Coalition Cabinet Decision Making: Institutional and Psychological Factors

Coalition Cabinet Decision Making:Institutional and Psychological Factors1

Juliet Kaarbo

University of Kansas

This essay reviews the intersection between institutional and psychologi-cal conditions that occurs in multiparty coalition cabinets and theeffects on foreign policy and decision making. Parallel research in socialpsychology and foreign policy can provide clues to the underlyingmechanisms linking institutional context to policymaking and policychoices. The psychological processes involved in group polarization,persuasion, and other influence strategies as well as psychological fac-tors affecting the quality of decision making are important in coalitioncabinets and are reinforced by the particular institutional dynamics ofmultiparty governance. Indeed, this essay proposes that future researchfocus on contingency factors in the policymaking process, given thecompeting views on the effects of multiple advocacy on the quality ofdecision making and on the types of foreign policies associated withmultiparty cabinets. More broadly, this essay supports the view that ahighly structural understanding of the effects of institutions on politicsand policies is incomplete and that research on the interplay amongstructures and human agents is critical.

When policy is made in parliamentary democracies, it is made within the particu-lar institutional and political context of the governmental cabinet and party sys-tem. Policymaking is also conditioned by a variety of social and psychologicalfactors that influence the process. This essay examines the intersection betweenthe institutional and the social psychological conditions operating in multipartycoalition cabinets and their effects on foreign policy and decision making. Atten-tion to the decision-making process during the life of cabinets is lacking inresearch on coalitions and parliamentary systems. Instead, previous research con-centrates on the formation and termination stages, ignoring the policymakingprocess and decision outputs in between. Likewise, institutional explanations offoreign policy behavior, such as found in democratic peace research, assumemuch about the policymaking process in their predictions concerning the institu-tional effects on policy choices.

Democratic coalition cabinets, however, are susceptible to a host of institu-tional pressures and social psychological dynamics that condition their choicesand their effectiveness in governing. While the institutional context is significantto understanding the behaviors of coalitions, cabinets—as groups of individu-als—are affected by group-level processes as well. Moreover, the institutional

1The author wishes to thank Ryan Beasley for helpful suggestions on this essay and John Levine for his insightsin previous discussions about various topics in this paper. Research for this essay was supported by the University ofKansas General Research Fund allocation #2301-(FY2007). An earlier version was presented at the annual meetingof the International Society of Political Psychology in Lund, Sweden, in 2004.

� 2008 International Studies Association.Published by Blackwell Publishing, 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA, and 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ , UK .

International Studies Review (2008) 10, 57–86

design of coalition cabinets can enhance certain group effects. In this essay, theargument is made that general psychological processes such as (1) group polari-zation, (2) persuasion and other influence strategies, and (3) psychological fac-tors affecting the quality of decision making are important in coalition cabinetsand are reinforced and supplemented by the particular institutional dynamics ofthis type of governance.

This essay does not offer a social psychological perspective that is competitivewith an institutional one. Rather, its purpose is to propose that the social psycho-logical perspective can provide clues to the underlying mechanisms linking theinstitutional context to policymaking and policy choices. The idea that socialpsychology can serve a complementary function is supported by psychologicalresearch that mirrors recent developments in foreign policy analysis. This researchis parallel and complementary, not distinct. In other words, this essay does notargue that psychological factors provide one perspective (that is, focusing on themotivations of actors) and institutional factors provide another perspective (thatis, focusing on the constraints on actors) and that both are needed to understandcoalition decision making. Instead, the proposal is made that the psychologicaland the institutional perspectives focus on similar phenomena, but do so fromdifferent angles and can, thus, in combination enhance research in this area.

In particular, the essay will examine similar explanations in the political scienceand psychology literatures for polarization and extreme foreign policy choices;indirect influence strategies such as manipulation, framing, and the constructionof shared understandings; and the trade-offs of multiple advocacy on the qualityof decision making. The purpose here is to bring together research from socialpsychology on group processes and from political science on political institutionsand foreign policy decision making in an effort to synthesize our understandingof coalition policymaking. Toward this end, it is necessary to investigate key con-tingency factors that mediate between the different images of small groups andcoalitions—images that stem from both psychological and political perspectives.

Current Research on Coalition Policymaking

Cabinet government, quite common in parliamentary democracies worldwide,provides a distinct context compared with most other political systems. Unlikedictatorial, authoritarian, and even presidential political systems in which a singleleader sits at the apex of a hierarchy, parliamentary democracies explicitly placeauthority and responsibility in the hands of a group, the cabinet. Cabinet deci-sion making is complicated when it is shared by two or more political parties incoalition. In multiparty cabinets, the parties are independent political actors,competitors with one another in the electoral process, and they frequentlydisagree on policy, including their country’s proper response to internationalsituations. How disagreements are resolved can be critical to the countries’ policychoices. While disagreements within an executive are not unique to coalitioncabinets, the dynamics of bargaining and decision making are different as thecontinued existence of the executive is at stake. If the policy dispute is not set-tled, the coalition may dissolve. Because of this, junior coalition partners, whichmay be fairly small political parties, can have significant influence, even thwart-ing the dominant party’s preference at times (Kaarbo 1996a,b). This is especiallyimportant for foreign policy if junior parties control the posts of foreign ordefense minister, as they do in most contemporary coalition cabinets.

In response to the significance and distinctiveness of coalition governance,there exists a vibrant field of research on coalition cabinets (see Muller andStrøm 2000; Timmermans 2003 for recent reviews). Yet this scholarship has tradi-tionally focused on the characteristics of the political system that give rise tocoalitions (for example, fragmentation of party systems and proportional

58 Coalition Cabinet Decision Making

electoral laws) and on the particulars of coalition formation (for example, thesize of the coalition and the likely coalition partners). Coalition research has alsoincluded the study of coalition durability and coalition termination.

What is missing, however, in the study of coalition cabinets is attention to thedecision-making process and its effects on policy outputs. According to ThomasBaylis (1989:62), ‘‘there has been some interest in the conditions that facilitatethe ‘endurance’ or maintenance of coalitions over time, but very little attentionhas been accorded to the precise nature of leadership and decision makingwithin coalitions or the character of internal power relationships among the par-ticipants in a coalition.’’ Rudy Andeweg (1988:125) referred to the study of cabi-net decision making as ‘‘terra incognita.’’ These observations, made over15 years ago, remain true today (Muller-Rommel and Strøm 2000). Addressingthis gap in our knowledge of the decision-making processes in coalition cabinetsis important because it is the link between coalition formation and coalition ter-mination (Timmermans 2003). Not only can policies deviate from the coalitionagreement that is reached at the time of formation (Hofferbert and Klingemann1990), but coalitions often dissolve due to internal disagreements (Strøm 1990).Therefore, what goes on in the life of the cabinet—how parties manage conflictand negotiate political and policy disagreements—is critical for a full under-standing of coalition cabinets, their policy choices, and democratic stability andgovernance.

While there is little research on the effects of policymaking by coalitions, thereare many expectations, particularly concerning the effect of coalition politics onforeign policy.2 Some expect coalitions to be more peaceful in their foreignpolicy (see, for example, Elman 2000), while others expect them to have little orno coherent foreign policy at all (see, for example, Hagan 1993). This essay willprovide a discussion of the theoretical foundations of these expectations below,but it is important to note here that the little research that has been performedon coalition politics and foreign policy has yielded decidedly mixed results. Insupport of the proposition that coalitions breed aggressive foreign policy, forinstance, Brandon Prins and Christopher Sprecher (1999) found that coalitioncabinets are more likely to reciprocate behavior in militarized interstate disputesthan were single-party parliamentary governments; Glenn Palmer, Tamar R. Lon-don, and Patrick M. Regan (2004) discovered that coalitions were slightly morelikely to become involved in international disputes. On the other hand, MichaelIreland and Scott Sigmund Gartner (2001) and Dan Reiter and Erik Tillman(2002) have reported no differences between single party and coalition cabinetsin dispute initiation and Palmer et al. (2004) found no differences between sin-gle and multiparty cabinets in dispute escalation. Even if these studies produceda consensus in the types of policies associated with coalition cabinets, the find-ings would rest on unexamined assumptions about the decision-making process.

Given the dearth of research on the life of coalition cabinets, the mixedempirical results on the effects of coalition politics on policy, and the competingand unstudied assumptions on which such empirical studies are based, it isimportant to examine the decision-making processes in coalition governments.To do this, it is wise to take into account the special institutional characteristicsof coalitions and the social psychological processes that occur in small groupssuch as cabinets. Indeed, ‘‘small groups…often serve as a bridge between imper-sonal and institutional forces on the one hand, and concrete decisions andactions by political leaders on the other’’ (‘t Hart, Stern, and Sundelius 1997:6).Coalition cabinets are affected by both bureaucratic politics and small groupdynamics. Cabinet members represent both their various departmental ministries

2There is some research on the effects of coalition politics on economic policies which also tends to ‘‘blackbox’’the policymaking process (see, for example, Bawn and Rosenbluth 2006; Iversen and Soskice 2006).

59Juliet Kaarbo

(for example, ministries of foreign affairs and defense) and their parties. Theyare also formally elected by, and accountable to, the parliament. As such, coali-tion decision making is affected by the institutional constraints and opportunitiesassociated with bureaucratic politics, intra- and inter-party competition, and exec-utive-legislative relations.3

Yet, cabinet members meet and make decisions in the context of a smallgroup. As leaders of their parties and their ministries, they have the authorityto make government policy (Muller-Rommel and Strøm 2000). Coalition cabi-nets meet the definition of small groups because they are ‘‘small-scale socialunits where political leaders, officials, experts, and…representatives from politi-cal parties…meet, enact their respective roles, exchange information, argue,exert, and experience influence, and somehow arrive at…decisions’’ (‘t Hartet al. 1997:5). Although cabinet members are certainly affected by their out-side ties to the bureaucracy, political parties, and parliament, they form a col-lective decision unit that creates its own internal dynamics as well. ‘‘In cabinetgovernment…, both in theory and to a large extent in practice, ministers andprime ministers form part of a common enterprise in which they have ashare’’ (Blondel and Muller-Rommel 1993:1). Thus, attention to both institu-tional and group processes that affect coalition decision making is appropriateand important.

This essay proceeds by examining the psychological explanations behindgroup polarization and the ways in which these dynamics are reinforced by theinstitutional context of coalitions. It then focuses on strategies of influence avail-able to a junior coalition partner—an actor which is disproportionately privi-leged in the coalition setting. Both psychological and political strategies areexamined. Finally, the essay focuses on the negative and positive aspects of thepresence of multiple advocates, such as junior parties, on the quality of policy-making and on the policies of coalition cabinets. The images of coalitions as‘‘good’’ and ‘‘bad’’ decision-making units are also based on both psychologicaland institutional perspectives.

The Social Psychology of ‘‘Extreme’’ Cabinet Choices

Coalition cabinets are small groups and, as such, are susceptible to the dynam-ics that often occur in small group settings. One of the most researched effectsof the group context is polarization. Over the years, numerous studies havefound that groups are more than the sum of their parts as they tend to makemore extreme and more cautious choices than their individual members indi-cate that they prefer before engaging in group discussion (Brown 2000). Whileearlier research focused on the ‘‘risky-shift’’ tendency, assuming that groupsare more risk-prone, later studies have demonstrated that the shift occurs inboth directions, risky and cautious, leading to the more general term ‘‘grouppolarization.’’ Polarization means ‘‘the average post-group response will tend tobe more extreme in the same direction as the average of the pre-groupresponse’’ (Myers and Lamm 1976:603). Evidence for group polarization comesfrom studies conducted in over a dozen different countries and from a wide-range of research on attitudes, jury decisions, ethical decisions, judgment, per-son perception, and risk taking (Myers and Lamm 1976; Brauer and Judd1996).

Polarization seems to be a general phenomenon, applicable to all types ofgroups. Although the research on polarization in social psychology has rarelylooked at institutional characteristics that might enhance group polarization,

3Andeweg (1988) argues cabinets largely dominate parliaments leaving political and bureaucratic divisions asthe two ‘‘centrifugal forces’’ affecting cabinet decision making.

60 Coalition Cabinet Decision Making

there may be certain institutional settings, such as coalition cabinets, in whichpolarization may be more likely. Indeed, there are many reasons to expect thatmultiparty cabinets might polarize and make extreme choices and research oncoalition decision making, while sparse, includes a variety of expectations andsome empirical findings about the polarized choices cabinets might make. Someresearchers (Hagan 1993; Prins and Sprecher 1999), for reasons to be discussedbelow, expect coalitions to engage in excessively aggressive behavior. Others(Auerswald 1999; Elman 2000) expect coalition cabinets to act more peacefullythan their single-party counterparts. The logic for the latter expectation is similarto the institutional explanation of the democratic peace—the more built-in con-straints in democracies (via checks-and-balances, multiple viewpoints, andaccountability), the more peace-loving publics can constrain war-prone leaders.Indeed, Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett (1993) argue that coalition governmentsare among the most constrained among democracies and, as a result, should bethe most peaceful toward each other (see also Prins and Sprecher 1999).

Both these expectations confound institutional dynamics with substantive pol-icy direction (Kaarbo and Beasley 2008). Implicit in the argument that coalitionsengage in more aggressive behavior is the assumption that junior partners, orother subsets of the cabinet, favor aggressive policies and are able to push thecabinet in this direction because of the nature of coalition politics. Similarly,implicit in the argument that coalitions are peaceful is the assumption that coali-tion leaders prefer more aggressive choices but are constrained by the institu-tional context. Of course, both assumptions may be misdirected. Indeed, juniorparties may favor more peaceful policies and propel the cabinet in that direc-tion. In Germany, for example, the Green party arguably pushed the entire coali-tion to be against participating in the US intervention into Iraq (Kaarbo andLantis 2003).

And peace-prone prime ministers would presumably be just as constrained aswar-prone ones by the institutional checks on their actions. After signing theCamp David Accords in 1978, Prime Minister Menachem Begin was constrainedfrom implementing the agreement’s provisions regarding the Palestinians whenhis junior coalition partner, the National Religious Party, succeeded in under-mining the negotiations (Kieval 1983). Furthermore, the same institutional con-ditions associated with coalitions may push some cabinets into more aggressiveforeign policies and constrain other cabinets.4 And these cross-pressures mayeven work on the same cabinet. Michael Green (2001:75) argues, for example,that in one Japanese coalition, the government was ‘‘risk-averse in foreign affairsbecause of the volatility of support for the ruling coalition. But this same envi-ronment of weakened institutions would also be more permissive to significantdepartures in security policy if Japan were confronted with major external threatsto its position.’’ Thus, coalitions may be excessively aggressive, peaceful, or both.In any case, there are strong theoretical foundations on which we can expectextreme, or polarized, behavior from coalition cabinets, and, in a recent study,coalitions were, indeed, found to exhibit more extreme behavior than single-party cabinets (Kaarbo and Beasley 2008).

Furthermore, the explanations for why coalitions might engage in extreme for-eign policies—extremely aggressive, extremely peaceful, or both—parallel manyof the explanations for group polarization and are overviewed in Table 1. Grouppolarization, for example, can arise from the sense that responsibility is diffusedin the group setting. ‘‘According to the responsibility diffusion explanation, ingroup decision-making contexts responsibility and accountability for conse-quences is diffused among group members. This reduces fear of failure, and

4Sue Ellen Charlton (2004:262–263) also notes these opposite effects of coalition governments in policymakingin India and in Japan.

61Juliet Kaarbo

thereby decision makers have incentives to make riskier decisions’’ (Vertzberger1997:281).5 Vertzberger (1997:282) argues further that ‘‘foreign policy decisionsare particularly susceptible to the consequences of risk sharing because they aredecisions made for others (the nation, or a particular group within it). Whenchoosing for others, people tend to prefer more cautious decisions than whenthey make decisions for themselves…. However, when decisions for others aremade by a group, the tendency toward risk avoidance is less pronounced becausefailure can be shared with others so that anticipated personal responsibilitywould be reduced.’’

The institutional characteristics of coalition cabinets may heighten this diffu-sion of responsibility, thus contributing to extreme choices. ‘‘With coalition gov-ernments, the voting public may be less able to attach responsibility to any oneparty for policy failures. Presumably then, coalition leaders would have greaterflexibility in their handling of foreign affairs’’ (Prins and Sprecher 1999:275).With this logic, Prins and Sprecher (1999:275) hypothesize that ‘‘coalition gov-ernments tend to be less accountable than single-party cabinets and as a resultshould be less constrained in decision making. These types of governmentshould be more willing to reciprocate militarized disputes.’’6 If coalitions are lessconstrained than single parties because the multiple actors make it more difficultfor others to assign responsibility to any single party, coalitions may feel morecomfortable engaging in extreme and high commitment endeavors.

A second explanation for extreme foreign policy in coalition cabinets concernsthe inherent weakness that often characterizes these executives. According to JoeHagan (1993:30–31), ‘‘the literature suggests that even the most unstable coali-tion may try to act on major foreign policy issues in order to demonstrate itsability to cope with policy crises and thereby achieve some legitimacy at home….In effect, because of their political fragmentation and vulnerability, these weak-ened actors [are] often compelled to deal with the most difficult issues in orderto legitimize themselves.’’ Coalitions in the French Fourth Republic, for exam-ple, sought greater legitimacy through their foreign policies (Hanrieder andAuton 1980). Moreover, ‘‘the relatively higher level of domestic uncertainty thatsurrounds coalition cabinets may…encourage greater risk-taking behavior’’(Prins and Sprecher 1999:275). The argument that the inherent domestic politi-cal weakness in coalitions may lead them to engage in ‘‘high profile’’ foreignpolicies in order to gain legitimacy and ⁄ or to divert attention from their domes-tic problems is usually used to predict more conflictual policies, but highly coop-erative foreign policies can serve the same purposes.

While extreme foreign policy choices may be a political strategy adopted bycoalitions, they may also be a psychological by-product of domestic problems and

TABLE 1. Parallel Explanations of Polarization in Coalitions

Psychological Perspective Institutional Perspective

Diffusion of responsibility Diffusion of accountabilityStress from domestic weakness,excessive desire for cohesion

Diversion from domesticweakness and uncertainty

Persuasion by assertive members Blackmail by extreme parties

5Yaacov Vertzberger (1997:282) notes that ‘‘it is not the actual probability of adversarial consequences of thedecision (policy risk) that is reduced, but the anticipated adversarial personal consequences to the decision maker(political risk).’’

6As already noted, their bivariate and multivariate analyses of state behavior in militarized disputes suggestedthat, indeed, coalition governments were more likely to reciprocate aggressive behavior than were single-party par-liamentary governments (Prins and Sprecher 1999:279).

62 Coalition Cabinet Decision Making

uncertainty. Irving Janis (1972) has argued that a stressful political environmentcan lead to groupthink, or excessive concurrence-seeking. According to him, pro-vocative situational contexts that include high stress from threats external to thegroup and temporary low-self esteem induced by recent failures can create inthe group an illusion of invulnerability, self-censorship, and pressure on dissent-ers, among other symptoms. These can lead to defective decision making, includ-ing poor information searches as well as failures to completely survey alternativesor to re-examine rejected alternatives. Such groupthink can involve polarizationif groups initially concur on an extreme position and group dynamics reinforcethis choice.

It may seem that coalition governments are not likely victims of groupthinkbecause they promote a difference of opinions and often involve disagreement(Blondel and Muller-Rommel 1993; Frognier 1993). Yet Max Metselaar and Bert-jan Verbeek (1997:109) argue that ‘‘when the survival of the government isthreatened and coalition partners estimate that the government’s downfall mayproduce serious negative electoral consequences or may otherwise harm partyinterests, they may engage in feverish consensus-seeking.’’ These researcherspoint out that the political pressures on the Dutch government in the early1960s help to explain the groupthink symptoms in the cabinet’s deliberationsregarding the conflict with Indonesia over West New Guinea. Furthermore, itmay be the desire for cohesion that is so often lacking in coalition cabinets that ismost dangerous. Indeed, Robert Brown (2000:219), in his review of the experi-mental research on groupthink, suggests that ‘‘maybe it is only when groups aredesperately seeking to manufacture unity that they become prey to the concur-rence-seeking defects that Janis identified; having once achieved it, the pressurefor unanimity will be more than outweighed by the security it provides to allowcriticism and dissent.’’ In effect, because of internal conflict and external prob-lems with legitimacy, coalitions may be particularly vulnerable to polarization viagroupthink.

Another explanation of polarization, and probably the most accepted (Brown2000), involves informational influence or persuasion. This explanation suggeststhat ‘‘discussion generates arguments predominantly favoring the initially pre-ferred alternative, including some persuasive arguments that the typical subjecthas not previously considered. Thus, a ‘message effect’ evokes response changeresulting from new cognitive learning’’ (Myers and Lamm 1976:611). Persuasionalso turns on characteristics of the proponent of the message.

Group members with more radically polarized judgments and preferences investmore resources in attempts to exert influence and lead others…. The more self-confident and assertive members of the group are very often capable of commu-nicating expectations that eventually their position will prevail…. These expecta-tions may act as a powerful incentive for those who are undecided and arewaiting for indications concerning which way the wind is blowing. Correctly orincorrectly, these members interpret assertiveness as a cue and throw in theirsupport. This triggers a self-fulfilling prophecy resulting in majority support forthe more polarized position (Vertzberger 1997:284).

Zeev Maoz (1990) provides an example of the persuasive ability of a commit-ted minority in Israeli cabinet deliberations during the Israeli-Egyptian war ofattrition. The coalition was divided over whether or not to accept a US proposal(the ‘‘Rogers Initiative’’) for a cease-fire and the beginning of peace talks. PrimeMinister Golda Meir and her party supported the proposal while a subset ofsmaller parties, led by Menachem Begin, opposed and threatened to leave thecoalition over the issue. In order to keep the coalition together, Defense Minis-ter Moshe Dayan proposed to ignore the US plan and instead respond to a

63Juliet Kaarbo

separate dispatch by the United States that promised continued American sup-port of Israel. Although Dayan’s idea was seen as ambiguous and ‘‘it was unchar-acteristic of Dayan to display a strong attachment to any proposal in thecabinet…this time he was adamant. And his insistence led to a shift of the entiremajority coalition to the option he advocated’’ (Maoz 1990:100).

Coalition cabinets are particularly vulnerable to persuasion by members withextreme positions. Coalitions are often (though not always) forged between a lar-ger, more centrist senior party and one or more smaller, more ideologicallyextreme junior parties. The presence of a junior partner that prefers a moreextreme position provides an opportunity for polarization via persuasion, ineffect, an opportunity for hijacking the national interest in foreign policy deci-sion making (Kaarbo 1996a,b). According to Miriam Fendius Elman (2000:97),‘‘in less majoritarian democracies, such as presidential and coalitional parliamen-tary systems, groups in favor of war will be better situated to push the state downthat road, even if the executive [the prime minister] favors a more moderateapproach.’’ As noted above, junior partners could favor more peaceful policiesand propel the cabinet in that ‘‘extreme’’ direction as well.

The ability of junior parties to persuade and otherwise influence their seniorpartners is discussed in more detail in the next section of this essay. Overall, thesocial psychological research on group polarization parallels and provides addi-tional insight into the explanations of the extreme foreign policy choices thatcoalition cabinets can make.7 The institutional setting of coalitions reinforcesthe dynamics of group polarization.

The Social Psychology of Junior Party Influence Strategies

The persuasion explanation with regard to group polarization focuses on subsetsof the group that move group members to endorse extreme (extremely cautiousor extremely risky) decisions. In coalition cabinets, the most likely subset, as dis-cussed above, are members of a junior party partner which has the potential fordisproportionate influence if it is critical to the maintenance of the coalition.But how can junior parties persuade the other members of the cabinet? Whatinfluence strategies can they employ? Although the research on coalitions hasnot, as discussed above, focused on coalition decision making per se, it does sug-gest political strategies that coalition partners are likely to utilize effectively.These strategies stem from an appreciation of the institutional and domesticpolitical context in which junior parties reside. Social psychology also offersinsights regarding the strategies junior party can use by drawing from researchon minority influence, which has been a vibrant and productive area of investiga-tion for over three decades (Maass and Clark 1984; Crano 2001). Table 2 sum-marizes the parallel points culled from research on political decision makingand minority influence.

Up until the 1970s, social psychologists assumed that influence was largely oneway: influence was done by majorities and to minorities. Minorities were consid-ered targets but not sources of influence, whereas majorities were consideredsources but not targets. The famous experiments conducted by Stanley Milgram(1963, 1965), in which experimenters convinced subjects to administer shocks(often in extreme amounts) showed that individuals were very obedient toauthority. Early and repeated studies by Solomon Asch (1955, 1956) showed thata majority could fairly easily convince a minority that a blue color slide, forexample, was green. Majorities influenced minorities to comply via societalthreats, rewards, and appeals to social norms. Some social psychologists were

7Other explanations of group polarization include group decision rules, interpersonal comparison, familiariza-tion, and intergroup differentiation (see Myers and Lamm 1976; Vertzberger 1997; Brown 2000 for reviews).

64 Coalition Cabinet Decision Making

concerned, however, about the assumption that minorities were only passive,conforming agents, acted upon by powerful majorities and reasoned that a con-sideration of social change rather than social control led to the inescapable con-clusion that minorities do influence majorities—originally deviant views canprevail. Serge Moscovici (1976) was one of the first to argue that social changerequires minority influence.8

Moscovici was motivated by an interest in revolutions—social, political, aca-demic, scientific, religious, and philosophical in nature. In his book on SocialInfluence and Social Change, Moscovici (1976:45) wrote:

We have evidence that nonconformity and marginality entail the harsh experi-ences of insult, ostracism, or even persecution in the defense of a belief, behav-ior, or area of knowledge. But the rewards are great. Otherwise one would nothave seen so many religious, political, artistic, and scientific figures and sub-groups taking the risks that they have, and braving severe pressure for such longperiods—and finally succeeding in carrying through major changes.

With this interest, Moscovici turned Asch’s studies around (sometimes referredto as the ‘‘Asch-backward paradigm’’) so as to have a confederate minoritydeclare that a blue color slide was green, for example. Moscovici noticed thatsometimes (eight percent in the original study) the majority adopted the minor-ity’s (wrong) view and set out to investigate the conditions under which minori-ties were influential. As Brown (2000:145) notes, ‘‘the figure of eight percentmay not be very startling…but it must be remembered that this was achieved bya deviant minority against a majority twice its size.’’

Moscovici’s ideas were based on the assumption that social influence inher-ently involves conflict and that minority influence differs from majority influ-ence. He proposed a ‘‘dual-process’’ model whereby the process of socialinfluence is qualitatively distinct depending on the target (majority ⁄ minority)and the source (majority ⁄ minority). Specifically, Moscovici and his colleaguesargued that when majorities influence minorities, the conflict is social andminorities comply, changing their position publicly, but not privately. Whenminorities influence majorities, by way of contrast, the conflict is cognitive—itmakes the majorities think and the majority convert (actually change their posi-tion), although the conversion is private and delayed, as aligning with a ‘‘devi-ant’’ minority in public is not desirable.

The most robust finding in Moscovici’s and Moscovici-inspired research is thatconsistent persuasion, demonstrating resolve and commitment, is one key tominority influence (though it is not that important to majority influence).According to Moscovici’s conversion theory,

TABLE 2. Parallel Ideas Regarding Junior Party Influence

Psychological Perspectives Political Perspectives

Minorities can influence majorities Small parties can have disproportionalinfluence

A variety of psychological conditions (e.g.,perceived consistency) affect influence attempts

A variety of political conditions (e.g., domesticpublic support) affect influence attempts

Indirect strategies are more effective forminorities

Political actors may use procedural manipulationmore frequently and effectively

Shared task representations and understandingsfacilitate asymmetrical influence

Framing, social norm construction, and sharedmeanings are important in politics

8Interestingly, Gordon Moskowitz and Shelly Chaiken (2001:60) suggest that Moscovici’s ideas provided a‘‘European perspective’’ to correct the North American bias on power, pressure, and conformity.

65Juliet Kaarbo

when a minority expresses a deviant view using a behavioral style that expressesconfidence and consistency, the majority group member wants to understandwhy they (dare) do this. In trying to understand what the minority apparentlyunderstands, a cognitive conflict is brought about and the group member, in try-ing to comprehend the deviant position, validates it…. [T]he process of recon-sidering one’s own point of view, and the thoughtful consideration of alternativeviews, results in changing the (cognitive) basis of the original opinion: ‘‘real’’change, not contingent upon the power of the group and its presence, but basedon new ideas and cognitions. This ‘‘real’’ influence will be indirect rather thandirect (De Vries and De Dreu 2001:3).9

Thus, from the social psychological research, we can propose that a juniorparty in a coalition, even if it is completely powerless, may be able to persuadeother cabinet members of its position merely through consistent argumentation.Junior parties can also adopt a number of other tactics to make their positionlook more credible and display commitment (Levine and Kaarbo 2001). Theycan, for example, convey the impression that they arrived at their position auton-omously, say, by taking a stand against their own constituency. They can alsoargue that they have special expertise on an issue or frame the issue in such away that highlights their expertise and jurisdiction over the issue. They may alsoinvoke the saliency argument—that is, that the particular issue is more signifi-cant to them and to their party than it is to the senior party. If they are in a posi-tion responsible for gathering information, they can manipulate thatinformation—by using selective information sources, by presenting part of theinformation, by outright lying—all in an effort to present the information in alight more favorable to their position.

Junior coalition partners, of course, are rarely completely powerless, as are theminorities in social psychological research. They have many other influence strat-egies available to them. In coalition cabinets, as in many political decision-mak-ing groups, the majority needs the minority’s support (or at least acquiescence)in order to achieve its goals; in such groups the minority wields considerablepower. Social psychologists have largely ignored this power because they gener-ally have not studied situations in which group members are interdependent interms of outcomes (Levine and Kaarbo 2001). In coalitions, junior parties thatare critical to the maintenance of a coalition’s control of a parliamentary major-ity are in a particularly good position to use this interdependence and to haveinfluence disproportionate to their size (Kaarbo 1996a, b). Junior parties, forexample, tend to control more ministries in the cabinet then their size alonewould predict (Browne 1982) and their positions can be a better predictor ofmany policy outcomes than are the positions of the senior party or the coalitionagreement (Hofferbert and Klingemann 1990).

A number of techniques are available to junior parties beyond persuasion.Strategies based on rewards and costs can be particularly effective for junior par-ties. They can make a variety of threats, such as threatening to leave the coali-tion. Threats to leave the coalition over foreign policy issues are common.Recently, for example, in 2006 the Democrats’ 66 party in the Netherlands threa-tened to leave the cabinet if the Dutch government sent troops to southernAfghanistan (Bickerton and Dombey 2006). Junior parties that are critical to thecoalition and pivotal in the party system do not always threaten to leave as theyunderstand the credibility of threats and their effectiveness depends on the cir-cumstances. In addition to threatening to leave the coalition, junior parties canthreaten to disrupt cabinet processes, to create outside pressure on the seniorparty, and to engage in whistle-blowing to discredit the senior party in a political

9For a review on Moscovici-inspired research and dual-process models of social influence, see Wendy Wood(2000).

66 Coalition Cabinet Decision Making

scandal. Junior parties may also use the threat to collapse. In effect, they mayargue that if they do not get influence on the issue, they will lose their electoralsupport or they will be consumed by factionalism within their own party. Inother words, they can capitalize on their very own weakness if the senior partyneeds them to stay a viable partner.10 Junior parties can also make promises.They can, for example, trade support for an issue that is more important to thesenior party in exchange for their influence on a particular policy. The NationalReligious Party in Israel, for example, gave its support for the 1979 peace treatywith Egypt in exchange for control over subsequent autonomy talks with the Pal-estinians (Wallfish and Segal 1979). This kind of logrolling, or side paymentstrategy, often occurs in coalition cabinets.

When junior parties make threats, promises, or otherwise engage in bargainingand negotiation in order to influence senior parties, a variety of social psycholog-ical factors can influence the effectiveness of these strategies. The personalitiesof the party leaders, for example, may affect cabinet negotiations as may thedegree of compatibility of the two or more personalities bargaining with oneanother (see Spector 1977 for a review of research on personality factors innegotiation). Other individual differences such as negotiators’ motivational ori-entations (cooperative, individualistic, or competitive) and images of self andothers may also influence bargaining (Deutsch and Shichman 1986; Fisher 1990;Bazerman, Curhan, Moore, and Valley 2000). Perceptions of the intentions, cred-ibility, capability, commitment, goals, and values of the other and the others’positions are also important and a variety of cognitive, attributional, and motiva-tional biases bound the rational processing of information and informationexchange in negotiations (Spector 1977; Jervis 1982; Deutsch and Shichman1986; Bazerman et al. 2000). More recent research on the social psychology ofnegotiation focuses on the mental models that negotiators hold, the role of emo-tion, and the influence of ethical standards. Such research has also examinednegotiations with more than two players and indicates that the greater complex-ity in multiparty settings increases the likelihood of cognitive simplification (fora review, see Bazerman et al. 2000). Multiple actors may also be affected by socialrelationships, not just interests. For example, ‘‘negotiators tend to form coali-tions with those who have been allies in the past, even if better partners exist’’(Bazerman et al. 2000:301). Thus, the use of threats and promises, which areoften made by junior coalition partners, involve a number of social psychologicalfactors.

Strategies based upon manipulation of the decision-making process are alsoavailable to junior parties who can manipulate procedures—how and where thedecision is made—in order to try to indirectly affect the policy outcome.‘‘Manipulation of decisions differs from persuasion or other direct attempts toinfluence choice outcomes. Whereas manipulation focuses on structuring thegroup decision-making situation in a manner that assures success, persuasionentails direct attempts to influence (or pressure) individual decision makers intochanging their preferences’’ (Maoz 1990:77; see also Hoyt 1997; Garrison 1999).There are a number of tactics that can be used to this end. Junior parties might,for example, try to alter the composition of the decision-making group so that itis more favorable to their position. This can involve excluding opponents (notinforming them of the meeting time, holding a meeting when they are away,etc.). Junior parties can also try to move the decision group to a forum thatincludes allies. In early 2006, for example, the Democrats’ 66 party successfullymoved the decision over sending Dutch troops to Afghanistan from the cabinet,where they faced opposition from their coalition partners, to the parliament,

10For a discussion of this strategy in the context of international negotiations, see Ulf Lindell and StefanPersson (1986).

67Juliet Kaarbo

where they believed that they had the support of the opposition parties (AgenceFrance Presse 2005). And junior parties can seek to shrink the decision group inorder to balance junior party–senior party representation more than is found inthe full cabinet, such as in ‘‘coalition talks’’ between the leaders of the partiesin the cabinet. This was a frequently used tactic of the Free Democrats, a long-time junior partner in West German coalitions (Asmus 1989; Saafeld 1990).

Junior parties can also work to change the explicit or implicit decision ruleaway from a focus on majority rule to one on consensus or unanimity, thusensuring their input and approval. Finally, junior parties can try to get policiesadopted incrementally so that in each decision their influence does not look sogreat, but leads the cabinet in the end to endorse their position whole-sale—something the senior party might have rejected out of hand otherwise(Maoz 1990). Procedural manipulation is an especially attractive and effectivetool for junior parties because it takes less status and authority to initiate thesechanges in comparison to substantive changes and because indirect changes pro-voke less opposition from the senior party than would direct policy attacks (Lind-say 1994; Wood, Lundgren, Ouellette, Busceme, and Blackstone 1994; Kaarboand Beasley 1998).

Another indirect means of influencing policymaking concerns how the prob-lem is framed. Junior partners may be able to avoid a clash with the senior part-ner over policy choices if they can frame the way a problem is represented. Aproblem representation is a mental image of an understanding of the problemand involves a definition of the situation (Sylvan and Voss 1998). Studies of polit-ical decision making suggest that the ways in which individuals and groups repre-sent a problem is key to understanding the policy choices that are consideredand eventually chosen. Those that have examined the role of problem represen-tation in the group setting (for example, Sylvan and Thorson 1992; Beasley1998; Garrison 2007) have noted that much of the group process revolvesaround negotiation among competing problem representations rather thanamong competing policy choices. This certainly occurs in coalitions when theparties bring alternative frames to the cabinet. In recent Dutch deliberationsover sending troops to southern Afghanistan, for example, the junior partyattempted to frame the issue in terms of the US Enduring Freedom missionwhich many Europeans associated with unlawful acts of torture and rendition.Senior parties in the cabinet tried to counter this by framing the decision interms of international responsibility and being a good ally (Dempsey 2005; Deut-sche Presse-Agentur 2005). If junior parties are instrumental in the framing process,they are likely to influence the policy from the outset.

This problem representation perspective is similar to research that hasemployed the concept of framing using prospect theory (see, for example, Levy2000). Although there have been few studies examining framing in the groupprocess, some have proposed that what frame is accepted by the group signifi-cantly influences group information processing and choice (for example, Haas2001). Particularly important is whether the issue is framed in terms of losses orgains, as the former tends to push groups to be more risk-prone while the lattertends to lead them to be more risk-averse. Individual group members or factionscan influence the group frame. ‘‘[I]f one favors a bold and risky alternative, theframing tactic requires a definition of the decision problem as a choice betweenrisky prospects. And if one wants to play it safe, the tactic requires that the prob-lem be defined as a choice between gains’’ (Maoz 1990:89).

The problem representation and framing perspectives are generally consistentwith the constructivist literature in IR theory that focuses on the roles of ideas,shared understandings and beliefs, and dominant discourse (for example,Doty 1993; Goldstein and Keohane 1993; Weldes and Saco 1996; Larsen 1997;Carpenter 2005). This research emphasizes the social construction of situations,

68 Coalition Cabinet Decision Making

interests, and options based on shared norms, although there has been littleconsideration of the processes involved in norm construction and the creationof shared understandings (Johnston 2001). Social psychologists have, however,recently paid attention to the role of socially constructed representations ingroup settings. Some have argued, for example, that actor’s positions are rooted‘‘in a shared conceptual system (for example, beliefs, values, assumptions, andlogic). The more widely shared a particular system is, the larger the potentialpool of targets of influence who will recognize and accept the substance of apersuasive message…. In this sense, ‘correctness’ is a social construction’’ (Kerr2001:207).

This notion of widely shared conceptual schemes, or shared task representa-tions, may be critical to understanding minority influence.

When a shared task representation does exist, asymmetries in the social influ-ence patterns are expected, with factions favoring the alternative consistent withthe shared representation being more influential than those arguing against it.However, these asymmetries will not necessarily follow ‘‘truth’’ in some absolutesense, but only truth in relation to the shared representation (Smith, Scott Tin-dale, and Anderson 2001:188–189).

One example of such asymmetry comes from research on jury decision mak-ing. There appears to be a bias or norm against guilty verdicts. Even if at the out-set of jury deliberations there is a majority supporting a guilty verdict, theminority not-guilty position is likely to prevail. R. Scott Tindale, Christine M.Smith, L. S. Thomas, J. Filkins, and S. Sheffey (1996) have argued that this biasexists because of the shared task representation formed when juries in the Uni-ted States are given instructions that emphasize the reasonable doubt criterion.‘‘Evidence consistent with this idea was found by Kerr and MacCoun (1985),who demonstrated that the leniency bias basically disappears when the reason-able doubt criterion is replaced by a ‘preponderance of the evidence’ criterion’’(Smith et al. 2001:189). Another example of a shared representation that favorsminority influence comes from a study by R. Scott Tindale, S. Sheffey, and L. A.Scott (1993) who found that minorities advocating risky alternatives were moreinfluential when the problem was represented to the group in terms of loss, con-sistent with prospect theory. Finally, a status quo bias may exist so that minoritiesblocking change may be more influential than minorities advocating change(De Dreu and Beersma 2001).

Shared representations may also extend beyond the group as minorities whoadvocate positions that are accepted by a majority outside the group or in linewith the current ‘‘Zeitgeist’’ are more likely to have influence (Clark and Maass1988; Clark 1994). And, finally, junior parties might try to frame the issue at ahigher level—in terms of constituency support, higher moral values, or policyprinciples that are shared by the entire coalition.

Overall, junior parties have a number of strategies and tactics available tothem in their attempts to influence government policy. Some of these strategies,such as persuasion, may be predominantly psychological in nature. Others, suchas bargaining and manipulation, are tied to the institutional context of coalitionand cabinet governance, but have social psychological dimensions themselves.

Coalitions and the Quality of Decision Making

Minority actors, such as junior parties, also influence the quality of decision mak-ing. The issue here relates to the enduring question of how governments shouldbe organized to produce effective policymaking, sound judgment, and successfuloutcomes. Specifically, the question of the effects that many voices in the

69Juliet Kaarbo

executive have on the quality of decision making dominates the normative judg-ments of coalition cabinets. While some see the multiple advocacy built into thisform of governance as ideal, others see inherent dangers.

Although there is no consensus on the criteria for evaluating the quality ofdecision making in groups like cabinets (‘t Hart 1997), there are three primaryways that the quality of decision making by coalitions has been judged. The firsttwo concern the process by which decisions are made. The rational choice per-spective includes fairly accepted criteria for high quality decision making: a sur-vey of objectives and alternatives; a thorough search for information; assimilationand processing of new information; reconsideration of originally rejected alterna-tives; evaluation of the costs, risks, and implications of the preferred choice; anddevelopment of implementation, monitoring, and contingency plans (‘t Hart1997; Peterson 1997; Verbeek 2003). When the decision-making process doesnot conform to these benchmarks, the process is seen as defective or even patho-logical. The Bay of Pigs invasion, for example, has been judged as a ‘‘fiasco’’partly because the policymakers did not follow these rational procedures (Janis1972). While rationality provides one normative standard for assessing decisionmaking, processes are also judged by democratic principles. If the decision-mak-ing processes are inclusive, representative, consensual, and transparent, forexample, then political values associated with democratic governance are met.

The third way that quality is judged is by the outcome. Foreign policy deci-sions are often judged as high quality if they advance the national interest and ifthey avoid or decrease the chance for conflict (Schafer and Crichlow 2002; seealso Peterson 1997). There are problems, of course, in the objective assessmentof the national interest and if it was advanced. Easier to assess is the level of con-flict in the policy, but not all agree that highly conflictual foreign policy neces-sarily implies a low quality decision.11 At a basic level, the outcome is seen asgood if it effectively addresses the issue. If the government fails to act or actsinconsistently so that it does not deal with whatever problem it is facing, it isseen as ineffective. Government policy, or the lack of a policy, that createsunwanted and unintended consequences such as political instability is alsojudged negatively.

How do coalition cabinets fare on the various criteria for judging the qualityof the decision-making process and the outputs produced? Coalitions can beseen as both ‘‘good’’ and ‘‘bad’’ at policymaking. Table 3 summarizes this dis-cussion of the trade-offs regarding the multiple advocacy that is built into coali-tion cabinets. The dominant image of coalitions is quite negative: the multiplevoices in the cabinet contribute to nonrational decision-making processes andproduce outcomes that, at best, do not effectively address national problemsand, at worst, spark political instability. In terms of their policymaking processes,coalition cabinets certainly attract criticism (Andeweg 1988; Gallagher, Laver,and Mair 2001). Coalitions are often accused of taking too long to make deci-sions, making excessive compromises, and exhibiting excessive conflict. Thesepoor policymaking procedures are supposedly the source of bad policy out-comes, primarily inconsistent, fragmented action or deadlock. As discussedabove, while some expect coalition cabinets to have more conflictual foreignpolicies than single-party cabinets (and there is some evidence to suggest this),others have failed to find a relationship between cabinet type and the level ofconflict in foreign policy.

11The link between the quality of the decision and the outcome of the decision is often questioned. Janis’s the-ory of groupthink, for example, has been criticized for assuming that poor decision-making processes were morelikely to produce foreign policy ‘‘fiascoes.’’ His small-N case study did not convince many that this relationship isuniversal. Nevertheless, those who have directly investigated the link between the quality of the decision-makingprocess and the quality of the outcome have found support for Janis’s original proposition (Herek, Janis, and Huth1987; Peterson 1997; Schafer and Crichlow 2002).

70 Coalition Cabinet Decision Making

The poor decision making associated with coalitions is usually related to theprocesses already discussed above and the social psychological and institutionalconditions underlying them. Coalitions, for example, are often thought to avoidconsidering all alternatives and engaging in thorough information searchesbecause they are ‘‘hijacked’’ by the narrow interests of small, junior coalitionpartners. In addition, because junior partners often possess veto power overpolicies, decisions require unanimity which can produce a variety of poor deci-sion-making processes. Charles F. Hermann (1993:189) summarizes the ‘‘pathol-ogies’’ associated with unanimity: ‘‘it can produce long delays as the membersstruggle to settle their differences and achieve closure. If meaningful agreementremains elusive, the group produces either deadlock or vague generalizationsthat disguise unresolved divisions.’’

Unanimity can also lead to psychological entrapment ‘‘whereby individualsescalate their commitment to a previously chosen, though failing, course ofaction in order to justify or ‘make good on’ prior investments’’ (Brockner andRubin 1985). Indeed, Tatsuya Kameda and Shinkichi Sugimori (1993) havefound that experimental groups are more likely to exhibit entrapment when theyare under a unanimity rule compared with a majority decision rule. Further-more, this was true for groups that were of split opinion initially (as coalitionsoften are) when compared with groups that agreed at the outset. Thus, the una-nimity that is often required in coalitions whose member parties are in disagree-ment can generate a variety of poor decision-making practices. More generally, I.M. Destler (1972:789) argues the presence of multiple advocates in a policymak-ing group can create ‘‘the worst forms of bureaucratic political practices and out-comes—minimal compromises, deference to bureaucratic rivals in their fields ofexpertise, [and] continuation of contradictory courses of action by differentagencies.’’

When the decision-making process in coalitions breaks down, it can producenumerous policy and political consequences. Indeed, one image of coalitioncabinets is that they, compared with single-party cabinets and other types ofexecutives, produce very little coordinated policy because they are so immobi-lized or deadlocked by their circumstances (Hagan 1993). In effect, as Elman(2000:103) has argued, ‘‘political stalemates are characteristic of coalitional par-liamentary governments in general…. Tough foreign policy trade-offs must beswept under the table in order to maintain fragile coalitions made up ofdiverse and contradictory bases of support. As coalitional governments can beeasily dismissed by legislative censure, there is an institutional incentive for cab-inets to choose the foreign policy path of least resistance.’’ Thus, coalitions areexpected to exhibit fragmented action, if they act at all (Hagan, Everts, Fukui,and Stempel 2001).

This expectation that coalition cabinets are immobilized is strongly rooted inhistorical examples from the French experience. Indeed, ‘‘a primary theme in

TABLE 3. Parallel Trade-Offs: The Effects of Coalition Politics on the Quality of Decision-MakingProcesses

Psychological Bases Institutional Bases

Coalitions are ‘‘Bad’’ Premature polarization,unanimity-induced entrapment

Hijacking by narrow interests,excessive conflict, unanimityrequirements

Coalitions are ‘‘Good’’ Dissent, diversity, minoritiesstimulate divergent andcomplex thinking and spilloverattitude change

Enhanced legitimacy,representation of alternativeoptions, ‘‘losers’’ monitorimplementation

71Juliet Kaarbo

studies of the foreign policy of the French Fourth Republic is the pervasive polit-ical constraints inherent in its succession of unstable, multiparty cabinets’’ whichcreated incoherent and ineffective foreign policy programs (Hagan 1993:26). Inpostwar settlement policy after WWII, for example, Norrin Ripsman (2002:219)notes that ‘‘what paralyzed French policy was the public and parliamentary pres-sure on the government—which government documents frequently acknowl-edged—and the fragile cabinet structure in a multiparty Assembly, which gavedissenting ministers the ability to withdraw their parties from the cabinet andtopple the government.’’ The French Third Republic experienced similar for-eign policy problems due to coalition politics. ‘‘In France, it was the ThirdRepublic’s coalitional parliamentary system that generated middle-of-the-roadpolicies instead of the prompt, decisive action called for by external exigencies.Lack of agreement between the various coalition members led to immobilism’’(Elman 2000:102).

Case studies of Italian coalition cabinets also stress ‘‘immobilismo,’’ passivity,paralysis, and weak commitments in foreign policy due to the diffusion of author-ity in the executive; similar conclusions have been offered to explain directionlessforeign policies during the West German Grand Coalition of the 1960s, Japan inthe 1990s, and several Dutch coalition cabinets (see Hagan 1993; Ahn 1997; Ber-ger 1999; Green 2001). Irmtraud N. Gallhofer, Willem E. Sairs, and Robert Voogt(1994) confirm this expectation more systematically in their study of Dutch cabi-net decision making. In their content analysis of cabinet meeting records, theyfound that disagreement in the group was likely to result in incremental action.They conclude that ‘‘this striving for consensus and minimal action…seems to bea substitute for good quality decision making (for example, decision makingbased on consequences and probabilities)’’ (Gallhofer et al. 1994:168).

The high level of conflict that occurs in coalition cabinets seems to be the crit-ical factor in the incrementalism and deadlock seen in their policymaking pro-cesses (Gallhofer et al. 1994). Not only is policymaking more conflictual incoalitions than in single-party cabinets (Blondel and Muller-Rommel 1993), but‘‘there is an increase in the level of conflict as the number of parties in the coali-tion increases’’ (Frognier 1993:64). This conflictual process—what Andeweg(1988) has called ‘‘excessive heterogeneity’’—has consequences for the life ofthe cabinet. Kaare Strøm (1990:116) reports that single-party cabinets holding amajority of votes in parliament last substantially longer than coalition cabinetsthat control a majority. Moreover, most coalition cabinets terminate because ofgovernment disunity—47% of the time—while single-party cabinets with a major-ity in parliament rarely resign due to internal disunity—only 5% of the time(Strøm 1990:120).

When conflict between political parties is extreme, the decision makers pursuealternative paths, producing contradictory policy. The 1996–1997 coalition inTurkey between the Welfare Party and the True Path Party brought together twoparties with very different foreign policy orientations (Ozkececi-Taner 2005).The Welfare Party and Prime Minister Erbakan were suspicious and critical ofthe European Union and believed Turkey’s identity should be more connectedto the Islamic world. The True Path Party and Foreign Minister Tansu Ciller sawTurkey’s future more in line with Western Europe and the NATO alliance. Whilethe prime minister was pursuing his ‘‘Islamic opening,’’ Foreign Minister Cillermaintained close relations with the West by, for example, reopening talks withthe IMF and attending EU Dublin summit meetings. The result was a dividedforeign policy during the 1996–1997 tenure of the coalition. ‘‘In effect, the Turk-ish government looked like a car with two drivers, each trying to steer it in oppo-site directions’’ (Hale 2000:239).

Thus, poor decision-making dynamics may produce poor policy and poor gov-ernance. Concerns over the policy implications of unstable and conflict-ridden

72 Coalition Cabinet Decision Making

coalition government often surface. Forecasting the emergence of the first-evercoalition in India, one proponent of a change in the political system warned that‘‘it will…be foolhardy to think that we can afford to experiment with coalitionsat the national level. One can easily imagine how a coalition with a slendermajority would not be able to tackle problems like that of terrorists and subver-sion in Punjab’’ (Sathe 1989). Another critic (Lardeyret 2006:88) of coalitiongovernance writes that ‘‘such governments are often reluctant to make unpopu-lar decisions because of the resistance of some coalition partner. The Palestinianproblem in Israel will probably never be solved unless Israel’s electoral law ischanged or extraordinary foreign pressure is exerted.’’ For these reasons, manyargue that majoritarian electoral rules and two-party systems are preferable toproportional representation rules and multiparty systems (for example, Lardeyret1996; Quade 1996; see Powell 2000 for a summary of this argument).

Yet others believe that the conflict arising from the multiple voices found incoalitions in parliamentary systems is more representative, consistent with demo-cratic principles, and can produce more legitimate policies and better decision-making processes (Linz 1990; Lijphart 1999; see Powell 2000 for a summary ofthis argument). Contending that the time in which coalitions were seen as inher-ently unstable has passed, Jean Blondel and Ferdinand Muller-Rommel (1993:4)claim that ‘‘major virtues have now been found in coalition governments. Farfrom being regarded as ‘aberrations’ or ‘pathological’ developments, they havestarted to be admired for the self-restraint that they require on the part of theirmembers.’’ Furthermore, ‘‘it seems apparent that the cabinet system, far frombeing unable to provide leadership to the nation in an effective manner, seemsbetter adapted to the requirements of modern liberal-democratic governmentthan other systems in that it is more flexible and it ensures better co-ordinationamong the various elements of the political chain’’ (Blondel 1997:3). In his dis-cussion of Turkish politics in the early 1960s, Clement H. Dodd (1969:103)noted some trade-offs regarding coalition governance:

Whether the coalition period is successful depends on the criteria by which it isjudged. A single-party government might have governed more positively and havegot more done, but would it have provided sufficient opportunity to represent,and meet, the many political demands that were made during this period of re-settlement after the revolution? The coalition system did not in fact break down,which meant that there was no successful challenge to the democratic politicalsystem itself. Looked at in the broad, the period 1961–1965 was one of markedpolitical success.

The multiple voices that are present in coalitions can also contribute to betterdecision making through the prevention of premature closure on an alternativepreferred by a majority. As Kameda and Sugimori (1993:284) have observed,Janis ‘‘himself emphasized the importance of a minority member’s dissentingbehavior as a possible remedy for groupthink, recommending that ‘at everymeeting devoted to evaluating policy alternatives, at least one member should beassigned the role of devil’s advocate’’’ (quoting Janis 1972:215). Junior partieswho disagree with their senior partners are natural devil’s advocates in coalitioncabinets.

Not only can junior parties provide multiple perspectives and multiple options,they can improve the decision-making process in more subtle ways. One impor-tant outgrowth of Moscovici’s theory and research on the conditions underwhich minorities can influence majorities has been a series of experiments onhow the mere presence of a minority opinion can influence creativity. It seemsthat when groups are engaged in simple problem-solving tasks, a minoritycan generate divergent thinking, even when they are unable to influence the

73Juliet Kaarbo

majority’s opinion. Specifically, minorities can trigger the consideration ofalternatives, not necessarily the one suggested by the minority itself. This creativethought process is called divergent thinking.

The divergent thinking effect was first found in a study by Charlan Nemethand Julianne Kwan (1987) who asked participants to note the first three-letterword they discovered in a string of six letters, such as tNOWap. The most obviousanswer is ‘‘NOW.’’ The participants then were told if a majority or minority ofprior participants agreed with their answer as well as that some in the groupanswered ‘‘WON’’ instead. The experimenters were interested in how this feed-back affected subsequent problem solving. If subjects were told that a majorityhad said ‘‘WON,’’ they adopted the strategy of backward reading in subsequentproblems (convergent thinking). If they were told that a minority had said‘‘WON,’’ they used a variety of strategies. The minority’s way of thinking was notblindly followed, but rather led to a consideration of all possible strategies (diver-gent thinking).

Similarly, based on their studies on hypothesis testing, Fabrizzio Butera andGabriel Mugny (2001:164–165) report that ‘‘individuals consider the majority’shypothesis as informative, as they use it more frequently to elaborate their ownhypotheses; in contrast, when confronted with the minority’s hypothesis, theyelaborate new and original hypotheses. In hypothesis testing, confirmation is themost frequent strategy, but individuals confronted with a minority use disconfir-mation more than those confronted with a majority.’’ Also, in an analogical rea-soning task, Robin Martin and Miles Hewstone (2001):830) report that aminority-endorsed proposal ‘‘caused more participants to generate the best solu-tion to the problem than when the same base problem was supported by amajority. In short, the minority led to better performance, as judged by the gen-eration of the best solution, than did the majority.’’ Subsequent research explor-ing some additional aspects of the impact of and mechanisms for minoritydissent on creative thinking has found that the presence of a dissenter canincrease others’ resistance to pressures to confirm, decrease the polarization ofattitudes, and promote role differentiation (Nemeth and Chiles 1988; De Dreuand Beersma 2001).

Minority dissent appears to influence the thinking of members of the majorityat an individual level. Deborah Gruenfeld et al. (Gruenfeld 1995; Gruenfeld,Thomas-Hunt, and Kim 1998)have found that majorities exhibit more integra-tively complex thinking when compared with minorities and with groups that areunanimous in their opinion in both natural groups (the US Supreme Court)and laboratory groups. In an experiment, they were able to determine that thiseffect was due to the presence of minority dissent rather than to a communica-tion strategy adopted by the factions as a function of their status. Similarly, oth-ers have found that the presence of a dissenting minority leads the majority tochange related opinions and attitudes, even if the minority does not have anyinfluence on the attitude or opinion being discussed (Perez and Mugny 1987;De Dreu and De Vries 1993; Crano and Chen 1998). As one study reports, ‘‘over-all, results support the conclusion that majority arguments affect attitudes onfocal issues more than on related issues because of convergent message process-ing, while minority arguments affect attitudes on related issues more than onfocal issues because of divergent message processing and a desire to avoid identi-fication with the source’’ (De Dreu, De Vries, Gordijn, and Schuurman1999:329).

This research on the positive effects of the presence of a minority on thequality of group decision making is supported by studies on the role of a devil’sadvocate (Schweiger, Sandberg, and Ragan 1986; Schwenk 1990) and on dissentand diversity (Peterson, Owens, Tetlock, Fan, and Martorana 1998; Williamsand O’Reilly 1998; Dooley and Fryxell 1999). ‘‘Thus, like an appointed devil’s

74 Coalition Cabinet Decision Making

advocate, authentic minority dissent appears to prevent teams from biased anddefective decision making’’ (De Dreu and Beersma 2001:274).

Moreover, even if minority members are not effective in the first considerationof a policy problem, they can subsequently become ‘‘agitators for change,’’ con-stantly monitoring the information environment for feedback that the seniorparty’s position is failing (Billings and Hermann 1998; Beasley, Kaarbo, Her-mann, and Hermann 2001). According to Kameda and Sugimori (1993:284),group members who are outvoted ‘‘generally act in a nonconforming or uncoop-erative manner in the post-decision interaction, [and] their behaviors may conse-quently contribute to the reduction of collective entrapment in a group; eventhough the initially chosen course of action turns out to be faulty, thesemembers with minority opinions may eventually help the group exit fromentrapment.’’

Future consequences of the presence of a minority also include ‘‘sleeper’’and ‘‘spillover’’ effects. Not only do majorities show delayed changes in theirattitudes on the topic of a minority’s message (the ‘‘sleeper’’ effect), majori-ties’ attitudes are vulnerable to change on topics not directly targeted by theminority’s influence attempt. Apparently, majorities, when faced with a minoritywith which they disagree, are forced to rethink their position and generatecounterarguments that ‘‘spillover’’ to their attitudes on topics which they seeas unrelated. This effect occurs when majorities are targets of minority influ-ence, but not when minorities are targets of majority influence (Alvaro andCrano 1997).

Thus, research in social psychology suggests numerous ways in which the coali-tion context, with the presence of a junior party that disagrees with the seniorpartner, can push coalition decision making closer to rational standards. In par-ticular, junior parties can stimulate a more thorough survey of alternatives.Because of a junior party’s dissent, the government may search for an alternativein order to keep the coalition intact. This occurred in the example mentionedpreviously when Israeli Foreign Minister Dayan introduced a new option to thecabinet: to ignore the controversial American plan that called for a cease-firewith Egypt and, instead, to accept a US declaration promising continued supportfor Israel (Maoz 1990). Similarly, when the Turkish coalition was split over theEuropean Union’s Helsinki Declaration in 1999, the cabinet decided to acceptthe declaration but issue a separate statement condemning its controversial pro-visions regarding Cyprus (Ozkececi-Taner 2005). Thus, coalitions, because ofinternal dissent, may find new, divergent outcomes and increase the number ofalternatives they survey.

Dissent within a coalition can also improve decision making by stimulatingcontingency planning. When a small Dutch junior partner recently opposedsending troops to Afghanistan, the Dutch parliament was given an unprece-dented 11th-hour briefing by NATO leaders and forced the alliance organizationto be more specific regarding conditions under which reinforcements would besupplied (Agence France Presse 2006).

Investigating Contingency Factors in Future Research

This review of psychological and institutional research leaves us with a numberof factors to consider when we investigate coalition politics and policy. The mainpurpose of this essay was to synthesize the existing research found in these twodisciplines. The social psychological perspective is not meant as an alternative topolitical perspectives nor is it meant to simply proliferate the factors to be con-sidered. Instead, the aim here has been to provide connections across parallelideas that are intended to excite, enrich, and direct future examination of theunderstudied phenomenon of coalition decision making.

75Juliet Kaarbo

Future research should focus on adjudicating between the competing expecta-tions—within and across the psychological and institutional perspectives—of theeffects of coalition politics. It is clear that coalition cabinets do not live up to the‘‘pure’’ images of them that exist in the literature. They are neither completelyconstrained so that they only pursue peaceful policies (witness Indian and Israeliforeign policies) nor are they so weak or hijacked that they engage in onlyaggressive policies. Coalition decision making is also not as ineffective as someportray. Coalitions are not so conflict-ridden that they never take meaningfuldecisions (Hagan 1993:27). But they are, at times, not capable of realizing thebest and most creative decision making associated with multiple advocacy. Thus,research should focus on investigating the contingency factors or conditions thatmediate between the different images or pathologies of coalition decision mak-ing. Why are some cabinets, at some times, more susceptible to the institutionaland psychological conditions reviewed above? In what follows, let us consider afew answers to this question which are not meant to be exhaustive but merelysuggestive. Table 4 summarizes some of these factors that emerged from thisexploration of the psychological and institutional perspectives.

There are some important contingency factors for unpacking the multipleimages of polarization in coalitions that are more institutional in form, althoughthey are consistent with both political and psychological explanations. To assessthe hypotheses that coalitions polarize when there is a diffusion of responsibilityand accountability, we can examine the number of parties in the coalition.According to both the psychological and the political logics, the more partiesthat are in the coalition, the more likely polarization is to occur. To assess thehypotheses that polarization is due to weakness, diversion, and the stress thatthese cause, we can examine the strength of the coalition. According to both log-ics, we should expect weaker coalitions (with weakness measured, for example,by public support or number of parliamentary seats controlled by the coalition)to exhibit polarization. And to assess the idea that polarization stems from per-suasion or hijacking by extreme parties, we could examine the ideological place-ment and ⁄ or policy positions of the parties in the coalition. Coalitions thatinclude a junior party with a worldview that supports aggression, for example,could be more likely to polarize toward aggressive action.

TABLE 4. Contingency Factors Based on Parallel Ideas from Psychological and InstitutionalPerspectives

Contingency Factors Psychological Aspects Institutional Aspects

When Do Coalitions Polarize and in What Direction?

Number of Parties Diffusion of Responsibility Diffusion of AuthorityParliamentary Strength Stress-Induced Polarization DiversionIdeological Orientations Persuasion by Extreme Positions Ideologically Based Worldviews

What Influence Strategies are Adopted and Which are Effective?

Credibility Consistency Party UnityParty Relationship History of Relationship; Social

CategorizationMinistry Distribution; PolicyDistance

When Do Coalitions Exhibit Poor Decision Making?

Unanimity Norms Comfort Level for OpinionExpression

Weighting of Actors’ Influence

Leadership Style Dominance Stifles Debate Arbitration Contributes toDeadlock; Political Use of JuniorParties Promotes Hijacking

76 Coalition Cabinet Decision Making

This review has revealed a number of influence strategies available to juniorparties. These include both psychological and political strategies, but we learnedthat even political strategies can be affected by psychological factors. Althoughresearch in both political science and social psychology suggests that indirectinfluence tactics may be most effective, we are still left with the empirical ques-tion of which strategies are actually used and with what degree of success.

One contingency factor that may affect the use and effectiveness of strategiesis the credibility of the junior party’s influence attempt. Social psychologicalresearch emphasizes that the majority’s perception of the minority’s commitmentto its position and the behavioral strategies that indicate commitment (such asconsistency and independence of judgment) are important for minority influ-ence but not particularly important for majority influence (De Vries and DeDreu 2000). Likewise, political scientists, and politicians, stress the significanceof the credibility of a junior party’s threat to leave the coalition. According toBarry Rubin (2000), when coalition partners disagree, ‘‘the smaller party’s tas-k…is to persuade the prime minister that it is serious about walking out in orderto obtain the maximum benefit.’’ One key to a junior party’s credibility is partyunity. Political parties, even small ones, typically contain multiple factions thatmay be based on differences over ideology, strategy, and ⁄ or leadership (Sartori1976; Belloni and Beller 1978; Hine 1982). If a party’s internal factions are notunited in a specific attempt to influence a policy decision, the party cannot makea consistent argument and may not have the capability of executing any threats(Kaarbo 1996a,b).

A second factor that is likely to affect choice and effectiveness of strategy isthe relationship between the parties in the coalition. Political scientists wouldpoint to the importance of the distribution of power between the parties (forexample, Baylis 1989; Hagan 1993), the distribution of ministries (for example,Pridham 1986), and the policy distance between the parties (for example, deSwaan 1973) as key aspects of the parties’ relationship that would conditionwhich strategies are used and with what success. Disagreements over means(such as how many troops to commit in an intervention), for instance, arelikely to provoke different types of influence strategies than are disagreementsover basic foreign policy orientation or the national identity of the country.12

Psychologists would also look at the relationship between the actors but focuson the history of that relationship (for example, Levine, Moreland, and Choi2001) and whether some form of social categorization divides them. Social psy-chologists, by way of illustration, find that ‘‘double minorities’’—actors that arenot only in the numerical minority on a position but also belong to a social‘‘outgroup’’—are less likely to have influence than are ‘‘single minorities’’ whoonly differ from the majority in terms of their opinion (Clark and Maass1988).

Whether a coalition exhibits the pathologies often associated with such institu-tions or escapes these problems and engages in the best of multiple advocacy(see George 1972) may depend on some key contingency factors with bases inboth psychology and politics. Some coalitions, for example, operate under una-nimity rules or norms of consensus while others allow for decision by majority(Gallhofer et al. 1994). For political scientists, norms and rules specify whichactors have to be involved, which decision-making mechanisms are viable, andwhat kind of resources ‘‘matter in weighting influence in the coalition, and howthese weights are to be combined in arriving at agreement’’ (Hagan et al.2001:178). For psychologists, consensual norms are associated with the levels ofcomfort that group members have in expressing opinions.

12See Binnur Ozkececi-Taner (2005) on how disagreements over philosophical and instrumental beliefs affectedcoalition policymaking in Turkey in the 1990s.

77Juliet Kaarbo

Coalitions that operate with unanimity or consensus as the explicit or implicitrule may experience some defective decision-making characteristics (such asdeadlock) but not others (such as poor information search) (see Schweiger et al.1986; Hagan et al. 2001; Andeweg and Irwin 2002 for the trade-offs regardingconsensus and unanimity from psychological and political perspectives). In Japanin the early 1990s, for example, the second coalition government, under PrimeMinister Murayama, did not want to repeat the ‘‘high-handed, top-down style inthe [previous] Hosokawa government’’ (Naoto 2000:109). By making consensusthe norm, the cabinet hoped to increase the legitimacy of its policymaking.‘‘The pitfall of this practice, however, was the sacrificing of effectiveness in deci-sion making. Not surprisingly, the Murayama government ended up shelvingmany controversial issues’’ (Naoto 2000:111). Thus, unanimity norms, whetherimplicit or explicit and institutionalized in cabinet practices, may mediatebetween the different images of the quality of coalition decision making.

Moreover, the performance of a coalition may be contingent on the leadershipstyle of the prime minister. In the research on groupthink, the leader’s style hasemerged as the most important variable relating to the quality of the processand the outcome (Fuller and Aldag 1997; Peterson 1997). This reinforcesgeneral findings in social psychology on the importance of leaders. As RandallPeterson (1997:1107–1108) has observed, ‘‘since the earliest days of social psy-chology…, research on leadership styles has consistently implicated directiveleaders as the cause of defective and poor outcomes in group decision making.’’

Prime ministers have a variety of leadership styles composed of a numberof dimensions (Muller, Philipp, and Gerlich 1993; Kaarbo 1997; Kaarbo andHermann 1998). Perhaps most important for the quality of the decision-makingprocess are a prime minister’s strategies for managing conflict in the cabinetand for managing party relations. Some prime ministers, for instance, tend toadvocate positions, others arbitrate. Some prime ministers adopt a competitiveattitude toward the junior parties and ⁄ or rival factions within their own parties,others seek to bridge any differences among political groups.

These differences in leadership style can have implications for the decision-making process, including its quality. Although leaders of coalitions rarely havethe luxury of completely suppressing dissent, forceful advocacy of a position ora competitive orientation toward the junior partner could stifle good decision-making procedures and alternative viewpoints. Leaders who adopt more of anarbitrator role may contribute to slow and ineffective policymaking, but coali-tions by these leaders could score high on legitimacy and representative crite-ria. And prime ministers may adopt different styles toward different actors inthe coalition.13 Some leaders use junior parties as tools against the faction orfactions internal to their own parties. German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, forexample, was often more open and compromising with his coalition partnerthan with factions in his own party. Indeed, Kohl would support the small,centrist Free Democratic Party over the Christian Social Union faction of hisown party as a way to counteract the influence of the more conservative andinternal rival wing (Clemens 1994; Muller-Rommel 1994; Kaarbo 1997). Thisleadership style may allow for extreme polarization to occur, as small juniorparties are given more policy influence by the prime minister for political rea-sons. Israeli Prime Minister Yitzak Shamir used a similar tactic in the NationalUnity Governments of the early 1990s but with different consequences for deci-sion making. Shamir encouraged participation of the coalition partner, theLabour party, because this increased his own political fortunes with his own

13This observation is consistent with vertical dyad linkage (VDL) theory in the study of organizational leadership(see Dansereau, Graen, and Haga 1975). The VDL theory posits that leaders develop different types of relationshipswith different groups, creating ingroups and outgroups in leader-follower relationships.

78 Coalition Cabinet Decision Making

party, Likud. With Labour involvement, Shamir was able to represent the hawk-ish viewpoint himself and thus take away some of his challengers’ ammunition(Goldberg 1992). This style ensured that the two major parties in the coalition,with clashing positions on the peace process, were equally involved. As a result,very little meaningful or effective foreign policymaking occurred (Elazar andSandler 1992; Kaarbo 1996b). Thus, different leadership styles may be associ-ated with different criteria for judging the quality of coalition decision makingand may be key intervening variables between the coalition context and thepolicymaking process in multiparty cabinets.

Conclusions

This essay has examined coalition decision making through both a social psycho-logical and an institutional lens in order to build a more complete understand-ing of the life of multiparty cabinets between formation and termination and toexamine the assumptions behind existing expectations about the effects of coali-tion politics on foreign policy. Coalitions are an ideal arena to explore the inter-section of institutional and psychological dynamics as they create distinctinstitutional conditions that complement and reinforce psychological factors. Inparticular, the extreme behavior often associated with coalitions can be linked tothe institutional factors of accountability, legitimacy, and the blackmail potentialof junior parties as well as to the psychological factors of diffusion of responsibil-ity, groupthink-like effects of stress, and persuasion. In addition, junior partiesare in an institutionally created position that offers potential for very dispropor-tionate influence. Whether this potential is realized depends on a number offactors including the consistency and perceived commitment in such parties’attempts at persuasion, their use and perception of bargaining tactics, themanipulation of institutions, and the framing of the problem in terms of sociallyshared representations. Finally, the presence of multiple actors can lead to poordecision making and unstable governments, but it is also associated with diver-gent and creative thinking.

At the intersection between psychological and political perspectives thereemerges concrete ideas for future research. Researchers should pay closer atten-tion to the policymaking process, including the group dynamics that occur, for itis the process that translates institutional design into good or poor decision mak-ing and certain policy outcomes as well as affects the life and stability of cabinetsafter formation. As Paul ‘t Hart, Eric Stern, and Bengt Sundelius (1997:4–5) pro-pose,

instead of assuming that what goes on in these groups is a mere reflection orartifact of the larger organizational, political, and even international system struc-ture of which they are a part, the small group perspective suggests that they formthe scene of rather complex and relatively unpredictable social-psychologicaldynamics. These group-level interactions may have a profound impact on theprocess and outcomes of foreign policymaking.

The research reviewed in this essay further suggests that future work on thesocial psychological processes that are reinforced by the institutional contextshould focus on the key factors that produce the very different expectationsassociated with coalition politics. Given the various competing views of theeffectiveness of coalition governments and the types of foreign policy outputslikely to emerge from multiparty cabinets, investigations of contingency vari-ables would seem a most fruitful avenue to pursue. In other words, questionssuch as ‘‘what factors translate coalition dynamics into aggressive vs. peacefulvs. fragmented foreign policies?’’ and ‘‘what conditions foster creativity vs.

79Juliet Kaarbo

infighting in the presence of multiple advocacy and dissent?’’ are the mostappropriate types of questions to ask in order to advance our current under-standing of coalition politics. Research in both political science and psychologysuggests that certain characteristics of the cabinet, the perceived credibility ofjunior party influence, the relationship between the parties, decision-makingnorms, and the prime minister’s leadership style may be important contingencyfactors mediating the very different images of coalition politics that we find inthe literature.

Future research on these issues should be multi-methodological. Quantitative,statistical analyses comparing foreign policy actions of cabinets with differentcharacteristics (such as size, strength, and ideological orientation) could unpackthe effects of coalitions. Although a few studies of the foreign policy behavior ofcoalition cabinets do include some of these variables in disaggregating the classof coalitions (for example, Ireland and Gartner 2001; Palmer et al. 2004), theytypically do so with only the institutional logic and have not, to date, provided aclear consensus on the role of these cabinet characteristics as intervening factors(see Kaarbo and Beasley 2004). In the end, these studies can indicate whichexplanation is most plausible—accountability ⁄ responsibility, weakness ⁄ stress, orpersuasion ⁄ hijacking—but they cannot detect which underlying mechanisms areactually operative. For this task, process-tracing case studies that ‘‘get closer tothe mechanisms or microfoundations behind observed phenomena’’ (Georgeand Bennett 2004:147) or laboratory experiments that isolate these mechanismsmake it possible to examine which factors seem to be significant in differenttypes of cabinets. Thus, a collection of case studies or experiments that comparedifferent types of coalitions—few vs. many parties, strong vs. weak parliamentarysupport, and left vs. right orientation—would be useful in future study of thisquestion.

Research on the factors that affect influence strategies would also benefit froma multi-methodological strategy. Detailed, comparative case studies could docu-ment which strategies are actually used and with what effects. Furthermore, labo-ratory studies would be helpful here if they go beyond the limited focus onpersuasion found in existing social psychological research and offer dissentingactors more resources for influence as well as make outcomes for individuals andsubgroups interdependent. Case studies on how norms and leadership stylesmediate between the good and bad images of coalition decision making couldalso be supplemented by experiments in which these factors are directly manipu-lated. A multi-methodological approach such as this is particularly important forresearch questions that are combining perspectives involving institutional andpsychological factors (see Gruenfeld 1995; ‘t Hart 1997; Peterson 1997). Giventhe parallel theoretical ideas from social psychology and political science, asreviewed in this essay, the combination of different methodological techniques isan exceptionally appropriate and potentially fruitful strategy for future researchin this area.

Broadly speaking, this essay supports the view that a highly structural under-standing of the effects of institutions on politics and policies is incomplete andthat research on the interplay of structures and human agents is critical. AsWalter Carlsnaes (1992:245–246) has noted, there is ‘‘an increasingly wide-spread recognition that, instead of being antagonistic partners in a zero-sumrelationship, human agents and social structures are in a fundamental senseinterrelated entities, and hence that we cannot fully account for the one with-out invoking the other.’’ The decision-making processes that occur in coalitioncabinets have profound effects on the effectiveness and stability of democraciesand the foreign policy choices they make and these processes are a product ofboth social psychological and political ⁄ institutional forces and their interrela-tionships.

80 Coalition Cabinet Decision Making

References

Agence France Presse. (2005) Netherlands Again Puts Off Decision on Afghanistan Deployment,December 22.

Agence France Presse. (2006) Pressure Mounts on the Netherlands to Send Troops to Afghanistan,January 30.

Ahn, C. S. (1997) Government-Party Coordination in Japan’s Foreign Policy-Making: The Issue ofPermanent Membership in the UNSC. Asian Survey 37:368–382.

Alvaro, Eusebio M., and William D. Crano. (1997) Indirect Minority Influence: Evidence forLeniency in Source Evaluation and Counterargumentation. Journal of Personality and Social Psy-chology 72:949–964.

Andeweg, Rudy B. (1988) Centrifugal Forces and Collective Decision-Making: The Case of the DutchCabinet. European Journal of Political Research 16:125–151.

Andeweg, Rudy B., and Galen A. Irwin. (2002) Governance and Politics of the Netherlands. Basing-stoke: Palgrave.

Asch, Solomon E. (1955) Opinions and Social Pressure. Scientific American 193:31–35.Asch, Solomon E. (1956) Studies of Independence and Conformity: A Minority of One Against a

Unanimous Majority. Psychological Monographs 70:1–70.Asmus, Ronald D. (1989) The Politics of Modernizing Short-Range Nuclear Forces in West Germany. Santa

Monica, CA: Rand Corporation.Auerswald, David P. (1999) Inward Bound: Domestic Institutions and Military Conflicts. Interna-

tional Organization 53:469–504.Bawn, Kathleen, and Frances Rosenbluth. (2006) Short Versus Long Coalitions: Electoral

Accountability and the Size of the Public Sector. American Journal of Political Science 50:251–265.

Baylis, Thomas A. (1989) Governing by Committee. New York: State University of New York Press.Bazerman, Max H., Jared R. Curhan, Don A. Moore, and Kathleen L. Valley. (2000) Negotia-

tion. Annual Review of Psychology 51:279–314.Beasley, Ryan. (1998) Collective Interpretations: How Problem Representations Aggregate in For-

eign Policy Groups. In Problem Representation in Foreign Policy Decision Making, edited by DonaldSylvan and James Voss. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Beasley, Ryan K., Juliet Kaarbo, Charles F. Hermann, and Margaret G. Hermann. (2001) Peo-ple and Processes in Foreign Policymaking: Insights From Comparative Case Studies. Interna-tional Studies Review 3:217–250.

Belloni, Frank P., and Dennis C. Beller, Eds. (1978) Faction Politics: Political Parties and Factionalismin Comparative Perspective. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-Clio.

Berger, Thomas U. (1999) Alliance Politics and Japan’s Postwar Culture of Antimilitarism. In TheU.S.-Japan Alliance: Past, Present, and Future, edited by Michael J. Green and Patrick M. Cronin.New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press.

Bickerton, Ian, and Daniel Dombey. (2006) Dutch Edge Closer to NATO Deployment as Opposi-tion Chief Set to Come on Side. Financial Times, February 1.

Billings, Robert S., and Charles F. Hermann. (1998) Problem Identification in Sequential PolicyDecision Making: The Re-Representation of Problems. In Problem Representation in Foreign PolicyDecision Making, edited by D. Sylvan and J. Voss. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Blondel, Jean. (1997) Introduction: Western European Cabinets in Comparative Perspective. In Cab-inets in Western Europe, 2nd edition, edited by Jean Blondel and Ferdinand Muller-Rommel. NewYork: St. Martin’s Press.

Blondel, Jean, and Ferdinand Muller-Rommel. (1993) Introduction. In Governing Together: TheExtent and Limits of Joint Decision-Making in Western European Cabinets, edited by Jean Blondel andFerdinand Muller-Rommel. New York: St. Martin’s Press.

Brauer, Markus, and Charles M. Judd. (1996) Group Polarization and Repeated Attitude Expres-sions: A New Take on an Old Topic. In European Review of Social Psychology, Vol. 7, edited byWolfgang Stroebe and Miles Hewstone. Chicester, UK: John Wiley.

Brockner, Joel, and Jeffrey Z. Rubin. (1985) Entrapment in Escalating Conflicts: A Social PsychologicalAnalysis. New York: Springer-Verlag.

Brown, Rupert. (2000) Group Processes. Oxford: Blackwell.Browne, Eric C. (1982) Considerations on the Construction of a Theory of Cabinet Coalition Behav-

ior. In Governmental Coalitions in Western Democracies, edited by Eric C. Browne and J. Dreijmanis.New York: Longman.

81Juliet Kaarbo

Butera, Fabrizzio, and Gabriel Mugny. (2001) Conflicts and Social Influences in Hypothesis Test-ing. In Group Consensus and Minority Influence: Implications for Innovation, edited by Carsten K. W.De Dreu and Nanne K. De Vries. Oxford: Blackwell.

Carlsnaes, Walter. (1992) The Agency-Structure Problem in Foreign Policy Analysis. InternationalStudies Quarterly 36:245–270.

Carpenter, R. Charli. (2005) Women, Children, and Other Vulnerable Groups: Gender, StrategicFrames, and the Protection of Civilians as a Transnational Issue. International Studies Quarterly49:295.

Charlton, Sue Ellen M. (2004) Comparing Asian Politics: India, China, and Japan. Boulder, CO: West-view Press.

Clark, Russell D., III. (1994) A Few Parallels Between Group Polarization and Minority Influence.In Minority Influence, edited by Serge Moscovici. Chicago, MI: Nelson-Hall.

Clark, Russell D., III, and Anne Maass. (1988) Social Categorization and Minority Influence: TheCase of Homosexuality. European Journal of Social Psychology 18:347–364.

Clemens, Clay. (1994) The Chancellor as Manager: Helmut Kohl, the CDU, and Governance in Ger-many. West European Politics 17:28–51.

Crano, William D. (2001) Social Influence, Social Identity, and Ingroup Leniency. In Group Consen-sus and Minority Influence: Implications for Innovation, edited by Carsten K. W. De Dreu and NanneK. De Vries. Oxford: Blackwell.

Crano, William D., and Xin Chen. (1998) The Leniency Contract and Persistence of Majority andMinority Influence. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 74:1437–1450.

Dansereau, F. Jr, G. Graen, and W. J. Haga. (1975) A Vertical Dyad Linkage Approach to Leader-ship Within Formal Organizations. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance 13:46–78.

De Dreu, Carsten K. W., and Bianca Beersma. (2001) Minority Influence in Organizations. InGroup Consensus and Minority Influence: Implications for Innovation, edited by Carsten K. W. DeDreu and Nanne K. De Vries. Oxford: Blackwell.

De Dreu, Carsten K. W., and Nanne K. De Vries. (1993) Numerical Support, Information Process-ing, and Attitude Change. European Journal of Social Psychology 23:647–662.

De Dreu, Carsten K. W., Nanne K. De Vries, Ernestine H. Gordijn, and Mieke S. Schuurman.(1999) Convergent and Divergent Processing of Majority and Minority Arguments: Effects onFocal and Related Attitudes. European Journal of Social Psychology 29:329–348.

De Vries, Nanne K., and Carsten K. W. De Dreu. (2000) Group Consensus and Minority Influence:Introduction and Overview. In Group Consensus and Minority Influence: Implications for Innovation,edited by Carsten K. W. De Dreu and Nanne K. De Vries. Oxford: Blackwell.

Dempsey, Judy. (2005) Dutch Future in Afghan Force Uncertain; NATO Awaits Final Decision by theNetherlands on Sending Troops. International Herald Tribune, December 24.

Destler, I. M. (1972) Comment: Multiple Advocacy: Some ‘‘Limits and Costs’’. American Political Sci-ence Review 66:786–790.

Deutsch, Morton, and Shula Shichman. (1986) Conflict: A Social Psychological Perspective. InPolitical Psychology, edited by Margaret G. Hermann. San Francisco, CA: Jossey Bass.

Deutsche Presse-Agentur. (2005) Dutch Cabinet for Sending Troops to Afghanistan, But No Deci-sion, December 22.

Dodd, Clement H. (1969) Politics and Government in Turkey. Manchester, UK: Manchester UniversityPress.

Dooley, Robert S., and Gerald E. Fryxell. (1999) Attaining Decision Quality and CommitmentFrom Dissent: The Moderating Effects of Loyalty and Competence in Strategic Decision-MakingTeams. Academy of Management Journal 42:389–402.

Doty, Roxanne Lynn. (1993) Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post-Positivist Analysis of USCounterinsurgency Policy in the Philippines. International Studies Quarterly 37:297–320.

Elazar, Daniel J., and Shmuel Sandler, Eds. (1992) Who’s the Boss in Israel: Israel at the Polls, 1988-89. Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press.

Elman, Miriam Fendius. (2000) Unpacking Democracy: Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and Theo-ries of Democratic Peace. Security Studies 9:91–126.

Fisher, Ronald. (1990) The Social Psychology of Intergroup and International Conflict Resolution. NewYork: Springer-Verlag.

Frognier, Andre-Paul. (1993) The Single Party ⁄ Coalition Distinction and Cabinet Decision-Making.In Governing Together: The Extent and Limits of Joint Decision-Making in Western European Cabinets,edited by Jean Blondel and Ferdinand Muller-Rommel. New York: St. Martin’s Press.

82 Coalition Cabinet Decision Making

Fuller, Sally Riggs, and Ramon J. Aldag. (1997) Challenging the Mindguards: Moving SmallGroup Analysis Beyond Groupthink. In Beyond Groupthink, edited by Paul ‘t Hart, Eric Stern andBengt Sundelius. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

Gallagher, Michael, Michael Laver, and Peter Mair. (2001) Representative Government in ModernEurope, 3rd edition. Boston, MA: McGraw Hill.

Gallhofer, Irmtraud N., Willem E. Sairs, and Robert Voogt. (1994) From Individual Preferenceto Group Decisions in Foreign Policy Decision Making: The Dutch Council of Ministers. Euro-pean Journal of Political Research 25:151–170.

Garrison, Jean. (1999) Games Advisors Play: Foreign Policy Advisors in the Influence Process. CollegeStation: Texas A&M University Press.

Garrison, Jean. (2007) Constructing the ‘National Interest’ in US-China Policy Making: How For-eign Policy Decision Groups Define and Signal Policy Choices. Foreign Policy Analysis 3:105–126.

George, Alexander L. (1972) The Case for Multiple Advocacy in Making Foreign Policy. AmericanPolitical Science Review 66:751–785.

George, Alexander L., and Andrew Bennett. (2004) Case Studies and Theory Development in theSocial Sciences. Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press.

Goldberg, Giora. (1992) The Likud: Moving Toward the Center. In Who’s the Boss in Israel: Israel atthe Polls, 1988-89, edited by Daniel J. Elazar and Shmuel Sandler. Detroit, MI: Wayne State Uni-versity Press.

Goldstein, Judith, and Robert Keohane. (1993) Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Frame-work. In Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change, edited by Judith Gold-stein and Robert Keohane. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Green, Michael Jonathan. (2001) Japan’s Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era ofUncertain Power. New York: Palgrave.

Gruenfeld, Deborah H. (1995) Status, Ideology, and Integrative Complexity on the US SupremeCourt: Rethinking the Politics of Political Decision Making. Journal of Personality and SocialPsychology 68:5–20.

Gruenfeld, Deborah H., Melissa C. Thomas-Hunt, and Peter H. Kim. (1998) Cognitive Flexibil-ity, Communication Strategy, and Integrative Complexity in Groups: Public Versus Private Reac-tions to Majority and Minority Status. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 34:202–226.

Haas, Mark L. (2001) Prospect Theory and the Cuban Missile Crisis. International Studies Quarterly45:241–270.

Hagan, Joe D. (1993) Political Opposition and Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective. Boulder, CO:Lynne Rienner.

Hagan, Joe D., Philip P. Everts, Haruhiro Fukui, and John D. Stempel. (2001) Foreign Policy byCoalition: Deadlock, Compromise, and Anarchy. International Studies Review 3:169–216.

Hale, William. (2000) Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000. London: Frank Cass.Hanrieder, Wolfram F., and Graeme P. Auton. (1980) The Foreign Policies of West Germany, France,

Britain. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.‘t Hart, Paul. (1997) From Analysis to Reform of Policy-Making Groups. In Beyond Groupthink, edi-

ted by Paul ‘t Hart, Eric Stern and Bengt Sundelius. Ann Arbor, MI: University of MichiganPress.

‘t Hart, Paul, Eric Stern, and Bengt Sundelius. (1997) Foreign Policymaking at the Top: Politi-cal Group Dynamics. In Beyond Groupthink, edited by Paul ‘t Hart, Eric Stern and Bengt Sunde-lius. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

Herek, Gregory, Irving Janis, and Paul Huth. (1987) Decisionmaking During International Cri-ses: Is Process Related to Outcome? Journal of Conflict Resolution 31:203–226.

Hermann, Charles F. (1993) Avoiding Pathologies in Foreign Policy Decision Groups. In Diplomacy,Force and Leadership, edited by D. Caldwell and Timothy J. McKeown. Boulder, CO: WestviewPress.

Hine, David. (1982) Factionalism in West European Parties: A Framework for Analysis. West EuropeanPolitics 5:36–53.

Hofferbert, Robert, and Hans-Dieter Klingemann. (1990) The Policy Impact of Party Pro-grammes and Government Declarations in the Federal Republic of Germany. European Journal ofPolitical Research 18:277–304.

Hoyt, Paul. (1997) The Political Manipulation of Group Composition. Political Psychology 18:771–790.

Ireland, Michael J., and Scott Sigmund Gartner. (2001) Time to Fight: Government Type andConflict Initiation in Parliamentary Systems. Journal of Conflict Resolution 45:547–568.

83Juliet Kaarbo

Iversen, Torben, and David Soskice. (2006) Electoral Institutions and the Politics of Coalitions:Why Some Democracies Redistribute More Than Others. American Political Science Review100:165–181.

Janis, Irving. (1972) Victims of Groupthink. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin.Jervis, Robert. (1982) Deterrence and Perception. International Security 7:3–30.Johnston, Alastair J. (2001) Treating International Institutions as Social Environments. Interna-

tional Studies Quarterly 45:487–515.Kaarbo, Juliet. (1996a) Power and Influence in Foreign Policy Decision Making: The Role of Junior

Coalition Partners in German and Israeli Foreign Policy. International Studies Quarterly 40:501–530.

Kaarbo, Juliet. (1996b) Influencing Peace: Junior Partners in Israeli Coalition Cabinets. Cooperationand Conflict 31:243–284.

Kaarbo, Juliet. (1997) Prime Minister Leadership Styles in Foreign Policy Decision Making: AFramework for Research. Political Psychology 18:553–581.

Kaarbo, Juliet, and Ryan K. Beasley. (1998) A Political Perspective on Minority Influence andStrategic Group Composition. In Research on Groups and Teams, Vol. 1, edited by Margaret A. Ne-ale, Elizabeth A. Mannix and Deborah H. Gruenfeld. Stamford, CT: JAI Press.

Kaarbo, Juliet, and Ryan K. Beasley. (2004) Foreign Policy by Coalition: A Comparative Analysisof the Effects of Cabinet Characteristics on Event Behavior. Paper presented at the annual meet-ing of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, September 2–5.

Kaarbo, Juliet, and Ryan K. Beasley. (2008) Taking It to the Extreme: The Effect of CoalitionCabinets on Foreign Policy. Foreign Policy Analysis. 4:65–79.

Kaarbo, Juliet, and Margaret G. Hermann. (1998) Leadership Styles of Prime Ministers: HowIndividual Differences Affect the Foreign Policymaking Process. Leadership Quarterly 9:243–264.

Kaarbo, Juliet, and Jeffrey S. Lantis. (2003) The ‘‘Greening’’ of German Foreign Policy in theIraq Case: Conditions of Junior Party Influence in Governing Coalitions. Acta Politica 38:201–230.

Kameda, Tatsuya, and Shinkichi Sugimori. (1993) Psychological Entrapment in Group DecisionMaking: An Assigned Decision Rule and a Groupthink Phenomenon. Journal of Personality andSocial Psychology 65:282–292.

Kerr, Norbert L. (2001) Is It What One Says or How One Says It? Style vs. Substance From an SDSPerspective. In Group Consensus and Minority Influence: Implications for Innovation, edited by Car-sten K. W. De Dreu and Nanne K. De Vries. Oxford: Blackwell.

Kerr, Norbert L., and Robert J. MacCoun. (1985) The Effects of Jury Size and Polling Method onthe Process and Product of Jury Deliberations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 48:349–363.

Kieval, Gershon R. (1983) Party Politics in Israel and the Occupied Territories. Westport, CT: GreenwoodPress.

Ladeyret, Guy. (2006) The Problem with PR. In Electoral Systems and Democracy, edited by LarryDiamond and Marc F. Plattner. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Larsen, Henrik. (1997) Foreign Policy and Discourse Analysis. London: Routledge.Levine, John L., and Juliet Kaarbo. (2001) Minority Influence in Political Decisio Making Groups.

In Group Consensus and Minority Influence: Implications for Innovation, edited by Carsten K. W. DeDreu and Nanne K. De Vries. Oxford: Blackwell.

Levine, John L., Richard M. Moreland, and Hoon-Seok Choi. (2001) Group Socialization andNewcomer Innovation. In Blackwell Handbook of Social Psychology: Group Processes, edited by M.Hogg and S. Tindale. Oxford: Blackwell.

Levy, Jack S. (2000) Loss Aversion, Framing Effects, and International Conflict. In Handbook of WarStudies II, edited by Manus Midlarsky. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

Lijphart, Arend. (1999) Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries.New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Lindell, Ulf, and Stefan Persson. (1986) The Paradox of Weak State Power: A Research and Liter-ature Overview. Cooperation and Conflict 21:79–97.

Lindsay, James M. (1994) Congress, Foreign Policy, and the New Institutionalism. International Stud-ies Quarterly 38:281–304.

Linz, Juan J. (1990) The Virtues of Parliamentarism. Journal of Democracy 1:51–69.Maass, Anne, and Russell D. Clark. (1984) Hidden Impact of Minorities: Fifteen Years of Minority

Influence Research. Psychological Bulletin 95:428–450.Maoz, Zeev. (1990) Framing the National Interest. World Politics 43:77–110.

84 Coalition Cabinet Decision Making

Maoz, Zeev, and Russett Bruce. (1993) Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace,1946-1986. American Political Science Review 87:624–638.

Martin, Robin, and Miles Hewston. (2001) Afterthoughts on Afterimages: A Review of the After-image Paradigm in Majority and Minority Influence Research. In Group Consensus and MinorityInfluence: Implications for Innovation, edited by Carsten K. W. De Dreu and Nanne K. De Vries.Oxford: Blackwell.

Metselaar, Max V., and Bertjan Verbeek. (1997) Beyond Decision Making in Formal and InformalGroups: The Dutch Cabinet and the West New Guinea Conflict. In Beyond Groupthink, edited byPaul ‘t Hart, Eric Stern and Bengt Sundelius. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

Milgram, Stanley. (1963) Behavioral Study of Obedience. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology67:376.

Milgram, Stanley. (1965) Some Conditions of Obedience and Disobedience to Authority. HumanRelations 18:57–76.

Moscovici, Serge. (1976) Social Influence and Social Change. Translated by Carol Sherrard and GretaHeinz. London: Academic Press.

Moskowitz, Gordon B., and Shelly Chaiken. (2001) Mediators of Minority Social Influence. InGroup Consensus and Minority Influence: Implications for Innovation, edited by Carsten K. W. DeDreu and Nanne K. De Vries. Oxford: Blackwell.

Muller, Wolfgang C., and Kaare Strøm. (2000) Coalition Governance in Western Europe: AnIntroduction. In Coalition Governments in Western Europe, edited by Wolfgang Muller and KaareStrøm. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Muller, Wolfgang C., Wilfred Philipp, and Peter Gerlich. (1993) Prime Ministers and CabinetDecision-Making Processes. In Governing Together, edited by Jean Blondel and Ferdinand Muller-Rommel. New York: St. Martin’s Press.

Muller-Rommel, Ferdinand. (1994) The Chancellor and His Staff. In Adenauer to Kohl: The Develop-ment of the German Chancellorship, edited by S. Padgett. Washington, DC: Georgetown UniversityPress.

Myers, David G., and Helmut Lamm. (1976) The Group Polarization Phenomenon. PsychologicalBulletin 83:602–627.

Naoto, Nonako. (2000) Characteristics of the Decision-Making Structure of Coalitions. In Power Shuf-fles and Policy Processes: Coalition Government in Japan in the 1990s, edited by Otake Hideo. NewYork: Japan Center for International Exchange.

Nemeth, Charlan, and Cynthia Chiles. (1988) Modeling Courage: The Role of Dissent in Foster-ing Independence. European Journal of Social Psychology 18:275–280.

Nemeth, Charlan, and Julianne Kwan. (1987) Minority Influence, Divergent Thinking and Detec-tion of Correct Solutions. Journal of Applied Social Psychology 17:786–797.

Ozkececi-Taner, Binnur. (2005) The Impact of Institutionalized Ideas in Coalition Foreign PolicyMaking: Turkey as an Example, 1991-2002. Foreign Policy Analysis 1:249–278.

Palmer, Glenn, Tamar R. London, and Patrick M. Regan. (2004) What’s Stopping You?: TheSources of Political Constraints on International Conflict Behavior in Parliamentary Democra-cies. International Interactions 30:1–24.

Perez, Juan A., and Gabriel Mugny. (1987) Paradoxical Effects of Categorization in Minority Influ-ence: When Being an Outgroup Is an Advantage. European Journal of Social Psychology 17:157–169.

Peterson, Randall. (1997) A Directive Leadership Style in Group Decision Making Can Be BothVirtue and Vice: Evidence From Elite and Experimental Groups. Journal of Personality and SocialPsychology 72:1107–1121.

Peterson, Randall, P. D. Owens, Philip E. Tetlock, E. T. Fan, and P. Martorana. (1998) GroupDynamics in Top Management Teams: Groupthink, Vigilance, and Alternative Models of Organi-zational Failure and Success. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 73:272–305.

Powell, G. Bingham. (2000) Elections as Instruments of Democracy: Majoritarian and Proportional Visions.New Haven: Yale University Press.

Pridham, Geoffrey. (1986) Coalitional Behaviour in Theory and Practice: An Inductive Model for WesternEurope. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Prins, Brandon C., and Christopher Sprecher. (1999) Institutional Constraints, Political Opposi-tion, and Interstate Dispute Escalation: Evidence From Parliamentary Systems, 1946-89. Journal ofPeace Research 36:271–287.

Quade, Quentin L. (2006) PR and Democratic Statecraft. In Electoral Systems and Democracy, edited byLarry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Reiter, Dan, and Erik R. Tillman. (2002) Public, Legislative, and Executive Constraints on theDemocratic Initiation of Conflict. Journal of Politics 64:810–826.

85Juliet Kaarbo

Ripsman, Norrin M. (2002) Peacemaking by Democracies: the Effect of State Autonomy on the Post-WorldWar Settlements. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press.

Rubin, Barry. (2000) Barak’s Uneasy Coalition and His Drive for Peace, AJC Israel ⁄ MiddleEast Briefing. Available at http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Politics/coalition.html.(June 21, 2007).

Saafeld, Thomas. (1990) The West German Bundestag After 40 Years: The Role of Parliament in a‘‘Party Democracy.’’ West European Politics 13:68–89.

Sartori, Giovanni. (1976) Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis, Vol. 1. Cambridge: Cam-bridge University Press.

Sathe, Vasant. (1989) For a Directly Elected President. In The Presidential System: The Indian Debate,edited by A. G. Noorani. New Delhi: Sage Publications, India Pvt. Ltd.

Schafer, Mark, and Scott Crichlow. (2002) The Process-Outcome Connection in Foreign PolicyDecision Making: A Quantitative Study Building on Groupthink. International Studies Quarterly46:45–68.

Schweiger, D. M., W. R. Sandberg, and J. W. Ragan. (1986) Group Approaches for ImprovingStrategic Decision Making: A Comparative Analysis of Dialectical Inquiry, Devil’s Advocacy, andConsensus. Academy of Management Journal 29:51–71.

Schwenk, C. R. (1990) Effects of Devil’s Advocacy and Dialectical Inquiry on Decision Making:A Meta-Analysis. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 47:161–176.

Smith, Christine M., R. Scott Tindale, and Elizabeth M. Anderson. (2001) The Impact ofShared Representations on Minority Influence in Freely Interacting Groups. In Group Consensusand Minority Influence: Implications for Innovation, edited by Carsten K. W. De Dreu and Nanne K.De Vries. Oxford: Blackwell.

Spector, Bertram I. (1977) Negotiation as a Psychological Process. Journal of Conflict Resolution21:607–618.

Strøm, Kaare. (1990) Minority Government and Majority Rule. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.de Swaan, Abram. (1973) Coalition Theories and Cabinet Formations: A Study of Formal Theories of Coali-

tion Formation Applied to Nine European Parliaments After 1918. Amsterdam: Elsevier.Sylvan, Donald, and Stuart Thorson. (1992) ‘‘Ontologies, Problem Representation, and the

Cuban Missile Crisis’’. Journal of Conflict Resolution 36:709–732.Sylvan, Donald A., and James Voss, Eds. (1998) Problem Representation in Foreign Policy Decision Mak-

ing. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Timmermans, Arco. (2003) High Politics in the Low Countries. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate.Tindale, R. Scott., S. Sheffey, and L. A. Scott. (1993) Framing and Group Decision Making:

Do Cognitive Changes Parallel Preference Changes? Organizational Behavior and Human DecisionProcesses 55:470–485.

Tindale, R. Scott, Christine M. Smith, L. S. Thomas, J. Filkins, and S. Sheffey. (1996) SharedRepresentations and Asymmetric Social Influence Processes in Small Groups. In UnderstandingGroup Behavior: Consensual Action by Small Groups, Vol. 1, edited by E. Witte and J. Davis. Hills-dale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Verbeek, Bertjan. (2003) Decision-Making in Great Britain During the Suez Crisis. Aldershot, UK:Ashgate.

Vertzberger, Yaacov. (1997) Collective Risk Taking: The Decision-Making Group. In Beyond Group-think, edited by Paul ‘t Hart, Eric K. Stern and Bengt Sundelius. Ann Arbor, MI: University ofMichigan Press.

Wallfish, Asher, and Mark Segal. (1979) Cabinet Approves Treaty, With Only Sharon, LandauOpposing. Jerusalem Post, March 20.

Weldes, Jutta, and Diana Saco. (1996) Making State Action Possible: The United States and theDiscursive Construction of ‘‘The Cuban Problem,’’ 1960–1994. Millennium: Journal of InternationalStudies 25:361–398.

Williams, K. Y., and C. A. O’Reilly III. (1998) Demography and Diversity in Organizations:A Review of 40 Years of Research. Research in Organizational Behavior 20:77–140.

Wood, Wendy. (2000) Attitude Change: Persuasion and Social Influence. Annual Review of Psychology51:539–570.

Wood, Wendy, Sharon Lundgren, Judith A. Ouellette, Shelly Busceme, and Tamela Black-

stone. (1994) Processes of Minority Influence: Influence Effectiveness and Source Perceptions.Psychological Bulletin 115:323–345.

86 Coalition Cabinet Decision Making