CMSC 414 Computer and Network Security Lecture 12

CMSC 414Computer and Network Security

Lecture 12

Jonathan Katz

Role-based access control

RBAC

Access controls assigned based on roles– Can use an access matrix, where “subjects” are roles

Users assigned to different roles– Can be static or dynamic

– A user can have multiple roles assigned

– Can use “access matrix” with users as rows, and roles as columns

– Will, in general, be more compact than a full-blown access control matrix

RBAC: basic idea

Users Roles Resources

research

marketing

admin

Server 1

Server 3

Server 2

Questions…

Where might RBAC make more sense than DAC?

Where might DAC make more sense than RBAC?

Advantages of RBAC– Users change more frequently than roles

RBAC reference models

RBAC0 – basic model

RBAC1 – Adds role hierarchies to RBAC0

RBAC2 – Adds constraints to RBAC0

RBAC3 – incorporates RBAC1 and RBAC2

RBAC0

Users, roles, and permissions– A user may have multiple roles, a role may be granted

multiple permissions

Session– Maps a user to a set of roles to which the user is

currently assigned

– Principle of least privilege

Role-to-permission mapping can be fine-grained– E.g., list/modify but not create; append but not modify

RBAC1

Define a partial order (not total order) on the roles

Inheritance– If role r’ is subordinate to role r, then r has all the

permissions that r’ does (and possibly more)

RBAC2

Adds constraints to user-to-role mapping

Mutually exclusive roles– A set of roles R such that a user can be assigned to at

most one role in this set, either overall (static) or per session (dynamic)

– Enforces separation of duties

Cardinality– Max. users assigned to a role (e.g., superuser); max

roles per user (or per session); or max roles having a certain permission

RBAC2 (continued)

Prerequisite– Mandates that a user can be assigned some role only if

already assigned some other role

– Can be used to enforce least privilege – a user can specify a weaker role when certain permissions are not needed

Comparing DAC/MAC/RBAC

What would an access control matrix look like in each case?

Trusted Computing

Overview

Secure hardware (“TPM”) installed in computer

Goals– Secure boot

– Software verification

– Attestation

– Encrypted storage

This is already deployed

Disclaimer

The intent of the following is to give the high-level ideas, rather than completely correct low-level details

Full specification available on-line– TCG consortium

TPM chip

I/O

Crypto Tools:RSA, SHA-1, …

Non Volatile Storage

(> 1280 bytes)PCR Registers(16 registers)

Non-volatile storage

Endorsement keys (EK) [RSA]– Created at manufacturing time, bound to computer

– Signing keys; used for attestation

Storage root key (SRK) [RSA]– Created by user; can be changed

– Used to encrypt data

PCR

“Platform Configuration Registers”

20 bytes; hold SHA-1 output

Can only be modified in two ways (enforced by the hardware):– TPM_Startup (initialize the contents of the PCR)

– TPM_Extend(D): PCR = SHA-1 ( PCR || D )

Used to obtain an “image” of the loaded software…

PCM usage

BIOS boot block

BIOSOS

loader OS Application

TPM

Hardware

measuring

Extend PCR

• Collision resistance of SHA1 ensures “uniqueness”

What next? Compare computed value with reference value

– Secure boot

Software validation– Verify signature– All this verifies is the source

Decrypt data– Decrypt only if in known configuration

Attestation– Prove to a third party that you are in a good

configuration

Encrypted data Encrypt AES key K with SRK; encrypt bulk data with K

– Hybrid encryption!

When encrypting the AES key, embed current PCR value– E.g., SignEK(PCR, EncSRK(K))

– (This is not actually the way it is done)

When decrypting, check that the embedded value matches the current value– Refuse to decrypt if not the case!

Can also incorporate a user password, etc.

Attestation

Goal: prove to a remote party what software is running on my machine

Applications:– Prove to company network that no viruses are running

on my machine

– Prove to another player that I am running an unmodified version of Quake

– Prove to Apple that I am running iTunes…

Basic idea

Sign PCR value with EK– Actually, sign with attestation identity key (AIK)

validated with EK (ignore this for now)

Assume third party knows EK– There is actually a PKI

To prevent replay, use nonce provided by the third party

Third party verifies signature; verifies that PCR corresponds to “good” state

Controversy

Loss of anonymity– Signature using EK uniquely identified the machine it

came from

– Third parties can tell what software you are running

Loss of control– What if google says you need to have google desktop

installed in order to use their search engine?

– What if Sony says you must use their music player to download their music?