SECv. Citigroup Global Markets - Remedies 1 s 1 S.E.C. v. Citigroup Global Markets George W. Conk Adjunct Professor of Law & Senior Fellow, Stein Center for Law & Ethics Room 409 [email protected]212-636-7446 Torts Today: http://tortstoday.blogspot.com Otherwise – Commentaries on Law, Language & Politics Blackstonetoday.blogspot.com Updated March 3, 2015 1
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Class Discussion Slides - S.E.C. v. Citgroup Global Markets
ppt discussion slides regarding scope of exercise by District Judge Rakoff of judicial discretion in granting or denying consent judgment sought by S.E.C. in settlement of a civil enforcement action against Citigroup Global Markets.
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SECv. Citigroup Global Markets - Remedies 1s 11
S.E.C. v. Citigroup Global Markets
George W. ConkAdjunct Professor of Law & Senior Fellow, Stein Center for Law &
SEC v. Citigroup (2012 & 2014) Did Judge Rakoff’s rejection of the
proposed settlement and injunction exceed his powers under FRCP 65 to take into account the public interest?
Was his order to the SEC and Citigroup to proceed to trial properly stayed?
Is there any significant role remaining for a trial judge to review a settlement between prosecutor and regulated entity?
Should there be?Ch. 4 Injunctions 4
Rule 8 – Stay or Injunction Pending Appeal
(a) Motion for Stay.
(1) Initial Motion in the District Court. A party must ordinarily move first in the district court for the following relief:(A) a stay of the judgment or order of a district court pending appeal;(B) approval of a supersedeas bond; or(C) an order suspending, modifying, restoring, or granting an injunction while an appeal is pending.
5Ch. 4 Injunctions
Rule 8 – Stay or Injunction pending Appeal (2) Motion in the Court of Appeals;
Conditions on Relief. A motion for the relief mentioned in
Rule 8(a)(1) may be made to the court of appeals or to one of its judges.
(A) The motion must:(i) show that moving first in the district court would be impracticable; or(ii) state that, a motion having been made, the district court denied the motion or failed to afford the relief requested and state any reasons given by the district court for its action.
6Ch. 4 Injunctions
Rule 8 – Stay or Injunction pending Appeal
(B) The motion must also include:i) the reasons for granting the relief requested and the facts relied on;(ii) originals or copies of affidavits or other sworn statements supporting facts subject to dispute; and
(iii) relevant parts of the record.
7Ch. 4 Injunctions
Rule 8 – Stay or Injunction pending Appeal
(C) The moving party must give reasonable notice of the motion to all parties.
8Ch. 4 Injunctions
Rule 8 – Stay or Injunction pending Appeal
(D) A motion under this Rule 8(a)(2) must be filed with the circuit clerk and normally will be considered by a panel of the court.
But in an exceptional case in which time requirements make that procedure impracticable, the motion may be made to and considered by a single judge.
9Ch. 4 Injunctions
Rule 8 – Stay or Injunction pending Appeal
(E) The court may condition relief on a party's filing a bond or other appropriate security in the district court.
10Ch. 4 Injunctions
Citigroup and SEC consent order
(1) a permanent injunction barring Citigroup violations of SEC Act
(2) disgorge $160 million asserted net profits usable to compensate investors
(3) prejudgment interest - $30 million (4) a civil penalty of $95 million - no offset vs. civil claims by
investors - internal changes monitored for 3
years SECv. Citigroup Global Markets - Remedies 11
Fair, reasonable, and in the public interest? Rakoff 2011
The injunctive power of the judiciary is not a free-roving remedy to be invoked at the whim of a regulatory agency, even with the consent of the regulated.
If its deployment does not rest on facts—cold, hard, solid facts, established either by admissions or by trials—it serves no lawful or moral purpose and is simply an engine of oppression.
SECv. Citigroup Global Markets - Remedies 12
2d Circuit – remand – June 4, 2014A rubber stamp? Proof of adequacy is not required “determining whether the proposed
S.E.C. consent decree serves the public interest...rests squarely with the S.E.C.”
“the primary focus of the [District Court] should be ensuring the consent decree is procedurally proper..taking care not to infringe on the S.E.C.’s discretionary authority to settle…”
SECv. Citigroup Global Markets - Remedies 13
Judicial review – 2d Cir. 2014
A court should, at a minimum, assess (1) the basic legality of the decree, (2) are the terms of the decree clear (3) does the consent decree reflects
a resolution of the actual claims in the complaint
(4) is the consent decree tainted by improper collusion or corruption of some kind.
SECv. Citigroup Global Markets - Remedies 14
Fraudulent Interstate Transactions15 U.S.C. 77q
A material omission
SECv. Citigroup Global Markets - Remedies 15
Securities Act of 193315 USC 77q(a) Fraudulent Interstate Transactions
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities…(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; orSECv. Citigroup Global Markets -
Remedies 16
Securities Act of 193315 USC 77q(a) Fraudulent Interstate Transactions
(3) to engage in any transaction,
practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud
or deceit upon the purchaser.
SECv. Citigroup Global Markets - Remedies 17
The complaint15 USC 77q (a)(2) and (3)
Citigroup Global Markets violated
sections 17(a)(2) and (3) of the
Securities Act of 1933 by negligently
misrepresenting key deal terms,
namely the process by which the
investment portfolio was selected
and Citigroup’s financial interest in
the transaction.
SECv. Citigroup Global Markets - Remedies 18
The remedies sought
“The Commission seeks
injunctive relief
disgorgement of profits
prejudgment interest
civil penalties and
other appropriate and necessary
equitable relief from defendant.”SECv. Citigroup Global Markets -
Remedies 19
15 USC 77t Injunctions and prosecution of offenses
(d)(2) (2) Amount of penalty
(A) … (ii) the gross amount of
pecuniary gain to such
defendant as a result of the
violation.
SECv. Citigroup Global Markets - Remedies 20
Synthetic CDO
SECv. Citigroup Global Markets - Remedies 21
Proposed settlement and complaint filed simultaneously October 19, 2011
SEC v. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc.
SECv. Citigroup Global Markets - Remedies 22
A negligence action
Citigroup “negligently
misrepresent(ed) key deal
terms“
SECv. Citigroup Global Markets - Remedies 23
SEC ¶ 43-45: Pitchbook described Citigroup as Initial CDS Asset Counterparty
Citibank – not Credit Suisse -
selected the assets to be sold as long
positions
Citigroup structured it as a “prop
trade”
Citigroup had a $500 million short
position of which $490 million was
“naked short”
SECv. Citigroup Global Markets - Remedies 24
SEC: negligent material omissions Citigroup play a substantial role in
asset selection Citigroup had taken a $500 million
short position of which $490 M was naked short
Citigroup shorted only the names it selected
SECv. Citigroup Global Markets - Remedies 25
SEC: Citigroup misleading disclosures were relied upon
Investors believed Citigroup was in
“traditional role of an arranging
bank”
But did not know Citigroup had
structured the deal and its interests
were adverse to those of the
investorsSECv. Citigroup Global Markets -
Remedies 26
The Deal“without admitting or denying
the allegations of the complaint”
SEC v. Citigroup
SECv. Citigroup Global Markets - Remedies 27
Citigroup consents to a final judgment: Permanently restraining violation of
Sections 17(a)(2) and (3) of the Securities Act
Pay disgorgement of $160 million Pre-judgment interest of $30 million Civil penalty - $95 million No offset in any related investor
action Preventive measures: In future -
closer internal controls and audit; advice of outside counselSECv. Citigroup Global Markets -
Remedies 28
The Court’s pre-hearing questions 1) Why should the Court impose a
judgment where serious securities fraud is alleged but the defendant neither admits nor denies wrongdoing?
2) Is there an overriding public interest in determining if the charges are true? Particularly where there is no parallel criminal case?
3) What was the total loss at most?
SECv. Citigroup Global Markets - Remedies 29
The Court’s pre-hearing questions 4) How was the amount set? Why is
the penalty here less than that in SEC v. Goldman Sachs?
5) State particularly how you applied the nine factors you say you consider in setting penalty amount.
6) How does SEC maintain compliance with the injunctions? Does it use contempt proceedings/
7) Why aren’t the culpable individuals paying the penalty?
SECv. Citigroup Global Markets - Remedies 30
The Court’s pre-hearing questions
8) What “control weaknesses”
led to the acts alleged? How will
the remedial measures prevent
recurrence?
9) How can a securities fraud of
this magnitude be the result
simply of negligence?
SECv. Citigroup Global Markets - Remedies 31
F.R.C.P. 65 – Injunctionsfair – reasonable - adequate - in the public interest
Plaintiffs must show:
(1) unless the restraining order issues, they will suffer irreparable harm;
(2) the hardship they will suffer absent the order outweighs any hardship the defendants would suffer if the order were to issue;
(3) they are likely to succeed on the merits of their claims;
(4) the issuance of the order will cause no substantial harm to the public; and
(5) they have no adequate remedy at law.
32Ch. 4 Injunctions
FRCP 65 - d) CONTENTS AND SCOPE OF EVERY INJUNCTION AND RESTRAINING ORDER.( (1) Contents. Every order granting an
injunction and every restraining order must:
(A) state the reasons why it issued; (B) state its terms specifically; and (C) describe in reasonable detail—
and not by referring to the complaint or other document—the act or acts restrained or required.
SECv. Citigroup Global Markets - Remedies 33
“a very good deal for Citigroup” (Rakoff)
Charged only with negligence
Very modest penalty
Injunctive relief of a kind rarely
if ever enforced
Inexpensive prophylactic
measures for 3 years
SECv. Citigroup Global Markets - Remedies 34
What does the settlement lack (Rakoff) No admission or finding of liability –
no collateral estoppel effect for investors
No Compensation for victims -who cannot recover for negligence under 10(b)(5)
Penalty low compared to Goldman Sachs and mere “pocket change” for Citibank
SEC contradicts itself by filing simultaneously against Stoker for intentional fraud
SECv. Citigroup Global Markets - Remedies 35
SEC – due deference is due The court’s fairness determination is
“within carefully prescribed limits” The court owes SEC “substantial
deference as the primary regulatory authority policing securities markets especially with respect to matters of transparency”
SECv. Citigroup Global Markets - Remedies 36
SEC – due deference is due Unless a consent decree is unfair,
inadequate, or unreasonable, it ought to be approved.
Also, the courts should pay deference to the judgment of the government agency which has negotiated and submitted the proposed judgment.SEC v. Randolph, 736 F.2d 525, 529 (9th Cir. Cal. 1984)
SECv. Citigroup Global Markets - Remedies 37
SEC v. Brian Stoker
Stoker intentionally structured
the deal as “a tailored
proprietary bet against the
assets in class V III”
SECv. Citigroup Global Markets - Remedies 38
Stoker’s “untrue statements of material facts or omissions of material facts” operated as a fraud or deceit upon purchasers of securities in violation of 17 (a) (2) and (3) of the Securities Act
SEC v. Brian Stoker
SECv. Citigroup Global Markets - Remedies 39
SEC: in assessing penalties we consider: Corporate benefits from the violation Impact on injured investors Need for deterrence Pervasiveness of the conduct Degree of scienter Harm to investors Difficulty of detection Voluntary remedial measures Extent of cooperation with
investigationSECv. Citigroup Global Markets -
Remedies 40
McConnell: judges must be neutral Judge Rakoff has effectively taken on
the role of a prosecutor, second-guessing the SEC’s law enforcement decisions. He may think his intervention will lead to more effective enforcement of the securities laws. But the more likely result of preventing settlements is to force companies to defend themselves in each case with all the resources at their command, rendering it impossibly costly for the SEC to pursue many enforcement actions.
SECv. Citigroup Global Markets - Remedies 41
Larson: need for congressional oversight
I certainly understand the frustration
of the court over what it apparently
perceives as persistent and systemic
problems at the SEC, as well as the
extent to which the SEC is effectively
(or ineffectively) fulfilling its mandate
through settlements such as the one
at issue in this case.SECv. Citigroup Global Markets - Remedies 42
Larson: need for congressional oversight
Those same concerns, however, are
most certainly a proper subject for
congressional oversight, and I would
not be surprised to see this case
serve as a springboard for additional
funding of the SEC by Congress,
perhaps precisely the objective Judge
Rakoff was seeking.SECv. Citigroup Global Markets - Remedies 43
Wanger: tough call I side with no one, as the law defines
the standards for approval of a class action settlement and vests the assigned judge with discretion to determine whether the overall settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable. A myriad of factors unique to making this determination are to be considered by the trial judge.
What record should SEC have to develop to satisfy a judge a settlement is fair?
SECv. Citigroup Global Markets - Remedies 44
NJ LJ: judges are not rubber stamps Rakoff recognized that substantial
deference was due the SEC but correctly observed that he had to exercise independent judgment to determine the settlement to be fair, reasonable, adequate and in the public interest.
The government took the extraordinary position that the SEC is the sole determiner of the public interest regarding consent judgments in its cases. But as Rakoff pointed out, that is not the law.
SECv. Citigroup Global Markets - Remedies 45
2d Circuit: D.J.’s Refusal to Approve Settlement Probably Unwarranted
3/15/2012
SEC/Citigroup Motion for a Stay or Mandamus
SECv. Citigroup Global Markets - Remedies 46
Stay – factors to consider (1) strong showing of likelihood
of success on merits (2) applicant will suffer
irreparable harm
(3) other parties will be injured by a stay
(4) a stay is in the public interest
SECv. Citigroup Global Markets - Remedies 47
Rakoff’s reasons for refusal to approve settlement as `fair reasonable, adequate, and in the public interest’
1) Failure of settlement to serve
the public interest
2) Unfairness to Citigroup
3)Absence of basis to assess
fairness
SECv. Citigroup Global Markets - Remedies 48
Rakoff – settlement fails public interest S.E.C. policy of allowing defendants
to enter consent orders without admitting or denying the underlying allegations is “hallowed by history but not by reason”
- investors shortchanged w/o collateral estoppel
Penalties too low - “a cost of doing business”
SECv. Citigroup Global Markets - Remedies 49
Rakoff – settlement fails public interest
Unfair to Citigroup because penalties
“on the basis of facts neither proven
nor acknowledged” carries risks of
abuse Injunction sought has inadequate
basis in facts established by trial or admissions
SECv. Citigroup Global Markets - Remedies 50
2d Circuit critique on merits Rakoff prejudged the facts
Assumed SEC would win at trial
Rakoff did not defer to SEC’s
judgment “on wholly discretionary
matters of policy”
Court review of policy-based
settlement decision is “minimal”SECv. Citigroup Global Markets -
Remedies 51
2d Circuit critique on merits Requiring an admission of liability
would “undermine any chance for compromise”
What is the harm in that? In school integration cases proof of
past discrimination is a required element for injunctive relief. [Grant v. Miami distinguished]
Shouldn’t payments of penalties and damages and injunctive relief have similar factual support?SECv. Citigroup Global Markets -
Remedies 52
SEC asserts its settlement is in the public interest Deference is owed to an executive
branch decision - - Agency expertise - Resolving competing views of the
public interest belongs to the political branches
- Judicial role not a rubber stamp – but limited to findings of arbitrariness, capriciousness, etc.
SECv. Citigroup Global Markets - Remedies 53
Will issuance of the stay substantially injure other persons in the Proceeding
The stay does nothing more than maintain the status quo existing prior to the district court's order.
We see no appreciable harm to anyone from issuing a stay [of the trial pending appeal].
SECv. Citigroup Global Markets - Remedies 54
Harvey Pitt as amicus in support of Judge Rakoff
A district court may consider
scienter or lack of it as one of
the aggravating or mitigating
factors to be taken into account
in exercising its equitable
discretion in deciding whether or
not to grant injunctive relief.SECv. Citigroup Global Markets - Remedies 55
Harvey Pitt as amicus in support of Rakoff
SEC internal processes address each factor in its prosecutorial decisions:
fair, reasonable, adequate, in public interest
SEC is able to answer Rakoff’s questions
Judge must exercise “a modicum of independent judgment”