Clausewitz and the Study of War

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Clausewitz and the Study ofWarThomas WaldmanPublished online: 10 Sep 2012.

To cite this article: Thomas Waldman (2012) Clausewitz and the Study of War,Defence Studies, 12:3, 345-374, DOI: 10.1080/14702436.2012.703843

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ARTICLE

Clausewitz and the Study of War

THOMAS WALDMAN

Carl von Clausewitz (17801831) is generally considered to be thegreatest theorist of the nature of war. Given his towering status in thefield it is useful to explore how he arrived at such a robust understand-ing. The methods Clausewitz employed to fulfil his intellectual objec-tives significantly shaped the outcome of his work and an appreciationof this is vital for understanding his seminal text, On War. Knowledgeof his approach is invaluable as a model of rigorous methodologicalendeavour for students of war attempting to come to grips with such avast and complex subject.

This article is divided into two sections. The first provides a generalbackground to Clausewitzs intellectual environment from which hedrew many of his methodological principles. The second section exam-ines Clausewitzs approach in greater detail. It considers his views onthe purpose of theory and the methods he employed.

Background and Influences

Clausewitzs life straddled a period during which, as described by SirMichael Howard, the framework of European society . . . was shaken toits foundations.1 Clausewitz was born in the old regime and laid to restin the modern world. He not only lived through such turbulent timesbut was an active participant in some of the foremost events of the per-iod.2 As Peter Paret suggests, it is difficult to imagine any age lendingitself less to intellectual expressions of universal value.3 It was easy forthose living through such epoch-changing times to either become over-whelmed by the particularities of the age or claim history had reached

Thomas Waldman, ESRC Research Fellow at the Post-war Reconstruc-tion and Development Unit (PRDU), University of York, UK. Hisbook, War, Clausewitz and the Trinity, will be published early in 2013.Email: [email protected]

Defence Studies, Vol. 12, No. 3, (September 2012), pp. 345374ISSN 1470-2436http://www.tandfonline.comhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2012.703843 2012 Taylor & Francis

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its grand conclusion. Momentous change and cataclysmic events ofteninduce declarations as to the unprecedented nature of the present at theexpense of historical perspective. Indeed, there is strong evidence tosuggest that much of the content of On War is primarily concerned withNapoleonic warfare and that it was only in his later years that Clause-witz developed a more comprehensive theory.4 Yet, although Clause-witzs work is inevitably influenced by the character of contemporarywarfare, his profound sense of history, sensitivity to change in humanaffairs, and searching mind loosened the tight grip of the present on histhought. If this was true with regard to the events of his day, Clausewitzshould equally be considered as one among a number of pioneeringmilitary thinkers who were beginning to transcend the intellectual hege-mony of the Enlightenment.

Enlightenment: the Spirit of Enquiry

In general terms, late 18th and early 19th century Germany was a placeof profound cultural activity, comparable to the classical golden age ofAthens in terms of the sheer quantity of rich artistic, philosophical, andliterary output.5 Such intense activity was largely a reaction to the cul-tural hegemony of the French Enlightenment and, subsequently, to theupheavals engendered by the French Revolution. Clausewitz was to beheavily influenced by this great cultural backlash, yet our exploration intothe roots of his approach must begin in the European Enlightenment.

Although the Age of Reason should be understood as consisting ofa confused bundle of attitudes there certainly was no united army ofthe enlightened6 we can identify some of its major threads. It was,for Immanuel Kant, the period in which Mankind grew out of its self-inflicted immaturity.7 Emerging from the scientific and philosophicalrevolutions of the 17th century, it can be seen as a reaction to thesuperstition, intolerance, and religious fanaticism of the medievalworld-view.8 It sought to throw the light of reason upon all manner ofphenomena through the processes of free thought: the route to truth nolonger began with Authority, but with doubt.9

At its heart was the optimistic belief in limitless progress throughrational processes, the accumulation of knowledge, and the assumptionthat the rules of the physical, human, and social worlds could beuncovered through the application of scientific enquiry.10 Indeed, in alldisciplines, an enthusiasm to understand everything and reveal universaltruths typified by the fervent work of the Encyclopedists permeatedthe European intellectual environment. Importantly, as Gat states, All

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spheres of human culture and all natural phenomena were to besubjugated to intellectual domination, and war was no exception.11 Themilitary thinkers of the Enlightenment strove to produce definitiveworks that would regulate the conduct of military affairs and, as Clause-witz observed, Efforts were therefore made to equip the conduct ofwar with principles, rules, and even systems.12 Five thinkers stand outas exemplars of the military-scientific tradition, all of whom Clausewitzwas familiar with:13 Saxe, Guibert, Lloyd, Blow, and Jomini.

Maurice de Saxe opened his 1732 Reveries de LArt de la Guerre with aself-challenge: All sciences have principles and rules. War has none.14

He believed that war, like nature whose secrets had just been laid bareby Newton, operates in accordance with fixed regularities,15 but thatthose regularities were, in his time, replete with shadows in whoseobscurity one cannot move with an assured step.16 His work purportedto unveil those regularities in the form of principles which, if followed,would lead to victory.

Likewise, the French officer and litterateur Jacques Antoine Hippolyte,Comte de Guibert, published his influential Essai tactique generale in 1772which aimed to be a grand system of war covering the whole subject.17

In his Essai Guibert argued that most principles formerly developedwere rendered obsolete by changed circumstances and the task of hisscience of all times18 was to apply scientific methodology to tactics sothat, like mathematical truths, people from opposite ends of the worldwould have to agree on the principles so formulated.19 Henry Lloydmeanwhile, in his Reflections on the General Principles of War of1781 stated that this art, like all others, is founded on certain and fixedprinciples, which are by their nature invariable.20 He believed mathe-matical principles could be applied to fortification, artillery, marching,and battle formations.21

Embracing formalism even further, Heinrich von Blows Spirit ofthe Modern System of War published in 1799 was based on geometricaland mathematical principles concerning an armys relation to its base, itsobjective, and the lines of operations connecting them22 the latterbeing a term borrowed from Lloyd. As Creveld notes, his work resem-bles nothing so much as a textbook in Euclidean geometry . . . theentire art of strategy was reduced to a single, simple, geometrical for-mula23 and Howard describes it as rococo absurdity.24 Clausewitzderided Blows geometrical system, to which as all charlatans arewont to do he ultimately gave a veneer of mathematical elegance25

Antoine-Henri de Jomini was also concerned with discovering a sys-tem for the art of war, which, like Blow, relied heavily on concepts

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such as base and lines of operations.26 In particular, Jomini drewattention to the importance of operating on so-called interior lines.27

In contrast to earlier thinkers, Jomini insisted that tactical matters weresubject to considerable flux, while strategy may indeed be regulated byfixed laws resembling those of the positive sciences.28 He sought hisprinciples of war by abstracting it from its political and social context. . . turning warfare into a huge game of chess.29 In many respectsJomini represented the culmination of the formalistic and schematicapproach. As John Shy has observed, Jomini was almost evangelical inhis insistence on the timeless verities that his science of war wouldprovide.30

It would be unfair to claim that this was all these theorists contrib-uted to the study of war or that Clausewitz was simply reacting against,rather than building upon their ideas.31 Their works are more nuancedthan outlined above and we should avoid subscribing to a vague andstereotyped image of Clausewitzs predecessors.32 For instance, Jominiwas aware that there was more to war than his formalistic concepts con-veyed. He even admitted that everything that can be termed the poetryand metaphysics of war will have a permanent influence on its resultsand that theories cannot teach men with mathematical precision whatthey should do in every possible case.33 Yet, although Jomini acknowl-edged that war, far from being an exact science, is a terrible and impas-sioned drama, he ultimately believed it was regulated by three of fourgeneral principles34 The implication is that, as Sun Tzu put it, Thosewho know [the principles] prevail, those who do not know them donot prevail.35 In the hands of competent generals with good troops theywere said to constitute means of almost certain success.36

So, regardless of qualifications, the overarching feature of these theo-ries was their emphasis on uncovering quantifiable, formal principles.Their recognition of other, less tangible factors did not greatly alter theregular operation of the principles they had purportedly discovered;moral, psychological, or political factors were not integrated into theirtheories, but presented as addendums, secondary concerns, or awkwarddimensions that theory might ignore. Clausewitz rejected such fanci-ful, one-sided, and pretentious theories, accusing them of sham bril-liance and sterile pedantry.37 Furthermore, those narrow systems wereaccompanied by a lawless rabble of camp followers in the form of jar-gon, technicalities, and metaphors.38 Their weakness, according to Clause-witz, was a consequence not only of their search for unrealisablescientific principles, but also their inevitable selectivity: their objectivecould only be attained by arbitrarily restricting their inquiries to those

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phenomena that would yield to precise formulae39 or what T. E. Law-rence would later term wars algebraical elements.40 Clausewitz, bycontrast, while certainly recognising the mathematical elements ofstrategy,41 emphasised the importance of understanding the whole andall the endless complexities involved.42

Yet, as John Keegan states, Clausewitz should be seen as a child ofthe Enlightenment43 in that he grew up in a Europe still heavily influ-enced by its message, and despite the fact that it had passed its zenithby the latter quarter of the 18th century. (It must also be rememberedthat Germany experienced its own unique Aufklarung). Only a thinkerinfluenced by the paradigmatic climate of Enlightenment inquiry wouldfeel compelled to write of his work that its scientific character consistsin an attempt to investigate the essence of the phenomena of war . . .No logical conclusion has been avoided.44 Indeed, Strachan notes thatOn War represents the culmination of the Enlightenments influence onmilitary thought.45 Certainly, Clausewitz was too wise to underrate therich vein of thought that emerged from the classical theorists.46

Equally, Clausewitz did not fully subscribe to the views of the so-called antinomians, led by the arch-sceptic Berenhorst, who held thatformal theory was inapplicable to war. Rejecting such defeatism, Clause-witz was prone to abstract speculation and motivated by an intensesearch for scientifically valid methods of interpreting the reality ofwar.47 This was evident in his early work, such as his 1805 article criti-cising Blow, in which he states that, We shall apply ourselves to gen-eral notions . . . because in the constitution of a science it is to themthat we shall above all return.48

We should perhaps view Clausewitz as the heir of a tradition of mili-tary thought stemming from the French Enlightenment, via the GermanAufklarers of the 1770s and 1780s, and through to his contemporaries,including prominent figures such as Jomini and his influential mentor,Gerhard von Scharnhorst.49 This was a lineage united by the search fora general theory of war but divided by their contrasting and individual-istic approaches. As Clausewitz reminds us, he was reacting against whathe believed to be the mistaken views of excessively rationalist theorists,yet importantly, and in a more positive sense, they certainly providedhim with a guiding vision of intellectual clarity, systematic analysis, andobjective inquiry without which On War may never have been con-ceived.

Here we must cease discussion of Clausewitzs indebtedness to theEnlightenment lest we overstate the association. Clausewitz owed moreto a tradition that represented, in many respects, its very antithesis.


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Following earlier thinkers, Clausewitz certainly developed a system,but it was more a system of notions and propositions which are linkedand which translates into ideas the structure of the object.50 As Paretnotes, he rejected the popular Enlightenment, with its doctrinaire faithin rationality and progress, and found no difficulty in acknowledginglimits to human understanding.51 To reduce war to a list of rules wasmistaken: no formalistic system could capture the incredible complexityof the phenomenon. For Strachan, it was perhaps less the influence ofany new thinking, but rather Clausewitzs own experiences of war andhis growing familiarity with military history that constituted the realitychecks on [his] inclination to abstraction.52

An Alternative Worldview: the German Movement

While Strachan is correct, we should nonetheless emphasise the extentto which the relative uniformity of Enlightenment military thought,typified by men such as Bulow and Guibert, was being assailed bythinkers such as Berenhorst and Scharnhorst, thus opening Clausewitzsmind to original ideas, while the pervasive cultural forces of the Ger-man Movement were revealing a whole new perspective on reality tohim. German society was experiencing a profound, if underlying, rup-turing of established patterns as the prevailing ancien regime order wasassailed by various competing socio-cultural forces. Clausewitzs workreflects this tension.

In military terms, Berenhorst was an important counterweight to therationalist hegemony and his contrarian approach would have impressedClausewitzs open and searching mind. Berenhorst, in his Reflections onthe Art of War, published between 1796 and 1799, argued that therecould be no fixed, scientific principles in war and suggested instead thateverything was dependent on the operation of individual genius thatcould be neither imitated nor analysed.53 The search for immutablelaws was wrong-headed in his opinion: What is the use of rules whenone is covered up to ones ears with exceptions?54 War was suffusedwith the unpredictable and incalculable. Blind chance, the spirit of anarmy, the moral factors that animate the troops: these unknown anduncontrollable modifications of the human spirit were the true ele-ments of war. 55 In military terms, Berenhorst was the embodiment ofthe Counter-Enlightenment with its excessive irrationalism.56 As Crev-eld suggests, if Jomini and Berenhorst typify, respectively, the extremesof rationality and irrationality in war then it was left to Clausewitz toreconcile these opposing strands of thought.57

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The influence of Scharnhorst is also vital, for at a crucial time in thedevelopment of Clausewitzs thought, while he was studying at the Ber-lin Academy for Young Officers, Scharnhorst was beginning to railagainst the one-sided theories that had emerged at around the turn ofthe century. Scharnhorst his great friend and mentor presentedClausewitz with the possibility of a theoretical middle-ground wherebywar has two sides: one is mechanical and susceptible to theoreticalstudy, the other circumstantial and dominated by creative genius andexperience.58 Thus, we can begin to understand that Clausewitzsapproach reflected the scientific Enlightenment standard principally interms of his foundational methodology and the desire for understandingthe phenomenon of war and its universal elements. However, withinthis broad conception, he consistently expressed the limits of theory andthe reach of rules or law-like propositions in the realm of war. As aresult his work contains some paradoxical features: for instance, his con-crete proposition that the uncertain in war must be recognised as cen-tral to theory. Clausewitz believed it was dangerous to generalise fromideas that have only limited validity and this assertion constitutes a cen-tral theme in his work: the search for an appropriate balance betweenthe universal and the particular. Vital to the resolution of such issueswould be a robust understanding of history, in terms of both substanceand deeper philosophical meaning.

Rediscovering History

In broad terms, historical perspective had been lacking in Enlighten-ment thought with its strong bias towards the future, typified by thebelief in progress based upon the discovery and implementation ofrational principles. The past was viewed as the backward place we hadcome from, the future the sunlit uplands we were heading towards.Indeed, various strains of utopianism stem from such rationalist, a-his-torical thinking.59 With regard to war, such thinking has manifesteditself in the belief that conflict could be perfectly understood, limited,or, indeed, eliminated from human social relations.

This occurs because, as Jeane Kirkpatrick explains, Thought set freefrom experience is unlimited by the constraints of experience or ofprobability. If history is not relevant, then the future is free from thepast. Therefore, theories cut loose from experience are usually blindlyoptimistic.60 This is precisely the kind of thinking Clausewitz rejected.The excesses generated by Enlightenment thought had been revealed tohim practically, in terms of the murderous consequences of the French


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Revolution, and theoretically, in the limited systems of the rationalistswho conveniently banished uncertainty, political conditions, and emo-tions from their work. The German Movement that emerged in the late18th century signified a dramatic shift away from such a-historical per-spectives and moralising assumptions.61 This attitude towards the pastwas symptomatic of the period and found its greatest expression in thework of Johann Gottfried von Herder.

Herder was a dominant figure in the development of the conceptionof history known as historicism. The essential premise of this outlookwas its emphasis on the particularity and uniqueness of historical cul-tures and societies, which could only be truly understood in their ownright through empathetic analysis of their peculiar characteristics. Thisindividualising view of the past stood in stark contrast with the prevail-ing Enlightenment conception, with its determinist belief in progressand the universalising, almost patronising, projection of its own valuesback through history. Herder believed that the Volksgeist62 or materialculture of a peoples life, their skills, language and beliefs and artisticand literary practices, make up a single self-sufficient and characteristicwhole.63 Herders concern with the importance of comprehending his-torical conditions was imparted to Clausewitz through Scharnhorst andthe influential theological scholarship of Friedrich Schleiermacher.64

Arguably the greatest influence on Clausewitzs thought, Scharnhorsthad emphasised that history was central to the study of war.65 AsClausewitz notes in his obituary of Scharnhorst, his mentor had a greatpreference and respect for the power of historic evidence in all mattersthat preoccupied him.66 Although the style of their historical work dif-fered in both style and content, the example of Scharnhorst is clearlyapparent in Clausewitzs pragmatic, objective, and non-partisan approachto historical study.67 Essentially, Scharnhorst taught Clausewitz that theonly evidence we have about war is historical. In On War Clausewitzreaffirms this lesson: Undoubtedly, the knowledge which is basic towar is empirical ... revealed to us only by experience.68

Clausewitz had a clear sense of the particularity of individuals andsocieties, which observed their own laws rather than rationalist abstrac-tions.69 While he held that human feelings might have a universal nat-ure, their human, social, and intellectual expression was in flux.70 OnWar is scattered with historical references, short analyses, and methodo-logical enquiries into the proper use of history. The extent of his histori-cism is most impressively revealed in his sociological survey of war fromthe semibarbarous Tartars through to the 19th century in Chapter 3Bof Book 8. He concludes that chapter by stating that we wanted to show

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how every age had its own kind of war, its own limiting conditions, andits own peculiar preconceptions . . . it follows then that the events ofevery age must be judged in the light of its own peculiarities.71

Clausewitzs Approach

The preceding survey of the dominant influences on Clausewitzsapproach provides the basis for a more detailed examination of themethod that underpins On War. What is fascinating about Clausewitzsapproach is the way in which it may be understood as a synthesis of thevarious pre-existing strands of thought. His theoretical work was deriva-tive, but his originality lay in the manner in which he combined distinc-tive analytic strands and applied their integrated force to the issuessurrounding war.72 We might visualise Clausewitz as being tied to anumber of ropes pulling him in various directions and, whilst at timeshe seemed to be drawn one way or the other, ultimately he managed toretain his balance, control those various influences, and utilise theirmost positive aspects towards his ultimate purpose. This was no easytask. At many points the temptation to be drawn towards a particularmethod or viewpoint was strong, and this tension can be sensed in hiswriting.

The following sections consider some of the central themes thatemerge in Clausewitzs theoretical approach. First, Clausewitzs generalconception of theory is outlined. Subsequently, a set of five methodo-logical pairs are presented as platforms for examining the prominentaspects of Clausewitzs approach to his subject: art versus science; dog-matism versus pedagogy; theory versus reality; material versus moralfactors; and the universal versus particular.

Developing a Conceptual Method

Scharnhorst had imparted to Clausewitz the importance of military the-ory which, through conceptualisation, makes possible the intellectualtreatment of the factors active in war.73 This sentiment is clearly appar-ent in Clausewitzs work. As he states, this subject, like any other thatdoes not surpass mans intellectual capacity, can be elucidated by aninquiring mind, and its internal structure can to some degree berevealed. That alone is enough to turn the concept of theory into real-ity.74 Despite his disdain for the systems of Enlightenment militarythinkers, Clausewitz did not follow Berenhorst in his theoretical antino-mianism: war was susceptible to theoretical analysis. The fundamental


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task of the theorist was to eliminate the weeds that spring from igno-rance by shining the light of theory on all phenomena.75

According to Clausewitz, the task of theory was to clarify reality, or,more accurately, to help men clarify it by stimulating their minds: The-ory will have fulfilled its main task when it is used to analyse the con-stituent elements of war, to distinguish precisely what at first sightseems confused.76 He also remarked that the human mind . . . has auniversal thirst for clarity, and longs to feel itself part of an orderlyscheme of things. 77 While rejecting the idea that war itself could betreated as a science, importantly, this did not mean it could not beapproached in the spirit of scientific inquiry, only that one could notexpect law-like principles to emerge as a result. Clausewitz proposes asystematic and clear-headed approach that would serve to clarify con-cepts and ideas that have become, as it were, confused and entangled.78

An essential element, even precondition, of reliable theory involvesan attempt to recognise the defining character of phenomena: he statesthat, Not until terms and concepts have been defined can one hope tomake any progress in examining the question clearly and simply.79 Histheory would seek to develop an understanding of war through a detailedexploration of its constituent elements, emphasised by Clausewitz at thevery beginning of On War: I propose to consider first the various ele-ments of the subject, next its various parts or sections, and finally thewhole in its internal structure.80 This, he explains, enables us to make adifferentiation and identification of the major components of thestructure of theory.81 How was he to achieve this goal? It is useful toconsider the principal methodological tools Clausewitz employed inorder to resolve the theoretical problems he faced, because knowledge ofthis is vital to understand the progression of Clausewitzs ideas. Thissubject has generated a great deal of debate: was Clausewitz Kantian,Hegelian, or even Newtonian82 in his approach? It is important to notethat a definitive answer on this issue is probably unrealisable, primarilybecause Clausewitz did not subscribe to any one particular method andnever absolutely or in the precise way intended by its originator. What isnot in doubt, however, is that certain central methodological tools areapparent: foremost amongst these is the method of the dialectic.

The use of the dialectical method was a strong feature of GermanIdealist philosophy of the time, and most strongly associated withHegel. It appears to have been a method that Clausewitz only seriouslyappropriated later in his life as he attempted to deal with issues thatinvolved apparent tensions in their relationship to one another.83 WhereClausewitz employed dialectical arguments to draw out ideas, the aim

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was to achieve understanding through debate, through point and coun-terpoint; the dialogue is continuous.84 Through this line of reasoning, athesis and its antithesis leads to a logical contradiction and must there-fore be resolved in some form of theoretical reconciliation. The dialecti-cal influence on his approach although not of a strictly Hegelian form is clearly revealed in Book 8 when Clausewitz states that, Up to nowwe have considered the incompatibility between war and every otherhuman interest . . . that no philosophy can resolve. Now we must seekout the unity into which these contradictory elements combine in reallife, which they do by partly neutralising one another.85

Failure to understand the nature of Clausewitzs method leads toconsiderable misunderstanding of his theories: The often tragic historyof the misinterpretation of his works derives largely from the inabilityof his readers to proceed beyond his thesis to its antithesis and tounderstand that he usually locates the truth in the tension between thetwo . . . In Clausewitzs work . . . polarity is a central concept.86 A simi-lar point is made by Strachan who notes that Hegel was interested inthe relations between the abstract and the concrete, and used dialecticsto explore them, even if in Hegels case the poles in the argumentexcluded each other, whereas in Clausewitzs case they tend to dependon each other.87 As Bassford has noted, the dialectic is crucial to under-standing Clausewitzs thought, notwithstanding the absence of a Hege-lian progression to an Absolute Idea and the lack of clear dialecticalsign posts, labelled thesis, antithesis, and synthesis.88

So, Clausewitz approaches the phenomenon of war by breaking itdown into observable and definable concepts; a vital process if theorywas, as he describes, to serve its principal purpose of discriminatingbetween dissimilar elements.89 In order to explain and determine theoperation of those concepts, Clausewitz often employed a form of dia-lectical reasoning, which posed sets of opposites against one another, andsought to determine the nature of their relationship. In a broader sense,a number of oppositional pairs can be observed in Clausewitzs method-ology, each of which we will explore in turn. Together these five pairsilluminate Clausewitzs endeavour to discover the points at which suchapparent methodological tensions cease to contradict and the underlyingstrength of this approach is reflected in his substantive ideas.

Art versus Science

Clausewitz believed the answer to whether war was an art or sciencewas of great significance, even indispensable because ones conclusion


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determined the way in which the entire subject is approached.90 Thisproblem of course reflects the broad dichotomy that Clausewitz recog-nised as existing within military theory. Thinkers such as Blow soughtscientific precision and ended up with limited, one-sided theories.Thinkers such as Berenhorst believed war was akin to a creative art,entirely dependent on individual genius, and ended up belittling therole of theory. If neither of these approaches would suffice, Clausewitzsought the reasons for this. Book 3, Chapter 3 is taken up with adetailed discussion of this issue.

Clausewitz first sought to determine the essential difference betweenthe two disciplines by centring on the prime objectives of each. Accord-ing to Clausewitz, in science the object is pure knowledge based oninquiry and is principally associated with subjects such as mathematicsor astronomy that aim at fixed values,91 the discovery of regularities,and the identification of laws of logic, reason, and cause and effect. Purescience has no objective other than the furtherance of knowledge. In artthe object is creative ability.92 Art, Clausewitz held, is intended to pro-duce an aesthetic effect, to which end it is necessary to use given means.To combine them is to create; art is thus the capacity to create. Unlikescience, art is not susceptible to law-like formulas, primarily because itaims at effects on the mind. For Clausewitz, these distinctions are mis-leading. All arts contain discrete sciences such as the geometrical ele-ments of architecture, while applied science always involves an elementof creativity and judgement, thus, it is impossible to separate art andknowledge altogether.93 The distinction is almost completely shroudedin the individual, but in their external forms the basic distinctionbetween, on the one hand inquiry and knowledge and, on the othercreation and production is clear.94 So how does this discussion applyto war?

In war, like no other activity, Clausewitz explains that the completeand total assimilation of knowledge and ability is vital. For the com-mander, whatever thorough knowledge he may have absorbed from somany scientific military manuals, all will be useless unless it can beturned into genuine capability.95 Books may lay down the basic princi-ples of an art but they cannot teach us how to do anything.96 Even ifthey purport to explain a certain art they are not in themselves art,because art is about creating. War is not even comparable to a mechani-cal art or craft, whereby given truths can be objectively and imperson-ally applied to the matter in hand; as Clausewitz made clear, It is neverlike that in war. Continual change and the need to respond to it com-pels the commander to carry the whole intellectual apparatus of his

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knowledge with him.97 In war, knowledge and ability must be alloyed.It is never enough simply to know because absolute, so-called mathe-matical, factors never find a firm basis in military calculations.98 Like-wise, creative ability is dependent on a knowledge of the relationship ofthings and the likely effects of given actions.

So war is strictly neither a pure art nor a pure science. It will alwaysinvolve a complex interaction of the two, particularly when approachedfrom the perspective of the individual commander. It appears that, wereClausewitz forced to make a decision he would state that war willalways be more like an art particularly at its higher levels primarilybecause of its practical and creative nature;99 a conclusion that evenJomini, despite his positivism, arrived at.100 But Clausewitz was notcontent to let the matter rest there. In fact, he believed that to baseanalysis on the distinction between art and science is misleading in thatit has unintentionally caused war to be put on par with other arts or sci-ences, resulting in a mass of incorrect analogies.101

Such analogies are misleading because neither science nor art cap-tures the unique nature of war. While it may certainly involve elementsof both, it is something altogether different because it deals with livingand moral forces102 it is a conflict of living forces.103 Previously boththe art and science of war viewed war as a unilateral activity and asnothing but a gradual rise from a craft to a refined mechanical art.104

Clausewitz clearly explained why war was in fact unique:

The essential difference is that war is not an exercise of the willdirected at inanimate matter, as is the case with the mechanical arts,or at matter which is animate but passive and yielding, as is the casewith the human mind and emotions in the fine arts. In war, the willis directed at an animate object that reacts. It must be obvious that theintellectual codification used in the arts and sciences is inappropriateto such an activity.105

If war is not usefully understood as a science or art, what is it? War, heexplains, is part of mans social existence. He suggests a better analogymay be commerce, but even that ignores the fundamental reality ofwar: that it is clash of major interests, which is resolved by blood-shed.106 War is deeply human and social. It takes place in a climate ofdanger, fear, exertion, and uncertainty and is inherently reactive. Artand science may, to some limited extent, display elements of these char-acteristics, but taken together war is something altogether unique. If itreflects any other human activity it is politics, because after all, as he


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explains, that is the womb in which war develops where its outlinesalready exist in their hidden rudimentary form, like the characteristicsof living creatures in their embryos.107

This presented a serious problem for theorising war, namely, to whatextent can theory provide laws regarding an activity involving a dynamicinteraction of human forces and so universally pervaded with chanceand uncertainty? Clausewitzs consideration of this issue led him to aparticular conception of the purpose and limits of theory.

Dogmatism versus Pedagogy

As Strachan has noted, much of On War is written with a forthright-ness that can easily be mistaken for dogma108 and Aron has observedthat, It is the systematic character of the Treatise which has some-times made superficial readers confuse it with dogmatism.109 It isclear that dogmatic was precisely the epithet Clausewitz wished toavoid. This is revealed in the heading of a section entitled, TheoryShould Be Study, Not Doctrine. In it he states that a theory neednot be a positive doctrine, a sort of manual for action but should beseen more as a guide. Far from dictating exactly what the com-mander should do on the battlefield, it is intended more to light hisway, ease his progress, train his judgement, and help him to avoidpitfalls.110 Clausewitz emphatically states that, it is simply not possi-ble to construct a model for the art of war that can serve as a scaf-folding on which the commander can rely for support at anytime.111 Historys great commanders did not rely on such doctrinaireguidance, indeed, anyone who thought it necessary to begin the edu-cation of a future general with a knowledge of all the details hasalways been scoffed at as a ridiculous pedant.112

Here Clausewitz differed from his contemporary Jomini who in theconclusion to his work stated that, Correct theories, founded uponright principles . . . will form a true school of instruction for gener-als.113 Like Thucydides before him, Clausewitz is less interested intelling his readers what to think than in teaching them how to think.114

This belief also has its analogue in the critical analysis of past wars. Thecritic, Clausewitz insisted, should not study a particular case through amechanical application of theory, but rather see that theories are thereto be used when needed, and their suitability . . . must always be a mat-ter of judgement. A critic should never use the results of theory as lawsand standards, but only as the soldier does as aids to judgement.115

Just as scientific guidelines are inappropriate tools on the battlefield, so

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they are in critical analysis where truths must be grasped through thenatural perception of the mind.116

So, it was not Clausewitzs aim to develop a utilitarian theory, butone that was predominantly analytic, descriptive, and didactic: theorycan teach but it cannot prescribe. What was the point of producing atheory which genius could laugh at and that the man of limited abilitycould learn by rote but fail to convert into success? Aron makes thecrucial point that for Clausewitz, It is the theory which indicates thatthe responsibility for decision is thrown back on the man of action.117

This was an approach consistent with contemporary German notion ofBildung, or self-direction and autonomous judgement.118 Theory canoffer sound insights into the great mass of phenomena associated withwar, but then leaves the mind to rise into the higher realms ofaction.119 Theory teaches that the essence of genius is that it is creative,not imitative; it can transcend existing rules, but in doing so it createsnew ones. Furthermore, Brodie contrasts Clausewitzs approach withthe modern inclination in various army field manuals . . . to encapsulatecenturies of experience and volumes of reflections into a few terselyworded and usually numbered principles of war and concludes thatClausewitz would have been appalled at such attempts, and not sur-prised at some of the terrible blunders that have been made in the nameof those principles.120 As General Ulysses S. Grant once commented,If men make war in slavish obedience to rules, they will fail.121

These points clearly reveal what Clausewitz was not attempting toprovide in his work. He did not set down hard and fast rules thatshould be followed unconsciously or without regard to unique circum-stances. This was not just an implicit feature of his work, but manifestlyexplicit. Book 2 of On War almost amounts to a plea not to read hiswork in that way. Commanders, faced with the problems of themoment, will always search for direct routes to success, and are wont toskate over the sections of a work that do not provide such practical, andindeed, psychological comfort. And here is the irony. The very weak-ness of the intellectual capacity of commanders not imbued with thenatural talent so clearly described by Clausewitz would be preciselythose desperate to read their way out of difficult situations, looking forthe type of principles in On War that Clausewitz rejected. He wouldnot provide such petty rules to follow because petty things will make apetty mind and a petty mind was deemed insufficient for a commanderfaced with the complexity of war.122

This is not to deny that Clausewitz does indeed articulate variousprinciples123 or that the weight of his ideas lean towards favouring a


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certain form of warfare. However, principles in On War always remainconditional. The limits to his system are repeatedly expressed, andoften through metaphors that should not escape even the casual readerseye.124 Moreover, in almost all cases where Clausewitz expresses someprinciple or another, no matter how forcibly stated, they are accompa-nied by qualifications.125 As Alan Beyerchen notes, even his most New-tonian-sounding analogy of a centre of gravity becomes swamped inqualifications and caveats intended to convey the complexity of war.126

So, Clausewitz did not aim at a positive theory of war and nor did heseek to provide a crutch for petty minded leaders. For him laws werenot applicable in war, as they may be in the sciences, because in warthere existed numerous subjective and intangible factors that were notsusceptible to formulation as objective laws, yet which are timelessaspects of its conduct.127 He stressed the difficulty of developing theorybecause of the often large distances between causes and effects, the con-tinuous interaction of opposites, the impact of changing conditions, andthe play of intangible forces that theory could never quite define.128 Yet,despite these limitations, as Creveld notes, theory can aspire to save thestrategist from the need to think out everything from the beginning, andprovides him with a starting point for thought. In so far as the theory issound, such a starting point is certainly not without value.129 Clause-witzs anti-doctrinaire view of what theory should be depended cruciallyon his contention that it should not conflict with the reality of war.

Theory versus Reality

In his panegyric to his late friend and mentor, Clausewitz described thequalities of Scharnhorsts mind which made for such apt and forcefulideas:

At the point where imagination leads the brilliant systematizerbeyond specifics, Scharnhorst would quietly turn back and direct hisenergies toward reconciling ideas and reality, carefully fusing the twoby theoretical and historical analysis, as the particular issue demanded. . . In war mere imagination has no creative power at all, while thetruth that emerges from the congruence of reality and analysis isindispensable.130

This quote lucidly reflects the approach Clausewitz felt was vital forunderstanding war, while simultaneously revealing his huge debt toScharnhorst.131 In criticising flights of the imagination, Clausewitz

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perhaps had in mind the philosophers associated with German Idealism.Although not unsympathetic towards their general project, Clausewitzwas adamant than in such a practical activity as war, pure abstract theo-rising would lead the thinker into dazzling and flowery fantasies132 thatwould have little applicability in reality. In an essay entitled The Ger-mans and the French, Clausewitz commented on how the Germanintellect, instead of taking immediate pleasure in the correspondence ofits ideas to reality . . . delves deeply into the nature of things, intoabstractions, and strives for complete understanding. This he says oftendamages his usefulness in practical, particularly, political life.133 ForClausewitz, Presumptuous philosophy deserves contempt and derisionwhen it seeks to raise us high above the activities of the day so that wecan escape their pressures because individual generations do not existto observe the world; by constantly striving for rational goals they arethe world.134 A similar concern is highlighted in On War when Clause-witz asks what the practical value is of obscure, partially false, confusedand arbitrary notions? Very little so little that they have made theory,from its beginnings, the very opposite of practice, and not infrequentlythe laughing-stock of men whose military competence is beyond dis-pute.135

Clausewitzs practical nature could not but persuade him as to thefutility of speculative notions that conflicted with reality and that leadsto a situation where an author soothes himself with obscure ideaswhich would not satisfy him if expressed in plain speech.136 Scharn-horst taught his student to oppose artificial and learned theorising byencouraging a certain naturalness of thought, which defeats emptyphraseology and brings the false conflict between theory and practice toan end.137 What abstract theorising there is in On War and there isplenty, particularly in Books 1 and 8 is always balanced by a forcefulcollision with reality.

The way in which Book 1, Chapter 1 sways between the abstractand the concrete can be a cause of mental sea-sickness for some, butthat is simply the result of a mind that was never content to rest in thecomfort of one or the other, preferring instead the challenge of search-ing out the points at which the two cease to contradict each other. Thisis why grasping this dialectic in Clausewitzs approach is so important without it one cannot understand what he was trying to achieve throughthe explication of his concepts. In an oft quoted passage, Clausewitzheld that he never avoided logical conclusions, but whenever the threadbecame too thin I have preferred to break it off and go back to the rele-vant phenomenon of experience. Just as some plants bear fruit only if


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they dont shoot up too high, so in the practical arts the leaves andflowers of theory must be pruned and the plant kept close to its propersoil experience.138

Clausewitz frequently employed a deductive approach to explore theboundaries of theoretical concepts: historical accounts would neverentirely suffice because, as Scharnhorst had recognised, experiencewithout philosophy is devoid of meaning.139 This is most apparent inClausewitzs later work. Book 8, Chapter 2 is an excellent example.Logically, he states, it would appear that the overthrow of the enemyshould govern all war plans. That all wars do not reach such extremesmight be explained by limiting factors inherent in the war-machineand natural inertia, but these are insufficient to span the gap betweenthe pure concept of war and the concrete form. Reconciliation is onlyachieved when it is accepted that war and its forms result from ideas,emotions, and conditions prevailing at the time in relation to whichstrictly logical reasoning often plays no part at all and is apt to be amost unsuitable and awkward intellectual tool. The logical absoluteretains its usefulness as a general point of reference, but reality has itsown necessity, determined by particular conditions that always makeswar a matter of degree. All the wars fought since the days of Alexan-der. . .down to Bonaparte cannot be rejected because they do not equateto the theoretical ideal, rather the divergence must be explained and theantinomy resolved.140 His use of abstract reasoning was not a conse-quence of intellectual pretension, but rather a conscious method ofrevealing fundamental truths in war.

So, as the counterweight to pure theory, experience for Clausewitzwas employed as a broad realm that encompassed two central aspects,both concerned with the reality of war, these being history and personalexperience. He held that history provided the theorist with a vast reser-voir of experience and counts for more than any amount of abstracttruths.141 As Paret and Moran note, Clausewitz held that, Without theinstrument of history, theory should not be constructed . . . History notonly tested and validated his theories, it gave rise to some of them.142

But for Clausewitz, this meant much more than familiarity with a fewhistory books. It was not simply the case, as Livy had it, that history is arecord of the infinite variety of human experience plainly set out for allto see.143 As Howard notes, the exercise of history had itself to be anexercise in critical judgement.144 A detailed basis of such critical histori-cal study is masterfully adumbrated by Clausewitz in Book 2 of OnWar. For Clausewitz, critical study of the past provides the theorist withsomething approaching recorded reality, and thus history becomes the

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starting point for theoretical analysis. It also serves to confirm genuineadvances in cognition.

The other potential source of observations on wars reality was ofcourse first-hand experience. It is certainly rare to find thinkers on warwho combine the qualities required of both the soldier and the philoso-pher. Clausewitzs experiences added to the depths of his comprehen-sion of war. Many sections of On War and his historical studies drawupon, albeit often implicitly, his own recollections of campaigns inwhich he fought.145 He also suggested that only those who have experi-enced war can truly be in a position to emphasise aspects that mayevade the armchair theorist. For instance, the danger, fear, and frictionthat affect war so greatly may not be directly apparent to the mere spec-tator. As Clausewitz pithily remarks, in ones library these elements arenot known.146 That these factors play such an integral role in his theoryowes a great deal, not only to influential forerunners, but also to hisfirst-hand knowledge of war. As he notes, theorists who have neverlearned to generalise from experience, are impractical and even ridicu-lous: they teach only what is already common knowledge.147 The diffi-cult task, however, was translating these experiences into theory, andexpressing them through coherent and comprehensible concepts.

So, Clausewitz conceived of a near ceaseless interaction between reason-ing and experience. They should be in constant dialogue with one anotheras neither is much use in isolation. The practical soldier in him led to a ten-dency to favour practice, but if theory was to improve mens understandingof the phenomenon then it had to make sense of the reality through philos-ophy: Analysis and observation, theory and experience must never disdaineach other; on the contrary, they support each other.148 The two are mutu-ally supportive as practice requires understanding, while theory should notrender itself useless by becoming detached from reality (the latter being apronounced problem in relation to modern nuclear strategy). The impor-tance of resolving this tension is revealed in a heated outburst in On Warwhen Clausewitz states that theory:

only needs intelligent treatment to make it conform to action, and toend the absurd difference between theory and practice that unreason-able theories have so often evoked. That difference, which defiescommon sense, has often been used as a pretext by limited and igno-rant minds to justify their congenital incompetence.149

There is, however, still one area of reality that theory must encompassif it is to retain its relevance. History not only revealed to Clausewitz


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the incredible variety of wars in the past, but opened his eyes to the vastpotential of the future. This sentiment is revealed in a section in whichClausewitz is speculating on whether the sort of limited wars, commonthroughout history, will recur: we should be bound to say that in spiteof our theory there may even be other wars of this kind in the next tenyears, and that our theory [of absolute war], though strictly logical,would not apply to reality.150 Clausewitz was not only concerned withwars in recorded history or that he had experienced, but also with thoseyet to occur.

Material versus Moral Factors

The emphasis Clausewitz placed on the importance of experience ledhim to another crucial issue. He notes how previously the study of warconcerned only the total body of knowledge and skill that was con-cerned with material factors.151 As such, war would hardly provide ascientific problem for a schoolboy.152 Most earlier theorists had directedtheir attention to physical matters such as issues of troop numbers, sup-ply, geometry, and even geology.153 These theories, he explains, wereabout as useful to combat as the craft of the swordsmith to the art offencing. It did not yet include the use of force under constant condi-tions of danger . . . nor the efforts of spirit and courage to achieve adesired end.154 Some of these thinkers, such as Saxe and Lloyd, hadplaced significant emphasis on the importance of psychological forces,but only in a haphazard manner.155 For instance, in his Reveries, Saxenoted how, in war, the solution lies in human hearts and that this mat-ter is the most important, the most learned and the most profound, ofthe profession of war.156 Nevertheless, his general insights on that sub-ject are not given a firm theoretical basis, no matter what excuses hegave for the irregularity of the arrangement, as well as the inelegance ofthe style of his work.157

Progressing beyond these limited systems, Clausewitz emphasisedthat an observation of reality revealed that moral forces are fundamen-tal to war and must be incorporated in theory. Previous theories haddirected their inquiries predominantly toward physical quantities,whereas all military action is intertwined with psychological forces andeffects.158 Clausewitz argued that, while material factors may yield tothe application of reason, war, as a human social activity, is universallybound up with intangible factors where the rules dissolve into nothingbut vague ideas.159 Just as Goethe revealed a mans physical weaknessto be relative by describing how he can be so enraged by an insult that

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he takes on six opponents and overcomes them,160 so Clausewitzstressed that analysis of physical factors alone was insufficient. Clause-witz observed that, All these and similar effects in the sphere of mindand spirit have been proved by experience: they recur constantly, andare therefore entitled to receive their due as objective factors. Whatindeed would become of a theory that ignored them?161 It was there-fore the task of theory to analyse emotional forces of all kinds: the psy-chology of the individual and the psychology of the group.162

Clausewitz thus developed concepts that he felt best expressed thesefactors, such as genius, passion, morale, courage, military virtues, and soforth. Their incorporation in theory mirrors what Clausewitz felt wasthe existing dichotomy between theory and practice: theory had a ten-dency to focus on material factors, as distinct from practice which wasinevitably pervaded by moral forces. Yet, he acknowledged this was anenormously difficult task: conceptualisation of these factors wouldalways be limited because they relate to values that can only be per-ceived by the inner eye, which differs in each person.163 He did notbelieve that such aspects of war could be quantified or calculated, butthat they must be recognised as an integral element of war and studiedas far as inherent limitations allow.

Moreover, any theoretical observations must be based on experience:no theorist, and no commander, should bother himself with psycholog-ical and philosophical sophistries.164 Perhaps Clausewitz had in mindhere some of the earlier thinkers, such as Berenhorst, who had over-played moral factors or expressed them in a manner that subvertedsound theoretical analysis. The recognition of such factors should not,Clausewitz held, preclude the articulation of clear concepts derivedfrom detailed study he did not entirely reject the possibility of a scien-tific approach, even when such intangibles were involved. He admittedthat theory becomes infinitely more difficult as soon as it touches therealm of moral values165 and this explains why he held strategy to beless susceptible to theoretical principles than tactics, which was con-cerned mostly with material problems166 but that if astutely analysedthey can at least be conveyed in the form of understandable conceptsand find their place next to physical aspects in theory.

Just as theory had to reconcile ideas and practice, so too did it needto reconcile material and moral factors.167 Clausewitz held that moraland physical forces cannot be separated and should be conceived as anorganic whole which, unlike a metal alloy, is inseparable by chemicalprocesses.168 Moreover, Clausewitz believed moral forces could be themost decisive in war: One might say that the physical seem little more


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than the wooden hilt, while the moral factors are the precious metal,the real weapons, the finely-honed blade.169 Napoleon had reached asimilar conclusion when he stated that the moral is to the physical asthree to one.170 One of the principal dangers of abstract theorising wasits tendency to ignore such intangible, yet often decisive elements ofwar because they do not translate neatly into mathematical formulae ordoctrinal precepts. Moreover, the emphasis on psychological factors onlyreinforced Clausewitzs belief that theory should not be dogmatic forinstance, what theory could actually teach courage in the face of danger.All theory could do is acknowledge their importance.

The Universal versus the Particular

Aron has observed that strategic thought draws its inspiration eachcentury, or rather at each moment of history, from the problemswhich events themselves pose.171 And so, the 18th century theorists,in their attempts to create a timeless science of war, focused tooheavily on their own times and paradoxically sacrificed universalapplication to contemporary relevance, and perhaps social acclaim.172

The great Napoleonic campaigns dominated the minds of militarythinkers in Clausewitzs day, and how could they not? Those cata-clysmic events not only represented a whole new form of war, butfor active officers like Clausewitz, analysis of them was powerfullylinked to action. Theory, as we have seen, had to be closely linkedto reality not only in the interest of methodological rigour, butalso for the sake of national survival. As Howard notes, Clausewitzhad the practical mans horror of abstractions that could not bedirectly related to the facts of the situation.173

This was undoubtedly so, but Clausewitz was equally concerned,particularly in his later years, to establish those aspects of war that wereimmutable. As Paret states, for Clausewitz, to devise effective strategyand tactical measures mattered far less to him than to identify the perma-nent elements of war and come to understand how they function.174 Heintended his work to last, that it would not be forgotten after two orthree years, and that possibly might be picked up more than once bythose who are interested in the subject.175 As Hugh Smith notes,Clausewitz believed there existed a universal element in war: commonand enduring features that escape change and must not be lost fromview.176 The problem of reconciling these two poles, the universal andthe particular objective and subjective knowledge was not a novelproblem and has occupied the minds of many philosophers throughout

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history. But, as Clausewitz understood, recognition of the problem wasnot a sufficient condition for progress toward its resolution.

Clausewitz had recognised too great an emphasis on the universalleads one towards the scylla of banal generalities and dull truths, whiletoo much emphasis on the particular led to the charybdis of mindlesstrivialities and sterile pedantry. As we have seen, his fear of descendinginto dogmatism restrained him from making theoretical claims of rele-vance only to the particular circumstances under study and whichwould cause one to drown in trivialities.177 He was also acutely awareof the limits of theory and that any attempt to establish timeless truthswas fraught with danger. As he recognised, most military theorists hadbeen over-impressed by the Napoleonic period, drawing hasty conclu-sions from the principles it appeared to emphasise: as he warned, Who-ever relies purely on the perspectives of his own times is inclined totreat what is most recent as best.178

It could be argued that Clausewitz very nearly fell into the trap ofparticularism. Two key factors perhaps explain how he avoided this pit-fall. First, it would be wrong to view the impact of the events ofClausewitzs times in a unitary fashion. Rather, the period he livedthrough is perhaps best conceived of as being split into two principalstages, both with unique features. As Creveld explains, Born and raisedin one set of axioms, rules, theories, beliefs, he saw it abruptly shatteredby defeat and replaced by another superior to it. It was this fact. . .whichenabled him to compare both sets [and] contrast them.179 This varietyof experience forced Clausewitz to attempt to reconcile such divergentperiods of war and consider their differences and similarities, their con-tradictions and commonalties.180 Of course, simply witnessing this tran-sition in the form of war was not sufficient to give rise to Clausewitzsmature theories, as his contemporaries drew quite different conclusions:that the decisive Napoleonic campaign represented the apotheosis ofwar and would constitute the norm henceforth. A wider perspectiveenabled Clausewitz to avoid this trap.

Second, the developing historicist school emphasised for Clausewitzthe particularity of different epochs and cultures. As noted above, hehad great sympathy with Herders view that different ages should beassessed in their own right, indeed, so much so that Clausewitz claimedthat every age would have held to its own theory of war.181 Of course,an extreme version of historicism can lead to a form of dusty antiquari-anism or a relativist belief that the singularities of unique periods serveto make attempts at abstract conceptual generalisations futile. Clausewitznever went this far. He was not a relativist and did not dismiss the


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possibility of comparison across ages. He believed that the analyst mustliberate himself from the fashions and constraints of his own age to dis-cover those elements that are comparable and present in every war.182

The historicist perspective acted as a check on the tendency to universa-lise his present the Napoleonic experience and compelled him toview it in its own unique context and helped him avoid the error of defin-ing Napoleonic war as the correct war.183 An awareness of the incredi-ble variety of wars throughout history forced the theorist to engage in adifficult process of distinguishing what is essential from what is merelyincidental. The desire to extrapolate the universal from the particular wasa crucial element of his historical studies, for instance Paret notes that,for Clausewitz, the manifold uniqueness of the episode reveals theworking of timeless elements.184

This is not to suggest that he always managed to bridge this divide.Creveld notes that those sections of On War where he comes closest tooffering advice of the how-to-do-it-variety . . . are most often regardedas hopelessly obsolete.185 Nevertheless, he was determined to develop atheory that was applicable to his own time as well as others, and thatdid not offer bland platitudes or overtly disagree with experience. It isapt to quote a passage by Clausewitz that encapsulates his thinking onthis issue:

Philosophy teaches us to recognise the relations that essential ele-ments bear to one another, and it would indeed be rash from this todeduce universal laws governing every single case, regardless of allhaphazard influences. Those people, however, who never rise aboveanecdote, as a great writer said, and who construct all history of indi-vidual cases starting always with the most striking feature, the highpoint of the event, and digging only as deep as suits them, never getdown to the general features that govern the matter. Consequentlytheir findings will never be valid for more than a single case; indeedthey will consider a philosophy that encompasses the general run ofcases as a mere dream.186

Reflections

In the course of writing On War Clausewitz attempted to reconcile theapparently conflicting elements of theory. He explored the extremes ofthese methodological dualities and sought their resolution by appropriat-ing the most valuable aspects of each and fusing them to create a theo-retical dualism, like a negotiated agreement between conflicting parties.

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On War is the fruit of these methodological labours. Clausewitz soughtto provide clear concepts derived from both logical reason and experi-ence, which combine material and ideational forces, and that are presentin every war, yet manifest themselves according to the circumstances ofthe moment. His central conclusions as most famously embodied inthe trinity of politics, chance, and passion are intended not as doc-trinal prescriptions, but as guides to understanding.

Clausewitz provided a standard of excellence in terms of developinga methodology making possible the formulation of a universal theory ofwar. It is a methodology that confronts the theorist with perhaps themost intractable problems in social studies and deals maturely withmany of the issues that continue to vex the minds of theorists today. Itmay even be argued that the direct and lucid way Clausewitz presentedthese problems is superior to the often convoluted language of manymodern political scientists.

Few military thinkers have approached the subject with such dedica-tion, wide-ranging experience, or intellectual integrity, combined with astrong desire to avoid an ostentatious exhibition of ideas187 as so oftenaccompanies intellectual vanity. Clausewitz faced his theoretical prob-lems almost with what at times appears to be a sense of desperation, asif his life depended upon the successful resolution of some nagging log-ical antinomy. To an extent this was true. Late in life Clausewitzbecame increasingly aware that he would not achieve great distinctionthrough battlefield command so he devoted his final years to one areawhere he could achieve lasting influence: theory. In this, we may confi-dently conclude that he succeeded. Even those who disagree with hissubstantive conclusions might at least recognise that he set the standardin tackling a subject that has evaded the grasp of many a great mind. AsClausewitz once put it, Not what we have argued but the manner inwhich we have argued may, we believe, benefit theory.188

NOTES

1 Michael Howard, War in European History (Oxford: OUP 1976) p.75.2 For instance: the Wars of the First Coalition, the Battle of Auerstadt, Napoleons disas-

trous Russian Campaign, and the Waterloo Campaign.3 Peter Paret, Clausewitz and the State: The Man, His Theories, and His Times (Princeton UP

1985) p.8.4 See Hew Strachan, Carl von Clausewitzs On War: A Biography (New York: Atlantic

Monthly Press 2007) p.-79.5 Karl Ameriks (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to German Idealism (Cambridge: CUP

2006) p.i.6 J.M. Roberts, The Hutchinson History of the World (London: Hutchinson 1976) p.710.


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7 Immanuel Kant, An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?, in ImmanuelKant, Political Writings, ed. Hans Reiss (Cambridge: CUP 1993) p.54.

8 Roger Osborne, Civilisation: A New History of the Western World (London: Jonathan Cape2006) p.304.

9 Roberts, History of the World (note 6) p.710.10 Gibbon could state in 1780 that we cannot determine to what height the human species

may aspire in their advances towards perfection; but it may be safely presumed that nopeople . . . will relapse into their original barbarism. Quoted in H.G. Wells, The Outlineof History (London: Cassell 1920) p.449.

11 Azar Gat, A History of Military Thought: From the Enlightenment to the Cold War (Oxford:OUP2001) p.-30. Emphasis added.

12 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret [1832](New York: Everymans Library 1993) p.-154.

13 See Gat, Military Thought (note 11) p.174.14 Maurice de Saxe, Reveries on the Art of War, trans. and ed. Thomas R. Phillips (New York:

Dover Publications 2007) p.17.15 Martin van Creveld, The Eternal Clausewitz, in Michael I. Handel (ed.), Clausewitz and

Modern Strategy (Abingdon, UK: Routledge 2005) p.40.16 Saxe, Reveries (note 14) p.17.17 R.R. Palmer, Frederick the Great, Guibert, Bulow: From Dynastic to National War, in

Peter Paret (ed.), Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Oxford:OUP 1986) p.106; Martin van Creveld, The Art of War: War and Military Thought (NewYork: Smithsonian Books 2005) p.91.

18 Guibert quoted in Palmer, From Dynastic to National War (note 17) p.107.19 Gat, Military Thought (note 11) p.49.20 Henry Lloyd, History of the Late War between the King of Prussia and the Empress of Germany

and her Allies (London 1781) p.vi.21 Gat, Military Thought (note 11) p.72.22 Palmer, From Dynastic to National War (note 17) p.115.23 Creveld, The Art of War (note 17) p.97.24 Michael Howard, Studies in War and Peace (London: Temple Smith 1970) p.25.25 Carl von Clausewitz, On the Life and Character of Scharnhorst, in Carl von Clause-

witz, Historical and Political Writings, ed. and trans. Peter Paret and Daniel Moran (NewJersey: Princeton UP 1992), p.103. In Book 5 of On War, he states that it is evident thatthis elegant piece of geometry is nothing but a toy: it rests on a series of substitutions atthe expense of truth. Clausewitz, On War (note 12) p.409.

26 Jomini was heavily indebted to Lloyd for many of his terms. Brian Bond, The Pursuit ofVictory: From Napoleon to Saddam Hussein (Oxford: OUP 2006) p.44.

27 See Antoine Henri de Jomini, The Art of War, trans. G.H. Mendell and W.P. Craighill[1838] (Texas: El Paso Norte Press 2005) pp.79100.

28 Jomini, Art of War (note 27) p.258. This point is also noted by Gat, Military Thought (note11) p.115.

29 John Shy, Jomini, in Paret, Makers of Modern Strategy (note 17) p.144.30 Ibid. p.-145.31 Strachan has noted that Clausewitz was not so different from his predecessors as he

liked to maintain: he developed their themes as much as he reacted against them. HewStrachan, Review of Azar Gats The Origins of Military Thought: From the Enlightenment toClausewitz, English Historical Review107/ 425 (Oct. 1992) p.1035.

32 Gat, Military Thought (note 11) p.95.33 Jomini, Art of War (note 27) pp. 258 and 260.34 Ibid. p.286.35 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. T. Cleary (Boston: Shambhala 1988) p.45.36 Jomini, Art of War p.260.37 Clausewitz, On the Life and Character of Scharnhorst (note 25) pp.1034.38 Clausewitz, On War (note 12) p.197. Emphasis in original.

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39 A point made by Alan Beyerchen in his article, Clausewitz, Nonlinearity and theUnpredictability of War, International Security, 17/ 3 (Winter 1992), pp.5990.

40 T.E. Lawrence, The Evolution of a Revolt, Army Quarterly and Defence Journal, Oct. 1920.41 Clausewitz, On War (note 12) p.215.42 Ibid. p.154.43 John Keegan, A History of Warfare (London: Pimlico 2004) p.12.44 Clausewitz, Authors Preface To an Unpublished Manuscript on the Theory of War,

Written between 1816 and 1818, in Clausewitz, On War (note 12) p.69.45 Strachan, Carl von Clausewitzs On War (note 4) p.89.46 Howard, Studies (note 24) pp.267.47 Paret, Clausewitz and the State (note 3) p.148.48 Quoted in Raymond Aron, Peace and War (New Jersey: Transaction, 2003) p.43.49 Gat has demonstrated that Scharnhorst should be situated in the context of the German

Aufklarers despite his rejection of the radical interpretations of the movement. Gat,Military Thought (note 11) pp.15961.

50 Raymond Aron, Clausewitz: Philosopher of War, trans. C. Booker and N. Stone (New Jersey:Prentice-Hall 1985) p.55.

51 Paret, Clausewitz and the State (note 3) p.149.52 Hew Strachan, Clausewitz and the Dialectics of War, in Hew Strachan and Andreas

Herberg-Rothe, Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press,2007) p.19.

53 Michael Howard, Clausewitz: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press,2002) p.23.

54 Quoted in Gat, Military Thought (note 11) p.156.55 Ibid. p.155.56 Antulio J. Echevarria II, Clausewitz and Contemporary War (Oxford: OU P 2007) p.112.57 Creveld, The Art of War (note 17) p.107.58 Gat, Military Thought (note 11) p.167.59 See John Gray, Black Mass: Apocalyptic Religion and the Death of Utopia (London: Penguin

2007).60 Jeane Kirkpatrick, Democracy and Double Standards: Rationalism and Reason in Politics (New

York: Simon and Schuster, 1982) p.10.61 Peter Paret, Understanding War: Essays on Clausewitz and the History of Military Power (New

Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993) p.138.62 Marvin Perry, An Intellectual History of Modern Europe (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 1993)

p.234.63 Nicholas Boyle, German Literature: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: OU P 2008) p.-48.64 Schleiermacher was a personal acquaintance of Clausewitz.65 Paret, Clausewitz and the State (note 3) p.71.66 Clausewitz, On the Life and Character of Scharnhorst (note 37) p.100.67 Paret, Understanding War (note 61) p.139.68 Clausewitz, On War (note 12) p.199.69 Paret, Clausewitz and the State (note 3) p.166.70 Ibid. p.167.71 Clausewitz, On War (note 12) p.717.72 Paret, Clausewitz and the State (note 3) p.150.73 Gat, Military Thought (note 11) p.162.74 Clausewitz, On War (note 12) p.174.75 Hugh Smith, On Clausewitz (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan 2005) p.176.76 Clausewitz, On War (note 12) p.163.77 Clausewitz, Unfinished Note, in On War (note 12) p.80.78 Clausewitz, On War (note 12) p.152.79 Ibid.80 Ibid. p.83.81 Ibid. p.101.


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82 See Creveld, The Eternal Clausewitz (note 15) pp.3548.83 Gat notes that in his work, prior to the last stage of his life, there are no theses and

antitheses, no polarity or dialectic, not, indeed, any mention of absolute war. Gat,Military Thought (note 11) p.233.

84 Strachan, Dialectics (note 52) p.37.85 Clausewitz, On War (note 12) p.732.86 Paret, Understanding War (note 61) pp.1634.87 Strachan, Biography p.91.88 Christopher Bassford, The Primacy of Policy and the Trinity in Clausewitzs Mature

Thought, in Hew Strachan and Andreas Herberg-Rothe, Clausewitz in the Twenty-FirstCentury (Oxford: OU P2007) p.75.

89 Clausewitz, On War (note 12) p.147.90 Ibid. p.173.91 Ibid. p.156.92 Ibid. p.172.93 Ibid. p.173.94 Ibid.95 Ibid. p.170.96 Ibid. p.172.97 Ibid. p.170.98 Ibid. p.97.99 Ibid. p.173.100 War in its ensemble is not a science, but an art. Strategy, particularly, may indeed be

regulated by fixed laws resembling those of the positive sciences, but this is not true ofwar viewed as a whole. Jomini, Art of War (note 27) p.258.

101 Clausewitz, On War (note 12) p.173.102 Ibid. p.97.103 Ibid. p.174.104 Ibid. p.153.105 Ibid. pp.1734.106 Ibid. p.173.107 Ibid. p.173.108 Strachan, Dialectics, p.17.109 Aron, Clausewitz (note 50) p.51.110 Ibid. pp.1623.111 Clausewitz, On War (note 12) p.161.112 Ibid. p.168.113 Jomini, Art of War (note 27) p.261.114 Paul A. Rahe, Thucydides as educator, in Williamson Murray and Richard Hart

Sinnreich (eds.)., The Past as Prologue: The Importance of History to the Military Profession(New York: Cambridge U P 2006) p.-99.

115 Clausewitz, On War (note 12) p.183.116 Ibid. p.196.117 Ibid. p.55.118 See Terry Pinkard, German Philosophy 1760-1860: The Legacy of Idealism (Cambridge:

CU P 2008) pp.79.119 Clausewitz, On War (note 12) p.698.120 Bernard Brodie, War and Politics (London: Cassell 1974) p.446.121 Quoted in Hew Strachan, European Armies and the Conduct of War (London: Routledge

2006) p.3.122 Clausewitz, On War (note 12) p.168.123 Clausewitz states that a whole range of propositions can be demonstrated without

difficulty. Clausewitz, Unfinished Note p.80.

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124 For instance: theory should not accompany the commander to the battlefield, just as awise teacher guides and stimulates a. young mans intellectual development, but is carefulnot to lead him by the hand for the rest of his life. Clausewitz, On War (note 12) p.163.

125 For one example amongst many, in his discussion of the principle that the destructionof the enemys force underlies all military actions, this is persistently qualified by suchphrases as, this aim is not always encountered in reality, and need not be fully realisedas a condition of peace. On no account should theory raise it to the level of a law. Ibid.p.103.

126 Alan Beyerchen, Clausewitz, Nonlinearity and the Unpredictability of War, Interna-tional Security, 17/3 (Winter 1992) pp.5990.

127 Paret, Clausewitz and the State (note 3) p.154.128 In relation to friction he notes that it is a force that theory can never quite define. Even

if it could the development of instinct and tact would still be needed. Clausewitz, OnWar (note 12) p.140.

129 Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York: Free Press 1991) p.-116.130 Clausewitz, On the Life and Character of Scharnhorst (note 37) p.100.131 Paret notes that, No military theorist at the time was as conscious as Scharnhorst of

the innate conflict between theory and reality. His elaboration of this fundamentalissue, and his refusal to seek its solution in increasingly complex abstractions, constitutethe most important lesson he taught Clausewitz. Paret, Clausewitz and the State (note 3)p.71.

132 Clausewitz, On the Life and Character of Scharnhorst (note 37) p.99.133 See Clausewitz, The Germans and the French, in Clausewitz, Historical and Political

Writings (note 25) p.57. See also Parkinson, Roger, Clausewitz: A Biography (New York:Stein and Day 1979) p.94.

134 Carl von Clausewitz, Notes on History and Politics, in Clausewitz, Historical and Politi-cal Writings (note 25) p.270.

135 Clausewitz, On War (note 12) p.198.136 Ibid. p.197.137 Clausewitz, On the Life and Character of Scharnhorst (note 37) p.104.138 Clausewitz, Authors Preface, in Clausewitz, On War (note 12) p.69.139 Strachan, Dialectics (note 52) p.38.140 Clausewitz, On War, pp.7003.141 Ibid. p.191.142 Peter Paret and Daniel Moran, Introduction to Part One, in Clausewitz, Historical and

Political Writings (note 25) p.3.143 Livy, The Early History of Rome, trans. Aubrey de Selincourt (London: Penguin 2002)

p.30.144 Howard, Clausewitz (note 53) p.31.145 His study of the 1812 Campaign is more overtly personal in character. Clausewitz,

Campaign of 1812 (note 25), pp.113204.146 Ibid. p.166. On the subject of friction, in On War, Clausewitz notes that, Those who

know of war only from books or the parade-ground cannot recognise the existence ofthese impediments to action, and so we must ask them to accept on faith what they lackin experience. Clausewitz, On War (note 12) p.211.

147 Ibid. p.139.148 Clausewitz, Authors Preface, in Clausewitz, On War (note 12) p.69.149 Clausewitz, On War (note 12) p.164.150 Ibid. p.702.151 Ibid. p.153.152 Ibid. p.208.153 Clausewitz discusses this in relation to Mathieu Dumas who discovered that the funda-

mental principle lay in possession of the higher ground. By way of numerous halftruths and doubtful conclusions this led to a highly picturesque system of geologicalanalogies. The neighbours of the clouds, the highest mountain peaks, rule the land


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below them, while the rivers become the couriers of their might. The art of war seemsto arise geologically from the bowels of the earth. Clausewitz, On the Life and Char-acter of Scharnhorst (note 37) p.103.

154 Clausewitz, On War (note 12) p.153.155 Paret, Clausewitz and the State (note 3) pp.1578.156 Saxe, Reveries (note 14) p.18.157 Saxe claimed that he wrote his work whilet sick with fever.158 Clausewitz, On War (note 12) p.156.159 Ibid. p.157.160 Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, The Sorrows of Young Werther [1774] (London: Penguin

1989) p.62.161 Clausewitz, On War (note 12) p.158.162 Paret, Clausewitz and the State (note 3) p.373.163 Clausewitz, On War (note 12) p.158.164 Ibid.165 Ibid. p.157.166 Ibid. p.162.167 Ibid. p.216.168 Ibid.169 Ibid. p.217.170 Quoted in Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World (Lon-

don: Penguin 2005) p.242.171 Quoted in Colin S. Gray, Strategy and History: Essays on Theory and Practice (Abingdon,

UK: Routledge 2006) p.-xi.172 As Luvaas notes, those theorists were far too pragmatic to worry about formulating

maxims that would apply for all time. Jay Luvaas, The Great Military Historians andPhilosophers, in John E. Jessop and Robert W. Coakley, A Guide to the Study and Use ofMilitary History (Washington DC: Center of Military History 1988) p.69.

173 Howard, Clausewitz (note 53) pp.23.174 Paret, Clausewitz, in Paret, Makers (note 17) p.187. Emphasis added.175 Clausewitz, Authors Comment, in On War (note 12) p.72.176 Smith, On Clausewitz (note 75) p.184.177 Clausewitz quoted in Smith, On Clausewitz (note 75) p.173.178 Quoted in Strachan, Dialectics (note 52) p.39.179 Creveld, Eternal Clausewitz (note 15) pp.467. Parkinson also draws a distinction

between the old forms of war in 1793 and 1806, and the new in 1812, 1813, 1814 and1815. Parkinson, Clausewitz (note 133) p.310.

180 Paret notes how Clausewitzs recognition of a discontinuity between Frederick andNapoleon helped Clausewitz create a unified, all-encompassing theory of war. Paret,Understanding (note 61) p.152.

181 Clausewitz, On War (note 12) p.717.182 Paret, Clausewitz and the State (note 3) p.153.183 Paret, Understanding (note 61) p.152.184 Paret in Clausewitz, Historical and Political Writings (note 25) p.206.185 Creveld, The Eternal Clausewitz (note 15) p.35.186 Clausewitz, On War (note 12) p.448.187 Ibid. p.197.188 Carl von Clausewitz, Strategic Critique of the Campaign of 1814 in France, in Clause-

witz, Historical and Political Writings (note 25) p.208.

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