1%7', -*$, ?hile the alliance itself ?as
formed in 1%*' "Smith '001, 71$
?ins elections in 1%**. 8emonstrates elite relationshi)s formed
amon!st leaders of Chinese
minority @acA "'00%$. 5lections ecame an incentives for these
!rou)s, liAe /C, to challen!e
/C; for )o)ular su))ort. "Smith '001, 71$.
*eferences
Bennett, @u?. '00%. I ery Salutary 5ffect: The CounterTerror
Strate!y in the 5arly /alayan
5mer!ency, Gune 1%4& to 8ecemer 1%4%.K!ournal of "trategic
"tudies. +'"%$: 41*444.
'&
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@acA, arl. '00%. IThe /alayan 5mer!ency as counterinsur!ency
)aradi!m.K!ournal of
"trategic "tudies. +'"+$: +&+414.
omer, 3oert F. 1%7'.The ala%an mergenc% in $etros*ect.
Fashin!ton, 8.C.: 3N8
Cor)oration.
Smith, Simon. '001. Ieneral tem)ler and counterinsur!ency in
/alaya: hearts and minds,
intelli!ence, and )ro)a!anda.Kefence and #ntelligence Anal%sis.
1-"+$: -07&.
Na!l, Gohn . '00'.&earning to at "ou* 2ith a nife)
Counterinsurgenc% &essons for ala%a
and /ietnam. Chica!o: niversity of Chica!o ;ress.
%. /oam(iBue *E+A/"# start $ 19%stalemate3dra8 Arreguin!Toft $
+3A) *A+, $ mied"
a-C,e2
A ! /assacres a(sent"0 ?hile there are many cases of
e6traEudicial murder, no evidence foundof lar!escale massacres.
- ! Eemplary 2orce present"0 once in )o?er, 235 uilt state )o?er
y identifyin!internal enemies to e re)ressed in the defense of the
nation. This re9uired the use of mass
detention, torture, e6traEudicial murder of tar!eted /o=amicans
"/achava '011$.
7
C ! *esettlement present"0 ?hile 235 did relocate individuals to
)rison or ?orA cam)s
?ho sus)ected of or ?ere convicted of treason or some ty)e of
crime a!ainst the state "/achava
'011$, it did not relocateentire civilian )o)ulations as a means
of controllin! them. Fhile a
villa!i=ation )ro!ram ?as enacted y 235 after the defeat of the
;ortu!uese, it ?as laterused as )art of the res)onse to 35N/>Hs
reellion "
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Lunstrom, Elizabeth. 2009. Terror, Territory, and
Deterritorialization: Landscapes of Terror and
the Unmaking of State Power in the Mozambican Civil War.Annals
of the Association of
American Geographers99(5): 884-892.
Machava, Benedito Luis. 2011. State Discourse on Internal
Security and the Politics of
Punishment in Post-Independence Mozambique (1975-1983).Journal
of Southern AfricanStudies 37(1): 593-609.
@uman 3i!hts Fatch. 1%%0.=uman $ights Watch World $e*ort 1990.
Ne? YorA: NY.
htt):???.hr?.or!re)orts1%%0F3%0inde6.htm#To)>f;a!e, last
accessed 2e. '1, '014.
&. /oam(iBue 'ndependence# start $ 19
incum(ent loss Arreguin!Toft $ loss) *A+, $ loss"
A-C,Ef
A /assacres present"0 ;ortu!uese ado)t a OscorchedearthO )arty
alon! Tan=anian order in
Cao 8el!ado ?ith simultaneous re!rou)in! in 1%-*. "(ssacson and
(ssacson 1%&+, 100$.
3eferences are made in historical sources to the use of
defoliants and na)alm /o=ami9ue, ut
these are often mentioned ?ithout reference to s)ecific
incidents. nother e6am)le is the
Isystematic a))lication of officially sanctioned violence
a!ainst noncomatants consisted of the
strafin! of trails and ?ater holes and the na)almin! of
!uerrilla forest ases.K "@enriAsen 1%&+,
1+1$. /issionaries leave (nhamin!a ;lateau to )rotest mass
Aillin!s, '00 dead from u!ust 1%7+
to /arch 1%74 "@enriAsen 1%&+, 1+1$. I2rom the e!innin! of
the conflict there e6isted a
marAed indifference to?ard /o=amican life.K "1+1$ Torture,
intimidation, and mass Aillin!s
used to com)el )o)ulation intoaldeamentos. "(id., 1+1$. lthou!h
no s)ecific incidents arementioned, ( assume these ?ere common)lace
amon! ;ortu!uese C>(N.
>ne noted massacre occurs in the villa!e of Firiyamu, south
of Tete, ?here ;ortu!uese
forces Ailled 400 "@enriAsen 1%&+, 1'0$. ;ortu!uese forces
also attacAed civilians out of
frustration follo?in! insur!ent attacAs, ?ith murders of
sus)ected mine layers and su))orters in
/ocumura in /ay 1%71 "@enriAsen 1%&+, 1'%$. lso thre?
!renades into cro?ded huts as
retaliation for allo?in! insur!ents to set u) attacAs "@enriAsen
1%&+, 1'%$.
- ! Eemplary 2orce present"0 Torture, intimidation, and mass
Aillin!s used to com)el
)o)ulation intoaldeamentos "@enriAsen 1%&+, 1+1$. ;ortu!uese
used civilians as human mine
detectors, forcin! them do?n sus)ect roads to clear them
"@enriAsen 1%&+, 1+'$. Civilian hutsand cro)s destroyed ?hen
they did not ?illin!ly move into resettlements "@enriAsen 1%&+,
1+'$.
;ortu!uese )olice torture and use e6traEudicial murder a!ainst
detainees "@enriAsen 1%&+, 1+-$.
;olice also use ?ide dra!nets and mass detention re!ularly,
lar!est ?as in 1%7' ?here 1&00 ?ere
detained "@enriAsen 1%&+, 1+7$. 5stimated 10,000 re!ime
o))onenets ?ere arrested et?een
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1%-71%7+, ?ith ;(85 usin! torture on )risoners "(ssacson and
(ssacson 1%&+, 10+$. lechas
"native frican s)ecial forces includin! turned insur!ents$ Ano?n
to Itreat ?ith a a sava!e
ruthlessness the villa!ers amon! ?hom they o)erated...to )rove
their ne? commitmentK
"@enriAsen 1%&+, 107$.
C *esettlement present"0 3esettlement schemes ?ere modeled after
British in /alaya"@enriAsen 1%&+, 1*4$. s Bender "1%7'$ )oints
out in n!ola, ;ortu!uese use three ty)es of
resettlements, includin! militaryrun aldeamentos, reordenamento
rural for socioeconomic
develo)ment, and colonatos de soldados But, reordenamentos are
used less in /o=ami9ue, and
more colnatos used in areas ?ith !uerrilla activity. "Gundanian
1%74,*'0$
Aldeamentos first )ro)osed in 1%-*, im)lemented south of
Tan=anian order in Cao
8el!ado, usin! scorched earth )olicy "(ssacson and (ssacson
1%&+, 100J Gundanian 1%74, *'+$. 1
million resettled y 1%70. >fficals admit that )o)ulation not
so involved in resettlement
construction, and Ithe amenities of the villa!es are minimal.K
(nfrastructure and services to
follo? after ra)id re!rou)in! "*'-$. "Gundanian 1%74, *40$
eneral rria!a does too much too9uicAly, uilt all settlements fast,
vie?ed ne!atively y the )eo)le . "Cann 1%%7, 1*7$
3esettlements often done forcefully, had hardshi)s on the )eo)le
and didnHt account for frian
desire to remain in their o?n lands. "Cann 1%%7, 1-1J @enriAsen
1%&+, 1-1$
, ! +egotiations3Amnesty present"0 ;ortu!uese did su))ort
efforts to !et 235 )ersonnel
to defect, as military )ulished offers of amnesty efore, durin!,
and after lar!e cam)ai!ns,
offerin! money for ?ea)ons. "@enriAsen 1%&+, 10+$. Fhen
rria!as comes to )o?er, he orders
that ?ounded 235 troo)s !et flo?n out for medical care first to
encoura!e defection.
"@enriAsen 1%&+, 104$
Ne!otiations eventually leadin! to inde)dence e!in on * Gune
1%74. nofficial ceasefires emer!e throu!hout the ;ortu!uese rmy.
;ortu!ual si!ns handover of )o?er to 235
on 7 Se)temer 1%74 "/unslo? 1%&+, 1'7$.
E ! ,evelopment Assistance present"0 >nly s)oradic
develo)ment )roEects in the asence of
maEor reordenamento rural)roEects "*'0$. These )ro!rams IhavenHt
een ?ell financed nor have
they hel)ed a si!nificant numer of fricans.K "*'1$ /aEor
develo)ment initiatives centered
around construction of the Caora Bassa 8am "@enriAsen 1%&+,
1-*$. But, the dam ?asnOt
intended so much for /o=amican develo)ment, ut to attract more
settlers, foster mineral
e6traction in Tete, and )rovide electricity to South frica
"(ssacon and (ssacson 1&+, 104J
/unslo? 1%&+, 114$.
lso, ;ortu!uese settlers ?ant to use fricans as a laor source,
less em)hasis on actually
)rovidin! develo)ment for them as o))osed to the 5uro)eans.
frican cro) )urchases fell,
indicatin! a declinin! standard of livin!, ?hile statistics sho?
hi!her economic !ains for
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5uro)eans "Gundanian *+-*+7 1%74$ Bisho)s also com)lain not
enou!h schools, 9ualified
teachers "Gundanian 1%74, *+&$.
Social )ro!rams: Cann )rovides data su!!estin! increases in
admitted students and
teachers in n!ola "*6$, uinea "'6$, and /o=ami9ue "1.&6$.
"Cann 1%%7, 147$ rmy )layed
Aey role, uildin! schools, ecame teachers if necessary. "Cann
1%%7 ,14&$ >n health,;ortu!uese ado)ted F@> standards for
)ro)er health care re!ardin! numers of )rofessionals
)o)ulation, military ecame )rime im)lementer. "(id., 14%$
/ilitary ?orAed to ensure
doctorsnurseshos)itals ?ere availale to meet standards. "(id.,
1*0$. But military had to fill in
a massive !a) since not enou!h teachers ?ere availale. ll these
su!!est a mi6ed a))roach
to?ard develo)ment.
2 ! Elite ocal *elationships a(sent"0 ;ortu!al al?ays sou!ht to
)it tries a!ainst each other,
su!!ested 235 ?as dominated y the /aAonde trie and an enemy of
the /aAua trie., all
in Cao 8el!ado "/unslo? 1%&+, 1'1$. (n Niassa, ;ortu!uese
)it the ;ao and NyanEa, the latter
?as 235 "(ssacson and (ssacson 1%&+, 10'$. (n aldeamentos,
local chiefs are moili=ed toraise a 101' man militia, su)ervised y
the army ut )aid y administration "/unslo? 1%&+,
1''$. But over lon!term, the ;ortu!uese fail to develo) a
Imoderate /o=amican
constituencyK "@endriAsen 1%&+, 47$, limited efforts to
include fricans in the colonial state ut
are never serious "@endriAsen 1%&+, 10&$. No )ro!rams to
train local leaders and youth to lead
local !overnment "@endriAsen 1%&+, 10%$. (N the last )hase,
;ortu!uese do su))ort the
emer!ence of the 6ru*o 4nido de oam(i7ue, ?hich advocated for
continued ties to
metro)ole, ut this is too little and too late to affect ?ar.
"@endriAsen 1%&+, 110$.
*eferences
(saacman, llen and Barara (saacman, 1%&+.oam(i7ue) rom
Colonialism to $evolution,1900 198.Boulder, C>: Fesvie?
;ress.
@enriAsen, Thomas @. 1%&+.$evolution and Counterrevolution)
oam(i7ues War of
#nde*endence, 19;-19>;.Fest)ort, CT: reen?ood ;ress.
Cann (((, Gohn ;. 1%%7. Counterinsurgenc% in Africa) The
+ortuguese Wa% of War, 191-19>;.
Fest)ort, CT: ;rae!er.
/unslo?, Barry. 1%&+.oam(i7ue) the $evolution and its
:rigins.
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A /assacres a(sent"0 iolence used a!ainst civilians, ut no
evidence of mass Aillin!s or
massacres.
- ! Eemplary 2orce present"0 ;olice tortured ca)tured
insur!ents, res)onsile for C>(N from
1%--1%74 "3ichard '007, 10$. Then South frican 8efence 2orces
ecome involved./istreatment of )risoners and civilians continues y
S82 )ost1%74 "(id., 14$.
C *esettlement a(sent"0No evidence of resettlement.
, ! Amnesty3+egotiations a(sent"0No evidence of
amnestyne!otiations.
E ! ,evelopment Assistance present" S82 does em)loy civic action
)ro!rams su))lyin!
)ulic !oods, indicatin! )rovision of develo)ment assistance,
social services "(id., 14$.
2 ocal Elite *elationships a(sent"0No evidence of elite
relationshi)s.
*eferences
Baines, ary. '007. IBreaAin! 3anA: Secrets, Silences and Stories
of South fricaOs Border
Far.K rahamsto?n: 3hodes niversity.
8ale, 3ichard. 1%%+. I/eldin! Far and ;olitics in Namiia: South
fricaOs Counterinsur!ency
Cam)ai!n, 1%--1%&%.KArmed orces and "ociet%. '0"1$: 7'4.
6=. +epal# start $ 199%stalemate3dra8 Arreguin!Toft $ +3A) *A+,
$ mied"
A-c,ef
A ! /assacres present"0 in later )hase, state violence ?as more
intense than insur!ents. fter
failure of '001 ceasefire and use of military, more
indiscriminate violence a!ainst civiliansoccur. (n u!ust '00+, 3;
Aills t?enty /aoist sus)ects near the villa!e of 8orama "Norris
'011, 14$.
- ! Eemplary 2orce present"0 3oyal Ne)alese rmy re!ularly Ailled
civilians as )art ofre)ressive strate!y a!ainst insur!ency. Caused
more casualties than insur!ents throu!hout most
of the conflict "Battacharya '01+$.
C ! *esettlement a(sent"0 no evidence of use of
resettlements.
, ! Amnesty3+egotiations present"0 ne!otiations and successful
ceasefire held after death of
royal family in '001, ut fail later on as state )ushes more
violence. +,000 deaths in '00'. /ostceasefires thus lead to failed
ne!otiations, e6ce)t for last ne!otiated settlement that leads to
the
dissolution of the monarchy "Battarcharya '01+$.
E ! ,evelopment Assistance a(sent"0 no evidence that develo)ment
assistance ?as used y
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Ne)alese re!ime as )art of counterinsur!ency strate!y.
2 ! Elite ocal *elationships a(sent"0 state did try to coo)t
local )atronselites y )rotectin!
their o?n economic interests "Goshi '01+$. But the Ne)alese
re!ime !radually alienated most
se!ments of the )o)ulation ?ith violence as /aoists rose in
)o?er, eventually forcin!
dissolution of the monarchy. No relationshi)s )resent or
sustained.
*eferences
Norris, Gohn. '011. I@o? not to Fa!e a Counter(nsur!ency: Ne)al,
the /aoists, and @uman
3i!hts.K=uman $ights Bulletin, 11"'$: 1+1*.
Goshi, /adhav. '01+. I
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*eferences
Close, 8avid. 1%&%. I3es)ondin! to
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Feathers, Bynum, 5. 1%&+. Iuerrilla Farfare in Nicara!ua,K
ir niversity 8ocumentary
3esearch Study. /ont!omery, !oni antioil )rotests are met ?ith
ei!ht e6traEudicial
e6ecutions in 1%%* "2rynas '001, 4%$.
C ! *esettlement a(sent"0 no evidence of resettlement.
, ! Amnesty3+egotiations present"0 amnesty !ranted in '00% to
all militants ever involved in
8elta insur!ency in e6chan!e for handin! over arms "5!?emi
'010$.
E ! ,evelopment Assistance present"0 in 1%%', the >il /ineral
;roducin! reas 8evelo)ment
Commission is estalished to launch a!ricultural develo)ments in
areas ?hile oil is e6tracted,
mostly usin! oil revenues. 3e)laced y Ni!er 8elta 8evelo)ment
Commission "2rynas '001,4+$.
2 ! ocal Elite *elationships present"0Ni!erian !overnment seeAs
to coo)t local actors in the
8elta y devolvin! local !overnmental res)onsiilities, enalin!
access to state )atrona!e.
*eferences
2rynas, eor!e GedrEeE. '001. ICor)orate and state res)onses to
antioil )rotests in the Ni!er
8elta.KAfrican Affairs. 100: '7*4.
5!?emi, . '010. I2rom /ilitancy to mnesty: Some Thou!hts on
;resident YarHaduaHs
))roach to the Ni!er 8elta Crisis.K Current $esearch !ournal of
conomic Theor%'"+$: 1+-
141.
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64. Papua +e8 7uinea# start $ 19&&
stalemate3dra8 Arreguin!Toft $ +3A) *A+, $ mied"
A-C,Ef
A ! /assacres present"0 ;N military forces fired !renades into
villa!es, indiscriminately shot
u) villa!es ?ith machine !uns, fired mortars at civilian areas
usin! ?hite )hos)orous rounds
"
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FelseySmith, Terence. 1%%1. I;a)ua Ne? uinea in 1%%0: Year in
Crisis.KAsian "urve%.
+1"'$: 1&&1%*.
65. Peru# start $ 19&=
'ncum(ent 8in Arreguin!Toft $ 8in) *A+, $ 8in"
A-cdE2
A /assacres present"0 (n 1%&&, massacre at Cayara y
;eruvian army Aills -0 civilians
"mnesty (nternational, 1%&&$. t ccomarca in 1%&*, -%
civilians Ailled "Truth and
3econciliation Commission '00+, -*+$. >ther massacres y the
rmy and death s9uads are
sus)ected althou!h less hard evidence e6ists to demonstrate
)roof they ha))ened.
B Exemplary Force (present): Intimidation, torture, and
harassment of civilians by Peruvian
military and police was common throughout the conflict.
C Resettlement (absent): While refugees were created by COIN and
insurgent operations, no
systematic policy of resettlement.
D - Amnesty/Negotiations (present): amnesty is offered to
Sendero fi!hts after the ca)ture of
u=man in 1%%'. Thousands res)ond )ositively.
E - ,evelopment Assistance present"0 lthou!h no detailed
develo)ment )lan ?as ado)ted,
;eru successfully uses smallscale )roEects
2 ! Elite ocal *elationships present"0 in 1%%0s, ;eru ?ins
su))ort of villa!e leaders of
;eruvian )easants to encoura!e formation of cam*esinos, local
villa!e militias. >ccurs after
rutal violence of Sendero and earlier indiscriminate violence y
the ;eruvian state.*eferences
Taylor,
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6. Philippines Du> *e(ellion"# start $195='ncum(ent 8in
Arreguin!Toft $ 8in) *A+, $ 8in"
A-c,Ef
A /assacres present"0 (n 1%*0, ;hili))ines rmy Aills 100
civilians in Bacalor, ;am)an!a
and urn over 100 homes in retaliation for death of one of their
officers y !uerrillas "8ou!las
1%*+, 11&$. *0 farmers Ailled in
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A ! /assacres a(sent"0 massacre of )rotesters y Civilian @ome
8efense Cor)s unit does
ha))en in 5scalante in 1%&*, ut they are tried for murder.
Nonetheless, !overnment retains
C@8Cs "van der roef 1%&-$.
- ! Eemplary 2orce present"0 ;hili))ine forces, es)ecially the
/ilitary ;olice Command,
asued villa!ers, intimidation and harassment, eatin!s ?ere
common. /any )olitical o))onents
?ere summarily e6ecuted individually. ;aramilitary forces and
!an!s allied ?ith re!ular military
and )olice en!a!ed in re!ular e6traEudicial murder, e6tortion,
and intimidation "van der roef
1%&-$
C ! *esettlement a(sent"0No evidence of resettlement of
civilians in ne? locations to enale
se)aration from insur!ents.
, ! Amnesty3+egotiations present"0Ne!otiations occur throu!hout
the late 1%&0s and early
1%%0s, includin! the )ros)ect of sustantial autonomy for /uslim
areas.
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6&. Philippines /'2"# start $ 19%%
incumbent win Arreguin!Toft $ +3A) *A+, $ 8in"
A /assacres a(sent"0 ?hile there are cases of e6traEudicial
murder, no cases found of lar!e
scale massacres.
- Eemplary 2orce present"0 aritrary arrests and torture of
civilians occur on several
occasions in late '000s "mnesty (nternational '00%$.
C *esettlement a(sent"0 ?hile (8;s are created y fi!htin! et?een
military and /(ld 8ynamics, Ne? ConEecture.KAsian "urve%
4-"1$: 1&71%+.
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http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2014/03/05/philippines-bangsamoro-development-plan-formulation-kicks-offhttp://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2014/03/05/philippines-bangsamoro-development-plan-formulation-kicks-offhttp://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2014/03/05/philippines-bangsamoro-development-plan-formulation-kicks-offhttp://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2014/03/05/philippines-bangsamoro-development-plan-formulation-kicks-off
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Bertrand, Gac9ues. '000. I;eace and Conflict in the Southern
;hili))ines: Fhy the 1%%- ;eace
!reement is 2ra!ile.K+acific Affairs7+"1$: +7*4.
69. Senegal# start $ 19&=
incum(ent stalemate3dra8 Arreguin!Toft $ +3A) *A+, $ mied"
A-c,e2
A ! /assacres present"0 military violently dis)erses t?o
1%&' )rotests y firin!
indiscriminately into cro?ds, in Aillin! many civilians
"@um)hreys and ! /ohamad '00*,
'*0$.
- ! Eemplary 2orce present"0 violence and harassment used
a!ainst civilians as )art of
e6tortion for economic !oods "5vans '00+$. Torture ?as also
common throu!h the late 1%&0s
"@um)hreys and ! /ohamad '00*$.
C ! *esettlement a(sent"0 no evidence of resettlement found.
, ! Amnesty3+egotiations present"0multi)le ne!otiations
throu!hout conflict, includin! the
Bissau ccord of 1%%1, resultin! in shaAy )eace treaty si!ned on
'00* et?een Casamance
reels and state re)resentatives "de Gon! and asser '00*$.
E ! ,evelopment Assistance a(sent"0 no evidence found.
2 ! Elite ocal *elationships present"0 Bissau ccords led the
2ront Nord ?in! of the
reellion to maintain )eace ut Aee) ?ea)ons, en!a!e in elicit
trade, ut ultimately su))ort the
!overnment. "/um)hreys and ! /ohamad '00*$. They ?ere
effectively coo)ted y
)ermittin! their o?n access to the ?ar economy.
*eferences
@um)hreys, /acartan and @aaye h /ohamed. '00*. ISene!al and
/ali.K (n 4nderstanding
Civil War, /ol #. 5d. y Nicholas Samanis and 8avid Collier.
Fashin!ton, 8.C.: The Forld
BanA, '47+0'.
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5vans, /artin. '00'. INi )ai6 ni !uerre: the )olitical economy
of lo?level conflict in
Casamance.K @; BacA!round ;a)er.
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8in;) *A+, $ ongoing :8ar ends in =1=;"
A-C,ef
A /assacres present"0 overnment forces shelled densely )o)ulated
areas in Northern Sri
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References
DeSilva-Ranasinghe, Sergei. 2010. Strategic Analysis of Sri
Lankan Military's Counter-
Insurgency Operations. Strategic Analysis Paper, Future
Directions International.
Jalal, Malik Ahmad. 2011. Think Like a Guerrlla:
Counterinsurgency Lessons from Sri Lanka.
Harvard Law School National Security Journal. June: 1-10.
Shahnewaz, Abdullah. 2010. Military Solution of Political Crisis
in Sri Lanka: Questions to be
Asked. Bangladesh Institute of Law and International Affairs
Working Paper.
Smith, Neil. '010. Inderstandin! Sri
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46. Ti(et# start $ 195
'ncum(ent 8in Arreguin!Toft $ 8in) *A+, $ 8in"
A-c,ef
A /assacres present"0 Chinese omed villa!es and monasteries to
su))ress reellions from1%*-1%*% "Tha)a 1%&', &%$. 3e)eated
mentions of atrocities leadin! u) to and durin! the mass
u)risin! in 1%*%. Chinese then shell and assault
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6,153 hamlets evacuated or destroyed by the military(Jongerden
2001, 80). Systematic cleansing
and evaculation occurred after 1991, leading to 2664 villages
emptied by July 1995 (McDowall
2000, 440). Civilians were expected to be resettled in
village-towns, which were constructed
along urban planning models but did not accommodate the
agricultural/pastoral lifestyle of the
Kurds. These were mostly rejected. (Jongerden 2001, 80-84).
D Amnesty/Negotiations (present): Turkish military adopts purely
military approaches
toward dealing with the PKK and never considers real political
reforms of alleviate causes of the
rebellion. Army was seen as the only means of suppressing the
rebellion, and negotiations were
never considered, but government of AKP announces a new Kurdish
initiative in 2009, which
presumes civilian negotiations not dominated by military
influence (Bacik and Coskun 2011,
251-252). Government brings home exiled Kurds, restores Kurdish
names of villages and cities,
has amnesty for low-middle ranked PKK fights, allows for Kurdish
language in education,
campaigns. (Bacik and Coskun 2011, 252).
E - Development Assistance (present): Military controlled all
large constructed projects andmilitary enterprises by 1990
employing 40,000, but no overall plan for implementation. MGK
declares itself as lead agent for development in SE through the
Southeast Anatolia Project
(GAP), to bring hydroelectric power to the region but no
consideration was given about how to
connect it to the Kurdish peasant capacity (Morgado 2006, 56;
McDowall 2000, 434). In the
course of resettlement of displaced Kurds into village-towns,
hospitals and clinics were
constructed alongside new homes for civilians. However, few
civilians returned to live in such
village-towns and utilize the available social services.
F - Elite Local Relationships (present): Following the initial
PKK offensives, the government
passed the Village Law in 1985 to organize militias in each
Kurdish village in SE Turkey. These
militias were organized against tribal clans led by elders,
these tended to identify with the
rightwing parties and were in conflict with PKK already. Also,
aghas (local landowners)
collected salaries for village guards and controlled
distribution, took a cut of the pay. (McDowall
2000, 422). Aghas also had close relationships with security
forces, these were used to obtain
construction contracts to build things like police complexes and
schools.
References
Bacik, Gokhan, and Bezen Balamir Coskun. 2011. The PKK Problem:
Explaining Turkey's
Failure to Develop a Political Solution. Studies in Conflict and
Terrorism. 34(3): 248-265.
McDowall, David. 2000.A Modern History of the Kurds. New York:
I.B. Tauris.
Morgado, Andrew. 2006. Turkish Culture and its Influence on the
Counterinusrgency Campaign
Against the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK). Thesis manuscript,
US Army Command and
General Staff College. Leavenworth, KS: Department of
Defense.
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Jongerden, Joost. 2001. Resettlement and Reconstruction of
Identity: The case of the Kurds in
Turkey. The Global Review of Ethnopolitics. 1(1): 80-86.
Jongerden, Joost, Jacob van Etten, and Hugo de Vos. Forst
burning as a counterinsurgency
strategy in Eastern Turkey. Paper presented at the Kurdish
Studies Conference, organized by the
Kurdish Instite of Paris and Salahaddin University, Arbil, Iraqi
Kurdistan, September 6 toSeptember 9, 2006.
an Bruinessen, /artin. 1%%-. ITurAeyOs 8eath S9uards.Kiddle ast
$e*ort. )rilGune: '0
'+.
45. ganda *A"# start $ 19&
incum(ent 8in Arreguin!Toft $ +3A) *A+, $ ongoing :override# *A
driven out of
ganda"
A-C,E2
A /assacres present" 8urin! resettlement )ushes, !andan military
forces fired artillery at
villa!ers and villa!es that did not leave their homes "Branch
'00*, 2innstrUm '00&$. /any
deaths follo? from such attacAs and other massacres, includin!
40 civilian deaths at NamoAora
in 1%&- ">tunnu 1%%&, -$.
B - Exemplary Force (present): Acholi were regularly harrassed
intimidated by Ugandan
forces, leading to human rights violations, tortured,
extrajudicial murder (Branch 2005,
Finnstrm 2008).
C Resettlement (present) Ugandan military forced the Acholi to
leave their homes forprotection camps in late 1980s (Utunnu 1998,
6). In 2002, forces civilians into IDP camps,
eventually leading to 95 percent of Acholi population becoming
IDPs (Branch 2005).
D Amnesty/Negotiations (present): LRA and Ugandan government
engage in negotiations
from 2006 2008, which end with LRA agreeing to leave Uganda for
safe areas in the DRC,
however, these are then attacked by Ugandan, the DRC, and South
Sudan (Finnstrm 2008).
E - Development Assistance (present): Ugandan government under
Museveni initiates Peace,
Recovery, and Development Plan in northern Uganda to provide new
livelihoods and
opportunities for reconstruction. This is widely supported and
coordinated with bilateral and
multilateral donors (Finnstrm 2008).F Elite Local Relationships
(present): Acholi are incorporated into the Ugandan government,
including as members of parliament. The lack of a political
program by the LRA has driven
many Acholi civilians and leaders into finding supportive
arrangements with the government.
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References
Otunnu, Ogenga. 1998. The Path to Genocide in Northern Uganda.
Refuge17(3): 4-13.
Branch, Adam. 2005. Neither Peace nor Justice: Political
Violence and the Peasantry in
Northern: Uganda, 1986-1998,African Studies Quarterly 8(2):
1-31.
2innstrUm, SverAer. '00&.&iving 2ith Bad "urroundings)
War, =istor%, and ver%da% oments
in 'orthern 4ganda. 8urham, NC: 8uAe niversity ;ress.
4. Fietnam# start $ 19=
incum(ent loss Arreguin!Toft $ loss) *A+, $ loss"
A-C,Ef
A /assacres present"0 S rmy conce)t of achievin! victory throu!h
fire)o?er is dominant,
sa? the conflict as a oreastyle conventional ?ar. This creates
many o))ortunities for the
destruction of )o)ulation centers, civilians. 2ire)o?er ?as used
Oas a crutchO for a
counterinsur!ency strate!y and alienated the )eo)le from the
army "re)enevitch 1%&-, 1%&$.
rmy destroys hamlets to remove C from )o)ulation "re)enevitch
1%&-, 1%%$. B*' omers
made availale in >)eration rc
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to Thompson's own work (1965), the Hamlet program was expanded
too quickly by Diem's
brother, which made each hamlet difficult to defend, poorly
located, and failed to adequately
develop them over time and spread successfully.
D Amnesty/Negotiations (present): Alongside Strategic Hamlets
was an anmesty program
called 'Open Arms', or Chieu Hoi, but it had a small budget, and
money wasn't actively spent, butorganized under ARVN. 11,000
communist defecting in 1963. But, South Vietnamese leadership
never expressed any interest, only draining enemy manpower,
didn't see the political potential
of the program. (Hunt 1991, 24) not interested in sharing power,
including former enemies into
political system.
E - Development Assistance (present): US policy-makers conceived
of development as a tool
to use in COIN and drive forward the modernization of South
Vietnam (Latham 2006). In 1966,
Westmoreland adopts pacification, creates Office of Civil
Operations (OCO) led by Dep. Amb.
William Porter, unties all civilian agencies under one chain of
command but still doesn't include
military (Andrade and Willbanks 2006, 13). Komer pushes for a
single manager, and CORDS iscreated in May 1967 with Westmoreland
as commander with three deputies (Andrade et. al.
2006, 14). Integration of development and military operations
occurs with AB 143, combined
campaign plan for 1968 (Hunt 1991, 101). But, SVN didn't
integrate with new Ministry of
Revolutionary Development and CORDS advisers, and Ministry of RD
never has any capacity to
implement to address development priorities or implement
US-provided aid programs (Hunt
1991, 103). Lack of ownership of development and state building
initiatives by SVN. But,
US creates more destruction than development: The alleviation of
social and political
dislocations which were the inevitable result of military
operations in populated areas was
impossible (Cable 1991, 130).
F - Elite Local Relationships (absent): From 1961 to 1962,
Special Forces and CIA do close
pop-centric COIN in Buon Enao, two hundred villages
participating in (Krepenevitch 1986, 70-
71). Army takes over from CIA in April 1962, Gens. Rosson and
Yarborough reform Special
Forces program. New Army-led Special Forces execute Operation
Switchback in 1962 for
offensive operations against VC, no longer building local
militias (Krepenevitch 1986,72)Elite
relationships are also hard to form after Diem's coup in the
political instability following it. Each
time a new ruler came into power, adminstrative turnover was the
result as they promoted their
own loyaltists (Ibid., 37). Over time, no experience could
develop among SVN pacification
cadres.
References
Cable, Larry. 1991. Unholy Grail: The US and the wars in
Vietnam, 1965-8. New York:
Routledge.
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3esearch ))endi6 Coercion and ;ersuasion in Counterinsur!ency
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5/28/2018 Coercion and Persuasion in COIN Approaches - Research
Appendix
http:///reader/full/coercion-and-persuasion-in-coin-approaches-research-app
Hunt, Richard A. 1991. Pacification: The American Struggle for
Vietnam's Hearts and Minds.
Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Kocher, Matthew Adam; Thomas B. Pepinsky, and Stathis N.
Kalyvas, 2011. Aerial Bombing
and Counterinsurgency in the Vietnam War,American Journal of
Political Science.
Latham, Michael E., 2006. Redirecting the Revolution? The USA
and the failure of nation-
building in South Vietnam. Third World Quarterly. 27(1):
27-46.
Krepenevitch, Andrew F. 1986. The Army and Vietnam. Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University
Press.
Turse, NicA. '01+.ill An%thing That oves) The $eal American War
in /ietnam.Ne? YorA:
/etro)olitan BooAs.
4%. ?im(a(8e# start $ 19%
'ncum(ent loss Arreguin!Toft $ +3A) *A+, $ loss"A-Cdef
A /assacres present"0 3hodesian military forces re!ularly
committed atrocities, focused
e6clusively on an enemycentric C>(N strate!y that )rioriti=ed
Ohi!hody countsO at the tactical
level "Cilliers 1%&*$.
B - Exemplary Force (present): Rhodesian military forces
regularly beat and intimidated
civilians, regularly executed prisoners (Cilliers 1985, De Boer
2011).
C - Resettlement (present): In July 1973, Rhodesian government
initiates Protected Village
programme, resettling Africans in new locations, eventually
becomes key part of RhodesianCOIN, leads to establishment of the
Guard Force, local militias to police Protected Villages (De
Boer 2011).
D - Amnesty/Negotiations (absent): Amnesty was announced twice
in 1979, about 6,500
insurgents accept, but not fully implemented by Rhodesian
military. Rhodesian military was
worried that the war effort would be undermined by amnesty for
rebels and this drove executions
of prisoners, which ultimately cancelled any amnesty policy at
the tactical level (Cilliers 1985).
E - Development Assistance (absent): Proposals for farms,
bakeries, even a national pension
plan for Africans were floated but never funded. (Cilliers
1985).
F - Elite Local Relationships (absent): No evidence of elite
relationships.
References
Cilliers, J.K. 1985. Counter-Insurgency in Rhodesia. London:
Croom Helm.
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5/28/2018 Coercion and Persuasion in COIN Approaches - Research
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8e Boer, /arno. '011. I3hodesiaOs ))roach to Counterinsur!ency:
;reference for illin!.K
ilitar%-$evie2Novemer8ecemer '011, +*4*.
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5/28/2018 Coercion and Persuasion in COIN Approaches - Research
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*+
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