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COA Decision Brief COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA BLUE SINGA
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COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

Dec 29, 2015

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Page 1: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

COA Decision BriefCOA Decision Brief

23 AUG 200223 AUG 2002

COS, COL MARK KOHCOS, COL MARK KOH

BLUE SINGABLUE SINGA

Page 2: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

PurposePurposeCOA Decision BriefingCOA Decision Briefing

To present staff conclusions from COA Analysis and COA comparison to the CCTF

To facilitate the CCTF’s COA decision making and recommend the selection of a military COA to the CCTF

Page 3: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

AgendaAgenda

Review on:– CTF Mission Statement– Crisis Situation– Higher Commander’s Intent– CPG Guidance– C2 Structure – Forces Available– COA Statement/Sketch

Staff Estimates from Respective Functional Groups

Page 4: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

COA 1COA 1

Minimum Military Footprint

Briefer

MAJ Koch

Page 5: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

CPG-1 GuidanceCPG-1 Guidance

Minimum Military Footprint

Heavy SOF, CMO, and involvement of smaller regional nations

Heavy HA, IO, PA, media campaign

Establish functional composite subordinate Task Forces (TF) -

(TF med, TF LOG, TF Security, etc.)

Strong border regime or Military Exclusion Zone (MEZ) - CPG make recommendation

Critical infrastructure repair & CA projects on Tindoro

Full integration of Multinational Forces

Page 6: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

COA 1 STATEMENTCOA 1 STATEMENT

NO EARLIER THAN 28 AUG 02, CTF GOODWILL, ORGANIZED INTO SUBORDINATE FUNCTIONAL TASK FORCES, CONDUCTS PKO AND FACILITATES HA IN THE TINDORO AO TO ESTABLISH A SECURE AND STABLE ENVIRONMENT PER UNSCR 147, BY HEAVY EMPHASIS ON CIVIL MILITARY AND INFORMATION OPERATIONS, THEREBY REDUCING THE MILITARY FOOTPRINT.

Page 7: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

Command and Control StructureCommand and Control Structure

CCTF

TF CA

TF SOF TF SECTF ENGTF INFO

OPSTF LOG/

MED

DIRMOBFOR CCC

1 X MSSG (60 days then RFF)

1 X Field Log Spt Staff

1 X Army Log Coy

1 X Army Spt Group

1 X Army Surg Unit

1 X Surgical Team

4 X Medical Team

1 X Air Evac Plt

1 X Air Mob Spt Sqn

1 X TALCE

24 X C-130/160

2 X C-5

4 X C-17

1 X KC-135

IL-76 MDX

1 X CA BDE (-)

1 X PSYOP Coy

1 X JPOTF

1 X JPOTF PDC

1 X TPD 980 HQ

1 X SOF HQ

1 X TSOAC

2 X MC-130H(RFF)

2 X MC-130P(RFF)

1 X SOAR (RFF)

1 X ODB

6 X ODA

1 x RTA SF Det

1 X Eng Bn

2 X Eng Coy

1 X Eng Plt

3 X ROWPU

1 X Eng Coy (60 days)

11 X Inf Bns

5 X MP Coy

1 X Civ Pol Coy

1 X FFG

4 X HC-3 Helos

2 X CH-47

Page 8: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

COA # 1COA # 1 PHASE 1: Pre-Deployment

CTF HQ: (ME) Advance Party, Liaison Officers (LNO) to Host Nations and SRSG rep. Issue Prepare to Deploy (PTD) order. Establish CCCTF CA: CMO assessmentTF SEC: Pre-deployment training TF SOF: Intel gathering, LNOTF Eng: Engineer Assessment TF LOG: Log pre-deployment planning and assessment.TF IO: Media campaign. Establish favorable condition

This phase starts with the Warning Order. The purpose is to stand-up the CTF,assess the situation and create conditions to conduct Operation Blue Singa. The main effort is establishing the CTF and deploying the LNOs to each Host Nation. This phase ends on the first deployment date (C-day).

CTF HQ(NZ)

Page 9: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

COA # 1COA # 1 PHASE 2: Lodgement

CTF HQ: Deploys to Hobart. Establish Command/Control/Communication over MNF.TF CA: Complete assessment. Establish liaison with NGO/IOTF SEC: Force Protection hand-over from UNMOG and coordination with Host NationTF SOF: Assess Host Nation police CT capability to establish training programTF Eng: Establish CTF infrastructureTF LOG: (ME) Establish APOD/SPOD. Combat Service Support (CSS) set-up. TF IO: Conduct IODIRMOBFOR: Airlift support

This phase starts upon the initial deployment of forces. The purpose is to deploy forces to CTF Goodwill Area of Operation (AO) and posture forces in Tindoro to conduct Operation Blue Singa. The main effort is the inter-theatre force projection and deployment and staging of CTF into Tindoro. This phase ends when TF SEC is ready and capable to engage in mandate enforcement.

CTF HQ

Page 10: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

COA # 1COA # 1 PHASE 3: Mandate Enforcement

MEZ

This phase starts when forces are postured and chopped, UNMOG has turned-over to CTF and MEZ declared. The purpose is to establish and maintain a secure environment in collaboration with HN and Civilian Agencies. The main effort is to establish the presence of the CTF and separate the two belligerents with priority to the MEZ, the two enclaves, and vital installations. This phase ends when the Host Nation or Competent Authority is capable and willing to take up CTF responsibilities.

TF CA: Maintain liaison with and commence support for IO/NGO in HA TF SEC: (ME) Show of presence and separation of belligerents by establishing Military Exclusion Zone (MEZ). Coord the protect of vital assets. Supervision of cantonment areas.TF SOF: Gather intelligence. Facilitate Host Nations police and security forces training as requested. TF Eng: Lines of Comm (LOC) and emergency infrastructure repairs in support of CA as requestedTF LOG: CSS and medical support to CTF and be prepared to assist HA efforts as requiredTF IO: Continue IO and media campaign with emphasis on restoration of stabilityDIRMOBFOR: Coordinates re-supply CTF HQ

Page 11: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

COA # 1COA # 1 PHASE 4: Transition

This phase starts when CTF begins to transition to HN and Civilian Agencies. The purpose is to hand-off operations to HN and Civilian Agencies. The main effort is coordinating and transferring operations to HN and Civilian Agencies. This phase ends when all transition is complete.

MEZ

CTF HQ: Coordinating transition to HN and Competent Authority.TF CA: Coordinate support for HA and Engineering TF SEC: (ME) Coordinate/transfer to Host Nations (HN) agencies and draw down presenceTF SOF: Draw down Counter-Terrorism training and transition to Foreign Internal Defense (FID)TF Eng: Change focus from supporting security mission to HATF LOG: Continue CSS/Medical support and conduct redeployment planningTF IO: Media CampaignDIRMOBFOR: Coordinating re-deployment plans and assets

CTF HQ

Page 12: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

COA # 1COA # 1 PHASE 5: Redeployment

CTF HQ: Oversees RedeploymentDIRMOBFOR: (ME) Coordinate re-deployment of forcesAll TFs: Re-deploy

This phase starts when forces begin to re-deploy. The purpose is re-deploy CTF forces. The main effort is the timely exit of CTF forces and transfer of authority back to Contributing Nations. This phase ends when the last unit re-deploys.

MEZ

CTF HQ

Page 13: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

Addressing the Centre of GravityAddressing the Centre of Gravity

Most acceptable to the population– Minimal military footprint– Heavy emphasis on facilitating HA

Least interference with the sovereign states

Leverages on Info Ops as key arbitrator of conflicts

Most economical

Page 14: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

COA 2COA 2

Heavy Military Footprint

Maj JIM ‘Spicy’ ERB

Page 15: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

CPG-2 GuidanceCPG-2 Guidance

Heavy Military Footprint

Establish MEZ along TEMASEK Agreement border

Demilitarization

Heavy mil-police security

Full integration of MNF

Establish CCMOTF to conduct HA & NGO support, Civil Military Operations (CMO) and support to SRSG

Page 16: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

AssumptionsAssumptions

• Advance party can be deployed in AOR before 28 Aug 02.

• Country allow air corridors to be used

• Government of both countries will support UN sanction

• All SPOD & APOD will be available throughout the operation

• MNF will be able to move freely within the AOR

• All ports are capable to handle all goods to be brought by MNF

• All ports are navigable by ships

• All harbour & sea area is safe for MNF movement

Page 17: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

COA-2 STATEMENTCOA-2 STATEMENT

The CTF will use a heavy military footprint in order to establish a secure and stable environment, by force if necessary, in North and South Tindoro. We will accomplish this through the full integration of the MNF in order to establish a MEZ along the TEMASEK Agreement border, to conduct and enforce demilitarization and to establish a heavy mil-police security. We will also establish CMOTF to facilitate the conduct of HA and NGO support, Civil Military Operations (CMO) and support the SRSG. Upon accomplishment of the enforcement phase of our mandate, we will conduct stability operations and perform post crisis transition of our operations to Host Nation responsibilities. Upon completion of transition the CTF will redeploy to home stations. The operation will be conducted 6 phases.

Page 18: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

Command and ControlCommand and Control

C F L C C C F A C C C F M C C C S O T G C C M O T G C P O T G Jo in t Lo g C C

C T F G O O D W ILL

Forces Available

• 8 INF BN, 2 USMC INF BN, 3 INF CO

• 3 ROWPU units

• 5 Engineer CO

• 4 Medical teams, 2 surgical teams

• 2 logistic units

• 1 comms unit (only 60 days)

• 1 SF GP, 1 SF Det

• 6 MP CO

• 1 BDE HQ

• 1 DIV HQ (CTF HQ)

• 1 PSYOP BN

Page 19: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

AORAOR

Page 20: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

COA #2COA #2 PHASE 1: Build-up / Pre-deployment

CTF HQ (Christchurch):PlanningCFLCC: Prep for deploymentEstablish bases for ForcesConduct RSOICFACC :Prep for deploymentCFMCC :Prep for deploymentJoint Log CC :Establish APOD/SPODCSOTG :Conduct task in support of IO CCMOTG :Support of IO CPOTG :Conduct of Psy Ops in support of IO

This phase starts on order. The purpose is to prepare all forces for deployment, to gather information and to establish staging bases for the deployment. The main effort is with Joint Log CC to facilitate RSOI. TOA will take place when NCE’s declare that staging is complete This phase ends when RSOI established.

MOE: 80% of Forces ready for deployment

Page 21: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

COA #2COA #2 PHASE 2: Deployment

CTF HQ:Establish FWB at Hobart and LauncesteonExecute mission Hand-off with UNMOGCFLCC: Deployment of troopsConduct RSOICFACC :Conduct Air Mobility Operation CFMCC :Conduct Maritime Mobility OperationDeployment of ShipsJoint Log CC :Coordination with host nationsCSOTG :Conduct task in support of IOCCMOTG :Establishing FWB for liaisonSupport of IO CPOTG :Conduct Psy Ops in support of IO

This phase starts when TCC Forces arrive in AOR. The purpose is secure foothold. The main effort is CTG LCC . This phase ends when all troops arrive.

MOE

CTF assets available for operation.

Page 22: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

CTF HQ:Execute mission Hand-off with UNMOGCFLCC: Occupy and establish border regime (MEZ)Conduct RSOISeparation of hostile factionsProvide security/presence at DP camps associated with militia and terrorist activityCFACC :Conduct Air Mobility Operation in support of LCCCFMCC :Conduct Maritime Mobility OperationDeployment of ShipsJoint Log CC :Coordination with host nationsCSOTG :Conduct task in support of IO CMOTG :Support of IOCoordination and liaison with NGOs/IOs/UN SRSGFacilitate humanitarian assistanceFacilitate reintegration of DPs to respective communitiesManagement of CMOCCPOTG :Conduct Psy Ops in support of IO Phase 4 prep (stability Ops)

COA #2COA #2 PHASE 3: Mandate Enforcement

MEZ

This phase starts when TCC forces have commenced operations. The purpose is to implement the enforcement phase of the mandate. The main effort is CFLCC. This phase ends when all enforcement actions are in place.

MOE

CTF assets has put in place all enforcement actions

Page 23: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

COA #2COA #2 PHASE 4: Stabilization

MEZ

CTF HQ:Occupation of FWB at Hobart and LauncesteonCFLCC: Conduct RSOIMaintain / Enforce border regime (MEZ)Provide security/presence at DP camps associated with militia and terrorist activityFacilitate development of DP routes and their securityFacilitate transport of DPs as necessaryCFACC :Conduct Air Mobility Operation in support of LCCCFMCC :Conduct Maritime Mobility OperationJoint Log CC :Coordination with Host NationsCSOTG :Conduct task in support of IO CMOTG :Support of IO Coordination and liaison with NGOs/IOs/UN SRSGCon’t to facilitate humanitarian assistanceCon’t to facilitate reintegration of DPs to respective communitiesCon’t to facilitate CivPol in Police trg when requestedCPOTG :Conduct Psyops in support of IOFacilitate external news media coveragePhase 5 prep (Post Crisis)

Page 24: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

COA #2COA #2 PHASE 4: Stabilization (Cont.)

This phase starts when threats have been subsided. The purpose is to establish a secure and stable environment. The main effort is CFLCC. This phase ends with the establishment of a conducive environment for reintegration of DPs.

MOE

Environment is stable and safe.

Page 25: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

COA #2COA #2 PHASE 5: Post Crisis

CTF HQ:Occupation of FWB at Hobart and LauncesteonExecute mission handoff from MNF to host nationsPlanning for re-deploymentCFLCC: Maintain security/presence at DP camps associated with militia and terrorist activityCon’t to facilitate development of DP routes and their securityCon’t to facilitate transport of DPs as necessaryPrepare to h/o security responsibilities(including MEZ) to host nationsPrepare for re-deploymentCFACC :Conduct Air Mobility OperationPrepare for re-deployment CFMCC :Conduct Maritime Mobility OperationPrepare for re-deployment

Joint Log CC :Coordination with host nationsPrepare for re-deploymentCSOTG :Conduct task in support of IOPrepare for re-deploymentCCMOTG :Support of IOCon’t to facilitate humanitarian assistanceCon’t to facilitate reintegration of DPs to respective communitiesCon’t to facilitate CivPol in Police trg when requestedPrepare for re-deploymentManagement of CMOCCPOTG :Conduct of Psy Ops in support of IOFacilitate external news media coveragePrepare for re-deployment

This phase starts when a secure and stable environment has been established. The purpose is to ensure smooth transition of responsibilities to host nations. The main effort is CCMOTG. This phase ends when transition to host nations is complete.

MOE

Ability of host nations to provide a safe and stable environment.

Page 26: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

COA #2COA #2 PHASE 6: Redeployment

CTF HQ:Execute re-deployment plansCFLCC: Re-deployment CFACC : Re-deploymentCFMCC :Re-deploymentJLCC :Re-deployment

This phase starts when transition has been accomplished. The purpose is to return forces back to home stations. The main effort is CTF HQ. This phase ends when all TCCs have departed N. / S. Tindoro.

MOEAll TCCs have departed N. / S. Tindoro.

MEZ

Page 27: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

COA 2 Advantages and COA 2 Advantages and DisadvantagesDisadvantages

Advantages –

• More security & stability

• Strong Deterrence Effect

Disadvantages –

• Strong military presence may result in friction with NGOs/IOs/Populace

Page 28: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

COA Decision Criteria (5)COA Decision Criteria (5)

Security Response Synergy with HA effort Coalition Building Flexibility of Plan Sustainability

Page 29: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

COA ANALYSIS BY COMPONENT COA ANALYSIS BY COMPONENT COMMAND GROUPSCOMMAND GROUPS

Page 30: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

CFLCCCFLCC

Phase Critical Event Action Reaction

1 Prep & establishing of bases for RSOI

No freedom of movement & non availability of SPOD & APOD

CTF HQ to coordinate with host nations to ensure that these facilities are made available

2 Preparation for Occupation & establishment of MEZ

Locating presence of local populace & leadership within defined MEZ

Coordinate with host nationsOption 1: Eviction of populace by forceOption 2: Allow populace to stay

3 Occupation of MEZ Separation of hostile faction

Providing security to DP camps associated with militia & terrorist activities

Identification of hostile factions/militia within AOR Militia create problems & endanger troops, NGOs and IOs

Seek assistance from host nations. Active info gathering activities Have a reaction force as reserve to deal with such incidents

4 Enforcement of border regime Violation of regime by militia

Forces on ground, local ground commander must be prepared to react with force

5 Repatriation Transfer of authority Ensure that host nations t/o

6 Demobilization Return to Home Stations

Page 31: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

CFACCCFACC

Phase 1 • WARNOR change to execute order

Phase 2 • Air mobility assets in place to accept strategic airlift• Arrival of marine tactical aviation

Contingency Plan – Backup APOD of Launceston & Warrnaubool

Phase 3, 4 & 5• Start of helo ops to support the MEZ• Ability to begin tactical airlift ops• Departure of marine tactical aviation

Phase 6• When are all assets out of AOR?

Page 32: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

CFMCCCFMCC

Phase 1

• All ships sail out to AOR.

Phase 2

• Ships arrive in AOR; selected ports for N Tindoro: Launceston - priority 1, Macquarie Harbour - priority 2; for S Tindoro: Hobart - priority 1, Dover - priority 2

• Secure harbour for MNF landing

Phase 3• Transportation of troops to different locations• Deployment of US marine in N and S Tindoro • UK frigate deploy between Samagaland and N Tindoro• Australian LCT deploy in N Tindoro• M’sia LCT – one in N Tindoro, one in S Tindoro

Phase 4 & 5• Assisting in HA & movement of DPs

Phase 6• Boarding of troops and return to home stations

Page 33: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

CSOTGCSOTG

Phase 1 • Conduct Special Recon(SR)and coalition support (CS)

• Critical event is deployment of SF Group and gaining operational capability within 2 weeks arrival

Phase 2 • Continue SR and CS missions• Critical event is gathering information on CCTF PIR and CCIR

Phase 3 & 4• Continue SR and CS missions• Critical event is monitor MEZ for violations and answering the CCIR and PIR

Phase 5• End SR and CS missions• Begin to redeploy to staging area• Critical event is providing adequate information to CCTF while redeploying

Phase 6 • Complete redeployment to home station

Issue: Request for authority to deploy CSOTG forces into country prior to 28 Aug

Page 34: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

CMOTGCMOTG

Phase 1

• Identify prob locations of CMOCC and other detachment• No info on NGOs/IOs deployed on the ground

Contingency plan – Change of pre-identified location for easy deployment

Phase 2 • Temp establishment of CMOC that might be moved after info gathered• No comms estab. with NGOs & IOs.• Request from NGOs & IOs exceed our capabilities

Contingency plan – Prioritise the request from NGOs and IOs by areas

Phase 3 & 4• Sustain facilitating activities with NGOs for DPs and HA• Routes of movement DPs not secured

Contingency plan – Request assistance from CFLCC

Phase 5• Develop indicators to identify best COA to h/o to local authorities• Local authorities not ready to t/o

Page 35: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

CPOTG/IOCPOTG/IO

Phase 1 • Change in consent by one or more parties

• Action by Coalition force to cause loss of creditability or legitimacy of CTF operations

• Compromise of CTF plans or orders.

Phase 2 • Change by general populace in acceptance of CTF• Compromise of CTF plans or orders.

Phase 3, 4 & 5• Host Nation changes acceptance• Loss of creditability

Phase 6• Host Nation security posture changes

Page 36: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

Joint Log CCJoint Log CC

Phase 1 - Access to APOD & SPOD denied

Contingency plan – Identify alternative landing sites

Phase 2 – Some countries arrive late, scheduling disrupted, confusion

- Military threat

Contingency plan – Prepare rescheduling plans effectively

Phase 3 – Disruption to resupply due to: poor weather, flooding, expired UN contracts, terrorist actions

- Mass casualty situation

Contingency plan – Identify alternative means & routes of resupply e.g. airlift, sealift

- Refer back to SOFA for new UN contracts- Prioritizing of in-coming & out-going flights

Phase 4 – Overwhelming request for assistance by NGOs/Ios (e.gt. Food, water & transport)

Contingency plan – Prioritize assets within units

- Same risks as P3

Phase 5 & Phase 6 – No significant critical event

Page 37: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

REVIEW ON COA # 3REVIEW ON COA # 3

LTC KISHIKAWALTC KISHIKAWA

BLUE SINGABLUE SINGA

Page 38: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

CTF MISSIONCTF MISSIONSTATEMENTSTATEMENT

Coalition Task Force GOODWILL will deploy a multinational force no earlier than 28 August 02 (C-Day), to conduct peacekeeping operations in North and South Tindoro, in accordance with UNSCR 147, to create the conditions necessary for the governments of North and South Tindoro to maintain a secure and stable environment.

Page 39: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

CRISIS SITUATIONCRISIS SITUATION

Threats– Terrorism

Operating from Displaced persons (DP) camps in Queenstown and the Fingal enclave.

– Poor law & order (Banditry) Direct impact on relief operations

– Aggression from opposing military forces Still deployed along border

– Poor humanitarian conditions May be exploited by terrorists & bandits Cause low morale

– Economy affected by war

Page 40: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

HIGHER CDR’S INTENTHIGHER CDR’S INTENT

I intend for CTF GOODWILL to conduct I intend for CTF GOODWILL to conduct peacekeeping operations in support of UNSCR peacekeeping operations in support of UNSCR 147, by providing a secure and stable 147, by providing a secure and stable environment in North and South Tindoro, so environment in North and South Tindoro, so that the inhabitants can rebuild their lives, that the inhabitants can rebuild their lives, economies, and social institutions in peace. economies, and social institutions in peace.

Page 41: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

CPG-3 GuidanceCPG-3 Guidance

Sector Establishment

Sector assignment of participating forces

Plan for smooth coordination of NGO / HA support

Security patrols / demilitarization

Coordinate reintegration of DPs across sectors and borders

Strong border regime or MEZ - CPG make recommendation

Minimize inefficiencies created by force structure

Determine optimum logistic support

Page 42: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

Commander Commander Coalition / Combined Coalition / Combined

Task ForceTask Force(CCTF)(CCTF)

CFMCCCFMCC CFACCCFACCCFLCCCFLCC

CCCCCCCC

Lead Nation CTF Component OrganizationLead Nation CTF Component OrganizationFunctional Component & Task ForceFunctional Component & Task Force

CIBCIB

Logistics Logistics ComponentComponentCommanderCommander

Amphibious Amphibious CommanderCommander

CMOCCMOC

Page 43: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

Force ListForce List

• 8 IN BN, 1 USMC IN BN, 3 IN CO

• 3 ROWPU units

• 5 Engineer CO

• 4 Medical teams, 2 surgical teams

• 2 logistic units

• 1 comms unit (only 60 days)

• 1 SF BN, 1 SF Det

• 6 MP CO

• 1 BDE HQ

• 1 DIV HQ (CTF HQ)

• 1 PSYOP BN

Page 44: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

• Purpose: I will form a multinational force to help create conditions necessary to establish a secure and stable environment in North and South Tindoro. All of our actions in keeping hostile forces apart, assisting with HA and return of DPs, must be focused towards this end.

•Method: I will commence this operation no earlier than 28 Aug 02. I will conduct this operation in 5 phases (pre-crisis response, lodgment, enforcement of mandate, stabilization & transition, post-crisis).

COA StatementsCOA Statements

Page 45: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

Phase 1 - Pre-Crisis ResponsePhase 1 - Pre-Crisis Response

PHASE 1: Pre-Crisis

This phase starts with the Warning Order. The purpose is to stand-up the CTF, assess the situation and create conditions to conduct Operation Blue Singa. The main effort will be assessment of the situation, deployment of Liaison Officers, and preparation for Lodgment (Phase II), including confirmation of CROE, and other interoperatability issues. The focus of our Info Ops will be the reinforcement of concurrence with the host nations. This phase ends on the first deployment date (C-day) No Earlier Than (NET) 28 Aug 02.

CTF HQ: Assessment teams (AT)/Liaison Officers (LO) in theater, commence Info Ops in preparation for CTF HQ and CMOC to be in Hobart by end of Phase ICFLCC: LO with AT and HQ, Prepare for LodgmentCFMCC: LO with AT and HQ, Prepare for LodgmentCFACC: LO with AT and HQ, Prepare for LodgmentAMPHIBCDR: LO with AT and HQ, Complete embarkation planLogCC: LO with AT and HQ, Prepare for Lodgment

Page 46: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

COA # 3COA # 3 Phase 2 - LodgementPhase 2 - Lodgement

PHASE 2: Lodgement

CTF HQ: Continue Info Ops and immediately establish Forward Command Element (FCE), CMOC, CIB and CCCC at Hobart.CFLCC: Deploy into sectors, prepare QRF, and establish SPODs/APODs, and receive handoff from UNMOG by sector.CFMCC: Establish Sea Lines of CommunicationCFACC: Establish Air Lines of CommunicationAMPHIBCDR: Move to AOR, prepare QRF.LogCC: Support deployment

This phase starts upon the initial deployment of forces. The purpose is to deploy forces to CTF Goodwill Area of Operation (AO), and posture forces in Tindoro to conduct Operation Blue Singa. The main effort will be the deployment and consolidation of forces, and the cooperation with other agencies. This phase ends upon the establishment of the CTF in Tindoro.

Page 47: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

COA # 3 Phase 3 – Mandate EnforcementCOA # 3 Phase 3 – Mandate Enforcement

This phase starts when forces are postured and in assigned sectors and UNMOG has turned-over to CTF. The purpose is to establish the credibility of the CTF and separate the two belligerents. The main effort is the establishing of a Military Exclusion Zone (MEZ) to separate the two belligerents. This phase ends when the belligerents are separated, no further cross border incursions occur, and formal border regimes are in place.

CTF HQ: Continue Info OpsCFLCC: Conduct PKO by sectorCFMCC: Control patrolling in sea sectorsCFACC: General supportAMPHIBCDR: Maintain QRF and assist as requiredLogCC: Maintain support

Page 48: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

COA # 3 Phase 4 –COA # 3 Phase 4 –Stabilization and TransitionStabilization and Transition

CTF HQ: Facilitate HA, transitionCFLCC: Facilitate HA, transitionCFMCC: Facilitate HA, transitionCFACC: Facilitate HA, transitionAMPHIBCDR: Facilitate HA, transitionLogCC: Facilitate HA, transition

This phase starts when the CTF has gained control of the security situation, allowing the CTF to reinforce where possible, the capacity of the NGOs, IOs, and host nations to provide humanitarian assistance. My main effort will be the sustainment of the mandate. This phase ends when transition is complete.

Page 49: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

COA # 3 Phase 5 - RedeploymentCOA # 3 Phase 5 - Redeployment

CTF HQ: RedeployCFLCC: RedeployCFMCC: RedeployCFACC: RedeployAMPHIBCDR: RedeployLogCC: Redeploy

This phase starts when a secure and stable environment can be sustained by the host nations without CTF assistance, and the handoff is complete. The purpose is to re-deploy CTF forces. The main effort is the redeployment of CTF forces. This phase ends when the last unit re-deploys.

Page 50: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

COA ComparisonCOA Comparison

Coalition Planning Group (CPG) Co-leaders LTC Lee and CPT Snyder

Page 51: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

COA Comparison MatrixCOA Comparison Matrix

Criteria WTraw w eighted raw w eighted raw w eighted

Security 3 3 9 3 9 3 9

Acceptance 3 3 9 2 6 3 9

Synergy with HA Effort 1 2 2 2 2 2 2

Coalition Building 2 2 4 2 4 3 6

Simplicity 2 2 4 2 4 3 6

COA #1 COA #2 COA #3

Total: 28 25 32

Page 52: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

Comparison CriteriaComparison Criteria

Criteria Remarks

SecurityThe provision of security in the MEZ or on the border and against asymmetric threats in the area of operations.

AcceptanceThe acceptance and trust of the MNF by NGOs, IOs, and Host Nations through its transparent, legal, legitimate, and proportional acts and its credibility and impartiality.

Synergy with HA Effort

The synergy of the HA effort provided by the MNFs ability to facilitate, coordinate, command, or control as appropriate, all civil military activities.

Coalition Building

The trust, confidence, appreciation, and unity of effort built within the MNF through the prudent application of TCC abilities and the focused inclusion of smaller, regional TCCs.

SimplicityThe simplicity inherent in the plan through its efficient task organization, streamlined command relationships, delegated authority, and wise assignment of tasks.

Page 53: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

Air Staff Estimate

Maj Pek Hong Hwa

Page 54: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

Planning Factors & AssumptionsPlanning Factors & Assumptions

Initial planning factor for Air Mobility is 130 pallets per day C+0 Initial planning factor for Air Mobility is 130 pallets per day C+0 – C+30– C+30

CFACC is a supporting commander CFACC is a supporting commander

Marine assets will give TACON of excess sorties to Air Marine assets will give TACON of excess sorties to Air Component Commander (CFACC)Component Commander (CFACC)

Two Strategic APOD’s: Hobart, LauncestonTwo Strategic APOD’s: Hobart, Launceston

Hub-and-spoke distributions by Tactical Aviation to sectorsHub-and-spoke distributions by Tactical Aviation to sectors

AssumptionsAssumptions

All APOD’s will remain openAll APOD’s will remain open

No diplomatic clearance problemsNo diplomatic clearance problems

Freedom of movement for all air assets in TindoroFreedom of movement for all air assets in Tindoro

Page 55: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

Phase IPhase I

TASK:TASK: Liaison with assessment teams and Liaison with assessment teams and HeadquartersHeadquarters

Deploy site survey teamsDeploy site survey teams

Deploy Tactical Air Logistics Control Element Deploy Tactical Air Logistics Control Element (TALCE)(TALCE)

Prepare APOD’s and airspace coordination Prepare APOD’s and airspace coordination procedures for incoming Strategic airliftprocedures for incoming Strategic airlift

Page 56: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

Phase IIPhase II

TASK:TASK: Establish Air Lines of Communication Establish Air Lines of Communication

Establish Airspace Control MeasuresEstablish Airspace Control Measures

Support initial sector deployment of TCC forcesSupport initial sector deployment of TCC forces

Page 57: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

Phase IIIPhase III

TASK:TASK: General Lift Support General Lift Support

MEDIVACMEDIVAC

SecuritySecurity

QRF supportQRF support

Intra-theater tactical logistic supportIntra-theater tactical logistic support

Page 58: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

Phase IVPhase IV

TASK:TASK: Facilitate HA Transition Facilitate HA Transition

Assist in draw-down of MNFAssist in draw-down of MNF

As requirements diminish, release air assets for As requirements diminish, release air assets for re-deploymentre-deployment

Phase VPhase V

TASK:TASK: Re-deployment Re-deployment

Support strategic re-deploymentSupport strategic re-deployment

Page 59: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

STAFF ESTIMATESSTAFF ESTIMATES

GROUND OPS ESTIMATE

MAJ KARL FORD UK(A)

Page 60: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

8 SECTORS8 SECTORS

Page 61: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

ISSUES/RECOMMENDATIONSISSUES/RECOMMENDATIONS

• C2:• LCC HQ: Devenport (Sing bde HQ)• Sector HQs: Bn/BG HQs

• RSOI:• Security to SPOD (N) & SPOD (S)• Phasing: Enclaves, MEZ, others (log & time)

• Troops to Task: • Differing sector priorities• Bn/BGs force-packaged at coy level

Page 62: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

• Coord:• Sectors aligned with existing administrative/police boundaries• Cross-MEZ integration• Sector CMOCs• Military Coordination Committee (LCC)• Joint

• QRF: • CTF res carries risk• LCC res constituted on coy gps; relies on avn

• MEZ: importance of cantonment

ISSUES/RECOMMENDATIONSISSUES/RECOMMENDATIONS

Page 63: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

STAFF ESTIMATESSTAFF ESTIMATES

MARITIME

CDR DAVID ISSITT

Page 64: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

STAFF ESTIMATESSTAFF ESTIMATESMARITIMEMARITIME

Phase I:– Prepare for lodgment– Deployment of maritime LOs

Phase II (Extended):– Lodgment

C + 5 to C + 27 Days – Maritime C + 18 – US Amphibious Assets

– Liaison with LCC on security of SPODs– Seaside harbour security

Page 65: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

STAFF ESTIMATESSTAFF ESTIMATESMARITIMEMARITIME

Phase III– Control patrolling in sea sectors (Maritime)– Maintain QRF and assist as required (Amphib)

– Spare capacities Provide logistics flow at sea (Log CC) Provide maneuver by sea (LCC) Potential platform for Info Ops Neutral Negotiation platform Emergency Afloat HQ

Page 66: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

STAFF ESTIMATESSTAFF ESTIMATESMARITIMEMARITIME

Phase IV:– As in Phase III

– Spare capacities: As in Phase III Facilitate HA

Phase V:– Re-deploy– C + 42 (Amphib)– As ordered (Maritime – via multiple Liberty ports)

Page 67: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

STAFF ESTIMATESSTAFF ESTIMATESMARITIMEMARITIME

Logistics sustainability– Store ships/Oiler– Shuttle to Christchurch– Host nations support

Capability Gaps– Request for additional combatant and MPA to enforce

maritime separation– Considerations for seaside harbour security

(asymmetric threats) Request for small crafts Local contract small crafts

Page 68: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

STAFF ESTIMATESSTAFF ESTIMATES

Special Operations

Page 69: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

STAFF ESTIMATESSTAFF ESTIMATES

Legal

LtCol Havranek

Page 70: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

Model Participating Nations Model Participating Nations AgreementAgreement

Memorandum Among Coalition Nations: Cross Service Agreements Claims Command and control (National & MNF) Intel Sharing Disciplinary Actions

Page 71: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

Rules of EngagementRules of Engagement

ROE Coordination Cell– Deconflict Differing National Policies– Consider Whether More Robust ROE are

Required by the Situation

ROE Training

Detainee – Policy and Procedures

Page 72: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

Command & ControlCommand & Control

Briefer :CPT KEVIN “LOONEY” WEE

STAFF ESTIMATESSTAFF ESTIMATES

Page 73: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

Lead Nation CTF Component OrganizationLead Nation CTF Component OrganizationFunctional Component & Task ForceFunctional Component & Task Force

Commander Commander Coalition / Combined Coalition / Combined

Task ForceTask Force(CCTF)(CCTF)

CFMCCCFMCC CFACCCFACCCFLCCCFLCC

CCCCCCCCCIBCIB

Logistics Logistics ComponentComponentCommanderCommander

Amphibious Amphibious CommanderCommander

CMOCCMOC

BASIC SET-UP

Along Functional lines integrating 8 separate sectors

Page 74: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.
Page 75: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

Primary ConsiderationsPrimary Considerations

• Coordination between 8 Sectors – to avoid repetition of effort

• Strict adherence to C2 procedures and processes

• Lines of Communications critical

• LNOs vital, with clear direction from higher HQ

• Coordination with border regime

• Coordination with MEZ

• Clear understanding of ROE and Sector authority

Page 76: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

STAFF ESTIMATESSTAFF ESTIMATES

Communications

LT Maama Misi

Page 77: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

STAFF ESTIMATESSTAFF ESTIMATES

ASSETS– 1x SAF Division Signal Battalion– 1x MSQ 126 (60 days only)– TCC organic communication assets

ASSUMPTIONS– Able to leverage Host Nations’ civil telecommunications

network infrastructure– Good satellite coverage over the Area of Operations– All TCC equipment is compatible (ie. Able to operate in

clear and fixed frequencies)– Encrypted Communications are only required from CTF

to SAF & CTF to Component Commanders

Page 78: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

STAFF ESTIMATESSTAFF ESTIMATES

Concept– To leverage Host Nation civil

telecommunications network– Employ MSQ 126 to link CTF HQs (Hobart) to

SAF HQs– SAF Division Signal Battalion installs terrestrial

(Line of sight) UHF communication network to Component Commanders

– Integrate Civil and Military networks to improve the reach

Page 79: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

STAFF ESTIMATESSTAFF ESTIMATES

Concept (continued)– Gradually expand the terrestrial network to the

Sector Forces’ HQ

Limiting Factors– Terrain– Interoperability– Additional communication assets required

Page 80: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

STAFF ESTIMATESSTAFF ESTIMATES

Engineer

Capt Isireli Cataka

Page 81: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

ENGINEER DEPLOYMENTSECTOR OVERVIEW

Engineers South

Engineers North

Page 82: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

• Engineers North - North Tindoro

Australia – 1 Engineer Company200 personnel + 10 support personnel1 Road Team + 2 Fld Troops + 1 Fld Sqd (ROWPU)

Korea – 1 Engineer Company150 personnel1 Road Team + 2 Fld troops + Construction Equip

Mauritius – 1 Engineer Platoon50 personnel + 5 support personnel 1 Field Troop

• Engineers South - South Tindoro

Japan – 1 Engineer Battalion450 personnel + 40 Support Personnel2 Field Companies + 1 Support Co. + 30 Pieces of Construction Equipment

Engineer Units AllocationEngineer Units Allocation

Page 83: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

ENGINEER PHASE EMPLOYMENTENGINEER PHASE EMPLOYMENT

Phase 1– Engineer Preparation– Coodinate and confirm with all available TCC Engineer

Units Phase 2

– Maintain LOCs open (especially APODs)– Support to establishment of CTF HQs (North and South)

Phase 3– Priority 1: support to CTF– Priority 2: coord and planning to facilitate HA

Phase 4– Facilitate HA– Maintain support to CTF

Phase 5– Redeployment

Page 84: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

• Support Forces Tactical Mobility in the Combined Operation Area

Landing zones• Influence local population with HA/HCA projects as part of CA portion of campaign

Production of waterConstruction of sheltersRepair/Maintenance of Roads/SheltersPower for isolated areas

• Survivability and Force Protection support to friendly forces

Barriers/protection• Re-integration/Repatriation

Primary support to military. Spare capacity to HA/DR.

PROBABLE ENGINEER TASKSPROBABLE ENGINEER TASKS

Page 85: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

Logistics Concept of Support

CPT Dana “Dundee” Alexander

STAFF ESTIMATESSTAFF ESTIMATES

Page 86: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

Logistics Concept of SupportLogistics Concept of Support

PHASE 1: Pre-Crisis

CSS South

CSS North

Hobart

Launceston

Page 87: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

Combat Service Support (CSS)Combat Service Support (CSS)

PHASE I (Pre-Crisis)

Preparation for CTF Arrival: - Buildup stock holdings of Classes 1,3,& 5; LNOs to Host Nation; Establish Fuel Contracts with local bulk fuel installations; MOU/Mutual Logistics Support Agreement established btwn countries; Finance contractor commence local civil contracts at HN. (Log Civil Augmentation Program)

PHASE II (Lodgement)

Reception, Staging, Onward Movement & Integration: - Establish Combat Service Support Area-North vicinity of Devonport; Establish CSSA-South vicinity Hobart; Commence RSOI; Establish SPODs at Devonport and Hobart; Establish APODs at Launceston and Hobart;

PHASE III (Mandate

Enforcement)Main focus on CTF: -Classes 1, 3 & 5 pushed from CSSAs to AO CSS elements. (Rail, road, air, and sea)

PHASE IV (Stabilization)

Main focus on CTF: - Be prepared to facilitate HA request from CTF HQs. Return focus to the CTF for redeployment planning. Ensure LOG hand-off to HN agencies is complete.

PHASE V (Redeployment) RSOI to home locations: - Downscale/transfer stocks and coordinate

redeployment.

Page 88: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

STAFF ESTIMATESSTAFF ESTIMATES

Civil Affairs &

PSYOPS

Maj Robinson

Page 89: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

• PHASE 1: PRE- CRISIS RESPONSE .

• Assessment teams (AT) / Liaison Officers in theater. CMOC will be in HOBART by the end of this phase. All of our actions are geared in keeping hostile forces apart, assisting with HA and return of DPs.

• PHASE 2 – LODGEMENT

• Establishment of Forward Command Element in Hobart and Civil Military Coordination Board (CMCB).

• Establishment of CAT-A level CMOCs in each sector.

• PHASE 3 – MANDATE ENFORCEMENT

• Support IO and facilitate HA support

• PHASE 4 – STABILIZATION AND TRANSITION

• Facilitate HA transition

• PHASE 5 – REDEPLOYMENT

• Redeploy

COA StatementsCOA Statements

Page 90: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

Commander Commander Coalition / Combined Coalition / Combined

Task ForceTask Force(CCTF)(CCTF)

CFMCCCFMCC CFACCCFACCCFLCCCFLCC

CCCCCCCC

Lead Nation CTF Component OrganizationLead Nation CTF Component OrganizationFunctional Component & Task ForceFunctional Component & Task Force

CIBCIB

Logistics Logistics ComponentComponentCommanderCommander

Amphibious Amphibious CommanderCommander

CMCBCMCB

CAT-ACAT-A

CAT-ACAT-ACAT-ACAT-A

CAT-ACAT-ACAT-ACAT-A

CAT-ACAT-ACAT-ACAT-ACAT-ACAT-A

CMOCCMOC

Page 91: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

ENDSTATEENDSTATE

REINTEGRATION OF DPs TO RESPECTIVE COMMUNITIES

HOST NATION TO ASSUME HA EFFORT IN COORDINATION WITH IOs & NGOs

Page 92: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

STAFF ESTIMATESSTAFF ESTIMATES

Special Operations

Page 93: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

STAFF ESTIMATESSTAFF ESTIMATES

Special Operations

Maj Wong

Page 94: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

Special Operations (Special Operations (CSOTF)CSOTF)

• Known Facts • Terrorist activities Fengal and Queenstown• Suspected operating base – displaced person camps• Denounce of terror activities by both governments• Insufficient information on terror activity

• Assumptions• Request for Forces (RFF) for Special Ops airlift will be supported• Separate components to HQ CTF

• Commanders intent• Support QRF• Assist Internal Defense training as requested

• Limitations • CTF will not Conduct Counter Terrorist Actions

Page 95: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

Special Operations (Special Operations (CSOTF)CSOTF)

• Tasks

• Assist establishment of lines of communication as required

• Augment overall security plan• Assist Internal Defense training as requested

• Supports Reactionary force

Page 96: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

Special Operations (Special Operations (CSOTF)CSOTF)

Phase 1, Pre-Crisis Response– Deployment; establish HQ

Phase 2, Lodgement– Support Quick Reaction Force (QRF) tasking

as appropriate

Phase 3, Mandate Enforcement– Continue support QRF– Assist in training as requested

Page 97: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

Special Operations (Special Operations (CSOTF)CSOTF)

Phase 4, Stabilization – Transition– On order, redeploy

Phase 5, Redeployment– Complete redeployment

Page 98: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

STAFF ESTIMATESSTAFF ESTIMATES

Intelligence

CDR Thomas Raivet

Page 99: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

Intel EstimateIntel Estimate

Threats– Terrorism

Operating from DP camps– Poor law & order

Direct impact on relief operations– Aggression from opposing military forces

Still deployed along border– Poor humanitarian conditions

May be exploited by terrorists & bandits Cause low morale

– Economy affected by war

Page 100: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

Intel EstimateIntel Estimate

Key considerations– Geography – mountainous & wet

Good terrain for bandits & terrorists– Low morale - difficult to gain support

Economy – unemployment & poverty– Well established terrorist cells

Existing terrorists’ infrastructures– Disposition & readiness of North & South

Tindoro forces

Page 101: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

Intel Organization Intel Organization

Intel ops centre at CTF HQ– Overall all-source intel operations– Work thru sector S2s, coordinate sector intel collection – Liaise with counter-intel and police– Force protection cell

S2 in each sector HQ– Responsible for sector intel ops

Comms connectivity – External, worldwide connectivity– CTF/CC with S2s and others esp law enforcement

agencies, national intel agencies

Page 102: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

Intel Products Intel Products

Twice daily shift-change intel briefings Early warning for threats Formulate & disseminate CTF HQ-level

int products e.g. Intel Info Reps, summaries, spot-reps, imagery products

Manage Req For Info Coord & meetings with sector S2s

Page 103: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

STAFF ESTIMATESSTAFF ESTIMATES

Information OpsPublic Affairs

Major Billy Canedo

Page 104: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

Information OperationsInformation Operations

Purpose: Facilitate communications and perceptions to support the MNF, while protecting own information and info systems

Psychological Operations (PSYOP): Influence populace perceptions to facilitate MNF mission accomplishment

Operations Security (OPSEC) : Protect sensitive operational info

Information Assurance (IA): Protect critical info systems

Public Affairs (PA): Legitimize the MNF mission

Page 105: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

IO: Phase OneIO: Phase One

CTF HQ: Establish Information Operations Working Group and LOs to Host Nations

PSYOP: Assessment teams garner local target audience support for introduction of MNF forces

OPSEC: Protect sensitive OPLANS, C2, and movement

information

IA: Protect info and info systems from adversary incursions among TCC HQs

PA: Promulgate PA Guidance, establish Coalition Information Bureau (CIB) at CTF HQs

Page 106: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

IO: Phase TwoIO: Phase Two

PSYOP: Sustain legitimacy of MNF mission, establish media systems, noninterference messages

OPSEC: Mask critical signatures of CTF into contested

areas (movement of Commanders and forces) IA: Priority of protection changes from CTF to

deploying Commanders’ information systems

PA: Establish CIBs in country at Host Nation’s capitols, integrating with local media and HN information ministries

Page 107: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

IO: Phase ThreeIO: Phase Three

PSYOP: Facilitate understanding of Mandate to garner cooperation with MNF; support and enhance HA

OPSEC: Protect signatures and movements

associated with possible necessary enforcement activities

IA: Priority changes to protection of information

systems in use by deployed forces

PA: Facilitate external and internal information, leveraging Command Information Messages

Page 108: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

IO: Phase FourIO: Phase Four

PSYOP: Continue support of HA; prepare populace for transition

OPSEC: Mask critical force movements as

necessary IA: Protect information systems between MNF

and Host Nation agencies

PA: Transition local information management to host nations

Page 109: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

IO: Phase FiveIO: Phase Five

PSYOP: Redeploy forces OPSEC: Support redeployment IA: Support redeployment

PA: Redeploy and evaluate

Page 110: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

STAFF ESTIMATESSTAFF ESTIMATES

MEDICAL ESTIMATE

LTC Faizal Bin Baharuddin

Page 111: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

Planning considerationsPlanning considerations

Support is primarily directed towards CTF units. Extra capacity will be used to facilitate HA effort.

Force protection against cholera is a priority.

Limited surgical assets with no permanent Level 3 facility in theatre (note: USS Essex is available from C+18 – C+46)

Page 112: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

Concept of operationsConcept of operations(In all Phases)(In all Phases)

Level 1 support to be provided at Sector level.

Level 2 support (surgical teams) to be centralised at Launceston (NT) and Hobart (ST).

Level 3/4 support identified in Samagaland and Australia.

High reliance on helicopters for in theatre evacuation.

Page 113: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

RequestsRequests

Deployment of permanent in theatre Level 3 facility (field hospital).

UN chartered air ambulance for strategic evacuation.

Page 114: COA Decision Brief 23 AUG 2002 COS, COL MARK KOH BLUE SINGA.

Commander’s GuidanceCommander’s Guidance