Civil Society in Putin's Russia

Template: Royal A, Font: ,Date: 22/01/2013; 3B2 version: 9.1.470/W Unicode (Jun 2 2008) (APS_OT)Dir: P:/eProduction/WIP/9780415656870/dtp/9780415656870.3d

Civil Society in Putin’s Russia

Unlike other books on civil society in Russia which argue that Russia’s civilsociety is relatively weak, and that democratisation in Russia went intoreverse following Vladimir Putin’s coming to power, this book contends thatcivil society in Russia is developing in a distinctive way. It shows that gov-ernment and elite-led drives to encourage civil society have indeed been lim-ited, and that the impact of external promotion of civil society has also notbeen very successful. It demonstrates, however, that independent domesticgrassroots movements are beginning to !ourish, despite di"culties andadverse circumstances, and that this development #ts well into the changingnature of contemporary Russian society.

Elena Chebankova is a Senior Lecturer in Politics at the University of Lin-coln, UK.


BASEES/Routledge Series on Russian and East European Studies

Series editor:Richard Sakwa, Department of Politics and International Relations, Universityof KentEditorial Committee:Roy Allison, St Antony’s College, OxfordBirgit Beumers, Department of Russian, University of BristolRichard Connolly, Centre for Russian and East European Studies, Universityof BirmhinghamTerry Cox, Department of Central and East European Studies, University ofGlasgowPeter Duncan, School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University CollegeLondonZoe Knox, School of Historical Studies, University of LeicesterRosalind Marsh, Department of European Studies and Modern Languages,University of BathDavid Moon, Department of History, University of YorkHilary Pilkington, Department of Sociology, University of ManchesterGraham Timmins, Department of Politics, University of BirminghamStephen White, Department of Politics, University of GlasgowFounding Editorial Committee Member:George Blazyca, Centre for Contemporary European Studies, University ofPaisley

This series is published on behalf of BASEES (the British Association forSlavonic and East European Studies). The series comprises original, high-quality, research-level work by both new and established scholars on allaspects of Russian, Soviet, post-Soviet and East European Studies in huma-nities and social science subjects.

1. Ukraine’s Foreign and SecurityPolicy, 1991–2000Roman Wolczuk

2. Political Parties in the RussianRegionsDerek S. Hutcheson

3. Local Communities andPost-Communist TransformationEdited by Simon Smith

4. Repression and Resistance inCommunist EuropeJ.C. Sharman

5. Political Elites and theNew RussiaAnton Steen

6. Dostoevsky and the Ideaof RussiannessSarah Hudspith


7. Performing Russia – Folk Revivaland Russian IdentityLaura J. Olson

8. Russian TransformationsEdited by Leo McCann

9. Soviet Music and Society underLenin and StalinThe baton and sickleEdited by Neil Edmunds

10. State Building in UkraineThe Ukranian parliament, 1990–2003Sarah Whitmore

11. Defending Human Rights in RussiaSergei Kovalyov, Dissident andHuman Rights Commissioner,1969–2003Emma Gilligan

12. Small-Town RussiaPostcommunist Livelihoods andIdentities A Portrait of theIntelligentsia in Achit,Bednodemyanovsk and Zubtsov,1999–2000Anne White

13. Russian Society and theOrthodox ChurchReligion in Russia afterCommunismZoe Knox

14. Russian Literary Culture in theCamera AgeThe Word as ImageStephen Hutchings

15. Between Stalin and HitlerClass War and Race War on theDvina, 1940–46Geo!rey Swain

16. Literature in Post-CommunistRussia and Eastern EuropeThe Russian, Czech and SlovakFiction of the Changes 1988–98Rajendra A. Chitnis

17. The Legacy of Soviet DissentDissidents, Democratisation andRadical Nationalism in RussiaRobert Horvath

18. Russian and Soviet FilmAdaptations of Literature,1900–2001Screening the WordEdited by Stephen Hutchings andAnat Vernitski

19. Russia as a Great PowerDimensions of Security Under PutinEdited by Jakob Hedenskog,Vilhelm Konnander, Bertil Nygren,Ingmar Oldberg andChrister Pursiainen

20. Katyn and the Soviet Massacreof 1940Truth, Justice and MemoryGeorge Sanford

21. Conscience, Dissent and Reformin Soviet RussiaPhilip Boobbyer

22. The Limits of RussianDemocratisationEmergency Powers and States ofEmergencyAlexander N. Domrin

23. The Dilemmas of DestalinisationA Social and CulturalHistory of Reform in theKhrushchev EraEdited by Polly Jones


24. News Media and Powerin RussiaOlessia Koltsova

25. Post-Soviet Civil SocietyDemocratization in Russia and theBaltic StatesAnders Uhlin

26. The Collapse of CommunistPower in PolandJacqueline Hayden

27. Television, Democracy andElections in RussiaSarah Oates

28. Russian ConstitutionalismHistorical and ContemporaryDevelopmentAndrey N. Medushevsky

29. Late Stalinist RussiaSociety Between Reconstruction andReinventionEdited by Juliane Fürst

30. The Transformation of UrbanSpace in Post-Soviet RussiaKonstantin Axenov, Isolde Brade andEvgenij Bondarchuk

31. Western Intellectuals and theSoviet Union, 1920–40From Red Square to the Left BankLudmila Stern

32. The Germans of the Soviet UnionIrina Mukhina

33. Re-constructing the Post-SovietIndustrial RegionThe Donbas in TransitionEdited by Adam Swain

34. Chechnya – Russia’s “Waron Terror”John Russell

35. The New Right in the NewEuropeCzech Transformation andRight-Wing Politics, 1989–2006Seán Hanley

36. Democracy and Myth in Russiaand Eastern EuropeEdited by Alexander Wöll andHarald Wydra

37. Energy Dependency, Politicsand Corruption in the FormerSoviet UnionRussia’s Power, Oligarchs’Pro#ts and Ukraine’s MissingEnergy Policy, 1995–2006Margarita M. Balmaceda

38. Peopling the Russian PeripheryBorderland Colonization inEurasian HistoryEdited by Nicholas B. Breyfogle,Abby Schrader andWillard Sunderland

39. Russian Legal Culture Beforeand After CommunismCriminal justice, politics and thepublic sphereFrances Nethercott

40. Political and SocialThought in Post-CommunistRussiaAxel Kaehne

41. The Demise of the SovietCommunist PartyAtsushi Ogushi


42. Russian Policy towards Chinaand JapanThe El’tsin and Putin PeriodsNatasha Kuhrt

43. Soviet KareliaPolitics, Planning and Terror inStalin’s Russia, 1920–39Nick Baron

44. Reinventing PolandEconomic and PoliticalTransformation and EvolvingNational IdentityEdited by Martin Myant andTerry Cox

45. The Russian Revolution inRetreat, 1920–24Soviet Workers and the NewCommunist EliteSimon Pirani

46. Democratisation and Gender inContemporary RussiaSuvi Salmenniemi

47. Narrating Post/CommunismColonial Discourse andEurope’s BorderlineCivilizationNata!a Kovacevic

48. Globalization and theState in Central andEastern EuropeThe Politics of Foreign DirectInvestmentJan Drahokoupil

49. Local Politics andDemocratisationin RussiaCameron Ross

50. The Emancipation of the Serfsin RussiaPeace Arbitrators and theDevelopment of Civil SocietyRoxanne Easley

51. Federalism and Local Politicsin RussiaEdited by Cameron Ross andAdrian Campbell

52. Transitional Justice in EasternEurope and the former Soviet UnionReckoning with the Communist PastEdited by Lavinia Stan

53. The Post-Soviet Russian MediaCon!icting SignalsEdited by Birgit Beumers,Stephen Hutchings andNatalia Rulyova

54. Minority Rights in Central andEastern EuropeEdited by Bernd Rechel

55. Television and Culture inPutin’s Russia:Remote ControlStephen Hutchings andNatalia Rulyova

56. The Making of ModernLithuaniaTomas Balkelis

57. Soviet State and Society UnderNikita KhrushchevMelanie Ilic & Jeremy Smith

58. Communism, Nationalismand Ethnicity in Poland,1944–50Michael Fleming


59. Democratic Elections in Poland,1991–2007Frances Millard

60. Critical Theory in Russia andthe WestAlastair Renfrew and Galin Tihanov

61. Promoting Democracy andHuman Rights in RussiaEuropean Organizationand Russia’s SocializationSinikukka Saari

62. The Myth of the RussianIntelligentsiaOld Intellectuals in theNew RussiaInna Kochetkova

63. Russia’s Federal RelationsPutin’s Reforms and Managementof the RegionsElena A. Chebankova

64. Constitutional Bargaining inRussia 1990–93Information and UncertaintyEdward Morgan-Jones

65. Building Big Business in RussiaThe Impact of InformalCorporate Governance PracticesYuko Adachi

66. Russia and IslamState, Society and RadicalismRoland Dannreuther andLuke March

67. Celebrity and Glamour inContemporary RussiaShocking ChicEdited by Helena Goscilo andVlad Strukov

68. The Socialist Alternative toBolshevik RussiaThe Socialist Revolutionary Party,1917–39Elizabeth White

69. Learning to Labour in Post-Soviet RussiaVocational Youth in TransitionCharles Walker

70. Television and PresidentialPower in Putin’s RussiaTina Burrett

71. Political Theory and CommunityBuilding in Post-Soviet RussiaEdited by Oleg Kharkhordin andRisto Alapuro

72. Disease, Health Care andGovernment in Late Imperial RussiaLife and death on the Volga,1823–1914Charlotte E. Henze

73. Khrushchev in the KremlinPolicy and government in the SovietUnion, 1953–64Edited by Melanie Ilic andJeremy Smith

74. Citizens in the Making inPost-Soviet StatesOlena Nikolayenko

75. The Decline of Regionalism inPutin’s RussiaBoundary issuesJ. Paul Goode

76. The Communist Youth Leagueand the Transformation of the SovietUnion, 1917–32Matthias Neumann


77. Putin’s United Russia PartyS. P. Roberts

78. The European Union and itsEastern NeighboursTowards a more ambitiouspartnership?Elena Korosteleva

79. Russia’s Identity in InternationalRelationsImages, perceptions, misperceptionsEdited by Ray Taras

80. Putin as Celebrity and Cultural IconEdited by Helena Goscilo

81. Russia – Democracy VersusModernizationA dilemma for Russia and forthe worldEdited by Vladislav Inozemtsev andPiotr Dutkiewicz

82. Putin’s Preventative Counter-RevolutionPost-Soviet Authoritarianism andthe Spectre of Velvet RevolutionRobert Horvath

83. The Baltic States from the SovietUnion to the European UnionIdentity, Discourse and Power in thePost-Communist Transition ofEstonia, Latvia and LithuaniaRichard Mole

84. The EU-Russia BorderlandNew Contexts for RegionalCooperationEdited by Heikki Eskelinen,Ilkka Liikanen and James W. Scott

85. The Economic Sources of SocialOrder Development in Post-SocialistEastern EuropeRichard Connolly

86. East European Diasporas,Migration and CosmopolitanismEdited by Ulrike Ziemer andSean P. Roberts

87. Civil Society in Putin’s RussiaElena Chebankova



Civil Society in Putin’s Russia

Elena Chebankova


First published 2013by Routledge2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN

Simultaneously published in the USA and Canadaby Routledge711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

© 2013 Elena Chebankova

The right of Elena Chebankova to be identi#ed as author of this work hasbeen asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and PatentAct 1988.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced orutilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, nowknown or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or inany information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writingfrom the publishers.

Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks orregistered trademarks, and are used only for identi#cation and explanationwithout intent to infringe.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication DataA catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication DataChebankova, Elena A.Civil society in Putin's Russia / Elena Chebankova.pages ; cm. – (BASEES/Routledge series on Russian and East EuropeanStudies ; 87)1. Civil society–Russia (Federation) I. Title. II. Series: BASEES/Routledgeseries on Russian and East European Studies ; 87.JN6699.A15C44 2013300.947–dc232012035527

ISBN: 978-0-415-65687-0 (hbk)ISBN: 978-0-203-38781-8(ebk)

Typeset in Times New Romanby Taylor & Francis Books


To James and Raisa



Contents

List of "gures and tables xivNote on spelling xvAbbreviations and glossary xviPreface xix

1 Methodology, theoretical considerations and the structureof the study 1

2 Public and private cycles of socio-political life in Russia 25

3 The public sphere and the state in Russia 48

4 A kind of society: the nature of political radicalism inmodern Russia 72

5 State-sponsored civic associations in Russia: systemic integration ora ‘war of position’? 99

6 Foreign-Sponsored associations in Russia: themes and problems 118

7 Grassroots movements in modern Russia: a cause for optimism? 140

8 Conclusion 164

Notes 171Bibliography 193Index 210


List of !gures and table

Figures

1.1 De#nitional and structural framework 41.2 Political factors 81.3 Economic factors 92.1 Index of consumer con#dence 372.2 Index of economic well-being 383.1 Index of media coverage of Russia’s four leading parties

between 10 and 25 October 2007 613.2 Index of favourable media coverage of Russia’s four leading

parties between 19 and 25 October 2007 62

Tables

2.1 Proposed phases of societal participation during the Putinpresidency 31

3.1 Distribution of Internet Resources and growth between 2004and 2008 53

3.2 The number of libraries in Russia from 1996 to 2006 65


Note on spelling

As it is virtually impossible to transliterate all Russian names consistently,except by means of a variety of specialised annotations which would necessi-tate their own glossary, the Modi#ed Library of Congress system has beenadopted to ensure consistency. The letters ‘ia’ and ‘iu’ have been transliteratedas ‘ya’ and ‘yu’. In addition, some Russian names have been anglicised.


Abbreviations and glossary

AIZhK Agency for Residential Mortgage LoansBoevoe Bratstvo Civic association of Russian paratroopers previously

involved in local con!ictsBP British PetroleumCIS Commonwealth of Independent StatesCPRF Communist Party of the Russian FederationDelovaya Rossiya Civic association of Russia’s small and medium-sized

businessDPNI Movement Againt Illegal ImmigrationDuma the lower house of Russia’s parliamentEdinaya Rossiya Russia’s political partyEkho Moskvy Russia’s oppositional liberal radio stationER Edinaya Rossiya PartyESM Eurasian Union of Youth (Evraziiskii Soyuz Molodezhi)FNPR Federation of Russia’s Independent Trade UnionsFOM Independent Foundation for the Study of Public Opinion

FrontFSB Federal Security Service (successor to KGB)FSU Former Soviet UnionFZ Federal Law (Federalnyi Zakon)Gazeta.ru Russia’s leading liberal electronic newspaperGazprom Russia’s state gas monopolyGDP Gross Domestic ProductIKSI RAN Moscow Institute of Complex Sociological ResearchIMF International Monetary FundINOP Institute for the Development of Societal ProjectsINSOR Institute of Modern DevelopmentISPI RAN Institute of Socio-Political Research, Russian Academy of

ScienceIzvestiya Russian newspaperKGB State Security Committee (political police)Kommersant Russia’s authoritative business and political dailyKrai large region


LDPR Liberal Democratic Party of RussiaLevada Centre Russia’s leading opinion polls agencyMIS RAN Moscow Institute of Sociology, Russian Academy of ScienceMolodaya Gvardiya Pro-Kremlin youth movementMVD Ministry of InteriorNashi Russia’s pro-Kremlin youth movementNATO North Atlantic Treaty OrganisationNBP National-Bolshevik Party led by Eduard LimonovNGO Non-governmental organisationsNovaya Gazeta Russia’s oppositional newspaperOGF United Civic Front led by Garri KasparovOkrug large territory or district, regionOPORA Union of Russia’s Entrepreneurial OrganisationsOrangism An ideology of street protests that swept a Ukrainian

government from power in the course of the 2003 Orangerevolution.

Otechestvo Fatherland (electoral bloc)OVR Fatherland-All-Russia (electoral block)PACE Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of EuropePerestroika a series of political and economic reforms initiated by the

last Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachevraion districtRAN Russian Academy of SciencesRechnik A village in the Moscow region where a political con!ict

between the city authorities and the residents became themost acute

RF Russian FederationRodina Motherland political partyROMIR Independent Research Centre for the Study of Public

OpinionRosStat Russian Statistic ServiceRumetrica Independent Public Opinion Analytical AgencySberbank Savings Bank of the Russian FederationSiloviki representatives of law enforcement agenciesSotsProf Co-ordinating Council of Russia’s Alternative Trade

UnionsSOVA Centre for the Study of Racial and Xenophobic CrimesSpravedlivaya Rossiya Russia’s social democratic political partySpravedlivost Human Rights Civic Movement established by Dmistry

BaranovskiiSR Spravedlivaya Rossiya (social democratic party of power)Surgutneftegaz Oil companySVR Foreign Intelligence Service (Sluzhba Vneshnei Razvedki)TOS Territorial Self-Governance Organisations

Abbreviations and glossary xvii


USAID United State Agency providing assistance to foreigncountries

USSR Union of Soviet Socialists RepublicsVedomosti Russia’s leading liberal-conservative newspaperVTsIOM All-Russian Centre for the Study of Public OpinionYabloko Russia’s left liberal partyYukos Russian oil company formerly headed by Mikhail

Khodorkovskii

xviii Abbreviations and glossary


Preface

Debates on the nature and functioning of civil society usually occupy one ofthe central places in the theoretical literature on democracy. It has long beenconsidered that civil society is a product of capitalist market economy in theeconomic sphere and liberal democracy in the political domain. The formalseparation of power and money in modern states created the need to establisha distinct realm for cultural transmission, social integration and socialisation.Jurgen Habermas termed this realm a lifeworld and claimed that in idealindustrialised and democratic societies the lifeworld should be well developedand located outside the in!uence of the state and economy. Cohen and Aratocontinued this line and suggested that civil society represents ‘the institutionalcore’ of the modern lifeworld. A general consensus has formed that viable civilsocieties would not be able to survive in non-democratic, and potentially non-market, environments. Civil society assumes open participation and discus-sion of issues relevant to the public good. This can take place in an environ-ment, in which people have stakes in the state and economy, and a reasonablypluralistic political system, where unimpeded expression of opinion isallowed. In other words, civil society is possible when the public is capable ofrenegotiating the boundaries of the state–society dialogue as free citizens andat the same time abide by the conditions of such a dialogue as subjects.

Following this logic, we should expect countries, which adopted democraticinstitutional and capitalist politico-economic structures, to have launched aparallel process of developing independent lifeworlds with civil society at its‘institutional core’. The nature and timing of this dynamic would di$er fromcountry to country, based on the country-speci#c political, cultural and historicconstraints. Nevertheless, the overarching system of capitalist economic-political relations and democracy should be conducive to this main develop-mental trajectory. A perplexing question emerges in the Russian context. If weare to believe that politico-economic institutions have an in!uence on civicbehaviour, then we could rightly think that the entrenchment of the capitalistmarket economy and the introduction, even though partially successful, of liberalinstitutions in this country should result in the development of civil society. Inthe end, this could only be viewed as a by-product of these fundamentalstructural transformations.


A range of practical questions spring to mind. Would the impressive eco-nomic growth of the past decade result in the emergence of a class of citizenswith stakes in the country’s administration and governance? Given the var-ious shortcomings of Russia’s democratic system, can we still hope thiscountry can achieve a viable civil society? Could multiple institutional con-straints imposed on civic movements – the lack of access to the nationaltelevised media, administrative pressures, information wars with the state andso on – overshadow the development of independent associations? Wherehave the boundaries between the state and the civil society in Russia beendrawn? What is the Western in!uence on the evolution of Russia’s civicmovements? How independent are Russia’s ‘independent’ associations? Whatare the main goals and objectives of the extant and potential future civicorganisations in Russia? What do they want from the state and what goals arethey trying to achieve?

This book is an attempt to answer such questions. The literature on Rus-sian politics customarily emphasises the restrictions imposed on public activ-ity and tends to expose the authoritarian nature of Russia’s political regime.At the same time, looking at Russian politics from this particular angle, ittends to overlook some important moves towards acceleration of civic activ-ity. Many critics of the government of Vladimir Putin claim that civil societyin Russia is underdeveloped and that the government plays a particularlynegative role in its evolution. While this study generally supports the latterstatement, it adopts a more nuanced approach to the former. The discussionaccounts for the acceleration of the capitalist market economy in Russia andhighlights the associated shifts in public preferences and expectations. My#ndings point towards the conclusion that political stability, order (poriadok),and decent living standards have begun to be taken for granted, while theideas of justice, civic participation and fairness have obtained a new politicalsigni#cance. This has serious potential to jump-start public activity in Russia.This dynamic corresponds to the #ndings of the theoretical literature onsociology which claims that urbanisation and material wealth result in theemergence of a new set of post-industrial values and promote alternative civicmovements. Thus, I argue that the Kremlin has been pursuing two incompa-tible goals. On the one hand, the government has restricted the public sphereand civic activity. On the other hand, it has improved Russia’s economy andthe living standards of citizens. The economic emphasis has raised publicexpectations. This urged the population to search for new avenues of socialparticipation by broadening the rights and freedoms that can be exercised.

This book examines various dimensions of civic activity in Russia. Toexamine this phenomenon, it adopts a trilateral approach to the study of civilsociety. It separately examines (1) the public sphere in the shape of mediaoutlets, think tanks, and other domains of public discussions (2) various civicnetworks, starting from state sponsored movements and ending up with for-eign funded associations and grass-roots Russian organisations, and #nally (3)it scrutinises the moral and ethical orientation of some organisations by

xx Preface


looking into the various movements of an extreme and radical nature. Themonograph shows that di$ering civic associations emerge and entrench theirpositions across the country. In most cases, they are prepared to face the statein pursuit of their political and practical objectives. I conclude with a positiveoutlook for the future of civil engagement in Russia and show throughout thisbook that Russian society has undergone some profound psychological andstructural changes during the past decade. This monograph follows politicaldynamics up to the 4 December 2011 parliamentary elections. These elec-tions, as well as the dynamics in their aftermath, turned a new page in thehistory of Russia’s civil society. At the same time, political events of sig-ni#cance do not appear accidentally and out of the blue. Rather, they surfaceas a culmination of complex preceding dynamics. This book will give anexplanation of why Russian society exhibited a high level of political engage-ment towards the end of the Medvedev presidency. The intention is that thereader will gain an understanding of how civic activity was growing withinRussian society throughout the decade of 2000s and how various factors ofeconomic, political, and social nature determined its evolution.

I am grateful to many colleagues and friends who supported me throughoutwriting this book. My special debt of gratitude goes to Professor RichardSakwa who initially pointed at the importance of this subject. Needless to say,I am alone responsible for all shortcomings and faults. I am grateful to manycolleagues in the political science #eld who have long been the source ofinspiration: Steven White, David Lane, John Barber, George Breslauer,Archie Brown, Paul Chaisty, Cameron Ross, Harald Wydra, Peter Solomon,Tomila Lankina, Paul Goode, Thomas D’Andrea, John McCormick. I thankmy Russian colleagues Rostislav Turovsky, Valery Fedorov, Vladimir Gelman,Valery Solovei, Nikolai Petrov, Alla Chirikova, Yakov Pappe, ViacheslavKalinin and many others who shared their expertise with me. Again, all thefaults remain my own. Colleagues at the University of Lincoln College ofSocial Science were very supportive throughout the #nal stages of writing thisbook and I thank every one of them for the encouragement. In particular, Iam very grateful to Peter Somerville and Jane Kirkpatrick for engagingdebates on politics and philosophy and Jane in particular for reading thismonograph on its completion. Finally, this book would not be possible with-out the help and support of my closest family and friends. I would like todedicate this work to James and Raisa, whose friendship has always beenprecious.

Elena ChebankovaDecember 2012

Preface xxi



1 Methodology, theoretical considerationsand the structure of the study

Despite ten years of seeming state repression, Russian civil society appearedto burst forth in unprecedented ways with mass protests following parlia-mentary elections in December 2011. Yet many scholars studying Russia hadconsistently evaluated civil society as underdeveloped, as a distortion of‘normal’ civil societies in democratic states, and as a minor player on theRussian political scene (McFaul and Treyger 2004, pp. 135–36; Levitsky andWay 2010, p. 25; Taylor 2011; Shevtsova 2007; Ostrow et al. 2007). How, then,were these protests possible? This book explores the trajectory of civil socie-ty’s development in Russia during the past decade. It analyses the shifting roleof the state in restricting the public arena, setting up pro-state civic groups andlimiting the power of grassroots organisations. The account argues that allthese factors simultaneously created opportunities for civil resistance. Thebook also examines the impact of economic growth on Russia as an advancedindustrial society generating new societal attitudes in support of political rights,and not just social and economic rights. In addition, the discussion exploresthe countervailing forces that have acted to suppress civil society’s develop-ment, including a tendency towards extremism across the political spectrumand the perceived pervasive role of foreign-sponsored NGOs in civil society.

The analysis shows that, although Russia may not have a democraticregime, it is a complex society with economically di$erentiated social groupsand a kind of pluralism that represents diverse interests. The discussion alsoargues that the trajectories of socio-economic change and political controlrun against each other in Russia, thus creating multifarious social tensionsand aiding the formation of a functional associational sphere. In parallel tothat, the monograph claims that the change of sense, socio-political grie-vances and ethical disappointments played a signi#cant role in triggeringactivity. In many ways, the monograph’s #ndings concur with a few com-mentators who, though not denying the importance of state domination,tended to view public opinion as a signi#cant factor in the evolution of Rus-sian politics (White#eld 2009; Lukin 2009). A closer look at Russian politicsand society during the past decade persistently gave us indications that var-ious changes in public preferences were slowly making their way into thepublic domain. Lively political debates that adopted a critical stance towards


the extant system of governance have been growing steadily behind the façadeof institutional rigidity, administrative corruption and the political monopoly ofthe dominant United Russia (Edinaya Rossiya ER) party. These debates haveunfolded in the printed press and books, the Internet, on the streets and inhouseholds, as well as in the minds of ordinary Russians.1 Some serious shiftsin people’s political sensations and preferences have been taking place. Politicalcategories of order and stability were now taken for granted, while the ideasof justice, fairness and greater inclusion obtained a new signi#cance. Thesepolitical and socio-economic tensions prompted new development in civilsociety and created conditions for the protests of the late 2011 and early 2012.

A complex methodological and de#nitional approach is required to analysethese dynamics successfully. In this light, two main themes compose thebackbone of this book. The #rst theme is structural. The second theme istheoretical-explanatory. The structural aspects are also tightly linked to de#-nitional problems. In relation to the civil society concept, selecting a de#ni-tion is perhaps the most di"cult task. A great many scholars have attemptedto de#ne the civil society phenomenon in their own ways. John Locke, GeorgHegel, Alexis de Tocqueville, Karl Marx, Antonio Gramsci, Robert Putnam,James Coleman, Jurgen Habermas are usually cited as the major politicalscientists and philosophers who introduced and rede#ned the concept of civilsociety in their theories of social evolution. However, all these thinkersapproached the civil society idea from varying angles. Hegel focused on theidea of ‘ethical life’. Locke emphasised a ‘civilising’ momentum of the state.Tocqueville highlighted the importance of ‘associational life’. Habermasreferred to the civil society realm as lifeworld, claimed its strict separationfrom the spheres of state and economy, and emphasised the importance of itscommunicative powers (Habermas 1997; Tweedy and Hunt 1994, p. 292;Cohen and Arato 1992). In this light, it is perhaps easier to set a #lter of whatto include under the civil society umbrella and what to leave out. PhilippeSchmitter (1995, p. 59) introduced a good workable barrier to implement thistask. Schmitter claims that in order to qualify for the inclusion into the civilsociety umbrella, a network must comply with four main conditions: (1) havean autonomy from state and family; (2) have a capacity for action in defenceof its members’ main passions and interests; (3) have self-limitations withregards to governing the polity as a whole; (4) have a willingness to act in acivil fashion. From this rather conclusive framework it is clear that civilsociety is not a mere sum total of NGOs (James 1995, p. 69); it must promotegood ends and ideals (Seligman 1992, pp. 197–98; Edwards 2009, pp. 52–53);it should reasonably fall out of state control (Hawthorn 2002, p. 276) (thoughthe extent of co-operation with the state is a matter of debate, practice andtradition, and varies from country to country Fowler 1996, p. 20–21; Tilly1984; Tarrow 2011, p. 27); it should not encompass commercial and pro#t-driven associations (Oakeshott 2000, p. 139; Young 1999); it should be activein dissemination of its ideals of the good life in the public domain (Habermas1989; Habermas 1997).

2 Theoretical framework structure of the study


Michael Edwards (2004) in his compelling analysis of the nature of civilsociety binds these seemingly loose ends together into one comprehensivemethodological paradigm. He adopts a complex, and almost universal,structural approach to the study of civil society. He claims that civil societyrepresents a social phenomenon that is composed of the three independent,but intrinsically interconnected, realms. These realms distinguish between theassociational, ethical and communicative spheres of civic activism. Suchseparation allows an e$ective empirical study of the di$ering dimensions ofcivil society in Russia, or any other state. Indeed, scholarship focused on eachdimension separately. During the decade of the 1990s and the #rst half of the2000s, literature covered the development of associational realm ratherextensively (Sperling 1999; Ottoway and Chung 1999; Ottoway and Carothers2000; McFaul 2002; Howard 2003; Mendelson and Glenn 2002; Gibson 2003;Henderson 2003; Evans 2006; Sundstrom 2006; Clement 2006; Green andRobertson 2008). The most recent scholarship tended to focus more on theethical and communicative domains (Nordensterg et al. 2002; Rantanen 2002;Lipman and McFaul 2003; Belin 2004; Zassoursky 2004; Dubin 2006; Oates2007; Oates 2008; Dunlop 2009; Laruelle 2009; Sperling 2006; Beumers et al.2009; Vartanova 2009; Lipman 2010; Rosenholm et al. 2010; Pilkington et al.2010). At the same time an integrative analysis of all three spheres under theunited civil society concept umbrella is still lacking.

In this light, this book will be organised around the study of these threerealms, each of which will form a separate discussion chapter. Figure 1.1illustrates the trilateral structural-de#nitional approach to the idea of civilsociety, which is adopted in this book. My empirical research will trace theevolutionary dynamics within all three realms with the view to #lling the gapin the available literature and launching the debate on the ongoing mode ofinteraction between the various faces of civil society in Russia. Naturally,given the breadth of the trilateral approach to the study of civil society, someof the issues discussed within the respective realms will not pass through thestrict #lter of the civil society de#nition.

That the borders of the overall civil society concept and its compositespheres are not coterminous in Figure 1.1 shows that not all associations,norms and values, and not all means of communication, can pass the civilsociety de#nition threshold. However, I will be discussing all these spheres fortheir ills, problems and achievements with the view to examine their respectiveimpact to the development of civil society in Russia. These matters will enterthe scene under the civil society rubric – something that I will make clear atthe beginning of each such chapter. Some of these themes will include thediscussion of the nature and causes of civic activism, extremist and radicalorganisations, as well as state-sponsored activity networks and state-dominatedmeans of communication. All such themes are complementary to the civilsociety idea and therefore must form essential components of this book.Allow me to elaborate on di$erent traditions of political thought that giveintellectual origins to each of the three civil society categories. This will help

Theoretical framework structure of the study 3


us to bind all three realms together logically and make a clearer case for thesubsequent empirical chapters that will be discussing these spheres.

Structural issues: the three faces of civil society

At this point, I shall rephrase the names of these three realms in order to useEdwards’ strict terminology throughout the book. In Edwards’ (2004, p. 10)de#nition, civil society simultaneously represents (1) a part of society in theshape of clubs, associations, networks, informal voluntary organisations, andpolitical and non-political networks that stand between the individual and thestate; (2) a kind of society as seen in the pursuit of positive norms, values andbeliefs, as well as protecting universal humanistic values, freedom and equal-ity; (3) or a distinct public sphere as seen in a set of institutionalised normsand forms enabling the functioning of these associations and networks withinthe conditions of the modern state and economy. Each of these visions has arich intellectual tradition that in some cases stretches back many centuries.

The #rst and most prevalent modern view of civil society as a part ofsociety derives from the works and political thought of Alexis de Tocqueville,who observed political developments within the nascent American democ-racy. Tocqueville managed to remove the market economy, class, self-interest

Figure 1.1 De#nitional and structural framework



and competition from the discussion on civil society and viewed town meet-ings and the multitude of independent associations as ‘an invisible hand’organising, directing, and shaping public and political life in the UnitedStates (Ehrenberg 1999, p. 161–64). Though Tocqueville is commonly regar-ded as the founding father of this intellectual tradition, the roots of suchthinking can be found in the writings of Baron de Montesquieu, Jean-JacqueRousseau and Edmund Burke. The comprehensive revival of this intellectualstrand of thought came with the work of Robert Putnam, who pondered thein!uence of associational life on political and economic performance inSouthern and Northern Italy (Putnam 1993), the United States (Putnam2000; see also Elshtain 1995; Sandel 1996; Fukuyama 1999) and subsequentlyin a number of countries worldwide (Putnam 2002). Putnam drew a directcorrelation between the density of voluntary associations of civic engagementand good governance, devising a working formula of ‘strong society, strongeconomy; strong society, strong state’ (Putnam 1993, p. 176).

At the same time, the undoubted importance of civic activity that repre-sents the cornerstone of the Tocquevillian approach to civil society cannotblind us to the comprehensive importance of the political content of suchassociations (Ehrenberg 1999, p. 239). For various forms of civic activity,though strengthening and promoting co-operation, could be aimed at goalsrather distant from the achievement of public good, socio-political harmony,economic and political equality, and physical security. Vibrant associationallife can thrive within criminal gangs, religious fundamentalist organisations,ethnic hatred groups and many other forms of human activity based on co-operation and expression of values. Their activity is a far cry from the ideal ofgenuine civic harmony, reciprocity, mutuality, fairness and equality. Thoughcompliant with associational life in form, these groups diverge from the goalsof democracy in content.

Thus, a border that divorces the forms and content of civic activism hasbeen drawn (Edwards 2004; Uslaner 1999; Putnam 2000; Levi 1996; Brusztand Stark 2000; Easter 1996; Diamond 1996). This border separates the veryidea of voluntary associations from their nature, aims, and scope. A cleardistinction was made between particularism and universalism, prejudice andfairness, exclusion and tolerance, mistrust and co-operation, as between‘order and freedom and chaos and compulsion’ (Tester 1992, p. 11). In thislight, many scholars introduce the idea of civil society as a kind of society thatstands for the ideals of a good and moral society. This intellectual traditionhas its roots in the ideas of Immanuel Kant, and later Hegel, who attributedto humans the ability of independent moral judgment and viewed civil societyas a kind of society knitting humanity into the realm of moral ends andenabling individuals to realise their ethical aspirations through the duties theyimpose on themselves (Ehrenberg 1999, pp. 83–90; Tester 1992, pp. 8–10;Cohen and Arato 1992, pp. 87–89; Goode 2005, p. 12–13).

Finally, the view of civil society as a public sphere could be ascribed to theintellectual tradition of the twentieth century, which attempts to marry



classical liberalism and its zeal to preserve the individual integrities of personswith Marxism that exposes domination in civil society (Edwards 2004, p. 9).The public sphere strand of thought examines the non-legislative, extra-judicialsocial realm that facilitates public communication, free exchange of opinionsand critical argument. The structural facets of this realm operate at varioussocietal levels and in!uence various public spaces such as discussion clubs,literary societies, independent newspapers, public radio and television, refer-enda, public opinion polls, free-accessed internet, universities, think tanks andthe like. They constitute, in Larry Diamond’s (1996, p. 229) words, the ‘ideo-logical marketplace’, which ensures the free !ow of information and ideas.The public sphere has a crucial role in enabling the formation of associations,guaranteeing their independence, ensuring the free exchange of opinionsbetween such organisations and the state, building a strong foundation forinstitutional partnerships, as well as fostering political participation and civicactivity. Arguably, without the provision of such an institutional milieu, thefunctioning of civic associations would be impeded and the discussion on themoral ends of these organisations would not be relevant.

This view on civil society takes its origins in the political thought of JürgenHabermas (1989; 1987), who, following an examination of the social dynam-ics of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Europe, pondered the rise, evolutionand subsequent decline of the public sphere. He contends that the publicsphere emerged from the unconstrained literary communication amongbourgeois families who, in the wake of economic developments, brought theirpersonal, private needs into the public domain. Participants in such publicdebates that took place in salons, co$ee houses or through the media ofnewsletters were soon transformed into critical citizens who wished to wrestcontrol over civic activity from the state and somehow supervise and in!uencepower without being part of it (Goode 2005, pp. 4–8; Cohen and Arato 1992,pp. 211–12; Edwards 2004, p. 57; Crossley and Roberts 2004, pp. 3–4; see alsoEhrenberg 1999, p. 219; Giddens 1997, pp. 135–36).

Habermas insists that a legitimate state has to be receptive to the demandsof the public sphere, stand apart from its functional processes, and ensure anappropriate institutional milieu for its evolution. This school of thought,however, laments the rapid development of the market economy and associ-ates the ultimate decline of the public sphere with the commodi#cation ofmedia and education (Arendt 1958; Sennet 1978; Habermas 1989), hijackingthe state with private interests and vice versa (Habermas 1987), as well asmarketisation and manipulation of public opinion (Habermas 1987; Adornoand Horkheimer 1995; Marcuse 1966).

Edwards (2004) argues that an integrative approach to the development ofthese realms assures the existence of a strong and vibrant civil society.According to Edwards, all three components complement each other, har-monise their respective strengths and weaknesses, and can bene#t from apositive and conscious interaction. He insists (2004, p. 91) that ‘an inclusiveand well-articulated associational ecosystem can be the driving force of a



good society, but the achievements of a good society are what make possiblethe independence and level playing #eld that underpin a democratic associa-tional life. Without a functioning public sphere neither would be possible,since there would be no space for associations to operate in de#ning the goodsociety’s ends and means’.

In the Russian case, the Kremlin plays an important role in the develop-ment of all three spheres and actively interferes with their functioning pro-cesses. The state seems to place particular e$ort in sti!ing and suppressing thepublic sphere. Moreover, the authorities pay very little attention to the nor-mative aspects of the civil society by courting organisations of extremeorientation and deliberately tarnishing the image of liberal associations in thepublic domain. The government also in!uences the development of associa-tional life by organising, promoting and directing various pro-Kremlinmovements and organisations within multiple societal sectors. Restrictive leg-islation on NGOs is also intended to exert constraining in!uence. However,this study will demonstrate that the evolutionary dynamics within the threegiven spheres diverge signi#cantly. While all three realms su$er from seriousgovernmental intrusions, the results are di$erent within each sphere. Thecommunicative and normative domains give cause for concern. The associa-tive dimension, however, displays some serious signs of successful indepen-dent functioning. Despite the Kremlin’s encroachments, independentgrassroots movements that have been formed and #nanced domesticallyrapidly multiply and entrench their positions across the country. These orga-nisations are prepared to face the state in defence of their interests and arecapable of articulating those interests. In this light, this book tests Edward’sthesis on the necessity of co-ordinated development of these three levels ofcivil society in the Russian context. The manuscript’s #ndings suggest that aviable associational sphere could develop against the backdrop of a restrictivepublic sphere and a dubious normative domain. As I mentioned earlier, thework also discusses multifarious socio-economic and political conditions thatlead to such a development.

Theoretical issues

The second theme of this book is theoretical and partly explanatory. It con-siders the overarching impact of modern political systems, economic growthand development on the evolution of civil society. While the structure of thisstudy will not follow this theoretical blueprint, each chapter will account, inits own way and from di$erent angles, for the relationships between institu-tional development, economic growth and civic activity in modern Russia. Ican distinguish two main groups of factors that led to the development ofcivil society in Russia – political-institutional and socio-economic. Thesere!ect the impact of democratisation, capitalism, modernisation and indus-trialisation on the emergence of social tension in Russia’s politics and society.Figures 1.2 and 1.3 illustrate the impact of political and socio-economic



factors respectively and show the causal chains. Both schemas are united by ashared theme, which examines the impact of the capitalist market economyand modern bureaucracy and democratic institutions on the emergence ofvarious public attitudes and perceptions, ranging from conformism and alie-nation and ending with the desire for political participation and even extremism.In these charts, horizontal scales display progressive development of democ-racy, market economy and modernisation. It is not the purpose of this bookto locate Russia on the scale of industrial/post-industrial, modern/post-modern ordemocratic/non-democratic development. Rather, if we assume that Russiafalls somewhere in the ‘twilight zone’ of transition from industrialism to post-industrialism, modernism to post-modernism and authoritarianism todemocracy, we could still claim that the causal in!uence factors proposed inthis book are at work. Perhaps, from this point of view, it does not come as asurprise that the civil society in Russia had not declared itself fully until animportant political trigger, such as the December 2011 and March 2012elections, had been pulled.

In the political chart (Figure 1.2), we see the in!uence of modern admin-istrative-democratic systems on people’s perceptions and attitudes that mightlead to the movement formation and activism. In the economic chart (Figure1.3) we see a rather nuanced argument. Rapid economic growth and

Figure 1.2



modernisation produce a philosophical antinomy. These dynamics generatetwo contradictory albeit not mutually exclusive outcomes. On the one hand,they foster moral dilemmas and disappointments by placing humans in the‘iron cage’ of consumerism. On the other hand, they generate a global senseof economic security and wellbeing that is conducive to the emergence ofpublic optimism. The moral dilemmas factor, as I will show later, urgespeople to feel disappointment and fosters a quest for fairness, justice, andassociated change. However, a mere feeling of disillusionment is not enoughto induce public action. A su"cient amount of social capital is needed toallow activity. Social capital, represented by the ability of people to unite forthe pursuit of common goals, is contingent on interpersonal trust and socio-economic optimism, which are also a function of economic growth (Lipset1960; Przeworski et al. 2000, p. 50 and p. 111; Inglehart 1997, 188$). There-fore, the moral dilemmas factor fosters feelings conducive for public activity,while the socio-economic optimism factor enables such activity instrumen-tally. At this junction these two outcomes of economic growth becomeintrinsically interconnected, despite coming across as contradictory on thesurface.

I will detail these theoretical issues in what follows.

Figure 1.3



Political factors: institutions, environment and disappointments

Civil society is often considered as an integral component of democratic sys-tems (Fitzpatrick 2011; Cohen and Arato 1992, pp. 501–3; see also Tilly1973). Thus, the formation of civil society in Russia could be regarded as oneimportant e$ect of the two decade long democratisation process. At the sametime, the question arises as to what extent we are able to apply these theoreticalexpectations to Russia, where the e$ects of political transition are unclear.Here I see three important avenues that could allow us to draw on Westerntheorisations in relation to the Russian case. First, the idea that civil societyand democratisation coincide in time and space is debatable. There is nodoubt that both processes are linked and mutually reinforcing. Tilly andWood (2009, pp. 139–41 and pp. 127–28 and pp. 135–36), for example, arguethat similar factors promote democratisation and civil society formation anddetail. At the same time, they propose a more nuanced argument for thisseemingly logical correlation. For example, they state that citizenship, whichalso represents an integral, but not su"cient, part of both movement formationand democracy, could surface in transitional, semi-democratic, semi-authoritarianand authoritarian regimes (Tilly and Wood, 2009, p. 127–28). Civil societymovements within such contexts could exercise their citizenship rights inpursuit of targets and ideas that do not necessarily converge with democracy.Ruth Collier (1999) makes a similar argument stating that, although demo-cratisation and civil society formation are inextricably linked, their timing andspatial redistribution might be slightly out of tune: ‘democracy and civilsociety movements sometimes precede and sometimes follow each other; nei-ther depends entirely on other’s existence’ (see also Tilly and Wood 2009, p.125). These theorisations mean that we should not allow critique of Russia’sextant political system blind us to the need of a formal study of civil societyformation in this country. Moreover, the latter could and should be underway,given the introduction of formal democratic rules. This logically leads us tothe following point.

Second, if we are to accept a signi#cant correlation between democratisationand movement formation, then the extent of democratisation in Russia givesgrounds for further re!ection. This point would require a di$erent line ofargument and further elaboration on the formal critique of the nature ofRussia’s political system. It is often claimed that Russia belongs to the ‘twi-light’ or ‘political grey zone’ located between fully-!edged democracy andoutright authoritarianism (McFaul et al. 2004, p. 8; see also Diamond 1999,p. 22; 2002, p. 23). Various conceptual frameworks have been proposed todescribe Russia’s political regime. Of particular signi#cance were the conceptsof ‘competitive authoritarianism’ (Levitsky and Way 2010 Diamond 2002, p.30), minimalist electoral or illiberal democracy (McFaul et al. 2004, pp. 7–8),‘guided democracy’ (Brown 2001a) as well as ‘managed democracy’ (Coltonand McFaul 2003) and ‘managed pluralism’ (Balzer 2003). All these de#ni-tions emphasise the extant distinction between formal democratic institutions



and the way in which political actors operate such structures. As McFaul etal. (2004, p. 8) observe, ‘while the formal institutions of electoral democracyseem to be stable, the democratic content of these institutions has eroded’.Similarly, Levitsky and Way (2010, pp. 5–7) move beyond structural andprocedural aspects and !esh out the importance of a political process seen inthe creation of a ‘reasonably level playing #eld’ that allows meaningful poli-tical competition between incumbents and opposition. They claim thatincumbent’s manipulation of state institutions and resources could seriouslylimit political competition and create an uneven level playing #eld, whichcould profoundly impact the nature of the political context.

At the same time, these theorisations are focused on the e$ects of political/informal treatment of formal networks on the nature of a political regime.The other side of the coin, however, is the impact of the existing formal rules andstructures on societal behaviour and social context. It has long since becomean academic consensus that institutional structures have a great deal of in!uenceon political culture, i.e. people’s political perceptions, attitudes, beliefs, andsensations (Alexander 2000; Almond and Verba 1989; Brown and Gray 1977;Brown 2005; Welch 1993; Cohen 1974; Greenstein 1969; Eckstein 1998; Swidler1998). Thus, the evolution of political attitudes within formal institutionalrules becomes an important element for the study of the societal context.Research conducted within the #eld of new and sociological institutionalism alsoclaims that institutional networks create a new cognitive environment inwhich individuals act in accordance with entrenched contextual conceptions. Thus,institutional rules and norms at some point evolve from being part of ‘poli-tical’ culture to becoming an essential component of ‘social’ culture (Rawls 1993,p. 14; Scott 2001, p. 57; North 1990, pp. 6–7; Lowndes 2010, p. 65). In Russia,the formal possibility and the idea of an electoral change of power, as well asfree expression of will within di$ering media settings, invariably e$ects idea-tional shifts and public expectations. Vibrant intellectual discussions, actions ofprotest and other aspects of public self-expression, to which I referred earlierin this chapter, underpin this point. The extent to which such shifts couldimpact practical policy-making is debatable, and should therefore be a matterof interest. In this light, Richard Sakwa (2010) rightly points out the existenceof a ‘dual nature’ of the Russian political system. The formal institutionalside of this duality de#nes objective democratic rules of the game, while theinformal manipulation of these rules by power holders subverts this formallydemocratic shell. Sakwa (2010, p. 203) argues that the formal constitutionalorder becomes a ‘subversive institution’ that generates a political crisis, whichcould end with the emergence of a greater autonomy and hegemony of formalstructures. At the moment, the open-ended struggle for in!uence between theformal and informal aspects of institutional system de#nes the nature ofRussia’s political, and more importantly, societal context.

We could reasonably suggest that the recent outbursts of civic activism andRussia’s growing civil society represent the workings of the formal rules andformal democratic political context. To sustain this, polls show that the public



had accepted democratic rules of the game and expected the state to guaran-tee better implementation of such rules long before the December manifesta-tions. The disa$ection with the lack of real opportunities for exercisingdemocratic framework had become visible towards the end of Putin’s secondpresidency. In 2008, 45 per cent of the Levada Centre respondents wished tosee more transparency and demarcation of ‘clear goals’ in the political arena;36 per cent su$ered from the lack of political choice, and 25 per cent did notsee any viable competition among Russia’s politicians.2

The third theme relates to the general impact of modern Western-typebureaucracy on public behaviour and preferences. Modern Western institu-tions often geared towards mitigation of political con!ict and, where possible,minimising participation to the level of electoral legitimation of the adminis-trative ‘system’ (Tweedy and Hunt 1994; Ehrenberg 1999; Habermas 1987).Such thinking is often driven by worries that high levels of political activitymight be destabilising, and therefore a healthy balance between participationand non-participation is desirable (Almond and Verba 1963). Indeed, politicalinstitutions of modern capitalism are grounded in technocratic thinking thatgoes beyond ideologies, and often morals, and is targeted towards adminis-trative e"ciency (Bell 1960; Hay 2007). Such a situation leads to the creationof overly stable frameworks that preclude critical thinking and participation.More importantly, these limitations tend to have a systemic, ongoing char-acter. Habermas (1987; see also Thompson and Held 1982, pp. 4–6) notesthat the contemporary administrative-bureaucratic apparatus is gearedtowards avoidance of ‘technical problems’ and risks to the current system.Given that socio-economic challenges can be resolved mostly by experts,politics tends to assume a singularly ‘negative character’ (Crossley andRoberts 2004, p. 5–8; Habermas 1987; see also Hay 2007, pp. 83–84; Hughes2003). This situation creates dilemmas, disappointment and unease with theideas of politics, solidarity, and civic engagement and gives rise to eitherdepoliticisation or negative politicisation, i.e. the ‘anti-politics’ phenomenon(Sloam 2007; Hay 2007; Pugh 2010; Todd and Taylor 2004; Barnes et al.2007; Dalton et al. 1990). The idea that people’s voice is not always heard,that the change of political leaders does not lead to the change of second rankexperts and non-political policy executives frustrates the public (Pugh 2010, pp.225–27; Tarrow 2011, pp. 95–98; Sloam 2007; Hay 2007). Anti-political sen-timents expressed in a radical dislike of the political-administrative systememerge as a result. The most recent cases are the Occupy Wall Street move-ment, various animal rights networks (Ganer 2005, 2006; Mika 2006)espousing an anti-systemic agenda, anti-globalisation protesters (Gill 2000;Held 2004) and other radical anti-political groups.

Russia could be regarded as a well-suited candidate for the rise of anti-political feelings. Her impenetrable bureaucracy exacerbated by corruptionand backstairs agreements evokes public grievances and mistrust (Taylor2011; Shlapentokh 2006). The ‘telephone rules’, in which superior o"cialsresolve problems falling outside their competence, nepotism, non-transparent rules



of the game, second echelon professionals who decide what is to be imple-mented at the regional level against the grain of federal doctrines – all this leadsto disappointments, moral dilemmas, and quest for alternative. The outburstsof anti-political activity were seen in the functioning of various radical youthorganisations, which I will discuss in the empirical parts of this book.3

Economic factors: disappointments and moral dilemmas

Critics of capitalism often present the picture of modern life as a mixturebetween passivity and subjectivism and the resistance to these trends at thepublic and private levels. Many authors (McCormick 1997; Wilson 2006, pp.15–17; Adorno and Horkheimer 1997; Sitton 2003; Giddens 1991) claim thatmodern belief in rationality represents the root cause of ‘world alienation’(Arendt 1999, p. 254), subjective preoccupation and nihilism (Sitton 2003, p. 23;McCormick 1997, p. 64). Scholars, such as Adorno, Horkheimer, Habermas,Marcuse, Arendt, Sennet and Lukács on the left, and Heidegger, Schmitt, Strauss,Voegelin and their pupils on the right, agree that rationalisation of modernlife in capitalist societies is targeted towards establishing the most e$ective pat-terns of doing things, be it the production of commodities, services, adminis-trative decisions or achievement of the most favourable personal situations.This environment leads to a plethora of moral dilemmas and disappointmentsthat manifest themselves in various socio-economic sectors of life.

In the economic arena, the rationalisation process is one-sided and cannotbe fully explained (Giddens 1973, pp. 183–84). This results in various ethicalpressures and disappointments. Modern men are capable of rationalising theprocess of production that is geared to the best possible and the most volu-minous consumer output. At the same time, men cannot rationalise the ethicalworth of produced goods. In the result, they are overcome by the irrationalurge to consume the unnecessary (McCormick 1997, p. 61; Giddens 1994,p. 166; Sitton 2003, p. 23; Arendt 1999, p. 253; Sennet 1978; Lasch 1979).Consumption soon falls beyond individual control and becomes de#ned byspeci#c lifestyles. This creates various pressures and ‘social strains’, in whichpeople are measured ‘as static elements, as success or failure’ (Adorno andHorkheimer 1997, p. 28). Such strains, on the other hand, result in dis-appointments, dilemmas and often lead to delinquent behaviour and mobilisation(Merton 1938; Cohen 1955; Gelder 2007, p. 41; Pilkington et al. 2010, p. 5).

At the social, and private–personal level, the overly rational modern envir-onment leads to the rise of the so-called individuation phenomenon thatstands in stark contrast to individualism promoted by various theoreticians ofWestern democratic societies. Emile Durkheim (1972, p. 115) draws a #nedistinction between these two meanings. Individualism is a moral conditionthat demands a person to live and work as a specialist and to feel as aresponsible citizen. Individuation, on the other hand, urges people to ‘fend forthemselves’. It entails atomisation of society into a sum of individuals ‘whoact in their own interests without reference to collective concerns’ (Dodd



2005, pp. 20–21). The rise of individuation is conducive to sel#shness andnarcissism and detrimental to social solidarity and civic activity (see WeberPolitics as a Vocation in McCormick 1997, p. 50; Bauman 2007; Schwartz1973; Hirschman 1979; Sennet 1978; Lasch 1979). Schmitt (inMeier 1995, p. 38;see also McCormick 1997, pp. 50–53) describes an individuated bourgeois as

a man who does not want to leave the sphere of unpolitical, risk-free,private … who … behaves as an individual against the whole, who ‘#nds’the substitute for his political non-entity in the fruits of peace andacquisition and, above all, in the ‘perfect security’ of the enjoyment ofthose things.

At the same time, this environment generates a range of moral dilemmas thatfuel reactionary mobilisation. Scholars o$er various explanations to thesedevelopments. Some of these explanations are presented on the psychologicaland moral planes. Some focus on instrumental and practical reasoning. Fromthe moral–ethical point of view, the ‘emptiness of modern life’ (Marcuse1966; Sitton 2003, p. 17) shifts away from individuation and prompts peopleto seek redemption in ‘alternative ways of life’ and values. This quest formeaning, as Voegelin (2000, p. 7) argues, represents an ‘existential humanneed’. At this junction Schmitt (in Meier 1995, p. 12) proposes his notoriousconcept of ‘the political’ claiming that man is ‘existentially grasped by poli-tical participation’. Developing Schmitt’s thoughts further, Strauss (in Meier1995, pp. 41–42) claims that a purely rational consumer existence could onlytake place ‘at the cost of the meaning of human life’ … for ‘if man hasrelinquished asking the question of what is right … he relinquishes being aman’. This questioning process may lead to the formation of choices that mayappear non-optimal for an individual but lead to more desirable social out-comes. Hirschman calls these choices meta-preferences. Such choices areethical and resemble Freudian theorising about the Superego (Hirschman1979, p. 71; Seligman 1992, pp. 26–28; Frankfurt 1971; Sen 1974). Such meta-preferences are responsible for the emergence of social movements and dis-tinctly civic types of public activity. In this light, E. P. Thompson (1971; seealso Tarrow 2011, p. 25) in his ‘moral economy’ idea claimed that the ‘senseof injustice’, rather than the nature of economic conditions, prompt people torevolt, and the ‘sense of injustice’ is the prime cause of forming meta-preferences.In the empirical chapters of this book I will be returning to these dynamics inthe Russian case.

Many other authors (Giddens 1991; Miles and Irvine 1982; Beck 1992) #nda more practical explanation to the emergence of public activity in moderncapitalist conditions. Common fear, developmental fatigue and shifting natureof social con!ict dominate such accounts. When some critical mass of positiveeconomic development is accumulated and domestic consumption reaches acertain level of ‘su"ciency’, the population starts searching for new avenuesof social participation by broadening the spectrum of rights and freedoms



that can be exercised in the public space. We can then observe a spill overe$ect: consumption ceases to be purely economic and spills over to the poli-tical realm. In this light, Ingelhart (1990, p. 11; see also Uslaner 1999) arguesthat political stability and socio-economic wealth induces a shifting awayfrommere economic and physical security ‘toward… belonging, self-expression,and the quality of life’. To continue with this line, Habermas (1981, p. 36)argues that, instead of asking what we should get, consumers begin to ponderquestions such as who we are, how we should live and who is accountable (seealso Edwards 2004, p. 115; Crossley and Roberts and 2004, p. 8–10; see alsoCrossley 2003; Kline 2000).

Fear is another common factor responsible for the emergence of civicactivity (Giddens 1994; Beck 1992; Bauman 2007). That fear pertains to certainareas of production, economic activity and development and often de#nes thetarget areas for singe-case public actions. As Beck (1992: 134) writes,

it may be incidents such as the planned highway in the vicinity of one’sown backyard, the worsening of the school situation for children, or theatomic waste storage dump being built nearby which cause aspects of a‘collective fate’ to penetrate into consciousness.

In this way, certain civic attitudes, as well as behavioural patterns, emanatefrom the common fear. Society develops a ‘common vocabulary’ and a newapproach to the socio-political and economic environment. In Western socie-ties such risks lead to the emergence of ecological, human rights and thepreservation of species movements.

The #nal theme is the changing nature of social con!ict in advanced capi-talist states. Most modern post-industrial societies have a complex character.This means that the social con!ict develops not along the poor-rich lines butalong the lines of segmented individual interests. Anthony Giddens (1991)claims that emancipatory politics of early capitalism (targeted at liberatingwider classes of people) gave way to the politics of self-actualisation seen indefence of professional, life-style, gender and environmental issues. What ismore important, and relevant to the later discussion of the Russian case, isthat collective action in most complex systems does not have a mass char-acter. In turn, it is case-focused and narrowly targeted. Civic movements‘emerge only in limited areas, for limited phases, and by means of moments ofmobilisation’ (Melucci 1989, p. 248; see also Lane 1974, pp. 175–78; Schwartz1973; Sloam 2007). It is also important that change in complex and eco-nomically developed societies does not occur on a large scale. Rather, it oftenexists in the ‘invisible realm of social consciousness’ (Havel 1989, p. 397) andit may take a long time for its e$ects to begin to show. At the same time,sociologists insist (Melucci 1989, p. 248; Keane 1989; Havel 1989) that thetwo poles of collective action (latency and visibility) are inseparable. Theywarn against con#ning our observations to the ‘visible side of mobilisation’for this strategy can lead us to ‘overlook the fact that what nourishes it is the



daily production of alternative framework of sense’ (Melucci 1989, p. 248).Keane (1989, p. 254) observes that the evolution of such societies is always‘discontinuous, discrete, di$erentiated. These systems never change at the sametime and in the same way at their various levels’ and these changes ‘are alwayschanges of an adaptive type’. While it is di"cult to predict with any degree ofcertainty the e"cacy of this type of latent action and whether it is destined tosuccess or failure, sociologists often hope (Keane 1989, p. 249) that it mightproduce some long-term e$ects in the three di$ering dimensions: (1) moder-nisation and institutional change; (2) emergence of new informal leaders inthe areas of information technology, new media, Internet advertising anddiscussion; (3) cultural innovation through instilling new behavioural patternsand new forms of social relationships associated with the above changes.

These theorisations are important for our subsequent study of the Russiancase. I am interested in establishing the ways in which Russia #ts into thesetrends. Which aspects of Western theories tailored to critique of moderncapitalism, both industrial and informational, come into play in Russia?Indeed, the extent to which Russia’s extant moral dilemmas have becomepost-industrial is an open question in that Russia di$ers from Western capi-talist countries, which had a consumption-based economy for decades, inmany di$ering ways. I shall leave the reader to form an opinion on thismatter, which could even perhaps spawn some additional and more systema-tic research. At the same time, the reach of industrialisation in Russia and thecapitalist market nature of her contemporary economy do not need particularelaboration in order to make a case for Russia’s susceptibility to the workingsof industrialised economics and market capitalism. In order to avoid an a-historical nature of this discussion, I must mention that even the SovietUnion – Russia’s predecessor – was universally considered as a modernindustrial state, while the industrial nature of its economic and socio-politicallife generated various debates on the ‘convergence of social systems’ (Eisen-stadt 2002; Wallerstein 1979; English 2000; Tsipko 1983) and a more critical‘multiple modernities’ (Eisenstadt 2002) thesis. Moreover, the Soviet societyfaced a plethora of universal industrial dilemmas even in the late 1970s andearly 1980s (see Brown 2004; Timofeyev 2004; English 2000; Brown 1996, pp.89–130). Scholarship points at the lively Soviet debates on ‘universality ofhuman values’ (Burlatsky 1982), the common ‘fear of nuclear disaster’ (Bykov1983), as well as discussions on ‘ecological and industrial pollution’, the issuesof abortion, genetic engineering and family life (see Voprosy Filoso"i journalfor more information). Alexander Tsipko (1983; see also Shakhnazarov 1984)from the Institute of Economy of the World Socialist Systems, for example,pondered classically post-industrial issues of the ‘limits to growth’, as well asmoral and spiritual problems of the autonomy of individuals within devel-oped industrial systems. It is expected that we would be able to trace some ofthese dilemmas in modern days. Yet again, a systematic comparison of moralSoviet and post-Soviet dilemmas is not the purpose of this account, for thissubject could form a separate book.



This volume will recurrently address Russia’s modern moral dilemmas andshow how Russians channel their responses to the new economic environmentinto various forms of civic (as well as non-civic) behaviour. World-alienation,conformism and privatism on the one hand, as well as a moral search forjustice and fairness on the other, are signi#cant issues at stake. The process ofceaseless accumulation of wealth clearly exhibits its moral boundaries withthe extravagancies of Russia’s new rich creating an air of ethical disapproval(White 2011). The pressures of the new ‘success’ society are becoming evidentwith the emergence of various forms of disappointment and social exclusion.Even though the room for improvement of the lives of the vast majority of thepopulation is signi#cant, the atmosphere of ‘post-scarcity’ (in Giddens’ inter-pretation of the term) politics and ‘developmental fatigue’ is gradually settingin on urban centres.

Furthermore, the nature of social con!ict in Russia also falls in line withpost-modern theorisations. Russia, due to her technological, market economicand socio-political development, has long since become a complex societymarked by the multiplicity of socio-political and private interests. Moreimportantly, this complexity grew signi#cantly during the decade of 2000s. Ifat the beginning of the 1990s, social con!ict had a two-dimensional characterand was evolving along poor–rich lines (or rather the state representing thevery rich, and being unable to contain economic turmoil, and society gen-erally representing the poor), economic growth of the 2000s changed thispicture signi#cantly. Rapid accumulation of wealth, the rise of informationtechnologies and growth of the purchasing power parity to match developedcountries of the West4 created qualitatively new socio-political and economicconditions in Russia. Despite the visibly technocratic and authoritarian styleof political governance, these new circumstances gave rise to a distinct societalcomplexity. Such a complexity ensured that the nature of social con!ict hasbeen altered to match the type of con!icts that evolve in modern complexsocieties.

Many critics of Russia’s civil society lamented the practical single-casecharacter of civic action or the dormant nature of social protest. Issues raisedby Russia’s new social movements often pertain to single-case lifestyle ques-tions. Strikes and industrial complaints emanate from richer workers re!ect-ing their desire to be better integrated into Russia’s growing modern economy.Ecological, professional, and other self-realisation networks are also some-what on the rise. I suggest that this feature of Russia’s public activity is rathera re!ection of the new complex, self-actualisation, character of the modernage, and not so much an idiosyncratic feature of Russia. Discussion of thistype of activity in Russia will be a recurrent theme in this book. In parallel tothat, however, political extremism emerges as another important answer tothe challenges of the age. This extremism often represents the result of the‘social strain’. It is usually manifested in the fanatical accumulation of wealth,overindulgent individuation, endorsement of authoritarian state tendenciesand, increasingly often, chauvinism and fascism.



The problem of a common fear is also particularly prevalent but, in contrastto Western states, it has some political dimensions related to the role of the statein society. Indeed, the risks of everyday life in Russia fall into two main groups:the technological and the political. The technological group includes aviation,railroads, tra"c accidents, various ecological and health threats. In the poli-tical realm individuals face the high costs of corruption, tenuous property rights,elite instability and a high crime rate. Both groups of risks become systemicand begin to transcend the issues of class, power, and socio-economic status. Theybecome equally potent for those in power and those below and thus con-tribute to the development of a common vocabulary. Poor ecological stan-dards a$ecting all levels of society, car accidents involving ordinary, expensiveand luxury vehicles, #res, planes and boat failures claiming lives of rich o"cialsand ordinary citizens regularly make the headlines of national news.

Risks related to the absence of socio-political and economic justice deservea special mention. It is signi#cant that high crime rates universally a$ect allsegments of Russia’s society with murders of high and middle ranking o"cialsas well as ordinary businessmen becoming commonplace and terrorist attackstargeting political elites (the attempted August 2011 Sapsan elite train explo-sion being one such example) and ordinary people. In the socio-economicsphere, Kirill Rogov (2011) observes that in an attempt to address the unjustnature of the 1990s market privatisation, the Putin state of the 2000s createda new, albeit even more unfair system. That system made property ownersdependent on state authorities, while state authorities positions became a newpower currency that enabled control over property and allowed enrichment.The only caveat was that these state power positions were not guaranteedeither and could be revoked at any time by the higher echelons of power.Thus, in such a system everyone is at risk of losing everything. Therefore,everyone is interested, at least theoretically, in minimising such a risk. Theserisks create a societal request towards genuine socio-economic and politicaljustice as opposed to the nominal con#rmation of property rights. Imple-mentation of these new requests would entail the formulation of a new systemof governance that could guarantee equal political and economic rights to allmembers of society. In this light, the quest for justice has become particularlyprominent. Sixty-eight per cent of the Independent FOM (Fund of PublicOpinion) respondents thought in 2011 that the Russian society is unjust(against just 12 per cent who thought otherwise) and 42 per cent of therespondents believed that Western societies are more just than Russia.5 It isalso indicative that 50 per cent of the 2007 VTsIOM (All-Russian Centre for theStudy of the Public Opinion) respondents suggested that corruption of Rus-sia’s state and administrative institutions represents the main factor tarnishingthe country’s image as a ‘normal’ and ‘civilised’ state.6

These developments have the potential of triggering a new political crisisthat is awaiting Russia in the coming decade. In this respect, the ongoingdebate on the Kremlin inspired modernisation looks rather intriguing. Theproject – which embraces political, as well as economic and technological



improvements of Russia’s various infrastructures – becomes an apparentnecessity. Against the backdrop of common fears it obtains a societal, ratherthan the political, grounding. In a sense, it emerges as a request ‘from below’.From a theoretical point of view, Dodd (2005: 197) insists that the response tosocietal risks undergoes two distinct phases. In the #rst phase, society realisesits common concerns and hazards, while in the second phase it attempts tochange the political paradigm that generated these hazards. This book sug-gests that, during the decade of the 2000s, Russia stood somewhere inbetween these two phases. The public mood had changed albeit this changewas not e$ectively articulated and translated into civic activity until thelaunch of the post-electoral December 2011 to May 2012 protests.

Thus, the Russian state faces multifarious challenges posed from below.Generally, the silent social protest related to moral dilemmas can be dealt withvia two main methods. These methods encompass state interventionalism, i.e.the ‘statisation of society’, or the ‘socialisation of the state’, i.e. neo-corporatism(Cohen and Arato 1992, pp. 251–53; McCormick 1997; Habermas 1992). Theelite-driven solution includes the state taking the functions of proposing newideologies and new solutions. The second option entails a ‘bottom up’approach, in which the state meets the demands of society and the societytakes the lead in determining new moral directions. Cohen and Arato (1992,p. 253) claim that these two potential answers rely on the two separate theo-retical-philosophical traditions: the Marxian tradition of state-society and theToquevillian project of re-establishing the intermediary associations of civiland political society in a democratic form. They further insist that ‘only thesecond form revitalises the constitutive interaction of the public sphere itselfin the form of genuine “rights of participation”’.

I will show in various parts of this book that the Russian government oftenchooses the #rst option for dealing with the problem. The state presides overthe political challenges, manipulates them and directs the solutions to meetparticularistic goals of ruling elites. The aim is to preserve the privilegedposition of these elites and to maintain their grip on power. However, by doingso the state substitutes the concept of the genuine ‘political’ with the ‘state-endorsed arti#cial’. The state attempts to create its own, safe and controllable,version of ‘the political’. At the same time, this is a slippery path available tothe Kremlin, and unless the state is prepared to adopt a new, more open andinclusive, approach to meeting these challenges the consequences may becomerather destabilising and unpredictable.

Social optimism and trust: the instrument of practical action

Let me now turn to the discussion of social optimism and its in!uence oncivic activity and democratisation. Scholars (Lipset 1960; Przeworski et al.2000, p. 50 and p. 111; Coleman 1990, p. 320; Uslaner 1999) often claim thatsocial optimism, trust and social capital represent three closely interconnectedconcepts that constitute important determinants of the civil society idea.



These concepts, in my view, have had some serious impact on the evolution ofsocietal trends in modern Russia. To ascertain these links, let me brie!y ela-borate on the nature of these phenomena and then move to the discussion oftheir impact on contemporary Russian developments. Social capital is uni-versally viewed as a category necessary and vital for the formation of civilsociety. It refers to the ability of citizens to actively participate in independentassociations and to take part in the social life of their community (Putnam1993, pp. 98–99). At the same time, trust plays a vital role in human interac-tions and predetermines the willingness of people to be involved in varioustypes of social activity (Uslaner 1999, pp. 128–30; Gibson 2003, pp. 70–74;Putnam 1997, pp. 161–67). It is therefore clear that trust facilitates all sorts ofsocial behaviour and civic activism, and represents, as a result, the centralelement of social capital.

The de#nition of trust, however, is not straightforward. Yamagishi andYamagishi (1994) distinguish between ‘generalised’ and ‘particularised’ formsof interpersonal trust. While generalised trust stands for the ability of peopleto extend trust to strangers, particularised trust is con#ned to close familial,religious, racial and other narrowly con#ned ties. This distinction led otherauthors to clarify the type of social capital and civic networks practiced bydi$erent societies and cultures. Discussions take place about ‘weak’ and ‘strong’social bonds (Granovetter 1973; Gibson 2003), as well as ‘bridging’ and ‘non-bridging’, or ‘extending’ and ‘binding’ forms of social capital (Inoguchi 2002;Fukuyama 1995; Yamagishi 1988; Edwards 2004, p. 33).

In all such cases, the distinction is made between the ability of people toengage in ‘bridging’ civic relationships with wide groups of citizens regardlessof their economic, political, religious and racial standings and the inclinationsof individuals to trust only those of their own type, class, background andfamily. Needless to say, particularised trust inhibits co-operation betweencitizens and results in atomisation of society. Generalised trust, and weaksocial networks, on the other hand, prompt people to join various associa-tions, to take an active role in political and social activity, and to volunteertheir time for the achievement of the common good (Uslaner 1999, p. 128;Gibson 2003, p. 63; Mishler and Rose 1997; Norris 1999).

Which factors form and predetermine generalised trust? Uslaner in hisexhaustive research on the moral foundations of trust dissects the main com-ponents of this phenomenon. He (Uslaner 2002, p. 97) argues that optimismand trust are inextricably linked and mutually reinforcing entities. Moreover,he reinforces this point by demonstrating that optimism predetermines trust,and the impact of optimism on trust is twice as great as that of trust onoptimism. Optimism, on the other hand, is directly related to socio-economicconditions and social stability. Arguably, all four elements of optimism dis-tinguished by Uslaner (2002, p. 82) – a sense that the future will be betterthan the past, a feeling that we can control our environment, as well as asense of personal well-being and supportive community – directly relate to thesocio-economic performance of the outside world.



Empirical research substantiates this hypothesis by demonstrating that inWestern societies economic performance and optimism are closely related toeach other and both account for the growing levels of social capital. Verbaand Nie (1972, p. 126; see also Inglehart 1990) empirically prove that anindividual’s socio-economic status has a direct correlation with his propensityfor political participation. They note that ‘the higher status individual has agreater stake in politics … greater skills, more resources, greater awareness ofpolitical matters. He is exposed to more communication about politics, heinteracts with others who participate’.7 Newton (1999, p. 185) concludes that

social trust is most strongly expressed … by the winners in society, in sofar as it correlates most strongly with education, satisfaction with lifeincome, class, and race. For that matter social trust is the prerogative ofthe winners of the world.

Similarly, Coleman (1990, p. 320) theorises that stability of social structures –that is directly related to socio-economic performance – is a key factor in theemergence and distraction of social capital. This argument is supported bythose academics who research the developmental dynamics of civil societiesacross the globe. Edwards (2004, p. 96–97) went as far as to argue that legalprotection of equal rights, provision of jobs with decent wages, adequate helpwith childcare, fair taxation, access to education and healthcare are sub-stantive blocks building a vibrant civil society. In that trying to make people ‘onthe breadline’ trust, co-operate and share is unreasonable and futile, unless‘e$orts are also made to create the conditions in which this is the safe andrational thing for them to do’.

These theorisations could a$ord a suggestion that the Russian govern-ment’s emphasis on enhancing the country’s economy and improving theliving standards of her citizens could lead to the growth of public optimismand generalised trust. It could also result in the increased expectations in thesocio-political sphere, spilling the consumption over from the purely eco-nomic to the socio-political realm and fostering higher demands. Indeed, in1995 Timothy Colton (1995, p. 749) argued that political participation wasvirtually absent as the main mood was that of concentration on personalsurvival. However, he warned that ‘political interests will emerge as economictransformation spawns property rights and a civil society, in which membershave pecuniary and physic stakes in what the government does’. The empiri-cal parts of this book will discuss the emerging expectations, optimism andtrust and their impact on the evolution of civil society in Russia (Rose 1996;Rose and Weller 2003; Gibson 2003; Clement 2006; Shlapentokh 2006;Rukavishnikov 2008).

Thus, the drive towards economic improvement goes against the leniencetowards control and domination within the civil society. Such inconsistency ingovernmental approach to social and economic policies generates some ten-dencies, in which grassroots associational movements accelerate against the



backdrop of the state’s active intrusions into the three realms of civil society.Having said that, my comments on the role of economic factors in the growthof social optimism and associational networks should be treated as ahypothesis rather than a #rm conclusion. For my evidence covers the periodof the past ten years and my suggestions must be tested continuously overtime and with the example of other, similar states.

The structure of the study

The rest of this book brings into focus the ongoing interplay between theevolution of Russia’s political and economic institutions and her nascent civilsociety. The discussion within each chapter deploys the theoretical apparatuson modernisation, industrial and informational capitalism, economic growthand development, as well as class strati#cation, for the analysis of the evolu-tion of civil society in Russia. As I made clear earlier, this book is structurallyorganised on the basis of Edwards’ trilateral approach to the study of civilsociety. Apart from Chapter 2, which continues this general theoretical dis-cussion, each chapter illustrates one of the spheres of this ‘trinity’ and exam-ines its development in the Russian case. Chapter 2 dissects the cyclicaldynamics of public participation that took place in Russia during the pastdecade. Distinguishing such phases of societal activity is important for expli-cating the existent link between Russian state and society and could provide abetter insight to the subsequent study of each given sphere of state–societyinteraction. A separate examination of civic activity is also necessary in thatcivil society and civic activity represent interconnected but not coterminousissues. This chapter will therefore examine public activity as an importantinstrumental expression of civil society (Fowler 1996). From this point ofview, this part is a necessary theoretical and empirical addition to the book,even though it somewhat digresses from the study of civil society as such. Thechapter is also intended as a contribution to the already ongoing debate onwhether ‘public opinion’ does matter in Russia (White#eld 2009; Lukin 2009;Shevtsova 2007). The discussion claims that governmental activity was con-ditioned, although among other factors, by public pressures and demands andthat a number of state policies converged with the general vector of socialparticipation.

Chapter 3 opens the trilateral discussion of the civil society study andexamines the nature of the public sphere in Russia. In this part I discusspractical ways in which the state manipulates and controls the public domain.This analysis complements and somewhat quali#es the previous discussion onthe importance of public opinion in state policymaking. At the end of thischapter a reader will hopefully conclude that the relationship between thepublic sphere and the state is nuanced and constantly shaped by a complexweb of interactive practices and unfolding socio-political events. On the onehand, the public is capable of forming independent opinions on the basis ofeveryday practices and realities, which often diverge from the picture



presented in the public domain (see a good theoretical discussion of this pointin Huntington 1968, pp. 369–71). On the other hand, the state makes all thee$orts to establish the nature of public perceptions and to subsequently shapethem in a desired fashion. The ‘shaping’ takes place both through partialaccommodation of dissatisfaction, which I discuss in Chapter 2, and throughconsistent ‘construction’ of virtual realities that could discourage potentialdissent. This analysis covers the political and economic dimensions. Thepolitical section delineates various techniques deployed by the ruling eco-nomic and political elites in order to achieve greater agenda setting capacitiesand to build a required ‘public opinion’. The economic part of the chapterdiscusses the impact of social strati#cation on the functioning of the publicspace and the ability of the latter to accurately re!ect processes taking placewithin society.

Chapter 4 considers Russian civil society as a kind of society. Given that therest of this book will allow a lot of space for the discussion of organisationsfocused on the ideas of public good and democracy, the purpose of this sec-tion is to illustrate our previous thesis that not all networks could be con-sidered benign and that we should carefully consider associations that do notpromote the idea of civil society as good society. In this light, the chapterexamines the roots and origins of extremism and links this to the advance-ment of modern economic relations. In this light, the chapter analyses thenature of various types of extremist behaviour in contemporary Russia. Itdiscusses the extremist tendencies within the liberal, left wing, conservativeand pro-Kremlin realms. The discussion shows that extremism often repre-sents a public response to the various adaptation di"culties related to theentrenchment of new market and institutional relations. The chapter furtherargues that the role of the state in the promotion of civil society as a kind ofsociety aimed at achieving the public good is not entirely clear. The discussionpoints to the state’s relationships with dubious organisations of ‘patriotic’orientation. The inconsistency of the Kremlin’s policy towards immigrationand xenophobia, which helps the acceleration of negative societal trends, isalso examined.

Chapters 5, 6 and 7 examine Russia’s civil society within the part of societystrand. It is necessary to divide the part of society sphere into three distinctgroups that fundamentally diverge in their origins, sources of funding, andoperational logic. These groups are (1) state-sponsored associations; (2) Western#nanced organisations; and (3) domestic grassroots movements. Thus we willrequire three separate chapters to analyse these spheres. These chapters showthat the third sphere gives grounds for cautious optimism, while the workingsof the #rst two generate more questions than answers. Chapter #ve considersthe functioning of state-sponsored associations. The argument is nuanced. Thechapter examines two principle theoretical paradigms deployed in the study ofthe relationship between the state and civic movements. The #rst approachtreats the state and civil society in antagonistic terms. The second line focuses onco-operation between the two entities. In this light, the chapter delineates the



areas of successful state–civil society co-operation in Russia, and then examineshow the two entities engage in a struggle for political and cultural hegemony. Thelatter part of the discussion shows how Russia’s Kremlin-sponsored associa-tions are involved in state subversive activities and adopt tactics of passiveresistance. Such subversive activities are analysed by deploying the Gramscianconcept of the ‘war of position’.

Chapter 6 looks at the functioning dynamics of foreign-sponsored associa-tions. It is an empirical account of the themes and problems that emerge inthe course of these groups’ workings in Russia. The chapter argues that bothdonors and recipients often manipulate such organisations in order to achievetheir particular goals. The state also aims to create a negative image of suchassociations in the public domain in order to resist foreign pressures appliedto its internal a$airs. At the same time, the chapter concludes that somepositive results could be achieved in the long term through the developmentand entrenchment of educational programs creating new generations of citizenssupportive of liberal values.

Chapter 7 discusses the emergence of potentially the most important sphereof civil society – independent grassroots movements. This chapter’s #ndingsposit that this strand of Russia’s associational sphere gives cause for opti-mism. The chapter analyses the social composition of grassroots movements.It demonstrates that the reduction of poverty played a role in determining thenature and dynamics of participation within such associations. The chapterclaims that, while these movements face a multitude of #nancial, organisa-tional and administrative problems, their development is underway. Chapter 8concludes that Russian society has undergone a considerable transformationsince the launch of the economic and political transition of the 1990s. Thee$ects of these transformations have led to a situation, in which the publicdeveloped a set of new expectations in the economic and political spheres.The focus of public attention has shifted from mere survival and politicalstability to the more advanced issues of equality, justice, greater participationand social inclusion. These new expectations result in the emergence of asocial protest that until recently had a silent nature. It is also signi#cant thatthe state is incapable of meeting the new demands and prefers to embark onthe policy of oppression in order to control these dynamics. The book con-cludes that the socio-political status quo achieved during the #rst presidencyof Vladimir Putin has already been altered although a new way in which thestate and society could continue their dialogue has not yet been found.



2 Public and private cycles ofsocio-political life in Russia

This chapter examines the two phases of civic activity in Russia: public andprivate. As I claimed in the introduction, this discussion will draw theboundaries between the concepts of civil society and civic action. The lattercould be regarded as an instrumental expression of the former. In otherwords, civic action, along with the range of its practical tools, represents an arena,in which civil society organisations could choose to function (VeneKlasen 1994;Fowler 1996). At the same time, civic action is a much wider concept thancivil society. Civic action, as opposed to civil society, does not necessarilyhave organised, institutional expression, for it also encompasses various formsof non-participation, as well as informal activities, conversations, readings,forming opinions and judgements, showing support or disapproval, voting,campaigning, volunteering, and agitating (Hay 2007, pp. 70–78). All suchactivities are engaged in a permanent interaction with the three spheres ofcivil society – associative, communicative and normative.

The previous chapter of this book has already suggested that we should viewthe entrenchment of civic activism in complex societies as an intermittent ratherthan a linear process. Indeed, public behaviour in the civic domain experiencesdi$ering phases of increased and faded activism (Hirschman 1979; Schlesinger1949; Nathan 1993, pp. 26–27; Eastertin 1980; Tilly and Wood 2009; Rapo-port 2006; Koopmans 1993; McAdam 1995; Tarrow 2011). Tarrow (2005, p. 219)speaking of transnational activism claims that it is ‘more like a series of wavesthat lap on an international beach, retreating repeatedly into domestic seas butleaving incremental changes on the shores’. Making parallels to the domesticscene we may also claim that local societies function in a cyclical fashionpermanently oscillating between the public and private phases of socialactivity (see Tarrow 2011, pp. 27–28).

During the private cycles society exhibits high levels of individuation andtends to concentrate almost totally on personal improvements and privatewelfare goals (Hirschman 1979, p. 3). This is seen in the pursuit of individualhappiness, a better life for oneself and one’s family, with ‘better being under-stood primarily in terms of material welfare’ (Hirschman 1979, p. 7). Duringthe public phases society is preoccupied with socio-political issues, taking partin activities conducted in the public interest. This is involvement in civic


a$airs and striving for the public good. The arrival of a public phase is seenin an increase in democratic participation. Verba et al. (1978, p. 52; see alsoLane 1959; Milbrath 1965; Hay 2007) argue that the intensity of participationvaries from taking action (putting a personal decisive e$ort into political life)to observing and making a strong political judgment to experiencing a com-plete indi$erence to socio-political matters. While the predominance of thethird type of behaviour corresponds to the arrival of a private phase, the #rsttwo can be viewed as a manifestation of a public cycle.

The #ndings of this chapter show that the onset of the private at thebeginning of Putin’s #rst presidency allowed the reconsolidation of the Kremlin’spower, while the popular lenience towards the public prompted correctiverhetoric near the end of his second term and through most of the Medvedevrule. The gradual resurfacing of a public cycle also demonstrates the ability ofthe Russian population to exhibit civic forms of behaviour when an appro-priate politico-economic climate arrives. Prior to the empirical discussion,however, we have to ascertain what contributes to a phase transition.

Theoretical remarks on the phase transition

Factors responsible for the phase transition could be classi#ed as external andinternal. External factors relate to exogenous events of a political and economicnature. Political events range from wars, foreign aggressions, surges in tyranny andregime changes to gradual institutional reforms. Declines (or improvements) inliving standards, consumer booms, stagnations and recessions are economic fac-tors. Internal factors account for the human ability to critically appraise experi-ences and choices. Scholarship is divided while assessing the weight of exogenousand endogenous factors in invoking public activism. A large body of authors(Tilly andWood 2009; Tarrow 2005; McCarthy and Zald 1977; Tilly 1973; Wilson1973; Gamson 1975; Lipsky 1968; Downs 1972) shift away from social psycho-logical factors of activism and argue that grievances and dissatisfaction are notenough to induce action. Instead they point at the ‘variety of resources that mustbe mobilised, the linkages of social movements to other groups, the depen-dence of movements upon external support for success, and tactics used byauthorities to control or incorporate movements’ (McCarthy and Zald 1977,p. 1213; see also Tarrow 2011, pp. 22–32 for comprehensive literature review).

Other authors (Hirschman 1979; Williams 2001; Durkheim 1951; Ho$er1951; Thompson 1966) claim that internal, psychological, factors are respon-sible for the launch of civic action. Bernard Williams (2001), in particular,argues that exogenous factors alone cannot move us to act. They merelyproduce knowledge and simply knowing is insu"cient to induce action. Thus,the reasons for action are always internal: a person must feel before he ismoved to act. Thompson’s (1966) ‘moral economy’ idea, which I introducedin the previous chapter, is similar to this claim. In this account I will side withthe social psychology advocates and discuss the importance of endogenousfactors in inducing public action. The introductory part of this book has

26 Public/private cycles of socio-political life


already granted the internal elements their due weight in analysing the emer-gence of moral dilemmas, meta-preferences and disappointments. The purposeof this discussion is to narrow these theorisations and trace shifts in the civicattitudes at the intra-systemic, micro-level. Thus, we shall examine particular!uctuations taking place within the overarching set of modern politico-economicinstitutions and ascertain their role in producing public preferences necessaryfor the phase transition in each given case.

Allow me to reiterate, albeit from a slightly di$erent angle, the signi#canceof disappointment in socio-political life. A large number of scholars arguethat the feeling of disappointment is the principal endogenous feature andthe driving force behind the attitudinal change. This is because it is not pos-sible to fully satisfy choices and preferences that we make in the public andprivate domains. First, as many critics of utilitarianism argue (Nozick 1974,pp. 42–45; cf. Kymlicka 2002, p. 13; Williams 2005), complete happiness isunobtainable. Moreover, most of us reject and fear this idea because we wantto experience and promote the entire range of mental states (Kymlicka 2002,p. 14). Second, human nature is generally insatiable and the process of arrivingat an end goal gives us more pleasure than the end goal itself. In this con-nection, Hirschman (2002, p. 11) quotes a correspondence between Kant andthe Russian historian Karamzin: ‘Give a man everything that he desires andat this very moment he will feel that this everything is not everything’. Hefurther argues that ‘this characteristic of human nature is closely related tothe mortality of man and human consciousness of this mortality’.

Third, the gap between expectations and reality accompanies almost allpreferences. Kymlicka (2002, p. 15) notes that ‘preferences do not de#ne ourgood’. Rather, ‘preferences are predictions about our good’. The results of oneor another preference-driven action would invariably fall short of expecta-tions, and it is extremely rare if things happen the other way around. Finally,we often make mistakes and this makes us human. We can select choices,through informed or uninformed decision-making, that would not promoteour welfare (Kymlicka 2002, p. 13; Hirschman 2002, p. 23).

In this light, disappointment represents the central element of humanexperience. We face disillusionment regardless of the initial preferences, idea-lised goals, achieved results, and socio-political contexts. Disappointmentcompels people to reassess their preferences and priorities and to adopt adi$erent behaviour. Based on this argumentation we can claim that politicaldisappointment represents the principal cause of the transition between thephases. The nature of this disappointment is di$erent in each political andsocio-economic environment. Nevertheless, the feeling of disappointmentsurfaces regardless of the existing exogenous factors, the nature of politicalparticipation and its aims and objectives. The context, on the other hand,creates a climate of public opinion that is permissive of the preference change.Thus, public retreat from the side e$ects, or negative e$ects, of the previousphase of participation colludes with contextual factors and triggers a shiftbetween the phases. The nature of this collusion is di$erent at each shift.

Public/private cycles of socio-political life 27


Transition from the private to public phase during an economic decline, orpolitical turbulence, is easy to explain. In these cases, disappointments stemfrom poor economic and political policies, ine$ective institutions and theincompetence of politicians. Such disappointments reverse the preference forpolitical withdrawal and generate a disposition for political action. A transi-tion from a private to public phase during a period of economic growth andpolitical stability is less self-evident but nevertheless explainable. In this casewe are dealing with a transition in which a happy consumer suddenly decidesto change preferences and turn to public action. As we have already discussedin the introductory chapter, when there is economic growth and stable politicsthe public yearns for more rights and develops a more sophisticated morality.This leads to the ‘de!ation of an ideology that presided over the quest for thesolely private happiness’ (Hirschman 1979, p. 67). New moral dilemmas,meta-preferences and choices emerge as a result. These sensations contributeto the emergence of public activism and civic movements.

The transition from the public to private phase requires a di$erent nature ofdisappointment. In this case disillusionment originates from the gap betweenidealised goals of public activity and its intermediate results (see Kolakowski 1961,pp. 127$). Hirschman (1979, p. 95) notes that ‘given the propensities of themodern imagination to conjure up radical change, and its inability to visualiseintermediate outcomes and halfway houses, the results of public action typicallyfall short of expectations’. As long as this gap between expectations and rea-lity exists, public action will continue to generate disillusionment leading to theeventual withdrawal from political activity. Yet again, this withdrawal cantake place against the backdrop of varying exogenous factors, both stable andturbulent.

We have already observed that modern rationality leads to the establish-ment of stable political and economic institutions that take pride in theire$ectiveness. These, however, impose various limits on actors within whichthey can operate. Such limits prevent citizens from expressing their politicalemotions fully and create the expectation-reality gap. The ensuing atmosphereof civic under-involvement fosters unwillingness to commit time and energyto public activity. In this light, Taylor (1995b, p. 221) observes that moderndemocracy can degenerate into a kind of ‘mild despotism’ in which citizensfall prey to a ‘tutelary power that dwarfs them and turns them away from thepublic to the private’. At the same time, opportunities for economic advancecan further promote consumerism and domesticity.

Disappointment with the intermediate results of public activity is also evi-dent against the backdrop of politico-economic turmoil. The latter encom-passes regime changes, drastic reforms, revolutions and wars at the politicallevel, and severe declines on the economic front. Political culture sociologistsfully explain this private retreat. They view political beliefs and behaviour asa certain toolkit that is ‘in some sense available for use, and may be volunta-rily selected from on the basis of the requirements of new situations’ (Welch1993, p. 103; see also Cohen 1974). Political turmoil induces various ‘culture



shocks’ and usually fails to deliver the idealised goals of civic struggle. These shocksresult in disillusionment with the public activity that triggered the change. Sothe public retrieves the most conservative values from its political toolkit anda private reaction sets in (Alexander 2000, pp. 42–43; see also Swidler 1998).Economic decline facilitates this. In that ‘di"culties that compel concentra-tion on #nding a job, keeping it, and making ends meet’ (Hirschman 1979, p. 4)could create an environment that is tolerant of a retreat to a private phase.

The oscillation between the public and the private can be seen as an ulti-mate manifestation of the two di$erent ‘faces’, or streams, of civil society. The#rst one stems from the pre-political concept of society and is driven by self-determination of citizens against the state. The second one propagates theidea of non-political nature of society and heads towards the marginalisationof state (see Taylor 1995a,b for the detailed discussion of both trends). Theextreme manifestation of the #rst strand is seen in the acceleration of publicactivity and the eventual annihilation of the state. The second trend, however,is conditioned by the e$ects of economic development and modernisationthat bring about new ethical morals and values. These, in turn, could ‘civilise’human relations to an extent at which the state’s instrumentalities and legalviolence would become obsolete. The danger of the second outcome is hiddenin what Taylor (1995a,b, p. 221; see also Hay 2007, pp. 82–87 and pp. 74–75)calls the ‘politics of marginalising politics’, which is manifest in politicalwithdrawal and pure pursuit of private pleasures. The two ‘faces’ of civilsociety are interconnected, complimentary, and cannot exist without oneanother. Thus, they condition and bring about the phases of social functioningin a somewhat cyclical fashion.

Setting the scene

Russian society underwent some distinct phases of public and private func-tioning during the post-Soviet period. During the early stages of Putin’s pre-sidency Russian society was in a private phase. Tendencies towards the publichad developed by 2006(7). I will not claim that Russia entered a new fully-!edged phase of public activity towards the end of Putin’s second presidency.My argument is that the private phase passed its peak in 2006 and waswaning thereafter. Growing signs of a public reawakening have altered statepolicies though by shades, rather than colours.

I have already claimed that socio-political disappointment with the out-comes of the previous phase represents the main driving force behind thetransition between these cycles. While examining the disappointments in theRussian case, we must also attend to the ideological changes that accompanythese disillusionments. Ideological notions fall in two broad categories: thoseconcerning the state and those concerning the role of the self in a politicalsystem (Almond and Verba 1963, pp. 14–15; Abramowitz 1989, pp. 178–79;Easton 1965). These two can no doubt overlap.1 Still the source of the rela-tionship remains di$erent. In the #rst case, we are concerned with how the



state interacts with society and what it does in the course of this relationship.In the second case, we analyse how a person deals with the state and interactswith others while doing so.

Ideological changes, however subtle they might be, are particularly con-sequential in the Russian case. The end of the Soviet Union divided the Rus-sian population on the issues pertaining to the role of the sate and the role ofthe self within the political system. The new ideals did not have su"cient timeto entrench (and become part of the new political culture), while the oldideals were incompatible with future development. Of particular interest is thetheories of the head of the Moscow Institute of Sociology, RAN, academicianMikhail Gorshkov. He has commended the ideological split on Russia’s so-called modernists and traditionalists (see Gorshkov 2009a, pp. 17–18, 2007;Gorshkov and Tikhonova 2004). They di$er on the role of the state and therole of the self in a political system.

Traditionalists prefer an atomised, individuated, society, in which everyone islocked in a private realm, while the state has the formative functions ofcompensating economically weaker groups and guaranteeing security for all.Modernists, on the other hand, value individualism, freedom, greater politicalparticipation and the ability to defend personal rights against the intrusions ofthe state. The state is granted minimum economic and political control functions.This is the split within which the Russian society functions and it has persistedsince the dissolution of the Soviet Union. However, the balance between themodernists and traditionalists has !uctuated. These motions are a guide tothe shifts between the phases of social participation. Growing traditionalism,for example, indicates the unwillingness to challenge the state and thereforesignals the onset of the private phase. The predominance of modernism, byway of contrast, can point to societal lenience towards public activity.

In what follows I detail such undulating changes in Russia during the Putinpresidency. I will #rst discuss the causal factors driving the switch from thepublic to private phase, as well as the attitudinal and behavioural features ofthat phase. The subsequent sections will examine the same trends during thetransition from the private phase to the more public cycle of the late Putinera. I will then trace these dynamics in the regions. In Table 2.1 I summarisecauses, instrumentalities and features of the phases, which can facilitate theensuing discussion.

Early Putin presidency: private phase

When Putin came to power in May 2000 Russia was in an emerging privatecycle. In line with the theorisation above, disappointment with the previousdecade stood behind the arrival of this shift. Towards the end of the 1990s ithad become clear that the public was seriously disillusioned. Con#dence ingovernmental institutions had declined. Trust in political leaders was replacedby cynicism. In 1998 and 1999, 65 and 63 per cent of the Moscow Institutefor Political Research (ISPI RAN) respondents thought that those in power



did not care about ordinary citizens. When asked to choose a leader whocould successfully resolve the country’s political and economic problems in2000, none of the 1990s politicians gained more than 10 per cent of approval.The ‘against all’ candidate led the polls attracting 39 per cent of the vote,while Vladimir Putin closely followed supported by 34 per cent of therespondents.2 President Yeltsin attracted the most criticism. Fifty-one per centof the 2001 Levada VTsIOM3 respondents approved when he resigned inDecember 1999, 27 per cent were surprised, and only 4 per cent regretted hisdecision.4 His seemingly sincere remorse did not fool the public. Some 40 percent thought that he resigned because he was physically unable to carry out hisduties, while 28 per cent believed that this was done with a view to facilitatingPutin’s March 2000 electoral campaign.5

As to political institutions, citizens were disappointed not with the regimeas such, for the majority of the VTsIOM6 and other agencies respondentssupported the formally democratic framework, but with the way in whichactors operated these structures. In 1998 and 1999, just 3 and 2 per cent of

Table 2.1 Proposed phases of societal participation during the Putin presidency

Period Phase Supportingcontext

Driving factors Signsmanifestations

Early–mid-Putin1999–2006

Private EconomicgrowthPoliticalstability

Disillusionmentwith thenegative e$ects,or side e$ects,of the Yeltsinera

Growingimportance oftraditionalistideologyDecreased levelsof public activityDecreasedinterest inpoliticsConcentrationon privatewelfare goals

Mid-Putin–earlyMedvedev2006–9

Transitionfrom privateto public

ContinuedeconomicprosperityUrbanisationEconomiccrisis as afactorimpeding theonset of thepublic phase

Moral and ethicaldisillusionmentassociatedwith partialsaturation ofconsumerdemandsDisappointmentwith the existinglevel of rights andfreedomsEmergingmeta-preferences

Growingimportance ofmodernistideologyAcceleration ofstrikes andworkerssolidaritymovementsIncreased level ofpublic activityRegionalcriticism of theextant politicalsystem



the ISPI RAN respondents were satis#ed with the way in which the country’spolitical system functioned and 49 and 42 per cent respectively wished tochange it. Disappointment in political activity was also widespread. It stem-med from the under-involvement. People began to believe that they could notin!uence political life. ISPI RAN claims that, while between 1995 and 199941–45 per cent of the respondents thought that they could not in!uence politics,their share grew to 50 and 58 per cent in 2000 and 2001 respectively.7

The public’s retreat from the negative e$ects of the previous decade col-luded with the permissive socio-economic context. The latter created a climateof public opinion which supported pursuit of material wealth by the generalpublic and tolerated the reconsolidation of power by the new political elites.Public individuation was in the air. Following the decades of Soviet depriva-tion and the ensuing impoverishment of the 1990s economic transition, theRussian population acquired a semblance of socio-economic stability coupledwith consistent growth of income at the beginning of the 2000s (Lukin 2009).This created a propitious environment for a quick retreat from the publicactivity of the post-perestroika years to a pattern of private consumption andencouraged many to concentrate on achieving private goals and materialwealth. In the political sphere, the December 1999 replacement of leadershipbrought with it a new style of governing which engendered greater trust in thestate and its main agents. The share of those approving the political systemalmost tripled, reaching 10 and 7 per cent of the positive vote in 2000 and2001. Accordingly, only 31 and 33 per cent of the respondents hoped for achange of the system during the same period of time (ISPI RAN 2002). Thisnewly emerged trust created an environment in which people could retreat tothe private realm without feeling the need to get involved in the politicalstruggle.

The resurfacing of the traditionalist ideology signalled the onset of theprivate phase. Gorshkov (2009b, p. 17) claims that since the 1990s, the shareof traditionalists has grown. In relation to the state, just 36.3 per cent of therespondents held the traditionalist point of view in 1994. Their share hadgrown to 41.4 per cent by 2001.8 Accordingly, the share of those who werestrictly modernist decreased from 12.5 to 8 per cent and the share of thosewho were predominantly modernist decreased from 39.5 to 37.2 per centduring the same period of time.9 The attitude towards the role of the self inthe political system also changed. An ideology which proclaimed self-interestedbehaviour as a social duty had emerged. Private concerns of family, business,work and consumption absorbed most citizens’ energy. The IndependentFoundation for the Study of Public Opinion (FOM) claims that during themid-2000s over 70 per cent of the population considered pursuing materialwell-being as the most signi#cant moral choice.

In this light, being poor has become socially unacceptable. While betweenNovember 1995 and December 1999 only 27–33 per cent of the populationidenti#ed with the middle class, this number had grown to 41 and 45 per centby 2000 and 2001; the #gure had risen to some 60 per cent by 2008.10 This



positive self-identi#cation did not correspond to the socio-economic reality,for only 16–20 per cent belonged to the middle class on the basis of theirprofessional status and earnings in 2000–1.11 The positive self-assessment,however, re!ected an important shift in the socio-cultural priorities that nowfocused on improving an individual’s #nancial status. Similarly, the number ofthose who thought that everybody could earn enough money using theirtalent and energy increased from 15 and 13 per cent in 1995 and 1998respectively to 26 per cent in 2000 and 2001.12

These ideological changes corresponded to non-political behavioural pat-terns, which included a decreased level of political activity, receding interest inpolitics and the emergence of materialistic behavioural strategies. The 2002analytical report produced by the Moscow Institute of Philosophy (RAN)states that, while during the 1990s the Russian population was keen to obtainindependent political analysis and information from the printed media (54 percent of the respondents in 1994) and the radio (41 per cent of the respondentsduring the same year), by 2002 newspapers had lost two-thirds of their read-ers. The number of Russians who did not read newspapers increased from 4 to13.5 per cent and the number of those who did not listen to the radio hadmore than doubled from 8 to 19 per cent.13 Similarly, people were not pre-pared to take part in political activity. Between 1997 and 1999, 28–31 per centof the Levada centre respondents were ready to attend a demonstration ofpublic protest. This #gure decreased to 15 and 20 per cent for the 2000 and2002 polls respectively. By the same token, the number of those who did notwant to get involved in such activities grew from 50 per cent in 1997 to 69 percent in 2000.14 Public expectations of future political activity were also low-ered. The FOM data show that while in 1997 38 per cent of the respondentsbelieved that mass protests will increase over time, in 2000 and 2001 this#gure dropped to 22 and 25 per cent respectively.15 Support for politicalmovements receded accordingly. Thirty-three to 40 per cent of the ISPI RANrespondents claimed in 2000 and 2002 respectively that they do not back anypolitical party, while the share of those in 1997 and 1998 was 26 and 25 percent respectively (Levashev 2006, p. 15).

Collusion with the state administrative apparatus accompanied the declinein political activity. This was a popular strategy adopted in a search formaterial welfare. Between 2002 and 2007 the number of young people willingto take up a state service career almost doubled.16 Forty-#ve per cent of theVTsIOM respondents aged between 18 and 35 wished to be involved in anadministrative career and only 25 per cent opted for creative professions. It isalso important that the largest share of those who wished to be employed bythe state as administrators was located within the youngest, 17–21-year-oldgroup; and the State Service/Administration had become the most prestigiousfaculty in the Moscow State University with 25 applicants competing for eachavailable position.17 Many such individuals justi#ed their preference for stateservice by the fact that these positions give access to privileges and providepowerful connections for the subsequent launch of a business career.



Young people were not the only group that was keen to improve itself byworking for the state. Business also used this method. Thus, regional execu-tive and legislative bodies attracted representatives of Russia’s medium-sized,small and even big business. In 2003, the proportion of business executives inregional governorships reached 14.7 per cent (Kryshtanovskaya 2003, p. 32),and by 2005 as many as 16 of Russia’s regions (approximately 18 per cent)were headed by top executives and owners of large corporations (Lapina2005, p. 74). Similarly, by 2005, the share of direct representatives of big andmedium-sized business in selected regional parliaments had reached some 70–85per cent (Chirikova 2005, p. 203).

The onset of the private phase ensured that the government received a carteblanche in implementing the policies of its choice, while the public focused onthe pursuit of material wealth and private pleasures. This resulted in unin-terrupted consolidation of the central state power for most of Putin’s pre-sidency. This does not come as a surprise from the point of view of classicalpolitical science. The unimpeded pursuit of material wealth is usuallyaccompanied by the allaying of citizens’ suspicions of power, growth of publicadministration and preparing the way for despotic government (Ferguson1767, pp. 220, 230, 255). Nevertheless, a careful examination of the Russiansociety during the second term of Putin’s #rst round of presidencies, and theMedvedev term, shows a resurfacing of the new public phase. This started in2006–7. And although we cannot yet talk of the advent of a fully-!edgedphase of public activity, this emergent tendency towards civic engagement andits causes should be carefully examined.

The new public phase: causes, instrumentalities and manifestations

Disillusionments and meta-preferences

Popular disappointment, perhaps not with the values that the Putin systemespoused but with its operational logic and intermediate results, had begun toemerge by 2006. The public had started questioning the o"cial politicalcourse, while the initial euphoria of the consumer rush was on the wane.Instead of focusing on individual economic improvement, people began pon-dering the state of morality and culture, the lack of justice and the lack ofpolitical rights. Public matters of greater equality and participation in decision-making suddenly obtained signi#cance. The public was disappointed with therole it had played in the political system during the previous cycle. This led tothe emergence of meta-preferences and moral dilemmas.

It has become clear that economic prosperity alone does not bring personalhappiness. The #rst signs of public activity, which emerged in winter 2004–5 withthe monetisation of the state bene#ts programme, mostly concerned moral–political rather than #nancial matters. For many protesters in St Petersburg,the Moscow Region, Perm, Barnaul, Omsk, Kurgan, Tver, Novosibirsk andSamara the monetisation was associated with the loss of status. This status



was seen in the deserved entitlement to state bene#ts and in the state’s moralduty to sustain such entitlements.18 The richest workers have carried outstrikes, to which I will return later in this book. They wished to see a more justsocial order and a more sophisticated welfare state (Chebankova 2009, pp.408–10; Kozina 2009, p. 19).

Similarly, one of Putin’s important failures, according to the August 2009Levada centre poll, concerned the decline in morality and high culture. Forty-fourper cent of the respondents lamented the situation in these spheres, and 32 per centdid not expect to see any improvements. This contrasts the previous phase ofsocietal participation. In 2001 this problem worried just 24 per cent of theMoscow Institute of Sociology respondents (Levashev 2006, p. 10; Okhotsky 2009,p. 27). The existing division between rich and poor was another moral dilemma.32 per cent of the Moscow Institute of Sociology respondents considered thisto be a problem in 2007 against 25 per cent of those in 2001. Similarly, 32 percent of the population lamented the unequal access to medical services in2007 against 25 per cent of those in 2001 (Okhotsky 2009, p. 27).

The picture was more nuanced in the political realm. I have already statedin the introductory part that, though supporting the political course of theRussian state in principle, Russians were critical of numerous aspects of itsfunctioning. The most important complaints concerned the lack of politicalchoice and competition among Russia’s political leaders.19 Thus, over 70 percent of the Levada centre respondents suggested in October 2009 that Russianeeds a viable opposition. It is indicative that this #gure had grown from 66per cent in October 2007.20 A comprehensive analysis of middle-class politicalviews conducted by the Levada Centre in 2008 shows that 76 per cent of therespondents felt that they were not protected from state arbitrariness; 65 percent thought that state o"cials were above the law; 83 per cent lamented thefact that could not in!uence political processes; 45 per cent wanted morepolitical transparency; 36 per cent wished to see new faces in government;and 25 and 24 per cent wished for healthy competition between independentpoliticians and ideas respectively.21

The Institute for Public Projects (INOP) research also claims that corrup-tion and non-transparent governance worried the public more (40.5 per cent)than the level of material welfare (31.8 per cent), crime (31.12 per cent),healthcare (30.12 per cent) and economic crisis (23.25 per cent).22 Moreimportantly, this concern has been growing over the years, climbing from theseventh to fourth place in the list of priorities between 2005 and 2009. Simi-larly, most December 2009 VTsIOM respondents emphasised the need togrant greater political in!uence to Russia’s parties (39 per cent), to developfair partisan competition and grant civic organisations equal access to themedia and administrative resources (49 per cent), and to introduce greateraccountability of regional executives to local parliaments (57 per cent).23

Furthermore, 66 per cent of the respondents resented the fact that Putin’srule did not bring any positive results in the sphere of law enforcement andjustice and 28 per cent of the respondents pointed at a severe decline in these



areas.24 The video appeal by militia major Alexei Dymovsky, who addressedVladimir Putin about injustice within the police force, was supported by manyof his colleagues across Russia. Similar appeals triggered o"cial investiga-tions in Moscow, Yakutiya and Ukhta.25 Trend had accelerated towards theend of the Medvedev rule. Many high-ranking administrative, military andpolice o"cials blew the whistle on corruption and the abuse of power withintheir agencies. Colonel Timofeev, for example, recorded a series of videomessages, in which he exposed the criminal collaboration between some of hiscolleagues and Siberian crime and prostitution gangs.26 This quest for justicesomewhat exonerates our earlier theorisations on moral dilemmas and ethicaldisappointments being part and parcel of a modern society, as well as the E.P.Thompson’s (1966) proposition on the ‘sense of injustice’ being an importanttrigger for civil action.

Supporting socio-political context

These dynamics took place against a backdrop of a more trusting societalenvironment. First, economic growth resulted in increasing socio-politicaloptimism. The four elements of optimism introduced in the theoretical chap-ter of this monograph exhibited consistent improvement, at least up to thepoint of the economic crisis of 2008. It is important that for the most of the2000s decade Russians believed that the future will be better than the past.Sociological polls conducted by the Allianz SE group across ten Europeancountries (Germany, Italy, Austria, Spain, Portugal, Croatia, Turkey, France,Greece, Russia) in May 2008 revealed that Russians were the most optimisticin comparison to other nations under review and have had the highest hopesfor their future. Twenty-four per cent of respondents described the economicsituation in the country as ‘very good’, 59 per cent claimed that it was satis-factory and only 17 per cent thought that the economic situation was ‘bad’ or‘very bad’. Russians also scored highly in their expectations for oncomingyears: 29 per cent claimed that they were optimistic about their future andhoped that the situation will improve even further.27 The Levada centre (2010,p. 12) returned some similar results in 2010, when nearly 50 per cent of therespondents thought that the forthcoming year will be better than the past, asopposed to 27 per cent of those who thought the same in 1999. Similarly, thesense of personal well-being was rather high and has been consistently grow-ing during the past decade. VTsIOM data shows that during the past tenyears the share of people who consider themselves as happy has grown from60 to 77 per cent, and those who consider themselves as unhappy decreasedfrom 25 to 15 per cent. This is directly related to the recent economic recov-ery. Ninety-two per cent of those with high income consider themselves ashappy; the #gure drops to 82 per cent among those with an average income,and further decreases to 53 per cent among the lower income groups.28

It is also important that Russians have begun to feel more control over theinternational environment and the place of their country in the global arena.



This undoubtedly brings more con#dence into domestic a$airs. In 2006, 36per cent of the VTsIOM respondents suggested that Russia has become arightful member of the G8 group of states against 25 per cent of those whofelt the same in 2005.29 The Levada centre claims that in 2006 societal opti-mism reached its highest peak since the dissolution of the Soviet Union.30

The 2008 #nancial crisis stalled the progressive development of public opti-mism, though it was gradually returning to the previous levels experiencedduring the past two years of recovery. Shifts in social perceptions are clearlyseen in the index of consumer con#dence, index of economic optimism, andthe index of national well-being. The bi-phasal dynamic of socio-economicoptimism is seen in Figures 2.1 and 2.2, where the post-2005(6) levels ofsocio-economic perceptions are generally higher than those achieved duringthe immediate post-Yeltsin period.

Second, according to our theoretical introduction, an increase in socio-economic optimism should result in growth of generalised inter-personaltrust. Indeed, while in January 2000 only 22.9 respondents of the RussianIndependent Research Agency for the Study of Market and Public Opinion(ROMIR) thought that unfamiliar people can be trusted, in September 2005as much as 36 per cent of the FOM respondents thought the same (Ruka-vishnikov 2008). Research conducted by James Gibson (2003) demonstratesthat Russians are more inclined to trust generally, and are often involved in‘weak’ interpersonal networks. Gibson (2003, pp. 70–74) #nds that the level ofgeneralised trust in Russia, though low in absolute terms – 30.5 per cent ofthose who trust against 59 per cent of those who do not – compares

Figure 2.1 Index of consumer con#dence



favourably to many countries undergoing democratic transition (Slovenia,Brazil, Latvia, Romania, Hungary, Czech Republic and Poland). Therefore,Gibson concludes that Russians are not atomised and their social networkshave a high potential for forming political values and becoming, at somepoint, building blocks for a vibrant civil society (Gibson 2003, p. 69–70).

The public phase: features and state responses

Thus, the stage was set for the transition to a public cycle. This shift is prob-ably the most engaging theme in Russia today. Signs of public reawakeningand state responses to these dynamics merit a detailed discussion.

Changes in ideology

Changes in ideological preferences signi#ed the resurfacing of the publicphase. Once again the tables had turned between modernists and traditional-ists. The ranks of the former were growing steadily, even though they failed tooutweigh the latter. The number of those who considered themselves liberalsand democrats grew from 4 and 16 per cent in December 2002 respectively upto 9 and 23 per cent in June 2006 (Levashev 2006, p. 31; ISPI RAN 2006).The share of those who called the current political system democracy grewfrom 8.8 and 10.9 per cent in 2000 and 2001 respectively to 12.1 per cent in2007, thus endorsing the liberal democratic development (Boykov 2009, p. 64).There was a simultaneous growth in patriotic values however, which we mustdiscuss within the framework of ideological change. The number of patriotsincreased from 17 per cent in 2002 up to 26 per cent in 2006, composing thesingle largest share of the Moscow Institute of Sociology poll answers

Figure 2.2 Index of economic well-being



(Boykov 2009, p. 64; ISPI 2006). Moreover, while ranking their main prio-rities, 83 per cent of the VTsIOM respondents valued patriotism, 88 per centpraised material wealth, 92 per cent concentrated on personal happiness, and95 per cent their families.31

At the same time, though potent and meaningful, this was a new type ofpatriotism that di$ered signi#cantly from the state patriotic ideology of theSoviet period. It was a mixture of individual privatism stemming from therecent private phase and a new liberalism characteristic of the emergingpublic cycle. Modern Russian patriotism was directed towards day-to-dayproblems and interpersonal relationships within an individual’s inner circle. 50per cent of the VTsIOM respondents saw patriotism in supporting theirfamilies, 47 per cent saw it in the preservation of traditions and 30 per centviewed patriotism as the best possible pursuit of one’s career.32 Thus, con-temporary patriotism is viewed in terms of labouring for one’s own good andthat of one’s own family.33 The share of those who were prepared to ‘work forthe country’ was gradually decreasing, while the share of those who wereprepared to ‘love the country’ was on the rise. It is in this connection that thehead of VTsIOM Valery Fedorov (2010) notes that more people ‘prefer tolove the country but work for themselves’.34 The success of the country andsuccess of each individual represent two separate categories.

Therefore, those who supported a patriotic ideology held liberal views withregard to personal choices. Sixty-three per cent considered taking up a highlypaid job in a foreign company appropriate, 62 per cent did not condemn theidea of emigration and 52 per cent approved marrying foreign nationals.35 Wemay suggest that the growth of patriotic values did not inhibit the rise of themodernism. The two were not mutually exclusive. It is also important thatpeople began viewing perestroika and the immediate post-Soviet period in amore favourable light. This also indicated the rise in modernist values. TheLevada centre shows that, while in 2002 66 per cent of the respondentsthought negatively of those periods, their share decreased to 52 per cent in2009. Similarly, dislike of Mikhail Gorbachev declined from 46 to 34 per centbetween 2002 and 2009, while the approval of Boris Yeltsin grew from 7 to 17per cent during the same period.36

The attitude to the role of the self in the political system has also changed.A more proactive stance has begun to emerge. Gorshkov (2009b, pp. 26–27)writes: ‘socio-political stability is no longer regarded as a priority. This parti-cularly concerns young people and the most active citizens’. He insists (2009,p. 28) that the number of those who were prepared to defend their rightswithin the existing legal system has grown, as did the number of those whowere no longer satis#ed with the existing stability. The Moscow Institute ofSociology claims that the share of those who chose to keep away from politicsin their day-to-day life decreased from 28.9 to 26.3 per cent between 2002 and2007. The share of those who tried to ‘get used to whatever the state is doing’decreased from 41 to 37.4 per cent during the same period. More importantly,the number of those who could not de#ne their role in politics increased from



12.9 to 21.2 per cent, thus indicating that the population could become moreproactive in propitious circumstances (Boykov 2009, p. 66). It is also impor-tant that 40 per cent of the December 2010 Levada Centre respondentsthought that the forthcoming year of 2011 will see an increase in the politicalactivity against 28 per cent of those who thought otherwise (Levada Centre2010, p. 14).

Public activity

Many observers claim that 2006 was a watershed year during which varioussocial movements with di$erent political agendas had begun to emerge(Gontmakher 2009; Petukhov 2009). Such movements surfaced at the locallevel and focused on practical ‘single-use’37 issues. The #rst signi#cant civicassociations of the 2000s surfaced during the 2005 monetisation of state ben-e#ts period. They subsequently broadened their spheres of activity andattracted new members. Such organisations often unite their e$orts at thecross-regional level and enter federal politics. The Union of CoordinatingCouncils is an example. This organisation had coordinated 25 political coali-tions across six di$erent regions between its inception in April 2005 and January2007.38 The emergence of movements in defence of residential rights is anothertrend. By the end of 2007, collective management of residential blocks hadrisen 20 per cent.39 The movements of property shareholders, ecological,professional and business associations, as well as the unions of motorists, havesecured national signi#cance (Vorozheykina 2008, pp. 18–20; Chebankova2009, pp. 405–6; Clément 2006). The proliferation of workers’ political activ-ity was another trend. Frequent strikes a$ected foreign investors40 and Rus-sian employers alike.41 Alternative trade unions emerged accordingly. Asopposed to the o"cial organisation of Russia’s trade unions FNPR (Federa-tion of Russia’s Independent Trade Unions), these unions represent genuinegrassroots associations that originate from within workers teams in selectedfactories. Moreover, such unions establish horizontal cross-regional ties. I willreturn to a full empirical discussion of these matters in Chapter 7.

Russia’s medium-sized and big businesses have also become involved, albeitto an extent that was permissible in the post-Yukos environment. Its activityfocused on new moral and cultural issues. Vladimir Kekhman, who #nan-cially supported the St Petersburg Mikhailovsky theatre and subsequentlybecame its executive director,42 Vladimir Potanin, who established the artsand humanities research foundation, as well as Vladimir Lisin43 and AlisherUsmanov,44 both of whom were involved in promoting popular sportingassociations, are examples. At the same time, the rise and fall of MikhailProkhorov’s political career during the summer of 2011 shows that big busi-ness is also willing to go beyond cultural issues and is prepared to raise itsstakes in politics.45 Prokhorov’s public con!ict with the Kremlin’s most in!u-ential administrator and political agenda setter, the deputy head of the Pre-sidential Administration Vladislav Surkov, spilled well beyond the ‘managed



democracy’ framework.46 The case demonstrated that Prokhorov has a largenumber of ideological supporters among the general public, as well as theintellectual and cultural elites.47

Medium-sized and small businesses adopted similar behavioural strategiesat the regional level. Local level activity, however, had a rather more pro-nounced focus on political issues. Alexei Navalnyi, Russia’s renowned liberalactivist and a former advisor to the governor of the Kirov region NikitaBelykh, began his nationwide activity at the regional level. During his time inKirov, he launched an informal movement that now defends the rights ofminority stakeholders, exposes kickbacks, money laundering and corruptionin Russia’s large #rms. By 2009, Navalnyi had been involved with 15 courtcases against large corporations and his activity has been publicised in Russia’sleading media outlets, such as the Vedomosti daily.48 The Yana Yakovlevaa$air, in which a manager of a medium-sized #rm was remanded in custodyon false allegations, led to the creation of a professional association defendingthe rights of medium-sized businesses. The a$air united over 200 chemicalindustry factories nationwide and had a serious socio-political impact.49 Asimilar situation occurred with the association of the veterinary professionalswho have been able to change the law on the sale of veterinary drugs.50

State response

The state responded to the emerging public activity. The strategies were bothconstrictive and accommodating. In the #rst case, the state was consistentlynarrowing the public sphere. A spectrum of restrictive laws on science, NGOsand media emerged during the second term of Putin’s presidency. Limitingworkers’ protests through the action of FNPR was another trend (Green andRobertson 2008, pp. 52–53). In addition, the state o$ered varying pre-approved ideologies for public discourse. Anti-Westernism, state patriotismand sovereign democracy entered political debates during the second half ofPutin’s presidency. The idea of ‘sovereign democracy’, introduced by Surkovin February 2006, condemned the American domination of global politics. Itendorsed foreign and domestic policies free from external in!uence and non-intervention in the internal a$airs of other states.51 The doctrine also calledfor limiting the ideological in!uence of foreign NGOs on Russia’s socio-politicalmovements. To further this goal, the state began #nancing loyal domesticNGOs. The initiative was launched in 2006 with a modest Ru500mln budgetand evolved into lavish #nancing amounting to Ru1.25bln in 2007 andRu1.2bln in 2009.52 The state subtly supported mild nationalistic movements,hoping that their version of patriotism could help the struggle against ‘Oran-gism’ and ‘ukrainisation’ of politics (Chebankova 2007).53 The state alsowished to lock the public into the private realm of consumption. Despite theobjections from Russia’s leading economists and the Ministry of Finance, theKremlin #nancially backed the Agency for Residential Mortgage Loans(AIZhK), which by 2006 had accumulated a Ru70bln mortgage collateral



portfolio and controlled over 160 banks and mortgage agents across thecountry.54 Given the multiplicative consumer e$ect of the housing construc-tion industry, the Kremlin’s support of AIZhK was essentially political, as itwas geared towards the expansion of private consumer demand.

Partial accommodation of the emerging societal preferences was anotherstate strategy. The sovereign democracy doctrine, for example, evolved overthe years to re!ect the new socio-political climate. While in 2006 Surkovclaimed that it was acceptable for the authorities to support just one partyand to have a manageable parliament, in summer 2008 he insisted on thenecessity of four strong parties. Moreover, it became compulsory for all par-ties running for parliamentary seats to partake in pre-electoral debates. It issigni#cant that at the beginning of the December 2011 parliamentary raceEdinaya Rossiya nominated the most outspoken critics of Russia’s political–institutional system as its debaters/discussants. Of particular importance wereAlexander Khinshtein, a prominent critic of corruption and political pro#t-eering, Andrey Makarov, who was outspoken about the ine$ectiveness ofRussia’s police, and the governor of Krasnodar Krai Alexander Tkachevknown for his liberal approach to politics and economics.55

It is also signi#cant that at the end of 2008 the Presidential Administrationbegan establishing a centre-right opposition party Pravoe Delo. The initiativehad a wide socio-political impact.56 The #nal fate of the Pravoe Delo project,which lost Prokhorov as its leader in September 2011, showed the party’sgrowing success and the Kremlin’s concerns over the increasing independenceof Russian party politics. At the time of writing (November 2011) the partywas at the dormant state due to the public expulsion of Prokhorov from ‘bigpolitics’. Nevertheless, it is premature to bury the project. As one of Pro-khorov’s supporters wrote in his Internet journal, ‘the party holds nationwidesupport among young and determined individuals who are con#dent profes-sionals, who see their future in Russia, and who want to create a safe, just,and fair socio-political climate in this country’.57 In this context, the party’sformer activist Evgeny Roizman insisted that ‘at this stage everything is justbeginning’.58 Furthermore, Dmitry Medvedev’s new course presented in hisSeptember 2009 gazeta.ru article titled Rossiya, Vpered! (Russia Forward!)emerged partly in response to the changes in the socio-political climate.59

Medvedev addressed the most advanced and #nancially successful audiencethrough the readership of one of Russia’s most liberal electronic newspapers.

At the legislative level, the Kremlin made some accommodating movestowards political parties. In February 2009, the president introduced a rangeof amendments to the law on ‘the main guarantees of electoral rights and theright of participation in referenda’. These amendments decreased the numberof signatures that non-parliamentary political parties must collect in order togain the right of participation in national legislative elections. Thus, duringthe 2011 parliamentary election Russia’s parties will have to collect just150,000 signatures, as opposed to the previous 200,000; and during the twofollowing campaigns the requirement will stand at just 120,000 signatures.60



Similarly, in March 2009 the president introduced the law ‘on guarantees ofequal access to mass media for parliamentary parties’ requiring electronicmedia to provide equal time for all parliamentary parties.61

Medvedev also proposed the bill, which changed the existing system ofparliamentary mandate redistribution. The current system states that onlythose parties, which collected more than 7 per cent of the popular vote, areeligible for parliamentary seats. In accordance with these innovations, partiesthat received more than 6 but less than 7 per cent of the vote are eligible fortwo parliamentary mandates, and parties that received more than 5 but lessthan 6 per cent of the vote are eligible for one parliamentary seat. Similar tofully-!edged parliamentary parties, these parties will not need to collect sig-natures for the following round of parliamentary elections.62

Finally, in June 2011 Medvedev o$ered the bill aimed at lowering theelectoral threshold during the parliamentary elections from the existing 7 to 5per cent. The President insisted that this law would enable representation of alarger number of political parties in the Russian parliament and would help tobetter re!ect the disposition of political forces within Russian society. TheState Duma enshrined presidential proposals into a federal law on 7 October2011, thus allowing Russia’s parties a lower electoral threshold starting fromthe December 2016 parliamentary campaign.63

The regional dimension: from increased participation to con"ictingfederalism and deceleration of public activity

Here we are concerned with territorial politics. The role of sub-national gov-ernments in many federal states is cyclical and changes with socio-economiccircumstances and ideology (Nathan 1993, p. 16; Elazar 1969; Zimmerman1992; Walker 1995). The periods of regional activism and decentralisation areusually followed by an increase in the role of the central state and a decline inthe role of composite territorial units. Given the cyclical nature of regionaldevelopment in multi-unit territorial states, it is reasonable to think that thephases of societal participation would, to some extent, correspond with federaloscillations between centralisation and devolution. Grodzins (1986, pp. 34–35)reinforces this point by introducing the concept of ‘centralisation/devolutionby chaos’ as a mode of transition from a current federal equilibrium. Heclaims that the devolution/centralisation by chaos is helped by public partici-pation, does not depend on the wishes of the national centre, and comes as aresponse to the pressures from below. Let me posit that the chaos of thepolitical process in Russia, manifest through the emergence of public andprivate phases of social participation, was a factor in the evolution of federalrelations. Then the actual process of either centralisation or devolution,although reliant on the central government, often represents a reactive game,a policy response by the Kremlin to the existing phase of public participation.

Given that a lengthy discussion of regional dynamics falls beyond the scopeof this monograph, I will focus on the public phase. This corresponded to the



overarching public cycle and had appeared at the regional level by 2006–7.Disappointment with the extant overly centralised system of regional man-agement was evident. Russia’s regional executives revealed this through theircriticism and complaints. This took place during their interviews with federalexperts and during o"cial state meetings.64 The Minister of Economics ofTatarstan Marat Sa#ullin, for example, complained that the number of indi-cators for which the regions are accountable to the federal centre currentlystands at 600, and suggested that this #gure should be dropped to 30.65 OlegChirkunov, the governor of the Perm region, consistently delivered his pro-posals towards pluralisation of the centre-regional dialogue in his Internetjournal.66 The ex-Mayor of Moscow Yurii Luzhkov criticised the federalgovernment, and the Ministry of Finance in particular, in his open interviewwith the Kommersant Daily in February 2009.67 Ex-governor of the Mur-mansk region Yurii Evdokimov condemned the Edinaya Rossiya party for itslack of openness and refused to support the ER candidate Mikhail Savchenkoduring the February 2009 Murmansk city mayoral election.68 The Presidentof Bashkortostan Murtaza Rakhimov criticised the existing system of centre-regional relations and the role of the ER party in Russia’s political system inJuly 2009.69 The regional assembly of Karachaevo-Cherkessiya twice refusedto approve the senatorial nomination of the ER favoured candidate ViacheslavDerev in 2009.70

The socio-political and economic context was supportive of these attitu-dinal changes. Elazar (1969, pp. 28–29) claims that the times of economicgrowth are usually permissive of a devolutionary cycle. He links this with theemergent pressures to spend/invest the surplus money, launch the innovative‘pilot projects’ by the regions, and the increased lobbying of regional leadersfor the implementation of new schemes that would grant them greaterresponsibilities. In Russia, the economic growth of the early 2000s generatedsuch patterns. Towards the end of Putin’s second presidency, enhanced #nan-cial infrastructure, opening up of regional economies, accelerated urbanisa-tion, and the expansion of the welfare state had made centre-regionalcollaboration more complex and interdependent. The regions became moreproactive in the federal arena and o$ered solutions for implementing variousindustrial programmes of national importance.

The National Projects Initiative,71 for example, enhanced the regions’ poli-tical potential. Some regions managed to co-#nance the national projectsgrants and thereby elevate their political status in the federal arena. In parti-cular, the regions of the Ural Federal District #nanced over 75 per cent of thecosts associated with the #ve national projects, with only 25 per cent of thefunds emanating from the federal centre.72 In the legal sphere, the nationalproject for accommodation prompted the regions to o$er a set of new resi-dential construction laws and new legislation regulating the sale of non-arableland.73 New federal infrastructure projects attracted investors to variousRussia’s regions and thus made regional politics more competitive. The con-struction of the Chita–Khabarovsk motorway,74 the launch of the 2012



Vladivostok Asia-Paci#c Economic Cooperation Summit75 and the prepara-tion for the 2014 Sochi winter Olympics are cases in point.76 The April 2009Sochi mayoral election attracted many public #gures of national signi#cance(Boris Nemtsov, Sergey Mironov, Alexandr Lebedev, Andrey Lugovoi,Andrey Bogdanov and Anastasiya Volochkova), and 20 candidates asked tobe on the ballot.77

At the same time, the 2008–9 #nancial crisis hampered the advance of thedevolutionary public cycle at the regional level. In Walker’s (1995) terminol-ogy, Russia’s federal relations during the economic slowdown were con#ictingfederalism, i.e. the growth of central control was coupled with ideologicalpressures towards deregulation and devolution. Walker (1995, p. 168) notesthat the con#icting federalism is ‘simultaneously centralised and decen-tralised, … co-operative and cooptive, … expansive and restrictive, … lessenmeshed yet more entangled’. In Russia the emergent wishes for deregula-tion went hand in hand with the central fear of loosing control over theeconomy and the regional need for federal subsidies that could tackle thecrisis. This has fostered con!icting federalism trends within the Putin–Medvedevregional system.

On the one hand, the centre was willing to take into account the new cli-mate of public opinion supportive of deregulation. The initial central statemoves towards deregulation became evident when Dmitry Kozak declared anew political course in December 2007. The revised strategy included trans-ferring some socio-political and economic responsibilities back to theregions.78 In late 2007 Putin emphasised that it is the Kremlin’s priority togrant the regions more duties and responsibilities. In July 2008 Putin orderedthe State Duma to consider all regional legislative initiatives and increasetheir share in the parliamentary legislative output. This political line wassupported by his successor Dmitry Medvedev. In his 2010 address to theFederal Assembly President Medvedev further insisted on expanding thenumber of regional legislative initiatives.79 The Federation Council activelyendorsed this stance and pledged to assist the regions with such an under-taking. The upper chamber of the Russian parliament established a regionalCo-ordinating Committee that aims at collecting and developing regionallegislative proposals and launching them at the national level.80 Regionallegislative initiatives gained prominence as a result of these policy proposals.Out of 80 such initiatives 22 were turned into law in 2007, and 23 out of 223initiatives became law in 2008.81

In the #nancial sphere, the centre relaxed its grants allocation criteria andallowed regions to redistribute the unemployment bene#ts at their discretion.The federal requirements for industrial grants were also lenient: regions wereexpected to co-#nance just 5 per cent of the federal grant. Thus, the Sver-dlovsk region received Ru1.5bln and co-#nanced Ru75mln, while the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous District contributed just Ru21mln against the federalgrant of Ru289mln.82 As for appointments, one purpose of replacing an ex-FSB general Murat Zyazikov with Yunus-bek Evkurov in October 2008 in



Ingushetia was to start a dialogue with the region’s opposition movements.83

Posting one of the opposition leaders Nikita Belykh to the governorship ofthe Kirov region in January 2009 was similarly motivated.

On the other hand, the Kremlin placed higher demands on the regions interms of economic and socio-political management. President Medvedevdeclared in July 2009 that leaders of the four regions, where the unemploy-ment was highest, would be dismissed.84 The governors were also expected tokeep public protests in check. The regional leaders were supposed to act as abu$er between the federal centre and the population. This, however, promp-ted the regional executives to establish closer ties with local civil societies andeconomic elites. In that the latter could secure societal support for a moree"cient system of governance. Governors began visiting regional plants topersuade the management to maintain employment and salaries at the pre-crisis levels and to accommodate workers’ social security needs. This tookplace in the Kemerovo, Tyumen and Chelyabinsk regions.85 The governors alsobroadened their relations with regional civil societies and oppositions, whichwas instrumental in containing the public protest. The republics of Bashkor-tostan and Ingushetiya, the Kirov region and Altai Krai are cases in point. Thisstrategy provided the regional leaders with new powers vis-à-vis the federalcentre and shifted the centre-regional dialogue towards co-operation.86

Yet again, the regional need to rely on the Kremlin’s anti-crisis grantsundermined their ability to challenge the centre. In fact, as the regional budgetsdecreased some 30–40 per cent, the regions have come to rely on those grants.This further entangled the regions with the federal centre. It is signi#cant thatthe budgets of Russia’s richest regions have been a$ected most.87 The richestregions have always been politically active and strongly in!uenced the evolu-tion of the country’s centre-regional relations during the past decade. Clearly,con#icting federalism distributed centre-regional political powers. Neither thecentre nor the regions fully determined their relations. The centre appreciatedthe need for deregulation, but, at the same time, pressed for better govern-ance. The regions, on the other hand, were dependent on the centre #nan-cially and relied on local economic elites and the public politically. Thus, theregions and the centre have become co-dependent in their struggle againsthostile economic environment and established a new, almost equal, balance ofpower. This marks a clear departure from the pre-existing model of thecentre-regional relationship that was based on the indubitable predominanceof the federal centre.

In conclusion, this chapter departed from a philosophical proposition thatsocieties function in a cyclical manner, permanently oscillating between thepublic and private phases. The transitions from the public to the private, andvice versa, stems from the regular public retreats from the negative e$ects, orside e$ects, of the previous phase. This takes place within a climate of opinionthat is permissive and tolerant of such changes. State policies react to thesephases of societal functioning by being more responsive during the publiccycle and less restrictive during the private stage. The discussion has traced



the evolution of the public and private phases during the Putin and Medvedevpresidencies and argued that many state policies have been largely condi-tioned by such swings.

What remains even more signi#cant is that the recent evolution of thepublic phase (that has been partially halted by the economic crisis) demon-strated that economic achievements generate ethical disappointments thatlead to the emergence of civic engagement and alternative social movements.This indicates that the nature of Russian society has changed and that thepublic is willing to reverse centralising trends and articulate its wishes instrategic circumstances. Therefore, economic prosperity, urbanisation, and theoil wealth could, at some point, transform these changes into powerful societaltrends and further shift the extant system of political relations. Post-Medvedevpolitics fall beyond the scope of this study. Nevertheless, it would be inter-esting to examine whether Russian society would retreat to a new privatecycle, disillusioned with the intermediate results of the 2006–11 public phaseand the return of Vladimir Putin to presidency. Another avenue of expectationwould be to wait and see whether the public phase would accelerate furtherfuelled by political disappointments and the lack of alternative.



3 The public sphere andthe state in Russia

This chapter opens up a sequence of discussions on the varying dimensions ofcivil society proposed by Edwards in his trilateral paradigm. The analysis willfocus on the nature and evolution of the public sphere in Russia. The publicsphere is a central feature of modern democratic society. Its main function isto promote popular control over the government to be exercised by means ofpublic opinion formed in a free and critical environment. However, Westernscholarship agrees that the public sphere today has many structural problems.It falls under the in!uence of economic and political elites. Thus, it becomes ameans of popularising and imposing ‘appropriate’ behavioural patterns withinthe economic and political domains. This chapter discusses how the state andhegemonic elites in!uence the public sphere in Russia. It is in four sections.The #rst section expands the previous introductory discussion and analyseshistorical and theoretical dimensions of the public sphere. The second exam-ines how trivial culture emerges and colonises the public domain. The thirdand fourth sections delineate the problems of political and socio-economicdomination. The chapter concludes that the values and behavioural patternsthat the state and elites propagate in the public sphere could impede ongoingeconomic and political modernisation.

Theoretical aspects

I have already introduced the public sphere concept in the theoretical part ofthis book. A detailed empirical discussion, however, begs further elaborationon its various structural aspects and evolutionary dynamics. Academic the-orists often distinguish the public sphere as an independent societal realm.They claim that the public sphere is conceptually distinct from both the stateand the economy. This literature decouples the private domain from the state,and sees the public sphere as the bulwark between the authority and society(Ehrenberg 1999). These authors (Goode 2005, p. 7; Ehrenberg 1999, pp.219–21; Cohen and Arato 1992, pp. 211–12; see also Giddens 1997 pp. 135–36;Johnson 2006, pp. 20–27; Roberts and Crossley 2004) insist that the state hasto stand apart from the public sphere’s functioning processes, while institu-tional mechanisms, such as a free press, freedom of speech, assembly and


communication, rights of petition and su$rage, as well as property and priv-acy rights, should secure the autonomy of the public space. The public sphereis also conceptually distinct from the o"cial economy. It is not ‘an arena ofmarket relations but rather one of discursive relations; it is a theatre fordebating and deliberating rather than buying and selling’ (Fraser 1990, p. 57).Finally, the public sphere is also distinct from civic networks, although it isconnected to them. Taylor (1995, p. 259) considers this an important feature,since it allows society to function as a whole, both ‘outside the ambit of thestate’ and ‘beyond the free multiple associations’.

In his Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, #rst published inGermany in 1962, Habermas claims (1989, p. 32) that the public sphere sawits ‘golden age between 1860 and 1730’, although it went into decline there-after. Habermas (1989, pp. 36–37 and p. 52) argues that at the time the publicsphere corresponded to a structural ideal that encompassed three main features:universal accessibility, a strict separation between the public and privaterealms, and openness to critical argument (Johnson 2006, pp. 23–24). Com-pliance with this ideal ensured that all participants of the public debate areequal and that the social status of speakers, or related matters, is kept private andhas no in!uence on discussions. In other words, the public sphere remainshomogenous. In this case, opinions emerge from a rational reasoning and allaspects that are relevant to the public good are discussed. Nothing is protectedfrom criticism (Taylor 1995, p. 263).

Blurring the boundaries between the public and private domains pre-determined the departure from this ideal (Habermas 1989, p. 32).1 The pro-gression of capitalist relations, class struggle and strati#cation of societyensured the new interpenetration between the public and private domains (‘re-feudalisation’, in the Habermasian lexicon). Private individuals of con!ictingbackgrounds began competing within the public space (Habermas 1989, p. 175).Economically disadvantaged classes appealed to the state for protection.Various subaltern strata demanded equality. The state gained new ‘formative’functions (Habermas 1989, p. 146–47; Johnson 2006, p. 29) in compensatingeconomically weaker groups and guiding the changes in the structure ofsociety. The public became a client of the state, thus destroying the potentialfor resisting authority. Furthermore, economically powerful groups with pri-vileged access to the media created industries around lucrative socio-politicalissues and in#ltrated the state. They began ‘constructing’ their audience(Habermas 1989, p. 193) by deploying ‘staged forms of publicity’ (Habermas1997, p. 106). Thus, a ‘public sphere that formerly emerged from the structureof society’ is now produced circumstantially on a case-by-case basis (Haber-mas 1997, p. 106). Critical reasoning crumbled as a result and the publicsphere ceased to fully serve its original purpose. Today it fails to control thestate in the desired fashion.

These themes remain central to contemporary political philosophy andpublic sphere theorisations. We can select two of the most important issues,which will be relevant to our subsequent discussion on Russia.2 These are

The public sphere and the state 49


problems of the commodi#cation of public life, and political and socio-economicdomination. We have already begun discussing the commodi#cation problemat the theoretical outset of this book. To expand further, the Frankfurt Schoolof Philosophy3 de#nes commodi#cation as the process that subjugates natureto the production of commodities. These authors claim that the commodi#-cation of public life is responsible for the new interpenetration between thepublic and private domains. Adorno and Horkheimer (1999; see alsoMarcuse1966) argued that no area, public or private, was left untouched by the ceaselessproduction of unnecessary goods, trashy #lms, simpli#ed music, and commercialadvertising. The newly emerged ‘culture industry’ (Adorno and Horkheimer1999, pp. 120–68) obtained a logic of its own, and, operating as an increas-ingly independent force, colonised the public sphere becoming an instrumentof political domination. Horkheimer (1999, p. 133–34) writes:

Consumers are the workers and employees, the farmers and lower middleclass. Capitalist production so con#nes them, body and soul, that theyfall helpless victims to what is o$ered to them. As naturally as the ruledalways took the morality imposed on them more seriously than did therulers themselves, the deceived masses are today captivated by the mythof success even more than the successful are. Immovably, they insist onthe very ideology, which enslaves them.

Bringing trivial issues into the public domain facilitates this process. Largecompanies, in pursuit of their commercial interests, exclude smaller mediaoutlets from the market so as to eliminate competition (Keane 1991, pp. 69–72),and, instead of fostering critical debates, focus on delivering simpli#ed com-mercial programmes that are devoid of quality (Richeri 2004, p. 192; Ehrenberg1999, p. 212; Thompson 1990, pp. 112–13). Trivialisation is seen through theproliferation of glossy magazines, vulgarisation of popular culture, exposingthe public to the in!uence of inauthentic ideas, and the inclusion of trivialmatters in the pages of serious political newspapers (Habermas 1989, pp. 162–63).In this process, the state colludes with #nancial elites. This dynamic creates asociety of consumers rather than citizens (Granham 1992, p. 374; Connell1991, p. 250; Curran 1991, p. 46), thus helping to contain the public protest.We have already observed that, for as long as the citizens are focused onpursuit of material wealth, the political and economic elites are left to theirown devices, conducting the policies of their choice (Keane 1989, p. 54).

Political and socio-economic domination is the second most importantissue. The contemporary public sphere fosters a new socio-political hegemony,in that the ruling classes – the wealthy, politically empowered, and thosebelonging to ethnic and cultural majorities – dominate the public space. Theytherefore have the ability to ‘persuade the oppressed groups to give theirassent to an unfair social structure by creating and circulating ideas’ in thepublic domain (Fraser 1990, p. 56; Eley 1992; McKee 2005, p. 10). Conse-quently, Marxist and feminist critics of Habermas argue that the public

50 The public sphere and the state


sphere should not be homogenous. Societies are strati#ed, and the singlepublic space is incompatible with pluralistic aspirations of post-moderndemocracies (Lee 1992, p. 416; Fraser 1990, pp. 66–70;McKee 2005, pp. 140–42;Landes 1998). A decentralised “nested public sphere” (Taylor 1995a, pp. 279–80),or even multiple ‘public spheres’ (McKee 2005, p. 142; Fraser 1990, pp. 70–71)in which subaltern groups can interact and articulate their wishes, o$ers fairerparticipation opportunities. In his later writings, Habermas conceded thesecriticisms. He admitted that the public should be charged with the task ofproviding a safety net for the economically marginalised and with responsi-bility for responding to the e$orts of private struggles to establish ‘the gen-eralizable signi#cance of diversity’ (Johnson 2006, p. 35). This trend is clearlyunder way in the post-modern and post-industrial West.

The Russian case provides an interesting illustration to these Western the-orisations. I have to clarify at the very beginning that depoliticisation andtrivialisation of public life in this country has two independent, but somehowinterconnected, origins. First, during the late, and arguably even mid-to-early,Soviet period the public valorised the private sphere and distrusted the publicdomain. Material deprivation and the public request to develop a modernconsumer culture fuelled this trend. There is no common consensus amongscholars as to when the public consumer request fully surfaced. Leonty Byzovclaims that the Soviet public formed a request towards establishing a massconsumer society with an individualistic system of values in the late 1960sand early 1970s.4 Other observers go a step further. Timashe$ (1946) in hisGreat Retreat thesis examines the emergence of hedonistic tendencies withinthe Soviet society from 1935 onwards. Lukin (2009, p. 71) theorises that theRussian ‘public political ideal’, which concentrated on the achievement ofhigh living standards, surfaced in the 1940s. He, however, supports Byzov byclaiming that late Soviet society viewed material wealth as the most impor-tant policy objective and regarded liberalisation as the means to this end.Regardless of timing, these dynamics created conditions that made it veryeasy to depoliticise and ‘commodify’ public discourse in the post-Soviet era.5

Second, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union Russia adopted capitalistand liberal democratic institutional blueprints. Even though many institu-tional practices diverged from the ideally envisaged models, the very existence ofthose models in!uenced and shaped some speci#c rules of the game and corre-sponding behavioural patterns. Thus, with the introduction of capitalistmarket economy and liberal political institutions we could rightly expect theemergence of a public sphere with its associated ills and bene#ts. At this point, thetwo independent origins #nally meet at one end. This means that, on the one hand,the adoption of the Western institutional structure led to the emergence of apublic sphere in Russia and determined its subsequent Western-style devel-opmental trajectory. Indeed, many observers of the public sphere, and inparticular its media dimension in Russia (Vartanova 2009, p. 215; Beumers etal. 2009, p. 9) claim that the realities and context within which the Russianpublic sphere develops in some ways converges with the Western pattern. This



is particularly true in the areas of the new social media (Beumers et al. 2009),where the state has yet to achieve a full grip, commercialisation (Zassoursky2004) and sensationalism (Beumers et al. 2009, p. 9). On the other hand, Russia’sspeci#c socio-historic features and the initial conditions of her socio-economictransition modi#ed that trajectory and sharpened its structural problems.Indeed, while in the West many of the trends discussed above evolve indepen-dently, or with the help of natural market forces, in Russia the state plays aprominent role and directs them. The public sphere therefore becomes instru-mental in creating a certain climate of public opinion, establishing ‘appropriate’behavioural patterns and in!uencing people’s preferences.

In what follows, I will deal with these issues empirically. The #rst subsec-tion discusses the problems of commercialisation and trivialisation. I willclaim that the state took an active part in promoting these trends with a viewto sustaining the extant structure of political and economic relations. In thesecond subsection, I will argue that the Russian public sphere is too mono-lithic, perhaps adhering in this way to the original Habermasian ideal, butfailing nonetheless to answer the post-modern aspirations of equality anduniversal participation.

Trivia, commodi!cation and the new middle class culture

The Russian state colludes with companies and leads the commodi#cationprocess. The main thrust of this strategy is to create a situation in whichpublic matters are marginalised and secondary, thus serving political stabilityand elite autonomy. We have already touched upon this strategy in the dis-cussion of the state reaction to the emerging public cycle of civic activity.Here we can treat this dynamic at length. In this context, the trivialisation ofthe public domain acts as a backbone of modern Russian consumerism,which contributes to setting up a climate of public opinion that could besupportive of the private cycle of activity. In this sense, Russia’s experiencecon#rms and further develops tenets about the public sphere developed in theWest. Scholarship claims that in the spheres of trivia, advertising and sensa-tionalism, Russia’s public sphere o$ers ‘no more than a slavish reproductionof the worse excesses of the Western model’ (Beumers et al. 2009, p. 5–14;Morris 2007; Borenstein 1999). Indeed, trivia dominates reading, the Internetand television segments. It has obtained threatening proportions, and in manyways outstripped Western states.

Production of glossy magazines was the fastest growing sector of Russia’smedia business during the 2000s. Rosenholm et al. (2010, p. 22) claim that in2007 there were 900 million copies of glossy magazines in circulation, 600million of which have been printed abroad. The annual growth of the maga-zine production industry has exceeded 13 per cent per year, making it one ofthe fastest growing magazine markets in the world after India and China. Thepresident of the International Federation of Magazines Donald Commer#eldclaims that, out of 72 countries uniting the Federation, Russia is the fastest



growing glossy magazines market.6 He links this to the fact that such magazinescontain no political information and re!ect the values and lifestyle of modernRussia. Accordingly, the share of those who read books and newspapers has beenin steady decline. The Levada Centre claims that 46 per cent of adult Rus-sians do not read books and 37 per cent do not read newspapers (Dubin 2006, p.14; Beumers et al. 2009, p. 6; Rosenholm et al. 2010). More importantly, thenature of readership has changed. The same research shows that, instead of lit-erary and socio-political books, Russians read ‘female’ stories (28 per cent ofthe 2008 poll respondents), romantic novels (19 per cent), detective stories (24 percent) and adventure and #ction (23 per cent). Some venture outside of this tocooking, health and beauty books, encyclopaedias, or tour guides. The mostpopular journals are female fashion (35 per cent), television programmes (28per cent), journals containing crosswords (19 per cent), automobile journals,hunting, gardening and home improvement (16 per cent) and humour (11 percent). Science–education issues interest just 14 per cent of readers.

The Internet has followed this trend. Entertainment resources are in thelead, with some 10.2 million people visiting such sites every month (data forApril 2008). This constitutes 41.3 per cent of the Russian Internet audience.Free music and #lm providers dominate with 80.8 per cent of the Internetaudience. Video resources such as rustube.ru, youtube.com and smotri.comclosely follow the lead. Television programmes, sport and male-related topics(construction and home improvement, hunting, shooting and the like) sharethird place.7 It is also important that Russia’s Internet is the fastest growingmedia segment in Europe, faster than such thriving Internet markets as thosein Spain and Ireland. E-market research demonstrates that, at the end of2008, Russia had some 40mln active Internet users; and the prognosis is thatby 2012 some 59mln people will be using the Internet in the country. This isalmost 72 per cent more than in 2007.8 At the same time, the Rumetricaanalytical agency states that between 2004 and 2008 the fastest growingInternet segments were con#ned to the commercial, entertainment and realestate sectors, while politics, culture, education and information were the leastgrowing domains. Table 3.1 below details this data.

Table 3.1 Distribution of Internet resources and growth between 2004 and 2008.9

Runet sector Number of sites Growth (%)

2004 2008

Commercial 16,909 41,061 142.8Entertainment 17,769 34,466 94.0House and family 4,053 9,344 130.6Auto Industry 2,756 6,169 123.8Information 3,725 6,050 62.4Real estate 1,056 3,380 220.1Other 41,594 56,179 35.1



Trivia also dominates television. Some programmes are exact replicas oftheir Western counterparts. Dom (the House) is a Big Brother remake, whileDavai Pozhenimsia (Let’s Get Married) resembles Blind Date, and PustGovoriat (Let Them Talk) is a replica of various sociological trivia talk shows.Some are uniquely Russian inventions, such as the Chastnyi Detectiv (thePrivate Detective) programme, which invites a suspicious wife or a husbandto hire a private detective and expose a cheating spouse on national television.More importantly, the vast majority of popular television programmes por-tray lifestyles that are not readily available for the majority of the population.Many productions – Karmelita, Bogataya Masha, Tatyanin Den, Lyubov-Morkov – show country houses, cars, clothes and domestic attributes that arenot readily accessible to the upper middle class in the West. Yet all this iscasually portrayed as an average, or at least commonplace/professional, life-style in Russia. Female series often show ‘success’ stories of lower-incomegirls who married rich business executives and thus found personal happiness.In the best-case scenario, these trends engage the population in the ongoingconsumer race, emphasising the importance of #nancial success in the neweconomic environment. In the worst-case scenario, they leave a bitter after-tasteof economic oppression and helplessness. Both outcomes lead to disengagementfrom politics and an aversion to public activity.

This also contrasts with the ideological ends of many Soviet-era produc-tions, which stated that happiness and success are possible through personaldevelopment, education and professional achievements. Two contrasting‘female’ stories are particularly interesting. The popular Milkmaid from Hat-zapetovka drama (2007) depicts a village girl who won the heart of an oli-garch by wearing an expensive dress given to her by a rich friend. Herpersonal qualities become apparent after she wore the appropriate clothingand learnt upper class manners. The timeless O$ce Romance (1973), on theother hand, is a romantic comedy featuring the life of an intellectual directorof a research institute. An unexpected love a$air transforms her from anunattractive researcher into a beautiful woman. In this case, clothing, beautyand female happiness arrive after her personal qualities become apparent, andnot the other way around as is the contemporary trend to depict. This di$er-ence in ideological priorities does not come as a surprise. The Soviet autho-rities focused on the creation of a scienti#c intelligentsia that could sustaintechnological progress in competition to the West. I do not claim that themodern Russian state should embark on Soviet-style indoctrination patterns.Nevertheless, the Soviet state was successful in popularising scienti#c andcultural professions in the public domain, which resulted in the emergence ofa formidable stratum of world-class scientists.

These features of the public sphere had an impact on the climate of publicopinion and professional preferences of the growing middle class. The attitudeto the rich and #nancially successful has changed considerably. The MoscowInstitute of Sociology claims that, while in the 1990s 65.7 per cent of thepopulation thought that economic elites were greedy and unfair, the number



of those who shared this view had decreased to 25.9 per cent in 2004. Simi-larly, 65.3 per cent of the 1990s respondents thought that economic elites werecorrupt, against 29 per cent of those who thought the same in 2004. Moreinterestingly, only 2.8 per cent of the 1990s respondents thought that eco-nomic elites had good entrepreneurial skills and adhered to the principles offair competition, against 33.5 per cent of those who thought the same in 2004(Gorshkov and Tikhonova 2004, p. 10). More importantly, Russia’s middleclass began to form outside the education, science and high-technology sec-tors. Three employment sectors recruited the new middle class and witnesseda substantial increase in the workforce between 1990 and 2004: trade andcatering (increase from 5,869,000 to 11,431,000 workers), #nance, credit andinsurance (from 402,000 to 934,000 employees) and state administration(1,602,000 to 3,211,000) (Avraamova 2008). Representatives of these professionsare more likely to adopt a conformist rather than critical stance towards statepolicies as long as such policies do not threaten uninterrupted accumulationof wealth.

We cannot ascribe these developments solely to the workings of the publicsphere, since economic factors have played their role. Nevertheless, the role ofthe public domain in shifting popular interest to the consumer domain hasbeen signi#cant. Television, as the most important source of information(Rosenholm et al. 2010, p. 22–23; Beumers et al. 2009, p. 6), was in the lead.Eighty-three per cent of the 2000–5 Levada centre respondents watched TVevery day; 13 per cent once per week; and only 1 per cent watched televisionless than once a month.10 Moreover, people trusted the media. Forty-sevenper cent of the 2004 Levada centre respondents thought that the state did notrestrict the media, and 45 per cent trusted the radio, television and printedpress. The Levada centre further shows that 42 per cent of the 2006 pollsrespondents suggested that Russian television was more interesting duringrecent times, while 28 per cent chose the Soviet period, and only 11 per centopted for the perestroika years. Similarly, 39 per cent of the respondentsthought that the state told the truth more on TV during the Putin presidency,39 per cent thought that the state never told the truth on television, and only6 per cent chose the Yeltsin and Gorbachev periods.11

The domination problem

Now to the problem of socio-political and economic domination. Russia’spublic sphere is too monolithic and fails to re!ect the existing societal strati-#cation. The nature of this strati#cation is both political and economic. Poli-tically, this means the division between the rulers and the ruled. Russia’s#nancial elites and state administrative apparatus constitute the rulers, whilesmall and medium-sized businesses, the employed workforce, as well as desti-tute social security bene#ciaries, fall within the ruled. Economically, this is thedivision between the middle and rich classes and those who can only aspire tojoin such ranks. The hegemonic state, bureaucratic elites and upper economic



classes dominate the public sphere. Thus, it becomes a monolithic realm,which allows the discussion of the concerns of the state and of economicallyadvanced citizens. Let me detail both types of domination.

Political domination

The state dominates the public domain politically. This is seen through thefour most important themes. First, the state fosters debates on importantsubjects within the public domain, but all the while acting as the principalagenda setter. Thus, instead of promoting a ‘discourse of reason on and topower’, the public sphere fosters a discourse of reason ‘by power’ (Taylor1995a,b, p. 265; Warner 1990). Second, the state often creates a manageable,or ‘engineered’, form of pluralism (Dubin 2006, p. 40) in the public domain.Third, the state uses the public sphere for acclamation of its own actors andpolicies, and, by doing so, deploys various forms of ‘political advertising’.Finally, state bureaucratic factions pursue their private interests in the publicdomain. This leads to the emergence of ‘staged forms of publicity’, to use theHabermasian terminology. The public sphere is therefore ‘produced circum-stantially’ on a case-by-case basis, serving the expedient interests of the mainstate actors.

First, it would be an overstatement to argue that the state focuses solely onpursuing its private goals at the expense of public preferences. As we havealready shown in Chapter 2, the Russian state is concerned about public opi-nion. The problem, however, lies in the nature of this relationship. In idealcircumstances, the public sphere should guide the government by using thecritical opinion formulated outside the state power (Taylor 1995a,b, p. 264–66).In Russia, this opinion, while formulated outside the ambit of the state,makes its way into the public domain under state supervision. The state col-lects such opinions through specialised polls and surveys, as well as throughthe medium of the Internet.12 It subsequently processes these views, selects themost important themes, and only then introduces them to the public domain.This strategy enables the state to control and supervise public discourse. Moreimportantly, the state selects those subjects that could bene#t the positions ofthe extant political actors. Thus, if public preferences coincide with stateinterests, the subject receives a green light to enter the public space, and, inparticular, its televised dimension. Many subjects discussed on national tele-vision have emerged in this particular fashion. They include the topics ofmodernisation, patriotism, and the Edinaya Rossiya party hegemony.

Indeed, the subject of modernisation was introduced because the wishes ofthe state and the public converged. The public was disillusioned withbureaucratised institutions, corruption and the lack of political alternatives.13

The 2008 economic crisis also revealed that the economy was overly relianton oil revenues and that industrial diversi#cation still remains a distant goal.Following the 2008 drop in oil prices, Russia’s economy shrunk some 7.9 per cent,marking the single largest decline among the world’s leading economies.14



Against the backdrop of these developments, the state was worried about thepossibility of public unrest in the regions. The government appreciated theexisting disa$ection potential, and decided to instigate structural reformsinstead of allowing the public discontent to slip out of control. Stylistically,this was done in a liberal fashion that could placate those who lamented theconstrictive nature of Russia’s political system. Many Russian commentatorsobserved that, by proposing the modernisation doctrine to the gazeta.rupages, President Medvedev acted as a critical citizen, and not as the head ofstate.15 This was tantamount to admitting that the usual public sphere outlets,such as the television and the printed press, are not capable of hosting criticaldiscussions. Medvedev-citizen felt sceptical about the current system of gov-ernance and focused on the most pressing problems of modern Russia, suchas corruption, administrative dominance, the lack of legalism and an ine"-cient economy. He critically appraised Russia’s history and called for thecreation of a state, which serves the interests of the people, and not the otherway around. More signi#cantly, the modernisation project proposed in thisaddress could not be implemented without altering the general approach topolitical conduct in Russia. This silently contradicts the ER party’s elitestrategy, which is composed of individuals interested in preserving the extantpolitical system and resource-based economy – a situation that the Presidentcondemned.16 Medvedev also invited the public to leave commentaries on thissubject in his personal Internet journal.17

The president’s address resulted in an avalanche of commentary and fos-tered genuine public debates.18 Vedomosti, one of Russia’s most authoritativedailies, established an online forum in which the public was invited to expressopinions on the president’s address. The forum required participants to #ll ina form, which included sections on the economy, political system, demo-graphy, innovations and corruption. The forum participants were invited tovote for the best proposals, which would be subsequently collated and for-warded to the Kremlin.19 Many electronic outlets followed this lead. Thepublic focused on ways of restructuring the extant socio-political system.Discussants agreed that modernisation should be implemented by non-coercivemeans. In turn, it should rely on a new generation of people who had stakesin the high technology, education, innovation and public activism sectors. Theexisting patron–client system of cadre selection was deemed dated andincompatible with the end of modernisation.20

Similar to the modernisation theme, the self-preservation instinct led thestate to discuss the problem of the Edinaya Rossiya administrative domina-tion. That the public did not entirely approved of the ER hegemony was seenthrough Internet publications, protest voting in some local elections, opinionpolls and the low level of electoral turnout. Indeed, only a quarter of thepopulation took part in the local and regional electoral campaigns thatoccurred during mid- and late 2000s.21 Edinaya Rossiya lost a large numberof votes in those areas where the opposition had political determination towin.22 During the March 2009 regional elections, for example, the party



underperformed compared with the 2007 parliamentary election results. Itsvote declined from 81.03 to 80.40 per cent in Tatarstan; from 96.12 to 72.30per cent in Kabardino-Balkariya, from 92.9 to 69.2 per cent in Karachaevo-Cherkessiya, from 59.50 to 55.74 in Khakassiya, from 61.8 to 54.3 in theBryansk region, from 57.70 to 49.54 in the Volgograd region, and from 56.7to 51.2 and from 56.80 to 51.27 in the Arkhangelsk and Vladimir regions.23

The party’s overall victories did not detract from the surfacing of populardisillusionment with its style of governance.

The autumn 2009 regional parliamentary and local elections, in whichEdinaya Rossiya won the majorities involving apparent violations of theelectoral rules (the Moscow federal city and Dagestan are cases in point),produced a public outcry. The state reacted to these dynamics by allowingpublic debates on this theme. The 22 January 2010 State Council introducedan unprecedented (by the standards of the Putin period) discussion on thenature of Russia’s political system. The State Council invited Russia’s mainopposition parties, including those which did not enter the State Duma.Every party was allowed to deliver proposals on ways of improving govern-ance, elections, and policymaking. The harsh criticism of Edinaya Rossiya’spolitical dominance and its use of administrative methods were broadcast onRussia’s main television channels. Similar situations occurred during theDecember 2011 parliamentary race. Under severe public pressure the EdinayaRossiya party was forced to issue public apologies related to administrativemisconduct of some of its members.24

Patriotism was another theme in which the state accommodated the climateof public preferences. Despite the general vector of Russia’s new patriotismbeing liberal, the state bene#ted from this trend. This is because patriotismand conservatism are ideologies that could contain public protest and help thepublic to consent to the extant system of governance. Hence the governmentactively promoted these values and used national television to achieve theseends. A number of patriotic #lms featuring Russia’s valiant military historyhave been produced. The state partially #nanced some of these productions.These included The 9th Company, a popular depiction of Soviet e$orts inAfghanistan, Spteznaz and Desantura, series featuring the adventures ofRussia’s Special Purpose and Airborne Assault Forces, Voina, Alexei Bala-banov’s view on the war in Chechnya, Marsh Brosok, another Chechen subjectproduction, Brat, a patriotic drama featuring the life of a Chechen war veteran,and many others. Similarly, a number of conservative-patriotic television chan-nels have been established. The Orthodox Spas, military Zvesda and DTVchannels are cases in point. Old Soviet movies have also regained prominence.

In addition, the government adopted an ambiguous stance towards the Stalinera. On the one hand, the state admitted that Stalin was a dictator whosacri#ced many lives in pursuit of his political ends. On the other hand, theauthorities subtly popularised the idea that Stalin should also be given his duecredit for technological and industrial modernisation, as well as for the vic-tory in the Great Patriotic War. This quiet rehabilitation of Stalinism resulted



in the emergence of a more tolerant public stance towards this period. Parti-cularly good evidence of that is the results of a popular vote on the socio-political television programme titled Historic Trials (Istorichesky Protsess).This programme features debates between Russia’s two prominent commen-tators Sergey Kurginyan and Nikolay Svanidze. The two analysts usually dis-cuss the implications of various historic events on Russia’s modern society. Inone such debate Kurginyan emphatically defended Stalinism. He claimed thatthe political regime established under Stalin represented a ‘normal’ left-wingdictatorship that occurred in many other states, such as France and Britain, atvarious points of their history. Kurginyan’s unequivocal victory with theoverwhelming majority of telephone text message votes cast by viewers in hisfavour shows the emergence of a tolerant attitude towards Stalinism. Statisti-cally, the number of those who thought negatively of the Stalin era decreasedfrom 43 to 23 per cent between 2001 and 2008. The number of positive esti-mates, at the same time, also decreased from 38 to 31 per cent during thesame period. More importantly, the percentage of indi$erent people hasgrown from 18 to 47 per cent.25

As regards ‘engineered’ pluralism, Taylor (1995a,b, p. 259) claims thatmany authoritarian and transitional states suppress and manipulate the publicsphere. At the same time, given the importance of the public sphere inmodern life, these governments usually fabricate such a sphere. Thus editorialsappear in in!uential, albeit state-controlled, newspapers, and demonstrationsgathering thousands of subservient citizens take place in support of govern-mental policies. The importance of this, Taylor (1995a,b, p. 260) argues, isthat the ‘existence of the public sphere projects an image of a democraticsociety in which people can freely form their opinions and that these opinionscan in!uence state policy making’. We cannot go as far as to claim that thepublic sphere in Russia is totally ‘faked’. As we have discussed above, variousdebates take place in the newspapers, Internet and television. However, someelements of the ‘faked’ public sphere can be seen when pro-governmentaldemonstrations gather thousands of supporters on the streets of capitalcities,26 or when pro-Kremlin youth movements are allowed to express theiropinions in the public domain with the vigour that would be denied to otherorganisations holding a more critical stance.27

The system of ‘engineered pluralism’ was the central element of this trend.It mainly a$ects television space (Dubin 2006). Vladimir Pozner, Russia’s pre-eminent political journalist, lamented a situation in which he was denied theright to raise certain subjects and interview certain people in his Vremena(Times) programme.28 Other analytical programmes, such as Vesti Nedeli(News of the Week), Geroi Dnya (The Hero of the Day), Sudite Sami (Judgeit Yourself), Poedinok (The Duel) and the like, host discussions among expertsand politicians. While many themes are interesting, the participants in thesedebates do not touch on certain subjects and avoid criticising a select circle ofpersons. They often discuss how to best implement current state policies, asopposed to the nature of such policies or the system within which such



policies originated. These debates usually pander to the traditional, andtherefore ‘safe’, split between Westerners and Russophiles, focusing on theexternal, and mainly Western, in!uence on Russia’s domestic politics andculture. The Poedinok programmes begs a qualifying observation in this con-text for some of its participants often allow criticism of the extant politicalsystem, yet again avoiding personalities and harsh lines. Programmes thatquestion the nature of the current political system have been taken o$ air. Ofparticular signi#cance were Svoboda Slova (Freedom of Speech), K Bareru,and Namedni (Today) programmes led by Savik Shuster, Vladimir Solovevand Leonid Parfenov respectively.29

The federal printed press has remained largely independent, though thelimits of self-censorship have had to be observed. The examples of RafShkirov from Izvestiya, who published a photo report of the Beslan tragedy,the New Times magazine correspondent Natalya Morar, who touched uponthe corruption subject, or the Moskovskii Korrespondent newspaper, whichalleged that Putin was romantically involved with Russia’s rhythmic gymnas-tics champion Alina Kabaeva, are cases in point.30 Similarly, a number ofregional outlets have been closed for hosting discussions on themes incon-venient to the central government. At the same time, we must give the stateits due credit for allowing the existing liberal conservative papers to discusscontroversial subjects from di$erent angles. Novaya Gazeta, Vedomosti,Kommersant and gazeta.ru are cases in point. Many such outlets host blogsand video programmes by liberal experts in their Internet editions. Thesediscussions are free and usually critical of the extant political system. At thesame time, these papers have very small production numbers, which meansthat they do not reach wide audiences. Vedomosti produces just 66,700 copiesper day, and Kommersant 135,000 copies. Reading is limited to those who canpurchase such papers in urban centres or who have Internet access.

Furthermore, the state uses the public domain for the acclamation of itspolicies and main actors. Political advertising has been one important tech-nique in achieving this goal. Political advertising is the process by which thestate subtly builds the ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ pictures of the world and forgessupport for its main actors in the public domain (Zemlyanova 1995; Trakh-tenberg 1999). Extensive use of political advertising led many experts to arguethat the televised media serves a communicative rather than informationalpurpose.31 In this light, it is often addressed as the ‘means of mass commu-nication’, as opposed to the ‘means of mass information’.32 Some politicaladvertising techniques have been deployed more frequently than others. Ofparticular interest are journalistic works based on an emphatic interpretationof political events. This concerns hardliner analysis programmes such asOdnako (However) and Post-Scriptum (PS), led by prominent experts MikhailLeontyev and Alexei Pushkov respectively. Such programmes claim thatRussia perpetually faces external threats that mainly emanate from the West.This implies that the public should support the current political actors whocan protect the country’s national interests.



Establishing a rigorous pattern of news delivery has also served the purposeof socio-political advertising. The most signi#cant news is usually followed byless important events. Thus the television always begins its coverage withactivities of the President, and, since the 2008 presidential election, the PrimeMinister. Political, economic and cultural life that takes place outside thesetwo institutions concludes the news (Rossoshansky 2008, p. 106). The messagedelivered by this technique is that the extant political system is e$ective andthe current political actors are the most suitable people for their jobs.Exposing various failings in foreign countries is another way of favourablyhighlighting the virtues of the Russian system.33 News programmes eagerlycover natural disasters and economic problems experienced by other states,subtly comparing those with stability at home. This technique extends to thevili#cation of the near past as epitomised by the Yeltsin and Gorbachev eras(Dubin 2006, pp. 40–42). These years of political turmoil and economicdeprivation are contrasted with the current period of economic prosperity.

Political advertising is also used during the national electoral campaigns,when the access to media resources by di$erent candidates depends on theirpolitical orientation. This particularly concerns electoral campaigns, when theaccess to media resources of di$erent candidates strongly depends on theirpolitical orientations. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 below provide a statistical summationof the media coverage of Russia’s four main parties during the run up to theDecember 2007 parliamentary campaign. It is clear that, instead of providingan objective coverage of candidates’ political programmes, Russia’s televisedmedia acted as a campaigner on behalf of governmental candidates from thepro-Kremlin Edinaya Rossiya party. Thus, while in 1999 people did not feelthat the media played a large role in their political choices (Bovt 2002, p. 98–99),in 2004, 55 per cent of the population believed that the presidential election couldbe cancelled, as Putin’s victory was inevitable (Ledeneva 2005). A similarsentiment was widely publicised over the Internet, following the nomination ofVladimir Putin as the ER presidential candidate for the March 2012 race inSeptember 2011.

Figure 3.1 Index of media coverage of Russia’s four leading parties between 10 and 25October 2007



These trends were exacerbated at the regional level. Public relations tech-niques deployed during regional and local campaigns have been particularlysophisticated. These often made a mockery of the electoral process and havehollowed out public debates. Some of these techniques have included intro-ducing bogus candidates with identical names, thus doubling or tripling thename of a runner-up and confusing the voters. Introducing a number ofsparring candidates who would abstain from campaigning, in favour of cer-tain other contenders, was another method.34 Implementing these tactics hasbecome a pro#table business. The electoral public relations market in Russia’sregions was estimated at US$300mln in 2004, with pricing for a gubernatorialseat ranging from US$5mln to 25mln, regional assembly deputy from US$50,000–300,000, and a state Duma deputy US$50,000–100,000.35 The Edi-naya Rossiya party often used the so-called ‘locomotive’ method. This meantthat regional governors lead the party electoral lists, with no intention oftaking up parliamentary mandates. Thus they act as the ‘driving engines’ fortheir less prominent party members. Persistent attempts by the opposition toabolish the ‘locomotive’ practice have engendered no interest from the rulingmajority. In this light, a quick look at the United Russia 2011 electoral listpresents a dull picture. Among the most important ‘locomotives’ were Rus-sia’s incumbent President Dmitry Medvedev, who is not even a party member,various members of government, such as Viktor Zubkov, Igor Shuvalov,Alexander Zhukov, Igor Sechin, Dmitry Kozak, Sergey Shoigu and 50 regio-nal governors. None of these candidates had plans to take up parliamentarymandates. Moreover, the party deployed Russia’s sport and #lm starts toimprove image. Of particular signi#cance were famous actor Vladimir Mash-kov, prominent political analyst Alexey Pushkov, and even gymnasts AlinaKabaeva and Svetlana Khorkina.36

Finally, various state administrative factions manipulate the public space inpursuit of their sectional interests. They forge support and publicity around

Figure 3.2 Index of favourable media coverage of Russia’s four leading parties between19 and 25 October 2007



single-case issues and create an illusion of open discourse. Such ‘staged formsof publicity’ leads to the formation of a ‘non-public opinion’. This problemstems from the fact that state power in Russia is deeply factionalised. Thereare numerous power groups, such as the Surkov team, the siloviki, the liberals,the oil lobby, the regional groups, etc.37 Such groups often in!uence auxiliarystate institutions through backroom negotiations. This leads to a situation inwhich these institutions advocate the positions of one faction or anotherwithin the public space. For example, the Public Chamber falls under thepatronage of the liberal wing of the Presidential Administration, while theSurkov faction has the leverage over Parliament and the judicial structures.38

Igor Sechin, the oil lobby leader, stands behind the legal enforcement agen-cies.39 Public discussions often re!ect political tensions between those groups.

These staged forms of publicity are elaborate. It is almost impossible to provethat the state has inspired, composed, orchestrated and manned these debates.A few examples are in order. The situation concerning the law on NGOs, whichwas enacted in December 2006, re!ected struggles between the liberal andsiloviki wings of the Presidential Administration. These tensions spilled into thepublic space and involved the newly formed Public Chamber and the Parlia-ment. A compromise was eventually found, with the liberals securing a range ofamendments and the hardliners marginalising the role of Parliament and thePublic Chamber during the law enactment process.40 It was often claimed thatVladislav Surkov staged the political con!ict and televised publicity around theButovo residential district in Moscow so as to discourage the Moscow Mayor,Yurii Luzhkov, from participating in the 2008 presidential race.41 Surkov alsohoped that the sovereign democracy idea would become a national ideology.He planned to entrench it by forging an elite consensus rather than byallowing a critical public discourse. His 2006 conference, organised under thepatronage of the Rossiiskaya Gazeta newspaper, is an example.42

Business plays a particular role in this process. It also deploys the publicspace in pursuit of its #nancial interests. However, the dynamic of this processis di$erent to that in the West, where business colludes with sectional interestgroups and creates lucrative industries around fraught socio-political issues.Indeed, most media outlets belong to corporations with close links to theKremlin. Gazprom purchased Izvestiya in 2005 and former governmentaladvisor Konstantin Remchukov, known for his association with Bazel,secured control over Nezavisimaya Gazeta.43 In 2008, Gazprom sold the con-trolling stake in Izvestiya to the Rossiya bank, owned by Yurii Kovalchuk, apersonal friend of Vladimir Putin. Furthermore, Trud and Argumenty i Faktyfell under the control of the pro-Kremlin Promsvyazbank, while the ownershipof Kommersant passed to the steel tycoon Alisher Usmanov.44

Many administrative o"cials head large private and state corporations(Shevtsova 2007), and families of regional executives control the largest andmost successful local #rms in the regions. Moreover, people personally closeto Russia’s highest elite echelons own large and successful companies. Thecareers of Gennady Timchenko, Arkady Rottenberg and the Kovalchuk brothers



have been widely discussed in the printed press.45 Given that business has aninterest in maximising its pro#ts, it refrains from constructive criticism of thestate. Those #rms that have intimate links to the state do not criticise thegovernment for obvious ‘corporate loyalty’ reasons. Those who do not havesuch links are nonetheless unwilling to criticise under the post-Yukos busi-ness–political pact. In this latter case, compliance with the extant politicalsystem can ensure unimpeded functioning at home and abroad. OlegDeripaska’s interview with the Spanish El Pais newspaper is an example.Deripaska, whose business was dependent on state support, refused to admitthat theYukos a$air was politicallymotivated and accusedMikhail Khodorkovskyof previously evading compulsory service in the Soviet Army.46

On the other hand, business is genuinely interested in transparent govern-ance and an independent judicial system, given that the development ofmarket relations, urbanisation and investments have made the country’s socio-economic and political climate more complex. It has become clear that acomplex industrial society such as contemporary Russia cannot be managedfrom a single centre. Neither is it possible to pursue successful economicdevelopment within the corrupt administrative system. This business opinion,however, became transparent only when the state launched the modernisationtheme in the public domain. Thus business seized the opportunity to advanceits real preferences only when a permissible political climate emerged. Thefunctioning of the Institute of Modern Development (INSOR) is an example.The Institute was established under the aegis of the Presidential Administra-tion in 2008. President Medvedev demanded that the Institute provide anobjective analysis of Russia’s political system and propose genuine ways ofadvancing political and economic modernisation. It is signi#cant that bigbusiness #nances this Institute through the interest is raised from capitalinvestment. The main thrust of the INSOR research argumentation endorsedpolitical and economic liberalisation. The head of INSOR Igor Yurgens gavenumerous interviews in January-February 2010. These were published inRossiiskaya Gazeta, Novaya Gazeta, Vedomosti, The New Times, Gazeta.ru,Rosbalt.ru, Radio Liberty, Polit.ru, Ekho Moskvy and the Pozner programmebroadcast on Channel 1. The Institute published 12 books and 20 researchpapers in 2009, and conducted 150 roundtables during the same year. Itdeveloped co-operation with European and American partners and drafted aprogramme of ‘positive co-operation’ with both parties.

Socio-economic domination

The public sphere in Russia is monolithic not only in the political but also inthe socio-economic dimension. It is impervious to the economically dis-advantaged and subaltern groups. Speaking of modern societies, Taylor(1995a,b) distinguishes two socio-economic rifts within the public domain.The #rst rift stems from the modality of the class war, in which economicallydisadvantaged groups are excluded from equal participation in the public



sphere. The second rift encompasses the resistance of subaltern groups tooppression by the majority culture. This rift is particularly prominent in theage of multiculturalism and political correctness (Taylor 1994; Habermas1994; Fraser 1990; McKee 2005, p. 62–65; Johnson 2006, p. 33). We cannotstudy both rifts in complete separation from each other due to the growingintersectionality of societal identities in the modern world. As Andrew Link-later (2009, p. 131) observers, ‘one cannot explain ethnicity of gender dom-ination without taking into account of class divisions in society. But nor canclass inequalities be grasped without understanding intersections with genderand other forms of domination’. At the same time, both rifts have di$eringweight in Russian society. The #rst rift has long been evident, while thesecond has only just surfaced.

First, the economically advanced have privileged access to the publicsphere. This is particularly true within the readership and Internet segments.Economically disadvantaged groups, on the other hand, are con#ned to thetelevision domain. The Levada Centre (2008, pp. 6–7) claims that the disin-tegration of the core outlets of the Soviet book redistribution system barredthe majority from obtaining reading material (Dubin and Zorkaya 2008).Indeed, new private publishers are not interested in reaching the peripheryaudience. This occurs for #nancial reasons. Posting books and journals toremote places, where people cannot buy them, is costly and #nancially unjust.Thus, the public can purchase these products only in wealthy urban centres.Towns and villages whose populations are under 100,000 people do not haveaccess to such materials. The system of public libraries has also disintegrated.The funding was limited during the 1990s, and the current government hasnot taken any steps to rectify this situation. Table 3.2 shows the decline in thenumber of public libraries between 1990 and 2006.

The Internet is also con#ned to the economically advanced. VTsIOMclaims that highly educated (28 per cent) and economically successful (22 percent) citizens residing in large cities (22–25 per cent) and in the richest areas,such as Moscow and St Petersburg (27 per cent), use the Internet. Less edu-cated (97 per cent), low income (84 per cent), and rural area (81 per cent)inhabitants have no access to the cyberspace.48 This means that public opi-nion, formed in the Internet forums, re!ects the concerns of the wealthiest

Table 3.2 The number of libraries in Russia from 1996 to 200647

1990 1995 2000 2004 2006

Number ofpublic libraries(thousands)

62.6 54.4 51.2 49.9 0.77

Number ofreaders (millions)

71.9 60.2 59.6 58.2 0.8



citizens and ignores the problems of the lower income groups. A brief look atthe Lichnyi Opyt (Personal Experience) discussions in gazeta.ru backs thissuggestion.49 These conversations concern the problems of the middle class.Discussants focus on travel, money, real estate, and family matters. Opinionsare split between those who praise the West for its advanced material ‘culture’(cleanliness, e"cient tra"c regulations, high service standards, interpersonaletiquette) and simultaneously denounce the Russian way of life, and thosewho defend Russia by denouncing the West. A similar situation happens inthe forums of Russia’s most authoritative business daily Vedomosti.

The di$ering access of Russia’s new classes to the public domain is parti-cularly salient for public discourse. This is for two important reasons. First,this situation excludes large segments of the population from critical debates.It leaves economically disadvantaged working class groups to consume #lteredthemes and engineered debates provided by televised media. The unequalaccess to the Internet and liberal newspapers is the biggest worry in that bothcontribute to the formation of a near-political society, which is free from the‘communicative’ indoctrination of the televised media. At the moment, onlythe economically successful can partake in this relatively free discourse andin!uence the state through the normative power of a critical opinion. Thissituation is particularly bene#cial to the state. Thus, the authorities turn ablind eye to such inequalities and promote the limited access to the advancedpublic domain in the fashion discussed above. This strategy helps to minimise,control, and contain free public debate, as well as to sustain the extantgovernment popularity through the televised outlets.

Second, since the middle and upper classes dominate the public space, themost important socio-political problems, as well as the concerns of the largestshare of the population, are not properly articulated. Thus, critical reasoningdelivered to the state via independent public sphere channels re!ects thewishes of the wealthier part of society. At the same time, many importantproblems originate within lower income groups. In 2008, the middle andupper classes composed just 17 and 1 per cent of the population respectively.The destitute, poor and proto-middle classes make up 7, 24 and 51 per cent ofcitizens respectively.50 The fact that social mobility mainly takes placebetween the poor, destitute and proto-middle classes supports this discussionfurther. Indeed, the proto-middle class almost doubled in size between 1998and 2008, and grew from 45 per cent in 2007 to 51 per cent in 2008. Thistook place due to the reduction of the destitute from 28 to 7 per cent and thepoor from 41 to 24 per cent.51 The middle class, on the other hand, grows byas little as 3 per cent per year.

Ignoring the socio-cultural diversity within the extant classes is anotherproblem. At this point, I would like to go back to the preceding trivialisationdiscussion. Appealing to the common denominator of #nancial success anddomesticity makes the public sphere impervious to the existing intra-class dis-tinctions. At the same time, recognising these distinctions is important,because Russia’s current class strati#cation has yet to achieve a signi#cant



cultural impact. Therefore, members of the same class have varying concernsthat cannot be reduced to the single denominator of common consumption.The new middle class is composed of di$erent representatives of the formerSoviet society with mixed educational and cultural backgrounds (Avraamova2008; Gorshkov and Tikhonova 2008). It also di$ers in terms of geographical, ageand professional dimensions. The head of the Moscow Institute of Sociologyacademician Gorshkovand Tikhonova (2008, p. 11) claims that this newmiddle class is composed of private sector representatives, as well as the statebureaucracy formed during the Soviet time. It also encompasses Moscow cityinhabitants, whose culture and mentality are predominantly West European,as well as the periphery citizens, who look at things di$erently. Similarly,young middle class people embrace the new political and economic structureand are at odds with older generations that cannot shake o$ the socio-culturalbaggage of the Soviet past (Gorshkov and Tikhonova 2008, p. 12).

The structure of the new poor is equally inconsistent. Gorshkov andTikhonova (2008, pp. 9–10) claims that Russia’s new poor have not yetformed a self-su"cient social class, like that in the United States and WesternEurope. Many engineers and scientists fell out of the middle class incomebracket by living on a modest university salary or a pension and so joined theranks of the poor (Lytkina 2003; Gorshkov and Tikhonova 2008). Addition-ally, while 67 per cent of the employed proto-middle class and 75 per cent ofthe employed poor are concentrated in small towns, these areas comprisesome 60 per cent of Russia’s territory. Therefore, the culture and education ofthese people do not always re!ect their income. Rather, this class identi#cationis the result of structural unemployment, or circumstantial low-paid employ-ment, in which citizens with higher education are forced to work in lowerincome jobs. Therefore, we cannot yet speak of a fully developed middle orworking class culture. While the current economic strati#cation is apparent, itwill take some generations to develop behavioural patterns, divorce livingspaces into distinct residential areas, and form clear domestic habits toachieve a corresponding cultural strati#cation. Therefore, excluding the issuesof intra-class diversity from the public domain can bottle up important societalcontradictions and postpone the resolution of corresponding problems.

As to multiculturalism, Russia’s politics of recognition have only justbegun. Therefore, many Russians do not regard the issues of ethnicity,nationality, gender and sexuality as important factors in securing a highersocio-economic status. Rather the issues of economic strati#cation over-shadow these matters. TheMoscow Institute of Sociology’s research (2004, p. 25)shows that only 7.9, 6.5 and 11.1 per cent of the respondents thought thatnationality, place of birth and gender respectively were important for achiev-ing #nancial success. At the same time, education, personal abilities, hardwork and political connections were important for 49.1, 52.2, 44.4, and 48.2per cent of the respondents respectively. One situation relating to migrantworkers exempli#es this dynamic. Representatives of minority cultures, theyare deprived of essential rights. They live and work in inhumane conditions,



and law enforcement o"cers, employers, and xenophobic groups habituallyabuse them.52 However, despite the injustice, we cannot strictly categorise thisas a cultural recognition issue, in that only the poorest segments of ethnicminorities, the manual workforce, falls under such unlawful abuse.53

Wealthy representatives of ethnic minorities, on the other hand, encountercultural oppression less frequently. Russia’s highest state apparatus is composedof di$erent ethnic groups. Sergey Shoigu is an ethnic Tuvin, while VladislavSurkov is a Chechen. Alisher Usmanov, Russia’s steel tycoon is Uzbek, andthe so-called ‘oligarchs’ circle is mostly Jewish. Thus, while the culturaldimension is undoubtedly present, it is rather a problem of income strati#cationthan ethnicity. Similarly, gays and lesbians enjoy interaction and recognitiononly among wealthier groups located in urban areas. There are numerousclubs, bars, meeting places, publication outlets and Internet resources avail-able for these groups.54 However, these exist only in rich city centres and areavailable to those who can a$ord to visit such places, buy appropriate litera-ture and connect to the Internet.55 Thus, in order to obtain recognition Rus-sia’s subaltern groups have to a"liate with a higher income class, and onlythen can they place their claims for distinct cultural, gender or sexual orien-tation identity. At the same time, the economic emphasis of domination leadsto the gradual emergence of multiple forms of deprivation – a trend that hasoften been studied with the example of Western societies. John Kenneth Gal-braith (2007, see also Crenshaw 1990) argued that the emergence of the so-called ‘functional underclass’ – a derogatory umbrella term uniting peoplesu$ering from multiple forms of deprivation – stems from the pressures ofglobal economy, which necessitates deployment of migrant labour in low paidunprivileged jobs. Thus, such people become doubly disadvantaged su$eringfrom both social exclusion and ethnic prejudice.

Our discussion of Russia has so far demonstrated that the rich and middleclass groups dominate the public space. Other segments of the population,such as the poor, proto-middle class, functional underclasses and subalterngroups, are excluded. This situation is likely to change in the future, sinceRussian society is gradually drifting towards the post-modern politics fosteredby urbanisation and the market economy. Perhaps in some years to come wewill be writing a di$erent account discussing how these subaltern groups exertpressure on the public domain. While these dynamics are nascent they arenevertheless certain. The voices of the lower middle classes are graduallymaking their way onto the Internet. Similar attempts occur over the recognitionof ethnic minorities and underclasses. Russia’s Tadjik workers, for example,united into an all-Russian Movement of Tadjik Migrants. The organisation isactively involved in socio-political activity. It publishes a monthly newspaperGolos Tadjikistana (The Voice of Tajikistan).56 The paper is usually producedin 50,000 copies and redistributed free across Russia.

The movement conducted two Congresses that raised many importantissues related to the life of migrant communities in Russia. Moreover, theorganisation struggled against the spread of xenophobia towards Tadjiks. In



the cultural realm, for example, they criticised the content of the NashaRussia (Our Russia) comedy programme, which portrayed Tajik migrantworkers as bad Russian speakers, poor workers and backward uncivilisedpeople. The issue obtained a political character with the Tajik movementleader Karamat Sharipov meeting the Nasha Russia actors on national tele-vision for public discussions. Following the 2010 programme revisions, pro-ducers excluded the Tajik migrant characters, though without admitting thatsuch a decision has been made under public pressure. Even though such issuesare not highly publicised, similar dynamics are gradually gaining momentumacross Russia.57 Proposals to establish a special trade union for migrantworkers in the Sverdlovsk region, calls to create a theatre for guest workers inMoscow, or con!icts over the gay parades, are cases in point.58

A gradual class consolidation can help this trend. The process is slow butclear. Di$erent behavioural patterns in the economic domain begin to emerge.For example, the number of lower income groups who use paid medical ser-vices, education or recreation services decreased from 57 to 34 per cent, 14 to8 per cent and 5 to 4 per cent respectively between 2003 and 2008 (Gorshkovand Tikhonova 2008, pp. 9–10). Future expectations by the people concernedalso indicate this class consolidation. Forty-eight per cent of the destitute, 54per cent of the poor and 47 per cent of the proto-middle class do not expectany improvement in their #nancial well-being; 29, 17 and 15 per cent respec-tively expect that it will get worse. At the same time, 53 per cent of the higherincome groups expect to improve their #nancial positions in the near future(Gorshkov and Tikhonova 2008, p. 7). At some point, this class consolidationwill force corresponding groups to articulate their wishes more clearly. How-ever, it may take some time until these groups’ voices can make their wayfully into the Russian public domain.

Clearly, if the goal was to achieve a greater equality, forging alternativepublic spheres for subaltern and economically deprived groups, and expand-ing the existing public sphere to re!ect the cultural diversity within the classescould be an answer. Public spheres generated for migrant communities andlower income groups with limited access to information resources are parti-cularly important. Migrant workers could bring their concerns about legalenforcement agencies and extremism into a wider public debate. Similarly,lower income groups could articulate their demands on local governance andthe welfare state. Finally, recognising cultural, and not only economic, diver-sity, of Russia’s new classes could shift discussions from trivia to moreimportant political matters. Clearly, the decentralisation of the public sphereis consistent with progressive development. At the same time, the practicalcreation of such ‘multiple publics’ requires institutional encouragement. Thestate could become a ‘better’ state and take upon itself moral, ethical andpolitical obligations to withdraw from the public domain albeit simulta-neously creating framework conditions for unimpeded functioning of thesenested public spheres and enabling subaltern groups to access such spaces.



The reality, however, is di$erent. Instead of consciously fragmenting thepublic sphere, the state has adopted the policy of centralisation. Most publicsphere outlets become subject to central control. The legal dimension is par-ticularly salient. The Russian labour code adopted in 200159 and the Law onNGOs enacted on 17 April 200660 are particularly good examples. The medialegislation was not conducive to the provision of viable public outlets for theexpression of popular concerns. The enactment of the Information SecurityDoctrine in September 2000 was aimed at enhancing the state’s control overthe !ow of information by exposing ‘irresponsible’ coverage of events and thespread of ‘false’ information (Belin 2004, p. 137). Russia’s 1992 Law onMedia was adapted to the Doctrine, as the number of state o"cials allowed toclassify public information was expanded, and foreigners were prohibitedfrom obtaining more than 50 per cent stakes in the media outlets (Belin 2004,p. 137). In this light, independent political journalism has become a dangerousand unpro#table business. The disappearing of the Yeltsin-era media-oligarchsand a rapid decrease in the number of political press outlets illustrates thistrend (Bunin 2007).

The Kremlin has also attempted to secure control over Russian academia.The new guidelines on foreign contacts for academics have been published(though without being enforced) and a few academics have been charged withespionage (Lipman and McFaul 2003, p. 64). Furthermore, since 2004, thegovernment has been drafting a reforms package aimed at subordinating theRussian Academy of Science (RAN) to governmental control.61 The newversion of the law ‘On Science’ enacted in November 2006 stipulates that thePresident of the Russian Federation approves the nomination of the head ofRAN, while the cabinet drafts and approves the RAN statutes. Some seriouspolitical battles erupted over the RAN statutes, the governmental version ofwhich aimed at depriving the RAN academic governorship of administrative#nancial control. In the wake of severe public and political pressure from thescienti#c community, the RAN governorship managed to regain control over#nancial matters and the authority to communicate directly with the Minis-tries of Finance and Economic Development and the State Duma. This,however, did not eliminate the state in!uence on the choice of the future headof RAN or the government’s in!uence over the future versions of the RANstatutes.62 Another hostile attack on the public sphere took place when theKremlin proceeded to take full control over Russia’s most prominent thinktank and public opinion agency VTsIOM (The All-Russian Centre for theStudy of Public Opinion).63 In 2003, the government reorganised VTsIOM bytransforming it into a new company with a 100 per cent state ownership anddismissing the centre’s long-standing director Yurii Levada.64 Clearly, theseconstrictive institutional measures cannot help the resolution of importantsocio-political ills that trouble Russia’s public domain at present.

To conclude, public sphere, as one ‘facet’ of civil society, su$ers from var-ious structural problems. These could fall into the three main groups. First,trivialisation of the public space creates a society of consumers, rather than



citizens. The state and business bene#t from this trend, in that it containspublic protest and helps maximise pro#ts. Second, the state manipulates the publicsphere politically. It colonises the public space and acts as the agenda setter,the major player, and the arbiter. The state #lters the most important societalproblems into the televised space, thus partially reacting to the public mood.It also fosters ‘engineered’ pluralism and allows inter-factional struggles toenter the public domain. Third, economic elites and the upper and middleclasses dominate the public debate. This situation excludes large segments ofthe population from critical debates. It also creates a virtual picture of the societalreality, which encourages subaltern groups to give their assent to the ongoingsocio-political domination. These problems are signi#cant for the future ofRussia’s political system. It is evident that in order to achieve greater demo-cratisation Russia must focus on creating a public sphere that is more rational,more decentralised and less impervious to the genuine public input. Reachingthese goals might also help the aims of political modernisation selected as themain priority by the Russian government. On a #nal note, it would be parti-cularly useful to establish in the not so distant future whether the extant ‘lib-eral loopholes’ of the public sphere in Russia have the potential of altering thepolitical landscape of this country in the longer term.



4 A kind of societyThe nature of political radicalismin modern Russia

This chapter explores the nature of political extremism in modern Russia.Most organisations discussed here will not pass through the civil society #lteroutlined in the theoretical introduction. Nevertheless, this discussion is animportant addition to the debate on public activity in Russia and could notbe ignored in the framework of this book’s analysis. The discussion claimsthat extremist dynamics originate in new economic conditions, the new poli-tical and institutional realities, and also inconsistent state policies that havefailed to control, or at times have even promoted, the spread of extremistsentiments. In the theoretical introduction to this book, I argue that the fra-mework of market economic and institutional relations generates variouspublic responses with anti-politics, radicalism and extremism being somepotential answers. To continue this theoretical line, this chapter analysesRussia’s modern extremism as one adaptation strategy embraced by thepublic at the turn of the century.

The discussion is in six parts. In the #rst section I examine how new economic,ideological and socio-demographic conditions, as well as multifarious transforma-tion di"culties, led to the emergence of various adaptation myths, strategiesand extremist responses. In the four following sub-sections I conduct anempirical analysis of those organisations that espouse extremism in its variousguises. This will encompass an examination of left-wing, liberal, right-wingand pro-Kremlin radical movements. The role of the state in containing, or in somecases promoting, these associations will be discussed in the #nal sub-section.

Setting the scene

With the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia’s new economic and institutionalenvironment shifted socio-political tensions from the realm of ideology to therealm of material wealth, social status, gender and age. Many previouslyimportant ideological dilemmas – such as East versus West or socialismversus capitalism – lost their prominence. With the passing of a brief ‘revolu-tion of expectations’ during the late 1980s and early 1990s,1 Russian societylost previous ideological grounding. It became deprived of ethical foundationsand had nothing but the economy to lean on. Many Russian sociologists


branded this process as an ‘ideological demobilisation’. This was particularlyclear during the acceleration of the private phase of societal behaviour thatpeaked in 2006–7. In line with the theoretical literature on political philoso-phy, the new ideological void fostered a reactionary public response. Threetrends seem most prominent: (1) the emergence of anti-Western ideologicalsentiment and a renaissance of Soviet-style political rhetoric, which was incon!ict with practical choices and life strategies of the public; (2) the emer-gence of political adaptation myths; (3) emergence of socio-economic andpolitical adaptation extremism.

First, the renaissance of the old Soviet-style rhetoric and surfacing of anti-Western feeling was particularly evident. This was taking place against thebackdrop of individualistic and materially oriented behavioural strategies. Wehave already detailed the rise of the success-focused ideology within the Rus-sian society. Wealth has become a self-su"cient socio-economic category forall, and in particular for young people. Of the Institute of Sociology respon-dents, 31.3 per cent showed somewhat extremist attitudes to their work, with12.5 per cent being almost fanatical. Younger people in particular insistedupon ‘making money at all costs’ (Zubok and Chuprov 2008b, pp. 6–7).

However, while adopting individualist behavioural strategies, many Russiansespoused a traditional Soviet-style ideology and were overtly critical of coreWestern values.2 The usual moral attractions of the 1990s, such as ‘capitalism’,‘West’, ‘business’, ‘reform’, ‘opposition’ and ‘liberalism’, had developedmostly negative connotations.3 Indeed, only 2 per cent of the March 2007VTsIOM respondents felt positive towards individualism (this number stood at1 per cent in 2004), 1 per cent felt the same towards liberalism in both 2004 and2007, and none valued capitalism (Petukhov 2008, p. 53). It is also signi#cantthat the majority of the Levada centre respondents (72 per cent in 2000 and80 per cent in 2008) thought that Russia has a special ethical and moral core,a system of fundamental values that are superior to those of the West. Amongthose values most respondents (77 per cent in 2000 and 74 per cent in 2008)distinguished the lack of materialistic drive and spirituality.4 Thirty-three percent of the 2008 VTsIOM respondents suggested that Russia had a ‘specialpath’ de#ned as the di$erence in values between Russia and the West; 23 percent of interviewees saw the ‘special path’ in the su$ering that the Russianpeople incurred in the course of their country’s history; and 21 per centthought that Russia’s unique geographical position de#ned it.

Clearly, the Russian socio-political life developed an interesting adaptationantinomy. On the one hand, people behaved in the capitalist market manner.On the other hand, they refused to adopt an ideology that could sustain suchbehaviour. This served as a defence mechanism against the pressure of thenew institutional and economic environment. Many Russian sociologists insistthat this discrepancy between actions and intentions, or between words anddeeds, represents the central feature of the modern Russian mentality. AsPetukhov (2009, p. 49) notes, the Russian mindset is trapped between theprogressive modernising present and the traditionalist Soviet and Imperial

Political radicalism 73


past. Leonty Byzov (2006) of VTsIOM goes as far as to claim that the divisionbetween the two super-civilisations, the traditional and ‘liberal-modernising’,de#nes the socio-cultural speci#city of modern Russia. The Gorshkov theorisationon the modernist-traditionalist ideological split, which fuelled our previousanalysis of the public activity !uctuations, further supports these suggestions.

This antinomy between the actions and ideology can be explained from anhistoric point of view. It originates in the ‘us and them’ psychological divisionline that is #rmly entrenched in the Russian mind. The formation of thisdivision line stretches back to the Soviet and Imperial eras. Speaking of theImperial period, many Russian sociologists point at the ‘Internal West’ phe-nomenon. Valery Solovey (Solovey and Solovey 2009), Leonty Byzov (2006)and Aleksandr Akhizer (2001) insist that the country’s peasantry has alwaysrepresented a distinct social stratum characterised by a minimal verticalmobility and traditional religiosity. In this light, the masses of traditionallyminded population were at odds with liberal elites, which espoused secularisedmodernism and progressive individualism (Byzov 2006; see also Malia 1994, pp.60–65; Klyuchevskii 1911–13, pp. 1–2). Thus, the West and its core values ofcapitalist market pragmatism were alien to the vast majority of the Russianpopulation, while the elites, who were fully integrated into it #nancially andpsychologically, composed the so-called ‘Internal West’ minority group.5

The subsequent arrival of the Bolsheviks altered the situation radically. Thechange took place on two separate planes: socio-psychological and economic.At the socio-psychological level, the Bolsheviks needed to create an externalenemy in order to justify the regime’s existence. The idea of two strugglinginternational camps, in which the West was positioned as an archenemy ofSoviet Russia (Brown 2004; English 2000), became one of the major tenets ofSoviet indoctrination patterns. In the economic realm, the industrial moder-nisation conducted by the Soviet government resulted in the destruction ofRussia’s peasant commune, which altered the traditional lifestyle and perceptionsof a vast majority of the population.

Both these factors resulted in the emergence of various myths about the West,which came to de#ne the Soviet mentality. The West was seen variously as a rival,an enemy, an object of envy, or an example to follow (English 2000). In thislight, Soviet social and economic policies completed a profound Westernisationof the Russian mind. As Solovey and Solovey (2009) write, the Communists,

within seventy years of their rule objectively, and without any subjectiveintentions, achieved a wide-scale Westernisation of the Russian mind –something that the Romanovs could not achieve for the three hundredyears of their governance.

This Westernisation did not necessarily entail a full-scale adoption of Westernmentality, but it granted the West extreme importance for Russian society.The ‘us and them’ dividing-line was #rmly entrenched within the Russianmind during that period.

74 Political radicalism


This ‘us’ and ‘them’ ideological struggle ended with the victory of tradi-tional socio-political perceptions and behavioural strategies during the Sovietera (Byzov 2006). Thus, the way in which the Soviet society functioned wascloser to the traditional Russian rather than to any Western blueprints (seealso Kharkhordin 2005; Malia 1994). The destruction of this traditionalmodel during the post-Soviet period, along with the imposition of individua-listic Western values, fostered a traditionalist reaction. Given that the Russianpeople were historically prepared to either demonise or admire the West, theywere eager to follow Western behavioural patterns but despise the ideologythat sustained them. This could explain why anti-Western ideological rhetoricdoes not correlate with the actual behavioural strategies of the Russianpopulation (Byzov 2006).

The second set of public responses entails the creation of new, and therevival of old, political adaptation myths. Going back to our previous dis-cussion, the idea of a country’s ‘special path’ and its ‘unique place in theworld’ represents one political myth characteristic of transitional societies.This perception emerges as a defence mechanism against various adaptationdi"culties and multifarious transformational failures, as well as a response tothe inability of the population to adequately meet new socio-economic chal-lenges.6 It is revealing that the rise and fall of the ‘special path’ idea is con-tingent on the point of a country’s entry to the economic and politicalmodernisation process. In this light, Germany, Spain, Italy and a number ofEast European and Latin American states harboured the ideas of nationaluniqueness and socio-historical distinctiveness at various turning points oftheir development (Dubin 2004, p. 316).

It is also important that, during the Soviet era, when the country wasconsidered as an advanced industrial state, only 10 per cent of sociologicalpolls respondents thought that the Soviet Union was following a ‘specialpath’. Thus, from a comparative point of view, it does not come as a surprisethat economic and political transition of the post-Soviet period increased thenumber of respondents who thought that the country was following a specialpath (Dubin 2004, pp. 305–6). While in 1994 only 8 per cent of the LevadaVTsIOM respondents held this view, the number of those who embraced thisidea grew to 10 per cent in 2000 and to a staggering 46 per cent in 2008.

Finally, proliferation of extremism, and youth extremism in particular, wasanother important manifestation of the socio-political adaptation response.Zubok and Chuprov (2008a) argue that high economic expectations placedon society drove many to embrace various self-defence mechanisms. Youngpeople were a$ected most. The ISPI RAN research shows that young peopleaged between 22 and 25 (34.6 per cent of the respondents) and 18 and 21(25.9 per cent of the respondents) often experience extremist sentiments. It isalso signi#cant that these feelings have been growing consistently and haveincreased twofold since 2002. These developments do not come as a surprisefrom the point of view of the social strain theory proposed by Robert Merton(1938) and Albert Cohen (1955). Cohen (1955, p. 59) argued that delinquent youth



behaviour re!ects the ‘problems of adjustment’ to prevailing social norms andaccepted social goals. In this light, forming organised subcultures (usually ofextremist and criminal nature) helps to overcome these adaptation di"culties.Merton (1938) works on this theme further, arguing that many young peopleare unable to meet various goals, norms and aspirations produced by middleand wealthier classes who dominate social discourse. The inability to meetsuch goals produces ‘strains’, dysfunctionality, and alienation (anomie). Thus,Merton argues that individuals have to be able to derive satisfaction not fromthe goals and ideals as such but also from the actual means and processes ofachieving them (see Gelder 2007, p. 41).7 And since these means and pro-cesses are not immediately available to all, nonconformity and extremismbecomes the means of expressing social dissatisfaction.

Thus, in the Russian context the emergence of the capitalist ‘success cul-ture’, with its emphasis on the achievement of material wealth, left manypeople, and young people in particular, feeling frustrated #rst with the need toclimb up the #nancial ladder and second with the lack of means for imple-menting this goal. The social composition and geographical concentration ofextremists illustrates my suggestions.8 People who espoused extremist senti-ments mostly came from a proto-middle class background, i.e. those whohave not yet achieved high and average levels of income. Extremist youth wasmostly employed in working class professions (43.0 per cent of the respon-dents) or studied in professional colleges, rather than in higher educationinstitutions (37.8 per cent). It does not come as a surprise that rural areas andbig cities had the highest concentration of extremist youth, with 30 and 24.7per cent respectively (Zubok and Chuprov 2008a, p. 42).

Such extremism was of an economic and socio-political character. On theeconomic front, 22.8 per cent of the respondents expressed hatred and intol-erance towards the rich, with 5.5 per cent of the respondents experiencingextremely strong feelings (Zubok and Chuprov 2008b, pp. 9–11). At the socio-political level, racial and ethnic hatred, as well as religious intolerance, werethe most important. Racial extremism was particularly signi#cant. Alternativesocial groups, such as economic migrants, representatives of di$erent religionsand ethnicities, were targeted most. Of the ISPI RAN respondents, 41.4 percent indicated their personal negative attitude towards migrant workers; 21per cent of youth supported radical nationalist politicians who were critical ofeconomic migrants; 35 per cent had a high level of intolerance towards peoplefrom the Caucasus, Vietnam andKorea (Zubok and Chuprov 2008a, pp. 41–42);38.3 per cent of the respondents were highly intolerant of representatives ofnon-Orthodox religions (Zubok and Chuprov 2008b, pp. 9–11); 7.5 per cent ofthose interviewed did not hide their radical approach to these problems; and10.5 per cent espoused these views as convictions.

Extremism and political radicalism did not boil down to just ethnic andreligious recognition matters. It was also seen as a radical espousal of politicalideas, emphatic interpretations of historic events, and fanatical attitudes tocareers and self-advancement that once again exhibits the ‘strain’ of the new



expectations. Broadly speaking, extremism and radicalism does not alwaysespouse violence in the achievement of goals and propagation of ideas. Inturn, extremist behaviour is often seen in aversion to any form of compro-mise, intolerance of dissent within the group and fanatical commitment tochosen ideas (Wintrobe 2006, pp. 5–6). The state was also responsible for theproliferation of all types of extremism, though it played the role of a catalystor a conductor of the existing public sentiment. In what follows, I willempirically examine various manifestations of political extremism in Russiaand the role of the state in containing or promoting these dynamics.

Liberal radicalism

I shall begin this discussion with liberal radicalism, as it represents the least radicalbranch of Russia’s extreme movements. Despite their generally moderateoutlook, some liberal activities could fall within the bounds of a radical, or toput it mildly politically emphatic, behaviour. National self-denial is one mainpsychological element of Russia’s radical liberalism. The emphatic espousal ofWestern institutional, cultural and political fundamentals has a somewhatreligious Gnostic character. It is not the love of the West as such, but moreoften the love of the West as against the geopolitical entity of Russia. Theviews of Valeriya Novodvorskaya, the leader of Russia’s People DemocraticUnion, are particularly indicative of this. Novodvorskaya is prepared toblindly support the United States in every political initiative, particularlyagainst every possible Russian domestic and international undertaking.9 Shereferred to the Russian nation as the ‘cancer of humankind’10 and suggestedthat it would be bene#cial if the United States declared war on the RussianFederation and eventually turned it into one of its states.11 Similarly, ValeryPanyushkin, Russia’s eminent liberal journalist, writes:

it would be easier for everyone if the Russian nation would cease to exist.Even Russians would feel better, if they no longer had to work on theirnation-state but rather turned into a small ethnos like avars of khanty.12

Sergey Kovalev, an eminent liberal human rights activist, also passed com-ments driven by a similar Western-centric sentiment. In particular, he insistedthat, due to the historically rooted imperial complex, Russia remains in the‘eyes of the enlightened humanity [my emphasis] a scare-crow that is useful toshow others how one should not lead one’s life’.13 Mikhail Leontyev, Russia’seminent political commentator of the pro-Kremlin and nationalist standings,writes a sharp critical comment on self-denial and Western-centric lenience ofRussia’s radical liberals:14

I, for a long time, considered myself a liberal and until now adhere tomany liberal values. But with the time it became clear that being a liberalis inseparable with the political orientation towards the West. Moreover,



liberalism is completely submerged by it. It appeared that the fate of lib-eralism and liberals hinges upon their relationship to the West. At thesame time, our liberals do not have an understanding that the West, orEurope as it is in fashion to say now, is not a synonym of liberalism. AsTyutchev wrote: ‘we are forced to call Europe something that should nothave had any other name but Civilisation.’ This is the di$erence, whichour liberals do not understand – the di$erence between voluntary bor-rowing and active submission.15

Driven by the desire to be more ‘Westernised’, more ‘advanced’, more ‘civi-lised’, modern radical liberal sentiments represent, in many ways, a hostilereaction to the realities of Russian life and di"culties and failures of Russia’spolitical transformation. These activists normally have close relationshipswith Western charity organisations, and often appeal to a Western audiencerather than their own people. As Putin ironically observed in his 2007 inter-view to Time magazine, a prominent liberal leader, Gari Kasparov, com-plained about his arrest to the media in English, as opposed to his nativeRussian. This cast doubts on the importance of ordinary Russians to hispolitical campaign.16

At the same time, the radical espousal of liberal ideas in a Western-centricfashion is not a new phenomenon in the Russian political scene. Rather, it hassome deep historical roots. Alexander Lukin (2000, p. 289) views the politicalculture of Russia’s radical liberals of the early 1990s as a distinct ‘subculture’that ‘ran violently counter to the political culture of the majority of thepopulation’. Lukin (2000, pp. 47–48) claims that Russian ‘democrats’ of thetime praised the abstract ‘Western world’ as the ‘centre of the normal devel-opment of civilisation’ and insisted that ‘it is in Russia’s natural interests tojoin this civilization’. In the event, radical liberals blindly implemented manyof their policies, which led to ‘destruction without any creation’ (Lukin 2000,p. 294). This resulted in a split within the liberal movement with many ex-radical liberals rejecting the national self-denial path, as well as the neglect ofthe majority of the population. Lukin (2000, p. 295) quotes a 1994 commentmade by a former activist in Democratic Russia and the ‘Radical Democrats’faction in the Russian Congress of People’s Deputies Mikhail Chelnokov: ‘Iam an opponent of nationalism and stand for equal businesslike co-operationamong all countries. But at the same time, I am an opponent of the betrayalof my Motherland that is going on today in Russia’. In this light, the way inwhich radical liberals wished to promote their policies was rooted in theirSoviet socialisation patterns and was often based on the imposition of valuesfrom above. Igor Timofeyev (2004, p. 93) insists that, despite having derivedtheir views from Western neo-liberal notions, Russia’s liberal intellectuals stillwished to rely on the ‘power of a strong state in order to promote the liberalprogramme among a reluctant population’.

To some extent, the radical civilisational sentiment was reminiscent ofnineteenth century Western liberalism. Liberals of that period had a



commonplace view, which was largely shared by socialists, that a number ofcore nations have a civilisational progress potential. These nations weregranted the right to self-determination as carriers of historical development.France, England, Italy, Germany, Hungary, Spain and Russia were amongthose nations. Smaller nationalities, such as Czechs, Slovaks, Croats, Basques,Welsh, Scots, Bulgarians, Romanians, and Slovens were considered unable tolead historical progress and were destined for coercive assimilation by greaternations. John Stuart Mill wrote:

It would be undeniably better for a Scottish Highlander to be part ofGreat Britain, or for a Basque to be part of France than to sulk on hisown rocks, the half-savage relict of past times, revolving in his own littlemental orbit, without participation or interest in the general movement ofthe world.

(quoted in Kymlicka 1995, p. 53)

Thus, progress was a measure of freedom and national self-determination.Therefore, it is not di"cult to trace how such ideas travelled to Russian soiland survived to this day albeit with progress and civilisation being understoodin terms of a full, even ruthless, assimilation with the Euro-Atlantic league ofstates and unequivocal abandoning the idea of Russia as a separate civilisationalentity.

At the same time, we must not forget that the liberal ideology enjoyed some15–20 per cent of ‘silent approval’ within Russian society during the decade of2000s. This #gure is the result of Russia’s Institute of Sociology research,based on a series of in-depth interviews with representatives of various socialstrata across the country (Afanasiev 2009). The research shows that the socialcomposition of Russian liberal sympathisers includes academics, creative andscienti#c intelligentsia, journalists and political analysts who do not #t theextant framework of Putin’s politico-institutional system. Similarly, small andmedium-sized businesses that do not bene#t directly from political closenessto the state apparatus feel discontent about the nature of Russia’s politicalsystem and are sympathetic to liberal reforms. The Institute of Sociology andVTsIOM researchers compare the social composition of this stratum with thesmall creative and scienti#c intelligentsia of the early Gorbachev period, whowere in favour of serious political reforms (Afanasiev 2009; Byzov 2009).17

More importantly, many liberal sympathisers do not share the self-denialstance, which represents a marked departure from their radical counterparts.Some moderate liberal advocates ideologically combine Russia’s historic greatpower ambitions, and the multitude of geostrategic interests, with the liberalpro-European course. Vladislav Inozemtsev, a professor at the Higher Schoolof Economics and editor of the left-leaning Svobodnaya Mysl (Free Thought)journal claimed that, although ‘Russia is a European country in its historyand traditions’, she could, at the same time, exercise larger geostrategicambitions (discussed in White 2011, pp. 307–8). However, Europe must be the



only ‘polygon’ where such ambitions could be realised. He hoped that Rus-sia’s accession to Europe would change the Western-centric civilisationalnature of the continent. Russia, in Inozemtsev’s mind, should give Europenew ‘geopolitical and geoeconomic dimensions’ by providing it with geopoli-tical and military resources, ‘which combined with Europe’s technology andglobal presence would make EuRussia the undoubted world leader’ (cited inWhite 2011, p. 308). At some ideological junctions, however, these largergroups of moderate liberally minded citizens merge ideologically with radicalliberals, in that those who support liberalism also realise that Russia couldembrace its ideas wholeheartedly only after a thorough revision of the extantpolitical paradigm, which could, potentially, lead to a full-scale revision ofRussia’s civilisational nature.18

On to empirical analysis. The United Civic Front is the most numerous andimportant radical liberal movement. It was formed in May 2005 and is led bythe former world chess champion, Gari Kasparov. Kasparov himself oftenresorted to radical rhetoric at times bordering absurdity. For example, hecoined the sale of Russian steel in the United States markets as ‘handlingstolen goods’ because Russia’s steel makers bene#t from cheaper gas pricesand are able to reduce self-costs. The ‘theft’ supposedly takes place from theRussian people who could have sold this gas on the international market at ahigher price.19 Kasparov’s organisation claims that its o"cial aim is ‘the totaldismantling and abolition of the Putin regime via the means of an organisedprotest’. The movement’s leaders have deemed Vladimir Putin to be an ille-gitimately elected president due to the lack of political competition andtransparency during the 2000 and 2004 presidential campaigns. They insistedthat they would ignore legislative acts drafted by the ‘illegitimate’ RussianParliament if those acts contradicted the ‘spirit’ of 1993 Constitution. Themovement’s members also claimed that, during time of political struggle, theywould not follow any ideological guidelines, and would also co-operate withany oppositional movement, including extreme left-wing organisations.20

The association conducted a series of street protests, widely known as theOpposition Marches or the Days of Wrath. Some of the Marches’ petitionsattracted as many as 10,000 signatures during the peak of their politicalactivity in 2008.21 Clearly, the Russian state and the liberal opposition havebeen the main parties to this con!ict. Both sides exhibited extremist tenden-cies, with the state being particularly violent. The state exerted political pres-sure on many opposition members prior to the Marches. Opposition activistswere drafted into the conscript Army more often than ordinary members ofthe public.22 They were also arrested and stopped on the streets, and theirplaces of residence were searched repeatedly. On some occasions, legal enfor-cement agencies and domestic intelligence services ‘advised’ the most activeopposition members to refrain from future political activities. Moreover, theauthorities withdrew the Marches’ printed materials on the basis of allega-tions that these might have extremist ideological content. For example, inMay 2007 in Gatchina the city authorities withdrew some 150,000 copies of



the movement’s newspaper in order to ‘familiarise’ representatives of the legalenforcement agencies with the content.23 Identical incidents took place in StPetersburg and Nizhnii Novgorod, where the authorities withdrew some29,000 and 60,000 newspaper copies respectively that had been intended forthe agitation campaigns.24

The opposition also engaged in radical behaviour. Some of the movement’smembers explicitly stated their a"liation and support for Boris Berezovsky,knowing that he openly called for the violent change of the political regime inRussia. The members of the Marches purposely conducted their activities inplaces that the authorities deemed inappropriate, and they were occasionallyinvolved in vandalism. Such behaviour often provoked violent clashes with thepolice.25 The authorities claim that the Marches’ participants speci#callyengaged in such behaviour with aview to provoking the legal enforcement agenciesinto reactive action and thus dampening Russia’s reputation in Europe.26

Towards the end of the Medvedev presidency, radical liberals frequenteddemonstrations staged by extreme nationalists and xenophobes.27 By doing soliberals emphasised the strategy of co-opting all radical political forces for thepurpose of opposing the state. At the same time, frequenting the company ofoutright xenophobes somewhat thwarts liberal ideals and simultaneously castsdoubts on the ‘real’ ideological standings of those who advocate liberal ideals inRussia’s public space. Having said that, the co-opting trend began much earlierwhen the Kasparov movement decided to co-operate with the National Bol-shevik party – a nationalist organisations that has little to do with liberalism.

Other liberal youth organisations usually refrain from the radical rhetoric. Ofparticular importance were the Democratic Alternative (DA) movement ledby Maria Gaidar, the daughter of Russia’s #rst Prime Minister, the late YegorGaidar, as well the Defence (Oborona) movement, and the St Petersburg-basedGoing Without Putin (Idushchie Bez Putina) organisation led by RomanDobrokhotov. These movements took part in various street protests occa-sionally exhibiting violent tendencies. They often protested against censorshipof the mass media and corruption within Russia’s academic institutions andjudicial and legal enforcement systems.28 The DA movement was less radicaldue to its close links with the former Union of Right Forces, a former centre-right party led by the in!uential state administrator Anatoly Chubais. More-over, the movement’s leader, Maria Gaidar, was subsequently appointed tothe post of deputy governor of the Kirov region in July 2009, which furthercontributed to the moderation of the movement’s political rhetoric. The DAmovement represents one of the most popular liberal youth movements inRussia and, according to the Levada Centre’s data, occupies tenth place inthe popularity and recognition rating among Russia’s youth movements.29

Left-wing extremism

Left-wing radical movements are not numerous, and are hence much lessdangerous to the government. These organisations do not openly advocate a



change of power via revolutionary means. Nevertheless, they are almostalways radically minded and in theory look to a revolutionary scenario. Anumber of important features distinguish these movements from their coun-terparts on the liberal, right-wing and pro-Kremlin fronts. Such associationsusually embrace a distinct ideological rigidity. While liberal organisationsoften co-operate with oppositional forces of various ideological standings,left-wing extremists are much more selective and rigorous. They also standapart from their fascist counterparts in that they do not propagate violence,hatred or racial intolerance. Finally, in contrast to the pro-Kremlin move-ments, which I will examine at a later point of this discussion, left-wing acti-vists do not treat their civic participation as a springboard to successfulcareers in the state administration or in business.30 These features ensure thatsuch organisations have high ‘street mobilisation’ potential, which providesthem with a comparative advantage over their counterparts from competingideological realms.

Despite these apparent advantages, however, most left-wing associationshave very limited political success. Their popular rating is extremely low andthe general public is unwilling to support them. These organisations do nothave a long lifespan and dissolve within a few years of forming. Most move-ments have no more than 8,000 active members and many dissolve beforebeing able to make any signi#cant political impact. These organisations con-duct annual anti-capitalism protest actions, which often result in violent cla-shes with the police. Yet, again, these only attract small groups ofparticipants, between 200 and 1,000 people.31

In this light, the Youth Left Front (Molodezhnyi Levyi Front) led by IlyaPonomarev is one of the most recognisable left-wing movements. It comprisesthe youth branch of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF)and the avant-garde of the Communist Youth (Avangard KommunisticheskoiMolodezhi) organisation. The latter movement espouses a radical version ofthe Communist ideology. It pledges to carry out a violent revolution thatwould result in the deposition of Russia’s extant government. The movementalso calls for the restoration of the Soviet Union, complete with its politicaland institutional systems. The ideological commitments of the movementmembers are very serious. They organised various actions of protest aimed attackling social security problems such as labour rights, price increases,reforms of the residential accommodation sector, and multifarious constructioninitiatives that could have a detrimental e$ect on the environment.

Russia’s National Bolshevik Party (NBP), led by Eduard Limonov, standsapart from its left-wing colleagues. It is probably the biggest and the mostimportant radical left-wing organisation. It has the most numerous andorganised regional network, high mobilisation potential and a well-function-ing system of operative control. The party appeals to radical intelligentsia andyoung people aged between 18 and 25 who disagree with Russia’s extantpolitical system. The NBP espouses radical ideology and is often involved inextremist political activity. The party’s activists have made extremist demands



in the realms of domestic and international politics. Russian annexation ofCrimea and unreasonable claims for granting citizenship to Russian speakersin the Baltic States were their most notable international requests. At thedomestic level, the NBP called for the resignation of the incumbent govern-ment and the improvement of the social security system.32 To stress theirclaims, the party conducted a series of violent acts, such as occupying thePresidential Administration reception o"ce in 2006, the Ministry of Healthbuilding in 2005 and the Surgutneftegaz oil company o"ce, with demands toraise salaries and stop unlawful redundancies.33

It is important to note that the NBP feels hostile to Russia’s extant politicalelites and is prepared to co-operate with any political force that would back the‘Russia without Putin’ slogan. This was seen in the party’s active co-operationwith the liberal opposition and extreme nationalists. At times it becomes dif-#cult to pigeonhole NBP members into any consistent ideological camp.34

The state capitalised on the NBP party’s extremist behaviour in order to pre-vent it from the oppositional anti-governmental activity. Russia’s SupremeCourt declared the party illegal in 2007, while the Ministry of Justice refusedit o"cial registration in 2006. Russia’s deputy General-Prosecutor, ViktorGrin, claimed that the party activity is aimed at the violent change of Russia’spolitical regime, and that a similar dynamic in Georgia and Ukraine hadresulted in a series of ‘coloured’ revolutions in these countries.35

Pro-Kremlin extremism

Pro-Kremlin extremism has been sustained by the government’s wish to pro-tect its political position, the willingness of some of Russia’s youth to achievea successful career at all costs – a version of economic and career extremism –and the proliferation of Russia’s ethnic majority nationalism. The Kremlin’spolicy as regards promoting extremist youth movements was fuelled by fearsof the ‘coloured revolutions’, which took place in the Former Soviet Union(FSU) countries. Following the November 2004 Orange Revolution inUkraine and the Revolution of Roses in Georgia in 2003, the Kremlin hasbegun to suspect that Russia could follow such a path. In this connection, theKremlin’s ideologists have appreciated the political potential of youth move-ments. Thus they put up an ideological and political struggle for Russia’syouth, trying to mobilise it in support of the current political regime. The ideais to create a political ‘safety-belt’ comprising young pro-governmental asso-ciations that will be capable, if need be, of deploying extremist means indefence of the interests of extant political elites.

In doing so, the Kremlin has adopted two main strategies. First, it createddomestic political movements co-ordinated by the Presidential Administra-tion. Second, it indirectly promoted political movements of chauvinisticorientation, dangerously equating patriotism with the struggle against the so-called ‘Orangism’. In the #rst instance, the Kremlin policy attracted ‘youngcareerists’ who view their political participation as a useful aid for subsequent



careers in business or state administration.36 The evidence of their genuinebeliefs and true career intentions is mostly anecdotal, in that activists wouldnot openly reveal such information in the o"cial opinion polls, fearing pos-sible sanctions. Nevertheless, it is often self-evident that the level of ideologicalcommitment within these organisations is low,37 while their functioning principlesresemble the operational logic of the former Soviet Komsomol.38

The list of the most notable Kremlin-led organisations includes Nashi,Molodaya Gvardiya, Mestnye and their regional branches or sister move-ments. TheNashimovement, which represents the most prominent Kremlin-runyouth association, was created to replace the previous pro-Putin movementcalled Idushchie Vmeste (Going Together). The Nashi foundation meetingtook place on 21 February 2005 and was organised by Vladislav Surkov andthe Idushchie Vmeste leader Vasily Yakimenko. During that initiative, theparticipants put forward a plan to establish a mass-based association com-prising no less than 200,000–250,000 members within a few years.39 Fromthat point onwards, the Kremlin supported the movement #nancially andpolitically. At the political level, Nashi became the only ‘civic’ associationwith which Vladimir Putin had regular meetings.40 Financially, the statesponsored the movement’s annual meetings on the Seliger Lake, Tver region.The average annual budget of the Seliger initiative is some US$17mln.41

Yakimenko claimed that the movement’s aim is to preserve the politicalsovereignty and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, construct aviable civil society, and modernise the country’s economy via a cadre revolu-tion.42 In reality, however, the movement was true to its original role as a pro-governmental puppet organisation. It backed various governmental policies inthe international and domestic #elds. Its members often resorted to extrememeasures in pursuing their policy lines. In the international policy dimension,the movement harassed ambassadors of foreign states that were critical of theKremlin’s policies. Between August 2006 and January 2007 a number of theNashimovement members followed the then British ambassador, Anthony Brenton.They adopted this policy in the wake of the political support that Brentonhad expressed for Russia’ ‘non-systemic’ liberal opposition.43 The EstonianAmbassador, Marina Kalyurand, faced similar problems during a diplomaticrow between the two countries over the Russo-Estonian war memorial locatedin the Estonian capital Tallinn. Following these events, the European Com-mission demanded that the Russian Federation maintain the country’sadherence to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.44 Support forgovernmental domestic policies has also taken place in an extreme fashion.Defence of the Russian conscript Army is an example. The movement’smembers blocked anti-conscription liberal demonstrations and beat up someof its participants in March 2007.45

The United Russia Youth Guard (Molodaya Gvardiya) is another youthorganisation that pursues the interest of extant elites. In particular, theKremlin demanded that the Young Guardweed out corruption within the regionalrank-and-#le United Russia members. In reality, however, this campaign



turned into a purge of freethinking party members. Political attacks con-ducted on Russia’s most liberal regional executive, Oleg Chirkunov, the gov-ernor of the Perm region, are good examples.46 Russia’s state authoritiesprotected the movement well. When Boris Nemtsov, one of the oppositionleaders, branded the association extremist because of the threats that themembers of the movement made towards Russia’s independent journalists,the Moscow City Court #ned the politician and demanded him to issue ano"cial apology.47 Similar protection applied to the Nashi organisation. It isindicative that NTV, one of Russia’s main television channels, took o$ the airone version of the Nerealnaya Politika (Unreal Politics) programme whichexposed the Nashi’s leader Yakemenko dining in one of Moscow’s mostexpensive restaurants.48

In the second case, the Kremlin contributed to popularisation of Russia’sethnic majority nationalism, which has a much higher commitment level andcould act as a viable ideological alternative for otherwise career- and wealth-focused behaviour of the pro-Kremlin youth. The policy line focused onstriking a dialogue with ‘benign’ nationalists. In the immediate aftermath ofthe Ukraine Orange Revolution, the Kremlin politically promoted the Eur-asian Union of Youth (ESM), headed by a prominent international a$airsanalyst Aleksandr Dugin. Dugin, a professor of philosophy at Moscow StateUniversity, drafted the so-called neo-Eurasian doctrine – a nationalist ideol-ogy directed against ‘Russia’s arch-enemies in Washington and London’(Bobrova 2005). For the Kremlin, this ideology was particularly instrumentalin preventing potential Western interference in the country’s domestic a$airs.

At the same time, Eurasianism has a long history and various interpretations.It originated in the Russian philosophy of the early twentieth century. Anumber of philosophers and theologians, such as Nikolay Trubetskoy (1890–1938),Georgy Florovsky (1893–1979), and Peter Savitsky (1895–1968), published aseries of articles under the title ‘The Eastern Exodus’ (Iskhod k Vostoku). Inthese works, they examined Russia’s special ties with the Asian world andemphasised the never-ending historic rivalry between Russia and the West.These authors partially agreed with the October Revolution, in that theyexpected this development to con#rm Russia’s trajectory towards politicalisolation and the ful#lment of her Imperial ambitions.49 Following this logic,the authors declared Russia to be a distinct geopolitical realm, which theyde#ned methodologically as Eurasia. They insisted that Eurasia is a uniqueethno-cultural complex, combining European and Asian features. Moreover,given that other parties would not be able to apprehend it fully, they statedthat it should be treated as a separate social civilisation.50

Modern Eurasianism falls into the three main groups: (1) the pragmaticEurasianism that merely states that Russia represents both European andAsian power and has a territorial border with both sides; (2) neo-Eurasianismthat has imperial overtones and espouses the idea of a struggle against theAnglo-American domination; and (3) inter-civilisational Eurasianism thatfocuses on Russia’s multi-ethnic identity (Rangsimaporn 2006, p. 372–73; see



also Sakwa 2008, pp. 269). Pragmatic Eurasianism remains the doctrine’so"cial interpretation in terms of real policy-making. Neo-Eurasianism, dueto its strong nationalist and anti-Western overtones, captures the minds ofordinary Russians and evokes Kremlin’s silent approval.

Dugin (2002, p. 13), as the main proponent of neo-Eurasianism, claims thatRussia should struggle against the totalising Americanisation of nations anddefend the multicultural complexity of the world. He views America as Rus-sia’s main threat and, paraphrasing Zbignew Brzezinski, observes that ‘for anAmerican a good Russia is a non-existing Russia’ (Dugin 2002, p. 18). Duginalso insists that the United States ended

its unspoken agreement not to intervene on the territory of the formerSoviet Union at the end of the Cold War and had declared a ‘geopoliticaljihad’: it was currently moving into the Northern Caucasus and the Volgabasin, using the same ‘orange’ methods it had protected elsewhere in theregion.

(White 2011, p. 310)

In his theoretical statements, Dugin claims that the world is ideologically andhistorically divided into two separate camps. The #rst camp represents the seaand the navy, while the second camp stands for the earth and the infantry.The #rst camp is lead by the United Kingdom and the United States. It actsas a proponent of rationalism, individualism, free market and competition.The second camp is composed of the former Roman Empire countries andlead by modern Germany and Russia. It propagates social hierarchy, order,social justice and solemnity. The struggle between these two camps drives theworld’s evolution (Dugin 2002). In the political Manifesto written for hisEurasia political party Dugin stated that Russia’s destiny is determined by herpolitical geography as the integrative ‘core of a continental bloc’, which heenvisaged as ‘comprising of three main elements: the EU; the Eurasian Union(roughly corresponding to the former USSR); and an Asia/Paci#c grouping’(Rangsimaporn 2006, p. 382).

However, while for the Kremlin it was obvious that the neo-Eurasianthinking was directed against potential Western interference in the country’sdomestic a$airs, the public understood these ideas quite di$erently. Instead oftargeting the ‘evils’ in London and Washington, the policy contributed torising chauvinism and xenophobia against migrants from Russia’s Caucasianrepublics and from the FSU states. The Russian March, conducted with theKremlin’s sanction on 4 November 2005, was most suggestive. Initiallyintended as a patriotic expression of public intolerance towards the growingWestern in!uence in the near abroad, the March turned into a demonstrationof hatred towards illegal immigrants (Chebankova 2007). The March partici-pants did not pledge their loyalty to the existing authorities. Neither did theycondemn the Euro-Atlantic forces for interfering with the a$airs of Russia’sneighbouring states. Instead, they vehemently expressed the ideas of Russian



ethnic chauvinism. The action, initially organized by the ESM, was supportedby a number of explicitly fascist organisations. Of particular importance was theMovement against Illegal Immigration (DPNI), which was subsequentlybanned in August 2011. Andwhile Dugin was #ghting the ephemeral tigers acrossthe Atlantic, the DPNI openly referred to non-ethnic Russians as ‘scum’ andpledged to ‘cleanse the city of Moscow and the Russian lands’ of them(Bobrova 2005). It is striking that, of the 3,000 participants of the RussianMarch, 2,500 were DPNI members, and just 50 represented Dugin’s ESM.51

Alarmed by such results, the Kremlin decided to ban the Russian Marchthroughout the country in subsequent years.52 However, it was already toolate to act. Xenophobic ideas had begun to spread, and many federal politi-cians started to deploy ‘the national card’. Along with the already popularDPNI, the 2006 Russian March organisation committee included some pro-minent national MPs: the former leader of the then parliamentary Rodinaparty, Dmitry Rogozin, LDPR members Andrey Savelev, Nikolay Kur-yanovich, and Viktor Alksnis, as well as academic Igor’ Shafarevich and anin!uential actor, Vasily Lanovoy.53 The authorities could not ban the 4November 2011 March and under severe public pressure allowed its conductin the outskirts of Moscow. O"cial estimates state that the initiative gatheredsome 12,000 people showing the wide reach of nationalistic sentiments.

Right-wing extremism

It became evident that the spread of xenophobia obtained a political momen-tum of its own. The state had e$ectively lost control over this process towardsthe end of the Putin presidency. At the same time, despite the apparent poli-tical contributions, the extent to which the Kremlin was directly responsiblefor the rise of right-wing extremism still remains a matter of academic debate.A number of authors (Dunlop 2009; Laruelle 2009; Sperling 2006) highlightthe signi#cant in!uence of Russia’s intelligence services and the military. JohnDunlop (2009, p. xix), for example, points at the closeness between the DPNIleader Alexander Belov-Potkin and KGB agent Dmitry Vasilyev, who for-merly led the notorious anti-Semitic Pamyat organisation. He further claimsthat Dugin has enjoyed support in the Russian military general sta$. More-over, he points that the Presidential Administration supported some #lms thatinterpret history in nationalistic terms. At the same time.

Pilkington et al. (2010) adopt a more nuanced view, seeing the rise ofRussia’s right wing extremism as an independent social phenomenon, whichsimultaneously re!ects the complexity of political processes taking placewithin Russian society. Pilkington et al. (2010, pp. 5–6) focuses on skinheadgroups and argues that these emerged in Russia immediately during the earlypost-Soviet period as part of a wider pan-European neo-right youth move-ment. Participants often referred to Jean-Marie Le Pen, used German sloganssuch as ‘Ausländer Raus’ (Foreigners Out), and adopted recognised signi#ersof ‘skinhead’, such as Dr Martens. Pilkington, however, continues that the



movement began to expand rapidly during the mid-1990s in response to thehardship of economic and socio-political life. The social consequence of priceliberalisation, rapid marketisation and privatisation led to disappointmentand social strain. The shelling of the Russian parliament in 1993 legitimatedpolitical violence. The launch of the #rst Russian military campaign inChechnya, which allowed deportations of people of Caucasian appearancesfrom Moscow, created an atmosphere of o"cially endorsed ethnic hatred(Pilkington et al. 2010, p. 5; Tarasov 2000, p. 46). My account concurs withthe view that that, while politically promoted to some degree, right-wingextremism has important socio-economic origins and re!ects complex pro-cesses taking place in society during its institutional, economic, and socio-culturaltransformation. During the 2000s, Russia’s xenophobia and extremism weremainly fuelled by economic migration from the FSU countries, which generateda plethora of socio-political issues and demographic problems. These createdsome important adaptation dilemmas and resentments.

On the one hand, Russia is in need of foreign labour from the FSUrepublics. The migrant workforce contributes some 8–9 per cent of Russia’sGDP.54 Russia’s Federal Migration Service con#rms that the country requiresapproximately 1mln building and construction workers annually to maintainthe extant levels of development within these industries.55 In 2006 alone, 40.8per cent of work permits were issued in these industries.56 It is also signi#cantthat these migrants creating greater economic interdependence between Russiaand the former Soviet Republics – a development that could secure Russia’sgeopolitical in!uence within the FSU space. Indeed, migrants’ monetarytransfers to their home countries account for up to 40 per cent of some oftheir home countries’ GDPs. The World Bank data shows that in 2009migrant workers in Russia transferred some $11.5bln to their home countries,accounting for 42 and 38.8 per cent of the Tajik and Moldovan GDPsrespectively.57 The same analysis names Russia as second to the United Statesin the amount of its migrant workforce.58

On the other hand, as I have shown above, the struggle against ‘illegalimmigration’ has already posed a serious threat to the political stability of theRussian state. Eighty per cent of these migrants come from the nine FSUcountries that have no entry visa arrangements with Russia. The exactamount of workers is unclear, as many of them work illegally. However, roughestimates show that there are four to nine million migrant workers labouringin Russia. Most of this workforce has a very low level of education. On aver-age, 15 per cent of these migrants do not speak !uent Russian,59 which makesthem vulnerable to exploitation and abuse. This induces hostilities and gives riseto extremism. As Boris Kagarlitsky, director of the Institute of Globalisationand Social Problems, notes:

the capital [Moscow] is bursting, coming out of its needs and abilities. Itcannot live without attracting migrant workforce. However, it is simulta-neously burning with hatred towards them. But it is precisely these people



who support and sustain the city’s economy. The city not only bene#tsfrom their labour but also from their oppression. It lives o$ the bribesthey are forced to pay and bene#ts from the ludicrously low cost of theirlabour.60

Indeed, the VTsIOM data shows that 55 per cent of Russians would preferto restrict the access of foreign labour to the country in order to eliminateethnic hostilities. 26 per cent of the respondents claimed that the authoritiesshould not allow the emergence of distinct residential areas populated byethnic minority groups, and only 12 per cent suggested that the governmentought to improve legal protection of migrants.61 Similarly, VTsIOM pollsasked respondents to identify those nations that evoke hostile feelings. Only56 per cent of the respondents declared that they did not have such national-ities in mind, while as many as 35 per cent of the respondents could namesuch peoples.62

In this light, the majority of the ethnic Russian population has begun tosupport the slogan ‘Russia is for Russians’.63 VTsIOM data for 2002 demon-strate that this statement was backed by 55 per cent of the respondents, with17 per cent making such a choice consciously, and insisting vehemently on theimmediate practical implementation of this policy. Thirty-eight per cent alsosupported the slogan while taking a more cautious stance regarding immedi-ate action. Only 28 per cent of the respondents overtly rejected the idea,branding it as fascist.64

Similar VTsIOM polls showed that the number of respondents who sug-gested that ethnic Russians should have more rights than other nationalitieshad increased from 31 per cent in 2003 to 36 per cent in 2006. There was alsoa considerable decrease in the number of those who suggested that Russiashould be ‘a multi-national home for all’. While in 2003 and 2004 49 per centof the respondents believed in such a statement, this #gure had decreased to44 per cent in 2006. Similarly, only 13, 17 and 11 per cent of the respondentsthought of the idea as fascist in 2003, 2004 and 2006 respectively.

These general public sentiments have been translated into an extremistactivity by smaller groups of radically minded youth. The Centre for the Strug-gle against Racial Hatred (SOVA) reports that, while in 2004 there were 259victims of racial crimes, this #gure soared to 448 in 2005, and to 450 in 2006.In 2005, 42 people were killed and 406 assaulted (which is well in excess of oneperson per day!). In the autumn of 2006 alone, nine people were killed and 94assaulted.65 Furthermore, Russia’s human rights organisations claim thatethnic crimes are growing by 15–20 per cent per year, and that 70 murdersand 126 racist attacks took place in Russia in the #rst six months of 2008.66

Assassination of political leaders involved in anti-fascist activities has alsobecome a trend. There was a threat of a physical assault on the judge arbi-trating the case of Aleksandr Belov (Potkin). Belov (Potkin), a former DPNIleader, was convicted of propagating ethnic hostilities and given a suspendedsentence of one and a half years in prison.67 Similarly, xenophobic groups



published personal information on the jury members arbitrating the VladimirMakarov case, which concerned a racist murder. SOVA was receiving anon-ymous threats from xenophobic groups throughout 2009. A number of threatswere forwarded to some activists from the Moscow Bureau on HumanRights.

The same tactics were used in the regions. In the cities of Rostov-on-Don,Novorosiisk, Ryazan and Petrozavodsk, leaders of anti-fascist movementsKonstantin Baranov, So#a Ivanova, Vadim Korostelev and Maksim E#movrespectively faced similar problems, with E#mov being physically assaulted inJuly 2009 (Kozhevnikova 2010). It is also important that fascism has becomea conscious ideological choice for many youngsters involved in such move-ments. During court hearings young racial crime o$enders did not hide theirxenophobic feelings, behaved aggressively, and showed no signs of repen-tance.68 The Moscow City and Tyumen Court trials, which concerned multi-ple murders of Uzbek, Kyrgyz, Vietnamese, Cameroonian and Chinesenationals, are cases in point.

The rise of xenophobia culminated in the tragic events in the city of Kon-dopoga, Kalinigrad region (August 2006), where the Russian ethnic majoritiesrioted against the settled Chechens and a number of people were killed. TheKremlin’s loyal President of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov, suggested inresponse to the tragedy that, if the federal government did not change theprincipal outlines of its nationality policy, the Russian Federation could su$erthe same fate as the USSR.69 A similar incident also took place in theMoscow Manezh Square on 11 December 2010, where radically mindedRussian youth rioted against foreign migrants, and clashes between theseethnic groups became inevitable.70

It is signi#cant that many racist organisations have begun to re#ne theirpolitical strategies with the view to enhance operative e$ectiveness andrecruitment. Six trends seem the most important (Kozhevnikova 20010a,b,c;Makarkin 2009). First, these movements adopt a partisan mode of operation.Second, they often point at their ability to strike up a dialogue with thehighest power echelons. Third, these movements collaborate with the rank-and-#le members of the state administration. Fourth, they address importantsocial issues from an oppositional point of view (Kozhevnikova 20010a,b,c).Finally, they get involved in various public activities with the view to disguisethemselves as ‘decent’ societal networks.

First, many radical movements began adopting a more cautious politicalstrategy. Towards the end of the Putin presidency, most ultra-nationalistmovements abandoned the idea of establishing mass-based organisations. Dueto the increasingly repressive state policies towards extremism, these move-ments focused on establishing small but well-organised groups that act silentlywithout revealing their political ideology in public. They abandoned the tac-tics of #lming their crimes on mobile phones and placing these videos on theInternet – a strategy that was popular during the early 2000s.71 AlexeiMakarkin of the Moscow Centre for Political Technology points at the



example of the St Petersburg racist mob called the ‘Military Terrorist Orga-nisation’. The group adopted special codes of behaviour, and established astrict hierarchy and communication system in order to minimise the possibi-lity of arrest. The organisation members did not discuss any details of pend-ing operations over the phone or the Internet.

Second, many ethnic hatred organisations, such as the Movement againstIllegal Migration, the Great Russia Party, the Russian Societal Movementand the People’s Movement, demonstrate their ability and willingness to strikeup a dialogue with the Kremlin. Such closeness to the government camou-!ages them as ‘decent’ organisations and improves their political image. Thistendency accelerated during the Medvedev presidency, when the state becamemore stringent about the spread of racial crimes and custodial sentencesbecame a genuine deterrent. During the 8 June 2008 o"cial meeting of theseorganisations, which took place in one of Moscow’s central venues, thenationalists branded themselves as democrats, defenders of human rights, andsigned a pact that called on Russia’s President, Dmitry Medvedev, to co-operate and provide them with the chance of participating in national elec-toral campaigns.72 Moreover, the leaders of these organisations also referredto Medvedev as their strategic ally in the struggle against bureaucracy, cor-ruption, and Russo-phobia.

Third, striking up a dialogue with the lower echelons of Russia’s authoritieshas become another prominent trend. The activity of the Russian Image(Russkii Obraz) organisation is a good example. In 2007, the Russian Imagedeclared its close links with the Sergey Baburin People’s Union (NarodnyiSoyuz) – a formerly prominent parliamentary party. The Russian Imageleader, Dmitry Taratorin, was employed by the state-sponsored OrthodoxSpas (Saviour) television Channel. Thus, at the o"cial level, the organisationdisguised itself as a moderately nationalist movement possessing access toRussia’s echelons of power. At the practical level, however, the movement wasinvolved in ultra-nationalist xenophobic activity spreading extremist gra"ti,taking part in racist marches and actively collaborating with ultra-nationalistorganisations (Kozhevnikova 2010). Similarly, Roman Zentsov, an ex-worldchampion in mixed-#ghting and leader of a national-socialist organisation,declared his closeness to the authorities by publishing some of his articles onthe United Russia party and the pro-Kremlin Nashi movement’s websites.

Fourth, xenophobes adopted a tactic of addressing important public issuesfrom an oppositional point of view. Representatives of these organisationsblame the government for fostering an oligarchic political system and pursu-ing the interests of extant economic elites. This allows many such movementsto position themselves as genuine defenders of public interests. An ideationalcollusion between the xenophobes and political opposition leaders hasbecome particularly evident in relation to important business constructionprojects and critical aspects of politics. During his campaign for the nomina-tion to become Mayor of Moscow, one of Russia’s most successful entrepre-neurs, Alexander Lebedev, came close to supporting the DPNI rhetoric.



Lebedev claimed that the Moscow authorities have personal stakes in thecity’s building and construction sectors, which makes them interested in thein!ux of cheap labour from Central Asia.

Lebedev insisted that, if the state managed to de-monopolise the buildingand construction industry, the city would have over three hundred con-struction companies, instead of the existing few. This would help in freeingup the labour market and eliminating the uno"cial labour exchange thatfosters the in!ux of migrant workforce.73 Andrei Kuznetsov, the extremistleader of the St Petersburg DPNI branch, echoed these thoughts by claimingthat the in!ux of Asian migrants serves the interests of ruling elites who arebene#ting from cheap labour, in particular in the business and constructionsectors. He also claims that these business elites are implementing some Wes-tern plans of destabilising Russia politically and breaking her up intoconstituent ethnic units.74

Similarly, many Russian March participants, as well as some moderateenlightened nationalists, demanded the government address rampant corrup-tion that resulted in channelling substantial sums of money toward the NorthCaucasus. They also claimed that corrupt leaders of Caucasian republicssiphoned federal grants and use them for personal enrichment. Thus, nation-alists argued that Russia’s ‘white’ population feeds the Caucasus, and that thebest course of action would be to create a mono-ethnic Russian state bykicking the North Caucasus out of the Federation.75 As I have alreadyobserved, Russia’s liberal opposition almost supported these claims albeitusing a slightly moderated rhetoric to deliver such ideas. Navalny, Russia’sprominent liberal leader, attended the 22 October 2011 nationalist meetingtitled ‘Stop Feeding the Caucasus’ (Khvatit Kormit Kavkaz) and the 4November 2011 Russian March.76

Finally, contributing to important public activities has become a prominenttrend among Russia’s racial hatred movements. This has helped them to puton yet another mask of ‘decency’ and improve recruitment. Many racialhatred organisations have conducted various anti-drugs and anti-alcoholcampaigns, and promoted sport and healthy lifestyles. For example, RomanZentsov, a prominent national socialist from St Petersburg, conducted anumber of sports promotion and anti-drug campaigns. At the same time, inhis media interviews, Zentsov stresses the need to unite all radical right-wingorganisations under the banner of one nationalist movement, mobilise theRussian nation on the basis of having external enemies and to create anational-socialist state.77 Another example is the Moscow racist group, whichwas presented as a Christian organisation based in the Moscow Children’sCulture Centre. During the o"cial hours, the Culture Centre organised mar-tial arts lessons, parachute jumping classes, and other extreme sport activities.In its ‘other’ life, however, the group members have been involved in terroristactivity and participated in organising a series of explosions in Moscowmarkets where migrant traders were employed.78



State tactics and policy responses

In this #nal section, I will return to the role of the state and examine theKremlin’s strategies in dealing with the problems of xenophobia. Two phasesof state activity were evident. The second phase, which commenced roughlyin 2007–8, saw the severing of policy towards xenophobia and racial extre-mism, as threats became apparent. The #rst stage, which lasted for most ofPutin’s #rst and second presidencies, saw the state unwilling to address theissue or soften the e$ects of political extremism. Not only did the Kremlin!irt with a range of nationalist organisations during that period, it alsorefused to adopt adequate information and institutional policies that couldhave directed public opinion towards a more tolerant approach. Three fea-tures of the #rst phase seem the most important: (1) the state had a distinctlack of a fair judicial review for racial crimes; (2) it allowed the spread ofcorruption, intolerance and xenophobia within the police force; (3) it failed toadopt a clear and consistent immigration policy that could help migrants tosettle and work legally.

The #rst term of the Putin presidency saw an alarming lack of appropriatejudicial action against racial crimes. The federal government clearly failed tosend a message to the legal enforcement structures to adopt an uncompro-mising stance towards nationalistic activities. The statistical data are stagger-ing. In 2004, with 259 registered racial crimes and 47 murders, only ninecustodial sentences were passed, with ten additional defendants acquitted orreceiving suspended sentences. In 2005, out of 448 crimes, only 15 custodialsentences followed, with #ve people acquitted or sentenced conditionally; andin 2006, just 25 custodial verdicts were ruled with 13 suspects acquitted orconditionally sentenced.79

More importantly, the custodial verdicts have been minimal and, in manycases, Russia’s judges refused to class xenophobic attacks as racial crimes. Forexample, members of a skinhead gang who stabbed a nine-year-old Tajik girlto death in 2004 were accused of hooliganism; some o$enders have beenacquitted and others have been sentenced to just 1.5 or 5.5 years in prison.80

A similar situation prevailed in Yaroslavl, where a previously convicted racialo$ender murdered a Tajik national on public transport. An equally disturbingcase took place in Moscow, when a judge demanded to carry out a linguisticanalysis of overtly racist slogans, which accompanied an assault on twoArmenian children. Only in the wake of serious public interest in the case wasit categorised as ‘racially motivated’ (Kozhevnikova 2010a,b,c). It is interest-ing that in many cases penalties for racial o$ences were comparable to thoseimposed for minor #nancial crimes. For example, Evgenii Bevz, an ex-Mayorof a small Russian town Karasuk in the Novosibirsk Region, was sentencedto 3.5 years in prison for allegedly spending 20,000 Roubles (approximately£400) from the regional budget on private purposes.81

Second, apart from the alarming situation in the #eld of judicial review,Russia’s police force promoted and sustained the spread of xenophobic



moods. Russian sociologists often claim that police o"cers are supportive ofnationalistic ideology and treat migrant workers in an almost criminal fashion.In!uential research papers show that the level of xenophobia within Russianlegal enforcement agencies is higher than in Russian society in general. It isindicative that, following his arrest at a fascist demonstration, Roman Zent-sov claimed that police treated him with due respect. He further insisted thatsome o"cers openly shared his sentiments towards migrant workers.

Indeed, in 2006 the ‘Open Society’ Institute and the JURIX organisationproduced research that the Russian police checked identi#cation documentsand residential registration paperwork of people of non-Slavic appearances21.8 times more often than of ‘ordinary-looking’ Slavic people.82 Many policeo"cers uno"cially admitted in their interviews to Human Rights Watch thatthey had special procedures for ‘working with non-Russians’. These proce-dures were aimed at ful#lling informal quotas on arresting, deporting and#ning people of ‘non-Slavic appearances’. Some police departments infor-mally designated duty posts near those public places where the concentrationof non-Slavic people could be the highest. These included mosques, tradingmarkets, railway stations and building sites.83

More importantly, the police habitually accept bribes from migrant work-ers, turning their prosecution into a pro#table business. Human Rights Watchorganisation interviewees claimed that, while travelling to Russia, they had tobribe numerous legal enforcement o"cials: customs o"cers, police andimmigration authorities. The Human Rights Watch organisation also regis-tered cases in which police o"cers physically assaulted and robbed migrantworkers. In some cases, legal enforcement agencies representatives purposelypatrolled bus and railway stations to spot workers who were leaving for theirhome countries and thus carrying large sums of payments in cash. An averagepolice ‘tari$’ for being allowed to board the train was around Ru1000(£20.00). On some occasions, police used migrant workers as slave labour,asking them to perform manual work at their places of residence (HumanRights Watch 2009, pp. 71–74).

Workers whom I interviewed in the Moscow region claimed that they wereengaged in illegal #nancial relationships with selected police o"cers. Thelatter ‘protected’ those migrants who did not have appropriate documentationfrom legal prosecution and received a ‘monthly fee’ in exchange. ‘Protected’workers automatically became immune to virtually any form of prosecution,and, in the event of detention, were discharged within hours without furtherinvestigation. An average monthly fee for such ‘services’ amounted to some£120–50, and, given that each policeman ‘protected’ a few migrant brigades,this made for a pro#table #nancial sideline for many low-ranking o"cers.84

This practice came to be widely publicised in the Krasnoyarsk Krai, where anemployee of the Federal Immigration Service ‘protected’ a number of illegalworkers’ communities and received a monthly income of Ru17,000 (£400).Similar cases have been registered in the Samara region and KrasnodarKrai.85



It does not come as a surprise that the police often turn a blind eye tovarious xenophobic crimes. Human Rights Watch organisation registeredcases where the police did not react to complaints made by migrant workers.One such case was documented in the Orel region, where a number of workerswere physically abused and exploited working for a car-wash #rm (HumanRights Watch 2009, p. 47). This was one of the few cases that was madepublic and ended up in court. Another example took pace in Moscow when axenophobic gang beat up the Kabardino-Balkariya Minister of Culture, ZaurTutov. When an o"cer on duty arrived and heard Tutov describing the attackas taking place under the ‘Russia is for Russians’ slogan, he publicly agreedwiththis statement and left the crime scene, unwilling to take the matter further.86

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, remarks should be made withregard to the Kremlin’s immigration policy and its role on the emergence ofethnic tensions. The legislative approach of the federal authorities towards theimmigration problem has been problematic and has led to the growth of inter-ethnic hostilities. During the Putin presidency, the policy towards immigra-tion was chaotic and inconsistent. Moreover, the main vector of this policywas restrictive and not conducive to the development of inter-ethnic harmony.Russian legislation demands that migrants register with a local immigrationo"ce within three days of arrival. Moreover, obtaining a legal work permit isa complex process that requires a lot of paperwork and normally takes morethan 40 days if all procedures are followed correctly. These regulations forceworkers to labour illegally while waiting for their paperwork. During thisperiod, these people become vulnerable to exploitation, abuse and persecutionfrom legal enforcement agencies.

Moreover, administrative di"culties associated with this legislation lead tothe adoption of various black market practices associated with the productionof false residential documentation. Many mediating and illegal black marketagencies exploit the low educational level of their applicants.87 Human RightsWatch claims that many such #rms are located in the countries of applicants’origin. They collect money from potential workers, send them to Russia, andsubsequently disappear, failing to provide their clients with work and legaldocumentation. The migrants have no choice but to appeal to local Diasporaleaders, who force them to work illegally and exploit them. Many such prac-tices include human tra"cking, human trade, deployment of slave labour, anddemeaning treatment (Human Rights Watch 2009, pp. 45–52).

Given that the Russian Federation has signed a number of internationalagreements on labour protection and prevention of human tra"cking andslave labour, it has taken certain steps to make immigration more transparentand systematic. In summer 2007, the Laws on the ‘Legal Status of ForeignCitizens in the Russian Federation’ and ‘On Control of Immigration andPersons without Citizenship in the Russian Federation’ were adopted.88 Fol-lowing the enactment of these laws in January 2007, migrant workers beganto come out of the shadows. Indeed, by 2009 the share of those who wereregistered for work legally had increased by two and a half times.89



The law on Citizenship of the Russian Federation, initially adopted on 17June 1993,90 has been amended a number of times, swinging from overtlyxenophobic rhetoric to somewhat more tolerant doctrines. The #rst set ofamendments appeared in 2001, restricting the bene#ts of FSU citizens inobtaining Russian citizenship. However, the government considered suchchanges insu"cient, and a Presidential Administration group, headed by oneof Putin’s closest allies, Viktor Ivanov, introduced a new set of amendments tothe package (Ekspert 2003). This was formulated into the new Law on Citi-zenship of the Russian Federation 62-FZ and adopted on 15 May 2002. Thedocument, which came into force on 1 July 2002, made the conditions forobtaining citizenship of the Russian Federation more severe, by raising theresidential requirements from #ve to eight years, abolishing the practice ofdual citizenship, and introducing a compulsory Russian language test for allapplicants.91

However, as I have already mentioned, this policy has been inconsistent,and a radical reversal of the doctrine took place in the middle of Putin’s #rstterm. In his address to the Federal Assembly on 16 May 2003, Putin admittedthat the new law had resulted in a situation where ‘over a million of theinhabitants of the Russian Federation became individuals without a citizen-ship’. He later demanded that the State Duma relax the existing legal code.The new range of amendments adopted on 11 November 2003 eased theprocess of application for Russian citizenship, and granted FSU citizens servingin the Russian Army easy access to Russian passports.92

The 2006 Immigration Amnesty and the National Programme for theRelocation of Former Compatriots, enacted on 22 June 2006 by PresidentialDecree No. 637, were intended as further steps towards the liberalisation ofdemographic policy. The relocation programme assisted FSU citizens toimmigrate to Russia and gain permanent residence. The initiative o$ered theparticipants substantial #nancial bene#ts, including compensation for travel-ling to their new places of residence, the initial job seekers (or settlement)allowance, as well as access to all available social services and mortgagefacilities.93

At the same time, these attempts at liberalisation had a number of short-comings, and have also been followed up by serious dilutions of the initialliberalising intentions. For example, while welcoming the former compatriotsin theory, the Relocation Programme designated unattractive and depressedregions of the Russian Federation as potential areas of settlement. Moreimportantly, the initiative instituted #nancial penalties for persons leaving theregions of settlement within the #rst two years of relocation. The policy hasthus disregarded the natural !ows of migration, attempting to arti#ciallyallocate signi#cant numbers of migrants to unattractive residential territories.

It is also striking that the federal government has further decided to allowthe governors of prosperous regions to introduce quotas on migrants. Thisinitiative was formalised in the new version of the law ‘On the Legal Status ofForeign Citizens on the Territory of the Russian Federation’, which was



enacted on 15 January 2007. In connection to this, the Deputy Director of theFederal Migration Service, Viacheslav Postavnin, openly declared that ‘anexcess of 17–20 per cent of the proportion of immigrants in one selected ter-ritory creates discomfort for the indigenous population’.94 It is #nally indicativethat the Russian Immigration Service remains part of the Ministry of theInterior, which is a priori engaged in tackling crime.95 Such an institutionalstructure creates an atmosphere, in which most immigrants are, a priori, classedas those who fall under the jurisdiction of the law enforcement agencies.

The second policy phase arrived when it had become clear that the problemof xenophobia could take on threatening proportions and pose a signi#cantchallenge to the stability of the extant political system. From 2007–8, the statetook a more proactive stance towards xenophobic crimes. Yet again, threeareas seem the most important: (1) the judicial review for racial crimes wasaltered; (2) possibilities for the dissemination of xenophobic literature wererestricted; (3) changes within the educational system were introduced. Thisrepresented a policy shift, from previous inconsistent attempts to address theproblem towards an uncompromising determination to contain it.

First, in the judicial review realm, the number of ‘guilty’ sentencesincreased signi#cantly: 135 people were convicted in 2009 against 118 in 2008(Kozhevnikova 2010). The number and severity of custodial sentences hasalso increased. In 2009 one person was sentenced to 23 years in prison; threepeople received 17–19 years in custody; 30 people were sentenced to #ve toten years in prison, and 23 people were sentenced to three to #ve years. TheSOVA centre further observes that the share of conditional sentences has beenin decline since 2008. In 2009, the share of conditional sentences was 21 percent of the total amount of the ‘guilty’ sentences, while in 2008 this sharestood at 25 per cent. More importantly, the state had to give public justi#cationsfor handing down conditional sentences.

Second, the state introduced severe punishments for the dissemination ofxenophobic literature. A large number of printed materials and Internetresources were adjudged racist in 2010. The state either issued o"cial warn-ings or imposed #nes on those responsible for the distribution of such mate-rials. In summer 2010, Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) proposedgranting national legal enforcement agencies the right to close down extremistwebsites within three days.96 The FSB suggested a series of amendments tothe Law ‘On Information, Information Technology and Defence of Informa-tion’ that would oblige Internet providers to withdraw domain names upon arequest from local prosecutor o"ces. According to these proposals, suchdomain names could be blocked for no longer than one month, until theCourt ruled whether the site contained extremist content.97

Finally, the state adopted a new educational policy aimed at mitigatinginter-ethnic tensions. In June 2010 Russia’s General Prosecutor O"ce for-warded a letter to the Ministry of Science and Education of the RussianFederation demanding that it change some administrative settings. In parti-cular, the Prosecutor O"ce demanded that the Ministry abandon the practice



of keeping information on pupils’ nationalities in their personal #les. It alsorequired the Ministry to adopt more e"cient surveillance of the Internet sitesused by students and to enact adequate preventive measures towards the useof extremist websites. In addition, the General Prosecutor’s O"ce complainedthat theMinistry of Education has yet to develop some educational programmesfor teaching ethnic minorities’ native languages at schools.98

In conclusion, the normative realm of civil society in Russia gives cause forconcern. Radical and extremist movements !ourish in the country, while thestate often turns a blind eye to such developments. The acceleration of extre-mist movements largely represents a response to the various adaptation di"-culties generated by the new economic and institutional conditions. This#nding concurs with our initial proposition on the importance of moraldilemmas and social strains made in the introduction to this book. The newideological and moral void that emerged with the dissolution of the Sovietstate led many to adopt individualist behavioural strategies. The focus onmaterial wealth and socio-economic status resulted in feelings of resentment.Such feelings have led Russia’s citizens to embrace various defence techniques.These range from the vigorous pursuit of money ‘at all costs’ to the supportof pro-Kremlin movements that could serve as a start to a successful career,to involvement in ethnic hatred groups targeting illegal migrants. Even associety was going through these di"cult processes of transformational adap-tation, the state often supported extremist groups with a view to achievingparticularistic political goals of extant elites. The Kremlin’s policies towardsinter-ethnic tensions and domestic extremism were inconsistent until itbecame clear that such dynamics could seriously destabilise Russia’s politicalsystem. The range of new policies that could mitigate the negative e$ects ofdomestic political extremism has only just been enacted, and the results areyet to be seen.



5 State-sponsored civic associationsin RussiaSystemic integration or a ‘war of position’?

This chapter opens the subsequent series of discussions on civil society as partof society by examining state-sponsored associations in Russia. The simplestmethod to approach this issue would be to discard such associations from the‘genuine’ civil society realm and to deem them unable to genuinely pursue thetasks of a civic struggle. This method could be justi#ed logically and wouldnot seem entirely unfair. In the introduction to this book, I set a de#nitionalbarrier that would generally concur with such an approach. However, thischapter continues an important qualifying statement made in the same placeand proposes to unveil a few more layers of the discussion. The extent towhich we would not be able to include such organisations into the civilsociety framework would vary from country to country depending on tradition,experience, and the nature of such organisations activity.

Two principal scholarly and political approaches de#ne debates on therelationship between the state and civil society. The #rst approach belongs tothe East European and Russian political tradition. It views civil society as anentity antagonistic to the state. These ideas gained ground against the back-drop of complex historical circumstances, in which civil society, by developingin direct opposition to the state, became the only route to surviving variousforms of authoritarian state oppression (Seligman 1992, pp. 7–8; Lewis 1992,pp. 1–16; Sperling 2006, pp. 11–28 and 152–55; Mendelson and Glenn 2002,p. 6; Shevtsova 2007). Authors working within this intellectual paradigmoften claim that unimpeded proliferation of state-sponsored associationscould lead to the emergence of the state corporatist model of civil society(Fish 1996, pp. 264–75; Diamond 1996, pp. 236–37; Schmitter 1985, pp. 96–100;Sperling 2006, p. 164), and they fear that the state could organise, fund, sub-ordinate, and control interest groups with the ‘view of co-optation, domina-tion, and repression rather than bargaining’ (Diamond 1996, p. 236). Theyclaim that the establishment of this model is often accompanied by the creationof an authoritarian, or technocratic-developmental, regime.

The second line of thought belongs to the West European or Anglo-American tradition, which re!ects the idea of liberal democracy and parlia-mentarism. This paradigm has rested on the inclusion of civil society in astate decision-making process, while maintaining its autonomy from the state


administrative apparatus. Thus the proponents of this trend (Lewis 1992, p. 4;Taylor 1995b) insist that it is an overreaction to view civil society in a nega-tive sense, as a category that is oppositional to and incompatible with thestate. They claim that the scope of civil society may extend in concert with thegrowth in the power of the state, and that ‘the interests of democracy are notby any means best served by discouraging the role of the state or minimisingthe conditions of its development’ (Lewis 1992, pp. 3–4; see also Taylor1995b; Keane 1988a, pp. 3–4 and pp. 10–11).

Based on this theoretical duality, I propose a nuanced approach to thestudy of this type of civic movement in Russia. In this chapter, I delineate theareas of successful state–civil society co-operation, and then examine howthe two entities engage in a struggle for political and cultural in!uence. Theargument is that both of these approaches are reasonable, and that the Rus-sian case presents us with an intricate picture of the role of state-sponsoredassociations in the evolution of Russia’s civil society. It has a dual, con-straining and subversive, character. This chapter is in four parts. The #rstsection examines the rich history of the two intellectual traditions and sets outthe methodological framework for the subsequent examination of state-linkedcivic organisations in modern Russia. The three following parts apply thismethodology empirically.

Theoretical and philosophical considerations

The history of political philosophy explains the closeness of state and civilsociety in the West European tradition. Until the middle of the eighteenthcentury, European political thinkers treated the state and civil society ascoterminous issues (Bobbio 1988, p. 78; Keane 1988b, pp. 35–39; Seligman1992, p. 22). Such thinking relied on the natural law theory, which initiallyemerged in the Stoic school, and became the most important component ofthe philosophical tradition that established the concept of civil society in theeighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The most important proponents of thistheory – Locke, Kant, Rousseau, Hume – claimed the existence of a universallaw of nature arising both from ‘a natural providence and from the workingsof right reason in the human soul’. The ultimate, axiomatic principles of thiscosmic law are turned into a positive law expressed in the state, which thenbecomes an instrument for completing and perfecting the natural society(Seligman 1992, pp. 17–22; Cottingham 1996, pp. 486–88; Skinner 2006, pp.148–53; Nozick 1974, pp. 10–26 and pp. 51–53). A variation of such thinkingwas found in Hobbes and Spinoza, who regarded natural society in negativeterms, as a perpetual war of all against all, and treated the state as a radicalnegation of such natural condition (Ehrenberg 1999, pp. 70–80; Peters 1967,pp. 72). This theorisation relied on the ‘nature-civilisation’ antithesis, in whichthe state was portrayed as the advent of a civilised point of human organisa-tion. In this sense, the state and civil society terms were used interchangeably,meaning that organising public life in a coherent administrative fashion was

100 State-sponsored civic associations


equivalent to being ‘civil’, while the state-of-nature represented the ‘uncivil’human condition (Keane 1988b, pp. 35–36; Bobbio 1988, p. 79).

Hegel was the last representative of the natural law tradition in that hesubsequently criticised it for confusing the state and civil society. Hegel’s civilsociety is locatedwithin the economic realm and di$ers from both the family andthe state (Bobbio 1988, p. 79 and pp. 81–82). His civil society is preoccupiedwith the resolution of private economic con!icts, while the state deals withthe public good as a whole (Keane 1988b, pp. 52–53; Pelczynski 1984, p. 11;Cohen and Arato 1992, pp. 91–102). Nevertheless, Hegel regarded civil societyas a weak entity, incapable of overcoming its internal divisions and being inneed of constant guidance by, and positive interaction with, the state (Keane1988b: 53). To stress this point, Hegel includes some of the state apparatus incivil society. These were the elements concerned with regulating civic rela-tions: judicial machinery, as well as administrative and corporative structures.

It now becomes clear why the West European intellectual and politicaltrend warns against simply equating civil society with the multitude of asso-ciations independent of state tutelage (Taylor 1995b, pp. 219–22; Giddens1998). Indeed, Western theorists discuss not the participation of the state incivil society as such, but rather the extent of such participation. As Keane(1988b, p. 10) observes, ‘neither neo-conservatives nor social democrats denythe elevated role of the state in civil society expansion and survival’. Whileneo-conservatives insist on ‘selective withdrawal of state power from civilsociety’ and the gradual increase of private competition and market ethics(Keane 1988b:, p. 10), ‘the reformed social democrats strive to see how thestate and civil society can be combined to promote and maximise equalitywith liberty’ (Keane 1988b, pp. 3–4 and 11). In this light, Anthony Giddens(1998, pp. 79–80) argues that

state and civil society should act in partnership, each to facilitate, butalso to act as a control upon, the other … Depending on context, gov-ernment needs sometimes to be drawn further into the civil arena, some-times to retreat

Empirical examples back these theorisations. In the vast majority of Euro-Atlantic countries the state actively co-operates with civil society organisa-tions and #nances the bulk of their activity. In Belgium, for instance, such#nancing reaches up to 70 per cent of all NGO activity. In some cases, state-sponsored organisations play a crucial role in alleviating social and economicills and ful#lling important roles in the supply of essential services. The casein point is Japan, where the number of state-sponsored associations sig-ni#cantly increased during the post-war period and had levelled o$ with pri-vate sector organisations by 1965 (Inoguchi 2002, p. 362–63). These organisationsmade a signi#cant contribution to the functioning of local governments, whosubcontracted their services for the maintenance of public facilities and forthe management of particular events.

State-sponsored civic associations 101


The second strand of thought contrasts with such practice and theorisation.This line has a rich intellectual tradition that originates in the writings ofMarx. Marx established a decisive break with natural law theory. For him, thestate was no longer the highest point of ethical life or the elimination of thestate of nature in either a positive (Locke, Kant) or a negative (Hobbes, Spinoza)sense. Rather, it is an instrument of coercion belonging to the dominant eco-nomic class (Kymlicka 2002, p. 167; Lukes 1985, p. 5). Marx abandoned the pre-vious ‘nature–civilisation’ antithesis and introduced a new ‘basis–superstructure’dichotomy. In this dichotomy, the base represents a realm of economic relations,and the superstructure stands for the political institutional sphere.

Marx thought that civil society is coterminous with the base and re!ects allsocio-economic contradictions developing within this realm. Thus, the state isnot a separate and sovereign entity set above society, but a political super-structure that re!ects civil society and is conditioned and subordinate to it(Bobbio 1988, p. 76). This equally explains how this approach #nds a wel-come ground in the East European and Russian political traditions, whichhave been marked by perpetual antagonism between state and society. Thepost-Communist reincarnation of this approach has changed the ‘workingclass-bourgeoisie’ antithesis into a ‘liberal-authoritarian’ one, and now main-tains that the civil society, in its new liberal guise, should act as an antagonistto the post-Communist transitional state.

This brings us to the thought of Antonio Gramsci, whose revised theore-tical paradigm could serve rather well to explain some of civil society activityin Russia. Unlike Marx, Gramsci approached the interaction between thebase and the superstructure in historical, rather than economic deterministic,terms. He also claimed that structural changes within the base determinecorresponding changes within the superstructure. At the same time, ideologi-cal, political and cultural battles occur within the superstructure itself. Thesedebates could take the ideas and culture of the dominated classes to the pointof universalisation, and lead a historic process of the transformation of thestate (Bobbio 1988, p. 96; Cohen and Arato 1992, p. 149). Thus, civil societydevelops not within the economic base, but within the political superstructure.It represents ‘the soft underbelly’ of the political system, which o$ers thedominated classes a chance to quietly undermine the positions of the domi-nant economic group in the realm of culture, values, ideas and education(Cohen and Arato 1992, p. 149).

At the same time, this state transformation is not straightforward. Similarlyto Marx, Gramsci thought that the dominant group initially secures thenature and form of civil society. New cultural associations would have towork their way through the ‘trenches’ of the extant civil society, which repre-sents the current socio-political order and is conservative in nature. The aimof new associations is to gradually produce ‘dysfunction within the existingforms of social integration’ and to slowly replace ‘the old forms of consentwith the new ones’ (Cohen and Arato 1992, p. 150). Gramsci terms this pro-cess a ‘war of position’ for cultural hegemony. Hegemony is understood as an



instrument of socio-political domination that invariably involves a degree ofsocial consent, and, at the same time, helps to build a future model of societyand conception of the world (1988, p. 93; see also Cohen and Arato 1992, p.642). This war of position is conducted on the ‘state home territory’, withinits infrastructure and by its silent permission (Simon 1982, pp. 74–77; Keane1988b, p. 23; Pelczynski 1988, p. 365; Cohen and Arato 1992, p. 642 fn 88). Inthis paradigm ‘the ideologies become the primary agent of history and theinstitutions the secondary one’ (Bobbio 1988, p. 88).

The Russian case

These two intellectual traditions have a direct bearing on the study of Russia.The nature of the transition determined that the evolution of civil societyepitomised elements of both approaches. The #rst trend emerged in theattempt to emulate the Western political experience. The second, post-Hegeliantrend, on the other hand, has a natural place in the country’s political beha-viour for historical reasons. In the Western paradigm, the state fosters theessential elements of civil society by #nancing, promoting and encouragingthe multitude of civic organisations. Some of these associations are includedin the state administrative machine, in line with the Hegelian theorisation.Other organisations receive funding and grants from the state, which helpsthem to conduct di$ering forms of activity that are mutually bene#cial to thestate and society. Many such associations collaborate with the state on var-ious matters relevant to the public good. Yet beyond this, the functioning ofsuch associations is often compliant with the post-Hegelian paradigm of thestate-civil society antagonism. The Gramscian approach is best able toexplain this complex dynamic.

It is fairly clear from the theoretical introduction that Gramsci singles outtwo main dichotomies. The #rst one is historiographic, and pertains to theinterplay between economic and ethical-political factors. It serves to identifythe essential elements of the relationship between the base and superstructure.The second dichotomy relates to the tension between ethical and politicalfactors. It re!ects the processes that take place within the superstructure itself(Pelczynski 1988, pp. 371–72; Bobbio 1908, pp. 73–101). This dichotomyshows what must be done to achieve a structural transformation of the state.In Russia, both dichotomies continuously overlap and determine the rela-tionship between the state and civil society.

The #rst aspect suggests the emergence of a certain ‘culture’ rift within theeconomic base. This rift creates political tensions and prepares the ground forthe cultural ‘war of position’. On the one hand, the acceleration of economicgrowth and consumerism makes the population apprehensive about anysudden political changes, and creates tolerance of the conservation of theextant political order. We have discussed these developments with the exampleof the private phase evolution. The state clings to these sentiments and pro-motes them ideologically. On the other hand, the development of the modern



economy, the progression of market relations, and urbanisation, have all ledto the emergence of new popular perceptions and culture (Avraamova 2008;Gorshkov and Tikhonova 2004; VTsIOM 2008; for theoretical explanationsee Lipset 1960; Przeworski et al. 2000, pp. 50 and 111).1 These new sensa-tions are mostly harboured by urbanised proto-middle and middle classes thatinclude small business and property owners, academics, intelligentsia ando"ce workers. These people are fearful of the excessive concentration ofpower, the unclear and selective application of law, unde#ned property rightsand the arbitrariness of the legal enforcement apparatus. Such groups #ndtheir current lifestyles, socio-political and ethical preferences to be at oddswith the constrictive state-administrative paradigm, as well as with the systemof bureaucratic corruption practised and perpetuated by the dominant classes.Therefore, they are generally supportive of changes that could either create adi$erent set of political arrangements or alter the way in which power isexercised within the extant state apparatus.

Thus, while larger segments of the population are supportive of the currentdegree of political stability, the politically advanced middle classes harbourmore nuanced preferences closely related to a liberal paradigm. In this con-text, the head of VTsIOM Valery Fedorov (2009) observes a consolidation of#rmer boundaries between the so-called ‘Putin’s majority’, and those whocould potentially form the backbone of Russia’s politico-economic moder-nisation as initiated by Medvedev. The Putin majority was forged with a viewto the preservation of the status quo. This category values the stability andeconomic prosperity that came with Putin’s presidency, and usually votes forUnited Russia. At the same time, it is also important to remember that thosewho compose the societal base for modernisation originate within this Putinmajority. They represent its most active part, and also include those who havefallen out with this ‘majority’ culturally and ideologically. The modernisationand Putin majority segments intersect in many ways, although they do notconverge entirely. Andrey Konchalovsky, Russia’s eminent #lm producer,publicist, and social thinker, expressed similar ideas. He claimed that Russia’smost active and professional part of the population joins the United Russiarankswith the viewof improving their #nancial and business positions. At the sametime, some of these people may begin to branch out from the ER ideologicallyand desire to change the political, economic and social spheres.2

These gradual cultural changes #nd their immediate re!ection in the poli-tical superstructure. This brings us to the second dichotomy, which deals withthe cultural, political and ideological battles that take place within this realm.Indeed, many intellectuals, who compose the institutional backbone of civilsociety, understand the changes happening within the base and realise theneed for greater liberalisation. These intellectuals often participate in civicorganisations and state institutions and engage in cultural and ideologicaldissent. Thus, many civic organisations sponsored or promoted by the statebegin to develop a new agenda that di$ers from the constricting traditionfostered by the state. Even though many such organisations originate within



the state terrain, they subtly propagate new cultural values and conduct a‘war of position’ to entrench their new ethical ideas. Thus, the politicalsuperstructure realm becomes the most vital terrain to be occupied in thestruggle for emancipation. In this context, Fedorov (2009) observes thatUnited Russia will soon be forced to ‘work within a more pluralist politicalsystem when it will not be able to form a government independently’. Thisprocess, however, is not straightforward. I do not claim that the ‘war ofposition’ is nearing its climax and that we are to witness the imminent victoryof liberal forces. Rather, my argument is that the gradual war of positionrepresents a general historical direction in which the Russian state and societyare headed. This dynamic could slowly shift the extant ethical–politicalparadigm.

The rest of this chapter is purely empirical. In the #rst subsection I examinepositive co-operation between the state and civil society and discuss the areasin which such dynamics serve the public good. In the second and third sec-tions, I turn to the empirical analysis of the ‘war of position’ taking placewithin the Russian political superstructure.

Positive co-operation: !rst approach

In line with the #rst paradigm, the state integrates civil society into its policy-making process in three important areas: (1) alleviating socio-economicinequalities and ful#lling a role in the supply of essential services; (2) charitywork; (3) #nancing socio-economic research and selected initiatives. First,Russia’s opinion polls suggest that the public feels positive about the state co-opting civil society organisations into its policy-making processes within anumber of areas related to the public good. The December 2004 Zircon pollrespondents suggested that the state should work with NGOs in the areas ofsocial security provision (57 per cent), preservation of nature (31 per cent),helping those who had su$ered the consequences of natural disasters andindustrial accidents (25 per cent), popularising healthy lifestyle (25 per cent),preventing social exclusion and anti-social behaviour, such as drug abuse,alcoholism and crime (21 per cent). Moreover, 38 per cent of the respondentsthought that the state should grant such NGOs tax preferences, 32 per centclaimed that the state should increase its #nancial support, and as many as 25per cent felt that these NGOs should be entitled to preferential registrationprocedures.3

Seemingly in response to such wishes, President Medvedev proposed, in his2009 address to the Federal Assembly, to legalise a new category of so-called‘socially oriented’ NGOs.4 The de#nition of the ‘socially oriented’ activityinvolved most areas described above, but also included the development ofcivil society, helping refugees and those dislocated during ethnic and religiouscon!icts, providing free legal aid, charity work and activity within the edu-cation, culture, science and research sectors. In April 2010, Medvedev legallyenshrined this initiative in a range of amendments to Law 7-FZ ‘On Non-



Commercial Organisations’. Law 40-FZ, which formalised the amendments,clearly de#ned a spectrum of activities that could be considered as ‘sociallyoriented’ and clari#ed those areas in which the state was in a position to grantsuch organisations #nancial support. This involved placing orders for certaingoods and services with these organisations and providing tax relief to #rmsgranting #nancial assistance to such associations.5

The system of Territorial Self-Governance (Territorial’noe ObshchestvennoeSamoupravlenie, TOS) is an example of where the state integrates civil societystructures into its policy-making process on social security and essential ser-vices provision. Federal Law 131-FZ regulates the TOS activity. In accor-dance with this document, a TOS can be formed as an independentorganisation or registered as a non-commercial entity or NGO.6 In this case,the state encourages bottom-up initiatives and local autonomy, while acting,at the same time, as a regulating force, brokering con!icts of interests anddevising an appropriate institutional environment within which these localorganisations must operate. Thus TOS act as independent civil society orga-nisations, mediating structures between the local authorities and population,and as independent commercial organisations.

The leaders of these associations often feel positive about their work andare eager to expand their activities by embarking on more active co-operationwith state and business. Opinion polls conducted in 2005–6 by the TatarstanState Service Academy show that 48 per cent of respondents hoped to takepart in the hearings of local assemblies; 69 per cent spoke in favour of playinga greater role in poverty relief; 69 per cent thought that these organisationsshould get involved in the socio-political events of their localities; and 76 percent advocated a greater collaboration with representatives of local business(Khaidarov 2006: 12–13). Practical results of the TOS activity have also beensomewhat evident. In the Volgograd region, for example, over 2000 TOSorganisations created an Internet page, on which they explained their areas ofcollaboration with regional authorities.7 In the cities of Novosibirsk, Ulia-novsk and Sochi, TOS assist the local authorities with crime prevention,maintaining residential areas, organising sporting and cultural events, andhelping poverty relief. In Novosibirsk, local TOS organisations arrangedtemporary summer employment within the regional and municipal adminis-trative apparatus for students from poor families.8 In the Yaroslavl city, localTOS are active in establishing institutions of self-governance within housingassociations.9

Second, co-operation between the state and civil society in the charitysector is also noteworthy. Charitable activity in Russia has been on the riseduring recent years. The 2010 Zircon report shows that 10 per cent of Rus-sians participated in charitable organisations, and over 40 per cent wereinvolved in personal acts of charity in 2009 alone. In order to consolidate thistrend, the state enacted a political doctrine ‘On the Support of CharitableActivity’ in July 2009.10 The Ministry of Economic Development, the PublicChamber, an institution for state-society co-operation established in



September 2004 to analyse proposed legislation, and Russia’s voluntarycharity organisations collaborated in drafting the document. The doctrinedeclared the state’s intentions to create a supportive socio-political environ-ment for conducting charitable activity, to promote the formation of charityassociations, to assist with the enhancement of the professional level of suchassociations, and to deploy their potential in various state initiatives related tohealthcare, education, poverty relief, and municipal services.11

The Russian public was highly supportive of such a move. Indeed, a com-prehensive research conducted by the Moscow Higher School of Economicsshows that 53 per cent of the respondents thought that the state should createa conducive environment for such organisations, 36 per cent believed that itshould grant them tax relief and 31 per cent thought that the state shouldsupport such associations morally (Mersiyanova 2010, p. 102). More impor-tantly, 72 per cent of the respondents thought that the state should monitorthe motives behind charitable activity. This indicates that the majority of thepopulation agreed with the thesis that the state should somehow superviseand control the activity of such organisations (Mersiyanova 2010, p. 105).

The state took an active part in charitable activity. The same researchshows that 22 per cent of all charity work in Russia is conducted by state-dominated organisations, 27 per cent by rich people, 19 per cent by indepen-dent charity organisations, 10 per cent by business structures and 19 per centby ordinary Russians (Mersiyanova 2010, p. 98). A few examples of the state’scharitable activity are in order. The Give Life Foundation, which cares forchildren with cancer, co-operated with the state-dominated Sberbank to issuea special credit card that transfers a percentage from every transaction to theFoundation. Russia’s cabinet, headed by Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, aswell as the regional governments, obtained such cards and helped the foun-dation to promote its activity across Russia’s regions.12 As a result, theFoundation collected some Ru100mln between January and March 2010alone, which helped many children across Russia to pay for life-savingoperations.13 The state also actively co-operates with charity organisationsthat are involved in poverty relief among veterans of local wars. Regionalgovernments, in association with local Afghan war veteran movements, allo-cate annual grants to veterans and to the families of those killed in action.These are normally redistributed on 15 February, the date of Soviet with-drawal from Afghanistan in 1989. In February 2009, for example, Chechenregional veterans received single grants of Ru6,500, combining to make aregional sum of Ru1,6mln, while widows of those killed in action were allocatedgrants of Ru25,000 each.14

Big business charity activity must be mentioned separately. This has oftenbeen conducted with the direct participation, approval, or even request, of thestate. In some cases, big business used charitable acts to demonstrate loyaltyto the state and consolidate its political position. Of particular importancewere Roman Abramovich’s donations to the Chukotka Autonomous Okrug,Viktor Veksel’berg’s purchase of Fabergé eggs15 and Alisher Usmanov’s



purchase of the Rastropovich–Vishnevskaya arts collection.16 However,modern charity activity has gone far beyond that. Russia’s ten leading com-panies with close links to the Kremlin donated some Ru14bln to charitableprojects in 2008 alone.17 As we have already observed, many top executivesestablished charitable foundations in the areas of sports, culture, arts, andscienti#c research. Oleg Deripaska, the owner of Russian Aluminium, DmitryZimin, the founder of Vympelkom-Beeline, Nikolai Tsvetkov, the co-owner ofUralsib, Dmitry Zelenin from AFK Systema, Mikhail Prokhorov fromOnexim Group, Aleksandr Khloponin, formerly from Norilsk Nikel – were allinvolved in such activity.18

Finally, starting from 2006, the state began redistributing grants on parti-cular civic projects. This move recited a welcome response among Russia’sNGOs. The 2007 Zircon group poll, conducted among Russia’s NGO leaders,had 88 per cent of respondents claiming that the state should increase its#nancial support; 4 per cent thought that such support should remain at thecurrent level, and only 1 per cent suggested that it must be reduced.19 Thus, in2006, Ru500mln was redistributed, while in 2007 the #gure rose to Ru1.25bln,and in 2009 the funding stood at Ru1.2bln.20 In order to avoid bureau-cratisation, the President and the Public Chamber nominated representativesfrom selected civic organisations to redistribute grants to their peers. Thus,the National Charity Foundation was entrusted with allocating someRu400mln to smaller associations tasked with poverty relief. The Znanie(Knowledge) Foundation was granted some Ru270mln to select worthy edu-cational programmes. The Grazhdanskii Klub organisation (Civic Forum) wasgiven some Ru230mln to support various youth initiatives (Nikitin andBuchanan 2002, pp. 147–65). The Liga Zdorov’ia Natsii movement (NationalHealth League) was entrusted with Ru150mln for health care initiatives. Thenon-commercial partnership V Podderzhku Grazhdanskogo Obshchestva (InSupport of Civil Society) was entitled to redistribute some Ru135mln forhuman rights movements, while the Fund of Civic Projects (InstitutObshchestvennogo Proektirovaniya) was given Ru60mln for civil societydevelopment programmes. It is now clear that, in line with the Europeantradition, the Russian state integrates some of the civil society organisationsinto its policy-making process and encourages its activity to serve the publicgood in the best possible way.

The war of position and dissent: the Marxist trend

Trenches of the dominant order

We now turn to the second philosophical paradigm. As discussed in the the-oretical section above, the Marxist tradition views civil society as a re!ectionof the existing political order and the main institutions of civil society as the‘trenches’ of the dominant elites. At the same time, the rupture of this struc-ture originates in the political realm, re!ecting multifarious changes taking



place within the economic base. Here, I will examine how the ‘trenches’ of thedominant order located within the political superstructure could ful#l a dualfunction. On the one hand, they promote, consolidate and sustain the poli-tical hegemony of the ruling elites. The state responds to such servicesfavourably, by politically encouraging these associations. On the other hand,the ‘the labyrinthine structure’ of these trenches and their inherent complexity‘allow well-organised assailants to in#ltrate’ (Keane 1988a,b,c, p. 23). Suchagents subtly conduct the cultural ‘war of position’ by disseminating new lib-eral values and propagating systemic change. I distinguish four of the mostimportant institutional forums that could serve both as ‘trenches’ of thedominant order and as the ‘war of position’ terrain: (1) ideological wings/clubs within the United Russia party; (2) the federal and regional PublicChambers; (3) state-sponsored civic organisations and civic associations withclose links to the state; (4) think-tanks and analytical agencies. In this sub-section, I will examine how they serve the state, and thereafter turn to analysetheir subversive activity.

Let me begin this discussion with a brief overview of the so-called ideolo-gical wings within the United Russian party. The emergence of such ‘wings’has projected a somewhat civic, pluralistic approach to political procedures. Ithas also o$ered the hope that greater civic engagement could be the result.Three o"cial clubs existedwithin the party until 2011: the Liberal-Conservative4 November Club, the State Patriotic Club, and the Centre for Social Con-servative Policy.21 The 4 November Club in particular was pledged to engagein research and publishing activities with a view to promoting liberal con-servative values in line with the interests of Russia’s growing middle class.22 Italso criticised the current political system and questioned the judicial inde-pendence and arbitrariness of the legal enforcement structures and the lack ofjudicial independence.23

At the same time, such intra-party discussion, which could appear to be theacceleration of civic trends, served to conserve the political dominance of theruling elite, and to re!ect the dominant political order. Indeed, VladislavSurkov was behind the Club’s inception as a means to co-opt Russia’smedium-sized business and middle-ranking administrative elites into theparty’s political realm. He hoped that these strata could deploy the party asan instrument for career advancement and administrative pressure, and wouldback it at the ballot box in exchange.24 In its publishing activity, the Clubworks together with the Institute for Public Projects (Institut Obshchestven-nogo Proektirovaniya, INOP) institute, and usually acts as an advocate forthe prevailing political order based on a strong leadership that is capable ofensuring socio-economic stability.25 The establishment of the Centre forSocial Conservative Policy was a political response by the party leader BorisGryzlov, who wished to keep United Russia ideologically monolithic andposition it from a socialist, rather than conservative, perspective. However,this move was also related to the Kremlin’s wish to secure United Russiaideological dominance over the entire political spectrum and hence to win the



2007–8 electoral cycle. Having completed this goal, the party could become apolitical instrument for consolidating the position of Russia’s political elites.26

The Public Chamber is another organisation that was called on to promotethe extant mode of socio-political integration. Law No 32-FZ ‘On the PublicChamber of the Russian Federation’, which was enacted on 1 July 2005 afterbeing passed by the State Duma in March 2005, orders the Chamber to serveas a mediating agent between the state and society by conducting an expertassessment of federal and regional legislation, exercising public control overthe Federation and regional governments, and ensuring freedom of speechwithin the Russian Federation. Moreover, the Chamber was ordered to pub-lish an annual report on Russia’s civil society. The regions were also to formlocal Public Chambers.27

At the same time, many legal aspects point to this institution having beenformed in order to enable the dominant elite groups to consolidate theirideological positions. The mode of the Chamber’s formation is of particularimportance. The federal Chamber consists of 126 distinguished members ofRussia’s civil society. The President appoints the #rst 42 delegates. Thesedelegates subsequently elect 42 more members from Russia’s civic organisa-tions, and the combined 84 members select representatives of regional civilsocieties. The criteria and procedure for the nomination of the remaining 84Chamber members, however, are not clearly outlined, which allows, from alegal point of view, free interpretation. It is also important that article 26 ofLaw 32-FZ states that the Federation government appoints the head of thisinstitution on the recommendation of the Chamber’s Council (Bondareva2006, p. 37; Kolomytseva and Kolomytseva 2008, pp. 148–51). Some expertsclaimed that this mode of the Chamber’s formation makes it a useful instru-ment in the hands of the executive power, and that it should therefore bealtered if this body is supposed ever to become a genuine institution of publicpolitics. The former editor-in-chief of Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Viktor Tret’ya-kov, proposed to reduce the in!uence of the Presidential Administration byallowing it to nominate a pool of 200 experts who would proceed to elect asearch committee, which would then select candidates from the Presidentialreserve.28

Furthermore, the aims and objectives of the Chamber’s activity have notbeen legally clari#ed (Bondareva 2006, p. 33; Kolomytseva and Kolomytseva2008, pp. 150–51). While article 2 of the document stipulates that the Cham-ber may carry out ‘societal expertise’, ‘societal initiative’, and ‘societal con-trol’, the meanings of such tasks are not de#ned. Thus, the Chamber could beaccused of illegal activity at any time. In addition, article 17 of Law 32-FZstates that the Chamber’s decisions are not binding. This means that the statecan simply ignore its opinion. Moreover, while article 16 of the same billempowers the Chamber to provide an expert assessment on various laws,ranging from federal constitutional amendments to various acts of local self-governance, article 18 negates this right by stating that such assessment canonly take place on a request from the Presidential Administration, the



Federal Assembly, or the government of the Russian Federation (Bondareva2006: 33). This system was in place until February 2009, when the StateDuma passed the law compelling the lower house to forward all draft legislationfor the Chamber’s assessment.29

Thus, the Chamber often acts as an apologist for the dominant political order.The most recent case took place when the Chamber supported the candidacyof Vladislav Surkov to chair the Russo-American committee on the developmentof civil society. This move produced an outcry among Russia’s liberals, whoforwarded an open letter to the presidents of both countries with a request forSurkov to be removed from this position.30 Many experts claim that theChamber abstained from criticising the highest echelons of Russia’s elite andoperated within the boundaries of self-censorship (Petrov 2006).31 In relation tothis, Russia’s radical human rights activist Sergey Kovalev refused theChamber’s invitation to take part in its hearings, and forwarded an open letter tothis institution claiming that it has been established with the view of defend-ing the extant system of political relations.32 Regional experts often claim that localpublic chambers are only deployed to in!uence public opinion by popularisingthe policies of the regional authorities (Frolova et al. 2007: 51).

The Chamber was also silently supporting the state during the researchgrants redistribution process. The foreign policy dimension was evident. Inthe 2007 round, the Chamber’s grants aimed at negating the e$ects of Wes-tern #nancing. The INOP head, Valery Fadeev, claimed that ‘we must makean e$ort to fund our own civil society so as to counter the lavish Western#nancing that is primarily aimed at promoting political activity’.33 During the2006 round, the Chamber allocated grants to organisations whose memberswere in the selection committees nominated by the President. Additionally,the number of winners was arbitrarily reduced from 617 to 516 in 2006. Noneof the oppositional NGOs, such as the Memorial for Human Rights (ZaPrava Cheloveka) and Memorial for Civic Rights (Za Grazhdanskie Prava)movements, have been included in the winners list during the same year.34

Given that the Public Chamber mostly refrained from an open political con-!ict with the state, popular interest in this institution has declined since thetime of its formation. While, in February 2006, 19 per cent of the LevadaCentre respondents hoped that the Chamber would be a meaningful politicalinstitution, this #gure declined to 15 per cent in January 2007. Similarly, thenumber of those who knew nothing about this institution increased from 22to 40 per cent during the same period.35

Finally, state-endorsed organisations of civil society also supported thepolitical interests of current elites. A number of foreign-funded organisationsadmitted that Vladimir Lukin, the ombudsmen for human rights, #led reportsthat were compliant with the state’s wishes, lacked boldness and clarity, anddid not touch upon serious political problems. He abstained in particularfrom criticising the state over freedom of speech, the situation in Chechnyaand attacks on the independent media. Also, as we could derive from theprevious discussions, the function ofNashi andMolodaya Gvardiyawas to ‘patrol



the boundaries of the legitimate, or state-approved public sphere’ (Richter2009: 49). Similarly, many business associations were loyal to the state andemerged with the approval of the Russian authorities, in order to supervise,control, and regulate the articulation of interests by entrepreneurial commu-nities. Of particular importance were the Council of Entrepreneurship under theaegis of the Russian Government, the Delovaya Rossiya association, and theUnion of Russia’s Entrepreneurial Organisations OPORa. Such associationsalmost always act with the permission of the Kremlin authorities and neverpursue an independent political agenda (Zudin 2005: 37–39). The DelovayaRossiya association, in particular, co-operates with the 4 November Club indrafting the main proposals for the country’s economic development.36

Dissent and the war of position

Let me now examine how these trenches of civil society, located within thepolitical superstructure, turn into the terrain for the ‘cultural war of position’.Besides the already outlined institutions, I will also discuss some of Russia’sthink-tanks and provide a case study of a state-controlled civic organisationfor Afghan war veterans, Boevoe Bratstvo (Brothers in Arms).

First, despite the fact that the existing United Russia factions generally representthe ‘trenches’ of the dominant order, Valery Fedorov (2009) still observes thatthe party is split between those who favour the status quo and those who wish tosee a serious systemic change. Indeed, the problem of an ideological commit-ment is paramount, in that many party members deploy their membership as aninstrument for career advancement, while at the same time holding di$ering,and often more liberal, views.37 This is in line with the popular perception ofthe party. The 2008 Foundation for the Study of Public Opinion (FondObshchestvennogo Mneniya, FOM) poll respondents, though generally sup-porting United Russia activity (62 per cent), thought that its members joinedthe party for career purposes and pro#teering (14 per cent of the answers).Curiously, this answer composed the second largest category after the ‘I don’tknow group’ (some 40 per cent of the answers).38 These popular and partisansentiments clearly surfaced in 2010, when the party established yet anotherliberal wing. The new group declared themselves the ‘party consciousness’.39

Some prominent business executives, such as Vadim Dymov, Nikolai Vla-senko and Eduard Pichugin, #nance this organisation, and the movement hasalso introduced membership fees in order to secure further #nancial indepen-dence from the state and the party. The club aims at e$ecting ideologicalchanges within the party by liberalising its principles and attracting liberalvoters. A number of Russian analysts claim that the appearance of this clubre!ects some serious ideological changes within the party membership. Thedissenting members propagate the emerging culture of Russia’s new middleclass, who is none too pleased with the current style of political conduct.40

Dissent within the ordinary United Russia members was becoming moreevident towards the end of the Medvedev presidency. Fedor Bondarchuk,



Russia’s popular #lm producer and a party member since 2009, emphaticallyclaimed at the ER Congress that the party had drowned in lies, corruptionand wrongdoing. Bondarchuk insisted that Russia’s society is nearing a poli-tical explosion and that the party must reform itself in order to avoid a cata-strophe. He argued that the acceleration of the dialogue between the state andcivil society via the means of new media such as the Internet and social net-works is the only solution to this situation.41 It is also important that theparty was becoming aware of this sentiment. Hence, President Medvedev’sproposal on political and economic modernisation, which were generallysupported by the majority of Russia’s liberal and middle-class intelligentsia,became the foundations of the party’s December 2011 electoral programme.Out of the eight programmatic points, six were borrowed from Medvedev’smodernisation thesis. Of particular importance were the lines on modernisa-tion of the country’s economy, improving labour productivity and the invest-ment climate, as well as the struggle against corruption.42 Moreover,Medvedev pledged that following the 2011 parliamentary victory the UnitedRussia party must undergo a serious restructuring in order to rid itself ofpro#teers, corrupt o"cials, and to become more modern and liberal. Withoutsuch changes, Medvedev claimed, the party would not be able to win anysubsequent rounds of elections.43

Second, the war of position is also evident in Russia’s think-tanks. Theirinnovative political ideas are popularised by the printed press, the Internetand the televised media and spawn numerous public debates. The most sig-ni#cant ideological battle takes place over the question of the pace andstarting-point of the ongoing socio-economic modernisation. Opinions aredivided between those who adopt the ‘gradualist’ approach and those whoargue in favour of more radical solutions. The #rst group departs from theproposition that Russia’s modernisation can only be conducted on a stablepolitical basis. Therefore, current socio-economic stability must serve as aspringboard for economic development and modernisation. By advocating theprimacy of economic over political reform, this group is reluctant to alter theextant system of administrative state dominance.44

The second group claims that political reform should be a primary elementof modernisation. While not denying the importance of socio-economic andpolitical stability, they claim that it is unethical to subjugate political life tothe interests of one dominant party (Bunin et al. 2010). They argue thatRussian society is too wealthy, too urbanised and too educated for single-handed arbitrary governance. These analysts claim that Russia alreadyaccomplished industrialisation during the 1930s. Therefore, it cannot retreadthe path of China, which uses the ongoing industrialisation process to fuel itseconomic recovery and builds its industrial success on the premise of anauthoritarian system.45 This group defends the interests of those societal seg-ments, who look beyond mere economic stability and are interested in thecreation of a political environment supportive of e$ective property rights andfair market competition.



Di$ering analytical reports re!ect the struggle between these two views. Ofparticular importance was the annual INOP report that delineated the mostimportant aspects of Russia’s policymaking in 2009. The INOP authorscomposed a generalised introductory chapter, and then invited 15 indepen-dent experts to draft the core articles. Given the INOP’s intimate links withthe Kremlin, the introduction did not sit well with the culturally di$erentbody of text. The INOP authors argued within the sovereign democracy andgradualist paradigms, and advocated national variants of democracy.46 Thecore authors, on the other hand, adopted a more liberal approach and insistedon the primacy of political modernisation.

The Institute of Modern Development (INSOR) report, entitled ‘Russia of the21st Century: the Image of Tomorrow’, further contributed to this debate.While the INSOR leadership claims that this institution works under theaegis of the Presidential Administration, it is composed of Russia’s mostprominent liberal experts – Igor Yurgens and Evgenii Gontmakher, to name buta few.47 Their research document proposed an ideological alternative to thestate-endorsed ‘Strategy 2020’ – the United Russia political programme.48 Inthis paper, the INSOR experts advocated a liberal reconstruction of the extantpolitical system and demanded the complete elimination of political and eco-nomic censorship, a return to direct popular voting for regional governors, alowering of the electoral threshold from the current 7 to a more realistic 4 percent, and comprehensive reform of the legal and judicial systems. In theinternational arena, INSOR specialists advocated the forging of friendlier tieswith the West and eventual accession to NATO.49 Both reports spawnednumerous ideological debates that re!ected the cultural war of position. In the#rst case, the discussions continued on the pages of Russia’s most author-itative newspapers and journals, thus re!ecting the unfolding war of position.50 Inthe second case, many pro-state analysts responded extensively, and some ofthem branded the document as deliberate subversive activity (vreditel’stvo).51

Third, despite the fact that the Public Chamber generally abstains from anyserious criticism of the extant system, it still acts as the terrain for the war ofposition. The ongoing public debate over whether the Public Chamber hasany real political weight and acts as a forum for a dialogue between the stateand society, or whether it is just a façade for an institution #rmly moulded intothe extant ‘power vertical’, contributes, in its own right, to some cultural andpolitical battles (Evans 2006; 2008; Vyzhutovich 2009). Moreover, as Richter(2009: 61) observes, the Public Chamber acts as an ‘additional forum, fromwhich society could pressure governmental agencies to do a better job’. Someselected Chamber members, who espouse new cultural values, often questionthe state on some principal matters.52 The ensuing public discussions invari-ably give publicity to the new values. Of particular importance has been theChamber’s initiative to support the militia major Alexei Dymovsky, whosesystemic criticism of the police force, expressed in a series of open videoaddresses to Russia’s Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, placed him under thethreat of prosecution.53 The Chamber also joined Russia’s liberals in their



struggle to release the ex-Yukos lawyer Svetlana Bakhmina – a move thatquestioned the objectivity of Russia’s judicial system.54 The institution defen-ded Russia’s juries system against the pending restrictive reform in December2008,55 and proposed to enact sanctions against State Duma absentees inApril 2010.56 The most notable struggles, however, happened between theChamber and the Moscow city authorities. These battles exposed systemic!aws in the Russian political structure and raised signi#cant questions aboutthe prevailing style of policy-making.57 The February 2010 Rechnik villagecase, when the Moscow authorities evicted a number of villagers, with a viewto erecting a sporting infrastructure in the area, was particularly noteworthy.The Chamber united with the Guild of Russian Lawyers to provide theRechnik residents with free legal advice against the city authorities, andquestioned why the state had neglected to implement a similar relocationprocedure in a neighbouring village populated by federal o"cials and prominententrepreneurs.58

Regional Public Chambers mirrored the federal experience. The Perm CivicChamber, for example, faced local authorities over important administrativeand economic issues. Of particular importance was the struggle for the pre-servation of direct popular voting for the local mayor,59 and also criticism ofthe piecemeal state measures of legal enforcement agency reform.60 Manyother regional public chambers struggled against gubernatorial attempts tonominate loyal candidates to these institutions. Some serious con!icts occur-red in the Samara regions, where the members refused to support guberna-torial candidates;61 in the Ulyanovsk region, where some delegates quit theirpositions in protest;62 and in the Sverdlovsk region, where the Chamberorganised a public meeting of protest against the governor’s decision torestrict the method of Chamber formation.63

Finally, a number of civil society institutions that have close links to thestate also contribute to the ongoing ‘war of position’. Selected human rightsorganisations often act as social agents within the government, and are pre-pared to struggle for the ful#lment of their civic duties. The o"ce of theHuman Rights Commissioner of Russia, currently occupied by a co-founderof the Yabloko party, Vladimir Lukin, and the Human Rights Commissionunder the President, headed by Ella Pam#lova, are cases in point.64 Eventhough, as mentioned above, these institutions are reluctant to engage in opencon!ict with the authorities, their very existence, and their public activities,contribute to subtle shifts within the political superstructure. Lukin often cri-tically assesses the functioning of Russia’s state institutions. In 2006, hereceived various complaints from 3.2 per cent of the population, which mostlyconcerned violations and abuse in the social sphere and criminal prosecu-tion.65 Lukin also embarked on an active attack on state policies against thefreedom of meetings and associations, by presenting, in 2008, a criticalsurvey, in which he stated that the Russian regional and central authoritieshad clamped down on a large number of demonstrations and violated citi-zens’ rights of free participation.66 Pam#lova also exerted pressure on the



state to relax the existing law ‘On Non-Pro#t Organisations’. In drafting theamendment package, Pam#lova worked closely with the Levada Centre and anumber of independent human rights organisations.67

Some civic organisations that o"cially support state policies also displaydissenting trends. Boevoe Bratstvo, an organisation of local war veteransestablished by the Afghan veteran groups, is a good case study. The movementsupports veterans of local con!icts, as well as Russian and Soviet ArmedForces veterans, their families, and all those who su$ered the consequences ofvarious wars. It unites over 90,000 local organisations, 400 regional branches,60 inter-regional associations and nearly 50 international groups within theCIS.68 The organisation is closely associated with the state. The governor of theMoscow region, Boris Gromov, who is the former commander of the 40th Armythat was deployed in Afghanistan between 1979 and 1989, heads the move-ment. The United Russia State Duma deputy Valery Vostrotin, a former com-mander of the 345th Independent Guards Airborne Regiment deployed inBaghram during the same period, leads the Moscow city branch. The orga-nisation signed a contract of co-operation with the United Russia party,which binds Boevoe Bratstvo to support the party initiatives politically.Finally, many rank-and-#le participants use their memberships to advancecareers and business connections within the state structures.69

At #rst glance, this organisation seems admirably suited to provide the statewith ideological and political backing. However, a nuanced examination revealssome serious cracks within this staunchly pro-Kremlin image. Indeed, manymovement members fall outside of ‘Putin’s majority’ stratum. Many Afghanwar veterans became successful #nancially during the 1990s, and thus joinedthe ranks of the new wealthy and middle class. Hence they often espouse newcultural political values and desire a reconstitution of the current politicalsystem. Those veterans who were unable to launch successful business careersresented the state for neglecting their social security needs, and complainedabout the state’s administrative ine"ciency in dealing with their requests.70

The movement’s leaders estimate that less than one half of the participantssupport the United Russia party, and this number is in a steady decline.71

Thus, the movement was prepared to challenge the state from an ideologi-cal point of view. This was re!ected in the movement’s proposals on militaryreform, which aim at creating a more just, e"cient and transparent system ofsocial security and legal enforcement agencies. Tackling corruption, however,was the most important sphere, in which the movement members wereengaged in the war of position. In line with our theorisation, this war hasbeen conducted on the state territory. On the one hand, the movement leaderso"cially insisted that their struggle is against particular persons within thestate apparatus, and not with the system as such. The movement issued ano"cial statement supporting the United Russia anti-corruption rhetoric, andtook part in some of United Russia’s o"cial meetings devoted to this theme.72

On the other hand, the movement began to co-operate with the Spravedlivost’(Justice) organisation – a human rights association that targets the state on



many serious issues and could be regarded as part of the non-systemic opposi-tion.73 Moreover, the most active Boevoe Bratstvo leaders issued public state-ments systematically criticising the extant judicial and political system andadvocating serious political change. Of particular importance was the activityof the deputy director of the Moscow city branch, Dmitry Baranovsky.74

Baranovsky went a step further and exposed speci#c persons within the Moscowregional administration and security service who were involved in corruption.The regional government retaliated, which resulted in Baranovsky’s arrest onfalse allegations and the launch of the movement’s nationwide struggle for hisrelease.75

To conclude, this chapter examined the functioning of state-sponsored (andstate linked) associations in Russia. Given that the nature of the relationshipbetween the state and civic movements depends on political context of eachstate (Tilly 1984; Tarrow 2011, p. 27), I examined such organisations throughthe prism of two di$erent intellectual paradigms emanating from Eastern andWestern intellectual traditions. The necessity of the dual approach stems fromRussia’s peculiar position as a semi-authoritarian, transitional state located inthe ‘twilight’ (McFaul et al. 2004, p. 8; see also Diamond 1999, p. 22) zone ofdemocracy. The #rst line analysed the close co-operation, even integration, ofcivil society structures into the state decision-making process. The evidencefrom Russia shows that the public good is best served through the accelera-tion of positive moments of the state–civil society co-operation. At the sametime, devising the watershed between the state and civil society remainsessential, which is not the case in modern Russia.

In this chapter, I deployed the Gramscian approach to delineating such aseparation. The ‘war of position’ between the dominant state institutions andrepresentatives of the emerging liberal culture has been discussed. This para-digm is particularly useful, in that the Gramscian theory emerged during acertain period in Italian history when, in Gramsci’s view, the country wassu$ering from a particular crisis of culture. ‘The crisis consists precisely in thefact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born’ (Cohen and Arato1992: 144 fn 77). By the same token, in modern Russia the old state-paternalistic paradigm faces ideological and structural di"culties, but the newliberal-democratic culture has not been fully born. The lenience towards thenew paradigm is gradually evolving, in line with the systemic transformationof the base. This leads to the emergence of a cultural rift, which could beovercome in the course of economic development and the ‘war of position’conducted by civic associations within the state superstructure terrain. Toconclude, these developments speak on favour of the associational civil societysphere in Russia. The interaction between the permanent process of integra-tion and the silent war of culture determines the complex web of relationshipsbetween the state and civil society in this country. At this time, such interac-tion – despite the odds and problems – shows some positive incrementaldynamic for the civil society’s associational realm.



6 Foreign-sponsored associationsin RussiaThemes and problems

This chapter discusses the functioning of foreign-funded NGOs in Russia.Foreign aid to developing and transitional countries is an important segmentof international relations. However, how signi#cant is this subject for Russia?Prior to the introduction of the law on NGOs in 2006, there were no o"cialgovernment data available on the number of such organisations operating inthis country. The nature of these organisations’ activity was also unknown.The head of Russia’s Federal Registration Service Sergey Movchan declaredin October 2005 that his institution could not estimate how many non-governmental and non-commercial organisations funded by external donorsare active in Russia. He claimed that the number varied between 250 and500.1 Comprehensive analysis of Russia’s NGOs #nancial structure conductedby the independent Zircon group suggests that the number of foreign-fundedNGOs in Russia is not large. NGOs normally draw their funds from domesticsupplies. Indeed, 19 per cent of total funds emanate from the NGOs com-mercial activity; 13 per cent stem from the contributions made by Russiancompanies; 13 per cent originate from membership fees; and as much as 25per cent come from federal, regional and municipal institutions. Only 11 percent are channelled through various foreign donations (Zircon 2008).

Similarly, statistical analysis accomplished by Russia’s Public Chambershows that the amount of foreign-funded NGOs in the country is relativelysmall. The Chamber claims that, as of May 2008, there have been 251 foreignNGOs functioning in Russia. The vast majority of these organisations (124,which corresponds to 54 per cent) came from the United States (Golobokova2009, p. 4). At the territorial level, most foreign-funded NGOs operate at theFar East and North-West Federal Districts (18 per cent each). Moscow Fed-eral City follows with 12 per cent of all foreign-funded NGOs; Siberian andSouthern Federal Districts had 11 per cent of such organisations each, whileVolga and Ural Federal Districts hosted 10 and 9 per cent of foreign NGOsrespectively (Zircon 2007, p. 31).

Western aid to the development of civil society in transitional countriesspawned numerous academic debates from a theoretical–comparative point ofview. The general concern was that, despite promoting democratic ends andsupplying a wide range of facilities, such funding bodies impose certain


conditions that the recipients either cannot ful#l or #nd unsuitable for theirparticular social and cultural climate (Howard 2003, p. 152; Ottoway andChung 1999; Edwards 2004). Edwards (2004, p. 105) speaks of the phenom-enon of ‘civil society determinism’, in which foreign funded organisationsattempt to blindly implement their established societal ideals, often ignoringdomestic expressions of citizen action that do not conform to Westernexpectations. This largely distorts ‘the authenticity of pluralism by favouringsome groups over others, retards the development of embedded relationshipsbetween states, citizens and their associations’, and creates a ‘backlash whenassociations are identi#ed with foreign interests’ (Edwards 2004, pp. 103–5;see also Howard 2003, p. 159).

In this light, I will follow the existing literature on the subject and distin-guish three main problems that will be relevant to our subsequent discussionon Russia. First, foreign NGOs face the problem of constituency building.Second, their long-term impact is questionable. Third, they are often viewedas organisations that pursue foreign policy objectives of the donor states ledby the United States. In the Russian case, there is a fourth dimension that isrelated to the impact of the activity of these NGOs on state policies and on therelationship between the state and civil society. These problems will constitutethe backbone of this chapter. I will detail them in the following theoreticalsubsection and then discuss such matters empirically in the four followingparts.

Theoretical dimensions

First, the problem of constituency building is particularly signi#cant for foreign-funded NGOs. The main objective of such NGOs is to involve the generalpopulation in voluntary activity with the view to articulate their problems andconcerns to the state. At the same time, foreign #nancing often leads suchorganisations to ignore objective domestic needs. Constrained by the ethical andmoral concerns of their sponsors they usually work within Western ideologi-cal paradigms at the expense of the wishes of their local constituencies. In thislight, Ottoway and Carothers (2000, p. 301) observe that the survival ofNGOs often ‘depends more on their ability to talk to and engage the donorsthan their ability to talk to and engage their fellow citizens’. Similarly, Hen-derson (2003, p. 10) following her rigorous #eldwork in Russia, claims that‘groups that had received funding tended to re!ect the post-material values of thedonor, such as concerns for gender equality, environmentalism or concern forhuman rights, rather than the survivalist, materialist bent of many organisationsthat relied solely on domestic sources of #nancial support’.

Sperling (2006, p. 168; Sperling 1999, pp. 244–46) also con#rms this thesisby stating that foreign assistance usually focuses on those issues that thepublic considers as ‘foreign’ or alien. She points at the example of women’smovements in Russia. Much of foreign funding went to support female orga-nisations, despite the fact that their values do not chime well with the general

Foreign-sponsored NGOs 119


perceptions of Russian people. Indeed, gender stereotypes are prominent andsustained by the media, governmental institutions and society. Many Russiansgenuinely believe in gender di$erences, and this is often re!ected in the opi-nion polls. Seventy per cent of the 1999 ROMIR respondents, for example,believed that a ‘woman needs to give birth in order to feel completely ful-#lled’, and 56 per cent thought that, given a lack of jobs, priority in themarket should be given to men (Sperling 2006, p. 170). Similarly, the March2008 VTsIOM poll shows that 22 per cent of male respondents valued sexi-ness in women; 66 per cent voted for the ability to be a good housewife; 49per cent valued #delity; and 46 per cent valued intelligence (VTsIOM March2008). This indicates that the ideology of women’s rights organisations did notsit well with the sentiments of the Russian population. Therefore, Sperling(2006, p. 163), following Richter (2002, pp. 32–37), insists that foreign aid towomen movements ‘failed most signi#cantly’.It does not come as a surprise that, due to the lack of genuine public

interest in such associations, these movements began to build hierarchical tieswith their #nancial patrons rather than horizontal informal ties associatedwith civil society. A similar situation occurs over the issues of human rightsand promotion of democracy. Many observers agree that such values cannotbe instilled through a mere proliferation of foreign-funded associations cam-paigning for these ideas. Richard Rose (1996, p. 262) compared the process ofentrenching democratic values with growing a garden. In that

it is not a project to be achieved overnight by planting institutions inalien soil, by grafting institutions from abroad, or by drawing up a hostof paper organisations that are no more real than plastic plants. It is aprocess that can be brought to fruition only by the patient cultivation ofinstitutions in soil that communism for generations sowed with distrust.

Second, there is a general concern that the long-term impact of organisa-tions operating on foreign aid is unclear. Many authors argue that, since theseassociations do not re!ect the ideals and wishes of their host countries’ pub-lics, they make no lasting contributions to long-term development when theaid iswithdrawn. EvenDiamond (1995, p. 253, quoted inHenderson 2003, p. 13),despite being an outspoken proponent of Western aid to democracy buildingaround the world, still admits the importance of this question. He ponderswhether such societies can become ‘self-generating’, following the withdrawalof Western support. I will respond to this comment in the empirical part ofthis chapter with the example of the impact of educational programmes. Myargument is that such initiatives help entrenching Western political, cultural,and behavioural patterns. Having #nanced the study of Russian specialistsabroad these programmes create a solid societal base of support for Westernculture and values. Such a base can serve as a springboard for popularisingcivic and democratic behavioural patterns. Those who received education inthe West and returned home usually pursue a successful career in business,

120 Foreign-sponsored NGOs


administration, law, or the civil service. They invariably espouse a more civic andmore liberal culture. These people form a new class of citizens that, despitesustaining the extant system of political relations on the outside, harbourmore enlightened, nuanced preferences and subsequently vote and act di$er-ently in the political arena. In this context, Mendelson and Glenn’s (2002, p. 6)quoting of O$e, speak of the ‘mental software’ that is needed to drive the‘hardware’ of the new institutions. And this ‘mental software’ is being slowlycreated over time via the media of educational and cultural grants.

Third, foreign funded NGOs are often seen as the instrument of otherstates’ foreign policy objectives. Indeed, most analysts agree (Mendelson andGlenn 2002, pp. 4–5; Henderson 2003, pp. 4–5; Marsden 2005; Youngs 2004;Mans#eld and Snyder 2005) that the promotion of democracy has been the‘central plank of U.S. foreign policy since the end of Cold War’ and thatNGOs have (occasionally funded by USAID) often taken the main burden ofimplementing this policy objective in the formerly communist countries. Inthis light, Marsden (2005, p. 15) claims that the Clinton administrationadopted a speci#c policy towards promoting democracy in Russia. He argues,however, that this was conducted at all governmental levels starting from thePresident and ending with non-governmental sector and religious activists.Mendelson and Glenn (2002, pp. 4–5) further cite the US government statisticas saying that the country spent some US$4,471bln on government assistanceto Russia between 1990 and 1999.

While the goal seems noble on the outside, it still begs two importantquestions. The #rst problem pertains to the intentions behind this democracypromotion policy. Is it a genuine desire to make the world a fairer and moresecure place or is it that the expansionist motivations within the political andeconomic elites drive this policy? The second problem relates to the limits ofexternal support for democracy. Indeed, such support often changes, or atleast erodes, the nature of state sovereignty. In regard to the #rst question, it issigni#cant that the political and economic motivations, such as the expansionof NATO and the European Union, as well as the interests of multinationalcorporations, played an important role. The successful integration of Eur-opean states into such organisations depended on how much the countries inquestion embraced norms, values, and beliefs common in the Western world(Youngs 2004, pp. 27–85). Moreover, Marsden (2005, p. 15) claims that thedemocracy promotion doctrine has been driven by the idea of American‘exceptionalism’. This is the notion that ‘America is destined to be the world’sleading nation with a unique mission either to bring or to represent its versionof freedom and democracy to the world.’

Outside the Russian and East European realm, this problem caused debateson the real intentions behind the Bush administration’s war on terror. Theassociated ‘democracy promotion’ rhetoric (Melia 2005, p. 1) was placedunder scrutiny. The host countries’ populations were particularly apprehensiveof these dynamics. A 2007 study of the Arab American Institute shows thateven those Arabs, who support democracy and human rights in principle,



strongly feel that the United States should not campaign this cause on theirterritory. They believe that this policy serves US geo-strategic and economicobjectives rather than the genuine cause of democratisation (CongressionalResearch Service 2007, p. 4). At the practical level, many critics focused onthe destructive and destabilising political results of such democracy promo-tion measures (Mans#eld and Snyder 2005). The high costs of implementationwere also scrutinised (Congressional Research Service 2007).

As to the second dilemma, the general perception was that the US admin-istration interfered with other countries domestic a$airs. In Russia this wasparticularly evident during the Yeltsin–Clinton presidencies. Indeed, Clinton’sclose ties with Yeltsin led the former to grant an unequivocal political supportto the latter and to promote ‘democratic ideals’ by overtly non-democraticmeans. Thus, the United States administration played a large role in sustainingthe Yeltsin government through policy advice, consultations, and media cam-paigns, often justifying these actions as ‘promotion of democracy’. What ismore important, however, such promotion took place at the expense of Rus-sia’s public opinion (Rose 1996, p. 259). America’s silent, and often approv-ing, stance on the 1993 shelling of the parliament, neglect for human rights,rigged presidential elections in the summer 1996, and the arbitrary #ring ofseveral Prime Ministers support this proposition (Marsden 2005, p. 22). Cri-ticism and mistrust grew even higher when some commentators implicatedBoris Yeltsin and foreign assistance organisations in money laundering andpro#teering from the war in Chechnya (Mendelson and Glenn 2002, p. 5).

This brings us to the #nal point of this discussion, namely the impact thatthese developments have had on contemporary policy-making in Russia. Iwill argue that the Russian government has been able to capitalise on theexisting shortcomings of foreign NGOs with the view to implementing its ownpolitical agenda. This involved creating a somewhat more restricted atmo-sphere for foreign-funded NGOs and tightening a grip over the civic activitynationwide. Thus, the process evolves on a bilateral basis. On the one hand,the functioning of Western-sponsored NGOs causes backlash in Russiansociety because many such organisations impose values that are not whole-heartedly accepted by the Russian public. On the other hand, the Russianstate skilfully capitalises on these dynamics and deploys this situation to itsadvantage. It converts the mistakes of foreign NGOs into state-patrioticideological currency and uses it to justify and popularise the extant system ofpolitical relations. This is a double negative moment, which is graduallyevolving into a vicious cycle sustained by both sides. In this light, the successof foreign non-commercial and non-pro#t organisations in Russia has beenlimited. Let me focus on these issues empirically.

Constituency building

Constituency building is paramount for all NGOs. However, this task is par-ticularly problematic for foreign-funded NGOs because their policies do not



comply with the general perceptions of the Russian population in two mostimportant ways. First, opinion polls conducted by the VTsIOM agency inDecember 2005 indicate that the Russian population expects NGOs to engagein practical social security work, rather than to pursue fanciful political goalsrelated to post-industrial ideals. Indeed, 47 per cent of the December 2005VTsIOM poll respondents thought that NGOs must provide help withmaternity and child care; 31 per cent suggested that such organisations shouldtake care of local housing estates; 30 per cent voted for educational pro-grammes; 29 per cent went for healthcare issues; and 29 per cent suggestedthat NGOs should tackle social exclusion problems. Second, 66 per cent ofthe respondents believed that NGOs should co-operate with the authorities indealing with these matters with only 18 per cent of the respondents viewingthe state and civil society as antagonist entities.2 Given that most foreignfunded NGOs did not comply with such popular wishes, they often facedvarious di"culties in their constituency-building process.3

First, in the realm of the state–civil society relationship, many foreignfunded NGOs viewed both entities in antagonistic terms, thus endorsing thepost-Hegelian tradition. This is mainly related to the history of Western sup-port for the anti-Communist struggle in the Eastern block countries. Duringthat time, various civil society outlets – such as Solidarity in Poland – ful#lledthe function of political opposition and had full political backing of theWestern governments. In the Russian case, however, foreign funded NGOsrepeat this trend and focus mostly on criticising and opposing the state. Theoverly critical political judgments of some foreign NGOs fuelled resentmentin the Russian society. Many such organisations provided particularly nega-tive assessments of Russia’s political realities, and in some cases, these criti-cisms come across as somewhat biased. The Freedom House report onGlobal Democratic Development is a good example. The organisation placesall countries under review into three separate categories: free, partially freeand not free. In 2007 Russia migrated from the ‘partially free’ category to the‘not free’ group, and was placed in the same league with Angola, Gabon andPakistan in relations to the level of political freedoms. The quality of civicfreedoms in Russia was estimated en par with Cuba, Libya and NorthKorea.4 Former Putin’s advisor Andrei Illarionov was present at the 2007report presentation and supported these claims.5 Illarionov insisted that Russiais consciously exporting authoritarianism across the globe by establishingbilateral relations with dictatorial regimes. He further claimed that Russia hasbeen secretly establishing a new International League of dictatorships andauthoritarian systems.6

Such rhetorically harsh assessments had a negative impact on these NGOs’constituency building. Given that the vast majority of the population hasbeen generally supportive of economic and political policies pursued by Vla-dimir Putin, such criticism often back#red. It created negative publicity forthe NGOs in question rather than for the Kremlin. Indeed, instead of impli-cating the Putin leadership, the Freedom House left the Kremlin on #rmer



ideological grounds to consolidate the chosen political course. In response tocriticism by Freedom House, the Russian television, printed press and theInternet publicly questioned institutional and #nancial standings of FreedomHouse. Public attention was drawn to the fact that this organisation is 80 percent #nanced by the US government and that it was at some point headed bythe former CIA chief R James Woolsey.7

Commenting on this situation, Russia’s prominent international a$airsanalysts Alexei Pushkov rhetorically called to imagine an inverse situation, inwhich the Kremlin would #nance a NGO and appoint a former chief of thestate security apparatus to chair its head o"ce. Pushkov further argued thatpolitical judgements of such an institution would invariably be clouded andthat nobody would take this institution seriously.8 This allegory chimes wellwith Sarah Henderson’s 2003 book on foreign assistance to civil societybuilding in Russia. Henderson (2003, p. 1) writes:

imagine that a large number of civic organisations in the United Statereceived their #nancial support from outside the country. How would thischange the face of civic activism? … Doubtless it would have seriousimplications for how civil society interacts with other civic actors, withsociety at large, and with the state.

In this light, it does not come as a surprise that a large number of Russianpoliticians and public #gures further criticised Freedom House, fomentingpopular backlash and tarnishing the organisation’s image in the publicdomain. Sergey Markov, a State Duma deputy and pro-Kremlin politicalanalyst, branded the Freedom House as an overtly Russophobe organisation.9

Ella Pam#lova, the head of the President’s Human Rights Commission,pointed at the Freedom House incompetence, while Russia’s Public Chamberexpressed its profound disagreement with the organisation’s #ndings.10

Second, the agendas of most foreign funded NGOs did not re!ect thewishes of the Russian population. Despite the population expecting NGOs toadopt a social security bound strategy for their work, many foreign-fundedand Western NGOs led in the expenditure on political activity and activityrelated to the defence of human rights. Forty-#ve per cent of all foreign grantswere spent on conducting political events, while 53 per cent of contributionswere dedicated to science, education, culture and entertainment. Socialsecurity work encompassed 41 per cent of foreign NGOs expenditure. Incontrast to this, Russian companies put forward just 25 per cent of their#nancial contributions towards political activity, 35 per cent on social securityprogrammes and charity work, and 61 per cent on education, culture, andentertainment.11

USAID is one important donor of foreign grants in modern Russia that isconcerned with various political and human rights issues. It aims to foster thedevelopment of Russia’s civil society and promote public support of Russia’sNGOs. The Fund #nances the St Petersburg Agency for Social Information,



the Creation Fund (Sozidanie), and the St Petersburg Centre for the Devel-opment of non-Commercial Organisations. The McArthur Foundation, theEuropean Youth Foundation under the aegis of the Council of Europe, theAmerican Foundation National Contribution to Democracy #nance Russia’sYouth Human Rights Movement (Molodezhnoe Pravozashchtinoe Dvizhenie,MPD). The MPD movement carries out wide-ranging socio-political activity.It works with various segments of Russia’s population providing free legalconsultations and legal aid aimed at supporting citizens’ rights and theirstruggle against the existing bureaucratic apparatus. Moreover, MPD provideseducational consultations on the means of developing a successful careerwithin the non-governmental and non-commercial sectors. The MPD fundcontributed to the cancellation of the Army conscription delays for studentsby organising actions of protest and collecting petition signatures.

Similarly, the Moscow Helsinki Group and the Memorial Foundation thatare involved in the protection of human rights in Russia attract large sums ofthe European Union funds. Ecological programmes could also be consideredas part of political activity. The USAID Forest initiative, conducted between2000 and 2005 across a number of Siberian and Far Eastern regions, is onenotable example of ecological-political initiatives. The total funds for thisinitiative amounted to some US$20mln. The programme was intended toprevent the spread of forest #res through the promotion of environment-friendly timber processing methods and encouraging the usage of biomass asan alternative energy supply.12 A large number of ecological associationsprotested against commercial and industrial exploration of the north ofRussia and insisted on the usage of nature-friendly technologies when con-ducting mining activities. The United Nations and the Global EcologicalFund, the Foundation of the Russo-American Economic Co-operation(FRAEC), the Paci#c Centre for the Research of the Environment, and theNorthern Forum have been particularly active in promoting such pro-grammes. In 2008, these associations united in organising the ‘World’s OilSpillage’ exhibition which was hosted across various regions of the north andfar east of Russia (Golobokova 2009, p. 4). At the same time, various criti-cisms emerged that many foreign-funded NGOs used the ecology theme withthe view to criticise the political activity of the Russian government. The pro-Kremlin movement Molodaya Gvardiya staged an action of protest in Bur-yatiya, in which it accused such NGOs of capitalising on the problems withLake Baikal to assist with their struggle against Russia’s extant politicalsystem.13

Finally, while concentrating on political activities, as well as ecologicalprogrammes, foreign NGOs largely ignored social problems, such as thedefence of consumer rights and trade union work.14 The activity of the Fundfor the Struggle Against Smoking represents, perhaps, one important excep-tion to this pattern. The Fund was instituted by Michael Bloomberg with theassistance of the Bill Gates Foundation and allocated some US$500mln foranti-tobacco campaigns in Russia, India, and China. In 2009, the Fund



granted US$590,000 to the Russian Confederation of Societies for theDefence of Consumer Rights. These funds aimed at ensuring appropriateanti-tobacco advertising on all cigarette packaging redistributed acrossRussia. Dmitry Yanin, the head of the Confederation claimed that thesefunds have been su"cient to launch a series of training seminars for Russiandoctors who attempt to persuade patients to give up smoking.15

Pursuing foreign policy ends of donor states

The Russian population often perceives that foreign NGOs pursue the geo-strategic interests of donor-states. This takes place for a number of reasons.First, many such NGOs usually advance the idea of a direct correlationbetween liberalism, democratisation and submissive foreign policy. They oftenstand on the position that a liberal course in domestic politics and the build-ing of a democratic state should correlate with pursuing the ‘Atlantic line’ inforeign relations, often at the expense of Russia’s national interest. A numberof experts within such organisations, and sympathetic media outlets, such asthe Echo of Moscow Radio Station, often support a number of policies thatact as clear irritants to the Russian society. This concerns the eastwardexpansion of NATO, the construction of the missile defence system in Polandand the Czech Republic, relations with Georgia and Ukraine, and many otherpainful foreign policy issues. At the same time, as I have already observed, theintroduction of Euro-Atlantic integration values cannot be aggressivelytaught, imposed or promoted. These ideas must mature gradually and comefrom within. In this context, such organisations should adopt a more cautiousand understanding approach to this range of sensitive issues to gain weightand take roots within the Russian society.

Second, many such organisations do not make any e$ort to understandRussian foreign policy positions and often uncritically adopt the stance ofRussia’s opponents. They also often act against Russia in the various propa-ganda wars. The August 2008 Russo-Georgian con!ict was particularly indi-cative. The Moscow Helsinki Group, the Memorial and For Human RightsMovements, as well as the all-Russian Civic Congress – some principal Wes-tern-#nanced Russian associations – issued a petition against the escalation ofviolence in the Russo-Georgian con!ict. They claimed that Russia, as thestrongest party in the con!ict, should exercise self-restraint and refrain fromusing force on par with the Georgian side. Western NGOs operating in Russiawere in agreement with these Russian organisations. Human Rights Watch,for example, took the Georgian side unequivocally, placing the blamesquarely on Russia and admitting the Georgian right to enact a constitutionalorder on its territory. It ignored the history of the con!ict, which is vital keyto understanding the nature of that war. The organisation claimed that theaim of the Georgian 7–8 August 2008 night assault was the South Ossetianrebels who hampered the Georgian e$orts at creating a constitutional orderacross the country. Freedom House supported this stance by accusing Russia



of attempting to occupy the Georgian territory and solidify its political con-trol over the region. The Jacob Blaustein Institute for the Advancement ofHuman Rights, the International League for Human Rights, and the BritishHalo Trust sustained this line.16 The Georgian branch of George Soros’ OpenSociety Institute published an open letter in which it rhetorically accusedRussia of attempting to punish Georgia for her desire to become a part of the‘democratic world’.17

This reaction of Western-funded and foreign NGOs supported the widelyheld opinion of the Russian public. The overwhelming majority of Russians(70 per cent) endorsed the government’s policy in the con!ict zone.18 Eighty-six per cent supported the South Ossetian side in the con!ict. Over 27 percent of the 2009 VTsIOM respondents claimed that the Russian governmentacted correctly, and 60 per cent thought that Russia should have given greatersupport to South Ossetia one year prior to the con!ict.19 It is also signi#cantthat as many as 59 per cent suggested that Russia should have handled thecon!ict along with the active participation of European and internationalpartners, thus viewing their country as an important part of the internationalcommunity.20 It now becomes clear that the opinions and actions of Western-sponsored NGOs created a backlash within the Russian society. The mainsuspicion was that such associations were involved in a larger geopoliticalgame unfolding between Russia, European Union and the United States inthe South Caucasian region. Thus, the objectivity of these organisations wasin doubt. It is also signi#cant that these organisations’ stance helped to dis-credit many other pro-Western liberally oriented politicians and organisations.

Third, many foreign funded NGOs took an active part in the change ofpolitical elites in the neighbouring FSU countries. Indeed, the outcome of theso-called ‘coloured’ revolutions has been largely determined by variousoppositional NGOs that enjoyed close #nancial and political connectionswith some Western sponsors. A large number of foreign funded organisationshad covered Ukraine by the beginning of the October 2004 elections andacted as the counterweight to the Kuchma government. Of particular impor-tance were the Soros-funded International Renaissance Foundation, theDemocracy League – a co-ordinated group of NGOs that evolved in 2004into the New Choice 2004 coalition, as well as the Democratic Initiative andthe Committee of Voters think tanks (Diuk 2006, p. 74–76). The most activeorganisation, however, was the Pora youth movement that had close parallelswith the Georgian Kmara, the Serbian Otpor, and the Slovakian OK’98movements. The Canadian International Development Agency, FreedomHouse, and the German Marshall Fund of the United States funded the Poramovement (Demes and Forbrig 2006, pp. 86–88). The association actively co-operated with other international organisations that had an experience inconducting electoral monitoring, actions of civic protests, and other activitiesrelated to resisting the incumbent governments. Western #nancing was direc-ted at conducting electoral exit polls.21 By the same token, in Kyrgyzstan,where the state authorities allowed foreign funded NGOs to engage in



political activity more than in any other Central Asian republic (Adamson2002, p. 185), the 2005 Tulip revolution ended with the ousting of the AskarAkaev government.

The pattern of government change in Slovakia, Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine,and Kyrgyzstan, as well as the attempted ousting of the Karimov governmentin Uzbekistan, in which youth movements and foreign funded NGOs took anactive part, left the Russian authorities feeling uneasy. The Kremlin hasbecome apprehensive that such a scenario may occur in Russia.22 The autho-rities became suspicious of foreign funded organisations and began to scruti-nize the real motivations behind their activity. At the same time, the Kremlinconverted those fears into a useful state-patriot currency. The Kremlin beganpopularising the idea that most foreign NGOs were in one way or anotherconnected to di$ering Western intelligence services. In his 26 May 2004address to the Federal Assembly Putin insisted that “many Russian NGOs are#nanced from abroad and, instead of concentrating on constructive criticism,engage in servicing the interests of their foreign patrons and pursuing dubious#nancial interests”.23 He reiterated his concerns in autumn 2005 by declaring:‘I agree with some colleagues that a situation in which some NGOs are#nanced from abroad and involved in political activity in Russia is unac-ceptable. Whether these organisations want it or not, they are becoming aninstrument of political pressure by foreign governments in our country’.24 Theinfamous British rock scandal exacerbated suspicions. The con!ict eruptedwith the demonstration of the Spies (Shpiony) documentary produced byRussia’s prominent television journalist Arkady Mamontov. In this #lmMamontov released a video recording in which four employees of the Britishembassy in Moscow transmitted intelligence data through a specialised elec-tronic rock planted in one of the city’s parks. Mamontov further claimed thatthese employees have been involved in #nancing Russia’s most in!uentialNGOs, such as the Helsinki and Eurasia Groups. Representatives of theseorganisations had to subsequently defend their reputation in court. Never-theless, they were forced to publicly admit accepting various funds fromBritish and American governments.25 This somewhat dented the alreadyshaky group reputation.26 In general, the Kremlin’s policy of vili#cation offoreign-funded NGOs yielded results. Forty-six per cent of the December2005 VTsIOM poll respondents thought that NGOs must receive funds fromthe Russian government; 37 per cent thought that such #nancing is the task ofRussian business and only 8 and 4 per cent believed that this should be doneby foreign organisations and foreign governments respectively.27

State reaction

Of particular importance to this discussion are the relations between theRussian state and foreign NGOs. This relationship was not easy and had asigni#cant impact on Russia’s foreign and domestic policies. The dynamic ofthis relationship was dependent on two main factors: (1) the mode of



functioning foreign NGOs in Russia, and (2) Russia’s new internationalambitions. We have already examined the #rst parameter in the discussionabove. Thus, let me proceed immediately to the Russian international aspira-tions. Due to the recent economic success and domestic political stabilityachieved during the Putin era, Russia was determined to establish a newinternational image. The country hoped to come out of the post-Soviethumiliation shadows and position itself as an independent power capable ofpursuing foreign and domestic policies without external in!uence.28 Thesovereign democracy thesis, presented by Vladislav Surkov in February 2006at the United Russia party meeting, provided an ideological backing to thisstance.29 Western countries, on the other hand, felt that they still had moralauthority to guide Russia in the realm of democratic values, norms, andbehavioural principles. This involved the state – civil society relationship – anarea, in which some Western countries continued to give advice. This situa-tion invariably led to a battle of wills, or a political clash of sovereignties, inwhich neither side was prepared to give up their positions.30 I have alreadyobserved that, in order to turn this situation to its own advantage, the Rus-sian state capitalised on tactical mistakes committed by Western NGOs. TheKremlin relied on the popular backlash against these associations to promotepolicies that could consolidate the extant political order. This dynamic hadthree main outcomes. First, it led to a competition between the Russian stateand Western NGOs in the constituency-building sphere. Second, it enabledthe Kremlin to introduce a range of constrictive legislation that impeded thefunctioning of foreign NGO in Russia. Finally, it spawned intense politicalstruggles between the Russian authorities and foreign NGOs. These con!ictsre!ected wider diplomatic disputes. In this case, organisations of civil societyoften fell victims to political manipulation by political elites and governmentsof Russia and other states. Let me detail these trends.

First, the Russian state and foreign NGOs began to compete in the con-stituency-building #eld. Indeed, 20 per cent of all foreign-funded organisa-tions prefer to work with politically active citizens. This compares to 23 percent of state-sponsored organisations, which target similar groups. Further-more, 28 per cent of both state and foreign NGOs aimed to work with stu-dents, teachers, and educational institutions; 16 and 15 per cent respectivelywent for socially excluded and #nancially vulnerable categories; 12 and 18 percent respectively worked with political institutions; and 5 per cent each paidattention to the needs of children (Zircon 2008, p. 33). Similarly, the Russianstate often attempted to beat foreign governments and their loyal NGOs in#nancing political activity. The Kremlin spared some 39 per cent of all NGOcontributions towards political activity, 35 per cent went on charity and edu-cation, and 40 per cent was spent on culture, science, and education. The statealso competed with its Western counterparts in partially #nancing opposi-tional movements. Thus, the Youth Democratic Alternative Movement (DA)led by Maria Gaidar and Alexei Navalnyi received a presidential grant for thepurchase of computer equipment and o"ce supplies amounting to US$20,000



in 2006. This took place disregarding the fact that the DA movement isactively involved in the anti-Kremlin political activity by organising demon-strations of protest and collaborating with the Kremlin’s worst foe – TheOther Russia association led by Garry Kasparov.31

Second, the Russian state proceeded to restrict the functioning of foreignNGOs within the legal sphere. In particular, the January 2009 legislationpackage impeded the Western governments’ ability to #nance Russia’s NGOs.Government order No. 485 signed by Prime Minister Putin on 2 July 2008and enacted on 1 January 2009 reduced the number of NGOs that wereexempt from paying taxes on foreign grants allocated in Russia. Given thatthe statutes of many Western NGOs forbid making any #nancial contribu-tions to the budgets of foreign states, this document had a negative impact onthe ability of Western governments to #nance such associations. Indeed, theorder deprived 101 organisations from tax-exempt status. Only 12 associa-tions were allowed to retain the tax-free status. These elected organisationswere involved in developing Russia’s ties with European Union states in theareas of economic, cultural, educational, and political co-operation under theaegis of the Russian government. The list of the tax-exempt organisationscomposed the Commission for European Societies, the Council for Baltic SeaStates, the Council of Ministers of Foreign Countries, International Agencyfor Atomic Energy, Organisation for the Black Sea Economic Co-operation,European Fund for the Development and Promotion of Cinematography, theUnited Institute for Atomic Energy Research and a number of UnitedNations funded programmes.32 Such organisations were instrumental in clar-ifying the policies of the Russian government to the West. The Council ofNorthern Countries, for example, is involved in promoting diplomatic co-operation between Russia and Nordic states. It #nances visits by representa-tives of Russian and Nordic countries NGOs to their respective states withthe view to sharing managerial and administrative skills.33 It is indicative thatmany politically oriented NGOs, such as the Ford Foundation, the EurasiaFoundation, the Charities Aid Foundation (CAF) and the Wild Life Foun-dation, were excluded from the list. It does not come as a surprise that theKremlin arbitrarily drew the list of such tax-exempt organisations. None ofthe criteria for qualifying for the tax-exempt status have been legally outlined.

More importantly, some new legislation deliberately complicated the NGOregistration process and made the #nancial activity of foreign NGOs di"cult.Of particular importance was Federal Law 18-FZ, which regulated the activ-ity of NGOs. The bill was initially proposed in September 2005 and adoptedin January 2006.34 Following the introduction of this particularly restrictivelaw, a large number of Russia’s NGOs could not continue functioning. Theregistration procedure became particularly costly and cumbersome. The headof the Human Rights Commission under the President Ella Pam#lova com-plained in 2007 that the expenditure on registration, drafting reports, #ndinglegal and professional secretarial help would cumulate across the existingNGOs between Ru2bln and Ru6.7bln per year.35 Moreover, in 2007 the



Federal Registration Service refused registration to some 11,000 NGOs,which corresponded to 13 per cent of the total volume of applications. Therefusal rate was the highest in Russia’s most politically active regions. Forexample, local authorities declined 36.8 and 35.6 per cent of applications inthe Sverdlovsk region and St Petersburg federal city respectively.36 Moreover, thelaw enabled regional authorities to ban inconvenient NGOs and many localgovernments were quick to deploy the new framework. This particularly a$ec-ted those associations that functioned in the North Caucasus and campaignedfor human rights in Russia’s war zones. Indeed, the High Court of Ingushetiaforbade the activity of NGOs, which assisted Chechen refugees in Ingushetia inApril 2006. Similarly, organisations such as the Centre for Peace and HumanDevelopment (Great Britain), Help-Self Help (Germany), and InternationalMedical Corporation (United States) were banned.37 It does not come as asurprise that the enactment of this law fostered severe domestic and interna-tional political battles. This legislative process warrants a separate discussion.

The legal enactment process

The 2006 Law on Non-Commercial Organisations was at the epicentre ofmedia attention since its introduction in autumn 2005 and was revisedrepeatedly.38 The #rst draft, which was presented to the State Duma in Sep-tember 2005, was extremely constrictive. The document required all NGOs toregister with the Russian Registration Service as Russian-based organisations.Moreover, Article 7.4 of the draft law stated that the registration authorityhad the right to deny an organisation registration, if its aims and objectives,as well as some forms of its activity, contradicted the Russian Constitution,supported terrorist activity, and helped legalising the proceeds of crime.39

Moreover, Article 7.4 stated that the authorities could deny an NGO regis-tration if its aims and objectives threaten ‘sovereignty, political independence,territorial integrity, national unity, uniqueness, cultural heritage, and thenational interests of the Russian Federation’. The state could also deny aregistration if the NGOs’ behaviour is unethical and insults national andreligious feelings of the Russian population.40 This clause opened the way fora free interpretation and could empower the state to ban any inconvenientorganisation. More importantly, the draft law demanded that all NGOs mustdisclose their sources of funding, account for spending, and provide lists ofthose participating in their initiatives and the media outlets covering theiractivity. These reports had to be completed in two separate forms: one inten-ded for the Tax Authorities and one for the Russian Registration Service. It issigni#cant that, prior to the introduction of the law, foreign NGOs did notreport on their #nancial activity and noti#ed the Russian Registration Serviceof their incorporation without any registration process.

Introduction of these constrictive initiatives fostered severe political battlesat the domestic and international levels. Western governments exerted pres-sure on Russia with demands to correct the law or abolish it altogether. The



United States pressured Russia not to adopt the bill by threatening to impedethe country’s chances of joining the World Trading Organisation (WTO). TheUnited States government also claimed that the bill was incompatible withRussia’s membership and the then pending presidency of the G8.41 Moreover,a special US committee on Security and Co-operation forwarded a letter tothe speaker of the Russian State Duma Boris Gryzlov requesting not to enactthe law in its current form and warning of negative consequences in case ofincompliance. The European Union was also part of the international pres-sure. The European Parliament issued a special release, branding the draft lawanti-democratic.

Interestingly, the Kremlin chose the road of non-confrontation and posi-tively co-operated with the European Union to improve the draft. The Rus-sian government posted the Minister of Justice Yurii Chaika to Strasburg todiscuss the pending European suggestions on the ways in which the law couldbe improved. Moscow also pledged to incorporate European requirementsinto the new version of law, with Putin taking the amendment process underhis personal control. European Union representatives, on the other hand,selected a wide range of areas, in which the law should have been altered. TheGeneral Secretary of the Council of Europe Terry Davis organised a group ofleading experts headed by an eminent Amsterdam Professor of Law Tymenvan der Ploeg.42 The van der Ploeg group was particularly critical of therequirement for compulsory re-registration for NGOs already operating inRussia. The group believed that this step would result in the abuse of power.It also claimed that the success of such re-registration would depend on anorganisation’s relationship with the authorities. The groups further suggestedthat it is impossible for many NGOs to register as a Russian-based legalentity. Similarly, the requirement that only those foreign nationals whoobtained Russian residency could be employed by NGOs restricted theseorganisations employment policies.

These international pressures fostered various struggles within the Pre-sidential Administration. Ideological battles took place between those whofavoured more constrictive foreign and domestic policies and those who wereamenable to a rather liberal approach. The #rst wing was mainly focused onpotential threats emanating from the West. They claimed that Western intel-ligence services conduct subversive activity in Russia using their loyal NGOsas agents of in!uence. This group consistently argued that the revolutionarychange of governments in the neighbouring FSU countries took place withthe active participation of local NGOs, which have been linked to variousWestern security apparatuses. The second wing, on the other hand, favoured apolitico-diplomatic approach. It argued for the establishment of closer tieswith Western countries and was not interested in dampening Russia’s image inthe international arena.

Tatyana Stanovaya from the Moscow Centre for Political Technologyobserves that the two wings struggled over two important issues. First, theydisagreed over the content of the draft law. Second, given the objective



necessity to alter the document, they disputed the mode of legislativeamendment. The politico-diplomatic wing secured victory over the new lawcontent, while representatives of law enforcement agencies, the so called silo-viki, made sure that the amendments were enacted in the most constrictivemanner. In particular, the group lobbied to exclude the Public Chamber fromthe law reviewing process. Under Law 32-FZ from July 2005, the PublicChamber can review any legal bill passed by the State Duma and recommendappropriate amendments.43 Until February 2009 such revisions were notcompulsory and could only take place on a request from the PresidentialAdministration, the Federal Assembly, or the Government of the RussianFederation.44 That the siloviki managed to bar the Public Chamber from thelaw reviewing process ensured that the media focus on this issue was minimal.Also, amendments were introduced in a fast-track regime. The entire lawamendment process took just one week. The President issued a simpleamendment note to the Parliament instead of deploying his constitutionalright of legislative initiative.

With regards to the content, the politico-diplomatic wing introduced someserious amendments, which were in line with the international, and primarilyEuropean, suggestions.45 It is signi#cant that in the wake of the Chaika visit,the Kremlin changed the o"cial justi#cation behind the law enactment.Instead of claiming that the bill was introduced with the view to keep theactivity of foreign NGOs in check, the new formulation stated that the lawwas intended to put the brakes on money laundering and terrorism.46 Theresulting set of amendments introduced by Putin on 9 December 2005allowed NGOs to abstain from the registration process and instead just tonotify the Russian Registration Service of their formation. More importantly,foreign NGOs were no longer required to register as Russian-based organi-sations. This legal provision removed one serious disagreements with theWest, as most foreign NGOs would #nd it almost impossible to comply withthis requirement. Furthermore, NGOs were no longer required to incorporateas a legal entity and were allowed to retain an informal status. In addition,the President restricted the ability of controlling agencies to supervise theNGOs #nancial activity. Finally, the amendments allowed to form NGOswithin territorial units with restricted residential rights and special migrationcontrol – the so-called closed administrative-territorial formations (ZATO).47

Nevertheless, despite the partial relaxation of the draft bill, a large numberof contentious issues remained. Potential NGOs still had to provide informa-tion on their aims and objectives, disclose the details of their funding andexpenditure. The state also reserved the right to verify whether the activity offoreign NGOs corresponds to declared aims and objectives and whether thedeclared volume of funding corresponds to the disclosed level of activity.48

Thus, the legal amendment process was not over. The law was further criti-cised following its April 2006 enactment. The Parliamentary Assembly of theCouncil of Europe (PACE) issued a harsh resolution on 25 January 2006,immediately after the State Duma passed the amended draft law. The



resolution claimed that the new Law did not correspond to the Europeancriteria. In particular, the PACE document claimed that the most importantinformation on tortures, kidnapping, and murders in Chechnya was chan-nelled to Europe by various NGOs and that the new law made the receipt ofthis information almost impossible. The subsequent communiqué issued bythe European authorities softened this rhetoric by stating that, while themodi#ed version of the law was a step forward from the draft project, anumber of its clauses still remained unsatisfactory. In particular, Europeanauthorities were concerned with those clauses, which allowed the Russiangovernment to ban foreign organisations that, in their view, ‘threatened thesovereignty, uniqueness, and cultural heritage of the Russian Federation’. Thisstatement allegedly violated Article 8 of European Convention on HumanRights.49

Representatives of Russian civic organisations sided with their Europeancolleagues. This led to the launch of consecutive sets of amendments, whichaimed at the gradual relaxation of the incumbent law. The 2007 amendments,for example, simpli#ed reporting procedures for the Church and religiousorganisations. Order No. 212 from the Ministry of Justice allowed the Churchto account only for four functional aspects: ‘main activity’, ‘sources of fund-ing and property’, ‘details of expenditure’ and ‘details on property receivedfrom international and foreign organisations and individuals’. Thus, theChurch was relieved from providing the annual balance sheets. Similarly, thestate did not require the Church to report on the number of people attendingservices.50 Other non-religious organisations began pressing for the introduc-tion of similar regulations for all civil society associations. Interestingly, state-sponsored NGOs led the battle with independent members of civil societyonly supporting the initiative. Ella Pam#lova initiated the struggle by claim-ing that within the current legal framework most NGOs cannot functionfreely and many were forced to avoid the law.51 And a group of economistsfrom Moscow State University, the Higher School of Economics, the Institutefor the Civic Analysis, and the Levada centre drafted a range of amendmentsto abolish the legal requirement to account for expenditure and draft lists ofevents participants.

The accession of President Medvedev to power in March 2008 softenedpolitical rhetoric and somewhat altered the style of policy making in Russia.NGOs became the subject of the attempted alteration in political style. In his15 April 2009 meeting with representatives of Russia’s civil society, Medvedevpledged to relax the existing Law on NGOs. The President admitted that thecurrent version impedes the activity of civic organisations. He also claimedthat many corrupt o"cials who view NGOs as a threat to their illicit activitydeploy the Law to their advantage.52 Thus, a new working group emerged tofurther improve the document. The group was composed of representatives ofthe state and state-sponsored civil society groups. While the unpopular #rstdeputy head of the Presidential Administration Vladislav Surkov headed thegroup, it also included presidential advisor Larisa Barycheva, vice-president



of the Russian Union of Lawyers Vladislav Grib, the head of the PresidentialCouncil on Civil Society Ella Pam#lova, and the Chancellor of the HigherSchool of Economics Yaroslav Kuzminov, as well as the president of theCentre for the Development of Democracy and Human Rights Yurii Dzhi-bladze. The State Duma enshrined legislative amendments proposed by thegroup into a separate Law 170-FZ adopted on 26 June 2009 and enacted on 1August 2009.53 These amendments banned registration authorities fromdemanding documentation which has not been legally outlined. Also, therequirement for the ‘appropriate’ compilation of documents, which could stallregistration of any inconvenient organisation, has been abolished. Moreimportantly, foreign NGOs were allowed to function even if their activitythreatened the ‘national uniqueness and cultural heritage’ of the RussianFederation. Nevertheless, the clause referring to the defence of the ‘nationalinterest’ remained in place.54 Moreover, a range of documents required forregistration has been limited and the facility for submitting #nancial reportsover the Internet was introduced. In addition, the state was now entitled tocheck the activity of NGOs every three years, and not annually as was statedin the original 2006 version.55 It is also important that the Ministry of Justicewas required to reach a decision on banning an NGO during 14 days fromthe launch of an original state query. Similarly, the registration process waslegally reduced to 14 days, while NGOs received the right to apply for newregistration even if their application was previously rejected.56 The lawamendment process is still underway with further corrections pending in thecoming years. Let me now turn to the last point of this discussion pertainingto the evolution of diplomatic con!icts and their impact on the functioning offoreign-sponsored NGOs in Russia. I will examine these issues with theexample of the British Council a$air.

The British Council a!air

The British Council was instituted in 1934 as a non-pro#t organisation. It isinvolved in cultural and educational programmes across 110 countries aroundthe world. The Council has worked in Russia since 1992 and, until theDecember 2007 con!ict with the Russian authorities, had had branches in 16Russian regions. The history of Russo-British diplomatic relations had adirect impact on the Council’s activity in Russia. Diplomatic hostilitiesbetween the two countries made the Council a hostage to these battles. Abrief history of these tensions is in order. At the beginning of Putin’s pre-sidency Britain hoped to act as a link between Russia and the United States.Tony Blair was the #rst foreign leader with whom Putin met upon his acces-sion to power in May 2000. However, the political relations between the twocountries have been deteriorating thereafter and good intentions were under-mined (see White 2011, pp. 279–80). A chain of political disagreements wasgradually evolving into a full-scale diplomatic war. The initial tensionsemerged when the British authorities declined Russia’s three consecutive



requests to extradite Boris Berezovsky, a former billionaire involved in somefraudulent business schemes.57 More importantly, when Berezovsky publiclythreatened to use force in order to overthrow Russia’s incumbent governmentin summer 2007, the British Foreign O"ce warned the oligarch but refused totake the matter further.58

A similar situation occurred over the extradition of Akhmed Zakaev inSeptember 2004, one of the Chechen resistance leaders and a Prime Ministerof the unrecognised Republic of Ichkeriya.59 The ‘spy scandal’, which eruptedin January 2006 over the electronic rock found in a Russian park and alleg-edly used by four British embassy employees to receive intelligence data,exacerbated mutual mistrust.60 The death of a defecting ex-Federal SecurityService (Federal’naya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti, FSB) agent Alexander Litvinenko,who su$ered polonium poisoning in London in November 2006, placed the#nal nail in the co"n of Russo-British relations. The British investigationimplicated the Kremlin in the spy’s murder and concluded that Litvinenkopaid a high price for his vocal criticism of the Russian government. Britainplaced unsuccessful requests to extradite the prime suspect Andrei Lugovoi.Given that the Russian Constitution does not allow extradition of the coun-try’s nationals, the British former Foreign Secretary David Miliband openlysuggested that the Russian parliament should change the Constitution inorder to extradite Lugovoi.61 This statement infuriated the Russian side. The topechelons of Russia’s authorities interpreted these words as an open presumptionof political and institutional superiority by the British.62

The British Council fell victim to these political and diplomatic battles. TheKremlin deployed the lack of legal framework for the Council’s functioning toattack it politically. The grounds for such attacks were propitious. The #rstCouncil branch was opened in Moscow in 1996 on the basis of a bilateralagreement on cultural co-operation concluded between the two countriesduring the mid-1990s. The British government subsequently extended theCouncil o"ces to 15 of Russia’s regions and opened English language schools,which were engaged in teaching activity on a commercial basis. However, thiswas done without concluding supplementary agreements on the Council’sregional activity. The Council, at the same time, reimbursed the teaching sta$under the diplomatic scheme that assumes substantial tax relief. The Russianside deliberately refused to sign a new agreement in summer 2006 in order tohave a legal weapon against the British. This move indeed left the Council’sregional branches on tenuous ground from a legal point of view.

The #rst Kremlin attack on the Council occurred in 2004 following the Brit-ish refusal to extradite Berezovsky and Zakaev. During that year the Russiantax authorities accused the Council of tax avoidance connected to the work-ings of regional English language schools. The Council was forced to close anumber of such schools.63 The a$air was quickly forgotten only to resurfacein 2006 in the wake of the infamous ‘rock scandal’. The new December 2007Kremlin attack was overtly political and represented, in Sergey Lavrov’swords, a response to the ‘unfriendly moves’ by the British government in the



Lugovoi extradition case. During this time, the Russian government deman-ded the closure of all regional British Council branches, apart from the cen-tral o"ce operating in Moscow.64

The British side, on the other hand, openly refused to comply. It attemptedto attract public attention to the issue and create negative publicity for theKremlin in Russia and beyond. In the wake of his visit to the Russian ForeignO"ce, Anthony Brenton, the British Ambassador to Russia, declared that theCouncil would continue working in the regions despite the ban imposed bythe government.65 The British Council also granted its regional branches thestatus of British Embassy cultural departments. It was, nevertheless, forced toclose all organisations operating outside embassy-hosting cities, such asMoscow, St Petersburg and Yekaterinburg. The Russian Ministry of ForeignA$airs, however, considered such re-branding as an attempt to continueworking under a new banner and mounted further pressure by refusing entryvisas to some British Embassy workers and refusing accreditation of the cur-rent Council employees. Britain threatened to deport at least 34 Russian dip-lomats as retaliation and to sever the rules for obtaining UK visas for Russiancitizens.66

This British Council con!ict revealed some serious underlying problemsrelated to the functioning of foreign NGOs in transitional countries. On theone hand, the British side felt con#dent to promote behavioural patterns,norms and values through its NGOs working in foreign states from a moraland historical–political point of view. It was also con#dent in the fact that themode of operation of such NGOs is appropriate and that it can set standardsfor their functioning. On the other hand, growing politico-economic con-#dence of Russia led the country to claim the right to determine the legal,and primarily political, framework under which such organisations couldfunction. This led to a clash of political wills from both sides. It is alsoimportant that both sides used the Council to advance their respective poli-tical interests and resolve international disputes. This made the Council avictim of political manipulation. In the event, the ideas of NGOs acting asindependent organisations impartially pursuing the cause of the public goodand genuine democratic governance become devalued.

The long-term impact problem: educational programmes case study

Let me now discuss the problem of the lasting impact of foreign-fundedorganisations. In contrast to the pessimistic picture of their activity, one mayargue that such organisations could still have an impact on the values andculture of host countries. As I mentioned in the introduction, educationalprogrammes are of particular importance. Most such initiatives have anovertly political character and pursue aims and objective closely related to thepromotion of international ties. George Soros, an American philanthropistand political activist, was the #rst person to institute an educational founda-tion in Russia in 1990. By the end of the 1990s, during the peak of his



philanthropic activity in Russia, the Soros Foundation had allocated some US$45mln per year for educational programmes. In 2003 the Fund stopped itsRussian operation citing its motivation for withdrawal as the reluctance of theRussian authorities to back its activity.67 Eurasia was another Americanfoundation that followed the Soros organisation to Russia. It subsequentlyjoined the Russian-based New Eurasia (Novaya Evraziya) Fund. The FordFoundation also redistributed purpose-built educational and research grants.The British Charities Aid Foundation (CAF-Russia) has become one maineducational grant provider during the 2000s. The Funds redistributed some500 grants annually with over £2.2mln allocated between 2008 and 2009.68

Similarly, a number of Danish, Dutch, British and American Foundationso$ered competitive scholarships and fellowships for Russia’s students andpost-doctoral researchers to continue their education in Europe and theUnited States. Among the most prominent foreign educational funds operat-ing in Russia during the 2000s were the Danish Sirius Foundation, theGerman European Recovery Programme, the British Chevening Scholarship,a multitude of the British Council educational initiatives, Erasmus MundusEuropean Commission Masters Courses and the Oxford College Hospitalityscheme.

Most of these initiatives aimed at creating a new generation of young pro-fessionals and political leaders who could contribute to Russia’s democraticdevelopment and help establish amicable relations with the Euro-Atlanticleague of states. In particular, the American Young Leadership Fellows forPublic Service Programme was instituted to provide training in governmentala$airs, community matters and other areas relevant to democratic transitionin Russia. The Chevening fund implements the policy of the British govern-ment to invest in individuals with clear Russia-focused career plans and thepotential to become in!uential leaders in their #eld. Similarly, the aim of theBritish Council’s educational programmes is to create a layer of creativemiddle class citizens who would be amenable to the ideas of democracy, asthey are understood in the West. The former head of Russia’s British CouncilTony Andrews claimed that such people could help in forging a productiverelationship between Russia and the West.69 It is also important that withinthis framework, the British Council instituted a large number of libraries andinformation centres across Russia. Some 200,000 people visit such centresannually. On a similar note, the Nordic–Baltic–Russian co-operation schemesupports research and redistribution of knowledge within the areas of NGOcollaboration, innovative schools and special education, distance learning,and education quality control.

These educational programmes have already yielded some positive results.During the British Council a$air public opinion was divided between thosewho used the Council’s services, studied in Britain, and was involved in var-ious civic activities and those who have never been abroad and were mereobservant of events. Indeed, 156 Russian business executives, who obtainedtheir graduate degrees from British universities, forwarded a petition to



Vladimir Putin defending the organisation and pointing at its signi#cantcontribution to Russo-British cultural exchange.70 Similarly, the administrationof the Russian blog space provider openspace.ru issued a public statement insupport of the British Council, praising its input to the development of cul-tural ties between the two countries. This statement was issued in response tothose negative commentaries, which condemned the British Council’s activityduring the con!ict.71 In general, supportive commentaries dominated the Rus-sian Internet and printed press publications, thus indicating the public’sdisappointment with the Russian government’s policy line against the Council.

In conclusion, the working of foreign-funded and Western NGOs in Russiameets various problems. These organisations often fall victim of politicalmanipulations on the side of the donors and recipients. The donor states oftenpursue their foreign policy objectives, while the recipients attempt to use thepopular backlash to the activity of such organisations as justi#cation forconsolidating the constrictive political system and legitimising extant rulingelites. At the same time, there is scope for some optimism. Institutionalstructures and standards set up by such organisations slowly e$ect culturaland political change. This particularly pertains to various educational pro-grammes that help to create a new class of citizens whose values and beliefsare more tolerant of post-industrial and most-modern democratic patterns.These gradual changes along with economic developments and associatedcultural changes that take place within transitional societies could help reachthe initial goals envisaged and idealised by many Western NGOs. On the #nalnote, these dynamics contribute to the formation of a more vibrant associationalrealm, which will be the subject matter of the next chapter.



7 Grassroots movements inmodern RussiaA cause for optimism?

This chapter will examine the proliferation of domestic civic associations,delineate their functional dynamics and analyse problems and challenges thatthese organisations face. The discussion is divided into three main sections. Inthe #rst section I will examine the social composition of these movements. Iwill then turn to the discussion of the movements functioning dynamics. Theemergence of networks and open associations will be analysed. In the #nalsubsection I will carry out an empirical study of various grassroots move-ments. This will include an examination of strikes, professional networks andresidential associations, as well as ecological organisations.

Social composition of grassroots movements

In line with our theoretical propositions, two factors in!uenced the emergenceof grassroots civic activity in modern Russia: (1) economic growth and socio-political stabilisation; (2) the rise of a new wealth distribution model and classstructure. The #rst factor generates various moral dilemmas and generalisedinter-personal trust. The second factor ensures that civic participation was notdistributed equally within the newly formed social classes. It also pre-determines the nature of grassroots participation, its socio-political and economicagenda, as well as the sustainability level of civic networks.

In the introductory chapter of this book I elaborated on the connectionbetween economic performance and civic activism. I argued that the recentdecade of economic growth in Russia contributed to the rising levels of publicoptimism and shifted public attitudes towards greater civic participation andinclusion. However, this picture becomes more nuanced when we examine thesocietal composition of grassroots movements and its relation to Russia’s newclasses. Some qualifying observations are in order. Of particular signi#canceis the #nding that Russia’s proto-middle class represents the most politicallyactive social stratum, while the middle class, the rich and the poor are lesskeen to act.

With respect to the rich and upper middle classes, empirical research oftenshows that these partly merge with the regime and accept the rules of thegame. They are more focused on a personal accumulation of wealth and are


unwilling to get involved in civic actions. Representatives of this stratum havealready accumulated su"cient back-up capital. They are employed in in!u-ential ‘white collar’ positions that yield substantial #nancial bene#ts. Theycan a$ord to sustain non-transparent administrative interactions and arefearful of serious changes that could shake their socio-economic positions(Grigoriev and Salamina 2009; Tikhonova 2006; Maleva and Ovcharova2009; Maleva 2003). As to the poor, they are focused on mere survival andhave no personal or #nancial resources to devote to civic action.

In this light, the proto-middle class acts as the most potent force of thecountry’s civil society. Three main reasons contribute to this. First, thesepeople have just stepped out of poverty and become keen to consolidate their#nancial positions. At the same time, they do not have substantial capital tolean on which conditions their propensity for collective action. Russiansociologists claim that, while the proto-middle class composes nearly 70 percent of Russia’s population, it is deeply between those who are at risk offalling back into poverty and those who are potential middle class recruits.Maleva (2003, p. 213) claims that the proto-middle class includes the poverty-risk group (37 per cent of the composite stratum) and the middle class recruitgroup (33 per cent of the composite stratum). Grigoriev and Salamina (2010,p. 278) insist that the structure of the proto-middle class had changed by2010. It is composed of a 30–40 per cent split. The Moscow Institute ofSociology Russian Academy of Sciences (Rossiiskaya Akademiya Nauk,RAN) also claims that the middle class periphery composes 32 and 29.3 percent of the poverty and middle class candidates respectively (Maleva andOvcharova 2009). The di$erence in these estimates does not change thesituation drastically. The proto-middle class stratum remains unstable #nan-cially and the future of their socio-economic status is unclear. This fosterseconomic fears and sustains higher mobilisation potential.

Second, despite the unstable economic positions, this class has alreadytasted the bene#ts of the capitalist market economy and developed highersocio-economic expectations. This factor ensured a signi#cant level of gen-eralised inter-personal trust within such stratum (Dmitriev 2008; Clement2006). Finally, collective action often becomes the only viable means ofresolving common problems, as other means of con!ict resolution require#nancial and political resources, which these citizens lack. Indeed, as the costsof successful navigation within the non-transparent politico-institutionalenvironment grow, larger segments of the population become unable to paybribes. Even though socially acceptable, bribes became out of reach for manyordinary proto-middle class Russians. The sense of economic threat and fearis often accompanied by the feeling of helplessness against the monolithicstate apparatus (Clement 2006; Clement 2008). Uniting for the resolution of acommon concern often remains the only path available to these citizens.Karine Clement (2006) conducted a number of interviews with grassrootsmovements’ activists who claimed that they have been previously involved in#ghting administrative bureaucratic battles alone to no avail.

Grassroots movements 141


Thus, the proto-middle class becomes the least politically stable and su"-ciently critical social group. Empirical research (MIS RAN 2010; Clement2008; Tikhonova 2006; Grigoriev and Salamina 2010; Dmitriev 2008) con-#rms these #ndings. The studies show that the most active participants ofgrassroots collective action are recruited from the proto-middle class segment.As I discussed elsewhere in this book, the Moscow Institute of SociologyRAN (MIS RAN 2010; Gorshkov and Tikhonova 2004; Gorshkov 2007;Gorshkov 2009a, pp. 17–18) divides Russian society into two main groups:modernists and traditionalists. These groups are distinguished by the basis oftheir attitude towards the role of the state in the economy and the role of theself within the political system.1 Consequential to our discussion, however, isthat the level of material wealth plays an important role in the decision to getinvolved for both modernists and traditionalists.

While traditionalists with larger incomes display a relatively higher level ofinvolvement in public life, wealthy modernists prefer to abstain from collec-tive activity and focus on the achievement of individual goals – thus showingthe growth of the individuation phenomenon, which we de#ned and discussedat the theoretical outset. On the other hand, modernists with the lowest levelof income, which belong to the proto-middle class stratum, represent the mostactive civic group nationwide. Thirty-nine per cent of such people wereinvolved in one or another type of civic action during the past three years; 36per cent of modernists with an average income took part in collective action;and 28 per cent of the higher income group modernists got involved in civicactivity during the past there years (MIS RAN 2010, pp. 100–101).

The higher level of proto-middle class activity is not unique to Russia. Iranis a good example. Continuous economic growth that lasted for a decade upto 1979 led to a considerable reduction of poverty and growth of the proto-middle class segment. This class was capable of collective action and experi-enced fear for its economic and political future. Thus, the Islamic Revolutionof 1979 took place against the backdrop of these important economic andsocio-political shifts (Dmitriev 2008). In many Latin American countries,social mobility mainly takes place between the poor and proto-middle classes(Portes and Ho$man 2003; Dmitriev 2008; Grigoriev and Salamina 2010,p. 122), which results in a considerable growth of the proto-middle class seg-ment. These countries, with Venezuela being a good example, have high levelsof proto-middle class civic protest potential.

Advanced Western capitalist economies also repeat this picture albeit withsome signi#cant allowances towards political stability. The development ofthe capitalist market economy in the Western context also increases economicinequalities between proto-middle and middle classes (Gilbert 2002; Potier2003). Proto-middle classes of the West are also less protected economically,have lower levels of education, less autonomous in their creative and labouractivities and have a lower level of income. Florida (2007, p. 421) estimates,the middle (or creative) class composes 30 per cent of the US workforce, whilethe working class composes some 26.1 per cent of the population, and the

142 Grassroots movements


service sector class composes some 43.4 per cent of the population. He statesthat the working and service classes are the most politically dissatis#ed segmentsof the population.

Zbignew Brzezinski had a more critical approach to these dynamics. In his14 October 2011 speech in Normandy he lamented the situation in which 35per cent of America’s national wealth belongs to the very rich and politicallypowerful 1 per cent, while the remaining 90 per cent of the working andproto-middle class has access to just 25 per cent of the national product.2

Brzezinski claimed that such a situation results in the growth of socio-poli-tical tensions and instability. Interestingly, America’s prominent left-wingsociologist Christopher Lasch expressed some similar thoughts a decade earlier.Lasch (1995, p. 8) insists that upper middle classes, the so-called elites, col-lude with the existing political order and lose the capacity for critical thinkingand civic consciousness (see also Galbraith 1992, The Culture of Content-ment). Therefore, it becomes down to the proto-middle class to accumulatethe potential for social protest.

However, the Western socio-political context creates a number of distinct‘social mobility lifts’ (Sorokin 1957). These lifts facilitate greater levels ofmigration across the classes, which mitigate socio-political con!ict and reducethe protest potential of the proto-middle class. The e$ectiveness of such ‘lifts’in the Western context, however, has been widely questioned. For example,Christopher Lasch (1995, p. 56) claims that the American society ‘clung to anutterly unrealistic conception of society as a ladder, which anyone with energyand ambition could hope to climb, whereas it should have been apparent thatthose at the top had pulled up the ladder after them’. Nevertheless, the veryidea of such a ‘ladder’ glues society together and creates a foundation forpolitical stability. Thus, such stability largely depends on whether a countryopts for an ideology of ‘social mobility’ or ‘social conservation’. In relation toRussia, I have already observed that the country’s middle class grows by just 3per cent per year, while the proto-middle class is on the rise due to the massivereduction of poverty.3 It is also important that the atmosphere of the admin-istrative corruption, as well as state elitism, precludes the very idea of free andfair social mobility. It is clear that in the context of middle class formationRussia remains at the ‘social conservation’ stage, which fosters multifarioussocio-political challenges and enhances proto-middle class dissatisfactionand mobilisation potential.

Functioning dynamics

On to the functioning features of new grassroots movements. Three trendsseem to be the most prominent: (1) emergence of new leaders; (2) politicisa-tion of issues; (3) network formation. First, Russia’s new social movementsare heavily dependent on their leaders. This separates the functioningdynamic of Russia’s networks from that of the West, where the role of leadersis not as signi#cant (Rootes 1999). Davydova and Usacheva (2009, p. 61)



claims that these leaders are well educated and can disseminate knowledge onmatters under discussion. Such leaders often perform mediating and publicrelations functions in that they have well-constructed networks of socio-politicalconnections. Clement (2006; 2008) further notes that leaders are almostalways occupied in creative professions: lawyers, musicians, artists, teachers,academics and journalists. This means that their motivation for public activityis based on humanistic values rather than practical considerations that arecommon to the majority of rank-and-#le movement members. Leaders usuallyespouse socialist ideology and have a systemic approach to solving socialproblems. They focus on the need to change an institutional frameworkwithin which socio-political problems originate (Clement 2008). It is sig-ni#cant that a leader’s withdrawal from the network could bring an end to themovement’s activity. For example, the sudden death of Irina Bergulaeva, theleader of the Moscow regional association of the halls of residents movement,practically stalled the functioning of the network.4

Second, politicisation of civic movements has become a visible trend. Whilemany actions of protest begin with single utilitarian policy demands, theysubsequently elevate their claims to the political realm. The Kaliningrad casewas particularly indicative. The February 2010 protest action began withrequests to abolish restrictive quotas and tari$s on imported foreign vehicles,which constitute the main source of income for many regional entrepreneurs.These petitions soon escalated into political demands. Protesters insisted onpolitical pluralisation, ending the United Russia party political monopoly,and dismissal of the regional governor Georgii Boos.5 Many other Russiancities, such as Vladivostok, Yekaterinburg, Irkutsk, Krasnoyarsk, Omsk,Astrakhan and Murmansk, faced similar situations. Having started frompractical domestic claims, protesters proceeded to demand that the govern-ment observes Article 31 of the Russian Federation Constitution, whichguarantees freedom of associations.6

Similarly, residential movements often exposed wider problems of corrup-tion. The defence of the Rechnik village in the Moscow region was a parti-cularly good example.7 A smaller scale case occurred in the Moscow Districtof Sviblovo. Residents in a local block of !ats discovered that the Districtadministration forged the residential committee paperwork and nominated aDistrict administration member, who did not reside in the block, to head theresidential committee. The Court interference resulted in the dissolution ofthe residential committee and the onset of a criminal investigation. This setan example for other block residents and by February 2010 there had been sixsuch cases in various Moscow Courts.8

Finally, participation in local campaigns is a vital element of grassrootsmovements’ politicisation. The law on ‘the main guarantees of electoral rightsand participation of citizens in referenda’ permits these organisations to par-take in municipal elections, if these movements are registered in local elec-toral committees and their statutes contain clauses that allow electoralparticipation.9 Due to this legal provision, social movements had become



prominent players in regional municipal elections by the end of 2007. Localcouncil elections in Tolgiatti, Dolgoprudnyi, Tver, Lesnoy Raion of the Tverregion, Novozybkov and Zeya in the Amur region are cases in point. Despitedefeats and state pressure, the public proved that it is willing to face theauthorities in defence of its interests. Many movements raised ethical, moraland publicly oriented issues. In the Tver region, for example, local electoralcommittees registered the Union of People’s Deputies, Parents against Drugs,the Union of Electors, Parents for Children’s Future organisations. In the Amurregion, Civic Initiative, the Union of Veterans and the organization of teachers’trade unions applied for electoral registrations.10 In Mytishchy, Moscowregion, local residents struggling against the construction of a rubbish-burningfactory nominated a candidate for a seat in the local council in 2009.11 Asimilar situation took place in Sergiev Posad, where a group of Afghan warveterans proposed their candidate Andrei Ivonin for the post of local mayorduring the same year.12 In Moscow, Astrakhan, Irkutsk and Zhukovsky, cityrepresentatives of local movements also took part in municipal elections.13

Such movements often created political parties. Alternative trade unions, forexample, established The Party of Labour (Partiya Truda) in 2002.14

It is signi#cant that struggling against the political dominance of theUnited Russia party has become the mainstream theme in these movements’electoral programmes. The most common concerns were that the Russianstate is unresponsive to public demands and is not interested in the problemsof the ordinary population. Thus, pressures to increase public control andcivic participation have become commonplace. In Irkutsk, local activistsadopted an electoral slogan ‘State Policies – Under Public Control’. In theAstrakhan mayoral election the Spravedlivaya Rossiya (Just Russia) candidateOleg Shein pledged to expand co-operation with local civic movements and toinclude them into the decision-making process.15 It does not come as a sur-prise, however, that none of the candidates managed to secure a position inregional power structures. Many representatives of civic movements werebarred from the elections on the grounds of administrative shortcomings.Oleg Shein complained about this situation at the national level by insistingthat the extent of corruption and administrative pressure during the Astrakhanelections was unprecedented.16

Third, network formation among Russia’s associations, as well as theirgrowing policy focus, have become particularly evident. Scholarship (Rootes1999; Dobson and Bell 2006; Dean 2001; Gabrielson 2008) often distinguishesbetween single-case and policy-bound movements. Single-case associationsare concerned primarily with one particular issue relevant to a particularcommunity. They do not task themselves with wider political matters andusually dissolve when a desirable result has been achieved (or otherwise).Policy-bound movements focus on broad ideological themes and campaignfor a wide range of issues within a given policy area. They usually function ona cross-regional network principle. Such movements strive to change themodus operandi of di$ering political structures responsible for multifarious



societal problems. A similar classi#cation is made between local and nationalmovements. While the former focus on narrow problems of a particularlocality, the latter stand for wider policy-oriented national matters (Rootes1999).

In the theoretical part of this monograph I have already observed thatsingle-case movements have a particularly important grounding in complexmodern societies. For the purpose of this discussion, it is important to elabo-rate on this statement further. In advanced Western democracies both types ofmovements work in close co-operation. The importance of single-case asso-ciations lies in the fact that they often raise issues that could subsequentlyobtain national signi#cance. National networks, on the other hand, often#nance local and single-case movements with the view to expanding theiractivity and reaping political rewards (Rootes 1999; Dean 2001; Gabrielson2008). Single-case local activity remains the most prominent form of civicengagement in modern Russia (Levashev 2006, Clement et al. 2008, Mirasova2008; MIS RAN 2010; Clement 2008). Such movements usually focus on thepreservation of the environment, resisting building and communication pro-jects and other matters related to domestic problems. However, despite theoverarching focus on the single-case local activity, a trend towards construct-ing wider policy-based national networks is underway. Indeed, a range ofdi$ering networks has been established across the country. Such networksunite residential movements, associations of failed investors, ecological orga-nisations and campaigners struggling against the monetisation of state bene#ts.Two main factors are responsible for this.

First, while involved in a civic action, many activists begin to see a widerpicture of socio-political injustice and grow to detest the rigidity of the extantpolitical system. They gradually develop a sense of common purpose. Manystay within the movements after resolving their personal problems or remainon a stand-by basis ready to support a similar action of protest elsewhere(Mirasova 2008; Clement 2008; Clement et al. 2008). Second, each action ofprotest increases the level of generalised interpersonal trust, which leads tofurther recruitment. People begin to believe in their ability to change extantpolitical settings and become more trusting of the existing civic networks.Statistical data and empirical examples back these propositions. During the2010 Zircon polls, NGO leaders claimed that public support given to theirorganisations has grown over recent years. They connect this dynamic withthe growing level of participation in civic movements. While in 2008 one in#ve interviewed NGO leaders considered the level of public support as ade-quate, in 2010 every third respondent stood by this statement (Zircon 2010, p. 5).Similarly, the Zircon data show that the number of people who have heardabout grassroots movement activity in their regions has grown from 30 to 50per cent between 2008 and 2010. Accordingly, the number of those whowould like to know more about the functioning of such associations in theirlocalities increased from 50 to 65 per cent during the same period of time(Zircon 2010, p. 7). Practice also shows that in the Perm region many



participants of residential single-case movements got involved in civic activity onrecommendation of their friends and neighbours.17 A similar principle workedin Izhevsk,18 where people took part in local actions of protest following aword-of-mouth agitation campaign (Clement 2006).

Obstacles to activity: problems and answers

Despite some positive shifts, the formation of grassroots civic activity net-works is a slow and intermittent process that faces multifarious di"culties.The main obstacles to consolidation of public activity stem from the groups’internal power struggles, resource de#cits, state repression and the lack ofmedia access.19

Internal struggles

Internal struggles unfolding within civic organisations often impede thefunctioning of these networks. On the one hand, the ongoing power gamescould be seen as a sign of the movements’ greater politicisation and risingpolitical stakes. On the other hand, intra-group disagreements can stall thedevelopment of a uni#ed political agenda and impede co-ordinated activity.In particular, larger groups with wider and more e$ective networks oftenengage in hostile takeovers of smaller groups. These larger movements usuallydeprive smaller networks of political independence and agenda-setting capa-cities. In some cases, larger groups deliberately provoke con!icts withinsmaller movements and deploy internal disagreements among members totheir own advantage. The Yabloko party, the RKRD (Rossiiskaya Kommu-nisticheskaya Rabochaya Partiya) and Gari Kasparov’s OGF were particu-larly active in pursuit of such tactics.20 Kasparov’s fall out with the movementof Moscow Hostels was an example of these developments.21

Lack of "nances

Furthermore, most networks’ activists claim that the lack of #nancial resour-ces represents the major impediment to civic activity. The Moscow HigherSchool of Economics poll conducted among national NGO leaders showsthat nearly three-quarters of these organisations lack funding to conducte$ective operations and only 3 per cent of the movements can a$ord devel-oping #nancial reserves.22 Financial di"culties originate from three importantsources: (1) social composition of the movements’ participants; (2) the lack ofpublic trust in #nancial transparency of these organisations; (3) the fears ofstate pressure on behalf of medium-sized and big business structures. As Idiscussed above, grassroots associations often attract representatives of Rus-sia’s proto-middle class. These people are not materially wealthy and #ght forthe preservation of their socio-economic status. Thus, they could not a$ordsubstantial #nancial contributions to their movements functioning. In this



light, following the 2008 #nancial crisis, the number of NGOs attractingmoney from the general public was in a steady decline (Zircon 2010). Thisrelates to the fact that the proto-middle class has su$ered the consequences ofeconomic turmoil most and could not sustain its monetary contributions atpre-existing levels.23

Furthermore, the general public does not trust the #nancial structure ofcivic movements, despite the improving attitude towards NGOs. Moreimportantly, the level of this trust is in a steady decline. While an averageestimate of NGOs’ #nancial transparency was 5.2 points out of 10 in 2008,this #gure dropped to 4.5 out of 10 in 2010 (Zircon 2010, p. 4). Similarly, only 50per cent of the Zircon poll respondents thought that NGOs and socialmovements could be trusted #nancially. Wealthy contributors and movementparticipants also prefer donating money on a single-case basis. They transferfunds on receipt of authorised bills and abstain from handing it directly toindividuals.24 At the same time, such contributions accounted for an almost 40per cent share of the entire associational ‘market’ in 2007 (Alekseeva 2007).

Finally, the oppositional and anti-governmental stance of such movementsprevents them from attracting money from the state.25 It is also signi#cantthat business executives who are capable of assisting civic activity are reluc-tant to support public campaigns that could provoke a negative state reac-tion.26 In this light, the Zircon (2010) research shows that the number ofmovements capable of raising large sums of money decreased, while thenumber of movements capable of collecting insigni#cant sums from varioussources was on the rise.

Despite these di"culties, Russia’s new social movements engage varioustechniques to attract funds. Financial !ows originate from membership fees,ad hoc contributions from business and wealthier members, commercialactivity, such as research, and donations from larger and wealthier organisa-tions. In some cases, these movements win state support grants (Kupreeva2007). Collective donations from participants in movements are a particularlyimportant source of income. For example, residents of Zhukovskoe, who pro-tested against deforestation of local woods, collectively contracted the Levadacentre to carry out an opinion poll that could demonstrate that the localpopulation is unanimously against the developmental plans of the authorities.27

Similarly, the Moscow Spravedlivost association was #nanced primarily by itsfounding father Dmitry Baranovsky. A successful business executive, Bar-anovsky also donated personal funds to various charity projects that deliveredaid to local con!icts veterans.28

Clement (2006) adds to this picture by observing that personal connectionsof movements’ leaders play an important role. This often helps to overcomevarious logistic and administrative di"culties. Access to conference venuesand accommodation is normally arranged through personal connections ofthe movement members. At the empirical level, most 2010 Zircon pollrespondents claimed that, while they could not a$ord to donate monetaryresources, they would be willing to o$er non-monetary assistance (Zircon



2010, p. 3). The number of those who spoke in favour of this form of aid grewfrom 47 to 60 per cent between 2008 and 2010.

Voluntary work by the movements’ leaders, rank-and-#le members and thegeneral public is another important source of support. At the same time, suchcontributions are insu"cient. While 70 per cent of the NGO leaders inter-viewed by the Zircon agency claimed that they would like to see voluntarycontributions to their work, just 25 per cent of the population stated that theyhad ever made occasional donations. This discrepancy stems from the di$er-ence in priorities perceived by NGOs and the general public. While the publicfocuses on charity, NGOs deems other activities more important.

Indeed, most Zircon respondents suggest that social movements must con-centrate on helping the socially excluded: elderly, children, veterans of localcon!icts and disabled people. Fifty-two per cent of the Zircon intervieweesstated that they could be willing to get involved in some forms of charitable activity,such as collecting goods and clothes or organising hot lunches for thesegroups of citizens. At the same time, only 17 per cent of Russia civic move-ments work within such spheres. Similarly, while 27 per cent of citizens wouldvolunteer to give blood, only 4 per cent of NGOs work in this area (Zircon2010, p. 4). I have already observed that foreign-funded NGOs also repeatthis pattern, which creates di"culties in achieving their constituency-buildingobjectives.

Finally, self-imposed civic taxation is one important means of voluntarycontribution at the local level. This form of #nancing has gained prominencein small towns, villages and remote regions. This is done in conjunction withlocal and municipal committees, who appeal to the population for help withparticular construction and development projects. Despite the voluntarynature of such contributions, they #ll the budgets of small localities. Suchactivity also enhances public control over the state expenditure. The governorof the Kirov region Nikita Belykh notes that in 2006–8 the budgets of smallmunicipal towns collected some Ru1.7mln through self-imposed civic taxa-tion. In 2009 this #gure rose to Ru4mln, and increased to some Ru7mln in2010.29 Various localities spent these monies on di$ering developmental pro-jects such as modernising local #re-safety equipment, landscape gardening ormaintaining local memorials.

State resistance

The state resistance remains one of the most important impediments to civicactivity in modern Russia. It falls into three broad categories: (1) covert pro-secution of activists; (2) introduction of legislation that constrains civicactivity; (3) systemic constraints, such as informal practices and the non-transparent nature of state institutions. First, the authorities often deploysecret service institutions to halt the activity, which they deem particularlythreatening to state interests. Amnesty International claims that in Chechnya,Dagestan and Ingushetiya the regional authorities detain suspects randomly



and deploy torture as a form of questioning.30 Murders of prominent civicactivists became commonplace. Of particular signi#cance were the NatalyaEstemirova and Maksharip Aushev cases.31 It is indicative that investigationsinto abuse of human rights in Chechnya had almost stopped in the wake ofthose crimes. Furthermore, Russia’s legal enforcement agencies persecutedvarious protests by the ‘non-systemic’ opposition and extended politicalpressure towards its leaders. The arrests of the National Bolshevik leaderEduard Limonov, the liberal leader Boris Nemtsov, as well as the legal pro-secutions of the Sakharov museum director Yurii Samodurov and the artcritic Andrey Erofeev are cases in point.32

At the legislative level, Vladimir Putin introduced a range of changes thatare hostile to the proliferation of collective action. Scholars have exploredthese dynamics in detail. These include the erection of administrative barriersfor strikes and public protests (Green and Robertson 2008), cancellation ofdirect popular voting for the governors (Chebankova 2010; Goode 2007;Goode 2010), adoption of a restrictive law on referenda, cancellation of thesingle-mandate voting principle for the State Duma elections, raising theelectoral barrier for parliamentary parties from 5 to 7 per cent, severing theparty registration rules (Wilson 2006), introduction of the new law on NGOs(Chebankova 2009), tightening control over the media (Belin 2004, p. 137;Bunin 2007; Bovt 2002, p. 98–99) and academia (Lipman and McFaul 2003,p. 64). In 2008, the State Duma also began drafting a range of measuresaimed at enhancing state control over the Internet, and restricting the accessof foreign investors to Russia’s cyberspace.33

Finally, the non-transparent institutional structure of Russia’s extant poli-tical regime acts as the most serious systemic impediment to civic activity.Given that collective public action is carried out within formal institutionalrules, many of those who stand at the apex of Russia’s decision-making pro-cess silently support de-formalisation of the country’s socio-political life(Sakwa 2010). As Clement (2006) notes, Russia’s elites are eager to adoptlaws that are di"cult to interpret. That these laws are applied selectively(Brown 2001; Sakwa 2010; Hendley 2006) further promotes an atmosphere ofinformality. This pushes people to adopt informal practices, choose corruptforms of behaviour, and abstain from transparent forms of collective activity.As Mikhail Leontyev observed,

corruption became such an integral part of Russia’s socio-political, eco-nomic, and administrative life that its miraculous elimination could makethe entire country stand still. It would be tantamount to unplugging anelectric device from its power socket!34

Russia’s Association of Lawyers empirically backs these propositions.The ‘Corruption 2010’ report based on research data collected during theperiod between 2 July 2009 and 30 July 2010 claims that nearly 50 percent of Russia’s GDP is linked with corruption. In this report Russia’sbusiness executives cite their expenses associated with informal practices,



such as mediating services and direct bribes. These show that the stateadministrative procedures are 90 per cent reliant on mediating practicescarried out by #rms with informal access to state o"cials.35 Similarly,Russia’s educational sphere is 80 per cent reliant on informal #nancialcontributions and corruption has almost taken over the country’s judicialand legal enforcement agencies.36

The Levada centre further shows that 28.6 per cent of the November 2009poll respondents admitted to bribing various o"cials; 20.3 per cent of therespondents openly admitted to bribing the tra"c police, while 8.8 per centrefused to comment; 14.5 per cent confessed to bribing bureaucrats at variouslevels; 7.4 per cent gave bribes to nurseries; 6.7 per cent bribed school tea-chers; and 7.1 per cent bribed university sta$.37 Russia’s General ProsecutorYurii Chaika claimed that in the #rst half of 2009 his o"ce discovered some11,000 violations of the law ‘On State Service’ and some 50,000 violations ofthe law ‘On Municipal Service’. In addition, they revealed some 12,000 vio-lations of the state purchase procedures and over 58,000 violations of the lawon state and municipal property in 2009 alone.38 Chaika also claimed thatstate o"cials habitually engage in entrepreneurial activity, despite the o"cialban on doing so. It does not come as a surprise that carrying any form ofpublic activity is exceptionally di"cult within these conditions. Such a situa-tion serves particularly well to those elite segments that are apprehensive ofpublic activity and political participation.

Lack of media access

The lack of media access by alternative movements has a particularly detri-mental e$ect on civic activity. The 2010 Zircon respondents claimed that thelow level of information about public activity represents the main reason whypeople abstain from civic campaigns. At the same time, civic action accel-erates when media access becomes available. The Seversky Metallurgy Plantcase is particularly interesting. An interview given to a local newspaper by afactory worker Aleksandr Ovechkin provoked a chain reaction. In his inter-view Ovechkin complained about dire working conditions at the factory. Thefollowing newspaper issue published a collective letter of complaint from 28workers and the next issue hosted a public demand by 128 employees toimprove working conditions. When the factory administration attempted tomake the protesters redundant, the workers collectively appealed to Russia’sPrime Minister Vladimir Putin. This resulted in the State Duma committeeinspecting the plant.39

Generally, the lack of media access is overcome by the spread of the Inter-net, alternative publishing, and distribution of lea!ets. The Internet plays aparticularly signi#cant role in the functioning of civic movements. We havealready observed that video addresses have became an important form ofpolitical agitation. The examples of Alexei Dymovsky and his followers, as



well as the Novosibirsk-based inter-regional association Rossiiskim Detyam –Dostupnoe Doshkolnoe Obrazovanie (Accessible Nursery Schools for RussianChildren), whose video campaign fostered numerous demonstrations of pro-test, legal cases against local governments and petition letters to the federalauthorities, have been widely publicised.40

The Internet also plays a role in mobilising public activity, even though itspotential is not as signi#cant as that of national political parties. This parti-cularly concerns various charity issues and urban development plans. Vladi-vostok city saw the local Internet community raising funds to #nance the citymotorway repairs.41 Hundreds of Life Journal users in the Pskov regioncampaigned against the embezzlement, which occurred in the local old people’shome. This campaign prompted the regional executive to order an investiga-tion that resulted in the dismissal of the institution’s #nancial authority.42 Theaction’s success enabled civic campaigners to secure a governmental grant forthe sum of Ru250,000, which was allocated for purchasing wheelchairs andmattresses.

Furthermore, the Internet often facilitates recruitment to local civic move-ments. NGO leaders interviewed in 2010 by the Zircon group claimed thatInternet advertising was the most e$ective means of attracting new members,action participants, and volunteers. In St Petersburg, for example, the ZhivoiGorod movement, which defends the city’s historic architecture, originatedfrom Internet forum boards.43 Similarly, the Berdsk city (Novosibirsk region)Internet community organised an online public waiting list for local statenurseries and a portal of public control over local road construction.44 Whenthe city General Prosecutor politically insulted local Internet Life Journalusers by calling them ‘anonymous individuals who are scared to face theauthorities’, an avalanche of commentaries with names, home addresses andvideo recordings followed. A similar situation took place in Krasnoturinsk,when the local mayor made identical claims against the local newspaperforum users (Horton et al. 2010).

The public increasingly uses the Internet to exercise control over the federalgovernment. The compulsory online log of administrative purchases accumu-lated on the zakupki.ru website is an example. The intentions of the Minis-tries of Interior and Finance to place orders for expensive sets of gold platedluxury furniture produced a public outcry. When the case reached the printedpress, the Ministry of Finance was forced to withdraw the order thus savingthe federal budget some Ru2.5mln.45 Similarly, a public database of govern-mental cars with specially mounted sirens has been launched online. Thisdatabase enables the public to send complaints about these cars’ road beha-viour and monitor their compliance with the state tra"c code.46 Similar casesoccur when civic activists place video recordings documenting variousadministrative abuses on the YouTube portal. The YouTube activity of thesinie vederki (blue buckets) motorist movement resulted in Russia’s o"cialstaking measures and issuing o"cial apologies. A case when the Minister ofthe Emergencies chau$er used inappropriate language through the car



loudspeaker to threaten other motorists resulted in his dismissal. The Minis-try was also in the midst of a big public scandal.47 I have already observedthat the attempts by the Izhevsk mayor Denis Agashin to blackmail cityveterans organisations during the December 2011 electoral campaign attrac-ted public attention through a publication on youtube.48 The party was forcedto distance itself from Agashin and issue a number of mitigating statements.Similarly, when beating of female prison inmates in the Amur region wasmade available on the youtube portal, dismissal and criminal prosecution ofcorrupt o"cers followed.49

Finally, the Internet contributes to the development of civic attitudesamong younger generations. Cyberspace enables young people, in particularuniversity and high school students and graduates, to discuss themes andproblems that they deem important. This enhances the levels of interpersonaltrust and generates lenience towards collective action. The IndependentFoundation for the Study of Public Opinion under the aegis of the HigherSchool of Economics and the Institute for the Study of Civil Society claimthat young people aged between 14 and 18 have much higher levels of gen-eralised interpersonal trust. They are much less atomised and individualisticthan people of older generations. People of that generation are one and a halftimes more willing to help strangers than those of older ages; their attitude to lifeis 20 per cent more positive than those of older generations. More importantly,half the active Internet users of that age took part in an action of publicprotest in the past two or three years. These people volunteered for charitywork twice as often as their older counterparts.50 Apart from the nature of theyounger age and the absence of the Soviet socialisation patterns, researchersattribute these attitudes to the growing role of modern communications andthe Internet.

Empirical examples

Strikes

I shall begin the empirical part of this chapter with an examination of strikes.This is because strikes represent a positive development in Russia’s industrialrelations and socio-political life. They contribute to the formation of a morejust and transparent political system. Strikes also enhance social solidarityand often show that collective activity by workers is capable of achievingpublic good. During the past decade the number of workers movements andstrikes increased. Widespread strikes a$ected foreign investors, as workers inFord, Heineken, and Coca Cola articulated their demands in 2007.51 Russianemployers were not spared from these developments either. June 2007 wit-nessed unrest of builders in Groznyi, strikes by workers in MikhailovTsementin Ryazan, Yuzhnaya hydro-electricity station in Penza, Krasnodarenergor-emont factory in Kransodar and Madok furniture plant in Vishera. Threehundred catering sites were a$ected in the Irkutsk region; 900 doctors were



engaged in strikes across 19 districts of the Chita region; and plumbers wereinvolved in social activities in Saratov during the same month.52

A number of themes are important in the discussion of strikes. Of parti-cular signi#cance remains the fact that, since the early 2000s, strikes in Russiahave obtained a di$erent character. This new character re!ects the shiftingnature of industrial con!ict and relates to the more advanced stages of eco-nomic development. This dynamic took place within three important areas:(1) the nature of workers’ complaints was modi#ed; (2) the social compositionof strikes participants was altered; (3) the industrial con!ict began to developbetween new contesting parties. Let me begin with the examination of labourcomplaints. Considerable economic growth, which lasted almost a decade untilOctober 2008, resulted in the change of socio-economic expectations. Unem-ployment was no longer a threat, while the wage arrears of the 1990s becamealmost a distant memory. The IKSI RAN report shows that the share ofpeople with a stable income increased from 72 to 87 per cent between 2002 and2007. And while almost 70 per cent of the respondents believed that they could#nd alternative employment, many were satis#ed with their jobs and incomes(Kozina 2009, p. 2009). These factors changed the nature of labour demands.

New claims were generally aimed at improving the existing legal codewithin the labour market and resolving important problems related to labourproductivity, social welfare, and protection of fundamental human rights.Workers usually insisted on an increase in salaries and a fairer redistributionof companies’ pro#ts. They also pushed for better working conditions andmore extensive social security packages. Consequential to the country’s poli-tical and economic system was the claim to legalise salary payments. Indeed,establishing a transparent wage system by eliminating shadow ‘cash in hand’payments would enable workers to take part in the consumer credit marketand maintain a higher socio-economic status (Kozina 2009, pp. 19–20). Theemergence of such claims led Russia’s Independent Fund for Public Opinionto conclude that workers have begun to develop a civic consciousness andhave become more willing to articulate their claims in the public domain.53

Second, the social composition of strikes participants has also changed tore!ect new demands. However, strikes take place not as a result of workers’impoverishment, as happened during the 1996–98 unrest, but in the wake ofgrowing living standards. During the 1990s, the poorest segments of thecountry’s workforce were engaged in strike activity. These were representativesof professions in which wage arrears were the most severe – doctors, teachersand coalminers. In the 2000s, on the other hand, protests emanated from themost well-paid segments of the labour market. In 2003, well-paid employeesof the Norilsk Nikel metal plant demanded increased wages, better workingconditions and improved social security packages. Siberian air controllers,who also belong to the highest paid labour league, presented similar claimsshortly afterwards. The second term of Putin’s presidency witnessed strikeswithin the highest paid sectors of the economy, such as oil (Surgutneftegaz),metal production (Sual, Karelskii Okatysh, Mikhailovtsement), coal mining



(Esaulskaya and Tagaryshskaya shafts) and the car manufacturing (AvtoVAZ,Ford-Vsevolzhsk) industries.54

Finally, industrial con!ict involved a new range of participants. During the1990s, workers addressed their claims to the state, which was unable to containthe ongoing economic turmoil. During the 2000s, workers con!icted directlywith the owners and managers of enterprises. Thus, the con!ict shifted from the‘government–labour’ line towards a ‘labour–capital’ duo (Kozina 2009; Bunin2007). This shift was consequential to the nature of civic activity. Whilestruggling against the state within the conditions of economic turmoil was arelatively easy task involving an abstract enemy in the Kremlin, dealing directlywith industrial administration is a much more daunting a$air. Given that itinvolves personal relationships and entails the threat of dismissal, such activitydemands better organisational capacities and greater political determination.

Let me now discuss another theme pertaining to the state’s pressure exertedon workers’ activity. It is interesting that the Kremlin’s legal, administrativeand political resistance to strikes could not fully impede the emergence of newworkers’ movements. The Kremlin’s pressure was particularly clear in thelegislative sphere. From a legal point of view, developed industrial countriescould be divided into two broad groups: those which enshrine the right tostrike within their legal codes and those which deduce this right from thefreedom of associations idea (Lushnikov and Lushnikova 2009; Ewing 1986;Kupferberg 1985; Budd 1996; Burchill 1992). The #rst group (Germany,United States, Italy and Portugal) could be considered as ‘strike constraining’,while the second group (Belgium, Great Britain and the Netherlands) as‘strike enabling’. The constraining nature of the #rst group stems from thefact that some additional legislation is needed to direct and regulate workers’activity. Indeed, each legal right requires some further legislative guidance onhow to exercise it. The second group lacks such regulations, which grantsworkers greater organisational and logistical leeway.

Russia belongs to the #rst, ‘strike-constraining’ group of states. The Rus-sian labour code adopted in 2001 is cumbersome and ine"cient. It is unableto accommodate the functioning of independent trade unions and allow thefree expression of the will of workers through strikes and industrial protests.The right to strike is enshrined in Article 37.4 of the country’s Constitutionand in Article 409 of the Russian Federation’s Labour Code (Lushnikov andLushnikova 2009; Kozina 2009, pp. 13–14). The right, however, is a subject tomultifarious rules and regulations. Trade unions are legally responsible fororganising a strike while o"cial representatives are appointed to deal with theauthorities. The rules demand that workers must sign a contract if conductinga strike, have a quorum of no less than 50 per cent of the employees with over50 per cent of the vote supporting the strike. Moreover, an o"cial strikerequires establishing a mediation or reconciliation committee. It is almostimpossible to organise an o"cial industrial protest according to these rules.55

Russian experts claim that implementing all the o"cial regulations wouldrequire at least 42 working days (Kozina 2009, p. 15).



More importantly, the strike could be deemed illegal if administrativeorganisational procedures were not followed correctly. Therefore, most strikesthat took place in Russia’s factories, including the November 2007 protest inthe Vsevolzhsk Ford plant, were declared illegal by the judicial authorities.Such a situation prompts workers to embark on some hidden forms of protestthat threaten to undermine the country’s economic performance, decreaselabour productivity, and unbalance the existing socio-political relations.Among the most common forms of protest were hunger strikes, sabotage,mass redundancy claims and street violence (Chebankova 2009; Green andRobertson 2008). In addition, Russia’s o"cial statistics are almost blind to thelevel of strikes taking place in the country. It reports a decrease in the ‘o"cial’strikes and underplays the real situation. The Russian Statistics Service (Ros-Stat) claims that the number of strikes decreased eightfold in 2008 and thatthere were just seven and four ‘o"cial’ strikes in 2007 and 2008 respectively.56

At the same time, these #gures are grossly misrepresented. The independentInstitute of Collective Action claims that there were 35 and 27 strikes duringeach respective year (Kozina 2009, p. 16).

Furthermore, trade unions play a particularly important role in shapingworker’s activity. While in many instances this in!uence is mobilising andpositive, in some instances it may have a negative character. We have alreadyobserved that Russia’s trade unions are divided between the old Soviet-styletrade union organisations led by the Federation of Russia’s Independent(Federatsiya Nezavisimykh Profsoyuzov Rossii, FNPR) and a host of alter-native trade unions that represent genuine working associations formed withinfactories for the defence of particular labour interests. A few further com-ments are in order. The FNPR has always been an administrative organisa-tion representing the state power. Due to its close links to the state, theFNPR has a wealthy economic structure. It operates a big holiday businessand owns a substantial property portfolio in the centre of Moscow. It is inpossession of a large network of hotels in the South of Russia and is the mainshareholder of Rosno insurance, Russia’s leading insurer.57

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the FNPR sided with var-ious political forces in pursuit of the private goals of its leaders. At di$erentstages the movement co-operated with a multitude of left-wing organisations,the Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs and the Otechestvo-Vsia-Rossiya(OVR) political party led by Yurii Luzhkov, the ex-mayor of Moscow. TheFNPR vice-president Andrey Isaev was elected as the State Duma deputyfrom the OVR list during the 1999 State Duma campaign. Close relationshipswith the Moscow Mayor enabled business structures linked to the FNPRorganisation to sub-contract millions of dollars each year for conductingvarious public events and proceedings.58

It does not come as a surprise that the FNPR often impedes activity byindependent workers and covertly acts on behalf of the state and big business.It often staged ‘harmless’ protests, in which workers introduced demandsconvergent with political proposals of the ER party (Green and Robertson



2008, pp. 52–53). More importantly, the state and the o"cial economyusually collude to prevent the acceleration of the alternative trade unionmovement. In doing so they deploy the ongoing political competition betweenthe FNPR and alternative trade union associations (Green and Robertson2008). In this light, the FNPR consistently discredited independent tradeunions in the printed press and television broadcasts. Moreover, in 2009, theKremlin allocated some Ru71mln for training FNPR activists only andignored the alternative trade unions representatives.59 Similarly, during theformative Congress of Russia’s Alternative Trade Union Association, whichtook place in September 2010, Putin demonstratively attended an FNPRgathering that was conducted simultaneously in Moscow.60 It is also impor-tant that Russia’s leading large companies constituting the Union of Indus-trialists and Entrepreneurs pledged to resolve industrial con!icts with the helpof the FNPR and abstain from co-operation with alternative trade unions.61

Nevertheless, alternative trade unions rapidly develop against the backdropof state resistance. In September 2010 they established an all-Russian asso-ciation titled Soiuz Profsoyuzov Rossii ‘The Union of Russia’s Trade Unions’.The new movement pledged to compete with the FNPR and become a viablepolitical force representing the genuine interests of Russia’s workers. Theorganisation, however, missed out on including representatives of dock-workers, miners and non-ferrous metal industry workers.62 A Union coordi-nating council, Sotsprof, unites 19 of Russia’s alternative trade unions acrossdi$erent industries. The Council operates across 72 regions with a head o"cein St Petersburg. It is estimated that the organization unites some 1.5 millionpeople.63 Public manifestations in support of the alternative trade unions tookplace across the country in summer 2009 and forced Russia’s regional autho-rities into a dialogue with the Sotsprof organisations.64 It is also signi#cantthat ordinary workers gradually realised the ability of alternative trade unionorganisations to achieve tangible results and their growing socio-politicalimportance.65 The independent Institute for Globalisation and Social Move-ments insists that, despite only 23 per cent of Russians being involved inindependent trade unions in 2008, this #gure is on the rise. The Institute pre-dicted that the alternative trade union movement would penetrate banking,retail, transportation and service sectors in the near future.66

More importantly, membership of the alternative trade unions di$ers fromthat of the FNPR. Alternative unions are composed of the most active, free-thinking young activists who are prepared to defend their professional inter-ests. Indeed, in an interview with IKSI RAN researchers, an alternative tradeunion member observes:

we are determined to prove that the so-called “civilised” working condi-tions that have become a norm in the West represent the result of astrenuous workers’ struggle. And we are determined to engage in such astruggle in our country in order to achieve identical results.67



It does not come as a surprise that the alternative trade unions mostlyemerged in large transnational corporations that employ a quali#ed andenergetic workforce (Kozina 2009, p. 21).

Professional movements

Various professional associations spring up across the country. Russia’sCentre for Support of Small Business accounts for 30 existing nationwideorganisations that encompass various sectors of the economy from ice-creamproducers, bakers, professional translators and travel agents to building andconstruction workers, freight carriers and electronic goods producers (Alek-seeva 2007). Such associations often emerge in response to the existing gaps inthe legislation and tackle widespread injustice. The lack of clarity within thelaw on illegal substances, for example, has led to the arrest and prosecution ofchemical industry workers. The existing legislation on the sale of ethanol andpure alcohol gave the police the right to blackmail chemical industry workersand extract bribes and kickbacks. However, when the directors of Kapital-khim and Slavianka factories fell under unlawful prosecution in September2006, some serious societal responses followed. Over 200 existing chemicalindustry enterprises expressed concerns. The ensuing demonstrations whichtook place in Moscow and Samara attracted the attention of State Dumadeputies and led to the release of arrested executives and parliamentary dis-cussions on a change to the law.68 Similarly, professional veterinary move-ments and social organisations across Russia campaigned for the release ofAlexander Duka – a vet who had been remanded in custody for the use of theketamine drug in medical practice. Societal movements won a long-standingbattle with the Russian authorities, who were subsequently forced to releaseDuka and change the law.69

The public activity of Russia’s motorists also gives cause for optimism.Russia’s national Union of Motorists, headed by a prominent liberal politi-cian Victor Pokhmelkin, achieved a number of impressive results, alteringexisting legislation. In particular, the Union enforced a legal recognition ofpresumption of innocence, thus demanding that tra"c police o"cially prove adriver’s guilt. The Union has also pushed for the ban on re-examination dueto the loss of a driver’s licence, the ban on withholding driving licences ascollateral for #ne payments and the ban on the repetition of the MOT testingwithin the same year. Apart from this national organisation, numerous localassociations of motorists have sprung up across the country. Such movementstackle the most pressing problems of corruption within Russia’s tra"c policeand enjoy nationwide support. In most cases, their activities attract mediaattention and generate public concern. The Sverdlovsk case, when policearbitrariness against the leader of the local motorists union spawned numer-ous public protests and attracted the attention of the national televised mediaand press, is a case in point.70 Russia’s motorists also organise numerouspublic protests against the rise of petrol prices and quotas on imported cars.



In Vladivostok, such actions managed to get the ban on left-hand drive carsoverturned (Chebankova 2009).

Residential movements

Associations of residential property owners are being formed across Russiawith the view to manage apartment blocks. While only 7 per cent of residen-tial property owners were united in such associations at the beginning of2007, this #gure had grown to 20 per cent by the end of the year. The Min-istry of Regional Development claims that the number of such associationsincreased twofold in 2008.71 These associations represent voluntary organisa-tions that enforce residential discipline and manage local a$airs pertaining tothe socio-economic functioning of local neighbourhoods. Very often, suchassociations launch court cases against municipal authorities that do not ful#ltheir duties, embark on construction in the areas that are unsuitable forapartment owners or pursue policies inconsistent with the right of living in apeaceful residential area. Such con!icts are widespread and often publiclyexpose the ine"ciency of Russia’s municipal authorities as well as the extentof corruption within these organisations. More importantly, such associationsoften force local authorities to become more accountable to popular needsand to comply with the socio-economic expectations of residents.

Struggling against urban construction plans often goes hand in hand withecological themes. Citizens contest building and construction in areas thatrepresent natural reserves, forests and local parks. The federal city of Moscowwas the area in which such protests took place most frequently. The Khimkiforest case was probably the most signi#cant example. The federal authoritiesplanned to construct the Moscow–St Petersburg motorway directly throughthe forest grounds. This evoked the most signi#cant public protest by residentsin the Putin era, with the case being discussed on television and in the news-papers.72 Similar movements were organised in defence of Butovo forest andBitsa Park in south Moscow.73 The movement For the Salvation of theButovo Park, for example, united some 5,000 participants who demonstratedagainst the park transfer under the jurisdiction of the Foreign IntelligenceService (SVR) and received the government’s o"cial pledge not to use thepark’s land for private purposes.74 Identical struggles took place in Samara in2009 and in Novosibirsk in defence of Narymsk Park.75

The struggle for the preservation of historical memorials was anotherimportant theme. In the federal city of Moscow, for example, the Arkhnadzor(Architectural Guard) movement defended historic churches from demolitionand destruction. The movement leaders took part in drafting the Moscow cityconstruction and development plan. In doing so, they persuaded the Moscowauthorities to adopt over 300 amendments related to the preservation of thecity’s historic and cultural legacy.76 The Moscow Council on Cultural Legacyestablished in 2008 is another social movement that united several hundredestablished people from the #elds of culture, journalism, architecture and



literature. The Council mobilised Moscow residents to defend various histor-ical and architectural monuments. The Preservation of the Central House ofArtists was one the movement’s biggest achievements.77

Property shareholders movements of who lost their stakes due to theinability of some construction companies to ful#l their obligations are alsogrowing across the country. An All-Russian Association of Investors wasformed in March 2006 and now accounts for over 100 voluntary groups from72 di$erent regions of Russia.78 The Association subsequently developed intoan All-Russian Committee for Property, Earth and People (Zhil’e, Zemlya,Lyudi) led by the State Duma deputy Anton Belyakov.79 The Associationestablished networks in 72 of Russia’s regions and has more than 500,000members. Despite the active ongoing dialogue with the authorities, the Com-mittee also practices various forms of street protest. It organises demonstra-tions, blocks streets and motorways, and has occasional clashes with thepolice. In 2009 failed investors actively campaigned in the Moscow region,Moscow Federal City, Tyumen region, Rostov region, the cities of St Petersburgand Rostov-on-Don. In the Tyumen region residents formed initiative groupsintended to face various building corporations such as TyumenLukoilStroi,PromzhildorTrans, Stroitekhnogroup, ZAO Tyumenskiy Stroitel.80

In response the city authorities pledged to provide administrative supportto protesters and to #nd alternative investors for the projects which were nearcompletion. More importantly, many cases have been transferred to thecriminal investigation by the city prosecution o"ce. An identical situationtook place in the federal city of St Petersburg, where the residents set up acivic movement to assist residential investors (Fond Sodeistviya ObmanutymDolshchikam).81 This civic activity led the State Duma to enact a range ofamendments to Law no. 214 from 2004 ‘On Participation in Shared Invest-ment Building of Residential Property’. The new amendments precipitated adetailed course of action in the event of a construction #rm bankruptcy. Ithas also obliged developers to deploy mutual funds solely for constructionpurposes. Failure to comply with this requirement would result in criminalprosecution.82 The terms for the completion of a building project have alsobeen clearly articulated. With the enactment of this law all constructioncompanies were obliged to conduct their investor relations on the basis of itsprovisions.83

Russia’s hostel residents movements are particularly active in organisingnetworks. These organisations united in e$orts to defend their rights in var-ious Russian cities and regions, such as Novosibirsk, federal city of Moscow,the Moscow region, Izhevsk and others.84 The network formation processwas particularly active in the federal city of Moscow and the Moscow region.The DOM (Dvizhenie Obshchezhitii Moskvy i Moskovskoi Oblasti) networkco-ordinated the activity of many small movements of Russia’s hostels residentsacross the country. The movement co-operated with Russia’s various left-wingorganisations and received help from left-wing State Duma deputies such asGalina Khovanskaya and Oleg Shein, as well as from Lyudmila Alexeeva, the



leader of the Russia’s Helsinki Group.85 This organisation managed to altervarious legislative provisions. In particular, Russia’s High Court issued a notein summer 2006 which converted Article 7 of the Law on Residential Codeinto an instrument for defending the rights of halls of residents’ occupants.The amendments enabled the hostels residents to privatise their rooms – apractice that had been previously forbidden.86 Finally, ecological movementshave been particularly active in establishing cross-regional and regional civicnetworks.

Ecological movements

Ecological movements represent the most vibrant sector of Russia’s grassrootscivic activity. These associations deliver proposals to the authorities, adoptvarying forms of political struggle, build associational networks and win var-ious legal cases. The activity of such movements can make a positive con-tribution to the dialogue between state and society. They also make an impacton the social perceptions of public activity. The Levada centre states that asmany as 60 per cent of Russians are supportive of ecological movements andas many as 17 per cent are prepared to take part in an ecological protestaction.87 Ecological movements deploy various forms of public engagement.They create associational networks, disseminate the results of their research tothe general public and the authorities, and organise actions of protest againstviolations of public interests in the environmental sphere (Khalii 2008, p. 10).

These movements tackle various issues such as the preservation of naturalreserves, civic control over building and construction, the struggle againstgenetically modi#ed food and the like (Khalii 2008, p. 8). Foreign origins andthe cross-national nature of activity are the main characteristics of ecologicalassociations. These features distinguish such movements from their counter-parts focusing on other socio-economic problems. Moreover, professionallawyers, scientists and local intelligentsia often support ecological organisa-tions. The leaders of these movements also come from the layers of the intel-ligentsia that grant such organisations with more signi#cant forms of socialcapital (Davydova and Usacheva 2009).

As I noted above, these associations normally function on the networkprinciple. For example, in Karelia the Association of Karelia’s Green estab-lished the Ekologiya (Ecology) Club. This regional network instituted bran-ches in the region’s small towns and villages. Russia’s Green Party is anotherenvironmental movement that operates on a network principle. The partyformed some 52 acting branches nationwide, having some 17,000 members.Some party activists were elected to municipal councils and regional legis-latures (Khalii 2008, p. 6). Similarly, defenders of the Bolshoi Utrish naturalreserve in Krasnodar Krai established a cross-national association and orga-nised a number of all-Russian protest actions. Many cities, such as St Peters-burg, Yekaterinburg, Penza, Kaliningrad, Chelyabinsk and Tambov, as well assmall towns in the Moscow region supported the movement.88



Russia’s largest ecological movement is the Socio-Ecological Union (Sot-sialno-Ekologicheskii Soyuz). The movement has an international reach. TheUnion has become an in!uential organisation with more than 100,000 mem-bers in 19 countries in Europe, Asia and North America. The Russian branchof the World Wide Fund for Nature, the Baikal Ecological Wave beganforming independent ecological networks and attracting local socio-politicalactivists to take part in their campaigns. They were becoming increasinglypolitical and collaborated with local activists on various issues of socio-politicalimportance. For example, the World Wide Fund for Nature worked unitedwith activists defending the Khimki forest.89

The politicisation of local environmental movements stems from the factthat such associations are often involved in con!ict with large industrialenterprises that operate in, or are trying to enter, the regions in question. Inmost cases, such enterprises ignore environmental issues and propose aggressivedevelopmental plans. Regional authorities, on the other hand, are inclined tohost such #rms given their #nancial contributions to local budgets. Thus,regional governments are often forced to strike a balance between the essentialpopular needs in the environmental sphere and the #nancial in!ows raisedfrom the functioning of large enterprises.

The results of this struggle are rather positive. Ecological associations havesaved various nature reserves and in!uenced governmental policies in regionallocations. In Sochi, the Social-Ecological Movement won a court case againstthe build up of the national park for the pending 2014 Winter Olympic games.Gazprom, a company that has already embarked upon various hotel con-struction projects, has su$ered most from the judicial decisions.90 Similarly,under pressure from Russian ecological associations, the government led byVladimir Putin pledged to divert bobsleigh tracks, VIP hotels, and SPA clubsfrom the ecological zones of the Grushevoi Ridge.91 In addition, demonstra-tions in defence of the Baikal Lake resulted in the transfer of the prospectivepipeline route away from the lakeshore.92 By the same token, regional civilsociety is struggling against the permission granted to Oleg Deripaska by theKremlin to dispose of liquid chemical waste into the Baikal Lake.93

Following the pressure from ecological associations, the Nizhnii Novgorodauthorities drafted a special reconciliation document, which stated that theregion would not be hosting any enterprises that refuse to conduct an envir-onment-friendly policy. The regional administration also pledged to discussany business proposals from ecologically dangerous #rms with representativesof civil society (Khalii 2008, p. 9). It is also signi#cant that ecological move-ments exposed corruption within Russia’s administrative system. In the Zhu-kovsky town of the Moscow region protests against deforestation were linkedto the recent falsi#cation of mayoral elections. The protest action gatheredsome 4,000 people who protested against the administration, declaring theER member Alexander Bobovnikov the poll winner.94

In conclusion, the development of Russia’s grassroots civic movementsgives cause for some optimism for the future of civil society in this country.



This optimism exonerates our initial proposition that the associational sphereof civil society can develop against the backdrop of restrictive conditionswithin the public and normative domains. The state makes some seriousintrusions into the associational realm and, at the moment, the movementsface a host of organisational, #nancial, logistic and administrative di"culties.Nevertheless, the formation of such movements is underway. Objective socio-economic factors precipitate this. Such factors include rising living standards,an increase in the level of generalised inter-personal trust, a reduction inpoverty and the shifting of public preferences towards greater inclusion andparticipation. Furthermore, the state refusal to acknowledge these objectivedynamics, as well as the growing costs of sustaining the non-transparentmethods of administrative interactions, fosters the public propensity to unite.



8 Conclusion

This work examined the evolution of civil society in Russia during the decadeof 2000s. The account pursued both empirical and theoretical objectives.From the empirical point of view, this study analysed various legal, adminis-trative, societal, and media settings within which Russia’s civil society oper-ates. The book detailed the functioning of grassroots civic movements,foreign-sponsored organisations, state-promoted civic associations and var-ious radical and extremist networks. From a structural point of view, theempirical discussion divided civil society into the three separate spheres. Itanalysed the phenomenon as (1) a part of society; (2) a kind of society; and(3) a distinct public sphere.

On a theoretical plane, the book also pondered a number of importantquestions. It discussed the impact of economic growth and development onattitudes, perceptions and public activity in Russia. A separate chapter deli-neated the cycles of civic participation in Russia, thus claiming that publicactivism represents an intermittent process in which phases of active engage-ment replace periods of withdrawal and privatism. Finally, the account com-plemented, or rather challenged, the proposition of Michael Edwards, whoclaimed that the three strands of civil society must develop in concert andcannot exist without permanent fully-!edged interaction.

The discussion demonstrated that a potent associational realm coulddevelop within propitious economic conditions and against the backdrop of arestrictive public sphere. This line of questioning opens an avenue for furthertesting in other, similar states with comparable socio-political and economicconditions. That said, the extent to which such associational life can functionwithout the appropriate support of the public sphere is still unknown. Atsome point, these movements and associations will need to enter an ‘ideolo-gical marketplace’, an operational arena or a viable public outlet for articu-lating their demands and expressing their concerns. Thus, they will force thegovernment to alter its policies towards sti!ing the public sphere and willwant to expel the state from its operational realm. The force with which thattakes place will depend on the level of imbalance between the accumulatedassociational activity and the repression of the public sphere.


The #ndings of this book also give grounds for some cautious long-termoptimism. This account points to a number of positive shifts that took placewithin the realms of attitudes and practical action alike. The book allows theconclusion that the number of Russians who appreciate qualities such as an‘active life stance’ and ‘the ability to take initiative’ has grown over recentyears, as did the share of those who thought that an active approach to life isimportant. It is also clear that the vast majority of Russians consider them-selves socially active individuals capable of adjusting to various socio-economicand political situations. This trend is re!ected in the fact that various centresof public activity and civic networks consistently emerge nationwide. Grass-roots movements – motorist unions, ecological groups, property holders andprofessional unions – speak about practical socio-political and economicproblems. The number of nationwide voluntary small business associationshas also grown dramatically. Similarly, Russia’s citizens often unite for theprotection of parks and forest zones landlocked within urban areas. Equallyimportant are the actions of small plot holders who consistently defend theirrights against local authorities and speak on various important legal andpublic issues relevant to the use of land in industrial areas.

At the same time, I need to warn against overly excessive optimism. Rus-sia’s civic participation still evolves on the basis of a peculiar duality. Practicalcivic activity mostly has a targeted, local and single-case character. Arguably,such ways of expression are an integral feature of modern complex societies.Nevertheless, the strengths and potential of these single-case associations isstill unclear. The emergence of civic networks is a new and interesting trendthat attracts the attention of sociologists, although it is not a widespreadphenomenon visible to the naked eye. Moreover, the social base of thesemovements is limited to certain classes and does not involve wider segmentsof the general public. The most liberally minded and materially wealthyRussians display the lowest levels of social solidarity and civic activity. Proto-middle classes with lower levels of income, on the other hand, are forced toget involved in civic activism, as this represents the only viable means ofresolution of their common problems. We can therefore conclude that, whilethe majority of Russians are keen on change theoretically, they are not pre-pared to sacri#ce their time, energy and in particular comfort for theachievement of these goals.

Thus, we are observing an interesting antinomy, in which the change ofattitudes and sensations is negated by the proliferation of political con-formism and individuation. Apathy is seen in the plebiscitary approval of theUnited Russia party, despite the widespread realisation of multifarious ideo-logical, organisational and ethical problems existing within this organisation.Public protest often takes ‘silent’ forms, and civic privatism usually prevails.As Alexei Levinson from the Levada centre notes, the ‘general’ support forVladimir Putin’s policies represents a social phenomenon related to indivi-duation and conformism, rather than the systemic problem, or a fault, of the‘regime’.1 In this light, the main feature of Russia’s modern civil society is its

Conclusion 165


silent nature. We can observe a silent approval of oppositional sentiments anda silent popular protest against the injustice of the extant political structure.At the same time, the change of attitude is important in that it could subse-quently lead to a signi#cant change in behaviour. The causes of thesedynamics are economic and political. Economic facets contribute greatly todevelopment of liberal hopes and expectations. Political settings, on the otherhand, limit these hopes because they constrict the public sphere and containfree civic engagement.

The e$ects of socio-economic growth and development are seen in theprofound attitudinal change that took place in Russia during the past decade.The economic success of Putin’s Russia created a situation in which most pre-existing fears of the Yeltsin period have become memories of the past. Thethreat of economic collapse, territorial disintegration and civil war has movedto the ‘periphery of public consciousness’ (Petukhov 2010). Mere economicsurvival and political stability ceased to be the most important priorities onthe public agenda. As the economy grew, many Russians began to identifythemselves as middle class, while the proportion of those who regarded theireconomic positions as bad decreased rapidly. Even though this positive self-identi#cation does not correlate with the actual density of Russia’s real middleclass, it indicates the surfacing of some serious shifts within public socio-economicand political perceptions. Economic expectations spilt over to the civic andpolitical spheres. Modern Russians expanded their preferences towardsdeveloping a transparent political system, independent judicial institutions,e"cient police force, equality of all before the law, e$ective local governance,and more comprehensive and just social welfare packages. By the end of thePutin presidency, it became clear that Russia had reached a stage at whichsocialisation of politics, greater inclusion, welfare and social justice hadentered the public political agenda. Accordingly, the values of social solidar-ity, fairness and reciprocity have obtained greater prominence (Petukhov2010). This book has showed that these new values, along with the ever-present sense of injustice, played a large role in triggering civic activity inRussia. This #nding somewhat exonerated the arguments put forward by alarge body of theoretical literature on the subject and presented (partly) inthis volume.

It is also important that popular thinking about the role of the state in theeconomy and society and about the role of the self in the political system haschanged. As I observed in this book, the attitudes to those issues divide Rus-sian society into two broad groups – modernists and traditionalists. With thedevelopment of the capitalist market economy, the proportion of modernistshas been growing consistently. Thus, Russia has begun to form a new socialstratum that is not willing to submit silently to the o"cial state ideologies andthat does not expect paternalistic gestures from the government. In turn, thesepeople opt for personal sovereignty and socio-economic freedom. In thelonger term, they are prepared to face the state in defence of their vitalinterests and political values.

166 Conclusion


Indeed, the majority of modern Russians (57 per cent) are convinced thatevery citizen should be free to defend his/her economic rights, including theright to strike and demonstrate. It is also important that the number of thosewho thought that e"cient laws are more important than e"cient leaders hasbeen growing steadily. While in 2007 39 per cent opted for good legislationand 50 per cent for good leadership, in 2010 48 per cent chose good laws and47 per cent voted for good leaders (MIS RAN 2010, p. 45). This shows thatRussia can no longer be perceived as a country with an impoverished politi-cally impotent population with state paternalistic preferences (Petukhov2008a, p. 356; Diskin 2007, p. 224).

The negative impact of the political sphere, however, was mainly seen in thelimiting nature of its institutions. The government suppressed and consciouslynarrowed the existing public sphere and reduced the scope and possibility forarticulating public demands and concerns. It also simultaneously diminishedthe chances of weeding out organisations of dubious reputation and attemp-ted, in many cases, to create a negative image of the activity of the civilsociety. Limiting public space in such a manner often resulted in the emer-gence of an arti#cial, conspiracy-based, dilemma between the ‘Kremlin andthe American Embassy’ in which one had to choose between supporting thegovernment or joining the company of those who aim to diminish Russia’sstate sovereignty and undermine her geostrategic positions abroad. Opposi-tion and civic activists were presented as political forces promoting the inter-ests of Euro-Atlantic foreign policy in Russia, while the government #guredas the only political force capable of defending Russia’s national interests.This ideology appeals to the sense of national pride and patriotism and actsas a serious deterrent from a critical analysis of the state and from resisting itsnegative evolutionary trends at the domestic level. It limits activity by callingfor an uncritical national unity.

Creating speci#cally non-transparent rules of the game and sustaining thesystem, which allows corruption, was another political means of containing activ-ity. Those who could secure quick and easy enrichment through co-optationinto the extant system of institutional relations are unlikely to turn into cri-tical citizens. In this light, the system attempted to co-opt upper layers of themiddle class, the rich and the most successful segments of the lower middleclass. This strategy worked very well, fuelling the ongoing consumer race anddistracting people from political activity. Indeed, we have seen that modernRussians, in particular those belonging to richer sectors, are focused on theimprovement of their material welfare and elevation of their socio-economicstatus. Such a situation weakens the bonds of social solidarity and leads to theindividuation of society. Many people feel indi$erent towards political events,rely on a close circle of friends and family, and abstain from taking responsi-bility for the future of their country. Despite harbouring reformist hopes andexpectations, they shift the burden on the President and his administration.

The irony of the situation, however, is that with the growth of the economyand living standards, the non-transparent system of governance becomes an

Conclusion 167


impediment to future development. It can no longer secure the newlyobtained wealth, as this task requires the creation of a formal institutionalsystem that relies on equality of all before the law. Non-transparent institutionalsettings, on the other hand, result in the law being applied selectively andcannot guarantee e$ective property and civic rights for all. Moreover, suchsettings involve substantial operational and social costs – bribes and personalconnections – that are not available to all. As the costs of navigation through theadministrative bureaucratic system grow, many ordinary, and even rich, Rus-sians become unable to resolve their practical problems through direct perso-nal interaction with state o"cials. Russian citizens loose their trust in thestate and in particular its core legal, judicial and local executive institutions.

People begin to describe the state as ‘deaf ’, ‘elitist’ and irresponsive to theirdemands. Collective action becomes the only way to protect common interestsrelated to peaceful enjoyment of economic and political rights and freedoms.The closure of public activism and self-expression channels invariably #guresas a pressure cooker mechanism that could explode when the appropriatemoment arrives. Thus, the recent growth of public expectations has thepotential of in!icting a ‘legitimation crisis’ for the extant political system.Vadim Volkov critically observes that the Russian public, and in particular itsintellectuals, are already expecting the state to conclude a ‘new social con-tract’ with society with the view to resolve the pending legitimation crisis.However, Volkov continues that there is no apparent need to do so because inthe current political climate plans, ideas, sensations, and even infrastructuralbasis for change, are present. What is needed, and missing at this stage is thepolitical will to take responsibility.2

Extremism becomes another outcome of political pressures. Political pas-sivity, disappointment and the limited nature of participation evoke radicalreactions and adaptation strategies. Therefore, extremism enters the scene asanother side of the political conformism coin. This book argued that extre-mism has occupied a solid niche in the typology of Russia’s public activity. Itpenetrated various spheres of socio-political and economic life, and was evi-dent in public attitudes to business and careers, in the growth of religious andracial intolerance and in the radical espousal of liberal, socialist and con-servative views. Ad hoc extremism has become particularly prominent.Sporadic expressions of public hatred that are accompanied by violent clashesand riots took place in various parts of the country.

Racial and religious intolerance was on the rise, along with a steadyincrease in the number of associated crimes. Left-wing extremism, thoughmarginal, has serious mobilisation potential. Various liberal groups emphati-cally criticise all government undertakings thus re!ecting a radical nihilismphenomenon, as opposed to the espousal of moral–political values.3 Businessand career-enhancing extremism is evident in the proliferation of membershipof pro-Kremlin youth organisations. Many young people become involved inpro-state civic associations with the view to establishing personal connectionswithin business and politics, deploying these as a springboard to their future

168 Conclusion


careers. Similar to racist groups, these youth movements organise ‘#ghtingbrigades’ and resort to violence to achieve their goals. It is clear that the reachof extremism to these various spheres does not depend on the nature ofideology. Rather, it is reliant on the style with which such ideologies areespoused and delivered.

These dynamics are dangerous for a number of reasons. Most importantly,they endorse extremism as a form of political struggle. This blurs the dis-tinction between those organisations that pursue the public good and thosemovements that are concerned with the ideology of hatred and intolerance.Moreover, these groups can unleash their extremist potential in full, shouldthe state loosen its grip on socio-political civic activity. This could take placein the event of a serious reshu%ing of the Kremlin’s elites or the emergence ofa large rift within the extant power groups. Russian nationalists, for example,have never been as strong and numerous, and what is more importantlyideologically coherent, as they are at this stage. They are waiting impatientlyfor the escalation of a political crisis with the view to capturing the politicalscene.4 The emergence of these networks made clear that modern Russianextremism no longer stems from political instability and economic turmoil.Rather, these dynamics are intrinsically connected to multifarious problemsthat sponge o$ the very fabric of Russia’s modern political and economicsystems. Of particular importance are the surfacing of economic inequalities,bureaucratic ine"ciency, social exclusion, atomisation of society and theomnipotence of the consumer market mentality.

To conclude, Russia’s potential for civic engagement is on the rise, regard-less of the existing obstacles. Until the December 2011 parliamentary elec-tions, this potential had not been fully translated into vibrant political action.It has been slowly gaining momentum thereafter. Despite Putin’s convincingvictory in March 2012 – and the majority of population accepting him as alegitimate leader – his government will have to deal with new realities. Largecities and the country’s capital, Moscow, will become bastions of the newlyformed opposition, and this situation will make it almost impossible for theprevious balance to continue. With the period of initial economic adaptationcoming to an end, Russian society will develop higher expectations anddemands. Given that the public #nds it di"cult to satisfy these demandswithin the extant bureaucratic administrative system, changes become anecessity that is clear to all. In this light, collective action comes across as aviable means of resolving these problems. This contributes to the growth ofcivic consciousness, greater awareness of collective action, and con#dence inthe public ability to achieve change via the means of political struggle. In thislight, the development of civic consciousness and the culture of participationare no longer unreachable goals.

Which factors can accelerate these trends? Socio-economic and politicalmodernisation proposed by Russia’s third president, Dmitry Medvedev, is onepotential answer. A viable civil society represents a sustaining pillar of amodern democratic system. Therefore, the process of establishing such civil

Conclusion 169


society grows organically out of the process of modernising the extant poli-tical setting. The very idea of civil society, seen in the public control over stateactivities, provides a point of entry into the concept of a modern politicalsystem. By the same token, the rupture of the old administrative bureaucraticsystem can only take place with active public participation. At the same time,we should not expect this to be a revolutionary process. Rather, suchdynamics can be carried out through a gradual entrenchment of new socio-economic and socio-political relations, new perceptions, new attitudes and asa result new behavioural patterns. These behavioural patterns would includethe determination and the ability to face (and when needed to co-operatewith) the state in defence of the public good. This book has demonstratedthat one can imagine the emergence of such structural changes in Russiansociety today.

170 Conclusion


Notes

1 Methodology, theoretical considerations and the structure of the study

1 ‘Putin Uzhe ne Tot’, gazeta.ru, 27 October 2011, available at www.gazeta.ru/politics/elections2011/2011/10/27_a}3814410.shtml, last accessed 27 October 2011.

2 ‘Sredne-apokalipticheskii’, gazeta.ru, 3 July 2008, available at www.gazeta.ru/politics/2008/07/03_a}2773567.shtml, last accessed 26 August 2008.

3 The Art Group Voina (War) is one such example, which I would like to mentionhere though at the footnote level. In 2011 the group drew a 50-meter-long penis onthe Liteisky Bridge in St Petersburg. The bridge is situated opposite the StateSecurity (FSB) building and is raised every night for the passage of large vessels.The group waited until the bridge, along with the picture, was raised to the eyes ofthe security apparatus o"cials and documented this activity as one of their bestachievements in the struggle against the extant political system.

4 According to the IMF and World Bank data, Russia’s purchasing power parity –an indicator that points at the spending power, disposable income, and the abilityto purchase goods relative to the costs of living – placed Russia in the top tenleading countries on the sixth place one point above the UK. See World BankReport http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GDP_PPP.pdf and IMF report for 2010 and

5 ‘Spravedlivost ne Torzhestvuet’, FOM Publications, 25 November 2011, available athttp://fom.ru/obshchestvo/10263, last accessed 15 May 2012.

6 ‘Byurokratiya i Vlast’, VTsIOM publications, 21 June 2006, available at http://wciom.ru/arkhiv/tematicheskii-arkhiv/item/single/2785.html, last accessed 26 August2008.

7 At the same time, their later comparative cross-country analysis re#nes this argu-ment (1978, p .19; and pp. 80–93) by demonstrating that such a correlation is oftenskewed by the pattern of cleavages in societies and the way in which such cleavagesare institutionalised in parties and organisations. Nevertheless, their mainstreamempirical data supports the initial claim on the general correlation between thesocial status and propensity towards the political activity.

2 Public and private cycles of socio-political life in Russia

1 The literature on political culture provides a more nuanced categorisation of politicalorientations. For the purpose of this account, I take these two broadest divisionso$ered by Almond and Verba (1963, p. 14–15) in their in!uential Civic Culture.

2 ‘Kak zhivesh’.3 VTsIOM is Russia’s leading opinion poll agency abbreviated as the All-RussianCentre for the Study of Public Opinion. The institution was previously headed by


the late Yurii Levada. Levada’s independent approach to polling resulted in hisresignation in 2003 and the establishment of a new Levada VTsIOM opinion pollagency, subsequently renamed to the Levada Centre. The old VTsIOM, now led byValery Federov, retained its original name.

4 www.levada.ru/press/2000011901.html last accessed 4 September 2011.5 www.levada.ru/press/2000011901.html last accessed 4 September 2011.6 Byzov, ‘Rossiiskii Politicheskii Spektr: Perspektivy perekon#guratsii’, MonitoringObshchestvennogo Mneniya. 2005. No. 2.

7 ‘Kak zhivesh’.8 Osipov, G. and Gorshkov, M. 2001. ‘10 Let Reform Glazami Rossiyan. Anali-ticheskii Doklad’, November 2001, available at www.ispr.ru/SOCOPROS/socopros200.html, chapter ‘Osobennosti Ekonomicheskogo Soznaniya Rossiyan’, availableat www.ispr.ru/SOCOPOS/socopros204.html.

9 By strictly modernist I mean those who thought that Russia needs a state whichwould withdraw from the economy and grant the public maximum rights andfreedoms. Predominantly modernist were those who thought that the state shouldoccupy a small strategic sector within the economy and simultaneously expand freeenterprises and public rights. Traditionalists are those who claim that the stateshould reinstate its control over the economy and that regardless of the nature ofthe state Russia needs a strong leader who could determine its future development.

10 ‘Kak zhivesh, Rossiya?’, The Moscow Institute for Socio-political Research RAN,November 2001, available at www.ispr.ru/SOCOPROS/socopros300.html. See also‘Formirovanie srednego klassa v Rossii’, wciom.ru/tematicheskii-arkhiv/item/single/10562.htm/?no-cache = 1& cHash = eol0491f38, 22 August 2008.

11 These estimates vary between di$erent research institutions but they never gobeyond 20 per cent. See for example Maleva, T. and Ovcharova, L., ‘Srednie klassyv Rossii i ikh okruzhenie na etape ekonomicheskogo rosta’, Independent Instituteof Social Policy, published in Demoscope Weekly, 15–30 June 2009. See alsoGorshkov, M. 2000. ‘Nekotorye Metodologicheskie Aspekty Analiza SrednegoKlassa v Rossii’, Sotsiologicheskie Issledovaniya SotsIs, No. 3, pp. 4–12.

12 ‘Kak zhivesh’.13 Nikolai Lapin, O Tsennostnykh Orientatsiyakh Rossiyan. Moscow: Izdatelstvo

Fakulteta Sotsiologii MGU, 2002.14 ‘Protestnyi Potentsial v Marte 2009 goda’, Levada Centre 26, March 2009.15 ‘Protestnyi Potentsial’ 19 July 2001, http://bd.fom.ru/report/map/projects/dominant/

dominant2001/238_3643/dd012626, last accessed 17 September 2009.16 ‘Molodezh Vybiraet Gossluzhbu’, Trud, 22 November 2007.17 ‘Sluzhit by Rad’, Novye Izvestiya, 28 July 2008.18 ‘Lgotnyi Kurs’, Novye Izvestiya, 11 January 2005.19 ‘Sredne-apokalipticheskii’, gazeta.ru, 3 July 2008, available at www.gazeta.ru/politi

cs/2008/07/03_a_2773567.shtml, last accessed 3 September 2009.20 ‘Rossiyanam nuzhna oppozitsiya’, gazeta.ru, 29 October 2009, available at http://

gazeta.ru/politics/2009/10/29_a}3278514.shtml, last accessed 12 November 2009.21 Levada Centre, ‘Rossiiskii Srednii Klass: Ego Vzglyady na Svoyu Stranu i Evropu’,

15 May 2008, available at www.levada.ru/press/2008070101.html, last accessed 28May 2011.

22 Fedorov et al. (2009) ‘Sposobnost’ Politicheskoi Sistemy Reagirovat’ na GlavnyeObshchestvennye Ozhidaniya i Opaseniya’ in Ezhegodnyi Doklad INOP. OtsenkaSostoyaniya i Perspektiv Politicheskoi Sistemy Rossii, available at www.inop.ru/page529/page484, last accessed 28 May 2011.

23 ‘Modernizatsiya Politicheskoi Sistemy’, Press Release No 1389, 16 December 2009,available at http://wciom.ru/arkhiv/tematicheskii-arkhiv/item/single/12906.html?no_cache=1& cHash = 0c5d6646f9 (accessed 28 May 2011).

172 Notes


24 ‘Putin Opravdal Polovinu Nadezhd’, gazeta.ru, 15 September 2009, available athttp://gazeta.ru/politics/2009/09/15_a_3260899.shtml, last accessed 15 September 2009.

25 ‘Chelovek Nedeli: Alexei Dymovskii’, Vedomosti, 11 November 2009.26 ‘Polkovnik Pokazal Krugovuyu Poruku’, gazeta.ru, 15 August 2011, available at

www.gazeta.ru/social/2011/08/15/3734157.shtml, last accessed 10 October 2011.27 ‘Vse Neplokho’, gazeta.ru, 4 June 2008, available at www.gazeta.ru/politics/2008/

06/03_a_2743417.shtml.28 ‘Schastie Est: NaZhizn Rossiiskie Grazhdane Smotryat s Optimizmom’, VTsIOM,

2 April 2008, available at http://wciom.ru/arkhiv/tematicheskii-arkhiv/item/single/9922.html.

29 ‘Dorosli’, Vedomosti, 10 July 2006.30 Leonid Sedov, ‘Anatomiya Optimizma’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 10 November 2006.31 Valerii Fedorov, ‘Rossiiskii Patriotizm: Istinnyi i Mnimyi’, VTsIOM, Rossiiskaya

Gazeta, 22 December 2006.32 Fedorov, ‘Rossiiskii Patriotizm’.33 Valery Fedorov, ‘Patriotizm u Rossiyan v Proshlom’, Moskovskii Komsomolets, No.

25392, 5 July 2010.34 Valery Fedorov, ‘Osobennosti Natsionalnoi Ksenofobii’, Moskovskii Komsomolets,

No. 25359, 25 May 2010.35 Fedorov, ‘Rossiiskii Patriotizm’.36 ‘K perestroika stremitsya vsya strana’, gazeta.ru, 29 January 2010, available at

www.gazeta.ru/politics/2010/01/029_a_3318064.shtml.37 Petukhov, Vladimir, ‘Perezagruzka demokratii’, Pro"l, 8 September 2009.38 Clement, K. ‘Podem grazhdanskikh protestnykh nastroenii v zakrytoi politicheskoi

sisteme: potentsialnyi vyzov gospodstvuyushchim vlastnym otnosheniyam?’, 18January 2007, Institute of Sociology, RAN, available at http://ikd.ru/node/78, lastaccessed 1 September 2009.

39 ‘Do Kontsa Goda Kolichestvo TSZh v Rossii Udvoitsya’, Sobstvennik, 5 June 2007.40 ‘Zabastovochnoe Dvizhenie v Rossii Shiritsya ne Budet’, Vedomosti, 24 April 2007.41 ‘Rost Zabastovachnogo Dvizheniya v Rossii Sposoben Izmenit Vsyu Stranu’,

Moskovskie Novosti, 10 August 2007.42 ‘Vladimir Kekhman Ispolnil Solo’, Kommersant Daily, 18 November 2008.43 ‘Lisin – president evropeiskoi strelkovoi assotsiatsii’, Sovetskii Sport, 13 July 2009.44 ‘Alisher Usmanov Izbran Prezidentom Mezhdunarodnoi Federatsii Fekhtovaniya’,

Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 6 December 2008.45 ‘Pravoe Delo bez Pravykh Sil’, gazeta.ru, 29 September 2011, available at www.

gazeta.ru/politics/elections2011/2011/09/20_a}3775125.shtml, last accessed 11October 2011.

46 ‘Zataili Vse’, gazeta.ru, 10 October 2011, available at www.gazeta.ru/politics/elections2011/2011/10/10_a_3795786.shtml, last accessed 11 October 2011.

47 Russia’s most in!uential rock and pop stars – Alla Pugacheva and the leader of theTimeMachine band Andrei Makarevich – explicitly supported Prokhorov in his opencon!ict with the Kremlin. Moreover, Makarevich and Vladimir Shakhrin, the leaderof the popular Chaif band, publicly announced their disapproval of the Putin-Medvedev tandem, and refused to perform for the team in the event of their electoralvictory in 2012. See ‘Makarevich and Shakhrin Otkazalis Igrat dlya Pervykh LitsGosudarstva’, Moskovskii Komsomolets, 3 October 2011.

48 ‘Interview with Alexei Navalyi: Khochetsya pomenshe znat lyudei, kotorykh znatne stoit’, Vyatskii Krai, 3 April 2009; see also http://old.vedomosti.ru/blogs/navalny.livejournal.com.

49 ‘Yana Yakovleva: ya popala v strashnuyu myasorubku’, Vremya i Dengi, 25 June 2008.50 ‘Kto Podstavil Veterinara’, Vremya Novostei, 21 July 2004.51 ‘Politicheskaya Doktrina Suverennoi Demokratii’, Izvestiya, 30 November 2006.

Notes 173


52 ‘Obshchestvennaya palata raspredelila gosudarstvennye granty sredi NKO’, Kom-mersant Daily, 7 September 2009.

53 The term ‘Orangism’ was derived from the 2004–5 Orange Revolution in Ukraineand was seen in political support of the pro-Western movements across the FormerSoviet Union states.

54 ‘AIZhK lishayut monopolii na gosgarantii’, Kommersant Daily, 25 August 2006.55 ‘Edinaya Rossiya Reshilas na Samokritiku’, Vedomosti, 11 October 2011.56 ‘Konstantin Remchukov: Pravye nuzhny ne dlya dekora’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 7

October 2008.57 http://md-prokhorov.lifejournal.com/82332.hml, last accessed 11 October 2011.58 ‘Interview s Evgeniem Roizmanom’, gazeta.ru, 10 October 2011, available at www.

gazeta.ru/politics/elections2011/2011/10/10_a}3795786.shtml, last accessed 11October 2011.

59 Dmitry Medvedev, ‘Rossiya, Vpered!’, gazeta.ru, 10 September 2009, available atwww.gazeta.ru/comments/2009/09/10_a_3258568.shtml, last accessed 17 September2009.

60 ‘Prezident snizhaet byurokraticheskie barery’, Kommersant Daily, 28 February2009.

61 ‘Dmitrii Medvedev podelil e#r’, Kommersant Daily, 3 March 2009. The law, how-ever, remained silent on the situation, in which o"cial state positions coincide withpartisan positions, and thus allowing the state post holders to appear in massmedia as both party and state post-holders.

62 ‘Dmitrii Medvedev ne udovletvoril malye partii’, Kommersant Daily, 27 February2009.

63 ‘Prokhodnoi Barer v Dumu Budet Snizhen do 5 Protsentov’, KomsomolskayaPravda, 8 October 2011.

64 Author’s inverview with Alla Chirikova.65 Materialy Kruglogo Stola Ekonomicheskogo Kluba FBK, Skolko Stoit Regio-

nalnaya Vlast, 25 August 2009, available at www.fbk.ru/company/economic/261197/item/, last accessed 2 September 2009.

66 http://chirkunovoleg.livejournal.com, last accessed 1 September 2009.67 ‘Nado Ukhodit ot Monetarizma’, Kommersant Daily, 17 February 2009.68 ‘Murmanskaya Oblast: Krizis Vlasti ili Krizis Morali?’, Murmanskii Vestnik, 17

February 2009. ‘Gubernator Evdokimov Vooruzhilsya pered Partiei’, KommersantDaily, 12 February 2009. Evdokimov was subsequently forced to resign on 20March 2009. However, there was an open and adverse public reaction to Evdoki-mov’s removal. A number of national professional and public associations (such as#shers’ union, regional public chamber and other organisations) forwarded lettersof protest to president Dmitry Medvedev. This was an example of a genuine publicinitiative.

69 Interestingly, the ER candidate lost the election to Evdokimov’s nominated candi-date. See ‘Otstavka Gubernatora Murmanskoi Oblasti Yuriya Evdokimova’, AiF,21 March 2009.

70 ‘Murtaza Rakhimov: Operatsiya Preemnik’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 9 June 2009.71 ‘Stavelnnik Edinoi Rossii vo Vtoroi Raz ne Stal Senatorom’, 15 July 2009, www.

regnum.ru/news/1186445.html.72 In 2006 the Kremlin launched #ve nation-wide modernisation initiatives within the

gas, construction, education, healthcare and agriculture sectors.73 ‘Ne dozhidayas prikazov iz Moskvy’, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 22 April 2006.74 ‘Regionalnyi dozor, Ekspert, 14 May 2007.75 ‘Dolgaya doroga’, Vedomosti-Smart Money, 21 January 2008.76 ‘Ostrov Russkiy Predstavyat V Kannakh’, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 30 January 2008.77 ‘Mnogoznachitelnyi Visit’, Ekspert, 20 July 2009.78 ‘Predvybornyi Balet’, Ekspert, 26 March 2009.

174 Notes


79 ‘Polpredov perevodyat v Moskvu’, Vedomosti, 4 October 2007.80 ‘Poslanie Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii Dmitriya Medvedeva Federalnomu

Sobraniyu RF’, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 8 December 2009.81 ‘Zakon po Vseobshchemu Soglasiyu’, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 16 December 2010.82 ‘Itogi Koordinatsii’, Vedomosti, 3 November 2009.83 ‘Rabota i trud dlya tekh, kto ne krut’, Analiticheskoe Agentstvo Uralskogo Feder-

alnogo Okruga, 6 March 2009, available at http://pda.nakanune.ru/article.php?tag=13903, last accessed 1 September 2009.

84 Sergei Markedonov, ‘Ingushetiya: Novyi Kurs?’, politcom.ru, 13 January 2009,available at www.politcom.ru/7447.html, last accessed 1 September 2009.

85 ‘Osenyu mogut byt uvoleny chetyre nee$ektivnykh gubernatora’, Vedomosti, 20July 2009.

86 ‘Devyat Mesyatsev Spokoistviya’, Novye Izvestiya, 15 January 2009; ‘S mesta vkareru’, Tomskie Novosti, 2 July 2009; Author’s interview with Alla Chirikova 20July 2009.

87 The growing connection between the governors, local elites, and civic organisationsrestricted the Kremlin from freely dismissing the regional leaders on politicalgrounds. This particularly concerned executives with high popular ratings. MurtazaRakhimov’s criticism of the ER party, after which he retained his post due to hishigh popularity rating, is a case in point.

88 Natalya Zubarevich, ‘V krizis sleduet kastrirovat byudzhet i pomogat lyudiam, ane predpriyatiyam’, regnum.ru, 17 April 2009, available at www.regnum.ru/news/1152790.html, last accessed 2 September 2009.

3 The public sphere and the state in Russia

1 Some authors even argue that this ideal never existed (Calhoun 1992, p. 33). Wejust did not have enough information on the structural problems of the publicsphere of that age.

2 In this categorisation I partly followed McKee’s (2005) engaging introduction tothe public sphere debate.

3 Habermas himself was a student of Adorno but parted company with his mentorin the course of his work on the Structural Transformation.

4 Leontii Byzov, ‘Konservativnaya Volna v Rossii’, VTsIOM, 2 October 2006, http://wciom.ru/arkhiv/tematicheskii-arkhiv/item/single/3298.html?no_cache=1&cHash=ac273c90e, last accessed 30 August 2011.

5 Some authors make a compelling case that the politicisation of the Soviet politywas a deliberate strategy of the ‘mature socialist’ leadership. See Bren, P. TheGreengrocer and his TV.

6 ‘Pochemu zhurnaly tsvetut a gazety chakhnut?’, VTsIOM, 4 July 2007, available athttp://wciom.ru/arkhiv/tematicheskii-arkhiv/item/single/8466.html?no_cache=18cHash = a9f415203e, last accessed 16 November 2009.

7 ‘Razvlekatelnye resursy runeta’, www.mediaguide.ru/?p=news& id = 484ced1a.Data collected from the Gemyus Group – an Internet research agency located inCentral and Eastern Europe. The agency researches Internet related behaviouracross Eastern, Central, and Western Europe, including Israel. It works on theRussian market since 2006.

8 ‘Internet: Rossiya stanet No. 2 v Evrope’, http://cnews.ru/news/top/index.shtml?2008/02/11/287595

9 http://rumetrica.rambler.ru10 Dubin, Boris. ‘Media post-Sovetskoi epokhi’.11 Boris Dubin, Vestnik Obshchestvennogo Mneniya, No. 3 (83), May-June 2006, p. 39.12 Nikolai Petrov claims that the Kremlin orders the Moscow Fund of the Public

Opinion to conduct regular public opinion surveys in Russia’s regions. The

Notes 175


government deploys the results of this research in formulating its policy towardsthe regions. This data is often classi#ed, with the exception of the 2008 guberna-torial approval rankings, which were published while #ne-tuning the regionalpolicy. (Petrov, N. ‘Reputatsionnye poteri’, grani.ru, 26 May 2009, available atwww.grani.ru/Politics/Russia/m.151569.html, last accessed 24 December 2009.)Similarly, Russia’s regional experts claim that regional administrations have espe-cially designated public relations departments that measure public opinions on aweekly basis. The results are not disclosed but guide the governors’ policymaking(author’s interview with Alla Chirikova, Moscow Institute of Sociology RAN).

13 Levada Centre, VTsIOM.14 ‘S Rossiei po obvalu VVP v 2009 godu ne sravnitsya nikto iz vedushchikh ekono-

mik mira’, Vedomosti, 19 February 2010.15 ‘Rossiya, vpered’, gazeta.ru, 10 September 2009, available at www.gazeta.ru/comm

ents/2009/09/10_a}3258568.shtml, last accessed 24 December 2009.16 Aleksandr Zharikhin, ‘Dlya zayavlennykh Medvedevym tselei Edinaya Rossiya ne

ochen goditsa’, km.ru, 14 September 2009, available at http://news.km.ru/dlya_zayavlennyx_medvedevym_czel, last accessed 1 October 2009.

17 http://eng.kremlin.ru/sdocs/vappears.shtml, last accessed 24 December 2009.18 The full discussion is available on www.gazeta.ru/subjects/3260384.shtml, last

accessed 24 December 2009.19 The list of proposals and discussions is available on ‘Pomozhem Prezidentu’,

Vedomosti, www.vedomosti.ru/politics/president/test.shtml?9, last accessed 24December 2009.

20 Zharikhin, A. ‘Dlya zayavlennykh Medvedevym tselei Edinaya Rossiya ne ochengoditsa’, 14 September 2009, km.ru, available at http://news.km.ru/dlya_zayavlennyx_medevedevym_czel, last accessed 25 November 2009. See also: Bovt, G. ‘Vyzovdvykhpartiinoi sisteme’, 14 September 2009, gazeta.ru, available at gazeta.ru/column/bovt/3260358.shtml, last accessed 25 November 2009. See also, Kho-dorkovsky, M. ‘Modernizatsiya: Pokolenie M’, Vedomosti, 21 October 2009.

21 Badovsky, D. ‘Kak vernut doverie vyboram’, Vedomosti, 26 January 2010.22 Kynev, A. ‘My ne partiya, my zeds zhivem’, gazeta.ru, 18 February 2009, www.

gazeta.ru/comments/2009/02/18_x}2944886.shtml, last accessed 23 February 2010.23 Kynev, A. ‘Vybory v usloviyakh turbulentnosti’, gazeta.ru, 2 March 2009, www.

gazeta.ru/comments/2009/03/02_x_2950992.shtml, last accessed 23 February 2010.24 I refer to the Denis Agashin scandal, which took place in October 2011 in Izhevsk.

Then the Izhevsk city manager, and a prominent ER functioner, Agashin pledged,during the meeting with local veteran organisations, to link #nancing with thenumber of votes cast for the party on the 4 December 2011 election. Communistparty members videotaped Agashin and the story obtained public signi#cance.Russia’s opposition parties pledged to sue Agashin for violating Russia’s Constitution.

25 Lev Gudkov, ‘Propaganda: Bezotvetstvennost vlasti’, Vedomosti, 30 September2009.

26 ‘Ne sidet bez dela’, Vedomosti, 20 January 2009. See also (Green and Robertson2008).

27 I refer to the activity of the pro-Kremlin Nashi movement. The most recent scandalerupted over the Alexander Podrabinek case. The a$air was controversial. It con-cerned an insensitive article by Podrabinek accusing Russia’s war veterans of beingformer Soviet executioners, and an equally extremist response by the Nashi move-ment. Nashi began prosecuting Podrabinek and threatening his personal safety. SeeDmitry Kamyshev, ‘Makhrovye antishashlychniki’, Kommersant Vlast, No. 40, 12October 2009.

28 ‘Pozner ne nashel v Rossiiskikh SMI svobody slova’, http://lenta.ru/news/2008/03/27/roundtable, last accessed 24 February 2010.

29 ‘NTV snail ‘K Bareru”, Kommersant Daily, 29 April 2009.

176 Notes


30 Dobralis do bumagi: uvolen redaktor Izvestii’, Vedomosti, 7 September 2004;‘Gimnasticheskoe uprazdnenie’, Kommersant Daily, 21 April 2008; EkaterinaSavina ‘Grazhdanke Moldavii ne Pomogla Rossiiskaya Konstitutsiya’, KommersantDaily, 6 June 2008.

31 Ezhova, E. and Melnik, O. ‘Sotsialnaya reklama kak fragment media-reklamnoikartiny mira’, Filosofskie Nauki, No. 58, 2008, pp. 18–24.

32 Zemlyanova, L. 1995. Sovremennaya Amerikanskaya Kommunikavistika: Teor-eticheskie Konstruktsii, Problemy, Prognozy. Moscow: Izdatelstvo MGU. Dyakova,E. Trakhtenberg, A. 1999. Massovaya Kommunikativiskika i Problema Konstruir-ovaniya Realnosti: Analiz Osnovnykh Teoreticheskikh Podkhodov. Ekaterinburg:UrO RAN.

33 Ivan Preobrazhensky, ‘Druzia iz televizora’, politcom.ru, 8 May 2008, available athttp://politcom.ru/6149.html, last accessed 28 September 2009.

34 Alexandr Kynev. 2009.35 ‘Pochem izbratsya’, Pro"l, 15 March 2003.36 Vlasti.net/news/132574, last accessed 10 November 2011.37 See for example a discussion by Rostislav Turovsky ‘Komu meshali gubernatorskie

vybory?’, politcom.ru, 21 September 2004, available www.politcom.ru/2004/pvz512.php, last accessed 26 December 2009; or Alexei Makarkin’s account ‘Medvedev –preemnik Putina’, politcom.ru 18 December 2007, available www.politcom.ru/5499.html, last accessed 25 December 2009.

38 ‘Bez Surkova ne mogli’, Vedomosti, 30 August 2008; ‘Seryi kardinal Kremlyavykhodit iz teni’, Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, 10 July 2009.

39 ‘Rodstvennyi biznes’, Novaya Gazeta, 2 August 2007.40 Tatyana Stanovaya, ‘Zakonodatelstvo ob NKO: mezhdu zapadom i oranzhevoi

ugrozoi’, politcom.ru, 12 December 2005, available at http://politcom.ru/548htmllast accessed 25 December 2009.

41 ‘Politicheskaya zastroika’, Kommersant Daily, 30 June 2006.42 ‘Prishli k soglasiyu’, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 31 August 2006. This di$ers stylistically

from Medvedev’s attempt to speak openly in a free public domain. It is indicativethat Medvedev challenged Surkov on the issue in his 2006 interview to the in!u-ential socio-political Ekspert weekly. See ‘Dlya protsvetaniya nuzhno uchityvatinteresy kazhdogo’, Ekspert, 24 July 2006.

43 ‘Izvestiya ot Gazprom-Media’, Vedomosti, 2 June 2005; ‘Gazeta Zheny Chi-novnika’, Vedomosti, 5 August 2005.

44 ‘The Press in Russia’, BBC 16 May 2008, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4315129.stm, last accessed 20 June 2008.

45 ‘Chelovek Nedeli: Gennady Timchenko’, Vedomosti, 25 May 2008; ‘Nazval Kho-zyaina’, Vedomosti, 9 December 2009; ‘Arkady Rotenberg: Chelovek Nedeli’,Vedomosti, 14 December 2009.

46 ‘Deripaska oshchutil svobodu’, Vedomosti, 22 December 2009.47 Dubin, B. and Zorkaya, N. 2008. Chtenie v Rossii: Tendentsii i Problemy. Moscow:

Analiticheskii Tsentr Yuriya Levady.48 ‘Zachem Rossiyanam Internet?’, VTsIOM, 17 September 2009, wciom.ru/arkhiv/

tematicheskii-arkhiv/item/single/12441.html?no_cache=1&cHash=9d17460dfc, lastaccessed 1 December 2009.

49 Please follow the link to view sample discussions www.gazeta.ru/travel.50 ‘VTsIOM: srednii klass v Rossii pochti ne rastet’, 2 June 2008, newsru.com/arch/

#nance/02jun2008/middlies.html. A brief description of this categorisation is inorder. The destitute are those who do not have enough money for food. The poorare those who have enough money for food but not clothes. The proto-middle classare those who have enough money for food and clothes but not enough for inex-pensive household appliances. The middle class are those who have enough moneyfor everything apart from expensive purchases, such as !ats and houses. And rich

Notes 177


are those who do not feel any #nancial constraints. See ‘Formirovanie srednegoklassa v Rossii’, wciom.ru/tematicheskii-arkhiv/item/single/10562.htm/?no-cache=1&cHash=eol0491f38, last accessed 22 August 2008.

51 ‘VTsIOM: srednii klass v Rossii pochti ne rastet’, 2 June 2008, newsru.com/arch/#nance/02jun2008/middlies.html.

52 ‘Kak zhivut i rabotayut dvorniki-gastarbaitery v Moskve?’, Moskovskii Komsomo-lets, 20 February 2009. ‘Ocherednoe krovoprolitie ustroili nelegaly-gastarbaitery vMoskve’, Vechernyaya Moskva, 6 November 2008.

53 ‘Moskovskoe stoloptvorenie’, Kommersant Daily, 23 March 2005.54 Nikolai Alekseev Interview ‘V Rossii gomophobiya – sostavnaya chast ksenopho-

bii’, Deutsche Welle, 12 May 2008.55 ‘Nikolai Alekseev – initsiator gay parada’, Bolshoi Gorod, 5 June 2006.56 http://tajmigrant.com/ the movement’s o"cial website, last accessed 20 November

2011.57 ‘Tadjiki Obidelis na Nashu Rashu’, Komsomolskaya Pravda, 2 October 2007; see

also ‘Tadjik Dzhamshut iz Nashei Rashi Okazalsya Moldovaninom’, Komso-molskaya Pravda, 16 February 2008.

58 ‘Profsoyuz dlya gastarbaiterov’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 9 December 2009; see also‘Chuzhie zeds: nuzhen li Moskve teatr dlya gastarbaiterov?’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta,23 October 2009.

59 ‘Trudovye Spory: Pravo Deistvovat’, Vedomosti, 8 November 2007.60 ‘NKO Trebuyut Obyavit Sebya vne Zakona’, Kommersant Daily, 23 March 2007.61 ‘Ataka na Akademiyu’, Kommersant, 23 June 2006.62 ‘Nedruzhelyubnye Akademiki’, gazeta.ru, 29 May 2008, available at www.gazeta.

ru/education/2008/05/30_a}2739775.shtml, last accessed 26 August 2008.63 ‘VTsIOM Bez Levady’, Vedomosti, 6 August 2003.64 ‘VTsIOM Bez Levady’, Vedomosti, 6 August 2003.

4 A kind of society: the nature of political radicalism in modern Russia

1 VTsIOM researchers often refer to the period of the early 1990s as ‘the revolutionof expectations’. During this period, ideological values of the West – liberalism,individualism, democracy, and free enterprise – had an important meaning formost Russians. With the end of this ‘revolution’, many such values obtained nega-tive connotations at the rhetorical level, even if they have not disappeared fromday-to-day life.

2 Petukhov, Vladimir, ‘Dinamika Mirovozzrencheskikh I Ideologicheskikh Ustano-vok Rossiyan’, Monitoring Obshchestvennogo Mneniya, No. 1(85), January–March2008, pp. 48–61, at p. 49.

3 Byzov, Leonty. 2005. ‘Rossiiskii Politicheskii Spektr: Perspektivy perekon#guratsii’,Monitoring Obshchestvennogo Mneniya. No. 2.

4 Dubin, Boris. 2010. ‘Osobyi Put I Sotsialnyi Poryadok v Sovremennoi Rossii’,Vestnik Obshchestvennogo Mneniya, No. 1, January

5 Author’s Interview with Valery Solovey.6 Boris Dubin. 2004. Intellektualnye Gruppy i Simvolicheskie Formy. Ocherki Sot-siologii Sovremennoi Kultury, Moscow: Novoe Izdatelstvo.

7 Pilkington et al. (2010, p. 5) gives a similar explanation to the emergence of skin-head circles in post-Soviet Russia.

8 Drobizheva, L. M. and Shchedrina, O. V. 2006. ‘Sotsialnye Faktory PreduprezhdeniyaEkstremizma’ in Sovremennyi Extrimizm v Rossiiskoi Federatsii: Osobennosti Proyav-lenii i Sredstva Protivodeistviya. Materialy Vserossiiskoi Nauchno-prakticheskoiKonferentsii v Akademi Upravleniya MVD Rossii, 16 June 2006. Moscow: Aka-demiya Upravleniya MVD Rossii, Tver, Izdatelstvo Triada, pp. 15–16.

178 Notes


9 Her political cynicism borders extremism. In one of her statements she noted:‘never mind the Hiroshima accident. Look how sweet modern Japan looks as aresult!’

10 Garadzha, Nikita. 2006. Liberaly o Narode, Moscow: Evropa, p. 11; see alsoValeriya Novodvorskaya: Biography, www.bestpeopleofrussia.ru/persona/1440/bio,last accessed 15 November 2011.

11 ‘Pentagon Prizval Gotovitsya k Voine s Rossiei’, Komsomolskaya Pravda, 9 Feb-ruary 2007.

12 This is Panushkin’s controversial article titled ‘Logika Beshennoi Sobaki. BezNatsionalnoi Idei Nam Budet Legche Zhit. Eshche Legche – bez Gosudarstva’.The paper was originally published in GQ No. 2, 2005 and evoked a lot of debates.Full text available at http://woody-alex.livejournal.com/269098.html, last accessed20 November 2011.

13 Liberaly o Narode, p. 22.14 Liberaly o Narode, pp. 5–6.15 Nicolas Riasanovsky presents a similar argument with regard to Russia’s intellec-

tuals of the 19th century. He argued that as early as the 1820s-1840s the Slavophilemovements transformed the term ‘Enlightenment’ into that of the ‘West’ and‘romanticism’ into that of ‘Russia’ (cited in Laruelle 2009, p. 4).

16 Interview Putina Zhurnalu Time na Russkom Yazyke, available at RossiiskayaGazeta, 20 December 2007, www.rg.ru/2007/12/20putin-time.html.

17 Afanasiev, M. 2009. ‘Russia’s Elites: The Request for a new Course’. Theresearchers deployed in-depth interview methods and polled some 1003 peopleresiding in 64 regions. See also Byzov, L. ‘Ot Krizisa Tsennostei k Krizisu Institu-tov’, Svobodnaya Mysl, No. 4, 2009.

18 Mikulsky Konstantin. 2009. ‘Shans na Obnovlenie’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 23December 2009; Smirnov, Alexandr. 2010. ‘Modernizatsiya Rossii i Uroki Istorii:kuda Idet Upravlyaemaya Demokratiya’, APN website, 16 February; Biryukov,Sergei. 2009. ‘Rossiiskaya Modernizatsiya: Cherez Ternii k Vozrozhdeniyu Strany’,apn.ru, 23 December 2009, available at www.apn.ru/publications/article22264.htm;Byzov, Leonty. 2010. ‘Modernizatsiya: Rossiiskii Variant’, Issledovaniya SotsialnoiPolitiki: Nauchnye Diskussii, available at www.socpolitika.ru/rus/social_policy_research/discussion/document12507.shtml#_ftnref23.

19 www.youtube.com/watch?v=5AZznAl1mBE20 ‘Oppozitsia v Rossii Khochet Demontazha Rezhima’, BBC Russian Service, 9 June

2005, available at news.bbc.co.uk/hi/Russian/Russia/newsid_4077000/4077012.stm.21 Alexei Makarkin, ‘Demokraty: Novey Proekty Vmesto Obedineniya’, politcom.ru,

14 June 2005, available at policom.ru/430.html; see also ‘Russian Opposition toTake the Streets’, Radio Liberty Radio Free Europe, 17 March 2010, available atwww.rferl.org/content/Russian_Opposition_To_Take_AntiPutin_Pro-test_To_The_Streets/1986238.html.

22 ‘Organizatory Samarskogo Marsha Nesoglasnykh Arestovany i Prizvany vArmiyu’, lenta.ru, 18 October 2007, available at http://lenta.ru/news/2007/05/10/catch.

23 ‘V Gatchine arestovan 150-tysyachnyi tirazh gazety ‘Marsh Nesoglasnykh”, Fon-tanka, 31 May 2007, available at www.fontanka.ru/2007/05/31/092.

24 ‘V Peterburge Kon#skovan Tirazh Gazety Nesoglasnykh’, lenta.ru, 24 April 2007,available at http://lenta.ru/news/2007/04/29/newspapers; ‘V Nizhnem NovgorodeArestovan Tirazh Gazety Marsh Nesoglasnykh’, gazeta.ru, 21 March 2007, avail-able at www.gazeta.ru/news/lastnews/2007/03/21/n_1048015.shtml.

25 ‘Staraya Gvardiya Kremlya’, kasparov.ru, 7 June 2007, available at www.kasparov.ru/material/php?id=4667BAE126F9; see also ‘Marsh Nesoglasnykh: Kak eto bylo’.Pro"l, No 14/523, 16 April 2007.

Notes 179


26 ‘Putin Schitaet Tselyu ‘Marshei Nesoglasnykh’ Ustroit Provokatsyu’, RIA Novosti,30 August 2010, available at www.rian.ru/society/20100830/270303063.html. Theopposition’s defenders deny the charges. Many claim that well-trained state agentsact as provocateurs during their activities. The in!uential weekly Kommersant-Vlast published a series of interviews with former members of the pro-KremlinNashi movement, who claimed that the government paid them to in#ltrate theMarches of Opposition with a view to disrupting their activities and committingacts of violence (see ‘Russkie Marshi Poidut Drug na Druga’, Kommersant Vlast, 5October 2009).

27 ‘V Moskve Proshel Miting ‘Khvatit Kormit Kavkaz”, gazeta.ru, 22 October 2011,available at www.gazeta.ru/social/2011/10/22/3809650.shtml last accessed 15November 2011.

28 ‘Yablochko ot Yablonki nedaleko padaet’, Kommersant Daily, 28 July 2004.29 ‘Patriotizm i Dvizhenie Nashi’, Levada Centre Publications, 21 January 2008,

available at levada.ru/press/2008012101.htm.30 Tatyana Stanovaya, ‘Molodezhnye Proekty v Sovremennoi Rossii’, politcom.ru, 5

December 2005, available at www.politcom.ru/2005/analit275.php.31 ‘Igrushechnaya Revolyutsiya’, Argumenty i Fakty, No. 38 (428), 19 September

2001.32 ‘Eduard Limonov Dobralsya do Strasburga’, Kommersant Daily, 3 August 2006.33 ‘Natsbolam pustili pyl v glaza’, Kommersant Daily, 23 July 2008, see also ‘Aktsii

NBP’, lenta.ru, 18 October 2010, available at www.lenta.ru/story/nbp.34 The political orientation of an NBP member Matvey Krylov is a case in point.

Krylov took part in the December 2010 nationalist riot in the Manezh Square andin November 2011 deliberately threw water in the face of Russia’s state prosecutor,who pressed charges against the riot’s participants. Krylov also participated in theNBP attack on the Foreign Ministry reception o"ce in 2008. He was, at the sametime, a member of the Drugaya Rossiya movement and was sympathetic to a lib-eral cause, see ‘Krichal, Vylil, v Tyurmu’, gazeta.ru, 1 November 2011, available atwww.gazeta.ru/social/2011/11/01/3820326.shtml.

35 ‘Prokuratura Prichislila Neprimirimuu Oppozitstiyu k Posobnikam Terroristov’,lenta.ru, 19 April 2007, available at www/lenta.ru/news/2010/05/18/list; see also‘NBP Priznana Ekstrimistskoi Organizatsiei’, Novyi Region, 19 April 2007, avail-able at http://nr2/115551.html/

36 Mikhail Vinogradov, ‘Kardinaly Gvardeitsev’, Vremya Novostei, 11 December2010.

37 In my personal conversations with regional activists, I often heard complaintsabout Russia’s political system, the United Russia dominance of the party space, andthe false nature of their organisations. Many admitted that they needed participa-tion in order to establish business links within their regional political institutions.

38 ‘Molodezhnoe Dvizhenie Nashi’, anticompromat.ru, available at www.anticompromat.org/nashi/nashi.html.

39 ‘Obyknovennyi Nashizm’, Kommersant Vlast, No 301 (3113), 21 February 2005.40 ‘Vladimir Putin Uznal Nashikh’, Kommersant Daily, 19 May 2005.41 ‘Paren iz Nashego Dvora’, Vlast, 30 July 2007.42 ‘A nashisty vse o tom zhe’, Novey Izvestiya, 18 April 2005.43 ‘Vashe Velichestvo, Pishet Vam Kollektiv Russkikh Druzei’, Kommersant Daily, 6

January 2007.44 ‘EC Trebuet ot Rossii Zashchitit Posolstvo Estonii’, BBC Russian Service, 2 May

2007, available at news.bbc.co.uk/hi/Russian/Russia/newsid_6616000/6616313.stm.45 ‘Draka Nashikh i Radikalov na antiprizyvmon marshe’, gazeta.ru, 31 March 2007.46 ‘Molodaya Gvardiya Vozmetsya za Staruyu’, Kommersant, 22 August 2006.47 ‘Mosgorsud Zashchitil ‘Moloduyu Gvardiyu ot Borisa Nemtsova”, Kommersant

Daily, 12 May 2011.

180 Notes


48 This falls slightly out of the main discussion line, but we should pay a due credit toTina Kandelaki and Andrey Kolesnikov, the host journalists who decided to leavethe project following the authorities’ decision and to attract public attention to the case.In the event, 200,000 people viewed the Yakemenko video on the alternative you-tube portal. ‘Kolesnikov and Kandelaki Ushli iz Nerealnoi Politiki Posle Snyatiya sE#ra Dvukh Vypuskov Programmy’, gazeta.ru, 7 November 2011, www.gazeta.ru/news/blogs/2011/11/07/n_2085798.shtml, last accessed 15 November 2011.

49 Andreas Ulmand ‘Postsovetskie pravoektremistkie kontrelity I ikh vliyanie v sov-remennoi Rossii’, Neprikosnovennyi Zapas, No 1(57), 2008, available at www.interros.ru/readroom/nz/nz_57/2286-postsovetskie-pravoejeksremistkie.html.

50 Gumilev, Lev. 2003. Ot Rusi do Rossii Airis Press: Moscow.51 ‘Natsionalisty Privatizirovali Prazdnik’, Izvestiya, 7 November 2005.52 ‘Oni Zapretili, a Ya Razreshil’, Vremya Novostei, 2 November 2006.53 ‘Marshiruyut Vse’, www.lenta.ru/articles/2006/11/02/rusmarsh (accessed 25 June

2007), 2 November 2006; see also ‘Litsa Russkogo Marsha’, www.lenta.ru/photo/2006/11/01/marshorg, last accessed 25 June 2007.

54 Russia Today July 11, 2007, available at www.russiatoday.ru/guests/detail/239/55 ‘Sochi 2014: Mechta Stroitelya’, BBC Russian Service, 12 May 2008.56 Federalnaya Sluzhba Gosudarstvennoi Statistiki. ‘Trud i Zanyatost v Rossii – 2007

God’, available at www.gks.ru/bgd/reg/B07_36/main.htm.57 World Bank, ‘Outlook for Remittance Flows 2008–10: Growth Expected to Mod-

erate Signi#cantly, But Flows Remain Resilient’, Migration and Development BriefNo. 8, November 11, 2008, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTROSPECTS/resources/334954–1110315015165/MD_Brief.pdf.

58 Human Rights Watch 2009, p. 2.59 ‘Regulation of Migrant Workers and Preservation of Employment of Migrant

Workers with Irregular Status in the Russian Federation, 2008’, Publications ofInternational Labour Organisation.

60 ‘Sochi 2014: Mechta Stroitelya’, BBC Russian Service, 12 May 2008.61 Press Release No. 984, 23 June 2008, available at http://wciom.ru/arkhiv/tematicheskii-

arkhiv/item/single/10303.html?no_cache=1&cHash=60ac7edfef, last accessed 23August 2008.

62 Fedorov, Valery, ‘Osobennosti Nationalnoi Ksenofobii’, Analitika VTsIOM, 27May 2010, available at http://wciom.ru/index.php?id=266&uid=13537.

63 There is no distinction in English between the two very di$erent Russian words:Russkii (meaning ethnic Russian) and Rossiiskii (meaning belonging to the RussianFederation but not necessarily ethnic Russian). In this slogan, the literal translationshould be ‘Russia is for ethnic Russians’.

64 VTsIOM Press Release No. 603, ‘Rossiya Dlya Russkikh ili Dlya Vsekh?’, O"cyalWebsite of the All-Russian Centre for the Study of the Public Opinion, available athttp://wciom.ru/arkhiv/tematicheskii-arkhiv/item/single/3772.html (accessed 25June 2007), 21 December 2006; also see ‘53 Protsenta Tolerantnosti’, RossiiskayaGazeta, 17 August 2005.

65 http://xeno.sova-center.ru/29481C8/883BB9D#r11, last accessed 25 June 2007.66 ‘Pravozashchitniki: s Nachala goda v Rossii soversheno bolee 126 rasitskikh napa-

denii’, gazeta.ru, 17 May 2008, available at www.gazeta.ru/news/lenta/2008/05/17/n_1219920.shtml, last accessed 20 June 2008.

67 ‘Aleksandr Belov Poluchil Roznichnyi Prigovor’, Kommersant Daily, 29 May 2009.68 ‘Skinhedy so srokom’, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 8 October 2010.69 S. Markedonov, ‘Kondopoga: Perekhod Kolichestva v Kachestvo’, 6 September

2006, www.prognosis.ru/print.html?id=7873, last accessed 25 June 2007.70 ‘Pogrom na Manezhnoi Ploshchadi’, Novaya Gazeta, 10 December 2010; see also

‘Menshinstvo i Bolshinstvo: Koalitsiya Kon!ikta’, Vedomosti, 29 December 2010.

Notes 181


71 Alexei Makarkin, ‘Novyi pravyi ekstrimizm – ulichnye ubiitsy’, politcom.ru, 26February 2009, available at www.politcom.ru/7692.html.

72 ‘S Medvedevym Protiv Putina’, Vedomosti, 9 June 2008.73 Lebedev’s o"cial statements are available at www.luzhkva.ru/topics/10/.74 ‘My Tebuem Massovoi Deportatsii’, St Petersburg DPNI publications, 1 October

2010, available at www.dpni.org/articles/menie/17437.75 ‘Predvybornyi Mandrazh’, gazeta.ru, 28 October 2011, available at www.gazeta.ru/

comments/2011/10/28_e}3815642.shtml, last accessed 15 November 2011; see alsocommentary by Valery Solovey ‘Telekanal RBK. Programma Dialog. FutbolnyeFanaty’ www.youtube.com/watch?v=HxQ1oPpFslg, last accessed 15 November 2011.

76 ‘Tam zhe Stolko Bogatstv Ostalos’, gazeta.ru, 22 October 2011, available at www.gazeta.ru/social/2011/10/22/3809650.shtml, last accessed 15 November 2011.

77 ‘Sredi Silovikov Est Mnogo Nedovolnykh Rezhimom’, MK v Pitere, 14 March2009; ‘Roman Zentsov: Nuzhen Stenka Razin, Za Kotorym Poidut’, Limonka, No. 340,July 2010, available at www.limonka.nbp-info.com/340_article_1226841169.html.

78 Makarkin (2009).79 www.xeno.sova-center.ru, last accessed 25 June 2007).80 Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 10 August. 2006.81 Voronov, K. (2007) ‘Meru Na Den’ Rozhdeniya Podarili Tri s Polovinoi Goda’,

Kommersant Daily, 1 February.82 Open Society Justice Initiative ‘Ethnic Pro#ling in the Moscow Metro’.83 Valery Vyzhutovich ‘Rasplata po Dolgam’, politcom.ru, 10 February 2010, avail-

able at politcom.ru/9580.html.84 Author’s Interview with illegal migrant workers brigades.85 ‘Nachalnik Raionnogo UFMS bral Vzyatki’, news.mail.ru/inregions/volgaregion/

63/4522467, 1 October 2010.86 ‘Minstra Kultury Kabardino-Balkarii Izbili po-Russki’, Kommersant Daily, 3 April

2006.87 Human Rights Watch (2009, p. 20).88 Human Rights Watch (2009, p. 21). Federalnyi Zakon ot 18 July 2006 No. 110-FZ

‘O Vnesenii Izmenenii v Federalnyi Zakon o ‘Pravovom Polozhenii InsotrannykhGrazhdan v Rossiiskoi Federatsii”, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 20 July 2006; FederalnyiZakon ot 18 July 2006 No 109-FZ ‘O Migratsionnom Uchete InostrannykhGrazhdan i Lits Bez Grazhdanstva v Rossiiskoi Federatsii’, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 20July 2006. Both laws were enacted on 15 January 2007.

89 Human Rights Watch (2009, pp. 26–7).90 Zakon ‘O Vnesenii Izmenenii i Dopolnenii v Zakon o ‘Grazhdanstve RSFSR” No.

5206-I, Vedomosti S’ezda Narodnykh Deputatov Rossiiskoi Federatsii i Ver-khovnogo Soveta Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 1993, No. 29, p. 1112.

91 Federalny Zakon ‘O Grazhdanstve Rossiiskoi Federatsii’ No. 62-FZ, SobranieZakonodatel’stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii, No. 22, 2002, p. 2031.

92 Federalnyi Zakon ‘O Grazhdanstve Rossiiskoi Federatsii’, No. 62-FZ, SobranieZakonodatel’stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii, No. 46, 2003, p. 4447.

93 Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii No. 637 ‘O Merakh Po Okazanyu Sodeist-viya Dobrovol’noomu Pereseleniyu v Rossiiskuyu Federatsiyu Sootechestvennikov,Prozhivayushchikh za Rubezhom’, Sobranie Zakonodatel’stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii,No. 32, 2006, p. 2863.

94 ‘Prevyshenie 20-protsentnoi Normy Priezzhikh Vyzyvaet Diskomfort u KorennogoNaseleniya’, Vremya Novostei, 16 November 2006.

95 ‘Vladimir Zhirinovskii Vidit v Probleme Migratsii Prizrak Grazhdanskoi Voiny’,Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 15 September 2006.

96 ‘FSB Prosit Prava Zakryvat Neugodnye Saity’, Vedomosti, 24 June 2010.97 At the same time, the Russian authorities, at the regional level in particular,

deployed such mechanisms in eliminating political competition. An interesting case

182 Notes


took place in St Petersburg. The city’s Prosecutor O"ce ordered an inspection ofthe Spravedlivaya Rossiya (SR) newspaper, following a complaint from a UnitedRussia supporter who claimed that the paper propagated socio-economic and classhatred. The publication in question, however, was a mere criticism of the UnitedRussia policies (‘Golosa Sankt-Peterburga’, gazeta.ru, 26 Jun 2010). A similarsituation took place over the Evening Ryazan (Vechernyaya Ryazan) newspaper inthe Ryazan region. The paper’s criticism of Russia’s police force was considered asan extremist publication igniting hatred towards representatives of particular socialgroups namely Russia’s police workers. By doing so the regional authorities wishedto silence media criticism of the city’s institutional system (Antifasizm.ru/index.php/smi-review/279-mbhr-reiveiw-#rst-part-2010).

98 ‘Neud po pvedeniyu’, Vzglyad, 18 June 2010; ‘Gosudarstvo Vzyatok ne Beret’,Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 8 December 2009.

5 State-sponsored civic associations in Russia: systemic integration or a ‘war of position’?

1 Avraamova, E. V. 2008. ‘Srednii Klass Epokhi Putina’, Obshchestvennye Nauki iSovremennost’, No. 1, pp. 28–36; Moscow Institute of Sociology 2006; Fedorov, V.2010. ‘Politicheskaya Sistema Rossii Sozdana’, VTsIOM Publications 19 January,available at http://wciom.ru/arkhiv/tematicheskii-arkhiv/item/single/13069.html?no_cache=1& cHash = c41acb2f2d, last accessed 28 May 2010; for theoreticalexplanation see Lipset, S.M. 1960. Political Man (New York, Doubleday); Prze-worski, A., Alvarez, M., Cheibub, J., Limongi, F. 2000. Democracy and Develop-ment: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950–1990 (New York,Cambridge University Press), p. 50 and p. 111.

2 Konchalovsky’s personal page on youtube in which he comments on politicaldevelopments in Russia, available at http://youtu.be/lsEns1dmNE4 last accessed 15October 2011. Konchalovsky, at the same time, was pessimistic about the future ofRussia’s political system. He characteristically cited Russia’s late Prime MinisterViktor Chernomyrdin as saying ‘whichever party you are trying to establish inRussia, you will receive a CPSU’. In this, Konchalovsky claimed that the Russianpublic has a tendency of ignoring politics and focusing on personal enrichment atthe expense of civic engagement.

3 Interestingly, political matters, such as defence of human rights and provision offree legal help, scored just 18 and 19 per cent of answers. These were the areas inwhich people felt least trustful of the state, and thus thought that it could have arestrictive in!uence on NGOs, impeding or manipulating e$ective co-operation.‘Rossiyane ob Obshchestvenno-poleznykh NKO i ikh Svyaziakh s Gosudarstvom’,Zircon Press Release, 28 December 2009, available at www.zircon.ru/upload/File/russian/publication/4/091228.pdf, last accessed 28 May 2011.

4 ‘Poslanie Prezidenta Dmitriya Medvedeva Federal’nomy Sobraniyu RF’, Rossiis-kaya Gazeta, 13 November 2009.

5 Federalnyi Zakon RF ot 5 Aprelya 2010 No 40-FZ ‘O vnesenii izmenenii votdel’nye zakonodatelnye akty RF po voprosu podderzhki sotsialno-orientir-ovannykh nekommercheskikh organizatsii’, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 7 April 2010.

6 Federalnyi Zakon No. 131-FZ ‘Ob Obshchikh Printsipakh Organizatsii MestnogoSamoupravleniya v Rossiiskoi Federatsii’, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 8 October 2003.

7 www.golostos.ru, last accessed 28 May 2011.8 O"cial website of the Ulyanovsk region government, ‘Tekhnologii Deyatel’nostiTOS na Primere Drugikh Regionov’, 16 April 2010, available at www.ja-grazhdanin.ulgov.ru/news/tenolgi, last accessed 28 May 2011.

9 O"cial website of the Yaroslavl city, www.city-yar.ru/home/city/tos.html, lastaccessed 28 May 2010.

Notes 183


10 ‘Sozdana Gosudarstvennaya Kontseptsiya Razvitiya Blagotvoritelnosti i Dobro-volchestva v Rossii’ regnum.ru, 6 October 2008, available at www.regnum.ru/news/10649&3.html, last accessed 28 May 2011.

11 ‘Dobrovoltsam Skazhut: Daesh!’, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 20 November 2008.12 ‘Sberbank Vypustil Kartu Sovmestno s Fondom Podari Zhizn’, Vedomosti, 23

December 2008.13 www.podari-zhizn.ru, last accessed 10 July 2011).14 ‘V Groznom otmetili 20-letie so dnya vyvoda Sovetskikh voisk iz Afganistana’,

regnum.ru, www.regnum.ru/news/1132651.html, 3 March 2009 (28 May 2011).15 ‘Prishli za Yaitsami’, Kommersant Daily, 5 February 2004.16 ‘Dali v Odni Ruki’, Kommersant Daily, 18 September 2007.17 ‘Gospodderzhka’, Moscow Charity Foundation Portal, available at www.mosblago.

ru/groups/page-4.html, last accessed 28 May 2010.18 ‘Blagotvoritelnost’ v Rossii: Novyi trend?’, Kapital Strany, 16 February 2010.19 ‘Usloviya razvitiya organizatsii nekommercheskogo sektora v Rossiiskoi Feder-

atsii’, GU-VShEi, 2007.20 ‘Prezidentskaya Pomoshch’, Ekspert, 18 March 2009; see also ‘A teper’ tretii’,

Vedomosti, 10 June 2008.21 ‘Obrazovan Eshche Odin Klub Partii Vlasti’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 5 April 2010.22 ‘Medvedi ne Letayut’, Vremya Novostei, 25 April 2005; ‘Poshli Napravo’, Gazeta,

22 November 2005.23 Tatyana Stanovaya, ‘Liberal-konservatory protiv Gryzlova’, politcom.ru, 6 May

2005, available at www.politcom.ru/2672.html, last accessed 28 May 2011.24 ‘Novyi Piar-Proekt Edinoi Rossii’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 26 September 2005;

‘Vladislav Surkov: Zapad ne Obyazan nas Lyubit’, Der Spiegel, 20 June 2005,available at www.inosmi.ru/inrussia/20050620/220396.html, last accessed 28 May2011.

25 ‘Liberal’no-konservativnoe Budushchee Rossii’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 18 Novem-ber 2005.

26 ‘Novyi Piar-Proekt Edinoi Rossii’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 26 September 2005.27 ‘Zakon N 32-FZ ob Obshchestvennoi Palate Rossiiskoi Federatsii’, Rossiiskaya

Gazeta, 7 April 2005.28 Viktor Tretyakov, ‘To, ne znayu chto’, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 28 July 2005.29 ‘Palata Stala Vazhnee’, Ekspert, 28 January 2009.30 ‘Otpisalis ot Surkova’, gazeta.ru, 8 July 2009, available at www.games08.gazeta.ru/

politics/2009/07/08_a}3220478.shtml, last accessed 28 May 2011.31 Svyatoslav Kaspe, ‘Luchshii itog deyatelnosti obshchestvennoi palaty, chto ona ne

prinesla nikakogo vreda’, Radio Liberty, 23 January 2007, available at www.lenta-com.ru/comments/10468.html, last accessed 28 May 2011.

32 ‘Pravozashchitnik Sergei Kovalev Raskritikoval Obshchestvennuyu Palatu’, newsru.com, 24 December 2008, available at www.newsru.com/arch/russia/24dec2008/palata.html, last accessed 28 May 2011.

33 ‘Nekommercheskie organizatsii nachinayut osvoenie byudzheta’, KommersantDaily, 8 August 2007.

34 ‘Oppozitsionnye NKO perevodyat na byudzhetnoe #nansirovanie’, demos.ru,http://demos-center.ru/14192.html, last accessed 10 July 2011.

35 Sotsialno-politicheskaya Situatsiya v Rossii v Yanvare-Fevrale 2007, 7 March 2007,available at www.levada.ru/press/2007030702.html, last accessed 28 May 2011.

36 ‘Vosstanie Noyabristov’, Kommersant Daily, 27 September 2005.37 Author’s interviews with a number of rank and #le party members, whose names

are not disclosed for ethical reasons, April 2010.38 ‘Edinaya Rossiya: Kto i Pochemu Vstupaet v Partiinye Ryady’, FOM, 29 May

2008, available at http://bd.fom.ru/report/map/az/0–9/dom0821/d082122, lastaccessed 28 May 2011.

184 Notes


39 ‘Edinorosy Aktiviziruyut Poisk Novykh Lits’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 5 April 2010.40 ‘KPRF Vidit v Edinoi Rossii Priznaki Raskola’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 5 April 2010.41 ‘Fedor Bondarchuk ne Poshchadil Edinuyu Rossiyu’, Moskovskii Komsomolets, 23

September 2011.42 ‘Edinorossy Uslyshali Golosa’, gazeta.ru, 15 October 2011, available at www.

gazeta.ru/politics/elections2011/2011/10/15_a}3802126.shtml, last accessed 15November 2011.

43 ‘V Sluchae Pobedy ER Zhdet Rekonstruktsiya’, gazeta.ru, 15 October 2011, www.gazeta.ru/news/lastnews/2011/10/15/n_2053318.shtml, last accessed 15 October 2011.

44 Valery Fedorov, ‘Bolezn’ Intelligentsii’, Vedomosti, 17 July 2009; ‘Edinorosy vPoiskakh Novykh Lits’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 5 April 2010; Andrei Kolesnikov,‘Politekonomiya: Suverennyi Liberalizm’, Vedomosti, 7 April 2010.

45 Evgenii Gontmakher, ‘Modernizatsiya: Promezhutochnye Otvety’, Vedomosti, 17February 2010.

46 Osnovnye Tezisy Ezhegodnogo Doklada Instituta Obshchestvennogo Proektir-ovaniya ‘Otsenka Sostoyaniya i Perspektiv Politicheskoi Sistemy Rossiiskoi Feder-atsii v 2008 godu – nachale 2009 goda’, 2 April 2009, pp. 19–20, available at www.inop.ru/page529/page484, last accessed 11 July 2011.

47 ‘Sovetnik Kremlya’, Vedomosti, 13 April 2009.48 ‘Rossiya XXI Veka: Obraz Zhelaemogo Zavtra’, Biblioteka Instituta Sovre-

mennogo Razvitiya, gazeta.ru, available at www.gazeta.ru/politics/2010/02/02_a}3319216.shtml?incut1, last accessed 28 May 2011.

49 Gontmakher, E. ‘Modernizatsiya: Promezhutochnye otvety’, Vedomosti, 17 Feb-ruary 2010.

50 Boris Makarenko, ‘Politicheskaya Sistema: Ideologicheskaya Sueta’, Vedomosti, 03July 2009; Mikhail Rogozhkin, ‘O Demokratii Bez Suety’, Ekspert, 23 July 2009;Valery Fedorov, ‘Bolezn’ Intelligentsii’, Vedomosti, 17 July 2009.

51 ‘Doklad INSORa: arkhaika vperemeshku s fantastikoi’, Pravda, 3 March 2010;Dmitrii Orlov, ‘Nazad v Budushchee: INSOR Zovet Rossiyu v 1990e’, Pravda, 3March 2010.

52 Of particular importance were journalist Nikolai Svanidze, lawyers Genri Reznikand Anatoly Kucherna, and economist Evgeni Yasin.

53 Dymovsky was subsequently remanded in custody under a range of allegations andsubsequently released on bail. ‘Alexei Dymovsky Arestovan’, Novye Izvestiya, 25January 2010; see also ‘Obshchestvennaya Palata Gotova Vzyat’ pod ZashchituDymovskogo’, Vedomosti, 9 November 2009.

54 ‘Obshchestvennaya Palata Vklyuchilas’ v Osvoboditelnoe Dvizhenie’, KommersantDaily, 16 October 2008.

55 ‘U Prezidenta Ostalos’ 10 dnei’, Novaya Gazeta, 25 December 2008.56 ‘Pust’ Gulyayut v Drugom Meste’, Vedomosti, 5 April 2010.57 ‘Strasti po Genplanu’, Ekspert, 9 April 2010.58 ‘Obshchetvennaya Palata i Gildiya Rossiiskikh Advokatov Besplatno Pomogut

Zhitelyam Rechnika’, Vedomosti, 3 February 2010; ‘Otkaz ot Snosa Ostrova Fan-tazii Vyzval Voprosy u Obshchestvennoi Palaty’, Vedomosti, 8 February 2010.

59 ‘Uslyshat’ Izbiratelya’, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 22 Aptil 2010.60 ‘Igor Averkiev: Neobkhodimo Menyat’ Vsyu Sistemu Pravookhranitelnykh Orga-

nov’, available at www.hro.org/node/5880, 24 June 2009, last accessed 11 July 2011.61 ‘Razbili Palatu’, Kommersant Daily, 2 April 2010.62 ‘Vyshli iz Palaty’, Ekspert, 18 June 2008.63 ‘Palata – ne ‘Palatka”, (2009) Ural’skii Kraevedcheskii Zhurnal, 2:8, 23–24.64 Ella Pam#lova resigned from the Commission in 2010 and was replaced by

Mikhail Fedotov. Clearly, under Pam#lova, her Commission had become bolderthan the Public Chamber in aligning itself with more radically dissident voices attimes, and confronting some supporters of the regime, like Nashi.

Notes 185


65 ‘Vladimir Lukin Otdelil Grazhdanskie Svobody ot Prav Cheloveka’, KommersantDaily, 5 April 2007.

66 ‘Minus Svoboda Mitingov’, Vedomosti, 15 February 2008.67 ‘NKO Prosyat Postavit’ sebya vne Zakona’, Kommersant Daily, 23 March 2007.68 Annual Report of the Boevoe Bratstvo Association unpublished. Results of

Author’s #eldwork.69 Authors’ Interviews with regional movement members, April 2010.70 Internet Forum Discussions Veterany Afgana, www.odnoklassniki.ru.71 Author’s Interview with the deputy head of the Moscow city branch V. Kalinin, 25

March 2010.72 The Boevoe Bratstvo Annual Report. Organisation’s Archives.73 O"cial site of the movement, which gives indication of their political activity

available at www.s-pravdoy.ru, last accessed 28 May 2011.74 See Baranovsky’s Life Journal at www.Vedomosti.ru/blogs/dm-b.livejournal.com,

last accessed 11 July 2011.75 www.dm-b.ru/2795, last accessed 3 June 2011.

6 Foreign-Sponsored associations in Russia: themes and problems

1 ‘Inostrannye NKO ne Speshat Podat Dokumenty do Zavtra’, Kommersant, 17October 2005.

2 ‘Nekommercheskie Organizatsii Rossii: Zachem Oni Nuzhny i Gde im BratDengi’, 8 December 2005, Press Release No 354, available at http://wciom.ru/novosti/press-vypuski/press-vypusk/single/2086.html, last accessed 28 May 2010.

3 At the same time, I will show in Chapter 7 that this problem also pertains to thefunctioning of many Russian-based NGOs. Therefore it is a common issue formost civic organisations operating in Russia.

4 ‘Freedom House otsenila Rossiyu na urovne Severnoi Korei’, Kommersant Daily,12 April 2007; see also ‘Rossiiskie svobody ponesli voennye poteri’, KommersantDaily, 14 January 2009.

5 Illarionov, one of the most outspoken critics of the Kremlin, !ed his Kremlin jobin 2005 to take up a senior research Fellowship in the Centre for Global Libertyand Prosperity at the Cato Institute in Washington, DC.

6 ‘Freedom House uravnyala RF s Severnoi Koreei po urovnyu grazhdanskikhsvobod’, newsru.com, 1 February 2007, available at www.newsru.com/arch/world/01feb2007/freedom.html, last accessed 1 November 2009.

7 Freedom House Annual Report.8 Interview with Alexei Pushkov, ‘SShA pytayutsya navyazat miru mnenie ob eroziiotvetstvennosti v Rossii’, km.ru, 13 March 2007, available at http://uncensored.km.ru/index.asp?data=13.03.2007%2012:20:00&archive=on, last accessed 1 November2009.

9 ‘Freedom House is Downgraded from Bad’, Moscow Times, 17 January 2008.10 RIA Novosti, 2 February 2007; ‘My poteryali mirovozzrencheskii sterzhen’, Ros-

siiskaya Gazeta, 12 February 2007.11 Such a redistribution does not come as a surprise. Following the 2003 Yukos a$air,

the state and business entered an uno"cial compact, under which business pledgedto refrain from political activity, while the state promised to create favourableeconomic conditions for loyal companies (Pappe and Galukhina 2009).

12 ‘Amerikanskii grant dlya russkogo lesa’, Tikhookeanskaya Zvesda, 2 April 2004;‘Neveroyatnyi krugovorot parazitov v prirode’ Tikhookeanskaya Zvesda, 29 Feb-ruary 2004.

13 ‘Molodaya Gvardiya Vystupit v Zashchitu Baikala ot Svoikh PoliticheskikhOpponentov’, Kommersant, 25 March 2010.

14 ‘A teper tretii’, Vedomosti.

186 Notes


15 ‘Ot dushi – ne znachit besplatno’, Kommersant Dengi, 22 June 2009.16 ‘Gruzinskikh vzryvotekhnikov gotovila britanskaya NPO’, RIA Novosti, 28 August

2008, available at www.rian.ru/osetia-news/20080828/150764366.html, last accessed10 November 2009.

17 ‘EU investigators debunk Saakashvili’s lies’, Der Spigel, 1 October 2009.18 ‘Rossiyane Voyuyut s Amerikoi’, gazeta.ru, 21 August 2008, available at www.

gazeta.ru/politics/2008/08/21_a_2817682.shtml.19 ‘VTsIOM soobshchilo o podderzhke rossiyanami Yuzhnoi Osetii v voine s Gru-

ziei’, Kommersant Daily, 4 August 2009.20 ‘Rossiyane Voyuyut s Amerikoi’, gazeta.ru, 21 August 2008, available at www.

gazeta.ru/politics/2008/08/21_a_2817682.shtml.21 Jonathan Steele, ‘Ukraine’s postmodern coup d’etat. Yushchenko got the US nod,

and money !ooded in to his supporters’, Guardian, 26 November 2004.22 ‘Vesna Zagovorshchikov’, Komsomolskaya Pravda, 14 April 2006.23 Putin’s address to the Federal Assembly, ‘Poslanie Prezidenta Federalnomu Sobra-

niyu’, 26 May 2004, Rossiiskaya Gazeta.24 Newsru.com/arch/Russia/01dec2005/popravki.html.25 ‘Golos za kamnem’, Kommersant Daily, 24 January 2006; see also ‘Khelsinskaya

gruppa poshla s kamnem v sud’, Kommersant Daily, 31 January 2006.26 Henderson’s research shows that the Moscow Helsinki group was the least popular

organisation in Russia’s regions and beyond.27 ‘Nekommercheskie Organizatsii Rossii: Zachem Oni Nuzhny i Gde im Brat

Dengi’, 8 December 2005, Press Release No 354, available at http://wciom.ru/novosti/press-vypuski/press-vypusk/single/2086.html, last accessed 28 May 2010.

28 Alexei Pushkov’s commentary ‘SShA Pytayutsya Navyazat Miru Mnenie ob“Erozii” Otvetstvennosti v Rossii’, km.ru, 13 March 2007, available at http://uncensored.km.ru/index.asp?data=13.03.2007%2012:20:00&archive=on, last accessed5 July 2010.

29 ‘Natsionalizatsiya Budushchego’, Ekspert, 20 November 2006.30 Alexei Pushkov’s commentary ‘SShA Pytayutsya’.31 ‘Oplata na obshchestvennykh nachalakh’, Kommersant Dengi, 22 June 2009.32 ‘NKO zaplatyat bolshe’, Ekspert, 3 July 2008.33 ‘NKO Severo-Zapada poluchili vozmozhnost ukreplyat sotrudnichestvo s partner-

ami severnykh stran’, regnum.ru, 20 February 2009, available at www.regnum.ru/news/1128051.html, last accessed 10 November 2009.

34 ‘Federalnyi Zakon Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 10 Yanvarya 2006 goda No. 18-FZ OVnesenii Izmenenii v Nekotorye Zakonodatelnye Akty RF’, Rossiiskaya Gazeta,17 January 2006.

35 ‘NKO prosyat postavit sebya vne zakona’, Kommersant Daily, 23 March 2007.36 ‘A teper tretii’, Vedomosti, 10 June 2008.37 ‘PACE: zakon of NKO ne sootvetstvuet evropeiskim normam’, grani.ru, 25 Jan-

uary 2006, available at http://grani.ru/potter/Society/m.101102.html, last accessed 2November 2009.

38 ‘NKO poluchat novey vozmozhnosti’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 26 June 2009.39 According to this clause, Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Leonid Nevzlin would not

have been able to #nance civic organisations and establish charity foundations.40 ‘Federalnyi Zakon Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 10 January 2006 N-18 FZ ‘O vnesenii

izmenenii v nekotorye zakonodatelnye akty Rossiiskoi Federatsii”, RossiiskayaGazeta, 17 January 2006. (Law accepted by the State Duma on 23 December 2005and enacted on 18 April 2006).

41 ‘SShA trebuyut ot gosdumy otmeny zakona o nekommercheskikh organizatsiyakh imogut ne pustit Rossiyu v VTO’, newsru.com, 1 December 2005, available at www.newsru.com/arch/russia/01dec2005/popravki.html, last accessed 1 November 2009.

42 ‘Sovet Evropy Voshel v Polozhenie’, Kommersant Daily, 15 February 2006.

Notes 187


43 ‘Zakon N 32-FZ ob Obshchestvennoi Palate Rossiiskoi Federatsii’, RossiiskayaGazeta, 7 April 2005.

44 ‘Palata Stala Vazhnee’, Ekspert, 28 January 2009.45 Tatyana Stanovaya, ‘Zakonodatelstvo ob NKO: mezhdu zapadom i oranzhevoi

ugrozoi’, politcom.ru, 12 December 2005, available at http://politcom.ru/548html.46 ‘Sovet Evropy voshel v polozhenie’, Kommersant Daily, 15 February 2006.47 Stanovaya. Mezhdu zapadom.48 Zakon ob NKO.49 Georgy Kovalev, ‘Zakon of NKO: net predela sovershenstvu’, politcom.ru, 15

February 2006, available at www.politcom.ru/2209.html, last accessed 2 November2009.

50 ‘Minyust otedelil tserkov ot nekommercheskikh organizatsii’, Kommersant Daily, 3April 2007.

51 ‘NKO prosyat postavit sebya vne zakona’, Kommersant Daily, 23 March 2007.52 ‘Surkov perepishet zakon ob NKO’, Vremya Novostei, 13 May 2009; see also

‘Medvedev: Zakon ob NKO nado korrektirovat’, grani.ru, 16 April 2009.53 Federalnyi Zakon RFot 17 July 2009 No 170-FZ ‘O vnesenii izmenenii v Federalnyi

Zakon ‘O nekommercheskikh organizatsiyakh’, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 22 July 2009.54 ‘Bolshe Svobody. Dmitry Medvedev vnes popravki v zakon o nekommercheskikh

organizatsiyakh’, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 18 June 2009.55 ‘Soedinenie s obshchestvom ne ustanovleno’, gazeta.ru, 27 June 2009, available at www.

gazeta.ru/politics/2009/06/27_a_3216181.shtml, last accessed 3 November 2009.56 ‘Gruppa Surkova podgotovila paket popravok dlya liberalizatsii zakona ob NKO’,

Vedomosti, 7 September 2009.57 ‘Send Berezovsky Back and We’ll Help the Litvinenko Case, Says Russia’, The

Times, 8 February 2007.58 ‘I am plotting a new Russian revolution’, Guardian, 13 April 2007; ‘Berezovsky is

playing us and it’s embarrassing’, The Times, 30 July 2007; ‘We could deport you,FO warns Berezovsky after coup threat’, Daily Mail, 13 April 2007.

59 ‘Foreign Minister attacks Britain for granting asylum to Chechen’, Guardian, 10September 2004.

60 ‘Golos za kamnem’, Kommersant Daily, 24 January 2006; ‘The coldwar is over but rockin the park suggests that the spying game still thrives’, Guardian, 24 January 2006.

61 ‘Miliband Hails Links with Russia’, BBC News, 2 November 2009, available athttp://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8337484.stm, last accessed 1 June 2010.

62 Putin in his meeting with Russia’s youth organisations angrily observed that Londonshould change its ‘brains’ before Russia changes her constitution. ‘Vladimir PutinPosovetoval Londonu pomenyat mozgi’, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 25 July 2007.

63 (Interestingly, the amount of tax due was halved from the initial Ru230mln downto Ru100mln during a more impartial court hearing that took place in October2008. ‘Sud svel schety s Britanskim Sovetom’, Kommersant Daily, 30 January 2009.

64 ‘Britanskii Sovet ne ukhodit po-angliiski’, Kommersant Daily, 15 January 2008;‘Moskva ozhidaet ot Londona pervogo shaga po ispravleniyu situatsii v otnoshe-niyakh dvukh stran – Lavrov’, Vremya Novostei, 26 December 2007.

65 ‘Britanskii Sovet poshel protiv MID’, utro.ru, www.utro.ru/articles/2008/01/14/708319.shtml.

66 ‘Moskva gotova razreshit Britanskomu Sovetu rabotat’, rosbalt.ru, 28 July 2009,www.rosbalt.ru/2009/07/28/658638.html.

67 ‘Tainaya lyubov Dzhordzha Sorosa’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 22 April 2005.68 ‘Oplata na obshchestvennykh nachalakh’, Kommersant Dengi, 22 June 2009.69 ‘Britanskii Sovet ne nuzhen Rossii’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 15 January 2008.70 ‘Russkie menedgery zastupilis za anglichan’, Vedomosti, 5 February 2008.71 ‘V podderzhku Britanskogo Soveta’, www.openspace.ru/theatre/projects/144/details/

2021

188 Notes


7 Grassroots movements in modern Russia: a cause for optimism?

1 I have claimed throughout this volume that the modernists take a more activestance in public life. Some 18 per cent of all those who held the modernist point ofview took part in at least one civic action in the past three years in comparison to15 per cent of traditionalists who did so during the same period of time (Gorshkov2010; MIS RAN 2010).

2 ‘Zbigniew Brzezinski Receives Jury du Prix Tocqueville Prize’, Centre for Strategicand International Studies, 14 October 2011, available at http://csis.org/publication/zbigniew-brzezinskis-de-tocqueville-prize-speech, last accessed 15 November 2011.A similar situation takes place in the United Kingdom. In 2002, the richest 1 percent owned 35 per cent of marketable wealth, excluding dwellings, and the top 50per cent owned 98 per cent of the wealth, while 22 per cent of the population livedin households with a total income of less than 50 per cent of the national average(Heywood 2007, p. 199).

3 Indeed, the proto-middle class almost doubled in size between 1998 and 2008, andgrew from 45 per cent in 2007 to 51 per cent in 2008. The number of the destitutewas reduced from 28 to 7 per cent and the poor from 41 to 24 per cent. ‘VTsIOM:srednii klass v Rossii pochti ne rastet’, 2 June 2008, newsru.com/arch/#nance/02jun2008/middlies.html.

4 Website of the movement, available at http://gkh.rwp.ru.5 ‘Zimnie Zabavy’, Vedomosti, 1 February 2010.6 ‘Ot Kaliningrada do Vladivostoka’, Reportazh, 1 February 2010, available at www.rusrep.ru/articles/2010/02/01/mitingi/; see also ‘Ot Stavki do Otstavki’, Nezavisi-maya Gazeta, 1 February 2010; ‘Massy Protiv Boosa’, Vremya Novostei, 1 Feb-ruary 2010; ‘Zimnie Zabavy’, Vedomosti, 1 February 2010.

7 ‘Iz-za Rechnika Perekryta Tverskaya’, Kommersant Daily, 29 January 2010. Seealso ‘Kak Snosili Derevnu Rechnik’, BBC, 21 January 2010, available at www.bbc.co.uk/russian/russia/2010/01/100121_rechnik_gallery.shtml.

8 ‘Grazhdanskoe Obshchestvo: Obedinyayutsya Protiv’,Vedomosti, 11 February 2010.9 Federalnyi Zakon No. 67-FZ ‘Ob osnovnykh garantiyakh izbiratelnykh prav iprava na uchastie v referendume grazhdan Rossiiskoi Federatsii’, RossiiskayaGazeta, 15 June 2002.

10 Alexandr Kynev, ‘My ne partiya, my zeds zhivem’, gazeta.ru, 18 February 2009,available at www.gazeta.ru/comments/2009/02/18_x_2944886.shtml, last accessed 1September 2009.

11 ‘Za Mytishchy bez Dioksina’, Radio Liberty, 3 October 2009, available at www.svobodanews.ru/content/article/1842723.html.

12 Andrei Ivonin, ‘Programmnye Zayavleniya’, Sergievskie Vedomosti, 31 March 2009.13 ‘Grazhdanskoe Obshchestvo. Tleyushchii Gnev’, Vedomosti, 11 March 2009.14 ‘Utomlennye Vlastyu’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 22 September 2010.15 ‘Oleg Shein: Idu na Vybory’ Interview, Astrakhanskiy Mir, 8 July 2009.16 ‘Na Vyborakh v Asktrakhani Rabotali Otmorozki’, Novaya Gazeta, 26 October 2009.17 ‘Permskie Obshchagi Prisoedinilis k Obshcherossiiskoi Aktsii Protesta’, Institute of

Collective Action Publications, 18 May 2008, available at www.ikd.ru/node/6186.18 ‘V Protestnom Dvizhenii Izhevska Peregruppirovka Sil’, Den, 28 May 2008; see

also ‘V Izhevske Partiya Vlasti v Panike Poshla na ‘Sudebnyi Bespredel’, chtobyUbrat Politicheskikh Konkurentov’, Publications of the Institute of CollectiveAction, 12 April 2010, available at www.ikd.ru.

19 Igor Zadorin, ‘Tretii Sektor Rossii. Novyi Tsentr Sotsialnoi Energetiki’, Nezavisi-maya Gazeta, 27 November 2007.

20 ‘Kogda u OGF ne poluchaetsa zapoluchit v svou orbitu vliyaniya kakuyu-liboorganizatsiyu tselikom, delaetsa popytka otkolot ot nee khot kusochek’, Komso-molskaya Pravda, 3 October 2006.

Notes 189


21 ‘Kasparova Obvinili v Provokatsii’, Komsomolskaya Pravda, 3 October 2006.22 ‘Grazhdanskoe Obshchestvo: Tretii Sektor’, Vedomosti, 7 October 2009.23 ‘Peredacha Vlasti. Retsessiya Srednego Klassa’, Vedomosti, 7 October 2008.24 Author’s interviews with business executives #nancing local war veterans movements.25 ‘Grazhdanskoe Obshchestvo: Tretii Sektor’, Vedomosti, 7 October 2009.26 ‘Delo Ruk Samogo Obshchestva’, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 29 April 2008; see also

‘Teper Budem Dumat’, Kommersant Daily, 18 June 2010.27 ‘Dostuchatsya do Soseda’, Kommersant Daily, 7 October 2010.28 Author’s interview with Brothers in Arms leaders in Moscow, March 2010.29 ‘Mestnoe Samoupravlenie: Dengi pod Nogami’, Vedomosti, 25 November 2009.30 ‘Komissiya PASE nedovolna situatsiei s pravami cheloveka na Severnom Kavkaze’,

www.kavkaz-uzel.ru, 1 June 2010, available at http://southdistrict.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/169553/.

31 ‘Zamedlennaya Reaktsiya’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 17 July 2009.32 ‘Prav bolshe ne stanovitsya’, Vedomosti, 27 May 2010; ‘Nemtsov Poborolsya s

Tverskim Sudom’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 13 January 2011; ‘Zapretnoe Isskustvo:Prosyat Khotya by ne Karat’, Kommersant Daily, 7 July 2010.

33 ‘Suverennyi Internet’, Vedomosti, 5 March 2008.34 Leontyev’s public lecture at the Moscow State University of Foreign Relations,

unpublished.35 ‘Putin: Posredniki Dostali Vsekh Uzhe’, Kommersant Daily, 27 October 2009.36 ‘Polovina VVP – Korruptsii’, gazeta.ru, 17 August 2010, available at www.gazeta.

ru/politics/2010/08/17_a_3408249.shtml. The #rst place in corrupt income belongsto executive departments of legal enforcement agencies: MVD (the Ministry ofInterior), FSB (the Federal Security Service), FSKN (the Federal Service for Nar-cotics Control), OBEP (the Department for Struggle against Economic Crimes).Corrupt employees in these agencies could raise some US$20,000 per month inincome. Corrupt o"cials in the prosecutor o"ce that have less in!uence on eco-nomic activity could achieve up to US$10,000 per month in corrupt income. Tra"cpolice inspectors earn on average US$5,000 per month due to public bribes. Localpolicemen and detectives could earn up to US$3,000 per month due to bribes col-lected from illegal immigrants and street retailers.

37 ‘Vzyatki Chashche vsego berut vrachi, gaishniki i chinovniki’, Vedomosti, 9December 2009.

38 ‘Dazhe vysokopostavlennye chinovniki narushayut zakon’, Vedomosti, 7 October2009.

39 ‘Grazhdanskoe Obshchestvo: Profsoyuz bez Svyazi’, Kommersant Daily, 19November 2009.

40 ‘Grazhdanskoe Obshchestvo: Dostoino Molchat’ v Ocheredi’, Vedomosti, 8 April2010.

41 ‘Peredacha Vlasti: Politika.ru’, Vedomosti, 6 April 2010.42 ‘Grazhdanskoe Obshchestvo: Babushki i Vybory’, Vedomosti, 5 November 2009.43 ‘Grazhdanskoe Obshchestvo: Piterskaya Istoriya’, Vedomosti, 22 October 2009.44 ‘Oni Sushchestvuyut’, Vedomosti, 22 April 2010.45 ‘Min#n bez pozoloty’, Vedomosti, 16 June 2010.46 ‘Migat ne Nado’, Vzglyad, 24 September 2010.47 ‘Voditel Shoigu Uvolen’, gazeta.ru, 16 May 2011, available at www.gazeta.ru/auto/

2011/05/16_a}3618965.shtml, last accessed 15 November 2011.48 ‘United Russia O"cial Buys Votes’, The Moscow Times, 1 November 2011.49 ‘Genprokuratura Podtverdila, chto zhenshchin-zakluchennykh v Amurskoi Oblasti

Izbival Zamnachalnika Kolonii’, gazeta.ru, 27 October 2011, available at www.gazeta.ru/news/lenta/2011/10/27/n_2070702.shtml, last accessed 15 November 2011.

50 ‘Pesni Nevinnosti’, Vedomosti, 19 January 2010.51 ‘Zabastovochnoe Dvizhenie v Rossii Shiritsya ne Budet’, Vedomosti, 24 April 2007.

190 Notes


52 Rost Zabastovachnogo Dvizheniya v Rossii Sposoben Izmenit Vsyu Stranu’, Mos-kovskie Novosti, 10 August 2007.

53 ‘Zabastovka Bolshe Chem Zhizn’, Novaya Gazeta, 20 February 2008.54 ‘Ot Redaktsii: Protest na Kolenyakh’, Vedomosti, 8 November 2007.55 ‘Trudovye Spory: Pravo Deistvovat’, Vedomosti, 8 November 2007.56 Human Rights Watch Monitor, www.hrmonitor.ru/index.php?pname=news&news_

id = 2036.57 ‘Proshlo Sobranie Aktsionerov Kompanii Rosno’, Kommersant Daily, 5 May 1995.58 ‘Professionalnyi Soyuznik. Mikhail Shmakov Vedet Trudyashchikhsya Kuda Izvo-

lite’, Kommersant Daily, 14 September 2000.59 ‘Utomlennye Vlastyu. Svobodnye Profsoyuzy Obedinilis na Platforme, Pre-

dlozhennoi Kremlem’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 22 September 2010.60 ‘S Izhdivenchestvom Nuzhno Borotsya’, Vremya Novostei, 20 September 2010.61 ‘Razdvoenie Lichnosti. V Profsoyuznom Dvizhenii Usilivaetsya Konkurentsiya’,

Vremya Novostei, 17 September 2010.62 ‘Bomba dlya predsedatelya’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 28 April 2010.63 ‘Alternativnye profsoyuzy namereny v techenie mesyatsa provesti mitingi v 12

regionakh Rossii’, regnum.ru, 11 August 2009, available at www.regnum.ru/news/1194971.html, last accessed 26 November 2009.

64 ‘Alternativnye prfosoyuzy rekomenduyut ne dovodit lyudei do krainosti’, rosbalt.ru, 24 July 2009, available at www.rosbalt.ru/2009/07/24/657942.html, last accessed26 November 2009; see also ‘Matvienko vstretilas s predstavitelyami alternativnykhprofsoyuzov’, rosbalt.ru, 22 July 2009, available at www.rosbalt.ru/2009/07/22/657328.html, last accessed 26 November 2009.

65 ‘Trudovye Spory: Pravo Deistvovat’, Vedomosti, 8 November 2007.66 ‘Zabastovka Bolshe Chem Zhizn’.67 www.marksizm.info/content/view/2635/33/.68 ‘Grazhdanskoe Obshchestvo Let cherez 10–15’, Vedomosti, 20 February 2007.69 ‘Kto Podstavil Veterinara’, Vremya Novostei, 21 July 2004.70 ‘Pravila Dvizheniya: Budte Zdorovy’, Vedomosti, 29 February 2008.71 ‘Do Kontsa Goda Kolichestvo TSZh v Rossii Udvoitsya’, Sobstvennik, 5 June

2008.72 ‘Les Rubit – Sebe Dorozhe’, gazeta.ru, 20 January 2010, available at www.gazeta.

ru/social/2010/12/20/3472157.shtml; see also ‘Khimkinskii les doshumit do marta’,Kommersant Daily, 11 February 2011; ‘Lider Dvizheniya v Zashchitu Khimkons-kogo Lesa Prodolzhit Borbu za Ekologiyu’, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 14 January2011.

73 ‘Butovsky Les ne Poddaetsya Razvedke’, Kommersant Daily, 16 June 2006; see also‘Genplan Vynesli s Obsuzhdeniya’, Kommersant Daily, 6 May 2010.

74 ‘Dachniki v Gneve’, Gazeta, 28 November 2006.75 Aleksandr Lekhtman, ‘Gorodskie Dvizheniya v 2009 Godu: ot Lokalnykh Aktsii k

Obshchegorodskim Kampaniyam’ Institut Kollektivnogo Deistviya, 28 January2010, available at www.ikd.ru/node/8050?q=node/12336.

76 ‘Arkhnadzor: Genplan Moskvy Neobkhodimo Peresmotret’, Argumenty i Fakty, 28September 2010.

77 ‘Khudozhniki Vystavilis v Zashchitu TsDKh’, Kommersant Daily, 25 February 2009.78 ‘Obmanutye Dolshchiki Poluchat Kompensatsii uzhe v Etom Godu’, Izvestiya, 5

June 2008.79 ‘V Kruge Vtorom’, Kommersant Daily, 31 January 2007.80 ‘Ssudnaya Dolya. Nesostoyavshiesya Novosely Reshili Borotsya za Svoi Prava

Soobshcha’, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 15 January 2009.81 ‘Peterburgskie Vlasti Obespechat Zhilem Obmanutykh Dolshchikov’, Komso-

molksaya Pravda, 20 October 2010; ‘Obmanutykh Dolshchikov v Sibiri StaloVdvoe Menshe’, Komsomolskaya Pravda, 16 September 2010.

Notes 191


82 Federalnyi Zakon RF ot 30 Dekabrya 2004 No 214-FZ ‘Ob Uchastii v DolevomStroitelstve Mnogokvartirnykh Domov i Inykh Obektov Nedvizhimosti i o Vnese-nii Izmenenii v Nekotorye Zakonodatelnye Akty Rossiiskoi Federatsii’, RossiiskayaGazeta, 31 December 2004.

83 Federalnyi Zakon RF ot 30 December 2008 No 306-FZ ‘O Vnesenii Izmenenii vNekotorye Zakonodatelnye Akty Rossiiskoi Federatsii v Svyazi s Sover-shenstvovaniem Poryadka Obrashcheniya Vzyskaniya na Zadolshennoe Imushchestvo’,Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 31 December 2008.

84 ‘Zhiteli Izhevskikh Obshchag Perekryli Dorogu’, kasparov.ru, 16 May 2008, avail-able at www.kasparov.ru/material.php?id=482D59AC9897D.

85 www.gkh.rwp.ru.86 ‘Razyasnenie Verkhovnogo Suda po Povodu Privatizatsii Zhilploshchadi v

Obshchezhitii’, available at http://hostel-moscow.ru/obshchaga-novosti-obshchezhitiy.87 ‘Vosstanie Lesov’, Vedomosti, 1 October 2010.88 ‘Pterburzhtsy Vstali na Zashchitu Bolshogo Utrisha’, Sila Dvizheniya, 28 Decem-

ber 2009.89 ‘Khimkinskii Les Doshumit do Marta’, Kommersant Daily, 11 February 2011.90 ‘Ekologi Otvoevali Sochi’, Vedomosti, 23 October 2007.91 rt.gazeta.ru/sport/2008/07/a_2773581.shtml, last accessed 26 August 2008.92 ‘Truboprovod Chistoi Vody’, Kommersant, 27 April 2006.93 ‘Litsenziya na Gryaz’, Vedomosti, 20 January 2010.94 ‘Miting v Zhukovskom Sobral 4 tysyachi uchastnikov’, 7 March 2009, gazeta.ru,

available at gazeta.ru/news/lenta/2009/03/07/n_1338516.shtml; ‘GrazhdanskoeObshchestvo. Tleyushchii Gnev’, Vedomosti, 11 March 2009.

8 Conclusion

1 Alexey Levinson, ‘Reitingu Putina Vse Nipochem’, Vedomosti, 1 November 2011.2 Vadim Volkov, ‘Navyazat Gosudarstvu Izmeneniya’, Vedomosti, 7 October 2011.3 Russia’s liberal community almost applauded to the accidental fall of decorationsin the newly reconstructed Bolshoi Theatre. The gloating had an air of revengeagainst the extant government. One look at liberal Internet journals would backthis point. Similar commentaries emerged following the crash of the Superjet 100,the latest Russian plane, in Indonesia.

4 Valery Solovei, ‘Rossiya Vtyagivaetsya v Krizis, kotoryi mozhet postavit podsomenine suchshestvovanie gosudarstva’, Gulyai Pole Rossiisko-Ukrainsii Poli-ticheskii Portal, www.politua.su/polit/3476.html, 30 January 2011, last accessed 15November 2011.

192 Notes


Bibliography

Abramowitz, A. 1989. ‘The United States: Political Culture under Stress’ in Almond,G. and Verba, S. (eds) The Civic Culture. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Adamson, F. 2002. ‘International Democracy Assistance in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbeki-stan: Building Civil Society from the Outside’, in Mendelson, S. and Glenn, J. (eds)Power and Limits of NGOs: A Critical Look at Building Democracy in EasternEurope and Eurasia. New York: Columbia University Press, 177–207.

Adorno, T.W. and Horkheimer, M. 1997. Dialectic of Enlightenment. London: VersoClassics

Afanasiev, M. 2009. ‘Russia’s Elites: The Request for a new Course’. Moscow: FondLiberalnaia Missiia.

Akhizer, A.S. 2001. ‘Spetsi#ka Rossiiskogo Obshchestva, kultury, mentalnosti kakteoreticheskaya i prakticheskaya problema’, Obnovlenie Rossii: Trudnyi PoiskReshenii, Vol. 9, RNISpNP, Moscow.

Alekseeva, L. 2007. Grazhdanskoe Obshchestvo: Let Cherez 10–15, Vedomosti, 20February.

Alexander, J. 2000. Political Culture in Post-Communist RussiaLondon: Macmillan Press.Almond, G.A. and Verba, S. 1963. The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democ-racy in Five Nations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Almond, G. and Verba, S. (eds) 1989. The Civic Culture Revisited. London: SagePublications.

Arendt, H. 1958. The Human Condition. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.Avraamova, E.M., Maleeva, T. 2003. ‘Srednie Klassy v Rossii: Ekonomicheskie iSotsialnye Strategii’, The Moscow Carnegie Centre. Moscow: Gendalf.

Avraamova, E.V. 2008. ‘Srednii Klass Epokhi Putina’, Obshchestvennye Nauki i Sov-remennost 1:28–36.

Balzer, H. 2003. ‘Managed Pluralism: Vladimir Putin’s Emerging Regime’, Post-SovietA!airs 19:189–227.

Barnes, M., Newman, J. and Sullivan, H. 2007. Power, Participation and PoliticalRenewal. Bristol, The Policy Press.

Bauman, Z. 2007. Liquid Times. Living in an Age of Uncertainty. Cambridge: Polity.Beck, U. 1992. Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. London: Sage.Belin, L. 2004. ‘Politics and the Mass Media under Putin’, in Ross, C. (ed.) RussianPolitics under Putin. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 133–152.

Bell, D. 1960. The End of Ideology. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.


Benhabib, S. 1992. ‘Models of Public Space: Hannah Arendt, the Liberal Tradition,and Jurgen Habermas’, in Calhoun C. (ed.), Habermas and the Public Sphere,Cambridge, MA: the MIT Press, 73–98.

Beumers, B., Hutchings, S. and Rulyova, N. 2009. The Post-Soviet Russian Media.Con#icting Signals. London: Routledge.

Beyle, T. 1992. Governors and Hard Times. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly.Blau, P. and Duncan, O. 1967. The American Occupational Structure. New York: Wiley.Bobbio, N. 1988. ‘Gramsci and the Concept of Civil Society’, in Keane, J. (ed.) CivilSociety and the State. New European Perspective. London: Verso, 73–99.

Bobrova, O. 2005. Fashizm Proshel. I Obeshchaet, Chto Pridet Eshche, NovayaGazeta, 7 November.

Bondareva, V. (2006). ‘Obshchestvennaya Palata Rossiiskoi Federatsii – Institut ili‘Ministerstvo’Grazhdanskogo Obshchestva?’ Vestnik VGU. Seriya Pravo, 1:1, 26–38.

Borenstein, E. 1999. ‘Public O$erings: MMM and the Marketing of the Melodrama’in A. Barker (ed.) Consuming Russia. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Bovt, G. 2002. ‘The Russian press and civil society: Freedom of speech versus freedomof market’, in Marsh, C. and Gvosdev, N. (eds) Civil Society and the Search forJustice in Russia. New York: Lexington Books, 91–105.

Boykov, V. 2009. ‘Konstitutsiya, Vlast i Narod. Rossiya 1990kh-godov – nachala XXIveka’, Sotsis, 1: 62–67.

Boyte, H.C. 1992. ‘The Pragmatic Ends of Popular Politics’, in Calhoun C. (ed.),Habermas and the Public Sphere. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 340–59.

Brown, A. 1996 The Gorbachev Factor. Oxford: Oxford University Press——2001. ‘Vladimir Putin and the Rea"rmation of Central State Power’, Post-SovietA!airs, 17:45–55.

——2001a. ‘From Democratisation to Guided Democracy’, The Journal of Democ-racy, 12:35–41.

——(ed.) 2004. The Demise of Marxism - Leninism in Russia (St Antony0s Series),London: Palgrave Macmillan.

——2005. ‘Conclusions’, in White#eld, S. (ed.) Political Culture and Post-Communism,London: Palgrave Macmillan, 180–202.

Brown, A. and Gray, J. (eds). 1977. Political Culture and Communist Studies, London:Macmillan.

Bruszt, L. and Stark, D. 2000. ‘Postcommunist Networking: Secret Agents, Ma#osiand Sociologists’, East European Constitutional Review, winter/spring: 115–20.

Budd, J. 1996. ‘Canadian Strike Replacement Legislation and Collective Bargaining:Lessons for the United States’, A Journal of Economy and Society, 35:245–60.

Bulakh, E. 2009. ‘TOS kak Forma Realizatsii Prava na Mestnoe Samoupravlenie’Munitsipalnaya Sluzhba: Pravovye Voporsy, 3:11–14.

Bunin, I. 2007. ‘SMI v Sovremennoi Rossii’, Publications of the Moscow Centre forPolitical Technology, 11 September, available at www.politcom.ru/article.php?id=5066, last accessed 1 September 2008.

Bunin, I., Makarenko, B. and Makarkin, A. 2010. ‘Konsilium: Modernizatsiya kaklechenie’, Vedomosti, 10 March.

Burchill, K. 1992. Labour Relations. London: Palgrave McMillan.Burlatsky F. 1982. ‘Filosophiya Mira’, Voprosy Filoso"i, 12:57–66.Bykov, O. 1983. ‘Revolutsionnaya Teoriya Izbavleniya Chelovechestva ot Voin’,

MEMO, 4:3.Byzov, L. 2006. ‘Konservativnaya Volna v Rossii’, Zametki Sotsiologa, 9:152–70.

194 Bibliography


——2009. ‘Ot Krizisa Tsennostei k Krizisu Institutov’, Svobodnaya Mysl, 4.Calhoun, C. 1992. ‘Introduction: Habermas and the public sphere’ in Calhoun, C.

(ed.) Habermas and the Public Sphere. Cambridge, MA: the MIT Press, 1–48.Chebankova, E. 2007. ‘Implications of Putin’s Regional and Demographic Policies onthe Evolution of Inter-ethnic Relations in Russia’, Perspectives on European Politicsand Society, 8:439–59.

——2009. ‘The Evolution of Russia’s Civil Society under Vladimir Putin: Grounds forOptimism or a Cause for Concern?’ Perspectives on European Politics and Society,10:393–414.

——2010. ‘Public and Private Cycles of Social Participation in Putin’s Russia’ Post-Soviet A!airs, 26:121–48.

Chirikova, A. 2005. ‘Regionalnaya Vlast v Rossii: Top-Menedzhery Kompanii kakVlastnye Aktory’, in Frukhtman, J. (ed.) Regionalnaya Elita v Sovremennoi RossiiMoscow: Fond Liberalnaya Missiya Press.

Clement, K. 2006. ‘Poyavlenie sotsialnykh dvizhenii novogo tipa v Rossii’, inPatrushev, S. (ed.) Institutsionalnaya Politologiya: Sovremennyi Institutionalizm iProblemy Politicheskoi Transformatsii Rossii. Moscow: ISPRAN, 229–64.

Clement, K. 2008. ‘Seichas Idet Vtoroi Etap Razvitiya Sotsialnykh Dvizhenii’, InstitutKollektivnogo Deistviya, 13 October, available at www.ikd.ru/node/7464.

Cohen, A. 1974. Two Dimensional Man: An Essay on the Anthropology of Power andSymbolism in Complex Society. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Clement, K., Gontmakher, E. and Klimov, I. 2008. ‘Ob Obyvatelyakh i Aktivistakh,Sotsialnykh i Politicheskikh Dvizheniyakh’, Obsuzhdeniye doklada Kar- in Klemanv INION RAN (On inhabitants and activists, social and political movements. Adiscussion of Karin Kleman’s talk at INION RAN). Moscow, December 2, 2008,available at www.ikd.ru/node/8050.

Cohen, A. 1955. Delinquent Boys: The Culture of the Gang. New York: Free Press.Cohen, J. and Arato, A. 1992. Civil Society and Political Theory. Cambridge, MA:The MIT Press.

Coleman, J.S. 1990. Foundations of Social Theory. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Pressof Harvard University Press.

Collier, R.B. 1998. Path Towards Democracy: the Working Class and Elites in WesternEurope and South America. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Colton, T. and McFaul, M. 2003. Popular Choice and Managed Democracy: the Rus-sian Elections of 1999 and 2000. Washington, DC: the Brooklings Institution Press.

Colton, T. 1995.Moscow: Governing the Socialist Metropolis. Cambridge: Belknap Press.Congressional Research Service Report, RL34296, Democracy Promotion: Cornerstoneof U.S. Foreign Policy? December 26, 2007.

Conlan, T. 1988. New Federalism: Intergovernmental Reform from Nixon to Reagan.Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.

Connell, I. 1991. ‘Tales of tellyland: the popular press and television in the UK’, inDahlgren, P. and Sparks, C. (eds) Communication and Citizenship: Journalism andthe Public Sphere in the New Media Age. London: Routledge, 236–53.

Coole, D. 1998. ‘Master Narratives and Feminist Subversions’ in Goode, J. andVelody, I. (eds) The Politics of Post-Modernity. Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, 107–25.

Cottingham, J. 1996. Western Philosophy. An Anthology. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.Crenshaw, K. 1990. ‘Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity, Politics, andViolence Against Women of Colour’, Standford Law Review, 43:1241–99.

Bibliography 195


Crossley, N. 2003. ‘Even Newer Social Movements? Anti-Corporate Protests, Capital-ist Crises and Rationalisation of Society’. Organisation, 10:287–305.

Crossley, N. and Roberts, M. 2004. After Habermas. New Perspectives on the PublicSphere. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.

CRS Report RL 33110, The Costs of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War onTerror Operations since 9/11. By Amy Belasco.

Curran, J. 1991. ‘Rethinking the media as a public sphere’ in Dahlgren, P. and Sparks,C. (eds) Communication and Citizenship: Journalism and the Public Sphere in theNew Media Age. London: Routledge, pp. 27–57.

Dahl, R. 1971. Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. New Haven, CT: Yale Uni-versity Press.

Dalton, R. et al. 1990. Challenging the Political Order: New Social Movements inWestern Democracies. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Davydova, S. and Usacheva O. 2009. ‘Setevaya Organizatsiya Ekologicheskikh Dviz-henii Rossii i Evropy’, Sotsis, 11:56–64.

Dawns, A. 1972. ‘Up and Down with Ecology – the Issue Attention Cycle’, PublicInterest, 28:38–50.

Dean, H. 2001. ‘Green Citizenship’, Social Policy and Administration, 35:490–505.Demes, P. and Forbrig J. 2006. ‘Pora “It’s Time” for Democracy in Ukraine’ inAslund, A. and McFaul, M. (eds) Revolution in Orange: The Origins of Ukraine’sDemocratic Breakthrough. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for InternationalPeace, 85–103.

Diamond, L. 1995. Promoting Democracy in the 1990s: Actors and Instruments, Issuesand Imperatives. New York: Carnegie Corporation of New York.

——(1996). ‘Toward Democratic Consolidation’ in Diamond, L. and Plattner, M.(eds) The Global Resurgence of Democracy. Baltimore, MD: the Johns HopkinsUniversity Press, 227–40.

——1999. Developing Democracy: Towards Consolidation. Baltimore, MD: JohnHopkins University Press.

——2002. ‘Thinking about Hybrid Regimes’, Journal of Democracy, 13:21–35.Diskin, I. 2007. Revolutsiya Protiv Svobody. Sbornik. Moscow: Izdatelstvo Evropa.Diuk, N. 2006. ‘The Triumph of Civil Soceity’, in Aslund, A. and McFaul, M. (eds)

Revolution in Orange: The Origins of Ukraine’s Democratic Breakthrough.Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 69–85.

Dmitriev, M. 2008. ‘Na Polputi k Bogatstvu’, Ekspert, 12:601.Dobson, A. and Bell, D. 2006. ‘Introduction’, in Dobson, A. and Bell, D. (eds)Environmental Citizenship. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1–19.

Dodd, N. 2005. Social Theory and Modernity. Cambridge: Polity.Downs, A. 1972. ‘Up and Down with Ecology - the Issue Attention Cycle’, The Public

Interest, 28:39–50.Dubin, B. 2004. Intellektualnye Gruppy i Simvolicheskie Formy. Ocherki SotsiologiiSovremennoi Kultury. Moskva: Novoe Izdatelstvo.

——2006. ‘Mass Media I Kommunikativnyi mir zhitelei Rossii: plasticheskaya khir-urgiya sotsialnoi realnosti’, Vestnik Obshchestvennogo Mneniya, 33–46.

Dubin, V. and Zorkaya, N.A. 2008. Chtenie v Rossii 2008: Tendentsii I Problemy.Moscow: Levada Center.

Dugin, A. 2002. Osnovy Evraziistva. Moscow: Arktogeya-Tsentr.Dunlop, J. 2009. ‘Foreword’, in Laruelle, M. (ed.). Russian Nationalism and the

National Reassertion of Russia. London: Routledge, i–xix.

196 Bibliography


Durkheim, E. 1951. Suicide: A Study in Sociological Interpretation. Glencoe, IL: FreePress.

——1972. Selected Writings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Easter, G.M. 1996. ‘Personal Networks and Postrevolutionary State Building. SovietRussia Re-examined’, World Politics 48:551–78.

Eastertin, R. 1980. Birth and Fortune: the Impact of Numbers on Personal Welfare.New York: Basic Books.

Easton, D. 1965. A Systems Analysis of Political Life. New York: John Wiley & Sons.Eckstein, H. 1998. ‘Congruence Theory Explained’ in Eckstein, H., Fleron F.J. Jr.,Ho$man, E.P. and Reisinger, W.M. (eds) Can Democracy Take Root in Post-SovietRussia? Explorations in State-Society, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Little#eld, 3–34.

Edwards, G. 2004. ‘Habermas and Social Movements: What’s ‘New’?’ in Crossley, N.and Roberts, J.M. (eds) After Habermas. New Perspectives on the Public Sphere.Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 113–30.

Edwards, M. 2009. Civil Society. Cambridge: Polity Press.Ehrenberg, J. 1999. Civil Society. The Critical History of an Idea. New York: NewYork University Press.

Eisenstadt, S.N. (ed.) 2002. Multiple Modernities. New Brunswick, NJ: TransactionPublishers.

Elaza, D.J. (ed.) 1969. The Politics of American Federalism. Lexington, MA: RaytheonEducation Company.

Eley, G. 1992. ‘Nations, Publics, and Political Cultures: Placing Habermas and thePublic Sphere in the Nineteenth Century’, in Calhoun, C. (ed.) Habermas and thePublic Sphere, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 289–339.

Elshtain, J.B. 1995. Democracy on Trial. New York: Basic Books.English, R. 2000. Russia and the Idea of the West: Gorbachev, Intellectuals and the Endof the Cold War. New York: Columbia University Press.

Evans, A.B., Jr. 2006. ‘Vladimir Putin’s Design for Civil Society’ in Evans, A.B. Jr.,Henry, L.A. and Sundstrom, L.M. (eds) Russian Civil Society: A Critical Assess-ment. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 305–22.

Evans, A.B. Jr. 2008. ‘The First Steps of Russia’s Public Chamber: Representation orCo-ordination’, Demokratizatsiya, 16:345–62.

Ewing, K.D. 1986. ‘The Right to Strike’, Industrial Law Journal, 15:143–60.Fedorov, V. (2009). ‘Zhelayu Uspekha’, Itogi, 15 December.——(2010). ‘Politicheskaya Sistema Rossii Sozdana’, VTsIOM Publications 19 Jan-uary, available at http://wciom.ru/arkhiv/tematicheskii-arkhiv/item/single/13069.html?no_cache=1& cHash = c41acb2f2d, last accessed 28 May 2011.

Fedorov, V., Tarusin, M. and Bokov, M. 2009. ‘Sposobnost politicheskoi sistemy rea-girovat na glavnye obshchestvennye ozhidaniya i opaseniya’. INOP Publications.Annual Congress of Political Science, Russia.

Fish, S. 1996. ‘Russia’s Fourth Transition’, in Diamond L. and Plattner M. (eds) TheGlobal Resurgence of Democracy. Baltimore, MD: the Johns Hopkins UniversityPress, 264–75.

Fitzpatrick, T. 2011. Welfare Theory. Introduction to Theoretical Debates in SocialPolicy. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Florida, R. 2007. Kreativnyi Klass: Lyudi, Kotorye Menyayut Budushchee. Trans fromEnglish. Moskva: Izdatelskiy Dom Klassika.

Fowler, A. 1996. ‘Strengthening Civil Society in Transition Economies – from Conceptto Strategy: Mapping an Exit in a Maze of Mirrors’ in Clayton, A. (ed.) NGOs,

Bibliography 197


Civil Society and the State. Building Democracy in Transitional Societies. Oxford:INTRAC.

Frankfurt, H.G. 1971. ‘Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,’ Journal ofPhilosophy, 68:5–20.

Fraser, N. 1990. ‘Rethinking the Public Sphere: a Contribution to the Critique ofActually Existing Democracy’, Social Text, 25/26:56–80.

Frolova, N., Dulina, N. and Omelchenko, I. 2007. ‘Iz ‘Kratkogo Kursa’ Stanovleniya IRazvitiya Obshchestvennoi Palaty Regiona’, Izvestiya Volgogradskogo Gosu-darstvennogo Universiteta, 4:50–52.

Fukuyama, F. 1995. Trust: Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity. New York:Simon and Schuster.

——1999. The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstruction of SocialOrder. New York: Free Press.

Gabrielson, T. 2008. ‘Green Citizenship: A Review and Critique’, Citizenship Studies,12:429–46.

Galbraith, J. 1992. The Culture of Contentment. Wilmington, MA: Mariner Books.Galbraith, J.K. 2007. The New Industrial State. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UniversityPress.

Gamson, W. 1975. Power and Discontent. Homewood, IL: Dorsey.Garner, R. (2005) Animal Ethics. Cambridge: Polity.——(2006) The Political Theory of Animal Rights. Manchester: Manchester UniversityPress.

Gelder, K. 2007. Subcultures. Cultural Histories and Social Practice. London: RoutledgePress.

Gibson, J. 2003. ‘Social Networks, civil society, and the prospects for consolidatingRussia’s democratic transition’ in Badescu, G. and Uslaner, E.M. (eds) SocialCapital and the Transition to Democracy. London: Routledge: 61–80.

Giddens, A. 1973 Capitalism and Modern Social Theory: An Analysis of the Writingsof Marx, Durkheim and Max Weber. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

——1991. The Consequences of Modernity. Cambridge: Polity.——1994. Beyond Left and Right. Cambridge: Polity Press.——(1997) Jurgen Habermas, in: Skinner, Q. (ed.) The Return of Grand Theory in theHuman Sciences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 123–39.

——1998. The Third Way. Cambridge: Polity Press.Gilbert, D. 2002. The American Class Structure. New York: Wadsworth Publishing.Gill, S. (2000) ‘Towards a Postmodern Prince? The Battle for Seattle as a Moment inthe New Politics of Globalisation’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies,29:131–41.

Golobkova, Y. 2009. ‘Nepravitelstvennyi inostrannye organizatsii kak instrument voz-deistviya na korennye malochislennye narody severa Rossii’, Vlast, 3:43–47.

Goode, J.P. 2007. ‘The Puzzle of Putin’s Gubernatorial Appointments’, Europe-AsiaStudies, 59:3365–99.

——2010. ‘Russia’s Gubernatorial Elections: a Post-mortem’, in Newton J. andTompson, W. (eds) Institutions, Ideas, and Leadership in Russian Politics. New York:Palgrave Macmillan, 43–66.

Goode, L. 2005. Jurgen Habermas. Democracy and the Public Sphere. London: Pluto Press.Gorshkov, M. 2007. ‘Rossiya kak ona est’, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 22 December.——2009a. ‘Rossiya kak Realnost. Rossiiskoe Obshchestvo v Sotsiologicheskom

Izmerenii’, Mir Rossii, 2:3–21.

198 Bibliography


——2009b. ‘Fobii, ugrozy, strakhi: sotsialno-psikhologicheskoe sostoyanie rossiiskogoobshchestva’, Sotsis, 7:26–32.

Gorshkov, M. and Tikhonova N. 2004. ‘Bogatstvo i Bednost v Predstavlenii Rossiyan’,Sotsiologicheskie Issledovaniya SotsIS, 3:16–21.

Gorshkov, N. and Tikhonova, N. 2008. Srednii Klass v Sovremennoi Rossii. Moscow:Institute Sotsiologii RAN.

Granham, N. 1992. ‘The media and the public sphere’ in Calhoun, C. (ed.) Habermasand the Public Sphere. Cambridge, MA: the MIT Press, 359–76.

Granovetter, M.S. 1973. ‘The strength of weak ties’. American Journal of Sociology78:1360–80.

Green, S. and Robertson, G. 2008. ‘Novoe Rabochee Dvizhenie v Rossii’, Pro etContra, March–June:36–58.

Greenstein, F. (1969) Personality and Politics, Chicago: Markham Publishing Company.Grigoriev, L.M. and Salamina, A.A. 2010. ‘Srednii Klass v Rossii: Povestka Dnya

Dlya Strukturirovannogo Analiza’, Sotsialnaya Politika, 12:105–24.Grodzins, M. 1969. ‘Attempts to Unwind the Federal System’, in Elazar, D.J. (ed.) ThePolitics of American Federalism. Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company, 193–202.

——1986. ‘Centralisation and Decentralisation in the American Federal System’ inGittell, M. (ed.) State Politics and the New Federalism, New York and London:Longman, 18–35.

Habermas, J. 1981. ‘New Social Movements’ Telos, 49: 33–37.——1987. The Theory of Communicative Action Volume II: System and Lifeworld.Cambridge: Polity.

——1989a. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: Inquiry into a Cate-gory of Bourgeois Society. Cambridge, MA: the MIT Press.

——1989b. The New Conservatism: Cultural Criticism and the Historians Debate.Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

——1992. ‘Further Re!ections on the public sphere’, in Craig Calhoun (ed.), Haber-mas and the Public Sphere. Cambridge, MA: the MIT Press, 421–61.

——1994. ‘Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State’ in Gut-mann, A. (ed.) Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition. Princeton,NJ: Princeton University Press, 107–49.

——1997. ‘The Public Sphere’ in Goodin, R. and Petit, P. (eds) Contemporary Poli-tical Philosophy. An Anthology. London: Blackwell Publishers, 103–6.

Hansesn. M. 1993. ‘Foreword’ in Negt, O. and Kluge, A. (eds) The Public Sphere andExperience: Towards an Analysis of the Bourgeois and Proletarian Public Sphere.Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, ix–xlii.

Havel, V. 1989. ‘Anti-political Politics’, in Keane, J. (ed.) Civil Society and the State.London: Verso.

Hawthorn, G 2002. ‘The Promise of Civil Society in the South’ in Kaviraj, S. andKhilnani, S. (eds) Civil Society: History and Possibilities. New Delhi: FoundationBooks, 269–86.

Hay, C. 2007. Why We Hate Politics. Cambridge: Polity.Held, D. 2004. Global Covenant: the Social Democratic Alternative to the WashingtonConsensus, Cambdridge: Polity.

Hellman, J.S., Jones, G. and Kaufmann D. 2002. ‘Seize the State, Seize the Day: StateCapture, Corruption and In!uence in Transition’. World Bank Policy ResearchWorking Paper No. 2444.

Bibliography 199


Henderson, S. 2003. Building Democracy in Contemporary Russia. Western Support forGrassroots Organisations. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Hendley, K. 2006. ‘Assessing the rule of law in Russia’, Journal of International andComparative Law, 14:347–91

Heywood, A. 2007. Politics. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.Hirschman, A. 1979. Shifting Involvements. Private Interest and Public Action. Prin-ceton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

——2002. Shifting Involvements. Private Interest and Public Action, twentieth anni-versary edition. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Ho$er, E. 1951. The True Believer. New York: Harper and Row.Horkeimer, M. 1999. ‘The Culture Industry: Enlightenment and Mass Deception’ inAdorno, T. and Horkheimer, M. (eds) Dialectic of Enlightenment. London: Verso,120–68.

Horton, B., Aismont, M. Petrov, N. and Collins, J. 2010. ‘Grazhdanskoe Obshchestvov Rossii: Kak Upravlyaemaya Demokratiya Dala Sboi’, Publications of the MoscowCarnegie Centre, 2 March, available at www.carnegie.ru/events/?fa=2879.

Howard, M.M. 2003. The Weakness of Civil Society in Post-Communist Europe.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hughes, O.E. 2003. Public Management and Administration. Basingstoke: Palgrave.Human Rights Watch. 2009. Ekspluatatsiya Trudovykh Migrantov v RossiiskomStroitelnom Sektore. USA: Human Rights Watch.

Huntington, S. 1968. Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven, CT: YaleUniversity Press.

——1996. The Clash of Civilisations? The Debate. New York: Foreign A$airs.Ingelhart, R. 1989. Culture Shifts in Advanced Industrial Society. Princeton, NJ: Prin-ceton University Press.

Inoguchi, T. 2002. ‘Broadening the Basis of Social Capital in Japan’ in Putnam, R.(ed.) Democracies in Flux. The Evolution of Social Capital in Contemporary Society.Oxford: Oxford University Press, 359–93.

James, W.G. 1995. ‘Civil Society and Democratisation’ in INPR International Con-ference on Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies: Trends and Challenges.Taipei: Institute for National Policy Research, 59–69.

Johnson, P. 2006. Habermas: Rescuing the Public Sphere. London: Routledge Press.Keane, J. 1988a. ‘Introduction’, in Keane, J. (ed.) Civil Society and the State. NewEuropean Perspective. London: Verso, 1–33.

——1988b. ‘Despotism and Democracy. The Origins and Development of the Dis-tinction between Civil Society and the State, 1750–1850’, in Keane, J. (ed.) CivilSociety and the State. New European Perspective. London: Verso, 35–71.

——1988c. Democracy and Civil Society. London: Verso.——(ed.) 1989. Civil Society and the State. London: Verso.——1991. The Media and Democracy. Cambridge: Polity Press.Khaidarov, R. 2006. ‘Stanovlenie Territorialno-Obshchestvennogo Samoupravleniya vMonopromyshlennykh Gorodakh: Sravnitelnyi Analiz’, Sotsialno-Ekonomicheskie iTekhnicheskie Sistemy: Issledovaniya, Proektirovanie, Optimizatsiya, 12:11–15.

Khalii, I. 2008. ‘Ekologicheskoe Obshchestvennoe Dvizhenie i Vlast: Formy Vzaimo-deistviya’, Polis, 4:130–39.

Kharkhordin, O. 2005. Main Concepts of Russian Politics. New York: University Pressof America.

200 Bibliography


Kim, E.M. 1997. Big Business. Strong State. Collusion and Con#ict in South KoreanDevelopment 1960–1990. New York: State University of New York Press.

Kline, N. 2000. No Logo. London: HarperCollins.Klyuchevskii, V.O. 1911–13. A History of Russia, trans. C. J. Hogarth, 5 vols. NewYork: Dutton.

Kolakowski, L. 1961. Der Mensch ohne Alternative. Munich: R. Piper.Kolomytseva, O. and Kolomytseva, L. 2008. ‘Deyatelnost’ Obshchestvennoi Palaty poOgranicheniyu Gosudarstvennoi Vlasti’ Vestnik Vladimirskogo Universiteta, 3:148–51.

Koopmans, R. 1993. ‘The Dynamics of Protest Waves: West Germany, 1965–89.’American Sociological Review, 58:637–58.

Kozhevnikova, G. 2010a. ‘Pod Znakom Politicheskogo Terrora. Radikalnyi Natsiona-lizm v Rossii I Protivodeistie emu v 2009 godu’, publications of the SOVA centre, 2February 2010, available at www.sova-centre.ru/racism-xenophobia/publications.

——2010b. ‘Ultrapravye Organizatsii Umelo Ispolzuyut Sotsialnye Nastroeniya’, 6September 2010.

——2010c. ‘Ultra-pravye tendentsii v sovremennykh pro-Kremlevskikh molodezhnykhorganizatsiyakh’ in Prbylovsky, Valery, Russkii Natsionalizm Mezhdu Vlastyu iOppozitsiei, Tsentr Panorama: Moscow, 4–18.

Kozina, I. 2009. ‘Zabastovki v Sovremennoi Rossii’, Sotsis, 9:12–26.Kryshtanovskaya, O. 2003. ‘Politicheskie Reformy Putin i Elita’, Ekonomika i

Obshchestvo, 4–5.Kupferberg, S. 1985. ‘Political Strikes, Labour Law, and Democratic Rights’, VirginiaLaw Review, 71:685–752.

Kupreeva, N. 2007. ‘Rasshirenie Vozmozhnostei Finansirovaniya NekommercheskikhOrganizatsii’, 1:162–66.

Kymlicka, W. 1995. Multicultural Citizenship. Oxford: Oxford University Press.——2002. Contemporary Political Philosophy. An Introduction. Oxford: Oxford Uni-versity Press.

Landes, J. 1998. ‘The public and the private sphere: a feminist reconsideration’ inLandes, J. (ed.) Feminism: the Public and the Private. Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, 135–64.

Lane, R. 1959. Political Life: Why People Get Involved in Politics. New York: Free Press.Lane, R.E. 1974. ‘Book Reviews of Robert D. Putnam The Beliefs of Politicians:Ideology, Con!ict, and Democracy in Britain and Italy and Schwartz, David C.Political Alienation and Political Behaviour.’ Political Science Quarterly, 89:175–78.

Lapina, N. 2005. ‘Bizness i Vlast’: Sokhranitsya li Regional’noe Mnogoobrazie?’, inFrukhtman, J. (ed). Regionalnaya Elita v Sovremennoi Rossii Moscow: Fond Liber-alnaya Missiya Press.

Laruelle, M. (ed.). 2009. Russian Nationalism and the National Reassertion of Russia.London: Routledge.

Lasch, C. 1979. The Culture of Narcissism: American Life in an Age of DiminishingExpectations. New York: W.W. Norton and Co.

——1995. The Revolt of the Elites and the Betrayal of Democracy. New York: W.W.Norton and Co.

Ledeneva, A. 1998. Russian Economy of Favours: Blat, Networking, and InformalExchange. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

——2005. Leadership and corruption in Russia, 2004–5. University College London,Centre for the Study of Economic and Social Change in Europe. Available at www.ssees.ucl.ac.uk/ publications/working_papers/wp54.pdf.

Bibliography 201


Lee, B. 1992. ‘Textuality, meditation, and public discourse’ in Calhoun, C. (ed.),Habermas and the Public Sphere. Cambridge, MA: the MIT Press, 402–18.

Levada Centre. 2010. Obshchestvennoe Mnenie 2010. Ot Mnenii k Ponimanyu.Moscow: Levada Centre.

Levashev, V.K. 2006. Grazhdanskoe Obshchestvo v Sovremennoi Rossii. Sotsiolo-gicheskoe Izmerenie. Moscow: ISPI RAN.

Levi, M. 1996. ‘Social and Unsocial Capital: a Review Essay of Robert Putnam’sMaking Democracy Work’, Politics and Society, 24:45–55.

Levitsky, S. and Way, A.L. 2010. Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes Afterthe Cold War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lewis, P.G. (1992). ‘Introduction’, in Lewis, P. (ed.) Democracy and Civil Society inEastern Europe. London: St Martin Press, 1–16.

Linklater, A. 2009. ‘Marx and Marxism’ in Burchill, S. et al. (eds) Theories of Inter-national Relations. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 111–35.

Lipman, M. 2010. ‘The Sleeping Giant’, Foreign Policy, August:19.Lipman, M. and McFaul, M. 2003. “Putin and the Media” in Herspring, D. (ed.) ThePutin Russia: Past Imperfect, Future Uncertain. New York: M.E. Sharpe, 63–84.

Lipset, S.M. 1960. Political Man. New York: Doubleday.Lipsky, M. 1968. ‘Protest as a Political Resource’, American Political Science Review,

62:1144–58.Lowndes, V. 2010. ‘The Institutional Approach’, in Marsh, D. and Stoker, G. (eds)Theories and Methods in Political Science. Basingstoke: Palgrave.

Lukes, S. 1985. Marxism and Morality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Lukin, A. 2000.Political Culture of Russian ‘Democrats’. Oxford: Oxford University Press.——2009. ‘Russia’s New Authoritarianism and the Post-Soviet Political Ideal’, Post-Soviet A!airs, 25:66–92.

Lushnikov, A. and Lushnikova, M. 2009. Kurs Trudovogo Prava. Moscow: Statut.Lytkina, T. 2003. Ekonomicheskoe povedenie ‘novykh bednykh’ v usloviyakh sotsialnoi

transformatsii. Moscow: RGB OD.Makarkin, A. 2009. ‘Novyi pravyi ekstrimizm – ulichnye ubiitsy’, politcom.ru, 26

February 2009, available at www.politcom.ru/7692.html.Maleva, T.M. 2003. Srednie Klassy v Rossii: Ekonomicheskie i Sotsialnye Strategii.Moscow: NISP RAN Publications.

Maleva, T.M. and Ovcharova, L.N. 2009. Rossiiskie Srednie Klassy na RazlichnykhEtapakh Ekonomicheskogo Razvitiya. Moscow: INSOR Publications.

Malia, M. 1994. The Soviet Tragedy. A History of Socialism in Russia, 1917–1991.New York: the Free Press.

Mans#eld, E. and Snyder J. 2005. Electing to Fight. Why Emerging Democracies go toWar. Cambridge, MA: the MIT Press.

Marcuse, H. 1966. One Dimensional Man, Boston, MA: Beacon Press.Marsden, L. 2005. Lessons from Russia: Clinton and US Democracy Promotio.Hampshire: Ashgate.

McAdam, D. 1995. ‘Initiator and Spin-O$’ Movements: Di$usion Processes in ProtestCycles’, in Traugott, M. (ed.) Repertoires and Cycles of Collective Action. Durham,NC: Duke University Press, 217–40.

McCarthy, J.D. and Zald, M. 1977. ‘Resource Mobilisation and Social Movement: aPartial Theory’, The American Journal of Sociology, 82:1212–41.

McCormick, J.P. 1997. Carl Schmitt’s Critique of Liberalism. Against Politics asTechnology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

202 Bibliography


McFaul, M., Petrov, N., Ryabov, A. 2004. Between Dictatorship and Democracy.Russian Post-Communist Political Reform. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowmentfor International Peace.

McFaul, M. 2002. ‘Introduction: Russian Civil Society,’ Demokratizatsiya, 10:109–16.McFaul, M. and Treyge, R.E. 1963. ‘Civil Society’ in McFaul, M., Petrov, N. andRyabov, A. (eds) Between Dictatorship and Democracy: Russian Post-communistPolitical Reform. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,135–174.

McKee, A. 2005. The Public Sphere: an Introduction. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-versity Press.

Meier, H. 1995. Carl Schmitt and Leo Strauss. The Hidden Dialogue. Chicago, IL:University of Chicago Press.

Melia, T. 2005. The Democracy Bureaucracy. The Infrastructure of American Democ-racy Promotion. The Princeton Project on National Security, September.

Melucci, A. 1989. ‘Social Movements and the Democratisation of Everyday Life’ inKeane, J. (ed.) Civil Society and the State. London: Verso.

Mendelson, S. and Glenn, J. 2002. Power and Limits of NGOs: A Critical Look at BuildingDemocracy in Eastern Europe and Eurasia. New York: Columbia University Press.

Mersiyanova, I. (2010). ‘Gosudarstvennaya Podderzhka Blagotvoritelnoi Deyatelnosti:Empiricheskaya Veri#katsiya Namechennykh Deistvii’ Voprosy Gosudarstvennogo iMunitsipalnogo Upravelniya, 4:94–110.

Merton, R. 1938. ‘Social Structure and Anomie’, American Sociological Review,III:672–82.

Mika, M. 2006. ‘Religion, Secular Ethic and the case of Animal Rights Mobilisation’,Social Forces, 85:915–41.

Milbrath, L.W. 1965. Political Participation: How and Why Do People Get Involved inPolitics? Chicago, IL: Rand McNally.

Miles, I. and Irvine, J. 1982. The Poverty of Progress. Oxford: Pergamon.Mirasova, O. 2008. ‘Ot Obyvatelya k Aktivistu: Transformatsiya Freima (IssledovanieZhilishchnogo Dvizheniya v Astrakhani)’, Sotsialnaya Realnost, 3:5–23.

MIS (Moscow Institute of Sociology) RAN 2010.Gotovo li Rossiiskoe Obshchestvo k Mod-ernizatsii? 2010. Analiticheskii Doklad. Moscow: Moscow Institute of Sociology RAN.

Mishler, W. and Rose, R. 1997. ‘Trust, Distrust, and Scepticism: Popular Evaluationsof Civil and Political Institutions in Post-Communist Societies’, Journal of Politics59:418–51.

Morris, J. 2007. ‘Drinking to the Nation: Russian Television Advertising and CulturalDi$erentiation’, Europe-Asia Studies, 59:1387–1403.

Nathan, R. 1993. ‘The Role of the States in American Federalism’ in Van Horn, C.E.(ed.) The State of the States. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 15–29.

Newton, K. (1999) Social and political trust in established democracies, in Norris, P.(ed.) Critical Citizens. Global Support for Democratic Government. Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 169–87.

Nikitin, A. and Buchanan, J. 2002. ‘The Kremlin’s Civic Forum: Co-operation orCooptation for Civil Society in Russia’ Demokratizatsiya, 10:147–65.

Nordensterg, K., Vartanova, E. and Zassursky, Y. (eds) 2002. Russian Media Chal-lenge. Helsinki: Kikimora.

Norris, P. 1999. ‘Introduction: The Growth of Critical Citizens?,’ in Norris, P. (ed.)Critical Citizens. Global Support for Democratic Government. Oxford: Oxford Uni-versity Press, 1–27.

Bibliography 203


North, D. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cam-bridge: Cambridge University Press.

Nozick, R.(1974). Anarchy, State and Utopia. New York: Basic Books.Oakeshott, M. 2000. ‘On Civil Association’ in Mahajan, G. (ed.) Democracy, Di!er-ence, and Social Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 138–49.

Oates, S. 2007. ‘The Neo-Soviet Model of the Media’, Europe-Asia Studies, 59:1279–97.——2008. Introduction to Media and Politics. London: Sage Publications.Okhotsky, E. 2009. ‘Korruptsiya: sushchnost, mery protivodeistviya’, Sotsis, 8:25–33.Ostrow, J.M., Satarov, G. and Khakamada, I. 2007. The Consolidation of Dictatorshipin Russia: An Inside View of the Demise of Democracy. Westport, CT: Praeger SecurityInternational.

Ottoway, M. and Carothers, T. (eds.). 2000. Funding Virtue: Civil Society Aid and Democ-racy Promotion. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Ottoway, M. and Chung, T. 1999. ‘Debating Democracy Assistance: Towards a NewParadigm’, Journal of Democracy, 10:99–113.

Pappe, Y. and Galukhina, Y. 2009. Rossiiskii Krupnyi Biznes: Pervye Pyatnadtsat Let.Ekonomicheskie Khroniki 1993–2008. Moscow: GU-VShE.

Pelczynski, Z. (1984). ‘Introduction: the Signi#cance of Hegel’s Separation of Stateand Society’ in Pelczynski, Z. (ed.) The State and Civil Society. Studies in Hegel’sPolitical Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1–14.

Peters, R. (1967). Hobbes. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.Petrov, N. (2006). ‘Obshchestvennaya Palata Dlya Vlasti ili Dlya Obshchestva’ Pro etContra, 1:40–59.

Petukhov, V. 2006. ‘Grazhdanskoe Obshchestvo i Demokratiya Uchastiya’, MonitoringObshchestvennogo Mneniya, 1:22–26.

——2008a. Epokha Putina i Dinamika Sotsialnykh Peremen, in Gorshkov (ed.) Ros-siya Reformiruyushayasya, vol. 7, Moscow: Institute of Sociology RAN, 353–73

——2008b. ‘Dinamika Mirovozzrencheskikh I Ideologicheskikh Ustanovok Rossiyan’,Gosudarstvo i Obshchestvo, 1:48–62.

——2009. ‘Perezagruzka demokratii’, Pro"l, 8 September——2010.Dinamika Sotsialnykh Nastroenii i Mirovozzrencheskikh Ustanovok Rossiyan.Rossiya-2010: Rossiiskaya Transformatsiya v Kontekste Mirovogo Razvitiya. Moscow:Logos

Pilkington, H., Omel’chenko, E. and Garifzianova, A. 2010. Russia’s Skinheads.Exploring and Rethinking Subcultural Lives. London: Routledge.

Piller, C. ‘Kinds of Practical Reasons: Attitude-Related Reasons and ExclusionaryReasons’, York: University of York.

Popper, K. 1966. The Open Society and Its Enemies, London: Routledge Kean Paul.Portes, A. and Ho$man, K. 2003. ‘Latin American Class Structure: their compositionand change during the Neo-liberal Era’, Latin American Research Review, 38:41–82.

Potier, B. 2003. ‘Middle Income can’t Buy Middle Class Lifestyle’. Harvard Gazette,30 October.

Przeworski, A., Alvarez, M., Cheibub, J. and Limongi, F. (2000). Democracy andDevelopment: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950–1990. NewYork: Cambridge University Press.

Pugh, J. 2010. (ed.) What is Radical Politics Today? Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.Putnam, R.D. 1993. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy.Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

204 Bibliography


——1997. Democracy in America at century’s end, in Hadenius, A. (ed.) Democracy’sVictory and Crisis. New York: Cambridge University Press, 27–70.

——2000. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. NewYork: Simon and Schuster.

——(ed.) 2002. Democracies in Flux: The Evolution of Social Capital in ContemporarySociety. New York: Oxford University Press.

Rangsimaporn, P. 2006. ‘Intepretations of Eurasianism: Justifying Russia’s Role inEast Asia’, Europe-Asia Studies, 58:371–89.

Rantanen, T. 2002. The Global and the National: Media and Communication in Post-Communist Russia. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Little#eld.

Rapoport, D. 2006. ‘The four waves of modern terrorism’ in Rapoport, D. (ed.) Ter-rorism. Critical Concept in Political Science, vol. 4, The Fourth, or Religious Wave.London: Routledge.

Rawls, J. 1993. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press.Remington, T. 2003. ‘Majorities without Mandates: The Russian Federal Councilsince 2000’, Europe-Asia Studies, 55:5.

Richeri, G. 2004. ‘Broadcasting and theMarket. The case of Public Television’ in Calabrese,A. and Sparks, C. Towards a Political Economy of Culture. Capitalism and Com-munication in the Twenty-Frist Century. London: Rowman and Little#eld, 178–93.

Richter, J. 2002. ‘Evaluating Western Assistance to Russian Women’s Organisations’ inMendelson, S. and Glenn, J. (eds) Power and Limits of NGOs: A Critical Look atBuilding Democracy in Eastern Europe and Eurasia. New York: Columbia Uni-versity Press, 54–90.

——2009. ‘Putin and the Public Chamber’ Post-Soviet A!airs, 25:39–65.Rogov, K. 2011. ‘Dumat’ Vpered i Menyat Nastoyashchee’, Vedomosti, 30 September,available at www.vedomosti.ru/opinion/news/1379454/revolyucionnyj_vopros.

Rootes, C. 1999. ‘Environmental Movements: From the Local to the Global’, in Rootes,C. (ed.) Environmental Movements. Local National and Global. London: FrankCass, 1–13.

Rose, R. and Weller, C. 2003. ‘What does social capital add to democratic values?’ inBadescu, G. and Uslaner, E.M. (eds) Social Capital and the Transition to Democ-racy. London: Routledge, 200–18.

Rose, R. 1996. ‘Post-Communism and the Problem of Trust’ in Diamond, L. andPlattner, M. (eds) The Global Resurgence of Democracy. Baltimore, MD: the JohnsHopkins University Press, 251–63.

Rosenholm, A., Nordenstreng, K. and Trubina, E. 2010. Russian Mass Media andChanging Values. London: Routledge.

Rossoshansky, A. 2008. ‘Politicheskaya funktsionalnost mass-media v sotsiokulturnomkontekste sovremennoi Rossii’, Izvestiya Saratovskogo Universiteta, 8:104–7.

Rukavishnikov, V.O. 2008. ‘Mezhlichnostnoe Doverie: Izmerenie i MezhstranovyeSravneniya’, SotsIs, 2:17–25.

Ryan, M. 1992. ‘Gender and Public Access: Women’s Politics in Nineteenth CenturyAmerica’, in Calhoun, C. (ed.), Habermas and the Public Sphere. Cambridge, MA:MIT Press, 259–89.

Sakwa, R. 2008. Putin: Russia’s Choice. London: Routledge Press.——2010. ‘The Dual State in Russia’, Post-Soviet A!airs, 26:185–206.Sandel, M. 1996. Democracy’s Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy.Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Bibliography 205


Schast’e Devushki v Rabote?, Argumenty i Fakty, 5 March 2010, available at http://wciom.ru/arkhiv/tematicheskii-arkhiv/item/single/13262.html?no_cache=1&cHash=580d60e618

Scheiber, H. 2000. ‘The Condition of American Federalism: An Hisotiran’s View’ inO’Toole, L. Jr (ed.) American Intergovernmental Relations, 3rd edn. Washington,DC: CQ Press, 65–73.

Schlesinger, A. 1949. Paths to the Present, New York: MacMillan.Schmitter, P. 1985. ‘Still the Century of Corporatism?,’ in Streeck, W. and Schmitter, P.(eds) Private Interest Government: Beyond Market and State. Beverly Hills, CA:Sage Publications, 85–131.

——1995. ‘Civil Society and Democratisation’ in INPR International Conference onConsolidating the Third Wave Democracy: Trends and Challenges. Taipei: Institutefor National Political Research, 59–69.

Schwartz, D.C. 1973. Political Alienation and Political Behaviour. Chicago, IL: AldinePublishing Company.

Scott, R. 2001. Institutions and Organisations. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.Seligman, A. 1992. The Idea of Civil Society. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Sen, A.1974. ‘Choice, Orderings and Morality’, in Körner, S. (ed.) Practical Reason.Oxford, Blackwell, 54–67.

Sennet, R. 1978. The Fall of the Public Man: On the Social Psychology of Capitalism.New York: Random House.

Service, R. 1998. A History of Twentieth Century Russia. London: Penguin Books.Shakhnazarov, G. 1984. The Coming World Order. Moscow: Politizdat.Shevtsova, L. 2007. Russia: Lost in Transition. Yeltsin and Putin’s Legacies. Washing-

ton, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.Shlapentokh, V. 2006. ‘Trust in Public Institutions in Russia: the Lowest in the World’,Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 39:153–74.

Simon, R. 1982. Gramsci’s Political Thought. An Introduction. London: Lawrence andWishart.

Sitton, J. 2003. Habermas and Contemporary Society. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.Skinner, Q. (2006). The Foundations of Modern Political Thought. The Age of Refor-mation. Vol. 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Sloam, J. 2007. ‘Rebooting Democracy: Youth Participation in Politics in the UK’,Parliamentary A!airs, 60:548–67.

Solovey, V. and Solovey, T. 2009. Nesostoyavshayasya Revolyutsiya. Feoriya: Moscow.——2010. ‘Russkii Natztionalizm pri Putine-Medvedeve’, in Prbylovsky, V. (ed.)

Russkii NatsionalizmMezhdu Vlastyu i Oppozitsiei. Moscow: Tsentr Panorama, 51–62.Sorokin, P. 1957. Social and Cultural Dynamics: A Study of Change in Major Systems ofArt, Truth, Ethics, Law and Social Relationships. Boston, MA: Extending HorizonsBooks.

Sperling, V. 1999. Organising Women in Contemporary Russia: Engendering Transi-tion. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

——2006. Women’s organisations: institutionalised interest groups or vulnerable dis-sidents? in Evans, A., Henry, L. and Sundstrom, L. (eds) Russian Civil Society. ACritical Assessment. New York: Sharpe Inc, 161–78.

Sperling, V., Evans, A., Henry, L. and Sunstrom, L. 2006. Russian Civil Society. ACritical Assessment. New York: Sharpe Inc.

Sundstrom, L., 2006. Funding Civil Society: Foreign Assistance and NGO Developmentin Russia. Standford, CA: Stanford University Press.

206 Bibliography


Swidler, A. 1998. ‘Culture and Social Action,’ in Smith, P. (ed.) The New AmericanCultural Sociology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,.

Tarasov, A. 2000. ‘Porozhdenie Reform: Britogolovye, oni Uzhe Skinhedy’, SvobodnayaMysl-XXI, 4:9–53.

Tarrow, S. 2005. The New Transnational Activism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Tarrow, S. 2011. Power in Movement. Social Movements and Contentious Politics, 3rdedn. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Taylor, B. 2011. State-Building in Putin’s Russia. Policing and Coercion After Com-munism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Taylor, C. 1994. ‘The Politics of Recognition’, in Gutmann, A. (ed.) Multiculturalism:Examining the Politics of Recognition. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,25–75.

——1995a. ‘Invoking Civil Society’, in Taylor, C. (ed.) Philosophical Arguments.Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 204–25.

——1995b. ‘Liberal Politics and the Public Sphere’, in Taylor, C. (ed.) PhilosophicalArguments. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Tester, K. 1992. Civil Society. London: Routledge Press.Thompson, J. 1990. Ideology and Modern Culture: critical social theory in the era ofmass communication. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Thompson, W. and Hickey, J. 2005. Society in Focus. Boston, MA: Pearson.Thompson. E.P. 1971. ‘The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the EighteenCentury’, Past and Present, 50:76–136.

Thomson, J. and Held, D. 1982. ‘Editor’s Introduction’ in Thomson, J. and Held, D.(eds) Habermas. Critical Debates. London: The MacMillan Press.

Tikhonova, N.E. 2006. Gorodskoi Srednii Klass v Sovremennoi Rossii. AnaliticheskyDoklad Instituta Sotsiologii RAN.

Tilly, C. 1973. ‘DoesModernisation Breed Revolution?’,Comparative Politics, 5:425–47.——1984. ‘Social Movements and National Politics,’ in Bright, C. and Harding, S.

(eds) Statemaking and Social Movements. Ann Arbor, MI: University of MichiganPress, 297–317.

Tilly, C. and Wood, L. 2009. Social Movements, 1768–2008. Boulder, CO: Paradygm.Timashe$, N. 1946. The Great Retreat. New York: Dutton.Timofeyev, I. 2004.‘The Development of Russian Liberal Thought since 1985’, inBrown, A. (ed.) The Demise of Marxism-Leninism in Russia. Basingstoke: PalgraveMacmillan, 51–119.

Todd, M.J. and Taylor, G. (eds). 2004. Democracy and Participation: popular protestand new social movements. London: Merlin Press.

Trakhtenberg, A. 1999. Massovaya Kommunikativiskika i Problema KonstruirovaniyaRealnosti: Analiz Osnovnykh Teoreticheskikh Podkhodov. Ekaterinburg: UrO RAN.

Tsipko, A. 1983. Nekotorye Filosofskie Aspekty Teorii Sotsializma. Moscow: Nauka.Tweedy, J. and Hunt, A. 1994. ‘The Future of the Welfare State and Social Rights:Re!ections on Habermas’, Journal of Law and Society, 21:288–316.

Uslaner, E.M. 1999. ‘Democracy and Social Capital’ in Warren, M. (ed.) Democracyand Trust. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 121–50.

Uslaner, E. 2002. The Moral Foundations of Trust. Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress.

Vartanova, E. 2009. ‘De-Sovietazing Russian Media Studies’, in Thussu, K. (ed.)Internationalising Media Studies. London: Routledge Press, 214–28.

Bibliography 207


VeneKlasen, L. 1994. ‘Building Civil Society: the Role of Development NGOs’, Con-cept Paper No. 1. Washington DC: InterAction.

Verba, S. and Nie, N. 1972. Participation in America: Political Democracy and SocialEquality. New York: Harper and Row.

Verba, S, Nie, N and Jae-On, K. 1978. Participation and Political Equality A Seven-Nation Comparison. London: Cambridge University Press.

Voegelin, E. 2000. Modernity Without Restraint. The Political Religions, The NewScience of Politics and Science, Politics and Gnosticism. Columbia, MO: Universityof Missouri Press.

Vorozheykina, T. 2008. ‘Samozashchita kak pervyy shag k solidarnosti (Self-defense asa #rst step towards solidarity’. Pro et Contra, 12:6–23.

VTsIOM 2008, Press Release No. 86, ‘Muzhchiny o Zhenshinakh: Seksapil’nost - etone Glavnoe’, available at http://wciom.ru/index.php?id=459&uid=9787.

Vyzhutovich, V. 2009. Mediinye Litsa Obshchestva, politcom.ru, 28 September, avail-able at www.politcom.ru/8862.html, last accessed 28 May 2011.

Walker, D. 1995. The Rebirth of Federalism. Slouching Towards Washington. Cha-tham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers.

Wallerstein, I. 1979. The Capitalist World Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-versity Press.

Warner, L. 1949. What is Social Class in America? New York: Irvington Press.Warner, M. 1990. Letters to the Republic. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Welch, S. 1993. The Concept of Political Culture, New York: St. Martin Press.White, S. 2011.Understanding Russian Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.White#eld, S. 2009. ‘Russian Citizens and Russian Democracy: Perceptions of StateGovernance and Democratic Practice, 1993–2007’, Post-Soviet A!airs, 25:93–117.

Williams, B. 2001. In the Beginning was the Deed. Realism and Moralism in PoliticalArgument. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

——2005. In the Beginning Was the Deed: Realism and Moralism in Political Argu-ment. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Wilson, A. 2006. ‘Ukraine’s Orange Revolution, NGOs and the Role of the West’,Cambridge Review of International A!airs, 19:21–32.

Wilson, H.T. 1985. Political Management: Rede"ning the Public Sphere. Berlin: Walterde Gruyter.

Wilson, J. 1973. Introduction to Social Movements. New York: Basic Books.Wilson, K. 2006. ‘‘Party-System Development Under Putin’, Post-Soviet A!airs,22;314–48.

Wintrobe, R. 2006. Rational Extemism. The Political Economy of Radicalism. Cam-bridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wright, B. 2003. ‘Reality Check’, Genre, 119:42–45.Yamagishi, T. 1988. The provision of a sanctioning system in the United States andJapan. Social Psychological Quarterly 51:265–71.

Yamagishi, T. and Yamagishi, M. 1994. Trust and commitment in the United Statesand Japan Motivation and Emotion, 18:129–66.

Yorke, A. 2003, ‘Business and Politics in Krasnoyarsk Krai’, Europe-Asia Studies,55:241–62.

Young, I.M. 1999. ‘State, Civil Society, and Social Justice’ in Shapiro, I. and Hacker-Gordon, C. (eds)Democracy’s Value, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 141–62.

Youngs, R. 2004. International Democracy and the West. The Role of Governments,Civil Society and Multinational Business. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

208 Bibliography


Zassoursky, I. 2004. Media and Power in Post-Soviet Russia. Armonk, NY: MESharpe.

Zemlyanova, L. 1995. Sovremennaya Amerikanskaya Kommunikavistika: Teor-eticheskie Konstruktsii, Problemy, Prognozy. Moscow: Izdatelstvo MGU.

Zimmerman, J. 1992. Contemporary American Federalism. The Growth of NationalPower. Leicester and London: Leicester University Press.

Zircon Agency. 2007. Usloviya razvitiya organizatsii nekommercheskogo sektora vRossiiskoi Federatsii, Moscow: GU-VShEi.

Zircon Analytical Centre. 2008. Dinamika Razvitiya i Tekushchee Sostoyanie SektoraNKO v Rossii. Moscow: Masterskaya Zadorina.

Zircon 2007–8. Tretii Sektor Rossii: Otsenka Vliyatelnosti. Analiticheskii Otchet porezultatam ekspertnogo oprosa. Zircon.

Zircon Analytical Agency. 2010. Obshchestvennaya Podderzhka NKO v RossiiskikhRegionakh. Problemy i Perspektivy. Moscow: ASI, Zircon

Zubarevich, N. 2002. ‘Prishel, Uvidel Pobedil?’ Pro et contra 7:107–19.Zubok, Y. and Chuprov, V. 2008a. ‘Molodezhnyi Ekstrimizm. Sushchnost i Oso-bennosti Proyavleniya’, Sotsis 5:37–47.

——2008b. ‘Molodezhnyi Ekstremizm. Sushchnost i Osobennosti Proiavleniia’,VTsIOM Research Papers, http://molodost.ru/upload/#le/23_09_09_01.pdf andhttp://wciom.ru/#leadmin/Monitoring/89/2009_1(89)_7_Chuprov_Zubok.pdf.

Zudin, A. 2005. ‘Vzaimootnosheniya krupnogo biznesa i vlasti pri Vladimire Putine iikh vliyanie na situatsiyu v regionakh’ in Frukhtman, J. (ed.) Regional’naya Elita vSovremennoi Rossii. Moscow: Fond Liberalnaya Missiya Press, 37–64.

Bibliography 209


Index

Abramovich, Roman 107academia, control of 70active life stance 165activism see extremism; public phaseAdorno, T.W. 13, 50Afghan war veterans 116Agashin, Denis 153Agency for Residential Mortgage Loans(AIZhK) 41–42

Akhizer, A. 74Alexeeva, Lyudmila 160–61Alexei, Makarkin, 90–91All-Russian Association of Investors 160Allianz SE group 36Alternative Trade Union Association157–58

Amnesty International 149–50animal rights networks 12anti-globalisation protesters 12anti-political groups 12–13anti-smoking organisations 125–26anti-Western ideological sentiment 73–75Arab American Institute 121–22Arato, A. 19Architectural Guard 159–60Arendt, H. 13Art Group 171n3assassinations 89–90associational life 2, 5, 7, 164Aushev, Maksharip 150

Bakhmina, Svetlana 115Baranovsky, Dmitry 117, 148Barycheva, Larisa 134–35Beck, U. 15Belov-Potkin, Alexander 87, 89Belyakov, Anton 160Belykh, Nikita 149bene#ts programme 34–35, 40

Berezovsky, Boris 81, 136Bergulaeva, Irina 144Bill Gates Foundation 125Blair, Tony 135Bloomberg, Michael 125Bobovnikov, Alexander 162Boevoe Bratstvo 116, 117Bondarchuk, Fedor 112–13book readership 53, 65Boos, Greorgii 144Brenton, Anthony 84, 137bribery 141, 151Britain 84, 127, 128, 138British Council affair 135–37, 138–39Brzezinski, Z. 143Bush, G.W. 121business

charity activity 107–8collusion with sectional interest groups63–64

liberalism 79migrant workers 92moral and cultural issues 40–41regional governorships 34Butovo forest case 159Byzov, B. 51Byzov, L. 74Canada 127capitalism, criticisms of 13Carothers, T. 119Caucasus 76, 92, 131censorship 114centralisation 43, 70Centre for Social Conservative Policy 109Centre for the Struggle against RacialHatred (SOVA) 89

Chaika, Yurii 132, 151Charities Aid Foundation 138


charity sector 106–7Chechnya 88, 90, 131, 149–50Chelnokov, Mikhail 78Chevening fund 138Chirkunov, Oleg 44, 85Chita–Khabarovsk motorway 44Chuprov, V. 75citizenship 10Citizenship of the Russian Federation95–96

civil societyde#nitional and structural framework3–4, 4

de#nitions 2–3growth of 11–12as a kind of society 4, 5, 23. See alsopolitical radicalism

as part of society 4–5, 23. See alsoforeign funding; grassrootsmovements; state-sponsoredassociations

political content 5as public sphere 5–6structural issues 4–7

civilising momentum 2class divisions 64–67Clement, K. 141, 144, 148, 150Clinton, Bill 121, 122co-operation 105–8Cohen, A. 75–76Cohen, J. 19Coleman, J.S. 21Collier, R. 10coloured revolutions 83, 127Colton, T. 21commodi#cation problem 6, 50, 52–54Communist Party of the RussianFederation (CPRF) 82

Communist Youth 82conscription 84constituency building 119, 122–26, 129construction industry 91–92consumer con#dence 37consumer rights 125–26consumerism 9, 14, 26, 28, 34, 50, 51corruption

antipolitical feelings 12–13, 18, 35exposing 36, 41, 42, 113, 116–17, 144,158, 162

nationalism 92protests 81, 92

‘Corruption 2010’ 150–51Council of Entrepreneurship 112Council of Europe 132

Council of Northern Countries 130crime rates 18Culture Centre 92culture, decline in 35culture shocks 28–29

Davis, Terry 132Days of Wrath 80–81decentralisation 43Defence movement 81deforestation 162Delovaya Rossiya 112Democracy League 127Democratic Alternative (DA)movement 81democratisation 10–11, 38, 120, 121–22Deripaska, Oleg 64Diamond, L. 6, 120diplomacy 130, 135–37disappointments 12–13, 27–29, 34–36Dobrokhotov, Anatoly 81Dobrokhotov, Roman 81Dodd, N. 19DOM (Dvizhenie Obshchezhitii Moskvyi Moskovskoi Oblasti) network 160–61

dominationpolitical domination 1, 50, 56–64,

167–68socio-economic domination 50–51,

64–71Dugin, Aleksandr 85, 86, 87Duka, Alexander 158Dunlop, J. 87Durkheim, E. 13Dymovsky, Alexei 36, 114, 151–52Dzhibladze, Yurii 135

ecological movements 125, 161–63, 165economic elites 46, 50, 54–55, 71, 91, 121economic factors

consumer con#dence 37–38disappointments and moral dilemmas13–19, 140

economic decline 28economic growth 17, 44, 165–66economic well-being 38optimism 36overview 8–9, 9

Edinaya Rossiya 42, 44, 56, 57–58, 62education 67educational policy 97–98educational programmes 120–21, 129,137–39

Edwards, G. 21, 119Edwards, M. 3, 4, 6–7, 22, 164

Index 211


Elazar, D.I. 44elections

electoral rights 144electoral rules violations 58legislation 42–43, 150political advertising 61–62pre-electoral debates 42

employmenteducational programmes 120–21, 138extremism 168–69labour code 70, 155middle class 55, 67migrant workers 67–68, 69, 76, 89, 95stable incomes 154state service 33

entertainment 53ER party 156–57Erofeev, Andrey 150Estemirova, Natalya 150Estonia 84ethical life 2, 73Eurasia 128, 138Eurasian Union of Youth (ESM) 85Eurasianism 85–86European Union

accession to 79–80foreign funding 125legislation 132, 133–34liberalism 77–78ties with 130Evdokimov, Yurii 44external/internal factors 26–29extraditions 135–36extremism

left-wing extremism 81–83liberal radicalism 77–81overview 72–77, 168–69pro-Kremlin extremism 83–87right-wing extremism 87–92state response 93–98young people 75–77

factionalism 62–63fascism 87, 90fear 15, 18February 2010 protest 144Federal Law 18-FZ 130–31Federal Registration Service 118Federal Security Service (FSB) 97federal states 43–47Federation of Russia’s IndependentTrade Unions (FNPR) 40, 41, 156

Fedorov, Valery 104, 112feminism 50–51

#nancial crisis 45, 56–57Florida, R. 142–43FNPR 40, 41, 156–57Ford Foundation 138foreign funding

constituency building 119, 122–26democratisation 120, 121–22educational programmes 137–39foreign policy ends of donor states126–28

legal enactment process 131–35overview 118–22state reaction 128–31

foreign policy 128–31Foundation for the Study of PublicOpinion 112

4 November Club 109, 112Frankfurt School of Philosophy 50Freedom House 123–24, 126–27freedom of associations 144functional underclasses 68Fund for the Struggle Against Smoking125–26

funding see foreign funding; state-sponsored associations

Gaidar, Maria 81, 129–30Galbraith, J. K. 68gays and lesbians 68gazeta.ru 42, 57, 60, 66gender 120Georgian con!ict 83, 126–27Germany 127Gibson, J. 37Giddens, A. 15, 101Glenn, J. 121Global Democratic Development 123Going Without Putin 81Gorbachev, Mikahil 39, 61, 79Gorshkov, M. 30, 32, 39, 67, 74Gramsci, A. 102–3grants 108, 111grassroots movements

ecological movements 125, 161–63, 165functioning dynamics 143–47funding 147–49internal struggles 147media access 151–53professional movements 158–59, 165residential movements 144, 159–61social composition 140–43state resistance 149–51strikes 153–58

Great Retreat thesis 51

212 Index


Green Party 161Grib, Vladislav 135Grigoriev, L.M. 141Grodzins, M. 43Gryzlov, Boris 109

Habermas, J. 2, 6, 12, 13, 15, 49, 50–51Halo Trust 127happiness/unhappiness 36Hegel, G. 2, 5, 101, 103hegemony 102–3Heidegger, M. 13Helsinki Group 125, 126, 128, 161Henderson, S. 119, 124Higher School of Economics 79, 107,134, 135, 147

Hirschman, A. 14, 27, 28historical memorials 159–60Hobbes, T. 100Horkheimer, M. 13, 50hostel residents movements 160–61human rights 111–12, 120, 125Human Rights Commission 130–31Human Rights Commissioner of Russia115

Human Rights Watch 94, 95, 126human traf#cking 95Hume, D. 100

Ichkeriya 136ideological changes 29–30, 32–33, 38–40,

72–75ideological wings 109–10Idushchie Vmeste 84Illarionov, Andrei 123illegal immigration 86–87, 88–89, 96immigrant workers

attitude towards 76, 89, 94–95contribution of 88–89organisations 68–69quotas 96–97

Immigration Amnesty 96immigration, movement against 87immigration policy 95Imperial era 74imports 144Independent Foundation for the Studyof Public Opinion (FOM) 18, 32, 33, 154

individualism 13–14, 73individuation phenomenon 13, 25, 32, 165industrialisation 113Information Security Doctrine 70infrastructure 44–45Ingelhart, R. 15

Inozemtsev, Vladislav 79–80Institute for Globalisation and SocialMovements 157

Institute for Political Research (ISPIRAN) 30–31, 32, 33, 75, 76

Institute for Public Projects (INOP) 35, 113Institute of Collective Action 156Institute of Modern Development(INSOR) 64, 114

Institute of Philosophy (RAN) 33Institute of Sociology 35, 39, 54–55, 67, 79institutions 10–11, 51internal struggles 147International Renaissance Foundation 127Internet

control of 60, 150extremist websites 97role of 151–53socio-economic domination 65–66users 53

Iran 142Islamic Revolution 1979 142ISPI RAN see Institute for Political

Research

Jacob Blaustein Institute 127judicial system 115JURIX organisation 94justice 35–36

Kadyrov, Ramzan 90Kagarlitsky, Boris 88–89Kalyurand, Marina 84Kandelaki, Tina 181n48Kant, I. 100Karelia 161Kasparov, Gari 78, 80, 130, 147Keane, J. 16, 101Kekhman, Vladimir 40Khimki forest case 159Khinshtein, Alexander 42Kolesnikov, Andrey 181n48Konchalovsky, Andrey 104Kovalev, Sergey 77, 111Kozak, Dmitry 45Kuzminov, Yaroslav 135Kuznetsov, Andrei 92Kymlicka, W. 27Kyrgyzstan 127–28

labour code 70, 155labour protection 95Lasch, C. 143Lavrov, Sergey 136

Index 213


Law 170-FZ 135Law 40-FZ 105–6law enforcement 35–36, 93–95, 114Law no. 214 160Law on Citizenship of the RussianFederation 96

Law on NGOs 70Law on Non-Commercial Organisations131

Law on Residential Code 161leadership 143–44Lebedev, Alexander 91–92left-wing extremism 81–83Legal Status of Foreign Citizens 96–97legislation 45, 70, 130, 131–35, 150, 167legitimation crisis 168Leontyev, Mikhail 77, 150–51Levada Centre

activism 33, 40corruption 151democratisation 12ecological movements 161ethical life 73media 53opposition 35optimism 36, 37reading material 65special path 75Yeltsin’s resignation 31

Levada, Yurii 70Levinson, Alexei 165Levitsky, S. 11liberal radicalism 77–81liberalism 38–39libraries 65Life Journal 152lifeworld 2Limonov, Eduard 82, 150Linklater, A. 65Lisin, Vladimir 40Litvinenko, Alexander 136local elections 144–45Locke, J. 2, 100Lugovoi, Andrei 136–37Lukács, G. 13Lukin, A. 51, 78Lukin, Vladimir 111, 115Luzhkov, Yurii 44, 63, 156

magazines 52–53Makarov, Andrey 42Makarov, Vladimir 89–90Maleva, T.M. 141Mamontov, Arkady 128

Marcuse, H. 13Markov, Sergey 124Marsden, L. 121Marshall Fund 127Marxism 50–51, 102, 108–12McArthur Foundation 125McFaul, M. 11media 52–54, 70media access 151–53Medvedev, Dmitry

electoral legislation 43ethnic hatred organisations 91INSOR 64legislation 134modernisation doctrine 57, 113, 169–70regional governorships 46, 62regional legislation 45Russia Forward! 42socially oriented NGOs 105–6

Memorial for Civic Rights 111Memorial for Human Rights 111, 126Merton, R. 75–76Mestnye 84meta-preferences 14, 27–28middle class 32–33, 52–54, 66–67, 140–

41, 166Mikhailovsky theatre 40Miliband, David 136military reform 116Milkmaid from Hatzapetovka 54Mill, J. S. 79modernisation doctrine 56–57, 113, 169–70modernism 30, 32, 38–39, 73–74, 142, 166Molodaya Gvardiya 84, 111–12, 125moral dilemmas 13–19moral economy 14, 26morality, decline in 35mortgages 41–42motorist unions 158–59, 165Movchan, Sergey 118Movement against Illegal Immigration(DPNI) 87

movies 58multiculturalism 65, 67–68municipal elections 144–45murders 150

Narymsk Park case 159Nashi 84–85, 111–12National Bolshevik Party (NBP) 81, 82–83National Programme for the Relocationof Former Compatriots 96

National Projects Initiative 44nationalism 85, 87

214 Index


NATO 114, 126natural law theory 100Navalnyi, Alexei 41, 129–30Nemtsov, Boris 85, 150neo-corporatism 19network formation 145–47, 165, 169New Eurasia 138newspaper readership 53newspapers 60Newton, K. 21Nie, N. 21Nizhnii Novgorod 162non-public opinion 63Nordic–Baltic–Russian co-operation

scheme 138Novodvorskaya, Valeriya 77nursery schools 152

Occupy Wall Street movement 12October Revolution 85Of"ce Romance 54oil industry 56old people’s homes 152‘Open Society’ Institute 94Open Society Institute 127Opposition Marches 80–81optimism 9, 19–22, 36–38Orange Revolution 85Orangism 83–84Otechestvo-Vsia-Rossiya (OVR) 156Other Russia association 130, 147Ottoway, M. 119Ovechkin, Aleksandr 151

Pam#lova, Ella 115–16, 124, 130–31, 134Panyushkin, Valery 77Parliamentary Assembly of the Councilof Europe (PACE) 133–34

Party of Labour 145patriotism 38–39, 41, 58–59, 167peasantry 74People Democratic Union 77Perm Civic Chamber 115persecution 149–50Petukhov, V. 73phase transition 26–29Pilkington, H. 87–88pluralism 56, 59–60, 119Poedinok 59–60policy-bound movements 145–46Polish missile defence 126political adaptation myths 75political advertising 60–61political content 5

political correctness 65political domination 50–51, 56–64socio-economic domination 64–71political factors 7–8, 8, 10–13political parties 35, 42–43political radicalism

left-wing extremism 81–83liberal radicalism 77–81overview 72–77pro-Kremlin extremism 83–87right-wing extremism 87–92state response 93–98

politicisation 144–45, 162Ponomarev, Ilya 82popular culture 50Pora youth movement 127post-modernism 17, 68Postavnin, Viacheslav 97Potanin, Vladimir 40poverty 66, 67, 68, 141Pozner, Vladimir 59Pravoe Delo 42preferences 14, 27–28private phase 30–34

phase transition 26–29, 31pro-Kremlin extremism 83–87professional movements 158–59, 165Prokhorov, Mikhail 40–41, 42property rights 18, 40, 160, 165proto-middle class 76, 140–43, 165Public Chamber 63, 110–11, 114–15,118, 133

public phasedisappointments and meta-preferences 34–36

ideological changes 38–40public activity 40–41regional dimension 43–47socio-political context 36–38state response 41–43

public sphereoverview 48–52political domination 56–64, 167–68socio-economic domination 64–71

publishing 65purchasing power parity 171n4Pushkov, Alexei 124Putin, Vladimir

early presidency 30–34elections 61foreign funding 128legitimacy 169opponents of 80regional legislation 45

Index 215


Time 78Putnam, R. 5

racism 76, 87–92, 168–69

ERRORjudicial action 93Rakhimov, Murtaza 44rationalisation 13–14, 28Rechnik village case 115, 144referenda 144regional elections 62regional governorships 34, 46, 62regional legislation 45regional policies 43–47registration 130–31, 133religious intolerance 76, 168–69religious organisations 134Relocation Programme 96residential movements 144, 159–61residential rights 40Richter, J. 114, 120right-wing extremism 87–92rights 48–49Rogov, K. 18Roizman, Evgeny 42ROMIR 37, 120Rose, R. 120Rosenholm, A. 52Rousseau, J.-J. 100Rumetrica 53Russia Forward! (Medvedev) 42Russia is for Russians 89‘Russia of the 21st Century: the Imageof Tomorrow’ (INSOR) 114

Russian Academy of Science (RAN) 70,141

Russian Image 91Russian Independent Research Agencyfor the Study of Market and PublicOpinion (ROMIR) 37, 120

Russian March 86–87, 92

Sa#ullin, Marat 44Sakwa, R. 11, 12Salamina, A.A. 141Samodurov, Yurii 150Schmitt, C. 13, 14Schmitter, P. 2secret service institutions 149–50self-actualisation 15, 17, 39–40Sennet, R. 13Seversky Metallurgy Plant 151sexuality 68

Shein, Oleg 145silent approval 165–66single-case movements 145–46Sochi 162social capital 9, 20social composition 140–43, 165social evolution 2social mobility 143social security work 55, 82, 105–6, 116,123, 124, 129

socially oriented NGOs 105–6Socio-Ecological Union 162socio-economic domination 50–51, 64–71socio-economic status 21, 166socio-political context 36–38Soiuz Profsoyuzov Rossii 157Solovey, V. 74Soros, George 127, 137–38Sotsprof 157sovereign democracy 41, 42, 63, 114, 129Soviet Union 16, 75special path 73, 75Sperling, V. 119Spinoza, B. 100Spravedlivost 148spy scandal 128, 136St Petersburg 160stability 21, 28–29, 39, 104, 143Stalin era 58–59Stanovaya, Tatyana 132–33state

interventionalism 19public phase 41–43resistance 149–51role of 7strikes 155–56war of position and dissent 108–17

state-sponsored associationsconstituency building 129–30evolution of 103–5lack of #nances 148overview 99–103, 118positive co-operation 105–8war of position 108–17

Statistics Service 156‘Strategy 2020’ 114Strauss, L. 13, 14strikes 40, 153–58, 167Structural Transformation of the PublicSphere (Habermas) 49

Surkov, Vladislav 40–41, 42, 63, 109,111, 129, 134

Sviblovo 144

216 Index


Tadjik workers 68–69Taratorin, Dmitry 91Tarrow, S. 25Tatarstan State Service Academy 106taxation 130, 136Taylor, C. 28, 29, 49, 59, 64–65technology 18telephone rules 12–13television

foreign funding 128patriotism 58–60political advertising 61programmes 54, 56socio-economic domination 65users 55

territorial politics 43–47Territorial Self-Governance (TOS) 106terrorism 18, 121‘The Eastern Exodus’ 85think tanks 113Thompson, E. P. 14, 26, 36Tikhonova, N.E. 67Tilly, C. 10Timasheff, N. 51Time 78Timofeev, Colonel 36Timofeyev, I. 78Tocqueville, A. de 2, 4–5torture 149–50trade unions 40, 41, 156–58traditionalism 30, 32, 38, 73–74, 142, 166transparency 12, 35, 80trilateral approach 3, 4, 22trivialisation 50, 52–54trust 20–21, 32, 37–38Tulip revolution 127–28Tyumen region residents 160

Ukraine 85, 127Union of Coordinating Councils 40Union of Industrialists andEntrepreneurs 157

Union of Right Forces 81United Civic Front 80–81United Russia Youth Guard 84–85United Russian party 109–10, 112–13,116, 145

United Statesdemocratisation 121exceptionalism 121–22funding 124–25legislation 132opposition to 86proto-middle class 142–43

support for 77upper class 54–55, 66USAID 124–25Uslaner, E. 20Usmano, Alisher 107–8Usmanov, Alisher 40utilitarianism 27Uzbekistan 128

van der Ploeg, Tymen 132Vasilyev, Dmitry 87Vedomosti 57, 60, 66Veksel’berg, Viktor 107Venezuela 142Verba, S. 21, 26veteran groups 116Vienna Convention on DiplomaticRelations 84

Voegelin, E. 13, 14Volkov, Vadim 168voluntary work 149VTsIOM

control of 70corruption 18foreign funding 123, 128G8 37gender 120individualism 73Internet 65–66migrant communities 89partisan competition 35priorities 39Russo-Georgian con!ict 127special path 75well-being 36Yeltsin’s resignation 31

Walker, D. 45war of position 102–3, 105

dissent and 112–17trenches of the dominant order108–12

war on terror 121Way, A.L. 11Williams, B. 26Winter Olympic games 162women’s movements 119–20Wood, L. 10Woolsey, R James 124working class 66working conditions 151world-alientation 13, 17World Trading Organisation (WTO) 132‘World’s Oil Spillage’ exhibition 125

Index 217


xenophobia 87–92state response 93–98

Yabloko party 147Yakimenko, Vasily 84Yakovleva, Yana 41Yamagishi, T. 20Yeltsin, Boris 31, 39, 61, 122Young Leadership Fellows 138young people

careers 33, 168–69extremist sentiments 75–76foreign funding 127Internet 153liberal youth movements 81

Youth Democratic AlternativeMovement (DA) 129–30

Youth Human Rights Movement 125

Youth Left Front 82YouTube 152–53Yukos affair 64

Zakaev, Akhmed 136zakupki website 152Zentsov, Roman 91, 92Zhivoi Gorod movement 152Zircon poll

foreign funding 118funding 108Internet 152media access 151public support 146state-sponsored associations 105voluntary work 148–49

Zubok, Y. 75

218 Index

Civil Society in Putin's Russia

Documents