CIVIL WAR OF 1860 IN LEBANON: A LOCAL CHRISTIAN NARRATIVE

Parole de l’Orient 37 (2012) 1-29

CIVIL WAR OF 1860 IN LEBANON:

A LOCAL CHRISTIAN NARRATIVE

BY

Naila TAKIEDDINE KAIDBEY

Introduction .............................................................................................. 1 The Chronicles: a review .......................................................................... 3 Egyptian Occupation ................................................................................ 7 Violence in 1840 ....................................................................................... 9 The Double Qai`imqamat ......................................................................... 12 Foreign Intervention: Civil War of 1860 .................................................. 14 View of the “Other” .................................................................................. 19 Conclusion ................................................................................................ 23 Bibliography ............................................................................................. 27 Notes .........................................................................................................

INTRODUCTION

The abundance of research about the Civil War of 1860 in Lebanon cre-ates a quandary for the researcher. What more can one actually add or con-tribute? The answer is not easy. Misconceptions and controversy tended at times to make this part of Lebanese history the subject of polemics rather than of proper scholarly investigation1. For those interested in the recent events in Lebanon, a reassessment of contemporary works of that period is essential to gain better insight into the present.

There is no denying that the bloody intersectarian outbreaks of 1860 made a lasting impression on the political and intellectual history of Leba-non2. As a result a new political system - the mutaṣariffiya - based on sectar-

1) On the controversy over the historicity of Lebanon see Kamal SALIBI, “The Historical Perspective”, in Nadim SHEHADI and Dana HAFFAR MILLS, Lebanon: a History of Conflict and Consensus, (I.B. Tauris, London, 1988), 4-13; Aḥmad BAYḎŪN, al-ṣirā‘ ‘alā tārīḫ lubnān (Lebanese University Publications, Beirut, 1989).

2) While events that took place in Damascus in 1860 were equally decisive in the histo-

2 NAILA TAKIEDDINE KAIDBEY

ianism rather than political affiliations was devised by the Powers for the Mountain. With the advantages of political autonomy thus granted, there was more than one view regarding the future of the communities and the nature of the political entity to be established. Political consciousness gave rise to the idea of a community with a continuous historical tradition worth preserv-ing; and a new sort of historiography developed. However, when talking about the history of Lebanon, it is useful to keep in mind that one is not speaking necessarily of one historical ‘script’ relating to a fully developed concept of a nation. Rather, there are a number of separate and distinct narra-tives which happen to have been played historically on the same stage; sometimes in conjunction with one another3.

This paper provides a brief survey of three contemporary chronicles from the nineteenth century: Mikha'īl Mishaqa (1800-1888), Al-ǧawāb ‘alā iqtirāḥ al-aḥbāb; Iskandar Abakarius (…-1885), Nawādir al-zamān fī waqā'i‘ ǧabal lubnān; Shahin Makarius, (1855-1920), Ḥasr al-liṯām ‘an nakabāt al-Šām4. It will also attempt to contribute an interpretive framework for understanding the complex processes of change that the Lebanese society underwent as viewed in modern historiography5.

In order to understand the deeper reasons that compelled authors to write their narratives, this paper will retrace through careful reading and comparison of the texts, the major issues they dealt with; issues of identity, the naissance of a Lebanese entity, the socio-economic changes among the Christians in Lebanon, and changes in their role in the politics of the Moun-

ry of the region, I will restrict myself in this paper to Mount Lebanon. 3) Kamal SALIBI, “The Historical Perspective”, in Nadim SHEHADI and Dana HAFFAR

MILLS (eds.), Lebanon: History of Conflict and Consensus (I.B. Tauris, London, 1988), 5. 4) Mīḫā'īl MIŠĀQĀ, muntaḫabāt min al-ǧawāb ‘alā iqtirāḥ al-aḥbāb, ed. Assad RUSTUN

and Ṣubḥī ABŪ ŠAQRĀ (al-maktaba al-būlusiyya, Beirut, 1985); Mikha’yil MISHAQA, Murder, Mayhem, Pillage, and Plunder: The History of the Lebanon in the 18th and 19th Centuries, trans. Wheeler M. Thackston, Jr., (State University Press, New York, 1988); Šāhīn MAKĀRIŪS, Ḥasr al-liṯām ‘an nakabāt al-Šām (Beirut, 1983), 2nd ed.; Iskandar Ya‘qūb ABAKĀRIŪS, nawādir al-zamān fī waqā'i‘ lubnān, ed. Abdul Karīm al-Samak (Riyāḏ Rayyis lil-kutub wal-našr, London, 1987); Iskandar Ya‘qūb ABAKĀRIŪS, The Lebanon in Turmoil: Syria and the Powers in 1860, trans J.F. Scheltema (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1920).

5) The main modern works consulted are: Laila TARAZI FAWAZ, An Occasion for War: Civil Conflict in Lebanon and Damascus in 1860 (Center for Lebanese Studies and I. B. Tau-ris, London, 1994); Caesar E. FARAH, The Politics of Interventionism in Ottoman Lebanon, 1830-1861 (Center for Lebanese Studies and I. B. Tauris, London, 2000); Ussama MAKDISI, The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History and Violence in Nineteenth Century Otto-man Lebanon (University of California Press, Berkeley, 2000).

CIVIL WAR OF 1860 IN LEBANON: A LOCAL CHRISTIAN NARRATIVE 3

tain. My aim is not to contest the validity of the narrative presented, one based on personal knowledge and observation. Rather, I will concentrate on tracing their reaction to the Civil War of 1860 and the analysis they offer through their particular background and reasoning. Their view of the “Self” vis-à-vis the “Other”, will further shed light on the deeper issues behind the conflict.

There are some general observations that need to be made before pro-ceeding further. In selecting the texts to be reviewed in this paper contempo-rary Maronite historian are not included despite the importance of their works as a source for the history of Lebanon6. The authors chosen offer a fresh departure from traditional historiography as they all come from non-clerical ‘bourgeoisie’ families of Greek Catholic origins. Thus the events of 1860 are presented from the perceptive of the larger Christian community. Furthermore, their close contact with Europeans in the commercial sector or with the missionaries, widened their secular perspectives and insight into the complexities of power politics.

THE CHRONICLES: A REVIEW

There is no doubt that Iskandar Abakarius was writing his work to rec-ord for posterity the ‘injustice’ committed against the ‘victimized’ Christians of Mount Lebanon. From the outset Abakarius was incensed by the ‘massa-cres’ that precipitated in the Mountain and blames the Druzes for initiating the disturbances. In this he affirms that the Civil War of 1860 was part of a wider ‘scheme’ to eliminate the Christian community from the whole of Syr-ia or Mount Lebanon in the least. He writes in the introduction:

“When the affliction came to pass which befell the Christians from the na-

tion of the Druzes in Mount Lebanon, its report spread… and the people

spoke of it in every place until in length of time it turned their tears to an-

ger… whoever comes after me may learn the truth about these troubles

and disturbances; and that he may know the design and intention of the

evil purposed in them”7.

6) For more information about traditional Maronite historiography, see Albert Hourani, “Historians of Lebanon”, in Bernard LEWIS and P. M. HOLT (ed.), Historians of the Middle East (Oxford University Press, London, 1962), 226-245; Kamal SALIBI, “The Traditional His-toriography of the Maronites”, in Nadim SHEHADI and Dana HAFFAR MILLS (eds.), Lebanon: a History of Conflict and Consensus (I.B. Tauris, London, 1988), 212-225.

7) Iskandar Ya‘qub ABAKARIUS, The Lebanon in Turmoil: Syria and the Powers in 1860, trans J.F. Scheltema (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1920), 45. There are many discrepancies between the Arabic edition by Abdul Karim al-Samak and the English edition.


The titles of the chapters indicate without any misgivings not only the substance of the contents of this monograph, but the demeanor of its author. The wordings of the titles are worth quoting as they also reveal the scope and focus of this work: Acts of injustice and inequity committed; troubles and disturbances; treachery and deceit suffered, heart-rending trials; car-nage… followed by the massacre; siege and forced emigration, massacre that was pitiless and did not seem to cease. The idea of Lebanon as an independ-ent territorial unit and “refuge” for the Christians was materializing among the educated Christian elite in the 19th century. Abakarius seems to champi-on this concept for he writes in the introduction: “Mount Lebanon is one of the most famous mountains that exist and its inhabitants have their origin in the most remote ages”8.

He then continues his discourse with a brief survey of the governorship of the Mountain. This is followed by a detailed description of the hostilities that took place between the communities since the early days of the Shihab Emirate and until the Civil War of 1860. In the last entry of text the author reports the imprisonment of Druze notable thus culminating years of conten-tion. He ends with this statement: “I beseech my most illustrious lord and master sīdī wa mawlāy al-mu‘aẓẓam Muḥammad Ṣādiq Pasha to grant me his benevolence by accepting this work al-ta'līf for I am but one among the servant of his exalted court”9. It would not be pure conjecture to surmise that Iskandar Abakarius was commissioned by the Pasha to write this mono-graph, or that he was trying to win favors with the Turkish government for whatever personal gain that might transpire. It is noteworthy that Sadiq Pa-sha, a protégé of Fu'ād Pasha was appointed Grand Vizier in 187810, presum-ably at the time that Abakarius was writing his manuscript.

It appears that different manuscripts were used by the editors. The title of the Arabic manu-script and the one used by the translator vary slightly. In the Arabic edition it appears as: na-wādir al-zamān fī waqā'i‘ lubnān; while in the translation the word lubnān is replaced by: Arab Countries. Scheltema mentioned in the footnote that this section of the title was scratched and re-written several times. As finally written, it may be read by the lover of such plays on words: “Arabs of the Garden (of Syria). In addition, some of the variations in the translated in my view shed light to the demeanor of the author Iskandar Abakarius, I will quote the English version wherever I deem necessary or if I believe they will add to the sub-ject at hand. To avoid confusion, I will specify in the notes the editions cited.

8) Iskandar Ya‘qub ABAKARIUS, ibid., 47. 9) Iskandar Ya‘qūb ABAKĀRIŪS, nawādir al-zamān fī waqā'i‘ lubnān, ed. Abdul Karim

al-Samak (Riyāḏ Rayyis lil-kutub wal-našr, London, 1987), 295. 10) Stanford J. SHAW and Ezel KURAL SHAW, History of the Ottoman Empire and Mod-

ern Turkey, 2 vols. (University Press, Cambridge, 1977), 2/439.


Mikha'īl Mishaqa and Makarius had a broader perception of these events. They were writing the history of Syria in which Mount Lebanon was an integral part. Albeit born and raised in Mount Lebanon, Mishaqa envi-sioned himself as a Syrian Ottoman subject of the Sultan. His years in Da-mascus as an active participant with the Damascene officials, no doubt had a credible influence on his outlook. He composed his work in response to a request from family and friends to deliver a first-hand description of the his-tory of Mount Lebanon and bilād al-Šām. The history of the Mishaqa clan in incorporated as part of a ‘public heritage’11. The title of his work: al-ǧawāb ‘alā iqtirāḥ al-aḥbāb, translated into: Response to the appeal request of friends and relations, confirms the above.

Mishaqa gives a historical view starting towards the end of the 18th century at the time of the Ottoman governor Ahamd Pasha al-Jazzar. During which time the imārah was reduced to a commodity offered to the highest bidder12. Emir Bashir II designated as al-kabīr (the Great) remains the cen-tral figure in Mishaqa’s account. He speaks of contention between the Emir and the feudality for he was continually pressed to increase revenues. Egyp-tian occupation and the turbulent years of the 1840s are reported, he also re-flects on the Civil War of 1860, but was more involved in the massacres of Damascus in that year because he was actually a participant in them. He was seriously injured and his house was looted. His account ends with the arrival of Fu'ad Pasha in Damascus.

Makarius perceives Mount Lebanon as part of a more general develop-ment. Without losing sight of its own specificities, it shares a common histo-ry with the other Syrian provinces. He writes in the introduction:

“Syria or bilād al-Šām was the cradle of culture and the center of afflu-

ence and felicity since ancient times. Nations were established; communi-

ties prospered and trade flourished to unlimited frontiers the like of which

was never reported in the annals of history”13.

A brief report about the early history of Syria until its fall under Otto-man influence is provided. The policy of the Ottoman State, reports Makari-us, and since its inception, was one of tolerance and equity towards all sub-

11) Fruma ZACHS, “Micha’il Mishaqa – the First Historian of Modern Syria”, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 28 (2001), 75.

12) Mas‘ūd ḎĀHIR, al-intifāḏat al-Lubnāniya ḏidd al-niẓām al-muqāṭi‘ǧī (Dār al-Fārābī, Beirut, 1988), p. 30.

13) Translation from the Arabic of all quotations is mine unless otherwise indicated.


jects. Local cultures and traditions were respected. Religious freedom was prevalent and people were permitted to practice their faith without interfer-ence. It was thus that the loyalty and acquiescence of the people was gained. However, the appointed wālīs presided with great latitude over the provinces and their authority unlimited.

Makarius was very critical of those officials who had nothing but self-serving interests in mind. They followed their own whims without considera-tion to law or justice. Sectarian conflict, he argues, was the outcome of con-flicting interests and avarice of the Ottoman wālīs who incited the communi-ties against each other so that they would prevail. As the weaker segment of society, Christians bore the brunt of the caprice of these officials. They were subjugated to insult and injury even from Muslim compatriots especially in major cities where they were not allowed to share the same sidewalks; išmil (walk on the left) was particularly abusive14. On many occasions they from suffered physical abuse; forced labor and confiscation of property; not to mention extra taxes that were sporadically imposed on them. At the same time, Makarius speaks of notables and ‘ulmā' (sages) who were against such ill-treatment; they would castigate their fellow citizens for ‘abominable’ be-havior15. Makarius did not exonerate local feudalities in Mount Lebanon who were no less injurious. They exploited their tenants especially the Chris-tians among them, to remain on the good side of the Ottoman officials16. He concludes this section by saying:

“In short, life was bitter for those living under the rule of callous beasts

that sanction harassment of those who do not profess the same Faith” .17

While Makarius’ account might be truthful per se, what he was actually doing was creating absolute distinction between Christian and Muslim com-munities. Injustice by Ottoman wālīs notwithstanding, it was not directed exclusively against Christians. Muslim sources permeate with stories of a populace disgruntled with the behavior of both the governor and the soldiery.

14) Iskandar Ya‘qub ABAKARIUS, The Lebanon in Turmoil: Syria and the Powers in 1860, trans J.F. Scheltema (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1920), 36-38.

15) Iskandar Ya‘qub ABAKARIUS, Ibid., 39. 16) Iskandar Ya‘qub ABAKARIUS, Ibid., 27-28. 17) Iskandar Ya‘qub ABAKARIUS, Ibid., 42.


EGYPTIAN OCCUPATION

Egyptian occupation of Syria changed beyond repair traditional rule in the Mountain. Mishaqa was very critical of Egyptian policy. Equity and reli-gious tolerance were recognized, but there was neither peace nor security during this period. Mishaqa paints a morbid picture where revolts were en-demic; heavy taxation was ruinous and military conscription particularly in-jurious to Mount Lebanon. In a communiqué addressed to the Egyptian offi-cials, Mishaqa criticized their polity of displacing traditional muqāṭi‘ǧīs (feudal chiefs) from their provinces. When those chiefs tried to ward off in-justice against their followers, he said, they were often rewarded by “chop-ping their heads off”18. Their inherited privileges were thwarted; authority over their tenants was weakened. Worst still, they were deprived of what they valued most, their ‘honor’. Free spirited Syrians, he reminded the offi-cial, are not accustomed to slavery, they are nothing like the ‘Pasha’s Egyp-tians subjects’ who have known slavery since the times of the Pharos19.

Mishaqa was aware that Egyptian policy provoked all notables in Mount Lebanon despite their excellent relationship with Emir Bashir20. In response, a major rebellion broke out in 1838 among the Druze of the Hawran region; it spread to Wady al-Taym in Lebanon. The Druze put up fierce resistance; finally they succumbed to the enemy’s superior number and weapons, but not without precipitating bitter resentment among the Druze directed at the Christians for their active participation in these events. What was perhaps more problematic to Christian-Druze relations was the in-volvement of Bahir’s son Khalil in putting down this insurrection. Khalil was instructed with the task of collecting their weapons. “To the Druze that was worse than death”21.

What perhaps escaped the author was that religious affiliation of the in-habitants was not an issue for Ibrahim Pasha. It was their revolt against the Egyptians that established their heresy. Once the rebels were granted amān “discursively, history was turned back” and Druze notables were returned to their former social standing22.

18) This statement was communicated to Bahri Bey, a very close associate of Ibrahim Pashe. See Mīḫā'īl MIŠĀQĀ, muntaḫabāt min al-ǧawāb ‘alā iqtirāḥ al-aḥbāb, ed. Assad Rustun and Ṣubḥī Abū Šaqrā (al-maktaba al-būlusiyya, Beirut, 1985), 142.

19) Mīḫā'īl MIŠĀQĀ, Ibid., 143-145. 20) Mīḫā'īl MIŠĀQĀ, Ibid., 1985), 122. 21) Mīḫā'īl MIŠĀQĀ, Ibid., 1985), 127. 22) Ussama Makdisi elaborates on this issue in a chapter entitled: “The faces of re-


Ibrahim Pasha was a ‘savior’ in Makarius’s assessment23. In 1831 the country was on the verge of civil strife; the Pasha brought peace and order to the land. Makarius in weighing up the situation had this to say:

“Ibrahim Pasha, the valiant hero, delivered the land from the nightmare it

was living and from certain ruin; as if we were in Hell and now we are in

Paradise”24.

There is no denying that Christians benefited from Egyptian policy to advance both financially and culturally. They were able to realize their best potential under these circumstances. Peace and order, as Makarius affirms, allowed those who had taken refuge in Mount Lebanon to return to the cities to take up their trade. The positive attitude towards Ibrahim Pasha faded when in his effort to return to the old social order, Christian loyalists were disarmed. Makarius reports that they joined hand with the Druzes with “whom they shared an independent spirit; both fought the Egyptians with equal tenacity”25.

Abakarius was equally enthusiastic about the Egyptian occupation of Syria. Commenting on the Druze insurrection of 1838 he wrote:

“At this juncture the illustrious Ibrahim Pasha asked the Christians to

serve him in the predicament so created, and they responded with alacrity

to his purpose. They fought valiantly; ravaged the homes of the Druze and

confiscated their weapons”26.

What is perhaps more of essence is that Druze sanctuaries were dese-crated during that expedition. Their secret religious books were stolen; thus a religion that had remained concealed for hundreds of years was revealed. This incident left a “bitter taste in their mouth and a misfortune not to be borne”27. It is worth noting that Abakarius is the only one among those writ-ers who speaks of ingrained animosity between the communities. He argues that confiscation of Druze weapons added to the bad feeling that ‘of old’ ex-

form”. Ussama MAKDISI, The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History and Violence in Nineteenth Century Ottoman Lebanon (University of California Press, Berkeley, 2000), 57.

23) Šāhīn MAKĀRIŪS, Ḥasr al-liṯām ‘an nakabāt al-Šām (Beirut, 1983), 45. 24) Šāhīn MAKĀRIŪS, Ibid., 68. 25) Šāhīn MAKĀRIŪS, Ibid., 69. 26) Iskandar Ya‘qub ABAKARIUS, The Lebanon in Turmoil: Syria and the Powers in

1860, trans J.F. Scheltema (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1920), 59. 27) Iskandar Ya‘qub ABAKARIUS, Ibid., 59. This sentence does not appear in the edited

Arabic version nawādir. Since the translation is much earlier I believe the editor of the Arabic version avoided reference to sensitive issues at the time when the Civil War was still raging in Lebanon in 1987.


isted between them and the Maronites. He overlooked the fact that once the rebellion was over and disorder was contained, Druze-Christian ‘dichotomy’ was meant to be erased; all subjects were to resume their former social standing28.

What Abakarius also failed to note was the disproportion in wealth that was created during the Egyptian occupation was actually at the expense of the Druze muqāṭi‘ǧīs. The former tenants of the feudality were now their money lenders. The delicate balance between the various communities was disrupted adding further to confessional antagonism29. Makarius carried the argument further when he accused the state of harboring bad intentions to-wards Christians in particular not only because of religious differences but more importantly because they were the more receptive to modernization and progress30. His observation is not without merit for it is not by pure co-incidence that the towns that witnessed the most aggressive fighting and bloodshed were Zahle and Dair al-Qamar31.

VIOLENCE IN 1840

The Egyptians faced yet another revolt that ultimately led to their com-plete withdrawal from Syria. Inadvertently, the exile of Bashir and the ap-pointment of his incompetent cousin Bashir Qasim left a power vacuum that gave the Ottomans the opportunity to intervene more directly in the politics of the Mountain. In a poignant message Makarius laments the end of Egyp-tian hegemony over Syria: “Wish to God the country remained until present times under the firm grip of the Egyptians; its economic supremacy among the nations of the East would have been secured”32. But ‘alas’, he complains, Turkish agents were back on the scene taking their revenge on the Mountain especially the Christians who were presumably the allies of the Egyptians.

28) Ussama MAKDISI, The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History and Violence in Nineteenth Century Ottoman Lebanon (University of California Press, Berkeley, 2000), 56.

29) For further information about the economic changes in the 19th century see William POLK, The Opening of South Lebanon: A study of the Impact of the West on the Middle East, (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass, 1968); Samir KHALAF, Resistance and Change in 19th century Lebanon (American University Publications, Beirut, 1979).

30) Šāhīn MAKĀRIŪS, Ḥasr al-liṯām ‘an nakabāt al-Šām (Beirut, 1983), 108. 31) For more details on the economic conditions in these two towns see Laila FAWAZ,

“Zahle and Day al-Qamar: two market towns of Mount Lebanon during the civil war of 1860”, in Nadim SHEHADI and Dana HAFFAR MILLS (ed.), Lebanon: a History of Conflict and Consensus (I.B. Tauris, London, 1988), 49-64.

32) Šāhīn MAKĀRIŪS, Ibid., 70.


Their efforts succeeded in splitting the communities on sectarian lines as each followed instincts of envy and prejudice33.

Bashir Qasim replaced his cousin Bashir II despite Druze objections. Makarius believed that religion became a sensitive issue in the Mountain with the conversion of the Muslim Shihab to Christianity. Power struggle had taken a different turn. Although both emirs had nothing but self-serving motives in mind when they challenged the muqāṭi‘ǧīs, it was viewed as an act of hostility by a Christian ruler bent on destroying the Druze. The three writers describe Bashir Qasim as weak and lacking the sagacity of his prede-cessor in handling the affairs of the Mountain especially in those turbulent times. They speak of his insolence and frivolity. The indecorous manner in which he treated the Druze notables and his vulgar language, were most of-fensive. Although they had their differences with Emir Bashir, “muqāṭi‘ǧīs” never heard an uncouth word from him nor was he ever disrespectful especial-ly when it is common knowledge that Druze speech is of absolute propriety”34.

What brought things to a head in the Mountain was the matter of tax collection35. Fiscal reforms were necessary to achieve stability in the Syrian provinces. Excessive taxation, however, was a strong inducement to revolt. While the Druze found it prudent to accept taxation without objection, the Maronites especially in Kisrawan refused to pay the customary taxes mīrī on the pretext that these cumbersome financial obligations were impoverishing the community. Petitions were drawn and dispatched to Istanbul describing the wretched condition of the people. “You would see thousands of homeless villagers, young and old, begging in the streets or engaged as domestic serv-ants or doing other menial jobs”36.

Mishaqa, however, was very critical of Maronite departure from tradi-tion. Noncompliance, he wrote was very hazardous, particularly when the issue of ǧizia (toleration tax) was brought forth. Muslim rulers, he argues, tolerated the ḏimmīs and allowed them to practice their religion; but in return for protection and as a mark of their submission, they were required to pay the ǧizya37. Should they refrain from payment, their status as ḏimmīs would

33) Šāhīn MAKĀRIŪS, Ibid., 71. 34) Mīḫā'īl MIŠĀQĀ, muntaḫabāt min al-ǧawāb ‘alā iqtirāḥ al-aḥbāb, ed. Assad Rustun

and Ṣubḥī Abū Šaqrā (al-maktaba al-būlusiyya, Beirut, 1985), 155; Šāhīn MAKĀRIŪS, Ibid., 74. 35) Mīḫā'īl MIŠĀQĀ, Ibid., 154; Šāhīn MAKĀRIŪS, Ibid., 78-79. 36) Mīḫā'īl MIŠĀQĀ, Ibid., 155. 37) William POLK, The Opening of South Lebanon: A Study of the Impact of the West on

the Middle East (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1963), 154; Ḥabīb al-Zayyāt, al-


be jeopardized. They would not only loose the protection of the Sultan, but would be subject to his wrath. He ends with the warning: “dire consequences await the Lebanese if the ǧizia is not collected”38.

The term “Lebanese” at this stage warrants some explaining. Mishaqa was writing at the time when such a term had become indicative of the awareness of the new identity that emerged after 1860. It was no more the Druze Mountain or Mount Lebanon, but an entity that has almost severed its relationship with the old regime and had become a state recognized by both the Ottomans and the Powers39.

Arguing the issue of taxation, Makarius disproved the Patriarch’s atti-tude. Inadvertently, the Patriarch ‘took it upon himself to be the cause of war and bloodshed’; the Patriarch knows the emirs were only trying to satisfy the insatiable appetite of the Turkish wālīs for money’40. Per contra, Makarius commended the Druze for being more rational and clairvoyant in this very crucial matter. They sent a delegation to Istanbul to pay homage and renew their allegiance to the Port. Apprehensive of the outcome of this conflict, Makarius concludes this argument by stating that ‘the situation clearly demonstrates without any doubt the incompetence of the notables of Leba-non in handling their own affairs thus giving the Turks a pretext to place the Mountain under direct Turkish rule’41.

A struggle over land and control over taxation elevated and gave mo-mentum for intercommoned tensions, which led to the first major sectarian clashes in the Mountain42. What took place between the Druze of B‘aqlin and the Christians of Dair al-Qamar in 1841 was much more than a trivial hunting incident in43. While the Druze initially accepted apologizes of the people of Dair al-Qamar, Mishaqa ascertains they were secretly prepared for revenge. The presence of several Druze notables in Damascus at the time

ḫizāna al-šarqiyya (Catholic Press, Beirut, 1937), 54-65. 38) Mīḫā'īl MIŠĀQĀ, muntaḫabāt min al-ǧawāb ‘alā iqtirāḥ al-aḥbāb, ed. Assad Rustun

and Ṣubḥī Abū Šaqrā (al-maktaba al-būlusiyya, Beirut, 1985), 155. 39) For more information see Kamal SALIBI, Modern History of Lebanon (Caravan

Books, New York, 1977, reprint edition 1965), Introduction. 40) Šāhīn MAKĀRIŪS, Ḥasr al-liṯām ‘an nakabāt al-Šām (Beirut, 1983), 74, 79. 41) Šāhīn MAKĀRIŪS, Ibid., 79. 42) Ussama MAKDISĪ, The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History and Violence

in Nineteenth Century Ottoman Lebanon (University of California Press, Berkeley, 2000), 63. 43) Mikha’yil MISHAQA, Murder, Mayhem, Pillage, and Plunder: The History of the

Lebanon in the 18th and 19th Centuries, trans. Wheeler M. Thackston, Jr. (State University Press, New York, 1988), 227.


confirmed his suspicions. Mishaqa recognized Qasim al-Qadi a prominent Shaykh from Dair al-Qamar who on his way back to the Mountain carried with him a load of arms and ammunitions; an attack on the town became imminent.

Mishaqa described the battle of Dair al-Qamar with apparent anguish. What was perhaps more hazardous than the looting and burning of homes, was that Druze muqāṭi‘ǧīs killed their Christian tenants. In the eyes of the people of Dair al-Qamar, Mishaqa included, the šayḫs had betrayed the very people they were supposed to protect. They ‘violated tradition of both hospi-tality and loyalty’44 that had been the backbone of traditional society.

The above observations sustain the argument that the problem in the 1840s was three dimensional. On the first level it was a struggle between Bashir Qasim and Druze feudality; on the second, refusal of Maronite com-moners to return to their former status under the muqāṭi‘ǧīs; and lastly a re-definition of the relationship between religion and politics and its implica-tions for a multi-religious society45. The situation worsened because “com-munal boundaries were shifting and religion was detached from its social environment and treated as a cohesive, exclusivist and organic force; neigh-bors suddenly became potential enemies”46. It was in fact a failure of all par-ticipants to fathom the actual circumstances that led to sectarian clashes. Re-ligious fanaticism created a legacy of mutual acrimony within the communi-ties that would not be easily obliterated. The situation did not escalate further and tranquility could still be reached in the 1840s because despite the sec-tarian undertone, the conflict was contained in one region and was still a power struggle between the elements of the society.

THE DOUBLE QA'IMMAQAMAT

Following the violence of the 1840s Omar Pasha was dispatched in an effort to bring law and order. Upon his arrival he arrested Druze notables presumably responsible for the violence that had taken place. Mishaqa saw in this a ploy by the Ottomans to appear as the nonpartisan conciliatory party in the conflict. Resistance to Omar Pasha was imminent as we read in the au-


45) For more information about economic transformations in Mount Lebanon see Do-minique CHEVALLIER, La société du Mont Liban à l’époque de la révolution industrielle en Europe (Libraire Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, Paris, 1970).

46) For a more detailed analysis see Ussama MAKDISĪ, Ibid., 64-65.


thor’s reports. The Ottomans had left the door open for both communities to enter into the political stage. Christians refused to cooperate with Omar Pa-sha. Druzes, ‘intoxicated with victory and savoring the sweetness of plun-der’, rejected foreign rule; they would accept nothing less than full sover-eignty over the Mountain47. Eager to demonstrate his efficiency to the Port, Omar Pasha sent his agent to circulate petitions and draw signatures from the whole country praising direct Turkish rule and castigating the rule of the Shihab emirs. Makarius called these reports taqārīr kāḏiba (false reports) and denounced the despicable policy of the Turkish government and their attempt to mislead European powers. Christians were especially targeted be-cause of their presumed affiliation with foreigners48. Apparently corrupt methods were used to procure the largest number of signatures. European consuls in Beirut strongly protested against the use of such methods, and de-clared the petitions to be unrepresentative of Lebanese opinion49.

By December of 1842 a joint Ottomans European compromise was reached to divide Mount Lebanon along sectarian lines known as the Double Qā'immaqāmat one Christian in the north and one Druze in the south. This new arrangement failed to satisfy either side especially in the mixed villages. Makarius poses a question: what about the commoners those who worked the land of the Druze muqāṭi‘ǧīs? Their allegiance was now put to question and their future was uncertain. Should they follow their traditional Druze Shaykh or should they seek a new life in the Christian areas, suddenly be-came a critical issue. What aggravated the situation further was the interfer-ence of the Maronite clergy. Commoners were facing an emerging sectarian situation. Encouraged by agents of the Maronite Patriarch they began to voice their complaints. Death was far better, they would say, than living un-der the rule of a Druze overlord50. A communiqué was distributed by Patri-arch Yusuf Hubaysh to his congregation to boost their moral asking them to openly oppose their Druze feudal lords. Makarius clearly objected to the es-sence of this communiqué and tells how Christian tenants became openly de-fiant. The Patriarch was challenging the traditional feudal system on which the politics of the Mountain rested. This new development did not fall well with the Druze muqāṭi‘ǧīs who saw in it an encroachment on their long-

47) Šāhīn MAKĀRIŪS, Ḥasr al-liṯām ‘an nakabāt al-Šām (Beirut, 1983), 109. 48) For the full text of the petitions and the European objections see: Šāhīn MAKĀRIŪS,

Ibid., 103-108. 49) Šāhīn MAKĀRIŪS, Ibid., 105; SALIBI, Modern, 55. 50) Šāhīn MAKĀRIŪS, Ibid., 116.


established authority. It would threaten a social hierarchy that to them was a ‘due right’ inherited from their forefathers since they first set foot in the Mountain.

Left hanging, however, was the fate of non-Maronite Christians. They accepted Druze dominance without objection which, as Makarius tells, was far better than the ‘governance of the Maronite clergy’. Emboldened by the stand of the Christian communities, the Druze rejected the newly acquired authority of the clerics. Attempts to remedy the situation by both factions failed; the ground was set for a new chapter of inter-communal violence. Thus, continues Makarius, the situation remained volatile for forty years fi-nally culminating in the disasters of 186051.

The implications of such a conclusion are clear. Makarius was con-vinced that three things caused the Civil War of 1860: corrupt Turkish agents, Maronite political ambitions and Druze disenchantment. Of the three, Turkish policy was the most liable ‘nothing happened without their clear di-rectives’52. It is the duty of the government to look after the entire population without discrimination. ‘Never in the annals of time have we heard of worse treachery committed by a government that claims to defend human rights’. ‘Lo! To the Druze if they had disobeyed; the Turks would have aided the Christians in slaughtering them ista‘ānat bil-naṣārā ‘alā ḏabḥ al-durūz53.

FOREIGN INTERVENTION: CIVIL WAR OF 1860

There is consensus among analysts of this period that European rivalries in the Levant complicated further an already multifaceted problem. Ceasar Farah forcefully argues the damages of the politics of ‘interventionism’. People of Mount Lebanon recluse in their forbiddingly remote strangleholds, could hardly fathom the particulars of European politics. Nor could one ex-pect them to make sense of the intricate diplomacy at the heart of which England and France were both fiercely vying for influence over the Levant. Each community had a protector or friend in one or more of the European rivals. Gradually feudal and religious alignments became more and more the “policy instruments of the powers whose clashing strategies either contribut-ed to or led to conflict among their respective protégés”54. Makdisi, whose

51) Šāhīn MAKĀRIŪS, Ibid., 76. 52) Šāhīn MAKĀRIŪS, Ibid., 239. 53) Šāhīn MAKĀRIŪS, Ibid., 97. 54) Caesar E. FARAH, The Politics of Interventionism in Ottoman Lebanon, 1830-1861,

Center for Lebanese Studies and I. B. Tauris, London, 2000, Introduction.


main argument is about the sectarianism, believed that the entrance of Euro-peans as players in elite politics dramatically altered the relationship among religion, knowledge and power. Whereas religion had once been an integral part of an elaborate nonsectarian social order it now constituted the basis and raison d’être for communal segregation in an era of profound change55. Samir Khalaf, as a social scientist, agrees that on the several occasions that foreign political intervention did take place in Lebanon it almost always generated further imbalances and accentuated the disparities and cleavages within society. They either provide opportunities for religious communities to enjoy disproportionate wealth and privileges, or they seek to “erode local autonomy of various traditional groups and dilute the cultural heritage of so-ciety”56.

These perspectives imply that the religious communities unavoidably had different interpretations of the European appearance on the local scene. The Druze found in the British a means to safeguard their traditional status; the Maronites and their French protectors worked to defuse this power57. Greek Catholics, on the contrary, viewed international involvement from a different standpoint. They belonged in their majority to a commercial class linked with the trade with the West. Hence, they realized that commercial interests could not flourish during civil strife. Moreover, they were accus-tomed to overlooking religious differences when it came to business58.

Based on the above arguments one ought to ask: how did 19th century indigenous historiography view foreign intervention? How much did social environment and religious affiliation affect rulings? As a forerunner of the religious and educational modernists of the late nineteenth century in the Le-vant59, and as a converted Protestant with Greek Catholic roots, Mishaqa ap-pears to have a more tolerant and secular outlook on events. His family, even


56) Samir KHALAF, Resistance and Change in 19th Century Lebanon (American Uni-versity Publications, Beirut, 1979), 14.

57) Šāhīn MAKĀRIŪS, Ibid., 125. 58) For more information on the subject see Laila FAWAZ, “The City and the Mountain:

Beirut’s Political Radius in the Nineteenth Century as Revealed in the Crisis of 1860”, Inter-national Journal of Middle East Studies, 16 (1984), 489-495.

59) Mikha’yil MISHAQA, Murder, Mayhem, Pillage, and Plunder: The History of the Lebanon in the 18th and 19th Centuries, trans. Wheeler M. Thackston, Jr. (State University Press, New York, 1988), 1.


his wife, did not welcome the conversion to Protestantism in 1848 and tried to bring him back to his own church. On this he writes:

“I thought it best to leave my church to abandon my standing with my

brothers and relatives preferring a clear conscience by being among the

few evangelicals in Damascus, whom the traditionalists call heretics be-

cause they reject the teachings of hypocrisy and consider God’s Word

sufficient”60.

His conversion can also be seen perhaps as a will to join a “more liberal and less constraining denomination”61. Were it not for Wood, he writes, who earnestly defended him against Patriarch Maximus’ attacks, his stay in Da-mascus would have been jeopardized. Other members of his family were al-so associated with the British consulate in Lebanon. His relation Khalil Mis-haqa was a dragoman and cancelliere in the British consulate general. Dur-ing the siege of Dair al-Qamar, it was the British officials who secured his safe conduct to Beirut. It is not conjecture to say that Mishaqa did not view British involvement in the affairs of Syria as damaging. Two explanations might be offered: one, he firmly believed that the Turks were playing a dirty game; then he had his own of self-interest to safeguard. What’s more, Assad Rustum affirms that Mishaqa’s close connection with the Americans necessi-tated that he defend their interests whenever the need arises62.

One can surmise that Mishaqa belonged to a generation that had close connections with Western representatives whether missionaries or govern-ment officials. His close connection with the American missionaries and his association with the British consulate opened new opportunities either in trade or in clerical positions when he served as ‘dragoman’ for Richard Wood63. Exposure to foreign cultures no doubt made him more likely to ac-cept foreign intervention as an advantage rather than a curse. Thus it was on-ly the positive side that he chose to communicate.

60) Mikha’yil MISHAQA, Ibid., 236. 61) Fruma ZACHS, “Micha’il Mishaqa – the First Historian of Modern Syria”, British

Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 28 (2001), 73. 62) Mīḫā'īl MIŠĀQĀ, muntaḫabāt min al-ǧawāb ‘alā iqtirāḥ al-aḥbāb, ed. Assad Rustun

and Ṣubḥī Abū Šaqrā (al-maktaba al-būlusiyya, Beirut, 1985), vi-vii; Zahcs, 73. Mishaqa served as deputy to the American consul in Damascus between 1857 and 1870. Fruma ZACHS, “Micha’il Mishaqa – the First Historian of Modern Syria”, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 28 (2001), 72.

63) Mīḫā'īl MIŠĀQĀ, Ibid., 152.


Makarius, speaks of international conspiracies dasā'is dawliyya and for-eign agents preparing the country for war. His sentiment was undoubtedly with the British. He argues that they did their utmost to help the people of Lebanon against the injustice of direct Ottoman rule that followed the with-drawal of Ibrahim Pasha. The Maronites, to ‘their own misfortune and to the misfortune of the whole country’64, he continues, condemned the British as heretics kuffār as they did the Druze and other Christians who did not adhere to the Maronite persuasion.

“If God had granted the people of the Mountain wisdom they would have

understood the [positive] role the British played and the conspiracy and

injustice of the Turkish government. [Maronite] arrogance and lack of

discretion created much grief; their naïveté and conceit resulted in the

gruesome massacres”65.

French presence at the court of the Maronite Patriarch, on the other hand, did its part in fomenting trouble. They were very influential with the Patriarch; seeking his counsel at every junction. Makarius was keen on giv-ing the exact amount – half a million francs - that was offered as financial aid to the Patriarch to distribute at his discretion. Or one might wonder did Makarius view it as a bribe or inducement to rebellion for he writes: “money was openly distributed among the congregation with the objective of crush-ing the Druzes and despoiling them of their privileges”66. He was actually reiterating the position of Colonel Rose67, the British consul in Beirut who candidly accused the Maronite clergy of “openly declaring their intention to dominate the entire Mountain even if this should lead to civil war” walaw addā ḏālika ilā al-ḥarb68. Indirectly Makarius was insinuating that a con-spiracy was being prepared between the Maronites and the French to wage war in the Mountain. Their ultimate aim was no doubt to establish communal autonomy to the detriment of all other factions thus ending the equilibrium that had prevailed.

The role of Turkish officials was the most hazardous as related by Ma-karius. Turkish policy is described as despicable danī'a and deceptive. Obvi-ously, he writes, this state had nothing but malicious designs towards all its

64) Šāhīn MAKĀRIŪS, Ḥasr al-liṯām ‘an nakabāt al-Šām (Beirut, 1983), 72, 125. 65) Šāhīn MAKĀRIŪS, Ibid., 72. 66) Šāhīn MAKĀRIŪS, Ibid., 71-72. 67) Iskandar Ya‘qub ABAKARIUS, The Lebanon in Turmoil: Syria and the Powers in

1860, trans J.F. Scheltema (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1920), 127. 68) Šāhīn MAKĀRIŪS, Ibid., 77.


subjects regardless of their religious affiliations especially the Christians. By breaking down their resolve any chance of communal cooperation against her would be nullified69.

Abakarius had other concerns than the complexities of foreign interven-tion. On the few occasions when he did mention foreign consuls; they com-municated their anxiety to Turkish officials that sectarian clashes in the Mountain were forthcoming. They only received perfunctory hearings. Their fears were either completely ignored; the troops dispatched were ineffective or plain biased towards the Druzes.

As a devoted Ottoman subject, Abakarius had nothing but praise to write about the Sultan. If there was injustice, it was the fault of corrupt offi-cials who conspired with the Druzes and accepted bribes to cast a blind eye. In many instances the troops participated in the carnage and committed the worst atrocities. While there is no clear indication that Abakarius was in-clined towards any foreign power, the fact that he spoke favorably of French interference suggests that he was echoing the Turkish stand. French troops were sent to Beirut for ‘no other purpose than the triumph of the rights of justice and humanity’. Their presence was for the sole reason to assist the sultan against ‘unjust and wicked people’70. His political affiliations or pre-dilection can be discerned from the title of the last chapter: Concerning the advent of the companion of the Empire and high consideration and dignity, Fu'ād Pasha, and his honoring visit to Beirut… for the purpose of restoring order in the affairs of Mount Lebanon.

Abkarius ended his chronicle without reference to the outcome of the trials. Plausibly, he was expecting more stern measures to be applied in Leb-anon as they were in Damascus. Culprits were brought to trial, and severe sentences were passed, yet the Druze feudal chiefs were allowed to find sol-ace in immigration; issues of reprisal and indemnification were allowed to die out. Since he decided not to comment, it would only be conjecture to say that Abakarius was disappointed but the outcome. But after his initial enthu-siasm for Fu'ād Pasha’s mission, he was doubtless in a dilemma.

69) Šāhīn MAKĀRIŪS, Ibid., 107-108. 70) Iskandar Ya‘qub ABAKARIUS, The Lebanon in Turmoil: Syria and the Powers in

1860, trans J.F. Scheltema, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1920), 151.


VIEW OF THE “OTHER”

Identity is defined as the perception of group difference and social boundaries created between sections of a population. A nation is created by a people whose members share a common name and elements of culture, pos-sess a myth of common origin and common historical memory, and who as-sociate themselves with a particular territory and possess a feeling of solidar-ity.�A Lebanese entity in the 19th century was still in its formative year; reli-gious communities were able to retain their identity through centuries of vi-cissitudes. Whatever changes had taken place, were still only variations of traditional patterns rather than a drastic departure from them71. Accordingly one needs to ask: what was the perception of the ‘other’ in the works of the three historians? How much of that was a basis for construction of group dis-tinction and consequently of political mobilization?

Mishaqa believed mutual acceptance and respect among the various communities is the only road one should follow and the only way that Leba-nese can expect to live in peace. He understood the mindset of minorities be-longing to one himself. He calls for complete accord among the communities and spoke highly of the Druze, their faith and their social habits and moral values. Such tolerance comes from his upbringing in mixed areas and years of experience at the court of the ruling Shihabs. Known for his diplomatic skills and widespread contacts, Mishaqa was also selected by emir Bashir as his representative at the courts of foreign consuls. In times of conflict he was often asked to intercede between Bahsir and notables of the Mountain from the various sects. Further, his sojourn in Damascus allowed him a great deal of interaction with the Muslim population where he developed many person-al friendships. During the events of 1860 in the city he and his family were given asylum in the home of the muftī Sharif Mahmud Efendi Hamza. One of the things that gave him solace in his affliction, as he recounts, was that one of the ‘greatest’ of the Shi‘ite ulemā came to inquire after him72. It fol-lows that the ‘other’ in this case, is viewed by Mishaqa as a compatriot with whom one can form a nation, perhaps not confined to the Mountain but to a greater Syria.

71) Thomas PHILIP, “Class, Community and Arab Historiography in the Early Nineteenth Century – Dawn of a New Era”, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 16 (1984), 164.

72) Mikha’yil MISHAQA, Murder, Mayhem, Pillage, and Plunder: The History of the Lebanon in the 18th and 19th Centuries, trans. Wheeler M. Thackston, Jr. (State University Press, New York, 1988), 261.


Makarius was less tolerant to the general Muslim populace and recounts the humiliation Christians were subjected to in the major cities of Bilād al-Šām73. They had to cluster in special quarters ḥārāt for security. Such a situ-ation was unfamiliar in Mount Lebanon where he tells that Christians and Druze lived side by side in every village. Albeit a militant community, the Druzes possess many commendable qualities. You could see Druzes under the patronage of Christian muqāṭi‘ǧīs, and the opposite is true74. Christians in Mount Lebanon amassed great fortunes, flaunted their wealth and built extravagant mansions and churches. They participated in the politics of the Mountain and the Druze feudal chiefs called them “brothers”75. This was sufficient proof for Makarius that hostilities that developed among the com-munities were not primordial but they were pushed into such dismal situa-tions by the conspiracies and intrigues of Turkish officials.

Social integration notwithstanding, Makarius uses very derogatory ter-minology when speaking about al-Ḥākim bi-'Amr Allāh, the initiator of the Druze faith. He reiterates Islamic sources known for their animosity to the Šī‘ā Fatimids and their caliphs. These statements, however, should be viewed in their proper circumstances. Makarius was not concerned with mat-ters of the Druze dogma. Rather, he recapitulates the sectarian mood that was prevalent during the Civil War; the difficulty of sharing the same coun-try with a group whose “antagonistic, calculating, and secretive strategy helped them prevail”76. In contrast with his previous statements Makarius holds them accountable for the calamities that come to pass in Bilād al-Šām.

It is a known fact that most of the calamities in al-Šām were instigated by the Druze; the competition and animosity between them and the Maro-nites and the policy of the Ottoman governors and their hatred of both com-munities77.

Makarius was equally intolerant of the Maronites’ disposition towards other Christian communities. Intoxicated by the ‘audacity’ of their clergy, he wrote, they took strength during the rule of Bashir III disregarding the ‘clouds’ of contention that were gathering over their heads78. The Maronites had gained a lot of power during the rule of the Shihab at the expense of oth-

73) Šāhīn MAKĀRIŪS, Ibid., 74. 74) Šāhīn MAKĀRIŪS, Ibid., 67. 75) Šāhīn MAKĀRIŪS, Ibid., 67. 76) Šāhīn MAKĀRIŪS, Ibid., 61, 78. 77) Šāhīn MAKĀRIŪS, Ibid., 51. 78) Šāhīn MAKĀRIŪS, Ibid., 77.


er Christian communities the Greek Orthodox and Greek Catholics. Makari-us found their behavior offensive: “If only they were content with challeng-ing the Druzes; instead they tried to stamp out qaṭl all those who did not ad-here to their convictions”79. What was far more injurious was the attitude of the Maronite Patriarch towards the other communities. “He resorted to ‘de-ceit’ kull anwā‘ al-ḥiyal to convince his congregation this was a ‘holy war’ ḥurūb dīniyya. It was the solemn duty of all Christians, he said, that they should take up arms against the Druzes and ‘deracinate them from Mount Lebanon iqtilā‘ aṯarihim min ǧabal lubnān”. Makarius disapprovingly com-ments: “Wish to God they cooperated with their old allies ḥulafā'ihim al-qudāmā – the Druze – and joined together in fighting the Turks, those who planted the seeds of dissension among them”80.

As a case in point and one worth recounting is the matter of American and British missionary schools in the Mountain. Makarius tells that the Pa-triarch used his religious and political clout to have them closed. He com-pletely ignored the intercession of Druze notable Ni‘man Junblat to modify his position. Moreover, when the bishop of Beirut vociferously challenged him by saying: “not only will we subjugate yabṭušu all the Druzes; we will soon prevail over all ‘heretics’ harṭūqī; the Patriarch did not react and Druze ‘hearts were filled with rage and frustration’81. Makarius, as the above inci-dent ascertain, candidly points the finger at the Maronites for starting the hostilities in 1845. Allegedly the Patriarch would later address his congrega-tion with these words: either the Druze will prevail or we do; let us begin preparations to strike the first blow, for the one who strikes first will prevail and will be victorious82.

It might be useful to note that the Maronite community was perhaps the smallest and most closely-knit community in Eastern Christendom83. It took pride in having retained its specificities; distancing itself from the ‘other’, it became unpopular among the other Christians. But when the Druze in 1860 began indiscriminate killing Christians even those who had joined with them against the Maronites, the tone of Makarius’s text changed84. He began to

79) Šāhīn MAKĀRIŪS, Ibid., 78. 80) Šāhīn MAKĀRIŪS, Ibid., 118. Translation mine. 81) Šāhīn MAKĀRIŪS, Ibid., 78. 82) Šāhīn MAKĀRIŪS, Ibid., 119. 83) Kamal SALIBI, “The Traditional Historiography of the Maronites”, in Nadim

SHEHADI and Dana HAFFAR MILLS (eds.), Lebanon: a History of Conflict and Consensus (I.B. Tauris, London, 1988), 215.

84) There are many such idioms to cite. Here are a few examples: Šāhīn MAKĀRIŪS,


speak of Druze deceit and treachery; their notables tormenters and Sa‘id Junblat an oppressors al-ṭāġiya and his sister Nā'ifa vulgar and inhuman al-fāǧira al-mutawaḥḥiša. Self-preservation became an issue and the ‘other’ was no longer a partner but an impending threat. Regardless, there was still the need to maintain some kind of continuance or maintenance of living in the same environment. What is perhaps bizarre about the Druzes, writes Ma-karius, is their concern for women’s honor; in the most cataclysmic of times no Druze was ever known to molest the enemy’s women85.

Abakarius the least tolerant of the three and the least informed about the Druze faith accuse the Druzes of calf worship probably to dehumanize them. The ‘other’ in this case the Druze, were not only heretics, idolatry and the villains, they were pernicious and treacherous. Whether intentional or not, his analysis of the causes of intersectarian hostilities remained superficial; rather he concentrated on a graphic description of the ‘massacres’ that en-sued.

I reiterate my first assertion that I do not argue the facts of the blood-shed in Dair al-Qamar or elsewhere; facts that are substantiated by contem-porary Druze sources86. What I argue here is that the text of Abakarius was written in ornate rhymed prose saǧa‘ and with explicit details for a more melodramatic effect; and for the utilitarian purpose of arousing utmost sym-pathy for the beleaguered Christians. Perhaps the fact that Abakarius was living in Beirut in 1860 where he witnessed the influx of refugees from the troubled areas, stirred in him compassion and sympathy to their anguish87. Destitute women and children their men either killed or still fighting, were a rich source of firsthand, albeit understandably biased, information.

Ibid., 86, 92, 94, 95, 127. 85) Šāhīn MAKĀRIŪS, Ibid., 85, 216; Yūsuf Ḫaṭṭār Abū Šaqrā (author), Ḥussain

Gahdbān Abū Šaqrā (narrator); ‘Ārif ABŪ ŠAQRĀ (ed.), al-harakāt fī lubnān ilā ‘ahd al-mutaṣarrifiyya (by the author, Ammatur, Lebanon, n.d.), 60-61; Henry JESSUP, Fifty-three Years in Syria (Garnet Publishing, New York, 1910, reprint 2002), 170.

86) Abu Shaqra comments “this was a horrendous massacre the like of which modern Lebanon had never seen. My pen refrains from recording this tragic mayhem were it not for my] integrity as a historian. Ironically, the narrator, whose family was of the Junblati faction, blames the atrocities on two men from the opposing Yazbaki faction. See Yūsuf Ḫaṭṭār ABŪ ŠAQRĀ (author), Ḥussain Gahdbān Abū Šaqrā (narrator); ‘Ārif ABŪ ŠAQRĀ (ed.), al-ḥarakāt fī lubnān ilā ‘ahd al-mutaṣarrifiyya (by the author, Ammatur, Lebanon, n.d.), 115-134.

87) Iskandar Ya‘qub ABAKARIUS, The Lebanon in Turmoil: Syria and the Powers in 1860, trans J.F. Scheltema (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1920), 45; Iskandar Ya‘qūb ABAKARIUS, nawādir al-zamān fī waqā'i‘ lubnān, ed. Abdul Karim al-Samak (Riyad Rayyis lil-kutub wal-našr, London, 1987), 75.


As a resident of Beirut, Abakarius was not sensitive to the delicate bal-ance between the communities in Mount Lebanon. One can glean from the text that both Maronites and Druzes were equally disparaged for their belli-cosity. ‘From the earlier times’ there was political dissension among the Druzes and many ‘wars occurred among them’. The Christians joined the contending parties and ‘they brought with them their bloody actions and re-taliations’88. The Ottomans, with French assistance, did their best to bring peace to the Mountain but some of their efforts were thwarted by the com-munities who preferred to settle their affairs in combat. Abakarius labeled the communities of Mount Lebanon, as ignorant, uninformed, and deluded. He alone speaks of sectarianism as a primordial problem in Mount Lebanon. Mutual ‘hidden hatred in the hearts of the companions of calamities’ did not cease to exist between them. Maronites and Druze are equally culpable and ‘companions’ bringing about the ruin of the nation, with the collaboration of corrupt officials especially Khurshid Pasha who surpassed the most ‘zealot Muslims by his detestation of the Christians89.

Although Abkarius left little room for compromise, he still allowed for the possibility of reconciliation and intercommoned coexistence. A bizarre incident between two opponents a Druze and Maronite is an example worthy of quoting in full.

And at a certain moment a Druze on the battlefield laid hold of one of the Christians and they clinched and threw each other… and did not cease mutual assaults, keeping close together until they reached the seashore where… they continued their fight. And while this was going on, a huge wave came and carried them out… and drowned them both. And in the morning they were found dead on the beach still clutching each other… and they buried the lifeless bodies in the sand… and they took refuge in God concerning this matter90.

The moral of the story requires no further comment.

CONCLUSION

In studying history we have to speculate about recorded particulars as best as we can; and in speculation, no two people can be exactly in the same

88) Iskandar Ya‘qub ABAKARIUS, The Lebanon in Turmoil: Syria and the Powers in 1860, trans J.F. Scheltema (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1920), 51-52.

89) Iskandar Ya‘qub ABAKARIUS, Ibid., 62, 63. 90) Iskandar Ya‘qub ABAKARIUS, Ibid., 72.


state of mind. That is why different interpretations of the same historical subject are always possible and valuable. The validity of accounts notwith-standing, these writers were in many instances echoing the sentiment of the environment they were living in. Thus, chronicling the momentous events of the 1840s and 1860 was not done simply for its own sake alone, but in de-fense of a particular thesis.

This paper attempted to point out that indigenous historians were aware of a new entity called Lebanon that was beginning to appear during that pe-riod. It was a Lebanon with a continuous history that to them merited record-ing. Loyalty to their homeland did not prevent Makarius and Mishaqa from seeing the broader picture. By so doing they are in harmony with other Arab intellectuals who tended to adopt the principle of Ottomanism, albeit coupled with an emphasis on their loyalty to what the tanẓīmāt called ‘native land’91.

Here again we can see clearly what Makdisi talks about vis-à-vis the historiography of the times. The ‘urgency of proximity’ is evident from their portrayal of the mayhem in the Mountain. The language they use and the graphic details they offer are imbued with emotions so different from those of modern detached bystanders writing with revulsion about these horrors92. In writing their chronicles these authors were in fact attempting to under-stand the complete break of political and social order; to rationalize sectarian violence in a society where hostility was typically political. Entire communi-ties were now involved for an ultimate goal of which ‘only God knows’. For these indigenous author’s traditional history ended in 1860.

The texts also show that economic and political developments were un-leashed by the introduction of the tanẓīmāt to the Syrian provinces contrib-uting further to this change. Here again the texts are testimony as to commu-nities had different readings of these reforms. While the feudality saw in them a return to their traditional rights after the fall of Bashir II, for the common people they had a different reading. They meant not only equality of all subject of the Sultan, but rather a release from the bondage to their feudal lords. Our historians, as non-Maronite Christians, belonged to a class of overwhelming business people. Hence it is not surprising to find in their texts an awareness of the close connection between peace and economic af-

91) Youssef M. CHOUEIRI, “Ottoman Reform and Lebanese Patriotism”, in Nadim SHEHADI and Dana HAFFAR MILLS (eds.), Lebanon: a History of Conflict and Consensus (I.B. Tauris, London, 1988), 69.



fluence. Entanglement in the Mountain, they asserted, cannot remain con-fined to its boundaries; it could tear up a nation still in its formative stage.

A central question that runs through much of the writings is whether events should be explained primarily as the result of internal features in the society or as the result of the operation upon Lebanese society of external forces. The three chroniclers were speaking of a plot beyond the control of Maronites or Druzes. The communities were either instruments of a Turkish scheme or were its victims. While the Ottoman state could not escape a great deal of responsibility for the deficiencies of its administration, it might not have been a state policy to act on the basis of divide and rule. It was only by balanc-ing the delicate interest of rival factions and repressing one to accommodate the other that the Ottomans could achieve for Mount Lebanon a ‘modicum of stability’93.

During a period of accelerating change, as it appears from these samples of indigenous literature, British and French interest were both for preserving not only the arena of their rivalry, but also the political interests of their cli-ents and, therefore, the autonomy of the Mountain from Ottoman encroach-ment94. One has to admit that France and Britain might have added to the causes of the conflict that broke out between Druzes and Maronites; but they also helped to settle it. Within the context of Ottoman hegemony and under the aegis of the Concert of Europe, they oversaw the establishment of the mutaṣarifiyya for a reunified Mount Lebanon endowed with a political sys-tem that would prove adaptable to its sectarian society95. In a small country like Lebanon success of a settlement always involves the sanction of region-al and international powers. “Without them, no war – and, hence no peace - is feasible”96.

93) For more on the subject of Ottoman administrative dilemma see Caesar E. FARAH, The Politics of Interventionism in Ottoman Lebanon, 1830-1861 (Center for Lebanese Studies and I. B. Tauris, London, 2000), 720-733, 739.

94) For more on Franco-British rivalries in the Middle East see John P. SPAGNOLO, “Franco-British rivalry in the Middle East and its operation in the Lebanese problem”, in Nadim SHEHADI and Dana HAFFAR MILLS (eds.), Lebanon: a History of Conflict and Consen-sus, (I.B. Tauris, London, 1988), 101-123.

95) John P. SPAGNOLO, “Franco-British rivalry in the Middle East and its operation in the Lebanese problem”, in Nadim SHEHADI and Dana HAFFAR MILLS (eds.), Lebanon: a His-tory of Conflict and Consensus (I.B. Tauris, London, 1988), 109.

96) Laila Tarazi FAWAZ, An Occasion for War: Civil Conflict in Lebanon and Damas-cus in 1860 (Center for Lebanese Studies and I. B. Tauris, London, 1994), 228.


As stated earlier these authors came from the Christian ‘bourgeoisie’ and were in one form or another connected with foreign missionaries – dip-lomatic or otherwise. Mishaqa and Abakarius as dragoman with the British and American delegations were in all probability familiar with the western discourses written about these events. Describing some of the massacres, their cataclysmic language, as Makdisi points out, is very close to that of Charles Churchill and to Henry Jessup, to be mere coincidence97.

One final observation is that all three authors were caught in the dilem-ma of where to place the Druze. At times they are compatriots and brothers in arms; at others they are the villains and conspirators; at best they are the victims of the deceit of Turkish officials. For that reason these authors ac-cepted the conspiracy theory as it distances the blame and allows for future reconciliations. The indigenous communities, as the authors candidly point out, were ignorant players lacking any effectiveness to alter the course of events. Regardless of whom the author supported in this game of chess - Turkish, British or French - blame was placed interchangeably on the other side for enticing their protégé. Each community was promised at variable junction’s full sovereignty over the Mountain.

The populace, on the other hand, was facing yet another dilemma of sorts. On the one side they adhered to their traditional status as Turkish sub-jects; on the other they were members of a separate community seeking its own autonomy. To give legitimacy to their cause, the ‘other’ - in this case the Druze - had to be a villain, vindictive, treacherous, and intolerable. Oth-erwise they would be at a loss to explain, or accept, the new political sys-tems imposed on them – qā'immaqāmat and mutaṣarriffiya – which separat-ed them into sectarian communities each vying for control over national politics.

At the end of this discourse one should ask: of what importance is a re-view of 1860 for a better understanding of the problem of sectarianism in the present? Allowing for multiple histories actually gives us a better under-

97) Iskandar Ya‘qub ABAKARIUS, The Lebanon in Turmoil: Syria and the Powers in 1860, trans J.F. Scheltema (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1920), 98-26; Mikha’yil MIS-

HAQA, Murder, Mayhem, Pillage, and Plunder: The History of the Lebanon in the 18th and 19th Centuries, trans. Wheeler M. Thackston, Jr. (State University Press, New York, 1988), 240-242; Henry JESSUP, Fifty-three Years in Syria (Garnet Publishing, New York, 1910, re-print 2002), 161-175; Ussama MAKDISI, The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History and Violence in Nineteenth Century Ottoman Lebanon (University of California Press, Berke-ley, 2000), 170.


standing of the events rather than aims to have a unified agreed upon narra-tive. Thus after a careful scrutiny of the texts, one comes to the conclusion that sectarianism was the byproduct of these events rather than their cause. We have to keep in mind that ‘in nature there are neither rewards nor pun-ishments, there are consequences’98. Unfortunately today the problem of sec-tarianism has become more entrenched in the Lebanese society and more multifaceted; and if it is dismissed as a distant memory of conflict; and if solace is taken in the myth of coexistence, then the probability of recurrences looms in the foreseeable future.

98) Robert Green Ingersoll’s as quoted in: John P. SPAGNOLO, “Franco-British rivalry in the Middle East and its operation in the Lebanese problem”, in Nadim SHEHADI and Dana HAFFAR MILLS (ed.), Lebanon: a History of Conflict and Consensus (I.B. Tauris, London, 1988), 101.


BIBLIOGRAPHY

ABAKARIUS, Iskandar Ya‘qub, Nawādir al-zamān fī waqā'i‘ lubnān. Abdul Karīm al-Samak, ed. Riyād Rayyis lil-kutub wal-našr, London, 1987.

––––, The Lebanon in Turmoil: Syria and the Powers in 1860, J.F. Schel-tema, trans., Yale University Press, New Haven, 1920.

ABŪ ŠAQRĀ, Yūsuf Ḫaṭṭār (author), Ḥussain Gahdbān Abū Šaqrā (narrator), ‘Ārif ABŪ ŠAQRĀ (ed.), al-ḥarakat fī lubnān ilā ‘ahd al-mutaṣarrifiyya. Ammatur, by the author, Lebanon, n.d.

BAYḎŪN, Aḥmad, al-ṣirā‘ ‘alā tārīḫ lubnān,, Lebanese University Publica-tions, Beirut, 1989.

CHOUEIRI, Youssef M., “Ottoman Reform and Lebanese Patriotism”. In Nadim Shehadi and Dana Haffar Mills (eds.), Lebanon: a History of Conflict and Consensus. I.B. Tauris, London, 1988.

ḎĀHIR, Mas‘ūd, al-intifāḏat al-Lubnāniya ḏidd al-niẓām al-muqāṭi‘ǧī. Dār al-Fārābī, Beirut, 1988.

FARAH, Caesar, The Politics of Interventionism in Ottoman Lebanon, 1830-1861. Center for Lebanese Studies and I. B. Tauris, London, 2000.

FAWAZ, Laila Tarazi, An Occasion for War: Civil Conflict in Lebanon and Damascus in 1860. Center for Lebanese Studies and I. B. Tauris, Lon-don, 1994.

JESSUP, Henry, Fifty-three Years in Syria. Garnet Publishing, 1910, reprint New York, 2002.

KHALAF, Samir, Resistance and Change in 19th century Lebanon. American University Publications, Beirut, 1979.

MAKĀRIŪS, Šāhīn, Ḥasr al-liṯām ‘an nakabāt al-Šām, 2nd ed., Beirut, 1983. MAKDISI, Ussama, The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History and

Violence in Nineteenth Century Ottoman Lebanon. University of Cali-fornia Press, Berkeley, 2000.

MIŠĀQĀ, Mīḫā'īl, muntaḫabāt min al-ǧawāb ‘alā iqtirāḥ al-aḥbāb, Assad Rustun and Ṣubḥī ABŪ ŠAQRĀ (eds.), al-maktaba al-būlusiyya, Beirut, 1985.

––––, Murder, Mayhem, Pillage, and Plunder: The History of the Lebanon in the 18th and 19th Centuries. Wheeler M. Thackston, Jr. Trans. State University Press, New York, 1988.

POLK, William, The Opening of South Lebanon: A Study of the Impact of the West on the Middle East. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1963.

SALIBI, Kamal, “The Historical Perspective”, in Nadim SHEHADI and Dana HAFFAR MILLS, Lebanon: a History of Conflict and Consensus, (I.B.


Tauris, London, 1988), 4-13. ––––, “The Traditional Historiography of the Maronites”. In Nadim SHEHADI

and Dana HAFFAR MILLS (eds.), Lebanon: a History of Conflict and Consensus. I.B. Tauris, London, 1988, 212-225.

––––, Modern History of Lebanon (Caravan Books, New York, 1977, reprint edition 1965)

SHAW, Stanford J. and Ezel Kural SHAW, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, 2 vols. University Press, Cambridge, 1977.

SPAGNOLO, John P., “Franco-British rivalry in the Middle East and its opera-tion in the Lebanese problem”, in Nadim SHEHADI and Dana HAFFAR

MILLS (eds.), Lebanon: a History of Conflict and Consensus, I.B. Tau-ris, London, 1988, 101-123.

ZACHS, Fruma, “Micha’il Mishaqa – the First Historian of Modern Syria”. British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 28 (2001), 67-87.

ZAYYĀT, Ḥabīb, al-ḫizāna al-šarqiyya. Catholic Press, Beirut, 1937.

Naila TAKIEDDINE KAIDBEY American University of Beirut E-mail: [email protected]

CIVIL WAR OF 1860 IN LEBANON: A LOCAL CHRISTIAN NARRATIVE

Documents