Climate change induced human migration: The necessity of collective global action

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Climate-Change-Induced Human Migration: The Necessity of

Collective Global Action

Raphael J. Nawrotzki, Mioara Diaconu, and Sharon Pittman

Andrews University, Berrien Springs, MI

2009

Accepted pre-typeset version of the following article:

Nawrotzki, R. J., Diaconu, M., & Pittman, S. (2009). Climate change induced

human migration: The necessity of collective global action. Global

Studies Journal, 2(1), 43-56.

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Climate-Change-Induced Human Migration: The Necessity of

Collective Global Action

Abstract The current period in history has been aptly termed “the age of globalization.”

This age is characterized by an increasing interconnectedness where positive as

well as negative events originating in one country may have a world-wide impact.

For example, the financial crisis of 2008 originated in the banking system of the

U.S.A. but affected the majority of the countries of this globe. The same is true

for anthropogenic climate change as a result of an increase in greenhouse gas

emission by industrialized countries which now compromises the well-being of

the world’s most vulnerable populations. These high risk Least Developed

Countries (LDCs) struggle to adapt to climatic changes like desertification and

rising sea level that force human migration in search for survival. The chaos of

this migration often precipitates violence and security crises that require

humanitarian and proactive collective global action. It is the goal of this paper to

explore the interface between climate change, conflict, and human migration

based on current research findings and case studies. Further, the two concepts of

environmental migrant and environmental refugee are presented and problems

with the terminology and the legal status of the vulnerable people groups are

discussed. Possible future migration patterns and their global impact are also

examined. Additionally, the phenomenon called ‘abrupt climate change’ is

explored. The article concludes with a set of recommendations targeting

governmental and humanities interventions on how best to mitigate climate

change induced migration with collective global action.

Keywords Human Migration, Climate Change, Environmental Migrant, Environmental

Refugee, Least Developed Countries, Emission Scenarios

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Climate-Change-Induced Human Migration: The Necessity of

Collective Global Action

Introduction The current period in history has been appropriately termed “the Age of

Globalization” (Rahman Khan & Riskin, 2001). Trade liberalization, the high

degree of mobility, and the development of high technological communication

techniques have resulted into the emergence of global markets (Faulkner, 2002).

As a result, the world has become a “global village” (Barclay, 1998) and the

effects of disruptions in the markets or political arenas caused in some countries

are now felt by numerous other countries regardless of the distance between them.

For example, the financial crisis of 2008 that originated in the banking system of

the United States of America had a global impact (Landler, 2008). This

phenomenon is not limited to the economic field. It can also relate to

environmental issues like global climate change.

Over the past decade the awareness level about global warming has

steadily gained prominence in public debates. The possible influences of climate

change have been widely discussed by both amateurs and experts alike (Gore,

2006; Brown et al., 2007; Birkmann, 2007; Kaplan, 2008). The fourth assessment

report of the International Panel of Climate Change (IPCC) added additional

momentum to the global public awareness movement (IPCC, 2007). The IPCC

defined the root causes for global warming as an atmospheric abundance of

greenhouse gases and aerosols in solar radiation and in land surface properties.

The panel also suggested that these influences alter the energy balance of the

climate system and cause a variety of disturbing natural phenomena like increased

desertification, more severe droughts, floods, tropical cyclones, more frequent

wildfires, rising sea levels and melting glaciers (Solomon et al., 2007).

As is the case with the global market, changes in the climate system are

currently very likely to wreak havoc on the entire planet. However, not every

nation is able to cope with climate change by using sophisticated technology and

expansive capital resources. People in Least Developed Countries (LDCs) are

particularly vulnerable. According to the office of the United Nations High

Commissioner of Human Rights, people living in these countries are more prone

to suffer first and most from climate change (UNHR, 2007), even though they

have contributed the least to its emergence (Huq et al., 2003). Our discussion here

will focus only on countries defined as LDCs by the United Nations in the World

Statistics Pocket Book (United Nations New York, 2003) and how their response

to climatic events may affect the whole world. Most of the 50 countries listed as

LDCs are found in sub-Saharan Africa, whereas a few others are located in Asia

and on small islands in Oceania.

A common strategy of humans to escape the consequences of a changing

climate, such as malnutrition, disease, or even death, is human migration

(Kniveton et al., 2008). As early as 1990 the IPCC stated that human migration

might be the greatest single impact of climate change (Brown, 2008). Massive

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human migration is in many respects problematic and may have significant global

impacts.

It is the goal of this article to explore the interface between climate change

and human migration in LDCs. Possible future scenarios for migration patterns

are examined in a global context. Furthermore, the concepts of environmental

migrants/refugees, the importance of good governance, the necessity for support

from the international community, and the importance of raising social awareness

are discussed. The article concludes with a set of recommendations on how to

mitigate climate change induced migration with collective global action.

The Impact of Climate Change on LDCs Global warming and climate change affect different LDCs in a variety of

ways. In Bangladesh, for example, approximately 150 million people live at sea

level. In 2004 excessive rains caused severe flooding that killed 600 people and

displaced over 20 million people (POST, 2006). It is predicted that over the

course of the twenty-first century, the partial melting of ice in Greenland and

Antarctica will cause a constant rise in sea level, which will result in an

inundation of a substantial part of Bangladesh with salt water (Kaplan, 2008).

Small island states like Kirbati are also affected severely by the rising sea level

and total inundation is likely to occur in the next few years (Offman, 2008).

Increasing vulnerability, in regions of Africa, precipitation has declined

about 3-4% during the period of 1960-1998 (Malhi & Wright, 2004). In particular,

the West African Sahel region (Guinea, Mali, Burkina Faso & Niger) has

experienced widespread and persistent droughts often forcing migration and

displacement (Agnew & Chappell, 1999). In East and Southern Africa, countries

like Mozambique and Zambia are struggling with unusual severe floods that

started in December, 2007, and caused outbreaks of infectious diseases like

cholera (Schatz, 2008). Global warming has also been credited with facilitating

major famine crises in Ethiopia and other North Eastern African regions. These

famines have displaced millions and caused significant loss of life because of

starvation (Broad & Agrawala, 2000; Salama et al., 2001).

Climate change had been credited with increasing both the force and

frequency of tropical cyclones (Webster et al., 2005). For instance in May, 2008,

cyclone Nargis hit Myanmar. It killed thousands of people and destroyed the

majority of the rice fields. Survivors of the cyclone faced severe food shortage

and tried to escape to bordering countries such as India and Thailand, which

created regional tensions (Rice, 2008).

Besides food scarcity, water shortage has become increasingly problematic

in other parts of the Asian continent. Nepalese people face growing problems

because of decreased quality and quantity of water due to melting of the

Himalayan glaciers and decrease in snow cover (Chalise et al., 2003). This effect

decreases both the drinking water supply and the agricultural output due to

reduced irrigation capacity.

Listed above are only a few examples that present the impact of climate

change on LDCs. The environmental degradation and the effects of natural

disasters are taking a higher toll on LDCs, due to the fact that they are depending

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more than other countries on the environment for their livelihood. Moreover,

because these countries depend more on the environment, they are more

vulnerable to changes (Reuveny, 2005). When confronted with the effects of

climate change, such as floods, famines, or droughts, people living in developed

countries are more likely to use adaptation techniques and technologies than

people living in LDCs, who more often than not have no other choice but to leave

the disaster prone areas and migrate to safer places (Kniveton et al., 2008).

Links between Climate Change, Conflict, and Migration There are numerous different consequences of climate change including

conflicts (e.g., civil unrest, tribal war), and human migration. The following are

two examples that demonstrate the association between conflicts and human

migration:

1. Conflict in the region/country of origin: In many parts of the world,

climate change often leads to the deterioration of environmental conditions and

therefore resource scarcity, which in turn leads to conflict that results in groups of

people fleeing the conflict areas (Gleditsch et al., 2007; CNA, 2007). This fact is

acknowledged by numerous researchers in the field, who agree that it is likely that

the reduced resources aggravate stress factors and fuel existing conflicts (Homer

Dixon, 2008; Christian Aid, 2007). These stress-inducers are diverse and

encompass ecological, institutional, economical, political, and cultural problems

that can cause violence when accumulated (Homer Dixon, 2008; Smith &

Vivekananda, 2007).

2. Conflict in the host region/country of settlement: In this case climate

change leads to resource scarcity, which in itself forces people to leave their

homes and migrate to other regions of their own country or to neighboring

countries. Huge numbers of migrants may cause conflict in the areas where they

decide to settle (Gleditsch et al., 2007; Smith & Vivekananda, 2007). In these

circumstances, the environmental refugees could either become the aggressors or

the victims in the conflict. They can cause the conflict by attempting to claim land

belonging to indigenous residents or they can also become the victims of crime,

violence, and broader militarized conflict due to their vulnerability (Purvis &

Busby, 2004)

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Figure 1. The association between conflicts and human migration due to climate

change resulting from resource scarcity.

When the environmental refugees decide to relocate into urban centers, an

accelerated urbanization process would take place. This would lead to the increase

in urban poverty, which in turn would lead to an increase in criminal activities and

conflicts (Smith & Vivekananda, 2007). These urban conflicts often remain

internationally unnoticed and take the form of insurgency, rebellion, and civil

unrest. (Homer Dixon, 2008). Another social consequence of climate change is

the disturbing of the traditional socio-cultural balance of a specific region. This

happens primarily when the environmental refugees decide to settle in areas

populated by people with a different ethnic/religious/tribal background. Thus,

environmental migration may exacerbate inter-generational or social friction

(Reuveny, 2005; CNA, 2007). By adding poor governance, poverty, and easy

access to weapons to this scenario, an explosive situation could arise (Brown,

2008).

Climate change could also lead to regional and international terrorist

activities. This opinion is supported by Admiral Adam Lopez. He points out that

the environmental refugees who are poor and have lost their homes and

livelihoods are more receptive to the message of extremists and terrorist groups

who would provide ways to channel their frustration towards open violence or

guerrilla warfare (CNA, 2007; Reuveny, 2005; Smith & Vivekananda, 2007). In

order to illustrate the consequences of climate change to the international security,

Sindico (2005) outlines a scenario in which climate change could trigger a

situation that the UN Security Council might see as a threat to the international

peace. For example, an unexpected rise in the sea level in the Ganges Delta might

result in a great number of environmental migrants fleeing from Bangladesh to

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India, similar to the events during the second half of the last century (Smith &

Vivekananda, 2007). India will not be able to deal peacefully with so many

environmental migrants and open conflict might arise. In this case, key allies may

need to become involved and major powers could join the dispute (Reuveny,

2005).

Case Studies that Underpin the Logical Link:

Fingar (2008) pointed out that climate-induced tensions due to water stress

and resource scarcity are a major contributing factor to the instability in many

LDCs in Africa. Several notable cases from this continent typify the vulnerability

for other global regions as well:

The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) has well

documented the environment catastrophe in Darfur, Sudan. Climate

change induced desertification resulted in the loss of grazing land and

forced nomads, mostly Arabs, to migrate southward in search of water and

herding ground. The results were bloody conflicts with the farming Dinka

tribes that were indigenous to this region. The combination of population

growth and tribal, ethnic and religious differences were exacerbated by the

competition for land, and turned to violence (UNEP, 2007; CNA, 2007).

Huge numbers of people have fled the conflicts and migrated to Chad

where these refugees in turn caused more violence and disruption in an

already fragile country (Smith & Vivekananda, 2007).

In Somalia, alternating droughts and floods led to migration of varying

size and speed, and created prolonged instability. Struggles that first

appeared to be tribal, sectarian, or nationalist in nature were triggered by a

reduction in agricultural productivity or water supplies (CNA, 2007).

Droughts in Mali damaged the pastoral livelihoods of the semi-nomadic

Tuareg which caused massive migration and eventually resulted in the

“Second Tuareg Rebellion” (Stern, 2007).

In Rwanda, cropland scarcity in combination with many other factors led

to the 1994 genocide (Homer Dixon, 2008) and the related migration of

thousands of people fleeing the revenge violence (Power, 2002).

Droughts have caused conflict between Ugandan and Kenyan pastoralists

in 2006, which led Ethiopian troops to move up north to stop Somalis

crossing the border in search of pasture and water for their livestock

(Christian Aid, 2006).

Possible Future Scenarios Using examples from recent events, we have discussed the critical links

among climate change, conflict, and human migration. What does this mean for

our global future? Computer-based climate modeling can provide an answer to

this question. Despite dramatic progress in meteorological science, climate

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predictions are still loaded with uncertainty. Nevertheless, it can be very valuable

to simulate possible scenarios in order to anticipate, prepare, and develop

programs for proactive adaptation to emergent changes.

IPCC Emission Scenarios

In 2000, the IPCC produced a Special Report on Emission Scenarios

(SRES). Four different “storylines”, labeled A1, A2, B1, B2, were described

based on different demographic, social, economic, technological, and

environmental development (Nakicenovic et al., 2000). Only the best and the

worst scenario and its implications on migration pattern are compared in the

following.

The best scenario is the B1 storyline which describes a convergent world

with a global population that peaks in mid-century and declines thereafter. This

scenario assumes a rapid change in economic structures towards a service and

information-oriented economy and the introduction of clean and resource-efficient

technologies. The emphasis lies on global solutions and sustainability but without

additional climate initiatives (IPCC, 2007). But, even for this bright future, an

increase in mean temperature of 1.8 °C, and a sea level rise of 0.18 – 0.38 m is

projected for the end of the century (IPCC, 2007). This small scale change will

result in a decrease of 20-30% in water availability with a sharp decline in crop

yield of 5-10% in some vulnerable regions such as Southern Africa (Stern, 2007).

On the other hand, a rise in sea levels of 10 centimeters could result in flooding of

most of Bangladesh (IOM, 2008). Thus, Brown (2008) predicts a globally

increased migration of 5 to10%.

The worst scenario is the A1F1 scenario, which is one of three possible

sub-groups of the A1 storyline. It assumes that the world’s economy continues to

rely heavily on fossil energy for economical and industrial development. In

general, the A1 scenario describes a very rapid economic growth, and a global

population that would peak mid-century. Also, the rapid introduction of more

efficient technologies is projected. It is assumed that an increased social and

cultural interaction takes place (IPCC, 2007). For this scenario, an increase of

mean temperature of approximately 4°C and a sea level rise between 0.26 and

0.59 m is likely by the end of the century (IPCC, 2007). An increase of 4°C in

mean temperature is likely to decrease the water availability in Southern Africa by

30-50% with an agricultural yield decline of 15-35% (Stern, 2007). The result will

be that large areas of the Sahel region could become permanently uninhabitable

(Brown, 2008). This may result in a massive migration of Africans to Europe and

will cause increased social and economic stress on the affected European nations

(CNA, 2007). In general, many authors expect that global water shortages will

become the major problem affecting millions of people and may lead to war and

mass migration (Christian Aid, 2007; DCDC, 2007; Shindell, 2007; Brown,

2008). In summary, under conditions of the A1F1 scenario, climate change has

the potential to displace huge numbers of people ranging from 200 million

(Brown, 2008) up to 1 billion (Lovell, 2008) by the year 2050.

Even though the A1F1 scenario seems to be very dismal, it is possible that

the reality may be even more dramatic. There are many factors that could easily

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worsen this worst scenario. First, the described SRES scenarios B1 and A1F1 are

both assuming that the global population will peak mid-century at about 9 billion

people and decline thereafter. However, research shows that it is more likely that

the world will face a constant growing population especially in the LDCs (PRB,

2007). A constant growing population could result in aggressive economic

competition, increased consumption, and might lead to intensive exploitation and

pressure on resources of all kinds (DCDC, 2007). All of this creates the fertile

ground for increased conflicts and mass migration. A second variable that is not

included in the above discussed scenarios are so called “feedback mechanisms”

which may lead to abrupt climate change.

Abrupt Climate Change

Abrupt climate changes are especially dangerous because they do not give

the human societies enough time to adapt (Steffen et al., 2004). Feedback

mechanisms, as shown in Figure 2, may play a major role in triggering abrupt

changes. For example, a decrease in snow cover will lead to a decrease in the

amount of solar radiation reflected back to space. Less reflection means more

absorption of thermal energy which leads to rising temperatures and a further

reduction in snow cover (Kniveton et al., 2008). Another feedback mechanism is

related to water vapor. Water vapor is a powerful greenhouse gas that absorbs

outgoing long-wave radiation. Absorption of thermal energy causes warming. An

even warmer atmosphere will cause more water to evaporate and so on (Staudt et

al., 2008).

Figure 2. Feedback mechanism that may lead to abrupt climate change. Left:

Snow cover feedback mechanism. Right: Water vapor feedback mechanism.

Climate homeostasis can be forced to a point where it suddenly flips into

another state. These points are collectively known as “tipping points” (Kniveton

et al., 2008). Tipping points could be the shutdown of the Gulf Stream in the

Atlantic (Gleditsch et al., 2007; Schwartz & Randall, 2003), the dying of the

Amazon tropical rainforest, or the collapse of the ice sheets in Greenland and the

west Antarctic. These could cause a sea level rise of up to 7 m (IPCC, 2007),

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inundation of at least 4 million km2 of land mass, and would force 5% of the

world’s population to migrate (Stern, 2007). Small island LDCs could be severely

impacted. For example, most of the land mass of Kiribati, the Maldives, and

Tuvalu are lower than 4 m above mean sea level (Watson et al., 1998; Nicholls &

Mimura, 1998) and would be totally inundated in the case of the rapid melting of

Greenland’s ice sheets.

In summary, it is considered that these scenarios of abrupt climatic

changes might result in “societal collapse, mega-migration, intensifying

competition for much diminished resources and widespread conflict” (DCDC,

2007, p. 79). We can hope the best but we must realistically plan for the worst!

Discussion Climate change is a matter of fact and already affecting millions of people

in numerous countries. Hosting a socially responsible discussion that intentionally

and preventatively explores solutions to mitigate this eminent crisis suggests key

roles for a variety of stakeholders.

The Role of Governments

Often times the non-climatic drivers increase the seriousness of climatic

conditions and put already vulnerable people in marginal situations (Brown, 2008;

Pielke et al., 2007). The most important factor in this regard is the involvement of

governments. Stern (2007) points out that the exact numbers of people who will

actually be forced to migrate will strongly depend on the level of investment,

planning, and resources the government is willing and able to devote to help

people adapt to challenges that come with climatic changes.

Poor governance: Particularly weak government institutions with

marginal economies do not have the capacity to provide the needed help to

households. Such societies have a high risk of being destabilized by climate

change. In this destabilized state, natural calamities will often end up as large-

scale humanitarian disasters (Purvis & Busby, 2004). For example, Nnoaham

(2008) links the fact that the climate change induced drought in Malawi caused

such a high death toll to poor governance in the Malawi leadership.

Sometimes governments are not only neutral entities that are unable to

help, but rather are responsible for the plight of the people in the first place. Often

these governments further exploit farmers in their already poor situations which

may lead to violent struggles and large-scale migration (Smith & Vivekananda,

2007).

Good governance: The best remedy to mitigate the problems of climate

change is a stable, well-organized government with adequate technological and

financial power. For example, when nations provide good governance in water

management during drought conditions, tensions may be reduced or even avoided

(Sindico, 2005). Furthermore, a government may enhance the situation of people

through policies about land distribution, resource management, and land use

guidelines (IOM, 2008).

Renaud et al. (2007) mentions that higher education, good access to

information, and the ownership of properties decreases the probability of

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migration. In addition, Purvis and Busby (2004) note that democratic systems are

important to stabilize a country and can significantly increase the resilience

towards adverse climate impacts. For example, Mali with its democratic

government has been able to cope with droughts and food insecurity much better

than Chad with its highly corrupt leadership (Smith & Vivekananda, 2007).

Global Collective Action

The United Nation’s system should be empowered to provide

humanitarian aid for environmental refugees/migrants (Bogardi, 2007). Also, a

UN agency could be awarded the power to distribute the climate migrants equally

among member nations, which would moderate the stress that a large number of

migrants could cause for a single country. In addition, King (2006) proposes the

establishment of an International Coordinating Mechanism (ICM) for

environmentally displaced persons that can address all problem areas of the

migration issue. This may include interventions such as prevention, preparedness,

mitigation, rehabilitation, and resettlement. ICM could also coordinate the work

of all other international organizations that currently focus on various facets of the

problem.

Offman (2008) reports that there is a growing number of scholars, NGOs,

and activists claiming that industrialized nations owe the displaced persons some

form of restitution which could be in the form of aid or human offsetting. It would

be socially responsible of the carbon-producing nations to accept and assimilate

these climate change refugees. This proposal of a Global Restitution Fund (GRF)

could be a solution for people from small island states such as Tuvalu that are

desperately looking for ways to evacuate because of the constant rising sea level

(POST, 2006). The supervision of such a program would best be administered by

a UN agency.

The four task categories of providing humanitarian aid, coordinating the

migrant flow and distribution, as well as oversight of the ICM and the GRF,

would be most efficiently served when centralized in a single UN agency. Thus,

the time may have come to put the suggestion of Purvis and Busby (2004) into

practice and create a new UN office of High Commissioner for the Environment.

This officer could be made responsible for all measures and policies dealing with

climate change and environmental issues, especially migration.

Environmental Migrants vs. Environmental Refugees

A major problem is that climate change displaced people are not

recognized under international law and are therefore invisible. Often they fall

through the cracks of international refugee and immigration policies (Brown,

2008). This issue should be addressed by establishing a sound terminology and

intervention mandate for these vulnerable groups of people. In subject-related

literature, the term “environmental refugee” and “environmental migrant” are

used frequently. These two constructs could be instrumental in designing future

mitigation programs.

Environmental refugee: The concept of environmental refugees is not new

and entered common usage after the UNEP published a paper titled

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Environmental Refugees (El-Hinnawi, 1985). The author defined environmental

refugees as “those people who have been forced to leave their traditional habitat,

temporarily or permanently, because of a marked environmental disruption

(natural and/or triggered by people) that jeopardized their existence and/or

seriously affected the quality of their life” (El-Hinnawi, 1985, p.4 cited in Bates,

2002). Two decades later, the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment project also

recognized the existence of environmental refugees (Safriel et al., 2005)

Environmental migrant: The International Organization for Migration

defined “environmental migrants” as “persons or groups of persons who, for

compelling reasons of sudden or progressive changes in the environment that

adversely affect their lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave their habitual

homes, or choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and who move

either within their country or abroad” (Kniveton et al., 2008, p. 31).

The difference between the two definitions lies in the conditions for the

displacement. Refugees have no choice to leave their homes whereas migrants

still have some freedom for making this decision. In order to clarify the

differences between refugees and migrants, Renaud et al. (2007) suggests the

following subdivision in categories with different underlying attitudes.

1a) Environmentally motivated migrants: “pre-empting the worst”

1b) Environmentally forced migrants: “avoiding the worst”

2) Environmental refugees: “fleeing the worst”

A problem with the terms “refugee” and “migrant” is that they imply that a

person has crossed an internationally recognized border. But most people,

displaced by climate change, are likely to stay within their own borders and are

therefore Internal Displaced Persons (IDPs) who are not covered by the definition

(Hugo, 2008). Therefore, we suggest adding a third category labeled

Environmentally Internal Displaced Persons (EIDPs). These three categories may

be a great starting point to establish and implement a framework to provide

environmental migrants and refugees with the needed legal recognition.

Adaptation

The best way to prevent mass migrations is to help people adapt to

changes. This could be done, for example, by providing new technology such as

drought resistant crops (Bei et al., 2008) or improved early warning systems such

as the Famine Early Warning System of USAID (Purvis & Busby, 2004).

Furthermore, education is an important means to help people understand the

causes for climate change, the range of possible impacts, and which adaptation

options are applicable to the individual (POST, 2006). However, the coping

strategies for LDCs are often limited because poverty restricts technological

adaptation and further increases vulnerability towards climate change (Gleditsch

et al., 2007; IOM, 2008).

Thus, the expertise and financial power of the UN is needed to help poor

countries to prepare for climate change and mitigate migration (Smith &

Vivekananda, 2007). Technology transfers should be facilitated and funded by

rich, industrialized countries, through which the adaptive capacity of weak LDCs

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can be enhanced. Governments will then be enabled to better cope with societal

needs and to resist the rise of extremist groups as a proximate result from climate

change induced resource depletion (CNA, 2007). In this way, rich countries could

exchange technology and financial means for global stability and security.

The transfer of technology and the financial support may have an

additional beneficial side-effect in that it generates incentives for young, skilled

workers to stay in their native countries. This group would otherwise be among

the first to migrate, which could precipitate the so-called “braindrain” of a country

(Brown, 2008; Bates, 2002).

Raising the Awareness Level

Currently the available literature about the issue of climate change induced

migration is limited. The lack of research on the environment-migration issue is

due to the fact that migration and environmental scholars work separately rarely

combining their efforts in genuinely interdisciplinary teams (Hugo, 2008).

Another reason for the limited availability of research data is the lack of

awareness of the climate change induced migration problem among politicians,

policymakers, and the general public (Bogardi, 2007). Improved political

recognition and expanded institutional support are needed to persuade funding

organizations to accept related research topics and to fund more longitudinal

investigations.

Renaud et al. (2007) also recommends that environmental forced migrants

should be included in the work of the IPCC. This would raise additional attention

towards the urgency of the climate change migration issues. This could sound the

alarm for mobilizing global collective action while providing a scientific basis for

featuring and administering effective and intentional worldwide interventions.

Also, underscored should be the fact that it is important to publically

polish up the reputation of environmental refugees/migrants. Activists need to

raise awareness of the fact that these are, primarily, people who have faced

hardship and great losses rather than people coming to a foreign country to steal

other people’s livelihoods (Renaud et al., 2007).

Conclusion Climate change as a cause for population movement in LDCs cannot be

presented exclusively as the problem of each individual country. The

environmental pressures like severe storms, rising sea levels, and desertification

have been caused partly by forces (greenhouse gas emission) located outside the

LDCs. These impacts have consequences which extend beyond the borders of the

LDCs. Migration is a logical and common immediate response to climate change,

yet may cause catastrophic humanitarian and security issues. These threats have

global implications that call for deliberate and decisive collective action on behalf

of the entire international community. In summary we can make a difference by:

Encouraging the formation of stable democratic governments in LDCs that

focus on just policies, resource management, education of its people, and

provide good access to information;

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Empowering the UN to provide more humanitarian aid, coordinate the

migrant flow, and distribute migrants among countries;

Centralizing oversight of a potential International Coordination

Mechanism as well as for the Global Restitution Fund in a UN agency

under a newly created office of High Commissioner for the Environment;

Establishing and implementing a framework to provide environmentally

displaced persons with the needed legal recognition;

Building adaptive capacity within LDCs by means of technology transfer

and financial support to effectively prevent “braindrain” or the emergence

of extremist groups; and finally,

Raising the level of public awareness about the problem of climate change

induced migration in order to make more funding available for research

projects, increase sensitivity among the general public, and to improve

social acceptance of environmental refugees and/or migrants.

Global climate change is not likely to be halted soon even if drastic

measures reduce current carbon dioxide emissions because of the inertia in the

global climate system. We can expect the impact of environmental disasters to

continue to increase and produce more environmental refugees/migrants. This

approaching crisis offers only disastrous scenarios; yet, it provides a unique

opportunity for working together to craft a brighter future of unity in our

commitments and directives for collective global action.

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