FIRST DIVISIONMARIANO NOCOM, G.R. No. 182984 Petitioner,
Present: - versus - PUNO, C.J., Chairperson, CARPIO,CORONA, AZCUNA,
and LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.OSCAR CAMERINO, EFREN CAMERINO, CORNELIO
MANTILE and MILDRED DEL ROSARIO, in her capacity as legal heir and
representative of NOLASCO DEL ROSARIO,Respondents. Promulgated:
February 10, 2009X
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XDECISIONAZCUNA, J.:This is a petition for review on certiorari
seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision dated February 14,
2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) which affirmed the Joint Order
dated June 9, 2005 and Summary Judgment dated June 15, 2006 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Muntinlupa City, Branch 203 and
dismissed petitioners appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court
for lack of jurisdiction and its Resolution dated May 23, 2008
which denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.The present
case is an offshoot of the prior case, G.R. No. 161029, entitled
Springsun Management Systems Corporation v. Oscar Camerino, Efren
Camerino, Cornelio Mantile, Nolasco Del Rosario, and Domingo
Enriquez, which was promulgated on January 19, 2005 (449 SCRA 65)
and became final and executory on May 4, 2005 as recorded in the
Book of Entries of Judgment. The factual antecedents are as
follows:G.R. No. 161029:Respondent Oscar Camerino and
respondents-intervenors Efren Camerino, Cornelio Mantile, the
deceased Nolasco Del Rosario, represented by Mildred Del Rosario,
and Domingo Enriquez were the tenants who were tilling on the
parcels of land planted to rice and corn previously owned by
Victoria Homes, Inc. covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
Nos. 289237, now S-6135 (109,451 square meters); S-72244 (73,849
square meters); and 289236, now S-35855 (109,452 square meters). On
February 9, 1983, without notifying the respondents, Victoria
Homes, Inc. sold the said lots to Springsun Management Systems
Corporation (SMSC) for P9,790,612. The three deeds of sale were
duly registered with the Registry of Deeds of Rizal and new titles
were issued in the name of SMSC. Subsequently, SMSC mortgaged to
Banco Filipino (BF) the said lots as collaterals for its loans
amounting to P11,545,000. As SMSC failed to pay the loans due, BF
extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage and, later, was adjudged
the highest bidder. On May 10, 2000, SMSC redeemed the lots from
BF. Earlier, on March 7, 1995, respondents filed a complaint
against SMSC and BF for Prohibition/Certiorari,
Reconveyance/Redemption, Damages, Injunction with Preliminary
Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order, docketed as Civil Case
No. 95-020, with the RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch 256.On January
25, 2002, the RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch 256, found respondents
to be tenants who have been tilling on the subject land planted to
rice and corn since 1967 and, thus, authorized them to redeem the
subject lots. The dispositive portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby as follows:1. Declaring that
plaintiffs are entitled (sic) to redeem, and ordering the defendant
Springsun Management Systems Corporation (now petitioner) to allow
plaintiffs to redeem the landholdings in question within 180 days
from finality of this decision at the total price of P9,790,612.00;
upon full payment of the redemption price, the defendant Springsun
Management Systems Corporation is ordered to deliver plaintiffs the
titles and the corresponding Deed of Redemption so that the titles
to the properties in litigation can be transferred in the name of
the plaintiffs;[if !supportLists]2. [endif]Declaring plaintiffs
entitled to possession, and ordering the defendant Springsun
Management Systems Corporation and all persons claiming under it to
vacate the lands in question and to surrender the same to the
plaintiffs;[if !supportLists]3. [endif]Dismissing the case against
Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank;4. Ordering the defendant
Springsun Management Systems Corporation to pay plaintiffs the sum
of P200,000.00 as attorneys fees, plus costs.SO ORDERED.[if
!supportFootnotes][1][endif]On September 23, 2003, the CA, in
CA-G.R. SP No. 72475, affirmed with modification the RTC by
declaring the respondents to be tenants or agricultural lessees on
the disputed lots and, thus, entitled to exercise their right of
redemption, but deleted the award of P200,000 attorneys fees for
lack of legal basis. On January 19, 2005, this Court, in G.R. No.
161029, affirmed the CA and reiterated that being agricultural
tenants of Victoria Homes, Inc. that had sold the lots to SMSC
without notifying them, respondents had the right to redeem the
subject properties from SMSC. This Court denied SMSCs motions for
reconsideration and for leave to file a second motion for
reconsideration and, on May 4, 2005, an Entry of Judgment was made.
The present G.R. No. 182984:On December 3, 2003, petitioner Mariano
Nocom gave the respondents several Philtrust Bank Managers Checks
amounting to P500,000 each, which the latter encashed, representing
the price of their inchoate and contingent rights over the subject
lots which they sold to him. On December 18, 2003, respondents,
with the marital consent of their wives, executed an Irrevocable
Power of Attorney which was notarized by their counsel Atty. Arturo
S. Santos. Thus,IRREVOCABLE POWER OFATTORNEY[if
!supportFootnotes][2][endif]KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: WE,
OSCAR CAMERINO, of legal age, Filipino, married to Teresita L.
Magbanua: EFREN CAMERINO, of legal age, Filipino, married to Susana
Camerino, CORNELIO MANTILE, of legal age, Filipino, married to
Maria Fe Alon, NOLASCO DEL ROSARIO, of legal age, Filipino, married
to Mildred Joplo, and DOMINGO ENRIQUEZ, of legal age, Filipino,
married to Dionicia Enriquez whose residences are stated under our
respective names, hereby APPOINT, NAME, and CONSTITUTE MARIANO
NOCOM, of legal age, Filipino, married to Anacoreta Nocom and with
office at No. 2315 Aurora Blvd, Pasay City, in an irrevocable
manner, coupled with interest, for us and in our stead, to do all
or any of the following acts and deeds:[if !supportLists]1.
[endif]To sell, assign, transfer, dispose of, mortgage and alienate
the properties described in TCT Nos. 120542, 120541 and 123872 of
the Register of Deeds of Muntinlupa City, currently in the name of
Springsun Management Systems Corporation, consisting of 292,752
square meters subject matter of Civil Case No. 95-020 of the
Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 256. The said
court, in its decision dated January 25, 2002 which was affirmed
with modification of the Court of Appeals in its decision dated
September 24, 2003 in CA-G.R. SP No. 72475, adjudged that we are
legally entitled to redeem the lands from Springsun Management
Systems Corporation;[if !supportLists]2. [endif]To comply with the
said decision by paying the redemption price to Springsun
Management Systems Corporation and/or to the court, and upon such
payment, to secure execution of the judgment so that the titles can
be issued in the name of our attorney-in-fact;[if !supportLists]3.
[endif]To accept and receive for his exclusive benefit all the
proceeds which may be derived from the sale, mortgage, transfer or
deposition thereof;[if !supportLists]4. [endif]To sign and execute
all the necessary papers, deed and documents that may be necessary
or the accomplishment of purposes of the Deed of Assignment, and to
issue receipts and proper discharges therefor;[if !supportLists]5.
[endif]To negotiate, deal and transact with all the persons and
entities involved in Civil Case No. 95-020, RTC, Muntinlupa City,
Branch 256, with full power and authority to compromise with
them;[if !supportLists]6. [endif]To procure all documents and
papers in government agencies relative to the said properties and
case in court; and[if !supportLists]7. [endif]To procure the
necessary transfer certificate of titles in his name as the
absolute owner of said properties.GIVING AND GRANTING full power
and authority to our said attorney-in-fact to do all things
requisite and necessary with legal effects as if done by us when
present.IN WITNESS WHEREOF, We have hereunto affixed [our]
signatures this 18th day of December, 2003.(Sgd.) OSCAR CAMERINO
(Sgd.) EFREN CAMERINO Principal PrincipalSparrow St., Diamond Park
San Antonio, San PedroVictoria Homes, Tunasan LagunaMuntinlupa
City(Sgd.) CORNELIO MANTILE (Sgd.) NOLASCO DEL ROSARIO Principal
PrincipalVictoria Ave., Tunasan Esmido St., Diamond ParkMuntinlupa
City Victoria Homes, Muntinlupa City (Sgd.) DOMINGO ENRIQUEZ
Principal Tunasan Proper, Arandia Tunasan, Muntinlupa City WITH OUR
MARITAL CONSENT:(Sgd.) TERESITA MAGBANUA (Sgd.) SUSANA CAMERINO
Wife of Oscar Camerino Wife of Efren Camerino(Sgd.) MARIA FE ALON
ALON (Sgd.) MILDRED JOPLO Wife of Cornelio Mantile Wife of Nolasco
del Rosario (Sgd.) DIONICIA ENRIQUEZ Wife of Domingo
EnriquezCONFORME:(Sgd.) MARIANO NOCOM Attorney-in-Fact Meanwhile,
on July 21, 2005, the respondents, in Civil Case No. 95-020 of the
RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch 256, filed a Motion for Execution
with Prayer to Order the Register of Deeds of Muntinlupa City to
divest SMSC of title to the subject lots and have the same vested
on them. As SMSC refused to accept the redemption amount of
P9,790,612 plus P147,059.18 as commission given by the petitioner,
the respondents deposited, on August 4, 2005, the amounts of
P9,790,612, P73,529.59, and P73,529.59, duly evidenced by official
receipts, with the RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch 256. The RTC of
Muntinlupa City, Branch 256 granted respondents motion for
execution and, consequently, TCT Nos. 120542, 120541 and 123872 in
the name of SMSC were cancelled and TCT Nos. 15895, 15896 and 15897
were issued in the names of the respondents. It also ordered that
the Irrevocable Power of Attorney, executed on December 18, 2003 by
respondents in favor of petitioner, be annotated in the memorandum
of encumbrances of TCT Nos. 15895, 15896, and 15897.On October 24,
2005, respondent Oscar Camerino filed a complaint against
petitioner, captioned as Petition to Revoke Power of Attorney,
docketed as Civil Case No. 05-172, in the RTC of Muntinlupa City,
Branch 203, seeking to annul the Irrevocable Power of Attorney
dated December 18, 2003, the turnover of the titles to the
properties in his favor, and the payment of attorneys fees and
other legal fees.Respondent Oscar Camerinos complaint alleged that
he and co-respondents were asked by their counsel, Atty. Arturo S.
Santos, to sign a document with the representation that it was
urgently needed in the legal proceedings against SMSC; that the
contents of the said document were not explained to him; that in
the first week of September 2005, he learned that TCT Nos. 15895,
15896 and 15897 were issued in their favor by the Register of
Deeds; that he discovered that the annotation of the Irrevocable
Power of Attorney on the said titles was pursuant to the Order of
the RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch 256 dated August 31, 2005; that
the Irrevocable Power of Attorney turned out to be the same
document which Atty. Santos required him and the other respondents
to sign on December 18, 2003; that despite repeated demands,
petitioner refused to surrender the owners duplicate copies of the
said titles; that petitioner had retained ownership over the
subject lots; that he had no intention of naming, appointing, or
constituting anyone, including petitioner, to sell, assign,
dispose, or encumber the subject parcels of land; and that he
executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim which was annotated on the
titles involving the subject lots.In his Answer with Counterclaim,
petitioner countered that on September 3, 2003, Atty. Santos
informed him of the desire of his clients, herein respondents, to
sell and assign to him their inchoate and contingent rights and
interests over the subject lots because they were in dire need of
money and could no longer wait until the termination of the
proceedings as SMSC would probably appeal the CAs Decision to this
Court; that they did not have the amount of P9,790,612 needed to
redeem the subject lots; that on December 18, 2003, he decided to
buy the contingent rights of the respondents and paid each of them
P500,000 or a total of P2,500,000 as evidenced by Philtrust Bank
Managers Check Nos. MV 0002060 (for respondent Oscar Camerino), MV
0002061 (for respondent Efren Camerino), MV 0002062 (for respondent
Cornelio Mantile), MV 0002063 (for Nolasco Del Rosario), and MV
0002064 (for Domingo Enriquez) which they personally encashed on
December 19, 2003; that on August 4, 2005, he also paid the amount
of P147,059.18 as commission; that simultaneous with the aforesaid
payment, respondents and their spouses voluntarily signed the
Irrevocable Power of Attorney dated December 18, 2003; that being
coupled with interest, the Irrevocable Power of Attorney cannot be
revoked or cancelled at will by any of the parties; and that having
received just and reasonable compensation for their contingent
rights, respondents had no cause of action or legal right over the
subject lots. Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the complaint
and the payment of P1,000,000 moral damages, P500,000 exemplary
damages, and P500,000 attorneys fees plus costs. On January 17,
2006, petitioner filed a Motion for Preliminary Hearing on his
special and/or affirmative defense that respondent Oscar Camerino
had no cause of action or legal right over the subject lots because
the latter and his wife received the proceeds of the Philtrust Bank
Managers check in the sum of P500,000 which they personally
encashed on December 19, 2003 and that being coupled with interest,
the Irrevocable Power of Attorney cannot be revoked or cancelled at
will by any of the parties. On January 26, 2006, respondents Efren
Camerino, Cornelio Mantile and Mildred Del Rosario, in her capacity
as legal heir and representative of Nolasco Del Rosario, filed a
Motion for Leave of Court to Admit the Complaint-in-Intervention
with the attached Complaint-in-Intervention, dated January 26,
2006, seeking the nullification of the Irrevocable Power of
Attorney for being contrary to law and public policy and the
annotation of the Irrevocable Power of Attorney on the titles of
the subject lots with prayer that petitioner be ordered to deliver
to them the copies of the owners duplicate certificate of TCT Nos.
15895, 15896, and 15897. Their Complaint-in-Intervention alleged
that they had a legal interest in the subject matter of the
controversy and would either be directly injured or benefited by
the judgment in Civil Case No. 05-172; that they were
co-signatories or co-grantors of respondent Oscar Camerino in the
Irrevocable Power of Attorney they executed in favor of the
petitioner; that their consent was vitiated by fraud,
misrepresentation, machination, mistake and undue influence
perpetrated by their own counsel, Atty. Santos, and petitioner;
that sometime in December 2003, Atty. Santos called for a meeting
which was attended by petitioner and one Judge Alberto Lerma where
petitioner gave them checks in the amount of P500,000 each as
Christmas gifts; and that the Irrevocable Power of Attorney was
void ab initio as the same was contrary to law and public policy
and for being a champertous contract. On January 30, 2006,
respondent Oscar Camerino filed a Motion for Summary Judgment
alleging that since the existence of the Irrevocable Power of
Attorney was admitted by petitioner, the only issue to be resolved
was whether the said document was coupled with interest and whether
it was revocable in contemplation of law and jurisprudence; that
Summary Judgment was proper because petitioner did not raise any
issue relevant to the contents of the Irrevocable Power of
Attorney; and that in an Affidavit dated January 23, 2005, he
admitted receipt of a check amounting to P500,000.00 which was
given to him by petitioner as financial assistance.On February 3,
2006, petitioner opposed respondent Oscar Camerinos motion on the
ground that there were factual issues that required the
presentation of evidence. On February 14, 2006, petitioner filed a
Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground that the petition for
the cancellation of the Irrevocable Power of Attorney was actually
an action to recover the titles and ownership over the properties;
that since respondent Oscar Camerino alleged in paragraph 29 of his
Motion for Summary Judgment that the assessed value of the subject
lots amounted to P600,000,000, the case partook of the nature of a
real action and, thus, the docket fees of P3,929 was insufficient;
and that due to insufficient docket fee, his complaint should be
dismissed as the RTC was not vested with jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the complaint. On February 22, 2006, respondent
Oscar Camerino opposed petitioners motion for preliminary hearing
of special and/or affirmative defenses alleging that it was
dilatory and that he had a cause of action. On March 9, 2006,
respondent Oscar Camerino filed his Reply to petitioners Opposition
to the Motion for Summary Judgment claiming that the determinative
issue of whether or not the amount of P500,000 given to him by
petitioner rendered the power of attorney irrevocable can be
determined from the allegations in the pleadings and affidavits on
record without the need of introduction of evidence. On May 5,
2006, respondent Oscar Camerino filed an Opposition to petitioners
Motion to Dismiss stating that the instant case was a personal
action for the revocation of the Irrevocable Power of Attorney and
not for the recovery of real property and, thus, the correct docket
fees were paid. On June 9, 2006, the RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch
203 admitted the Complaint-in-Intervention because the
movants-intervenors ([herein respondents] Efren Camerino, Cornelio
Mantile, and Mildred Del Rosario as legal heir of Nolasco Del
Rosario) have legal interest in the subject properties in
litigation and in the success of the petitioner [herein respondent
Oscar Camerino], who was precisely their co-plaintiff in Civil Case
No. 95-020, entitled Oscar Camerino, et al. v. Springsun Management
Systems Corporation et al., where they are the prevailing parties
against the defendant therein [SMSC], with respect to the same
properties, subject of this case, in a decision rendered by Branch
256 of this Court. The RTC, Branch 203, also granted the Motion for
Summary Judgment because a meticulous scrutiny of the material
facts admitted in the pleadings of the parties reveals that there
is really no genuine issue of fact presented therein that needs to
be tried to enable the court to arrive at a judicious resolution of
a matter of law if the issues presented by the pleadings are not
genuine issues as to any material fact but are patently
unsubstantial issues that do not require a hearing on the merits.
Thus, The instant Motion to Dismiss by the respondent is therefore
DENIED, PROVIDED, the petitioner should pay the balance of the
docket fees remaining unpaid, if any, pursuant to Rule 141, Section
7 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC within
the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. The Motion for
Intervention timely filed by intervenors Efren Camerino, Cornelio
Mantile and Mildred Del Rosario, in her capacity as legal heir of
Nolasco Del Rosario, as opposed by the respondent, is hereby
GRANTED.x x x Petitioners Motion for Summary Judgment is therefore
GRANTED. Consequently, respondents Motion for Preliminary Hearing
on his Special and Affirmative Defenses is deemed moot and
academic. SO ORDERED.[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif]On June 15,
2006, the RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch 203 rendered a Summary
Judgment annulling the Irrevocable Power of Attorney for being
contrary to law and public policy. The pertinent portions of the
trial courts decision state that: Irrespective of whether the Power
of Attorney in question is coupled with interest, or not, the same
can be revoked or annulled, firstly, because it is contrary to law
and secondly it is against public policy.As aptly pointed out by
the intervenors, the assailed Special Power of Attorney which under
its ultimate paragraph among others, authorizes the respondent
(Nocom) to procure the necessary Transfer Certificate of Title in
his name, as the absolute owner of the said properties is a
disguised conveyance or assignment of the signatories statutory
rights of redemption and therefore prohibited under the provisions
of Republic Act No. 3844, Sec. 62 which provides:Sec. 62.
Limitation on Land Rights.Except in case of heredity succession by
one heir, landholdings acquired under this Code may not be resold,
mortgaged, encumbered, or transferred until after the lapse of ten
years from the date of full payment and acquisition and after such
ten year period, any transfer, sale or disposition may be made only
in favor of persons qualified to acquire economic family-size farm
units in accordance with the provisions of this Code xxx.
(underlining supplied) The assailed power of attorney which was
executed on December 18, 2003 is void ab initio for being contrary
to the express prohibition or spirit of the aforesaid law or the
declared state and public policy on the qualification of the
beneficiaries of the agrarian reform program. It bears stressing
that the redemption price of the subject lots was paid only on
August 4, 2005 or 1 year, 8 months and 14 days after the execution
of the assailed power of attorney. If pursuant to the spirit of the
Agrarian Reform Law, the tenant cannot even sell or dispose of his
landholding within ten (10) years after he already acquired the
same or even thereafter to persons not qualified to acquire
economic size farm units in accordance with the provisions of the
Agrarian Reform Code, with more reason should the tenant not be
allowed to alienate or sell his landholding before he actually
acquires the same. The right of redemption of the petitioner and
his co-plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 95-020 as upheld by the Court
of Appeals and the Supreme Court is founded on a piece of social
legislation known as Agrarian Reform Code. Enunciated in the case
of Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, et al., vs.
Hon. Secretary of Agrarian Reform (G.R. No. 78742, July 14, 1989)
is the policy of the State on agrarian reform legislation. Said
State policy emphasizes the Land for the Landless slogan that
underscores the acute imbalance in the distribution of land among
the people. Furthermore, the assailed Special Power of Attorney is
a champertous contract and therefore void for being against public
policy. The pleadings of the parties show that the same special
power of attorney was executed by the petitioner, et al. through
the intercession of Atty. Arturo Santos and at the behest of the
respondent. In his own answer to the instant petition which he is
estopped to deny, the respondent alleges that the actual agreement
was for the respondent to pay the expenses of the proceedings to
enforce the rights of the petitioner and his co-plaintiffs in Civil
Case No. 95-020 without any provision for reimbursement. In other
words, the respondents, through the intercession of Atty. Santos,
petitioners attorney, had agreed to carry on with the action for
the petitioner et al. at his own expense in consideration of
procuring for himself the title to the lots in question as the
absolute owner thereof, with the respondent paying the redemption
price of said lots, as well as separate amounts of Five Hundred
Thousand (P500,000.00) to each of the five (5) co-plaintiffs in
Civil Case No. 95-020, including herein petitioner, or a total sum
of Two Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P2,500,000.00). Under
the premises, the aforesaid contract brokered by Atty. Arturo
Santos has all really the earmarks of a champertous contract which
is against public policy as it violates the fiduciary relations
between the lawyer and his client, whose weakness or disadvantage
is being exploited by the former. In other words, the situation
created under the given premises is a clear circumvention of the
prohibition against the execution of champertous contracts between
a lawyer and a client. A champertous contract is defined as a
contract between a stranger and a party to a lawsuit, whereby the
stranger pursues the partys claim in consideration of receiving
part or any of the proceeds recovered under the judgment; a bargain
by a stranger with a party to a suit, by which such third person
undertakes to carry on the litigation at his own cost and risk, in
consideration of receiving, if successful, a part of the proceeds
or subject sought to be recovered. (Blacks Dictionary; Schnabel v.
Taft Broadcasting Co., Inc. Mo. App. 525 S.W. 2d 819, 823). An
Agreement whereby the attorney agrees to pay expenses of
proceedings to enforce the clients rights is champertous. [JBP
Holding Corporation v. U.S. 166 F. Supp. 324 (1958)]. Such
agreements are against public policy especially where as in this
case, the attorney has agreed to carry on the action at its own
expense in consideration of some bargain to have part of the thing
in dispute. [See Sampliner v. Motion Pictures Patents Co., et al.,
225 F. 242 (1918). The execution of these contracts violates the
fiduciary relationship between the lawyer and his client, for which
the former must incur administrative sanction. The intention of the
law in prohibiting this kind of contract is to prevent a lawyer
from acquiring an interest in the subject of the litigation and to
avoid a conflict of interest between him and his client. In the
instant case, it seems that Atty. Santos and the respondent
colluded and conspired to circumvent these prohibitions.
Considering therefore that Atty. Santos, then petitioners counsel,
brokered the alleged deal between petitioners et al. and the
respondent with respect to the lands subject of litigation in Civil
Case No. 95-020, the deal contracted is illegal for being a
champertous agreement and therefore it cannot be enforced.Be that
as it may, granting the agency established in the assailed Power of
Attorney is coupled with interest, the petitioner and his
co-plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 95-020, who are the present
intervenors, are not revoking the Power of Attorney at will but
have precisely gone to court and filed the instant petition for its
cancellation or revocation. What is prohibited by law and
jurisprudence is the arbitrary and whimsical revocation of a power
of attorney or agency coupled with interest, at will by a party,
without court declaration.WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as
follows:(1) Nullifying the Irrevocable Power of Attorney in
question dated December 18, 2003, signed by the petitioner [herein
respondent Oscar Camerino] and his co-plaintiffs [herein
respondents who were the movant-intervenors] in Civil Case No.
95-020 in favor of the respondent [herein petitioner];(2) Ordering
the respondent to turnover the Certificates of Title Nos. 15895,
15896 and 15897 covering the lots, the subject of this case, to the
petitioner and the intervenors;(3) Ordering the respondent to pay
the petitioner attorneys fees and all other legal fees incurred by
the latter in connection with this case;(4) Ordering the petitioner
and the intervenors to return to the respondent the amount of
P7,790,612 paid by the latter as redemption price of the lots in
question plus commission of P147,049.18; and(5) Ordering the
petitioner Oscar Camerino and the intervenors Efren Camerino,
Cornelio Mantile, Nolasco Del Rosario or his heirs and Domingo
Enriquez, who are petitioners co-plaintiffs in Civil Case No.
95-020, to return to the respondent the total amount of
P2,500,000.00 or P500,000.00 from each of them paid by the
respondent to them under Philtrust Bank Check Nos. MV 0002060, MV
0002061, MV 0002062, MV 0002063, and MV 0002064 which checks were
encashed by them with the drawee bank.SO ORDERED.[if
!supportFootnotes][4][endif] On July 3, 2006 petitioner filed an
Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration seeking to set aside the trial
courts Joint Order dated June 9, 2005 and Summary Judgment dated
June 15, 2006 which was opposed by the respondents. On July 4,
2006, respondents filed a Motion for Execution Pending Final
Decision/Appeal which was opposed by petitioner. On August 14,
2006, the trial court issued an order denying petitioners Omnibus
Motion for Reconsideration. Within the reglementary period,
petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal and paid the corresponding
appeal docket fees.On February 14, 2008, the CA affirmed the trial
courts Joint Order dated June 9, 2006 and Summary Judgment dated
June 15, 2006 and dismissed the petitioners appeal for lack of
jurisdiction. The CA ruled that as the RTC rendered the assailed
Summary Judgment based on the pleadings and documents on record,
without any trial or reception of evidence, the same did not
involve factual matters. The CA found the issues raised by the
petitioner in his appeal to be questions of law, to wit: (a)
whether Summary Judgment was proper under the admitted facts and
circumstances obtaining in the present case; (b) whether undue
haste attended the rendition of the Summary Judgment; (c) whether
the Summary Judgment was valid for failure of the RTC to implead an
indispensable party; (d) whether the RTC erred in allowing the
intervention of respondents Efren Camerino, Cornelio Mantile, and
Mildred Del Rosario; and (e) whether the RTC erred in taking
cognizance of the case despite nonpayment of the required docket
fees. The CA concluded that since the issues involved questions of
law, the proper mode of appeal should have been through a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
directly to this Court and not through an ordinary appeal under
Rule 41 thereof and, thus, petitioners appeal to the CA should be
dismissed outright pursuant to this Courts Circular No. 2-90, dated
March 9, 1990, mandating the dismissal of appeals involving pure
questions of law erroneously brought to the CA. In its Resolution
of May 23, 2008, the CA denied petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration dated February 26, 2008. Hence, this present
petition.Petitioner raises the following issues:IWHETHER OR NOT THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR IN DISMISSING
PETITIONERS APPEAL.IIWHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
UPHOLDING THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT DESPITE THE
GENUINE ISSUE OF FACT RAISED IN PETITIONERS ANSWER.IIIWHETHER OR
NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS IS CORRECT IN NOT VOIDING THE ASSAILED
SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR FAILURE OF RESPONDENTS TO IMPLEAD AN
INDISPENSABLE PARTY.IVWHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
NOT DISMISSING CIVIL CASE NO. 05-172 FOR NON-PAYMENT OF THE CORRECT
DOCKET FEES.Petitioner contends that the CA erred in dismissing his
appeal as the case involves questions of fact; that summary
judgment was not proper as there were genuine issues of fact raised
in his Answer; that respondents failed to implead their lawyer,
Atty. Arturo S. Santos, as an indispensable party-defendant, who,
according to them, allegedly connived with him in making them sign
the Irrevocable Power of Attorney in his favor; and that since the
case partakes of the nature of an action to recover ownership and
titles to the properties, respondents complaint should be dismissed
for failure to pay the correct docket fees.Respondent Oscar
Camerino argues that the sole issue to be resolved pertains to the
legal issue of whether the Special Power of Attorney (SPA)
denominated as irrevocable may be revoked; that three material
facts have been established, i.e., that the SPA was executed, that
Atty. Santos facilitated the signing and execution of the SPA, and
that petitioner paid P500,000 to each of the respondents in
consideration for the signing of the SPA and, thus, summary
judgment was proper; and that pure questions of law are not proper
in an ordinary appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules.Respondents Efren
Camerino, Cornelio Mantile, and Mildred Del Rosario, in her
capacity as legal heir of Nolasco Del Rosario, aver that
petitioners petition is insufficient in form, i.e., due to
defective verification as the word personal was not stated when
referring to personal knowledge, and in substance, i.e., there is
no genuine issue to be resolved as the factual allegations of the
petitioner are unsubstantial and that Atty. Santos is not an
indispensable party to the case. The petition has merit.In
dismissing petitioners appeal, the CA erroneously relied on the
rationale that the petitioners appeal raised questions of law and,
therefore, it had no recourse but to dismiss the same for lack of
jurisdiction. The summary judgment rendered by the trial court has
the effect of an adjudication on the merits and, thus, the
petitioner, being the aggrieved party, correctly appealed the
adverse decision of the RTC to the CA by filing a notice of appeal
coupled with the appellants brief under Rule 41 of the Rules.
Contrary to the findings of the RTC and the CA, the present case
involves certain factual issues which remove it from the coverage
of a summary judgment.Under Section 1, Rule 35 of the Rules of
Court, a party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time
after the pleading in answer thereto has been served, move with
supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary
judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof. Summary
judgment is a procedural device resorted to in order to avoid long
drawn out litigations and useless delays. When the pleadings on
file show that there are no genuine issues of fact to be tried, the
Rules allow a party to obtain immediate relief by way of summary
judgment, that is, when the facts are not in dispute, the court is
allowed to decide the case summarily by applying the law to the
material facts. Conversely, where the pleadings tender a genuine
issue, summary judgment is not proper. A genuine issue is such
issue of fact which requires the presentation of evidence as
distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false claim.
Section 3 of the said rule provides two (2) requisites for summary
judgment to be proper: (1) there must be no genuine issue as to any
material fact, except for the amount of damages; and (2) the party
presenting the motion for summary judgment must be entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.[if !supportFootnotes][5][endif] A
summary judgment is permitted only if there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and a moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law. A summary judgment is proper if, while the
pleadings on their face appear to raise issues, the affidavits,
depositions, and admissions presented by the moving party show that
such issues are not genuine.[if !supportFootnotes][6][endif]The
present case should not be decided via a summary judgment. Summary
judgment is not warranted when there are genuine issues which call
for a full blown trial. The party who moves for summary judgment
has the burden of demonstrating clearly the absence of any genuine
issue of fact, or that the issue posed in the complaint is patently
unsubstantial so as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial.
Trial courts have limited authority to render summary judgments and
may do so only when there is clearly no genuine issue as to any
material fact. When the facts as pleaded by the parties are
disputed or contested, proceedings for summary judgment cannot take
the place of trial.[if !supportFootnotes][7][endif] Summary
judgment is generally based on the facts proven summarily by
affidavits, depositions, pleadings, or admissions of the parties.
In this present case, while both parties acknowledge or admit the
existence of the Irrevocable Power of Attorney, the variance in the
allegations in the pleadings of the petitioner vis--vis that of the
respondents require the presentation of evidence on the issue of
the validity of the Irrevocable Power of Attorney to determine
whether its execution was attended by the vices of consent and
whether the respondents and their spouses did not freely and
voluntarily execute the same. In his Answer with Counterclaim,
petitioner denied the material allegations of respondent Oscar
Camerinos complaint for being false and baseless as respondents
were informed that the document they signed was the Irrevocable
Power of Attorney in his favor and that they had received the full
consideration of the transaction and, thus, had no legal right over
the three parcels of land. Indeed, the presentation of evidence is
necessary to determine the validity and legality of the Irrevocable
Power of Attorney, dated December 18, 2003, executed by the
respondents in favor of the petitioner. From said main factual
issue, other relevant issues spring therefrom, to wit: whether the
said Irrevocable Power of Attorney was coupled with interest;
whether it had been obtained through fraud, deceit, and
misrepresentation or other vices of consent; whether the five (5)
Philtrust Bank Managers checks given by petitioner to the
respondents amounting to P500,000 each were in consideration of the
inchoate and contingent rights of the respondents in favor of the
petitioner; whether Atty. Santos connived with petitioner in
causing the preparation of the said document and, therefore, should
be impleaded as party-defendant together with the petitioner;
whether respondents deposited the amount of P9,790,612.00 plus
P147,059.18 with the RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch 256; and
whether the sale of respondents inchoate and contingent rights
amounted to a champertous contract. The incongruence and disparity
in the material allegations of both parties have been evident.
Respondent Oscar Camerino alleged in his complaint that he and his
co-respondents were required by their counsel, Atty. Santos, to
sign a document on the representation that it was urgently needed
in the legal proceedings against SMSC which turned out to be the
Irrevocable Power of Attorney; but petitioner disproved the
vitiated consent on the part of the respondents as they knew fully
well that the document they signed, voluntarily and intelligently,
on December 18, 2003, was the said Irrevocable Power of Attorney.
Respondent Oscar Camerino alleged in his complaint that he has no
intention of naming, appointing or constituting anyone, including
the petitioner, to sell, assign, dispose or encumber the lots in
question; but petitioner maintained that respondent Oscar Camerino
agreed to sell and assign to him his inchoate and contingent rights
and interests over the subject lot for and in consideration of the
sum of P500,000, plus the redemption price of P9,790,612.
Respondents claimed that the amount they received was grossly
disproportionate to the value of the subject land; but petitioner
countered that the respondents did not have the amount of
P9,790,612 needed to redeem the subject lots, so he decided to buy
their contingent rights and paid each of them P500,000 or a total
of P2,500,000 as evidenced by five (5) Philtrust Bank Managers
Check which they personally encashed on December 19, 2003, that he
also paid the amount of P147,059.18 as commission on August 4,
2005, that simultaneous with the aforesaid payment, respondents and
their spouses voluntarily signed the Irrevocable Power of Attorney
dated December 18, 2003, and that being coupled with interest, the
Irrevocable Power of Attorney cannot be revoked at will by any of
the parties.Respondents maintain that they were deceived into
executing the Irrevocable Power of Attorney in favor of the
petitioner which was done through the maneuverings of their own
lawyer, Atty. Santos, who, according to them, had connived with
petitioner in order to effect the fraudulent transaction. In this
regard, respondents should have impleaded Atty. Santos as an
indispensable party-defendant early on when the case was still with
the RTC, but they failed to do so. However, their procedural lapse
did not constitute a sufficient ground for the dismissal of Civil
Case No. 05-172.In Domingo v. Scheer,[if
!supportFootnotes][8][endif] the Court explained that the
non-joinder of an indispensable party is not a ground for the
dismissal of an action. Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules, as amended,
requires indispensable parties to be joined as plaintiffs or
defendants. The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory.
Without the presence of indispensable parties to the suit, the
judgment of the court cannot attain real finality. Strangers to a
case are not bound by the judgment rendered by the court. The
absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of
the court null and void. There is lack of authority to act not only
of the absent party but also as to those present. The
responsibility of impleading all the indispensable parties rests on
the petitioner or plaintiff. However, the non-joinder of
indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an
action. Parties may be added by order of the court on motion of the
party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or
such times as are just. If the petitioner or plaintiff refuses to
implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, the
latter may dismiss the complaint or petition for the petitioner or
plaintiffs failure to comply therefor. The remedy is to implead the
non-party claimed to be indispensable. In the present case, the RTC
and the CA did not require the respondents to implead Atty. Santos
as party-defendant or respondent in the case. The operative act
that would lead to the dismissal of Civil Case No. 05-172 would be
the refusal of respondents to comply with the directive of the
court for the joinder of an indispensable party to the case.In his
petition, petitioner prays for the reversal of the Decision dated
February 14, 2008 of the CA which affirmed the Joint Order dated
June 9, 2005 and Summary Judgment dated June 15, 2006 of the RTC of
Muntinlupa City, Branch 203 and dismissed petitioners appeal under
Rule 41 of the Rules for lack of jurisdiction and its Resolution
dated May 23, 2008 which denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration; the annulment of the RTCs Summary Judgment
rendered on June 15, 2006; and the dismissal of Civil Case No.
05-172 filed with the RTC on the ground that respondents failed to
pay the correct docket fees as the action actually sought the
recovery of ownership over the subject properties.The record shows
that Civil Case No. 05-172 is a complaint filed by respondent Oscar
Camerino against petitioner, denominated as Petition to Revoke
Power of Attorney, that seeks to nullify the Irrevocable Power of
Attorney coupled with interest dated December 18, 2003; that
petitioner be ordered to turn over TCT No. 15898, 15896, and 15897
to him; and that petitioner be ordered to pay the attorneys fees
and other legal fees as a consequence of the suit. This case is
therefore not an action to recover the titles and ownership over
the subject properties. For now, the nature of the suit remains
that of personal action and not a real action in contemplation of
Rule 4 of the Rules. Hence, the docket fees paid by the respondents
were in order. Should the complaint be amended to seek recovery of
ownership of the land, then the proper docket fees should be paid
and collected.While the RTC erred in rendering the summary
judgment, Civil Case No. 05-172 should not perforce be dismissed.
Instead, this present case should be remanded to the RTC for
further proceedings and proper disposition according to the
rudiments of a regular trial on the merits and not through an
abbreviated termination of the case by summary judgment.WHEREFORE,
the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated February 14, 2008 which affirmed the Joint Order
dated June 9, 2005 and Summary Judgment dated June 15, 2006 of the
Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 203 and dismissed
petitioners appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction and the Resolution of the Court of
Appeals dated May 23, 2008 which denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration in CA-G.R. CV No. 87656 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa
City, Branch 203, for further proceedings in accordance with this
Decision.No costs.SO ORDERED. ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate JusticeWE
CONCUR:REYNATO S. PUNOChief JusticeChairpersonANTONIO T. CARPIO
RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice Associate JusticeTERESITA J.
LEONARDO-DE CASTROAssociate JusticeCERTIFICATION Pursuant to
Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Courts Division. REYNATO S. PUNO Chief
Justice
[if !supportFootnotes]
[endif][if !supportFootnotes][1][endif] Rollo, pp. 49-50.[if
!supportFootnotes][2][endif] Rollo, pp. 154-155.[if
!supportFootnotes][3][endif] Rollo, pp. 188, 190.[if
!supportFootnotes][4][endif] Rollo, pp. 500-503.[if
!supportFootnotes][5][endif] Solidbank Corporation v. CA, G.R. No.
120010, October 3, 2002, 390 SCRA 241.[if
!supportFootnotes][6][endif] Ong v. Roban Lending Corporation, G.R.
No. 172592, July 9, 2008.[if !supportFootnotes][7][endif] Tan v. De
la Vega, G.R. No. 168809, March 10, 2006, 484 SCRA 538.[if
!supportFootnotes][8][endif] G.R. No. 154745, January 29, 2004, 421
SCRA 468.
THIRD DIVISION[G.R. No. 148864. August 21, 2003]SPOUSES EDUARDO
B. EVANGELISTA and EPIFANIA C. EVANGELISTA, petitioners, vs.
MERCATOR FINANCE CORP., LYDIA P. SALAZAR, LAMECS** REALTY AND
DEVELOPMENT CORP. and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF BULACAN,
respondents.D E C I S I O NPUNO, J.:Petitioners, Spouses
Evangelista (Petitioners), are before this Court on a Petition for
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court,
assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing their
petition.Petitioners filed a complaint[if
!supportFootnotes][1][endif] for annulment of titles against
respondents, Mercator Finance Corporation, Lydia P. Salazar, Lamecs
Realty and Development Corporation, and the Register of Deeds of
Bulacan. Petitioners claimed being the registered owners of five
(5) parcels of land[if !supportFootnotes][2][endif] contained in
the Real Estate Mortgage[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif] executed
by them and Embassy Farms, Inc. (Embassy Farms). They alleged that
they executed the Real Estate Mortgage in favor of Mercator
Financing Corporation (Mercator) only as officers of Embassy Farms.
They did not receive the proceeds of the loan evidenced by a
promissory note, as all of it went to Embassy Farms. Thus, they
contended that the mortgage was without any consideration as to
them since they did not personally obtain any loan or credit
accommodations. There being no principal obligation on which the
mortgage rests, the real estate mortgage is void.[if
!supportFootnotes][4][endif] With the void mortgage, they assailed
the validity of the foreclosure proceedings conducted by Mercator,
the sale to it as the highest bidder in the public auction, the
issuance of the transfer certificates of title to it, the
subsequent sale of the same parcels of land to respondent Lydia P.
Salazar (Salazar), and the transfer of the titles to her name, and
lastly, the sale and transfer of the properties to respondent
Lamecs Realty & Development Corporation (Lamecs).Mercator
admitted that petitioners were the owners of the subject parcels of
land. It, however, contended that on February 16, 1982, plaintiffs
executed a Mortgage in favor of defendant Mercator Finance
Corporation for and in consideration of certain loans, and/or other
forms of credit accommodations obtained from the Mortgagee
(defendant Mercator Finance Corporation) amounting to EIGHT HUNDRED
FORTY-FOUR THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED TWENTY-FIVE & 78/100
(P844,625.78) PESOS, Philippine Currency and to secure the payment
of the same and those others that the MORTGAGEE may extend to the
MORTGAGOR (plaintiffs) x x x.[if !supportFootnotes][5][endif] It
contended that since petitioners and Embassy Farms signed the
promissory note[if !supportFootnotes][6][endif] as co-makers, aside
from the Continuing Suretyship Agreement[if
!supportFootnotes][7][endif] subsequently executed to guarantee the
indebtedness of Embassy Farms, and the succeeding promissory
notes[if !supportFootnotes][8][endif] restructuring the loan, then
petitioners are jointly and severally liable with Embassy Farms.
Due to their failure to pay the obligation, the foreclosure and
subsequent sale of the mortgaged properties are valid.Respondents
Salazar and Lamecs asserted that they are innocent purchasers for
value and in good faith, relying on the validity of the title of
Mercator. Lamecs admitted the prior ownership of petitioners of the
subject parcels of land, but alleged that they are the present
registered owner. Both respondents likewise assailed the long
silence and inaction by petitioners as it was only after a lapse of
almost ten (10) years from the foreclosure of the property and the
subsequent sales that they made their claim. Thus, Salazar and
Lamecs averred that petitioners are in estoppel and guilty of
laches.[if !supportFootnotes][9][endif]During pre-trial, the
parties agreed on the following issues:a. Whether or not the Real
Estate Mortgage executed by the plaintiffs in favor of defendant
Mercator Finance Corp. is null and void;b. Whether or not the
extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings undertaken on subject
parcels of land to satisfy the indebtedness of Embassy Farms, Inc.
is (sic) null and void;c. Whether or not the sale made by defendant
Mercator Finance Corp. in favor of Lydia Salazar and that executed
by the latter in favor of defendant Lamecs Realty and Development
Corp. are null and void;d. Whether or not the parties are entitled
to damages.[if !supportFootnotes][10][endif]After pre-trial,
Mercator moved for summary judgment on the ground that except as to
the amount of damages, there is no factual issue to be litigated.
Mercator argued that petitioners had admitted in their pre-trial
brief the existence of the promissory note, the continuing
suretyship agreement and the subsequent promissory notes
restructuring the loan, hence, there is no genuine issue regarding
their liability. The mortgage, foreclosure proceedings and the
subsequent sales are valid and the complaint must be dismissed.[if
!supportFootnotes][11][endif]Petitioners opposed the motion for
summary judgment claiming that because their personal liability to
Mercator is at issue, there is a need for a full-blown trial.[if
!supportFootnotes][12][endif]The RTC granted the motion for summary
judgment and dismissed the complaint. It held:A reading of the
promissory notes show (sic) that the liability of the signatories
thereto are solidary in view of the phrase jointly and severally.
On the promissory note appears (sic) the signatures of Eduardo B.
Evangelista, Epifania C. Evangelista and another signature of
Eduardo B. Evangelista below the words Embassy Farms, Inc. It is
crystal clear then that the plaintiffs-spouses signed the
promissory note not only as officers of Embassy Farms, Inc. but in
their personal capacity as well(.) Plaintiffs(,) by affixing their
signatures thereon in a dual capacity have bound themselves as
solidary debtor(s) with Embassy Farms, Inc. to pay defendant
Mercator Finance Corporation the amount of indebtedness. That the
principal contract of loan is void for lack of consideration, in
the light of the foregoing is untenable.[if
!supportFootnotes][13][endif]Petitioners motion for reconsideration
was denied for lack of merit.[if !supportFootnotes][14][endif]
Thus, petitioners went up to the Court of Appeals, but again were
unsuccessful. The appellate court held:The appellants insistence
that the loans secured by the mortgage they executed were not
personally theirs but those of Embassy Farms, Inc. is clearly
self-serving and misplaced. The fact that they signed the subject
promissory notes in the(ir) personal capacities and as officers of
the said debtor corporation is manifest on the very face of the
said documents of indebtedness (pp. 118, 128-131, Orig. Rec.). Even
assuming arguendo that they did not, the appellants lose sight of
the fact that third persons who are not parties to a loan may
secure the latter by pledging or mortgaging their own property
(Lustan vs. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 663, 675). x x x. In
constituting a mortgage over their own property in order to secure
the purported corporate debt of Embassy Farms, Inc., the appellants
undeniably assumed the personality of persons interested in the
fulfillment of the principal obligation who, to save the subject
realities from foreclosure and with a view towards being subrogated
to the rights of the creditor, were free to discharge the same by
payment (Articles 1302 [3] and 1303, Civil Code of the
Philippines).[if !supportFootnotes][15][endif] (emphases in the
original)The appellate court also observed that if the appellants
really felt aggrieved by the foreclosure of the subject mortgage
and the subsequent sales of the realties to other parties, why then
did they commence the suit only on August 12, 1997 (when the
certificate of sale was issued on January 12, 1987, and the
certificates of title in the name of Mercator on September 27,
1988)? Petitioners procrastination for about nine (9) years is
difficult to understand. On so flimsy a ground as lack of
consideration, (w)e may even venture to say that the complaint was
not worth the time of the courts.[if !supportFootnotes][16][endif]A
motion for reconsideration by petitioners was likewise denied for
lack of merit.[if !supportFootnotes][17][endif] Thus, this petition
where they allege that:THE COURT A QUO ERRED AND ACTED WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
AFFIRMING IN TOTO THE MAY 4, 1998 ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT GRANTING
RESPONDENTS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT DESPITE THE EXISTENCE OF
GENUINE ISSUES AS TO MATERIAL FACTS AND ITS NON-ENTITLEMENT TO A
JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW, THEREBY DECIDING THE CASE IN A WAY
PROBABLY NOT IN ACCORD WITH APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE
COURT.[IF !SUPPORTFOOTNOTES][18][ENDIF]We affirm.Summary judgment
is a procedural technique aimed at weeding out sham claims or
defenses at an early stage of the litigation.[if
!supportFootnotes][19][endif] The crucial question in a motion for
summary judgment is whether the issues raised in the pleadings are
genuine or fictitious, as shown by affidavits, depositions or
admissions accompanying the motion. A genuine issue means an issue
of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence, as
distinguished from an issue which is fictitious or contrived so as
not to constitute a genuine issue for trial.[if
!supportFootnotes][20][endif] To forestall summary judgment, it is
essential for the non-moving party to confirm the existence of
genuine issues where he has substantial, plausible and fairly
arguable defense, i.e., issues of fact calling for the presentation
of evidence upon which a reasonable finding of fact could return a
verdict for the non-moving party. The proper inquiry would
therefore be whether the affirmative defenses offered by
petitioners constitute genuine issue of fact requiring a full-blown
trial.[if !supportFootnotes][21][endif]In the case at bar, there
are no genuine issues raised by petitioners. Petitioners do not
deny that they obtained a loan from Mercator. They merely claim
that they got the loan as officers of Embassy Farms without
intending to personally bind themselves or their property. However,
a simple perusal of the promissory note and the continuing
suretyship agreement shows otherwise. These documentary evidence
prove that petitioners are solidary obligors with Embassy Farms.The
promissory note[if !supportFootnotes][22][endif] states:For value
received, I/We jointly and severally promise to pay to the order of
MERCATOR FINANCE CORPORATION at its office, the principal sum of
EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY-FOUR THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED TWENTY-FIVE PESOS
& 78/100 (P 844,625.78), Philippine currency, x x x, in
installments as follows:September 16, 1982 - P154,267.87October 16,
1982 - P154,267.87November 16, 1982 - P154,267.87December 16, 1982
- P154,267.87January 16, 1983 - P154,267.87February 16, 1983 -
P154,267.87x x x x x x x x x.The note was signed at the bottom by
petitioners Eduardo B. Evangelista and Epifania C. Evangelista, and
Embassy Farms, Inc. with the signature of Eduardo B. Evangelista
below it.The Continuing Suretyship Agreement[if
!supportFootnotes][23][endif] also proves the solidary obligation
of petitioners, viz:(Embassy Farms, Inc.) Principal(Eduardo B.
Evangelista) Surety(Epifania C. Evangelista) Surety(Mercator
Finance Corporation) CreditorTo: MERCATOR FINANCE COPORATION(1) For
valuable and/or other consideration, EDUARDO B. EVANGELISTA and
EPIFANIA C. EVANGELISTA (hereinafter called Surety), jointly and
severally unconditionally guarantees (sic) to MERCATOR FINANCE
COPORATION (hereinafter called Creditor), the full, faithful and
prompt payment and discharge of any and all indebtedness of EMBASSY
FARMS, INC. (hereinafter called Principal) to the Creditor.x x x x
x x x x x(3) The obligations hereunder are joint and several and
independent of the obligations of the Principal. A separate action
or actions may be brought and prosecuted against the Surety whether
or not the action is also brought and prosecuted against the
Principal and whether or not the Principal be joined in any such
action or actions.x x x x x x x x x.The agreement was signed by
petitioners on February 16, 1982. The promissory notes[if
!supportFootnotes][24][endif] subsequently executed by petitioners
and Embassy Farms, restructuring their loan, likewise prove that
petitioners are solidarily liable with Embassy Farms.Petitioners
further allege that there is an ambiguity in the wording of the
promissory note and claim that since it was Mercator who provided
the form, then the ambiguity should be resolved against it.Courts
can interpret a contract only if there is doubt in its letter.[if
!supportFootnotes][25][endif] But, an examination of the promissory
note shows no such ambiguity. Besides, assuming arguendo that there
is an ambiguity, Section 17 of the Negotiable Instruments Law
states, viz:SECTION 17. Construction where instrument is ambiguous.
Where the language of the instrument is ambiguous or there are
omissions therein, the following rules of construction apply:x x x
x x x x x x(g) Where an instrument containing the word I promise to
pay is signed by two or more persons, they are deemed to be jointly
and severally liable thereon.Petitioners also insist that the
promissory note does not convey their true intent in executing the
document. The defense is unavailing. Even if petitioners intended
to sign the note merely as officers of Embassy Farms, still this
does not erase the fact that they subsequently executed a
continuing suretyship agreement. A surety is one who is solidarily
liable with the principal.[if !supportFootnotes][26][endif]
Petitioners cannot claim that they did not personally receive any
consideration for the contract for well-entrenched is the rule that
the consideration necessary to support a surety obligation need not
pass directly to the surety, a consideration moving to the
principal alone being sufficient. A surety is bound by the same
consideration that makes the contract effective between the
principal parties thereto.[if !supportFootnotes][27][endif] Having
executed the suretyship agreement, there can be no dispute on the
personal liability of petitioners.Lastly, the parol evidence rule
does not apply in this case.[if !supportFootnotes][28][endif] We
held in Tarnate v. Court of Appeals,[if
!supportFootnotes][29][endif] that where the parties admitted the
existence of the loans and the mortgage deeds and the fact of
default on the due repayments but raised the contention that they
were misled by respondent bank to believe that the loans were
long-term accommodations, then the parties could not be allowed to
introduce evidence of conditions allegedly agreed upon by them
other than those stipulated in the loan documents because when they
reduced their agreement in writing, it is presumed that they have
made the writing the only repository and memorial of truth, and
whatever is not found in the writing must be understood to have
been waived and abandoned.IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is
dismissed. Treble costs against the petitioners.SO
ORDERED.Panganiban, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.Corona, and
Carpio-Morales, JJ., on official leave.[if !supportFootnotes]
[endif]** Sometimes spelled as Lamecs.[if
!supportFootnotes][1][endif] RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, Br. 85,
Rollo, pp. 23-29.[if !supportFootnotes][2][endif] With Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. T-193458, T-192133, T-193136, T-193137
and T-193138; Id. at 30-39.[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif] Id. at
40.[if !supportFootnotes][4][endif] Id. at 26.[if
!supportFootnotes][5][endif] Id. at 63.[if
!supportFootnotes][6][endif] Id. at 71.[if
!supportFootnotes][7][endif] Id. at 72-73.[if
!supportFootnotes][8][endif] Id. at 80-83.[if
!supportFootnotes][9][endif] Id. at 85-97.[if
!supportFootnotes][10][endif] Id. at 118.[if
!supportFootnotes][11][endif] Id. at 119-123.[if
!supportFootnotes][12][endif] Id. at 128-131.[if
!supportFootnotes][13][endif] Id. at 134, dated May 4, 1998.[if
!supportFootnotes][14][endif] Id. at 159, dated July 17, 1998.[if
!supportFootnotes][15][endif] Id. at 222-223, Decision dated May
12, 2000.[if !supportFootnotes][16][endif] Id. at 223.[if
!supportFootnotes][17][endif] Id. at 234, dated May 14, 2001.[if
!supportFootnotes][18][endif] Id. at 12.[if
!supportFootnotes][19][endif] Evadel Realty and Development
Corporation v. Soriano, 357 SCRA 395 (2001).[if
!supportFootnotes][20][endif] Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co.
and/or Chemical Bank v. Rafael Ma. Guerrero, G.R. No. 136804,
February 19, 2003.[if !supportFootnotes][21][endif] Spouses
Guillermo Agbada & Maxima Agbada v. Inter-urban Developers, et
al., G.R. No. 144029, September 19, 2002.[if
!supportFootnotes][22][endif] Rollo, p. 71.[if
!supportFootnotes][23][endif] Id. at 72-73.[if
!supportFootnotes][24][endif] Id. at 80-83.[if
!supportFootnotes][25][endif] Article 1370. If the terms of a
contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the
contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall
control. (Civil Code of the Philippines); Ong Yong, et al., v.
David S. Tiu, et al., G.R. Nos. 144476 & 144629, February 1,
2002.[if !supportFootnotes][26][endif] Goldenrod, Incorporated v.
Court of Appeals, 366 SCRA 217 (2001).[if
!supportFootnotes][27][endif] Charles Lee v. Court of Appeals, et
al., G.R. Nos. 117913-14, February 1, 2002.[if
!supportFootnotes][28][endif] SEC. 9. Evidence of written
agreements When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to
writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon
and there can be, between the parties and their successors in
interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the
written agreement.However, a party may present evidence to modify,
explain or add to the terms of the written agreement if he puts in
issue in his pleading:(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or
imperfection in the written agreement;(b) The failure of the
written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the
parties thereto;(c) The validity of the written agreement; or(d)
The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties of their
successors in interest after the execution of the written
agreement.The term agreement includes wills.[if
!supportFootnotes][29][endif] 241 SCRA 254 (1995).
FIRST DIVISION[G.R. No. 153126. September 11, 2003]MONTEREY
FOODS CORP. and RAMON F. LLANOS, petitioners, vs. VICTORINO E.
ESERJOSE, and the Branch Sheriff assigned to the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 224, National Capital Judicial Region,
respondents.D E C I S I O NYNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:This is a petition
for review seeking to reverse and set aside the decision[if
!supportFootnotes][1][endif] of the Court of Appeals dated November
21, 2001, which upheld the Orders of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 224 in Civil Case No. Q-98-36421.[if
!supportFootnotes][2][endif]It is alleged in the petition that for
a period of twelve years, respondent bought from petitioner
Monterey Foods Corporation live cattle and hogs which he in turn
sold and distributed to his customers. The transactions were
covered by invoices and delivery receipts and were payable within
ten days from invoice date. Due to respondents inability to pay for
his purchases, his overdue account amounted to P87,434,689.37, and
as a consequence, petitioner corporation ceased its transactions
with respondent.Sometime in 1998, during the existence of the
contractual relations between the parties, they entered into a
contract growing agreement whereby petitioner corporation supplied
livestock for respondent to grow, care for and nurture in his farm
located in San Jose, Batangas. After five months of operation,
petitioner corporation withdrew from the contract without paying
respondent for his services, alleging that respondent failed to
post the requisite bond under the contract and poorly performed his
farm management functions to the detriment of the
animals.Respondent repeatedly demanded that petitioner corporation
pay him for his services under the contract, amounting to
P1,280,000.00. His demands went unheeded; thus, he filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 224, an action for sum
of money and damages against petitioner corporation and its
President, petitioner Ramon F. Llanes, which was docketed as Civil
Case No. Q-98-36421.[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif] After
petitioners filed their Joint Answer, the case was scheduled for
pre-trial conference on May 14, 1999.At the pre-trial conference,
petitioners and their counsel failed to appear, and an Order was
issued declaring them as in default and allowing respondent to
present evidence ex parte.[if !supportFootnotes][4][endif] On May
24, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment, the dispositive
portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is
hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendants ordering the latter to pay the former the following:1.
P1,280,000.00 representing the principal obligation;2. P100,000.00,
jointly and severally, as damages; and3. P50,000.00 as attorneys
fees.IT IS SO ORDERED.[if !supportFootnotes][5][endif]Petitioners
filed a motion for new trial,[if !supportFootnotes][6][endif] which
the trial court granted.[if !supportFootnotes][7][endif] Hence, the
case was again set for pre-trial conference and both parties
submitted their respective pre-trial briefs.[if
!supportFootnotes][8][endif]After the pre-trial, respondent
submitted a manifestation and motion alleging that petitioners have
admitted their liability under the contract growing agreement at
least to the extent of P482,766.88 when they alleged in their Joint
Answer: In accordance with the standard contract growing fee
provision plaintiff [respondent herein] was entitled to a
compensation of net P482,766.88.[if !supportFootnotes][9][endif]
Respondent thus prayed that reverse trial be conducted.[if
!supportFootnotes][10][endif]Petitioners opposed the manifestation
and motion, stating that the reverse trial order has no basis since
the amount allegedly admitted was dramatically less than the total
of P1,280,000.00 claimed by respondent.[if
!supportFootnotes][11][endif]At the initial hearing of the case,
petitioners confirmed in open court that they indeed entered into a
contract growing agreement with respondent and that the latter was
entitled to a net compensation of P482,766.88 under the said
contract.[if !supportFootnotes][12][endif] The trial court, acting
on petitioners judicial admission, rendered partial summary
judgment insofar as the amount of P482,766.88 was concerned, and
set the case for trial for the presentation of evidence on
petitioners claim for damages.[if !supportFootnotes][13][endif]
Respondent moved for the execution of the partial summary judgment,
which the trial court granted.Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration, which was denied for lack of merit.[if
!supportFootnotes][14][endif] Accordingly, on December 15, 1999,
the trial court issued a writ of execution directing the sheriff to
cause the execution of the partial summary decision.[if
!supportFootnotes][15][endif]On December 17, 1999, petitioners
filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 56305.[if !supportFootnotes][16][endif]
On November 21, 2001, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition.[if !supportFootnotes][17][endif] Petitioners motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied for lack of merit.[if
!supportFootnotes][18][endif]Petitioners are now before us
assigning the following errors:A.WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF
APPEALS COMMITTED A CLEAR AND REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT SANCTIONED
THE WRIT OF EXECUTION ISSUED BY THE TRIAL COURT OF A PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WHICH WAS NOT YET FINAL IN CHARACTER.B.WHETHER OR
NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A CLEAR AND REVERSIBLE ERROR
WHEN IT UPHELD THE WRIT OF EXECUTION OF THE PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ISSUED ON AN EX-PARTE MOTION THAT DENIED PETITIONER AN
OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD.C.WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED A CLEAR AND REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT UPHELD THE WRIT OF
EXECUTION OF THE PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ISSUED ON THE BASIS THAT
A BOND IS SUFFICIENT REASON FOR DISCRETIONARY EXECUTION TO
ISSUE.D.WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A CLEAR AND
REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT UPHELD THE WRIT OF EXECUTION ON THE BASIS
OF A PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT THAT IS PATENTLY INVALIDE.WHETHER OR
NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A CLEAR AND REVERSIBLE ERROR
WHEN IT UPHELD THE PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT THAT WAS RENDERED IN
DISPARAGEMENT OF DUE PROCESS.F.WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED A CLEAR AND REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT UPHELD THE TRIAL
COURTS PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ISSUED ON THE BASIS THAT THERE ARE
NO GENUINE TRIABLE ISSUES OF FACTG.WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF
APPEALS COMMITTED A CLEAR AND REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT SANCTIONED
THE DEPARTURE OF THE TRIAL COURT FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE
OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS.[if !supportFootnotes][19][endif]Simply
put, the primordial question to be resolved hinges on whether
summary judgment is proper in the case at bar.A summary judgment or
accelerated judgment is a procedural technique to promptly dispose
of cases where the facts appear undisputed and certain from the
pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits on record, or for
weeding out sham claims or defenses at an early stage of the
litigation to avoid the expense and loss of time involved in a
trial. Its object is to separate what is formal or pretended in
denial or averment from what is genuine and substantial so that
only the latter may subject a party in interest to the burden of
trial.[if !supportFootnotes][20][endif] Moreover, said summary
judgment must be premised on the absence of any other triable
genuine issues of fact.[if !supportFootnotes][21][endif] Otherwise,
the movant cannot be allowed to obtain immediate relief. A genuine
issue is such issue of fact which requires presentation of evidence
as distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false
claim.[if !supportFootnotes][22][endif]Rule 35, Section 3 of the
Rules of Court provides two (2) requisites for summary judgment to
be proper: (1) there must be no genuine issue as to any material
fact, except for the amount of damages; and (2) the party
presenting the motion for summary judgment must be entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.[if
!supportFootnotes][23][endif]Applying these principles to the case
at bar, we find that the Court of Appeals did not commit any
reversible error in affirming the assailed orders of the trial
court. Hence, the instant petition must be denied.The record shows
that at the hearing on November 25, 1999, petitioners admitted
liability under the contract growing agreement in the amount of
P482,766.88.[if !supportFootnotes][24][endif] As a result,
respondent agreed to waive all his other claims in the complaint,
including his claim for consequential damages.[if
!supportFootnotes][25][endif] Correspondingly, insofar as the
complaint was concerned, there was no other genuine issue left for
which the complaint for sum of money and damages may be prosecuted.
Also by reason of such admission, petitioners, in effect, likewise
waived whatever defenses they may have to deter recovery by
respondent under the said contract. Thus, respondent became
entitled, as a matter of law, to the execution of the partial
summary judgment. When there are no genuine issues of fact to be
tried, the Rules of Court allows a party to obtain immediate relief
by way of summary judgment. In short, since the facts are not in
dispute, the court is allowed to decide the case summarily by
applying the law to the material facts.[if
!supportFootnotes][26][endif]Clearly, the judgment finally disposed
of all the reliefs sought in the complaint. The order granting
summary judgment was akin to a judgment on the merits made after a
full-blown trial. Its consequent execution, therefore, may issue as
a matter of right in favor of respondent unless appeal was
seasonably made therein, which petitioners failed to do. Instead of
filing a notice of appeal with the trial court, petitioners
elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which is not a
substitute for the lost remedy of appeal.Petitioners maintain that
the order granting partial summary judgment was merely
interlocutory in nature and did not dispose of the action in its
entirety. They cite the doctrines laid down in Province of
Pangasinan v. Court of Appeals[if !supportFootnotes][27][endif] and
Guevarra v. Court of Appeals,[if !supportFootnotes][28][endif]
where the Court categorically stated that a partial summary
judgment is not a final or appealable judgment.Petitioners position
is untenable.The rulings in Province of Pangasinan and Guevarra is
not applicable in the case at bar. The said cases specifically
delved on the appeal of a partial summary judgment, which did not
dispose of all the reliefs sought in the complaint. In the case at
bar, other than the admitted liability of petitioners to
respondents under the contract growing agreement, all other reliefs
sought under the complaint had already been expressly waived by
respondent before the trial court. Accordingly, the assailed
November 25, 1999 Order of the trial court which granted partial
summary judgment in favor of respondent was in the nature of a
final order which leaves nothing more for the court to adjudicate
in respect to the complaint. In Santo Tomas University Hospital v.
Surla,[if !supportFootnotes][29][endif] the Court distinguished a
final judgment or order from an interlocutory issuance in this
wise:The concept of a final judgment or order, distinguished form
an interlocutory issuance, is that the former decisively puts to a
close, or disposes of a case or a disputed issue leaving nothing
else to be done by the court in respect thereto. Once that judgment
or order is rendered, the adjudicative task of the court is
likewise ended on the particular matter involved. An order is
interlocutory, upon the other hand, if its effects would only be
provisional in character and would still leave substantial
proceedings to be further had by the issuing court in order to put
the controversy to rest.We are not unmindful of petitioners
counterclaim. However, our cursory evaluation of the same fails to
convince us that the issues raised therein are closely related to
or intertwined with the growing contract agreement. The issues
raised therein clearly involved transactions distinct and separate
from the growing contract agreement; they refer to the alleged
obligations of respondent under their separate contract for the
sale and distribution of cattle and hogs. As such, these are in the
nature of permissive counterclaims which can be litigated
independently of the main complaint.Petitioners also argue that
they were denied an opportunity to be heard on the motion to
execute the summary judgment; and that the summary judgment was
rendered in disregard of due process.The argument is not
well-taken.A party cannot successfully invoke deprivation of due
process if he was accorded the opportunity of a hearing, through
either oral arguments or pleadings.[if
!supportFootnotes][30][endif] Contrary to petitioners claims, the
record shows that petitioners were duly represented by counsel when
the motion for summary judgment as well as the execution of the
same were heard by the trial court. Petitioners counsel did not
register any opposition to respondents oral motion for summary
judgment, saying that under the Rules of Court it should be
furnished a written motion for summary judgment at least 10 days
before it is heard. We find, however, that the absence of the
written notice did not divest the trial court of authority to pass
on the merits of the motion made in open court. The order of the
court granting the motion for summary judgment and its execution
thereof despite absence of a notice of hearing, or proof of service
thereof, is merely an irregularity in the proceedings. It cannot
deprive the court of its authority to pass on the merits of the
motion. The remedy of the aggrieved party in such cases is either
to have the order set aside or the irregularity otherwise cured by
the court, or to appeal from the final judgment, and not thru
certiorari.[if !supportFootnotes][31][endif]In fact, the counsel
for petitioners actively participated in disposing of the reliefs
prayed for in the complaint when he sought the reduction in
respondents claim to P482,766.88. Besides, we find from the records
that petitioners expressly agreed to the summary judgment[if
!supportFootnotes][32][endif] and to the execution of the same
after respondent posts a bond in an amount fixed by the court.[if
!supportFootnotes][33][endif] In short, petitioners were never
deprived of their day in court. Thus, they cannot now be allowed to
claim that they were denied due process. The Rules of Court should
be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of
securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action
and proceeding.[if !supportFootnotes][34][endif]Thus, in Ley
Construction and Development Corporation v. Union Bank of the
Philippines,[if !supportFootnotes][35][endif] it was
held:Admittedly, there is nothing in the records which indicates
that Judge Arcangel conducted a hearing before he resolved
respondents motion for summary judgment. Nevertheless, as explained
in Carcon Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, in
proceedings for summary judgment, the court is merely expected to
act chiefly on the basis of what is in the records of the case and
that the hearing contemplated in the Rules is not de riguer as its
purpose is merely to determine whether the issues are genuine or
not, and not to receive evidence on the issues set up in the
pleadings.xxx. In view of the fact that they admitted having
incurred the obligation which is the basis of the complaint, a
hearing would have served no pertinent purpose. The records already
provide sufficient basis for the court to resolve respondents
motion. Thus, we find that even if the trial court did not conduct
a hearing, this fact would not affect the validity of the summary
judgment rendered by Judge Arcangel.Neither does the fact that
respondents motion to resolve its motion for summary judgment was
filed ex parte affect the validity of Judge Arcangels resolution.
The requirement in Rule 35, 3 that the opposing party be furnished
a copy of the motion 10 days before the time specified for the
hearing applies to the motion for summary judgment itself and not
to the motion to resolve such motion. xxx. Thus, it could not be
said that they were deprived of the opportunity to question the
motion.WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant
petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 21, 2001 in CA-G.R.
SP No. 56305, which affirmed the Orders of the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City, Branch 224, directing the execution of partial
summary judgment in Civil Case No. Q-98-36421, is AFFIRMED.SO
ORDERED.Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, and Carpio, JJ.,
concur.Azcuna, J., on official leave.[if !supportFootnotes]
[endif][if !supportFootnotes][1][endif] Penned by Associate
Justice Eubulo G. Verzola, concurred in by Associate Justices
Rodrigo V. Cosico and Eliezer R. De Los Santos.[if
!supportFootnotes][2][endif] Rollo, pp. 96-99; penned by Judge
Emilio L. Leachon, Jr.[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif] Rollo, pp.
100-103.[if !supportFootnotes][4][endif] Rollo, p. 133.[if
!supportFootnotes][5][endif] Id., p. 131.[if
!supportFootnotes][6][endif] Id., pp. 134-152.[if
!supportFootnotes][7][endif] Id., pp. 157-160.[if
!supportFootnotes][8][endif] RTC Record, Vol. I, p. 214.[if
!supportFootnotes][9][endif] Joint Answer, p. 9, par. (c); Rollo,
p. 113.[if !supportFootnotes][10][endif] Rollo, p. 161.[if
!supportFootnotes][11][endif] Id., p. 167.[if
!supportFootnotes][12][endif] TSN, 25 November 1999, p. 66.[if
!supportFootnotes][13][endif] Supra, note 2; TSN, 25 November 1999,
pp. 73-74.[if !supportFootnotes][14][endif] Supra, note 3.[if
!supportFootnotes][15][endif] Supra, note 4.[if
!supportFootnotes][16][endif] Rollo, pp. 65-95.[if
!supportFootnotes][17][endif] Id., pp. 57-64.[if
!supportFootnotes][18][endif] Id., p. 256.[if
!supportFootnotes][19][endif] Petition, pp. 11-12; Rollo, pp.
18-19.[if !supportFootnotes][20][endif] Spouses Agbada v.
Inter-Urban Developers, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 144029, 19 September
2002, citing Excelsa Industries, Inc. v. CA, 317 Phil. 664
(1995).[if !supportFootnotes][21][endif] Solidbank Corporation v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120010, 3 October 2002.[if
!supportFootnotes][22][endif] Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co.
and/or Chemical Bank v. Guerrero, G.R. No. 136804, 19 February
2003.[if !supportFootnotes][23][endif] Solidbank Corporation v.
Court of Appeals, supra.[if !supportFootnotes][24][endif] TSN, 25
November 1999, p. 66.[if !supportFootnotes][25][endif] TSN, 25
November 1999, pp. 27-29.[if !supportFootnotes][26][endif] Supra,
note 26.[if !supportFootnotes][27][endif] G.R. No. 104266, 31 March
1993, 220 SCRA 726.[if !supportFootnotes][28][endif] G.R. Nos.
L-49017 and L-49024, 30 August 1983, 124 SCRA 297.[if
!supportFootnotes][29][endif] 355 Phil. 804, 811 (1998).[if
!supportFootnotes][30][endif] Alauya, Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos.
152151-52, 22 January 2003; See Rule 15, Section 2 of the Rules of
Court provides: All motions shall be in writing except those made
in open court or in the course of a hearing or trial.[if
!supportFootnotes][31][endif] See Galvez v. CA, G.R. No. 114046, 24
October 1994, 237 SCRA 685, 698, citing People, et al. v. Vergara,
etc., et al., G.R. Nos. 101557-58, 28 April 1993, 221 SCRA 560,
570-571.[if !supportFootnotes][32][endif] TSN, 25 November 1999,
pp. 42-50.[if !supportFootnotes][33][endif] TSN, 25 November 1999,
pp. 68-69.[if !supportFootnotes][34][endif] Section 6, Rule 1 of
the Rules of Court.[if !supportFootnotes][35][endif] 389 Phil. 788,
799 (2000).
G.R. No. 159357 April 28, 2004Brother MARIANO "MIKE" Z. VELARDE,
petitioner, vs.SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY,
respondent.DECISIONPANGANIBAN, J.:A decision that does not conform
to the form and substance required by the Constitution and the law
is void and deemed legally inexistent. To be valid, decisions
should comply with the form, the procedure and the substantive
requirements laid out in the Constitution, the Rules of Court and
relevant circulars/orders of the Supreme Court. For the guidance of
the bench and the bar, the Court hereby discusses these forms,
procedures and requirements.The CaseBefore us is a Petition for
Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the June 12,
2003 Decision2 and July 29, 2003 Order3 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila (Branch 49).4The challenged Decision was the
offshoot of a Petition for Declaratory Relief5 filed before the
RTC-Manila by herein Respondent Social Justice Society (SJS)
against herein Petitioner Mariano "Mike" Z. Velarde, together with
His Eminence, Jaime Cardinal Sin, Executive Minister Erao Manalo,
Brother Eddie Villanueva and Brother Eliseo F. Soriano as
co-respondents. The Petition prayed for the resolution of the
question "whether or not the act of a religious leader like any of
herein respondents, in endorsing the candidacy of a candidate for
elective office or in urging or requiring the members of his flock
to vote for a specified candidate, is violative of the letter or
spirit of the constitutional provisions x x x."6Alleging that the
questioned Decision did not contain a statement of facts and a
dispositive portion, herein petitioner filed a Clarificatory Motion
and Motion for Reconsideration before the trial court. Soriano, his
co-respondent, similarly filed a separate Motion for
Reconsideration. In response, the trial court issued the assailed
Order, which held as follows:"x x x [T]his Court cannot reconsider,
because what it was asked to do, was only to clarify a
Constitutional provision and to declare whether acts are violative
thereof. The Decision did not make a dispositive portion because a
dispositive portion is required only in coercive reliefs, where a
redress from wrong suffered and the benefit that the prevailing
party wronged should get. The step that these movants have to take,
is direct appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, for a
conclusive interpretation of the Constitutional provision to the
Supreme Court."7The Antecedent ProceedingsOn January 28, 2003, SJS
filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief ("SJS Petition") before the
RTC-Manila against Velarde and his aforesaid co-respondents. SJS, a
registered political party, sought the interpretation of several
constitutional provisions,8 specifically on the separation of
church and state; and a declaratory judgment on the
constitutionality of the acts of religious leaders endorsing a
candidate for an elective office, or urging or requiring the
members of their flock to vote for a specified candidate.The
subsequent proceedings were recounted in the challenged Decision in
these words:"x x x. Bro. Eddie Villanueva submitted, within the
original period [to file an Answer], a Motion to Dismiss.
Subsequently, Executive Minister Erao Manalo and Bro. Mike Velarde,
filed their Motions to Dismiss. While His Eminence Jaime Cardinal
L. Sin, filed a Comment and Bro. Eli Soriano, filed an Answer
within the extended period and similarly prayed for the dismissal
of the Petition. All sought the dismissal of the Petition on the
common grounds that it does not state a cause of action and that
there is no justiciable controversy. They were ordered to submit a
pleading by way of advisement, which was closely followed by
another Order denying all the Motions to Dismiss. Bro. Mike
Velarde, Bro. Eddie Villanueva and Executive Minister Erao Manalo
moved to reconsider the denial. His Eminence Jaime Cardinal L. Sin,
asked for extension to file memorandum. Only Bro. Eli Soriano
complied with the first Order by submitting his Memorandum. x x
x."x x x the Court denied the Motions to Dismiss, and the Motions
for Reconsideration filed by Bro. Mike Velarde, Bro. Eddie
Villanueva and Executive Minister Erao Manalo, which raised no new
arguments other than those already considered in the motions to
dismiss x x x."9After narrating the above incidents, the trial
court said that it had jurisdiction over the Petition, because "in
praying for a determination as to whether the actions imputed to
the respondents are violative of Article II, Section 6 of the
Fundamental Law, [the Petition] has raised only a question of
law."10 It then proceeded to a lengthy discussion of the issue
raised in the Petition the separation of church and state even
tracing, to some extent, the historical background of the
principle. Through its discourse, the court a quo opined at some
point that the "[e]ndorsement of specific candidates in an election
to any public office is a clear violation of the separation
clause."11After its essay on the legal issue, however, the trial
court failed to include a dispositive portion in its assailed
Decision. Thus, Velarde and Soriano filed separate Motions for
Reconsideration which, as mentioned earlier, were denied by the
lower court.Hence, this Petition for Review.12This Court, in a
Resolution13 dated September 2, 2003, required SJS and the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG) to submit their respective comments.
In the same Resolution, the Court gave the other parties --
impleaded as respondents in the original case below --the
opportunity to comment, if they so desired.On April 13, 2004, the
Court en banc conducted an Oral Argument.14The IssuesIn his
Petition, Brother Mike Velarde submits the following issues for
this Courts resolution:"1. Whether or not the Decision dated 12
June 2003 rendered by the court a quo was proper and valid;"2.
Whether or not there exists justiceable controversy in herein
respondents Petition for declaratory re