Civil Rvw Cases II

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G.R. No. L-20392 December 18, 1968

MARCIAL T. CAEDO, JUANA SANGALANG CAEDO, and the Minors, EPHRAIM CAEDO, EILEENCAEDO, ROSE ELAINE CAEDO, suing through their father, MARCIAL T. CAEDO, as guardian adlitem, plaintiffs-appellants,vs.

YU KHE THAI and RAFAEL BERNARDO, defendants-appellants.Norberto J. Quisumbing for plaintiffs-appellants.De Joya, Lopez, Dimaguila, Hermoso and Divino for defendants-appellants

MAKALINTAL,J .:

As a result of a vehicular accident in which plaintiff Marcial Caedo and several members of his familywere injured they filed this suit for recovery of damages from the defendants. The judgment, rendered bythe Court of First Instance of Rizal on February 26, 1960 (Q-2952), contains the following disposition:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the court renders a judgment, one in favor of the plaintiffs andagainst the defendants, Yu Khe Thai and Rafael Bernardo, jointly and severally, to pay toplaintiffs Marcial Caedo, et al., the sum of P1,929.70 for actual damages; P48,000.00 for moraldamages; P10,000.00 for exemplary damages; and P5,000.00 for attorney's fees, with costsagainst the defendants. The counterclaim of the defendants against the plaintiffs is herebyordered dismissed, for lack of merits.

On March 12, 1960 the judgment was amended so as to include an additional award of P3,705.11 infavor of the plaintiffs for the damage sustained by their car in the accident.

Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals, which certified the case to us in view of the total amount ofthe plaintiffs' claim.

There are two principal questions posed for resolution: (1) who was responsible for the accident? and (2)

if it was defendant Rafael Bernardo, was his employer, defendant Yu Khe Thai, solidarily liable with him?On the first question the trial court found Rafael Bernardo negligent; and on the second, held hisemployer solidarily liable with him.

The mishap occurred at about 5:30 in the morning of March 24, 1958 on Highway 54 (now E. de losSantos Avenue) in the vicinity of San Lorenzo Village. Marcial was driving his Mercury car on his wayfrom his home in Quezon City to the airport, where his son Ephraim was scheduled to take a plane forMindoro. With them in the car were Mrs. Caedo and three daughters. Coming from the opposite directionwas the Cadillac of Yu Khe Thai, with his driver Rafael Bernardo at the wheel, taking the owner from hisParaaque home to Wack Wack for his regular round of golf. The two cars were traveling at fairlymoderate speeds, considering the condition of the road and the absence of traffic the Mercury at 40 to50 kilometers per hour, and the Cadillac at approximately 30 to 35 miles (48 to 56 kilometers). Theirheadlights were mutually noticeable from a distance. Ahead of the Cadillac, going in the same direction,

was a caretella owned by a certain Pedro Bautista. The carretela was towing another horse by means ofa short rope coiled around the rig's vertical post on the right side and held at the other end by Pedro'sson, Julian Bautista.

Rafael Bernardo testified that he was almost upon the rig when he saw it in front of him, only eight metersaway. This is the first clear indication of his negligence. The carretela was provided with two lights, oneon each side, and they should have given him sufficient warning to take the necessary precautions. Andeven if he did not notice the lights, as he claimed later on at the trial, the carretela should anyway havebeen visible to him from afar if he had been careful, as it must have been in the beam of his headlights fora considerable while.

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In the meantime the Mercury was coming on its own lane from the opposite direction. Bernardo, insteadof slowing down or stopping altogether behind the carretela until that lane was clear, veered to the left inorder to pass. As he did so the curved end of his car's right rear bumper caught the forward rim of therig's left wheel, wrenching it off and carrying it along as the car skidded obliquely to the other lane, whereit collided with the oncoming vehicle. On his part Caedo had seen the Cadillac on its own lane; heslackened his speed, judged the distances in relation to the carretela and concluded that the Cadillacwould wait behind. Bernardo, however, decided to take a gamble beat the Mercury to the point where itwould be in line with the carretela , or else squeeze in between them in any case. It was a risky maneuvereither way, and the risk should have been quite obvious. Or, since the car was moving at from 30 to 35miles per hour (or 25 miles according to Yu Khe Thai) it was already too late to apply the brakes whenBernardo saw the carretela only eight meters in front of him, and so he had to swerve to the left in spite ofthe presence of the oncoming car on the opposite lane. As it was, the clearance Bernardo gave for hiscar's right side was insufficient. Its rear bumper, as already stated, caught the wheel of the carretela andwrenched it loose. Caedo, confronted with the unexpected situation, tried to avoid the collision at the lastmoment by going farther to the right, but was unsuccessful. The photographs taken at the scene showthat the right wheels of his car were on the unpaved shoulder of the road at the moment of impact.

There is no doubt at all that the collision was directly traceable to Rafael Bernardo's negligence and thathe must be held liable for the damages suffered by the plaintiffs. The next question is whether or not YuKhe Thai, as owner of the Cadillac, is solidarily liable with the driver. The applicable law is Article 2184 ofthe Civil Code, which reads:

ART. 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former,who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It isdisputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty of reckless driving orviolating traffic regulations at least twice within the next preceding two months.

Under the foregoing provision, if the causative factor was the driver's negligence, the owner of the vehiclewho was present is likewise held liable if he could have prevented the mishap by the exercise of duediligence. The rule is not new, although formulated as law for the first time in the new Civil Code. It wasexpressed in Chapman vs. Underwood (1914), 27 Phil. 374, where this Court held:

... The same rule applies where the owner is present, unless the negligent acts of the driver arecontinued for such a length of time as to give the owner a reasonable opportunity to observethem and to direct his driver to desist therefrom. An owner who sits in his automobile, or othervehicle, and permits his driver to continue in a violation of the law by the performance of negligentacts, after he has had a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct that the drivercease therefrom, becomes himself responsible for such acts. The owner of an automobile whopermits his chauffeur to drive up the Escolta, for example, at a speed of 60 miles an hour, withoutany effort to stop him, although he has had a reasonable opportunity to do so, becomes himselfresponsible, both criminally and civilly, for the results produced by the acts of the chauffeur. Onthe other hand, if the driver, by a sudden act of negligence, and without the owner having areasonable opportunity to prevent the act or its continuance, injures a person or violates thecriminal law, the owner of the automobile, although present therein at the time the act wascommitted, is not responsible, either civilly or criminally, therefor. The act complained of must becontinued in the presence of the owner for such a length of time that the owner, by hisacquiescence, makes his driver act his own.

The basis of the master's liability in civil law is not respondent superior but rather the relationshipof paterfamilias . The theory is that ultimately the negligence of the servant, if known to the master andsusceptible of timely correction by him, reflects his own negligence if he fails to correct it in order toprevent injury or damage.

In the present case the defendants' evidence is that Rafael Bernardo had been Yu Khe Thai's driver since1937, and before that had been employed by Yutivo Sons Hardware Co. in the same capacity for over ten

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years. During that time he had no record of violation of traffic laws and regulations. No negligence forhaving employed him at all may be imputed to his master. Negligence on the part of the latter, if any,must be sought in the immediate setting and circumstances of the accident, that is, in his failure to detainthe driver from pursuing a course which not only gave him clear notice of the danger but also sufficienttime to act upon it. We do not see that such negligence may be imputed. The car, as has been stated,was not running at an unreasonable speed. The road was wide and open, and devoid of traffic that earlymorning. There was no reason for the car owner to be in any special state of alert. He had reason to relyon the skill and experience of his driver. He became aware of the presence of the carretela when his carwas only twelve meters behind it, but then his failure to see it earlier did not constitute negligence, for hewas not himself at the wheel. And even when he did see it at that distance, he could not have anticipatedhis driver's sudden decision to pass the carretela on its left side in spite of the fact that another car wasapproaching from the opposite direction. The time element was such that there was no reasonableopportunity for Yu Khe Thai to assess the risks involved and warn the driver accordingly. The thought thatentered his mind, he said, was that if he sounded a sudden warning it might only make the other mannervous and make the situation worse. It was a thought that, wise or not, connotes no absence of thatdue diligence required by law to prevent the misfortune.

The test of imputed negligence under Article 2184 of the Civil Code is, to a great degree, necessarilysubjective. Car owners are not held to a uniform and inflexible standard of diligence as are professionaldrivers. In many cases they refrain from driving their own cars and instead hire other persons to drive forthem precisely because they are not trained or endowed with sufficient discernment to know the rules oftraffic or to appreciate the relative dangers posed by the different situations that are continuallyencountered on the road. What would be a negligent omission under aforesaid Article on the part of a carowner who is in the prime of age and knows how to handle a motor vehicle is not necessarily so on thepart, say, of an old and infirm person who is not similarly equipped.

The law does not require that a person must possess a certain measure of skill or proficiency either in themechanics of driving or in the observance of traffic rules before he may own a motor vehicle. The test ofhis intelligence, within the meaning of Article 2184, is his omission to do that which the evidence of hisown senses tells him he should do in order to avoid the accident. And as far as perception is concerned,absent a minimum level imposed by law, a maneuver that appears to be fraught with danger to onepassenger may appear to be entirely safe and commonplace to another. Were the law to require auniform standard of perceptiveness, employment of professional drivers by car owners who, by their veryinadequacies, have real need of drivers' services, would be effectively proscribed.

We hold that the imputation of liability to Yu Khe Thai, solidarily with Rafael Bernardo, is an error. Thenext question refers to the sums adjudged by the trial court as damages. The award of P48,000 by way ofmoral damages is itemized as follows:

1. Marcial Caedo P 20,000.00

2. Juana S. Caedo 15,000.00

3. Ephraim Caedo 3,000.00

4. Eileen Caedo 4,000.005. Rose Elaine Caedo 3,000.00

6. Merilyn Caedo 3,000.00

Plaintiffs appealed from the award, claiming that the Court should have granted them also actual orcompensatory damages, aggregating P225,000, for the injuries they sustained. Defendants, on the otherhand maintain that the amounts awarded as moral damages are excessive and should be reduced. We

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find no justification for either side. The amount of actual damages suffered by the individual plaintiffs byreason of their injuries, other than expenses for medical treatment, has not been shown by the evidence.

Actual damages, to be compensable, must be proven. Pain and suffering are not capable of pecuniaryestimation, and constitute a proper ground for granting moral, not actual, damages, as provided in Article2217 of the Civil Code.

The injuries sustained by plaintiffs are the following:

MARCIAL T. CAEDO:

A. Contusion, with hematoma, scalp, frontal left; abrasions, chest wall, anterior;B. Multiple fractures, ribs, right, lst to 5th inclusive. Third rib has a double fracture;Subparieto-plaural hematoma; Basal disc atelectasis, lung, right lower lobe, secondary;C. Pseudotosis, left, secondary to probable basal fracture, skull.

JUANA SANGALANG CAEDO:

A. Abrasions, multiple:(1)frontal region, left; (2) apex of nose; (3) upper eyelid, left; (4) knees.

B. Wound, lacerated, irregular, deep, frontal;C. Fracture, simple, 2nd rib posterior, left with displacement.D. Fracture, simple, base, proximal phalanx right, big toe.E. Fracture, simple, base, metatarsals III and V right.F. Concussion, cerebral.

EPHRAIM CAEDO:

A. Abrasions, multiple:(1) left temporal area; (2) left frontal; (3) left supraorbital

EILEEN CAEDO:

A. Lacerated wound (V-shaped), base, 5th finger, right, lateral aspect.B. Abrasions, multiple:

(1) dorsum, proximal phalanx middle finger; (2) Knee, anterior, bilateral; (3) shin, lower1/3.

ROSE ELAINE CAEDO:

A. Abrasions, multiple: (1) upper and lower lids; (2) left temporal; (3) nasolabial region;(4) leg, lower third, anterior.

MARILYN CAEDO:

A. Abrasions, multiple: (1)shin, lower 1/3 right; (2) arm, lower third

C. Contusion with hematoma, shin, lower 1/3, anterior aspect, right. (See Exhibits D, D-1,D-2, D-3, D-4, and D- 5)

It is our opinion that, considering the nature and extent of the above-mentioned injuries, the amounts ofmoral damages granted by the trial court are not excessive.

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WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is modified in the sense of declaring defendant-appellant YuKhe Thai free from liability, and is otherwise affirmed with respect to defendant Rafael Bernardo, withcosts against the latter.

G.R. No. 193861 March 14, 2012

PAULITA "EDITH" SERRA,1

Petitioner,vs.NELFA T. MUMAR, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO, J .:

Before the Court is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, assailing the 31 July2009 Decision 2 and 27 July 2010 Resolutio n3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 00023-MIN.

The Facts

At around 6:30 in the evening of 3 April 2000, there was a vehicular accident along the National Highwayin Barangay Apopong, General Santos City, which resulted in the death of Armando Mumar (Mumar),husband of respondent Nelfa T. Mumar (respondent).

Based on the evidence presented before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of General Santos City, one Armando Tenerife (Tenerife) was driving his Toyota Corolla sedan on the National Highway heading inthe direction of Polomolok, South Cotabato. Tenerife noticed the van owned by petitioner Paulita "Edith"Serra (petitioner) coming from the opposite direction, which was trying to overtake a passenger jeep, andin the process encroached on his lane. The left side of the sedan was hit by the van, causing the sedan toswerve to the left and end up on the other side of the road. The van collided head on with the motorcycle,which was about 12 meters behind the sedan on the outer lane, causing injuries to Mumar, which

eventually led to his death.

On the other hand, petitioner denied that her van was overtaking the jeepney at the time of the incident.She clai med that the left tire of Tenerifes sedan burst, causing it to sideswipe her van. Consequently, theleft front tire of the van also burst and the vans driver, Marciano de Castro (de Castro), lost control of thevehicle. The van swerved to the left toward s Mumars motorcycle. The impact resulted in the death ofMumar.

Subsequently, respondent filed a complaint against petitioner for Damages by Reason of RecklessImprudence resulting to Homicide and Attachment before the General Santos City RTC.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On 20 November 2003, the General Santos City RTC promulgated a judgment ,4 the dispositive portion ofwhich reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered against defendant Paulita Sierra, her co-defendant nothaving been served with summons because he could no longer be found, finding her liable for damagesby reason of reckless imprudence, and she is hereby ordered to pay plaintiff the sum of:

1. P65,000.00 for burial damages;

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2. P300,000.00 for loss of income;

3. P50,000.00 as moral damages; and

4. P50,000.00 as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED .5

The RTC found that, based on the evidence presented at the trial, at the time of impact "the van wasovertaking another vehicle without due regard for the safety of others, bumped the Toyota Car (sic) andthe motorcycle traveling in the right lane going to Polomolok, South Cotabato." The RTC noted that thedamage to the van was located at the bumper, evincing a frontal collision, while the damage to the sedanwas on the left side door and window, evincing that the van sideswiped the sedan. Likewise, the RTCfound that the van encroached on the sedan and motorcycles lane, in the process hitting the motorcycle,causing the injuries and subsequent death of Mumar .6

As to the claim for damages, the RTC said that Nelfa testified that her husband was earningabout P6,000.00 a month without presenting any documentary evidence to prove her claim, butnonetheless awarded herP300,000.00 for damages due to loss of income.

Petitioner appealed the RTC ruling to the CA.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its 31 July 2009 Decision, the CA denied the appeal and affirmed with modification the RTCs ruling:

FOR REASONS STATED, the appeal is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court ofGeneral Santos City, 11th Judicial Region, Branch 23, in Civil Case No. 6764 is AFFIRMED withMODIFICATION in that the appellant is ordered to pay appellee the following:

1. Civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00;

2. Indemnity for loss of earning capacity in the amount of P1,224,000.00;

3. Temperate damages amounting to P25,000.00 in lieu of the award for burial expenses;

4. Moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00.

5. The total amount of damages shall bear an interest of 12% per annum from the finality of thisDecision until fully paid.

The awards for burial expenses and exemplary damages are deleted.

SO ORDERED .7

The CA adopted the factual findings of the RTC. It also ruled that the RTC erred in awarding burialexpenses and actual damages for loss of earning capacity despite lack of proof. Based on the wifesclaim that the victim earned not less than P6,000.00 a month and his age at the time of death, based onhis birth certificate (29), the CA applied the formula:

Net earning capacity = 2/3 x (80 less the age of the victim at time of death) x [Gross Annual Income lessthe Reasonable and Necessary Living Expenses (50% of gross income)]

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Using the foregoing formula, the CA awarded damages due to loss of earning capacity in the amountofP1,224,000.00 .8

Likewise, the CA said that the RTC erred in not awarding civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00.The CA also awarded temperate damages of P 25,000.00 finding that respondent spent for her husbandsburial although the exact amount could not be proven.

Petitioners Arguments

Petitioner raises the following issues:

I. Whether or not the (sic) both the lower court and the Court of Appeals committed reversibleerror in finding that the incident which killed Armando Mumar was not purely accidental for whichdefendants may not be held liable[;]

II. Whether or not both the lower court and the Court of Appeals committed reversible error inholding Editha Serra as liable for damages and in not appreciating that she was not negligent inthe selection and supervision of the driver of the van, Marciano de Castro[;]

III. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in awarding to herein respondent "loss of earningcapacity" despite complete absence of documentary evidence that the deceased Mumar wasself-employed and earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws in force at thetime of his death, following the ruling in People v. Mallari, G.R. No. 145993, June 17, 2003 [.]9

Petitioner maintains that it was Teneri fes sedan that encroached on the lane of the van after the sedansleft front tire blew out. Petitioner points out that Tenerife himself admitted that what happened was merelya "sliding collision. "10 She points out that the sedan not only cut across two lanes headed in the oppositedirection, it also made a half-circle such that it stopped on the shoulder of the left side of the road(opposite its original lane), and then faced towards its origin, General Santos City. This could be for noother reason than that Tenerife completely lost control of his vehicle because the tire burst. Then, thesedan rammed into the van causing the latters front tire to tear; thus, the vans driver also lost control ofthe vehicle and headed towards the opposite lane and hit Mumar. Yet, the van was still facing itsdestination General Santos City. The greater damage to the van was from hitting the signboard on theside of the road and not from hitting the sedan.

Petitioner argues that the foregoing description of the events proves that it is purely accidental andwithout negligence on her drivers part.

Petitioner also insists that she was not negligent in the selection and supervision of the driver of the van.Respondent had the burden to prove that petitioner was negligent but failed to do so, petitioner claims.

As to the CAs award of damages due to loss of earning capacity, petitioner argues that the same has nobasis. She points out that there was no documentary evidence presented or formally offered at the trial tosubstantiate the claim for damages due to loss of earning capacity. Likewise, petitioner further argues

that, based on Nelfas testimony that her husband was ea rning "not less than P6,000 a month," theconclusion was that he was earning not less than the minimum wage at the time of the accident.

Petitioner counters that in 2005 the minimum wage in Region XII, where the accident occurred,was P200.00 per day plus a cost of living allowance of P13.50, or P5,558.00 per month. Petitioner positsthat it was safe to assume that at the time of the accident on 3 April 2000, the minimum wage was lowerthan the rate in 2005.

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Petitioner also argues that in Mumars line of wo rk contracting and manufacturing steel grills, fencesand gates some form of documentary evidence would be available to support his widows claim. Thatthese were not presented in evidence would remove the claim from the exceptions to the requirement thatthe amount of actual damages must be duly proved .11

Thus, petitioner prays that the assailed CA decision and resolution be reversed and set aside. In the

alternative, petitioner prays that, should the Court sustain the finding of negligence, that the award ofdamages for loss of earning capacity in the sum of P1,224,000.00 be completely deleted for lack ofevidentiary basis .12

Respondents Argument

In her Comment, respondent counters that petitioner raises no new matter, and the arguments are merelya rehash of those raised before the lower courts, which had already ruled on these .13

The Courts Ruling

The petition is partly granted. The Court affirms the decision of the CA, but modifies the award fordamages.

Uniform Findings of Fact by the RTC and CA

A petition for review on certiorari should raise only questions of law. In resolving a petition for review, theCourt "does not sit as an arbiter of facts for it is not the function of the Supreme Court to analyze or weighall over again the evidence already considered in the proceedings below. "14

When supported by substantial evidence, the factual findings of the CA affirming those of the trialcour t15 are final and conclusive on this Court and may not be reviewed on appeal ,16 unless petitioner canshow compelling or exceptional reasons 17 for this Court to disregard, overturn or modify such findings.

In the present case, the Court notes the uniform factual findings by the RTC and CA, and petitioner has

not shown compelling or exceptional reasons warranting deviation from these findings.

Both the trial court and the CA found that it was petiti oners van, then being driven by de Castro, thatencroached on the sedans lane, then hit the latter and, eventually, Mumars motorcycle.

The Court has previously held that evidence to be worthy of credit, must not only proceed from a crediblesource but must, in addition, be credible in itself. The evidence must be natural, reasonable and probableas to make it easy to believe. No better test has yet been found to determine the value of the testimony ofa witness than its conformity to the knowledge and common experience of mankind .18

Petitioners testimony is not credible considering that she admitted that she did not see the actualbumping of the van with the sedan because "it was dark and showering. "19 When she came out of thevan, she said she did not notice the sedan. She then left the scene to ask help from her brother, withouteven coming to the aid of her driver .20

Moreover, the traffic investigators findings are more consistent with human experience.

As found by the investigator, the van ended up on the other side of the road, opposite the lane it wasoriginally traversing. The vans forward momentum was going towards the opposite side. If indeed the vanstayed on its proper lane when the sedans tire blew out and los t control, the sedan would have bumpedinto the van on the latters lane and the van would have ended up on the side of the road with the sedan.Likewise, if the van had stayed on its lane, and the impact of the sedan propelled it forward, the van

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no documentary evidence is available; or (2) the deceased is employed as a daily wage worker earningless than the minimum wage under current labor laws .28

Based solely on Nelfas testimony, the CA determined that the de ceased falls within one of theseexceptions. Nelfa testified that her husband was in the business of contracting and manufacturing grills,fences and gates ,29 and his earnings "exceed P6,000.00 "30 per month prior to his death. She presented

no documentary proof of her claims.

It was error for the CA to have awarded dam ages for loss of earning capacity based on Nelfas testimonyalone.

First, while it is conceded that the deceased was self-employed, the Court cannot accept that in his line ofwork there was no documentary proof available to prove his income from such occupation. There wouldhave been receipts, job orders, or some form of written contract or agreement between the deceased andhis clients when he is contracted for a job.

Second, and more importantly, decedent was not earning "less than the minimum wage" at the time of hisdeath.

Wage Order No. RTWPB-XI-07 ,31 issued by the Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Board-XI ofthe National Wages and Productivity Commission, under the Department of Labor and Employment, tookeffect on 1 November 1999 and mandated the minimum wage rate in Region XI, including GeneralSantos City, at the time of the accident. Section 1 provides:

SECTION 1. NEW MINIMUM WAGE RATES. Effective November 1, 1999, the new minimum wage ratesin Region XI shall be as follows:

SECTOR/INDUSTRY Davao CityGeneral Santos CityIsland Garden City of

Samal

Tagum City

Provinces of:Davao del NorteDavao del SurDavao Oriental

Compostela ValleySouth Cotabato

NON-AGRICULTURE AGRICULTURE- Plantation (i.e. more than 24Hectares or employing at least20 workers)- Non-PlantationRETAIL/SERVICE- Employing more than 10workers- Employing not more than 10workers

148.00

138.00

117.00

148.00

117.00

146.00

136.00

115.00

146.00

115.00

Respondent testified that her husband was earning not less than P6,000.00 per month. 1wphi1 On theother hand, the highest minimum wage rate at the time of the accident, based on Wage Order No.RTWPB-XI-07, was P148.00. At that rate, the monthly minimum wage would be P3,256.00 ,32 clearly anamount less than what respondent testified to as her husbands monthly earnings. The deceased wouldnot fall within the recognized exceptions.

There is therefore no basis for the CAs computation for Mumars supposed net earning capacity and thesubsequent award of damages due to loss of earning capacity.

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WHEREFORE, we GRANT IN PARTthe petition. We AFFIRM WITH MODIFICATION the Decision of theCourt of Appeals dated 31 July 2009 and Resolution dated 27 July 2010 in CA-G.R. CV No. 00023-MIN.We ORDERpetitioner to pay respondent the following:

1. Civil indemnity of P50,000.00;

2. Temperate damages of P25,000.00, in lieu of the award for burial expenses;

3. Moral damages of P50,000.00; and

4. Interest on the total monetary award at the rate of 12% per annum from the finality of thisdecision until the award is fully satisfied.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 125078 May 30, 2011

BERNABE L. NAVIDA, JOSE P. ABANGAN, JR., CEFERINO P. ABARQUEZ, ORLANDITO A.

ABISON, FELIPE ADAYA, ALBERTO R. AFRICA, BENJAMIN M. ALBAO, FELIPE ALCANTARA,NUMERIANO S. ALCARIA, FERNANDO C. ALEJADO, LEOPOLDO N. ALFONSO, FLORO I.ALMODIEL, ANTONIO B. ALVARADO, ELEANOR AMOLATA, RODOLFO P. ANCORDA, TRIFINO F.ANDRADA, BERT B. ANOCHE, RAMON E. ANTECRISTO, ISAGANI D. ANTINO, DOMINGOANTOPINA, MANSUETO M. APARICIO, HERMINIGILDO AQUINO, MARCELO S. AQUINO, JR.,FELIPE P. ARANIA, ULYSES M. ARAS, ARSENIO ARCE, RUPERTO G. ARINZOL, MIGUEL G.ARINZOL, EDGARADO P. ARONG, RODRIGO D.R. ASTRALABIO, RONNIE BACAYO, SOFRONIOBALINGIT, NELSON M. BALLENA, EMNIANO BALMONTE, MAXIMO M. BANGI, SALVADOR M.BANGI, HERMOGENES T. BARBECHO, ARSENIO B. BARBERO, DIOSDADO BARREDO, VIRGILIOBASAS, ALEJANDRO G. BATULAN, DOMINGO A. BAUTISTA, VICTOR BAYANI, BENIGNOBESARES, RUFINO BETITO, GERARDO A. BONIAO, CARLO B. BUBUNGAN, FERNANDO B.BUENAVISTA, ALEJANDRINO H. BUENO, TOMAS P. BUENO, LEONARDO M. BURDEOS, VICENTEP. BURGOS, MARCELINO J. CABALUNA, DIOSDADO CABILING, EMETRIO C. CACHUELA,BRAULIO B. CADIVIDA, JR., SAMSON C. CAEL, DANIEL B. CAJURAO, REY A. CALISO,NORBERTO F. CALUMPAG, CELESTINO CALUMPAG, LORETO CAMACHO, VICTORIANOCANETE, DOMINADOR P. CANTILLO, FRUCTUSO P. CARBAJOSA, VICTORINO S. CARLOS,VICTOR CARLOS, GEORGE M. CASSION, JAIME S. CASTAARES, FLAVIANO C. CASTAARES,ELPIDIO CATUBAY, NATHANIEL B. CAUSANG, BEOFIL B. CAUSING, ADRIANO R. CEJAS, CIRILOG. CERERA, SR., CRISTITUTO M. CEREZO, DANTE V. CONCHA, ALBERT CORNELIO, CESARCORTES, NOEL Y. CORTEZ, SERNUE CREDO, CORNELIO A. CRESENCIO, ALEX CRUZ, ROGERCRUZ, RANSAM CRUZ, CANUTO M. DADULA, ROMEO L. DALDE, ZACARIAS DAMBAAN, ELISEODAPROZA, VIRGILIO P. DAWAL, TESIFREDO I. DE TOMAS, GAMALLER P. DEANG, CARMELINOP. DEANG, DIOSDADO P. DEANG, DOMINGO A. DEANG, FELIPE R. DEANG, JR., JULIETO S.DELA CRUZ, ELIEZER R. DELA TORRE, JEFFREY R. DELA TORRE, RAUL DEMONTEVERDE,FELIPE P. DENOLAN, RUBENCIO P. DENOY, RODRIGO M. DERMIL, ROLANDO B. DIAZ, LORENZODIEGO, JOVENCIO DIEGO, SATURNINO DIEGO, GREGORIO DIONG, AMADO R. DIZON, FE DIZON,VIRGILO M. DOMANTAY, LEO S. DONATO, DOMINADOR L. DOSADO, NESTOR DUMALAG,FREDDIE DURAN, SR., MARIO C. ECHIVERE, AQUILLO M. EMBRADORA, MIGUEL EMNACE, RIOT. EMPAS, EFRAIM ENGLIS, ANICETO ENOPIA, DIOCENE ENTECOSA, RUBENTITO D.ENTECOSA, AVELINO C. ENTERO, FORTUNATA ENTRADA, ROGELIO P. EROY, RODOLFO M.ESCAMILLA, SERGIO C. ESCANTILLA, LAZARO A. ESPAOLA, EULOGIO M. ETURMA, PRIMO P.FERNANDEZ, EDILBERTO D. FERNANDO, GREGORIO S. FERNANDO, VICENTE P. FERRER,MARCELO T. FLOR, ANTONIO M. FLORES, REDENTOR T. FLOREZA, NORBERTO J. FUENTES,RICARDO C. GABUTAN, PEDRO D.V. GALEOS, ARNULFO F. GALEOS, EDGARDO V. GARCESA,BERNARDO P. GENTOBA, EDUARDO P. GENTOBA, VICTORIO B. GIDO, ROLANDO V. GIMENA,EARLWIN L. GINGOYO, ERNESTO GOLEZ, JUANITO G. GONZAGA, ONOFRE GONZALES, AMADO

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J. GUMERE, LEONARDO M. GUSTO, ALEJANDRO G. HALILI, NOEL H. HERCEDA, EMILIO V.HERMONDO, CLAUDIO HIPOLITO, TORIBIO S ILLUSORIO, TEODURO G. IMPANG, JR., GIL A.JALBUNA, HERMIE L. JALICO, ARMANDO B. JAMERLAN, NARCISO JAPAY, LIBURO C. JAVINAS,ALEJANDO S. JIMENEZ, FEDERICO T. JUCAR, NAPOLEON T. JUMALON, OSCAR JUNSAY,ANASTACIO D. LABANA, CARLOS C. LABAY, AVELINO L. LAFORTEZA, LOE LAGUMBAY,NORBETO D. LAMPERNIS, ROLANDO J. LAS PEAS, ISMAEL LASDOCE, RENOLO L. LEBRILLA,CAMILO G. LEDRES, ANASTACIO LLANOS, ARMANDO A. LLIDO, CARLITO LOPEZ, ARISTONLOS BAEZ, CONCISO L. LOVITOS, ARQUILLANO M. LOZADA, RODOLFO C. LUMAKIN,PRIMITIVO LUNTAO, JR., EMILIO S. MABASA, JR., JUANITO A. MACALISANG, TEOTIMO L.MADULIN, JOSEPH D. MAGALLON, PEDRO P. MAGLASANG, MARIO G. MALAGAMBA, JAIME B.MAMARADLO, PANFILO A. MANADA, SR., RICARDO S. MANDANI, CONCHITA MANDANI,ALBERTO T. MANGGA, ALEJANDRO A. MANSANES, RUFINO T. MANSANES, EUTIQUIO P.MANSANES, ALCIO P. MARATAS, AGAPITO D. MARQUEZ, RICARDO R. MASIGLAT, DENDERIAMATABANG, ARNELO N. MATILLANO, HERNANI C. MEJORADA, ROSITA MENDOZA, GREGORIOR. MESA, RENATO N. MILLADO, ANTONIO L. MOCORRO, ALBERTO M. MOLINA, JR., DOMINGO P.MONDIA, JUANITO P. MONDIA, RICARDO MONTAO, RAUL T. MONTEJO, ROGELIO MUNAR,RODOLFO E. MUEZ, CRESENCIO NARCISO, PANFILO C. NARCISO, BRICS P. NECOR, MOISESP. NICOLAS, NEMESIO G. NICOLAS, ALFREDO NOFIEL, FELIX T. NOVENA, MARCELO P. OBTIAL,SR., TEODORO B. OCRETO, BIBIANO C. ODI, ALFREDO M. OPERIO, TEOTISTO B. OPON, IZRO M.ORACION, ALAN E. ORANAS, ELPEDIO T. OSIAS, ERNESTO M. PABIONA, NARCISO J. PADILLA,NELSON G. PADIOS, SR., FRNACISCO G. PAGUNTALAN, RENE B. PALENCIA, MICHAEL P.PALOMAR, VIRGILIO E. PANILAGAO, NOLITO C. PANULIN, ROMEO PARAGUAS, NESTOR B.PASTERA, VICENTE Q. PEDAZO, EDGAR M. PEARANDA, ILUMINIDO B. PERACULLO, ANTONIOC. PEREZ, DOMINGO PEREZ, OSCAR C. PLEOS, ANTONIETO POLANCOS, SERAFIN G. PRIETO,ZENAIDA PROVIDO, FERNANDO Y. PROVIDO, ERNESTO QUERO, ELEAZAR QUIJARDO, WILLIAMU. QUINTOY, LAURO QUISTADIO, ROGELIO RABADON, MARCELINO M. RELIZAN, RAUL A.REYES, OCTAVIO F. REYES, EDDIE M. RINCOR, EMMANUEL RIVAS, RODULFO RIVAS,BIENVENIDO C. ROMANCA, JACINTO ROMOC, ROMEO S. ROMUALDO, ALBERTO ROSARIO,ROMEO L. SABIDO, SIMON SAGNIP, TIMOTEO SALIG, ROMAN G. SALIGONAN, VICTORINOSALOMON, GENEROSO J. SALONGKONG, RODOLFO E. SALVANI, JIMMY A. SAMELIN,EDUARDO A. SAMELIN, ANDRES A. SAMELIN, GEORGE SAMELIN, ROMEO A. SARAOSOS,RUDIGELIO S. SARMIENTO, CIRILO SAYAANG, JARLO SAYSON, LEONCIO SERDONCILLO,RODOLFO C. SERRANO, NESTOR G. SEVILLA, SIMEON F. SIMBA, CATALINO S. SIMTIM,

SERAFIN T. SINSUANGCO, EDUARDO A. SOLA, VICTORINO M. SOLOMON, JAIME B.SUFICIENCIA, LYNDON SUMAJIT, ALFREDO P. SUMAJIT, ALFREDO L. SUMAJIT, PEDRO A.SUMARAGO, ERNESTO SUMILE, NESTOR S. SUMOG-OY, MANUEL T. SUPAS, WILFREDO A.TABAQUE, CONSTANCIO L. TACULAD, EUFROCINO A. TAGOTO, JR., SERAPIO TAHITIT,PANTALEON T. TAMASE, ERNESTO TARRE, MAGNO E. TATOY, AVELINO TAYAPAD, SAMUEL S.TERRADO, APOLINARIO B. TICO, ORLANDO TINACO, ALBERT G. TINAY, ANTONIO TOLEDO,ANTONIO M. TORREGOSA, ISABELO TORRES, JIMMY C. TORRIBIO, EDUARDO Y. TUCLAOD,JACINTO UDAL, RICARDO M. URBANO, ERNESTO G. VAFLOR, FILOMENO E. VALENZUELA,SALORIANO VELASCO, RODOLFO VIDAL, WALTER VILLAFAE, DANTE VILLALVA, PERIGRINOP. VILLARAN, JESUS L. VILLARBA, ELEAZAR D. VILLARBA, JENNY T. VILLAVA, HENRY C.VILLEGAS, DELFIN C. WALOG, RODOLFO YAMBAO, EDGAR A. YARE, MANSUETO M. YBERA,EDUARDO G. YUMANG, HENRY R. YUNGOT, ROMEO P. YUSON, ARSENIA ZABALA, FELIX N.ZABALA and GRACIANO ZAMORA, Petitioners,

vs.HON. TEODORO A. DIZON, JR., Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 37, General SantosCity, SHELL OIL CO., DOW CHEMICAL CO., OCCIDENTAL CHEMICAL CORP., STANDARD FRUITCO., STANDARD FRUIT & STEAMSHIP CO., DOLE FOOD CO., INC., DOLE FRESH FRUIT CO., DELMONTE FRESH PRODUCE N.A., DEL MONTE TROPICAL FRUIT CO., CHIQUITA BRANDSINTERNATIONAL, INC. and CHIQUITA BRANDS, INC., Respondents.

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G.R. No. 125598

THE DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY and OCCIDENTAL CHEMICAL CORPORATION, Petitioners,vs.BERNABE L. NAVIDA, JOSE P. ABANGAN, JR., CEFERINO P. ABARQUEZ, ORLANDITO A.ABISON, FELIPE ADAYA, ALBERTO R. AFRICA, BENJAMIN M. ALBAO, FELIPE ALCANTARA,

NUMERIANO S. ALCARIA, FERNANDO C. ALEJADO, LEOPOLDO N. ALFONSO, FLORO I.ALMODIEL, ANTONIO B. ALVARADO, ELEANOR AMOLATA, RODOLFO P. ANCORDA, TRIFINO F.ANDRADA, BERT B. ANOCHE, RAMON E. ANTECRISTO, ISAGANI D. ANTINO, DOMINGOANTOPINA, MANSUETO M. APARICIO, HERMINIGILDO AQUINO, MARCELO S. AQUINO, JR.,FELIPE P. ARANIA, ULYSES M. ARAS, ARSENIO ARCE, RUPERTO G. ARINZOL, MIGUEL G.ARINZOL, EDGARADO P. ARONG, RODRIGO D.R. ASTRALABIO, RONNIE BACAYO, SOFRONIOBALINGIT, NELSON M. BALLENA, EMNIANO BALMONTE, MAXIMO M. BANGI, SALVADOR M.BANGI, HERMOGENES T. BARBECHO, ARSENIO B. BARBERO, DIOSDADO BARREDO, VIRGILIOBASAS, ALEJANDRO G. BATULAN, DOMINGO A. BAUTISTA, VICTOR BAYANI, BENIGNOBESARES, RUFINO BETITO, GERARDO A. BONIAO, CARLO B. BUBUNGAN, FERNANDO B.BUENAVISTA, ALEJANDRINO H. BUENO, TOMAS P. BUENO, LEONARDO M. BURDEOS, VICENTEP. BURGOS, MARCELINO J. CABALUNA, DIOSDADO CABILING, EMETRIO C. CACHUELA,BRAULIO B. CADIVIDA, JR., SAMSON C. CAEL, DANIEL B. CAJURAO, REY A. CALISO,NORBERTO F. CALUMPAG, CELESTINO CALUMPAG, LORETO CAMACHO, VICTORIANOCANETE, DOMINADOR P. CANTILLO, FRUCTUSO P. CARBAJOSA, VICTORINO S. CARLOS,VICTOR CARLOS, GEORGE M. CASSION, JAIME S. CASTAARES, FLAVIANO C. CASTAARES,ELPIDIO CATUBAY, NATHANIEL B. CAUSANG, BEOFIL B. CAUSING, ADRIANO R. CEJAS, CIRILOG. CERERA, SR., CRISTITUTO M. CEREZO, DANTE V. CONCHA, ALBERT CORNELIO, CESARCORTES, NOEL Y. CORTEZ, SERNUE CREDO, CORNELIO A. CRESENCIO, ALEX CRUZ, ROGERCRUZ, RANSAM CRUZ, CANUTO M. DADULA, ROMEO L. DALDE, ZACARIAS DAMBAAN, ELISEODAPROZA, VIRGILIO P. DAWAL, TESIFREDO I. DE TOMAS, GAMALLER P. DEANG, CARMELINOP. DEANG, DIOSDADO P. DEANG, DOMINGO A. DEANG, FELIPE R. DEANG, JR., JULIETO S.DELA CRUZ, ELIEZER R. DELA TORRE, JEFFREY R. DELA TORRE, RAUL DEMONTEVERDE,FELIPE P. DENOLAN, RUBENCIO P. DENOY, RODRIGO M. DERMIL, ROLANDO B. DIAZ, LORENZODIEGO, JOVENCIO DIEGO, SATURNINO DIEGO, GREGORIO DIONG, AMADO R. DIZON, FE DIZON,VIRGILO M. DOMANTAY, LEO S. DONATO, DOMINADOR L. DOSADO, NESTOR DUMALAG,FREDDIE DURAN, SR., MARIO C. ECHIVERE, AQUILLO M. EMBRADORA, MIGUEL EMNACE, RIOT. EMPAS, EFRAIM ENGLIS, ANICETO ENOPIA, DIOCENE ENTECOSA, RUBENTITO D.ENTECOSA, AVELINO C. ENTERO, FORTUNATA ENTRADA, ROGELIO P. EROY, RODOLFO M.ESCAMILLA, SERGIO C. ESCANTILLA, LAZARO A. ESPAOLA, EULOGIO M. ETURMA, PRIMO P.FERNANDEZ, EDILBERTO D. FERNANDO, GREGORIO S. FERNANDO, VICENTE P. FERRER,MARCELO T. FLOR, ANTONIO M. FLORES, REDENTOR T. FLOREZA, NORBERTO J. FUENTES,RICARDO C. GABUTAN, PEDRO D.V. GALEOS, ARNULFO F. GALEOS, EDGARDO V. GARCESA,BERNARDO P. GENTOBA, EDUARDO P. GENTOBA, VICTORIO B. GIDO, ROLANDO V. GIMENA,EARLWIN L. GINGOYO, ERNESTO GOLEZ, JUANITO G. GONZAGA, ONOFRE GONZALES, AMADOJ. GUMERE, LEONARDO M. GUSTO, ALEJANDRO G. HALILI, NOEL H. HERCEDA, EMILIO V.HERMONDO, CLAUDIO HIPOLITO, TORIBIO S ILLUSORIO, TEODURO G. IMPANG, JR., GIL A.JALBUNA, HERMIE L. JALICO, ARMANDO B. JAMERLAN, NARCISO JAPAY, LIBURO C. JAVINAS,ALEJANDO S. JIMENEZ, FEDERICO T. JUCAR, NAPOLEON T. JUMALON, OSCAR JUNSAY,ANASTACIO D. LABANA, CARLOS C. LABAY, AVELINO L. LAFORTEZA, LOE LAGUMBAY,

NORBETO D. LAMPERNIS, ROLANDO J. LAS PEAS, ISMAEL LASDOCE, RENOLO L. LEBRILLA,CAMILO G. LEDRES, ANASTACIO LLANOS, ARMANDO A. LLIDO, CARLITO LOPEZ, ARISTONLOS BAEZ, CONCISO L. LOVITOS, ARQUILLANO M. LOZADA, RODOLFO C. LUMAKIN,PRIMITIVO LUNTAO, JR., EMILIO S. MABASA, JR., JUANITO A. MACALISANG, TEOTIMO L.MADULIN, JOSEPH D. MAGALLON, PEDRO P. MAGLASANG, MARIO G. MALAGAMBA, JAIME B.MAMARADLO, PANFILO A. MANADA, SR., RICARDO S. MANDANI, CONCHITA MANDANI,ALBERTO T. MANGGA, ALEJANDRO A. MANSANES, RUFINO T. MANSANES, EUTIQUIO P.MANSANES, ALCIO P. MARATAS, AGAPITO D. MARQUEZ, RICARDO R. MASIGLAT, DENDERIAMATABANG, ARNELO N. MATILLANO, HERNANI C. MEJORADA, ROSITA MENDOZA, GREGORIOR. MESA, RENATO N. MILLADO, ANTONIO L. MOCORRO, ALBERTO M. MOLINA, JR., DOMINGO P.

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MONDIA, JUANITO P. MONDIA, RICARDO MONTAO, RAUL T. MONTEJO, ROGELIO MUNAR,RODOLFO E. MUEZ, CRESENCIO NARCISO, PANFILO C. NARCISO, BRICS P. NECOR, MOISESP. NICOLAS, NEMESIO G. NICOLAS, ALFREDO NOFIEL, FELIX T. NOVENA, MARCELO P. OBTIAL,SR., TEODORO B. OCRETO, BIBIANO C. ODI, ALFREDO M. OPERIO, TEOTISTO B. OPON, IZRO M.ORACION, ALAN E. ORANAS, ELPEDIO T. OSIAS, ERNESTO M. PABIONA, NARCISO J. PADILLA,NELSON G. PADIOS, SR., FRANCISCO G. PAGUNTALAN, RENE B. PALENCIA, MICHAEL P.PALOMAR, VIRGILIO E. PANILAGAO, NOLITO C. PANULIN, ROMEO PARAGUAS, NESTOR B.PASTERA, VICENTE Q. PEDAZO, EDGAR M. PEARANDA, ILUMINIDO B. PERACULLO, ANTONIOC. PEREZ, DOMINGO PEREZ, OSCAR C. PLEOS, ANTONIETO POLANCOS, SERAFIN G. PRIETO,ZENAIDA PROVIDO, FERNANDO Y. PROVIDO, ERNESTO QUERO, ELEAZAR QUIJARDO, WILLIAMU. QUINTOY, LAURO QUISTADIO, ROGELIO RABADON, MARCELINO M. RELIZAN, RAUL A.REYES, OCTAVIO F. REYES, EDDIE M. RINCOR, EMMANUEL RIVAS, RODULFO RIVAS,BIENVENIDO C. ROMANCA, JACINTO ROMOC, ROMEO S. ROMUALDO, ALBERTO ROSARIO,ROMEO L. SABIDO, SIMON SAGNIP, TIMOTEO SALIG, ROMAN B. SALIGONAN, VICTORINOSALOMON, GENEROSO M. SALONGKONG, RODOLFO E. SALVANI, JIMMY A. SAMELIN,EDUARDO A. SAMELIN, ANDRES A. SAMELIN, GEORGE SAMELIN, ROMEO A. SARAOSOS,RUDIGELIO S. SARMIENTO, CIRILO SAYAANG, JARLO SAYSON, LEONCIO SERDONCILLO,RODOLFO C. SERRANO, NESTOR G. SEVILLA, SIMEON F. SIMBA, CATALINO S. SIMTIM,SERAFIN T. SINSUANGCO, EDUARDO A. SOLA, VICTORINO M. SOLOMON, JAIME B.SUFICIENCIA, LYNDON SUMAJIT, ALFREDO P. SUMAJIT, ALFREDO L. SUMAJIT, PEDRO A.SUMARAGO, ERNESTO SUMILE, NESTOR S. SUMOG-OY, MANUEL T. SUPAS, WILFREDO A.TABAQUE, CONSTANCIO L. TACULAD, EUFROCINO A. TAGOTO, JR., SERAPIO TAHITIT,PANTALEON T. TAMASE, ERNESTO TARRE, MAGNO E. TATOY, AVELINO TAYAPAD, SAMUEL S.TERRADO, APOLINARIO B. TICO, ORLANDO TINACO, ALBERT G. TINAY, ANTONIO TOLEDO,ANTONIO M. TORREGOSA, ISABELO TORRES, JIMMY C. TORRIBIO, EDUARDO Y. TUCLAOD,JACINTO UDAL, RICARDO M. URBANO, ERNESTO G. VAFLOR, FILOMENO E. VALENZUELA,SALORIANO VELASCO, RODOLFO VIDAL, WALTER VILLAFAE, DANTE VILLALVA, PERIGRINOP. VILLARAN, JESUS L. VILLARBA, ELEAZAR D. VILLARBA, JENNY T. VILLAVA, HENRY C.VILLEGAS, DELFIN C. WALOG, RODOLFO YAMBAO, EDGAR A. YARE, MANSUETO M. YBERA,EDUARDO G. YUMANG, HENRY R. YUNGOT, ROMEO P. YUSON, ARSENIA ZABALA, FELIX N.ZABALA, and GRACIANO ZAMORA, Respondents.

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G.R. No. 126654

CORNELIO ABELLA, JR., IRENEO AGABATU, PRUDENCIO ALDEPOLIA, ARTEMIO ALEMAN,FIDEL ALLERA, DOMINGO ALONZO, CORNELIO AMORA, FELIPE G. AMORA, LEOPOLDOAMORADO, MARCELINO ANDIMAT, JORGE ANDOY, MARGARITO R. ANGELIA, GREGOTIOAPRIANO, ALFREDO A. ARARAO, BONIFACIO L. ARTIGAS, JERSON ASUAL, SERAFINAZUCENA, FELIX M. BADOY, JULIAN J. BAHALLA, REYNALDO BAHAYA, ANTONIO L. BALDAGO,CESAR N. BALTAZAR, DOMINADO A. BARING, ANTIPAS A. BATINGAL, MARCIANO NATINGAL,MARINO BIBANCO, LEANDRO BILIRAN, MARGARITO BLANCO, CATALINO BONGO, MELCHORBRIGOLE, ELISEO BRINA, ROBERTO BRINA, LUIS BUGHAO, EDUARDO L. BURGUINZO, CELSOM. BUSIA, RPDITO CABAGTE, RICARADO C. CABALLES, CARLITO A. CAINDOC, CANDIDOCALO, JR., PEDRITO CAMPAS, FERNANDO R. CAPAROSO, DANILO CARILLO, BONIFACIO M.CATCHA, FRANKLIN CLARAS, JOSE F. COLLAMAT, BERNARDO M. COMPENDIO, CORNELIOCOSTILLAS, ENERIO R. DAGAME, FELIMON DEBUMA, JR., RICADO C. DEIPARIME, GREGORIO S.DE LA PENA, JOSE G. DELUAO, JR., ELPEDIO A. DIAZ, QUINTINO DISIPULO, JR., CESAR G.DONAYRE, JOSE DULABAY, JAIRO DUQUIZA, ANTONIO ENGBINO, ALFREDO ESPINOSA,ALONZO FAILOG, JAIME FEROLINO, RODOLFO L. GABITO, PEDRO G. GEMENTIZA, RICARDO A.GEROLAGA, RODULFO G. GEROY, ROGELIO GONZAGA, ROLANDO GONZALES, MODESTO M.GODELOSAO, HECTOR GUMBAN, CAMILO HINAG, LECERIO IGBALIC, SILVERIO E. IGCALINOS,ALFREDO INTOD, OLEGARIO IYUMA, DOMINGO B. JAGMOC, JR., EDUARDO JARGUE, ROLANDOA. LABASON, ROLANDO LACNO, VIRGILIO A. LADURA, CONSTANCIO M. LAGURA, FRANCISCO

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LAMBAN, ENRIQUE LAQUERO, LUCIO B. LASACA, SISINO LAURDEN, VIVENCIO LAWANGON,ANECITO LAYAN, FERNANDO P. LAYAO, MARDENIO LAYAO, NEMENCIO C. LINAO, PEDROLOCION, ENERIO LOOD, DIOSDADO MADATE, RAMON MAGDOSA, NILO MAGLINTE, MARINO G.MALINAO, CARLITO MANACAP, AURELIO A. MARO, CRISOSTOMO R. MIJARES, CESARMONAPCO, SILVANO MONCANO, EMILIO MONTAJES, CESAR B. MONTERO, CLEMENTENAKANO, RODRIGO H. NALAS, EMELIANO C. NAPITAN, JUANITO B. NARON, JR., LUCIONASAKA, TEOFILO NUNEZ, JORGE M. OLORVIDA, CANULO P. OLOY, DOROTEO S. OMBRETE,TEOFILIO OMOSURA, MIGUEL ORALO, SUSANTO C. OTANA, JR., CHARLIE P. PADICA,ALFREDO P. PALASPAS, CATALINO C. PANA, ERNESTO M. PASCUAL, BIENVENIDO PAYAG,RESURRECCION PENOS, PEDRO PILAGO, ROMEO PRESBITERO, OMEO L. PRIEGO, ELADIOQUIBOL, JESUS D. QUIBOL, MAGNO QUIZON, DIONISIO RAMOS, MAMERTO RANISES, NESTORB. REBUYA, RODRIGO REQUILMEN, ISIDRO RETANAL, CARLITO ROBLE, GLICERIO V. ROSETE,TINOY G. SABINO, MELCHOR SALIGUMBA, SILVERIO SILANGAN, ROBERTO SIVA, PACITASUYMAN, CANILO TAJON, AVELINO TATAPOD, ROMEO TAYCO, RENATO TAYCO, CONRADOTECSON, AGAPITO TECSON, ROMAN. E. TEJERO, ALFREDO TILANDOCA, CARLOS B. TIMA,HERMONEGES TIRADOR, JOSELITO TIRO, PASTOR T. TUNGKO, LEANDRO B. TURCAL, VICENTEURQUIZA, VICENTE VILLA, ANTONIO P. VILLARAIZ, LEOPOLDO VILLAVITO and SAMUEL M.VILLEGAS, Petitioners,vs.THE HON. ROMEO D. MARASIGAN, Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, DavaoCity, SHELL OIL CO., DOW CHEMICAL CO., OCCIDENTAL CHEMICAL CORP., STANDARD FRUITCO., STANDARD FRUIT & STEAMSHIP CO., DOLE FOOD CO., INC., DOLE FRESH FRUIT CO., DELMONTE FRESH PRODUCE N.A., DEL MONTE TROPICAL FRUIT CO., CHIQUITA BRANDSINTERNATIONAL, INC. and CHIQUITA BRANDS, INC., Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 127856

DEL MONTE FRESH PRODUCE N.A. and DEL MONTE TROPICAL FRUIT CO., Petitioners,vs.THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF DAVAO CITY, BRANCHES 16 AND 13, CORNELIO ABELLA, JR.,

IRENEO AGABATU, PRUDENCIO ALDEPOLIA, ARTEMIO ALEMAN, FIDEL ALLERA, DOMINGOALONZO, CORNELIO AMORA, FELIPE G. AMORA, LEOPOLDO AMORADO, MARCELINOANDIMAT, JORGE ANDOY, MARGARITO R. ANGELIA, GREGOTIO APRIANO, ALFREDO A.ARARAO, BONIFACIO L. ARTIGAS, JERSON ASUAL, SERAFIN AZUCENA, FELIX M. BADOY,JULIAN J. BAHALLA, REYNALDO BAHAYA, ANTONIO L. BALDAGO, CESAR N. BALTAZAR,DOMINADO A. BARING, ANTIPAS A. BATINGAL, MARCIANO NATINGAL, MARINO BIBANCO,LEANDRO BILIRAN, MARGARITO BLANCO, CATALINO BONGO, MELCHOR BRIGOLE, ELISEOBRINA, ROBERTO BRINA, LUIS BUGHAO, EDUARDO L. BURGUINZO, CELSO M. BUSIA, RPDITOCABAGTE, RICARADO C. CABALLES, CARLITO A. CAINDOC, CANDIDO CALO, JR., PEDRITOCAMPAS, FERNANDO R. CAPAROSO, DANILO CARILLO, BONIFACIO M. CATCHA, FRANKLINCLARAS, JOSE F. COLLAMAT, BERNARDO M. COMPENDIO, CORNELIO COSTILLAS, ENERIO R.DAGAME, FELIMON DEBUMA, JR., RICADO C. DEIPARIME, GREGORIO S. DE LA PENA, JOSE G.DELUAO, JR., ELPEDIO A. DIAZ, QUINTINO DISIPULO, JR., CESAR G. DONAYRE, JOSEDULABAY, JAIRO DUQUIZA, ANTONIO ENGBINO, ALFREDO ESPINOSA, ALONZO FAILOG, JAIMEFEROLINO, RODOLFO L. GABITO, PEDRO G. GEMENTIZA, RICARDO A. GEROLAGA, RODULFOG. GEROY, ROGELIO GONZAGA, ROLANDO GONZALES, MODESTO M. GODELOSAO, HECTORGUMBAN, CAMILO HINAG, LECERIO IGBALIC, SILVERIO E. IGCALINOS, ALFREDO INTOD,OLEGARIO IYUMA, DOMINGO B. JAGMOC, JR., EDUARDO JARGUE, ROLANDO A. LABASON,ROLANDO LACNO, VIRGILIO A. LADURA, CONSTANCIO M. LAGURA, FRANCISCO LAMBAN,ENRIQUE LAQUERO, LUCIO B. LASACA, SISINO LAURDEN, VIVENCIO LAWANGON, ANECITOLAYAN, FERNANDO P. LAYAO, MARDENIO LAYAO, NEMENCIO C. LINAO, PEDRO LOCION,ENERIO LOOD, DIOSDADO MADATE, RAMON MAGDOSA, NILO MAGLINTE, MARINO G.MALINAO, CARLITO MANACAP, AURELIO A. MARO, CRISOSTOMO R. MIJARES, CESAR

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MONAPCO, SILVANO MONCANO, EMILIO MONTAJES, CESAR B. MONTERO, CLEMENTENAKANO, RODRIGO H. NALAS, EMELIANO C. NAPITAN, JUANITO B. NARON, JR., LUCIONASAKA, TEOFILO NUNEZ, JORGE M. OLORVIDA, CANULO P. OLOY, DOROTEO S. OMBRETE,TEOFILIO OMOSURA, MIGUEL ORALO, SUSANTO C. OTANA, JR., CHARLIE P. PADICA,ALFREDO P. PALASPAS, CATALINO C. PANA, ERNESTO M. PASCUAL, BIENVENIDO PAYAG,RESURRECCION PENOS, PEDRO PILAGO, ROMEO PRESBITERO, OMEO L. PRIEGO, ELADIOQUIBOL, JESUS D. QUIBOL, MAGNO QUIZON, DIONISIO RAMOS, MAMERTO RANISES, NESTORB. REBUYA, RODRIGO REQUILMEN, ISIDRO RETANAL, CARLITO ROBLE, GLICERIO V. ROSETE,TINOY G. SABINO, MELCHOR SALIGUMBA, SILVERIO SILANGAN, ROBERTO SIVA, PACITASUYMAN, CANILO TAJON, AVELINO TATAPOD, ROMEO TAYCO, RENATO TAYCO, CONRADOTECSON, AGAPITO TECSON, ROMAN. E. TEJERO, ALFREDO TILANDOCA, CARLOS B. TIMA,HERMONEGES TIRADOR, JOSELITO TIRO, PASTOR T. TUNGKO, LEANDRO B. TURCAL, VICENTEURQUIZA, VICENTE VILLA, ANTONIO P. VILLARAIZ, LEOPOLDO VILLAVITO and SAMUEL M.VILLEGAS, Respondents.

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G.R. No. 128398

CHIQUITA BRANDS, INC., and CHIQUITA BRANDS INTERNATIONAL, INC., Petitioners,vs.HON. ANITA ALFELOR-ALAGABAN, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional TrialCourt, Davao City, Branch 13, CORNELIO ABELLA, JR., IRENEO AGABATU, PRUDENCIOALDEPOLIA, ARTEMIO ALEMAN, FIDEL ALLERA, DOMINGO ALONZO, CORNELIO AMORA,FELIPE G. AMORA, LEOPOLDO AMORADO, MARCELINO ANDIMAT, JORGE ANDOY, MARGARITOR. ANGELIA, GREGOTIO APRIANO, ALFREDO A. ARARAO, BONIFACIO L. ARTIGAS, JERSONASUAL, SERAFIN AZUCENA, FELIX M. BADOY, JULIAN J. BAHALLA, REYNALDO BAHAYA,ANTONIO L. BALDAGO, CESAR N. BALTAZAR, DOMINADO A. BARING, ANTIPAS A. BATINGAL,MARCIANO NATINGAL, MARINO BIBANCO, LEANDRO BILIRAN, MARGARITO BLANCO,CATALINO BONGO, MELCHOR BRIGOLE, ELISEO BRINA, ROBERTO BRINA, LUIS BUGHAO,EDUARDO L. BURGUINZO, CELSO M. BUSIA, RPDITO CABAGTE, RICARADO C. CABALLES,CARLITO A. CAINDOC, CANDIDO CALO, JR., PEDRITO CAMPAS, FERNANDO R. CAPAROSO,

DANILO CARILLO, BONIFACIO M. CATCHA, FRANKLIN CLARAS, JOSE F. COLLAMAT,BERNARDO M. COMPENDIO, CORNELIO COSTILLAS, ENERIO R. DAGAME, FELIMON DEBUMA,JR., RICADO C. DEIPARIME, GREGORIO S. DE LA PENA, JOSE G. DELUAO, JR., ELPEDIO A.DIAZ, QUINTINO DISIPULO, JR., CESAR G. DONAYRE, JOSE DULABAY, JAIRO DUQUIZA,ANTONIO ENGBINO, ALFREDO ESPINOSA, ALONZO FAILOG, JAIME FEROLINO, RODOLFO L.GABITO, PEDRO G. GEMENTIZA, RICARDO A. GEROLAGA, RODULFO G. GEROY, ROGELIOGONZAGA, ROLANDO GONZALES, MODESTO M. GODELOSAO, HECTOR GUMBAN, CAMILOHINAG, LECERIO IGBALIC, SILVERIO E. IGCALINOS, ALFREDO INTOD, OLEGARIO IYUMA,DOMINGO B. JAGMOC, JR., EDUARDO JARGUE, ROLANDO A. LABASON, ROLANDO LACNO,VIRGILIO A. LADURA, CONSTANCIO M. LAGURA, FRANCISCO LAMBAN, ENRIQUE LAQUERO,LUCIO B. LASACA, SISINO LAURDEN, VIVENCIO LAWANGON, ANECITO LAYAN, FERNANDO P.LAYAO, MARDENIO LAYAO, NEMENCIO C. LINAO, PEDRO LOCION, ENERIO LOOD, DIOSDADOMADATE, RAMON MAGDOSA, NILO MAGLINTE, MARINO G. MALINAO, CARLITO MANACAP,AURELIO A. MARO, CRISOSTOMO R. MIJARES, CESAR MONAPCO, SILVANO MONCANO, EMILIOMONTAJES, CESAR B. MONTERO, CLEMENTE NAKANO, RODRIGO H. NALAS, EMELIANO C.NAPITAN, JUANITO B. NARON, JR., LUCIO NASAKA, TEOFILO NUNEZ, JORGE M. OLORVIDA,CANULO P. OLOY, DOROTEO S. OMBRETE, TEOFILIO OMOSURA, MIGUEL ORALO, SUSANTO C.OTANA, JR., CHARLIE P. PADICA, ALFREDO P. PALASPAS, CATALINO C. PANA, ERNESTO M.PASCUAL, BIENVENIDO PAYAG, RESURRECCION PENOS, PEDRO PILAGO, ROMEOPRESBITERO, OMEO L. PRIEGO, ELADIO QUIBOL, JESUS D. QUIBOL, MAGNO QUIZON,DIONISIO RAMOS, MAMERTO RANISES, NESTOR B. REBUYA, RODRIGO REQUILMEN, ISIDRORETANAL, CARLITO ROBLE, GLICERIO V. ROSETE, TINOY G. SABINO, MELCHOR SALIGUMBA,SILVERIO SILANGAN, ROBERTO SIVA, PACITA SUYMAN, CANILO TAJON, AVELINO TATAPOD,

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ROMEO TAYCO, RENATO TAYCO, CONRADO TECSON, AGAPITO TECSON, ROMAN. E. TEJERO,ALFREDO TILANDOCA, CARLOS B. TIMA, HERMONEGES TIRADOR, JOSELITO TIRO, PASTOR T.TUNGKO, LEANDRO B. TURCAL, VICENTE URQUIZA, VICENTE VILLA, ANTONIO P. VILLARAIZ,LEOPOLDO VILLAVITO and SAMUEL M. VILLEGAS, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,J .:

Before the Court are consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,which arose out of two civil cases that were filed in different courts but whose factual background andissues are closely intertwined.

The petitions in G.R. Nos. 125078 1 and 12559 82 both assail the Orde r 3 dated May 20, 1996 of theRegional Trial Court (RTC) of General Santos City, Branch 37, in Civil Case No. 5617. The said Orderdecreed the dismissal of the case in view of the perceived lack of jurisdiction of the RTC over the subjectmatter of the complaint. The petition in G.R. No. 125598 also challenges the Orders dated June 4,199 64 and July 9, 1996 ,5 which held that the RTC of General Santos City no longer had jurisdiction toproceed with Civil Case No. 5617.

On the other hand, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 126654 ,6 127856 ,7 and 12839 88 seek the reversal of theOrde r 9dated October 1, 1996 of the RTC of Davao City, Branch 16, in Civil Case No. 24,251-96, whichalso dismissed the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

G.R. Nos. 125078, 125598, 126654, 127856, and 128398 were consolidated in the Resolutions datedFebruary 10, 1997 ,10 April 28, 199 711 and March 10, 1999 .12

The factual antecedents of the petitions are as follows:

Proceedings before the Texas Courts

Beginning 1993, a number of personal injury suits were filed in different Texas state courts by citizens oftwelve foreign countries, including the Philippines. The thousands of plaintiffs sought damages for injuriesthey allegedly sustained from their exposure to dibromochloropropane (DBCP), a chemical used to killnematodes (worms), while working on farms in 23 foreign countries. The cases were eventuallytransferred to, and consolidated in, the Federal District Court for the Southern District of Texas, HoustonDivision. The cases therein that involved plaintiffs from the Philippines were "Jorge Colindres Carcamo, etal. v. Shell Oil Co., et al.," which was docketed as Civil Action No. H-94-1359, and "Juan Ramon Valdez,et al. v. Shell Oil Co., et al.," which was docketed as Civil Action No. H-95-1356. The defendants in theconsolidated cases prayed for the dismissal of all the actions under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.

In a Memorandum and Order dated July 11, 1995, the Federal District Court conditionally granted thedefendants motion to dismiss. Pertinently, the court ordered that:

Delgado, Jorge Carcamo, Valdez and Isae Carcamo will be dismissed 90 days after the entry of thisMemorandum and Order provided that defendants and third- and fourth-party defendants have:

(1) participated in expedited discovery in the United States xxx;

(2) either waived or accepted service of process and waived any other jurisdictional defensewithin 40 days after the entry of this Memorandum and Order in any action commenced by aplaintiff in these actions in his home country or the country in which his injury occurred. Any

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plaintiff desiring to bring such an action will do so within 30 days after the entry of thisMemorandum and Order;

(3) waived within 40 days after the entry of this Memorandum and Order any limitations-baseddefense that has matured since the commencement of these actions in the courts of Texas;

(4) stipulated within 40 days after the entry of this Memorandum and Order that any discoveryconducted during the pendency of these actions may be used in any foreign proceeding to thesame extent as if it had been conducted in proceedings initiated there; and

(5) submitted within 40 days after the entry of this Memorandum and Order an agreement bindingthem to satisfy any final judgment rendered in favor of plaintiffs by a foreign court.

x x x x

Notwithstanding the dismissals that may result from this Memorandum and Order, in the event that thehighest court of any foreign country finally affirms the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction of an actioncommenced by a plaintiff in these actions in his home country or the country in which he was injured, thatplaintiff may return to this court and, upon proper motion, the court will resume jurisdiction over the actionas if the case had never been dismissed for [forum non conveniens] .13

Civil Case No. 5617 before the RTC of General Santos City and G.R. Nos. 125078 and 125598

In accordance with the above Memorandum and Order, a total of 336 plaintiffs from General Santos City(the petitioners in G.R. No. 125078, hereinafter referred to as NAVIDA, et al.) filed a Joint Complain t14 inthe RTC of General Santos City on August 10, 1995. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 5617.Named as defendants therein were: Shell Oil Co. (SHELL); Dow Chemical Co. (DOW); OccidentalChemical Corp. (OCCIDENTAL); Dole Food Co., Inc., Dole Fresh Fruit Co., Standard Fruit Co., StandardFruit and Steamship Co. (hereinafter collectively referred to as DOLE); Chiquita Brands, Inc. and ChiquitaBrands International, Inc. (CHIQUITA); Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A. and Del Monte Tropical Fruit Co.(hereinafter collectively referred to as DEL MONTE); Dead Sea Bromine Co., Ltd.; Ameribrom, Inc.;Bromine Compounds, Ltd.; and Amvac Chemical Corp. (The aforementioned defendants are hereinaftercollectively referred to as defendant companies.)

Navida, et al., prayed for the payment of damages in view of the illnesses and injuries to the reproductivesystems which they allegedly suffered because of their exposure to DBCP. They claimed, among others,that they we re exposed to this chemical during the early 1970s up to the early 1980s when they used thesame in the banana plantations where they worked at; and/or when they resided within the agriculturalarea where such chemical was used. Navida, et al., claimed that their illnesses and injuries were due tothe fault or negligence of each of the defendant companies in that they produced, sold and/or otherwiseput into the stream of commerce DBCP-containing products. According to NAVIDA, et al., they wereallowed to be exposed to the said products, which the defendant companies knew, or ought to haveknown, were highly injurious to the formers health and well -being.

Instead of answering the complaint, most of the defendant companies respectively filed their Motions forBill of Particulars .15 During the pendency of the motions, on March 13, 1996, NAVIDA, et al., filed an Amended Joint Complaint ,16 excluding Dead Sea Bromine Co., Ltd., Ameribrom, Inc., BromineCompounds, Ltd. and Amvac Chemical Corp. as party defendants.

Again, the remaining defendant companies filed their various Motions for Bill of Particulars .17 On May 15,1996, DOW filed an Answer with Counterclaim .18

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On May 20, 1996, without resolving the motions filed by the parties, the RTC of General Santos Cityissued an Order dismissing the complaint. First, the trial court determined that it did not have jurisdictionto hear the case, to wit:

THE COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES FILED WITH THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT SHOULD BEDISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION

x x x x

The substance of the cause of action as stated in the complaint against the defendant foreign companiescites activity on their part which took place abroad and had occurred outside and beyond the territorialdomain of the Philippines. These acts of defendants cited in the complaint included the manufacture ofpesticides, their packaging in containers, their distribution through sale or other disposition, resulting intheir becoming part of the stream of commerce.

Accordingly, the subject matter stated in the complaint and which is uniquely particular to the presentcase, consisted of activity or course of conduct engaged in by foreign defendants outside Philippineterritory, hence, outside and beyond the jurisdiction of Philippine Courts, including the present RegionalTrial Court .19

Second, the RTC of General Santos City declared that the tort alleged by Navida, et al., in their complaintis a tort category that is not recognized in Philippine laws. Said the trial court:

THE TORT ASSERTED IN THE PRESENT COMPLAINT AGAINST DEFENDANT FOREIGNCOMPANIES IS NOT WITHIN THE SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OF THE REGIONAL TRIALCOURT, BECAUSE IT IS NOT A TORT CATEGORY WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF THE PHILIPPINE LAW

The specific tort asserted against defendant foreign companies in the present complaint is product liabilitytort. When the averments in the present complaint are examined in terms of the particular categories oftort recognized in the Philippine Civil Code, it becomes stark clear that such averments describe andidentify the category of specific tort known as product liability tort. This is necessarily so, because it isthe product manufactured by defendant foreign companies, which is asserted to be the proximate causeof the damages sustained by the plaintiff workers, and the liability of the defendant foreign companies, ispremised on being the manufacturer of the pesticides.

It is clear, therefore, that the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the present case, if and only if theCivil Code of the Philippines, or a suppletory special law prescribes a product liability tort, inclusive of andcomprehending the specific tort described in the complaint of the plaintiff workers .20

Third, the RTC of General Santos City adjudged that Navida, et al., were coerced into submitting theircase to the Philippine courts, viz:

FILING OF CASES IN THE PHILIPPINES - COERCED AND ANOMALOUS

The Court views that the plaintiffs did not freely choose to file the instant action, but rather were coercedto do so, merely to comply with the U.S. District Courts Order dated July 11, 1995, and in order to keepopen to the plaintiffs the opportunity to return to the U.S. District Court .21

Fourth, the trial court ascribed little significance to the voluntary appearance of the defendant companiestherein, thus:

THE DEFENDANTS SUBMISSION TO JURISDICTION IS CONDITIO NAL AS IT IS ILLUSORY

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Defendants have appointed their agents authorized to accept service of summons/processes in thePhilippines pursuant to the agreement in the U.S. court that defendants will voluntarily submit to the

jurisdiction of this court. While it is true that this court acquires jurisdiction over persons of the defendantsthrough their voluntary appearance, it appears that such voluntary appearance of the defendants in thiscase is conditional. Thus in the "Defendants Amended Agreement Regarding Conditions of Dismissal forForum Non Conveniens" (Annex to the Complaint) filed with the U.S. District Court, defendants declaredthat "(t)he authority of each designated representative to accept service of process will become effectiveupon final dismissal of these actions by the Court". The decision of the U.S. District Court dismissing thecase is not yet final and executory since both the plaintiffs and defendants appealed therefrom (par. 3(h),3(i), Amended Complaint). Consequently, since the authority of the agent of the defendants in thePhilippines is conditioned on the final adjudication of the case pending with the U.S. courts, theacquisition of jurisdiction by this court over the persons of the defendants is also conditional. x x x.

The appointment of agents by the defendants, being subject to a suspensive condition, thus produces nolegal effect and is ineffective at the moment .22

Fifth, the RTC of General Santos City ruled that the act of NAVIDA, et al., of filing the case in thePhilippine courts violated the rules on forum shopping and litis pendencia. The trial court expounded:

THE JURISDICTION FROWNS UPON AND PROHIBITS FORUM SHOPPING

This court frowns upon the fact that the parties herein are both vigorously pursuing their appeal of thedecision of the U.S. District court dismissing the case filed thereat. To allow the parties to litigate in thiscourt when they are actively pursuing the same case s in another forum, violates the rule on forumshopping so abhorred in this jurisdiction. x x x.

x x x x

THE FILING OF THE CASE IN U.S. DIVESTED THIS COURT OF ITS OWN JURISDICTION

Moreover, the filing of the case in the U.S. courts divested this court of its own jurisdiction. This courttakes note that the U.S. District Court did not decline jurisdiction over the cause of action. The case wasdismissed on the ground of forum non conveniens, which is really a matter of venue. By takingcognizance of the case, the U.S. District Court has, in essence, concurrent jurisdiction with this court overthe subject matter of this case. It is settled that initial acquisition of jurisdiction divests another of its own

jurisdiction. x x x.

x x x x

THIS CASE IS BARRED BY THE RULE OF "LITIS PENDENCIA"

Furthermore, the case filed in the U.S. court involves the same parties, same rights and interests, as inthis case. There exists litis pendencia since there are two cases involving the same parties and interests.The court would like to emphasize that in accordance with the rule on litis pendencia x x x; the

subsequent case must be dismissed. Applying the foregoing [precept] to the case-at-bar, this courtconcludes that since the case between the parties in the U.S. is still pending, then this case is barred bythe rule on "litis pendencia. "23

In fine, the trial court held that:

It behooves this Court, then to dismiss this case. For to continue with these proceedings, would beviolative of the constitutional provision on the Bill of Rights guaranteeing speedy disposition of cases (Ref.Sec. 16, Article III, Constitution). The court has no other choice. To insist on further proceedings with this

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case, as it is now presented, might accord this court a charming appearance. But the same insistencewould actually thwart the very ends of justice which it seeks to achieve.

This evaluation and action is made not on account of but rather with due consideration to the fact that thedismissal of this case does not necessarily deprive the parties especially the plaintiffs of their possibleremedies. The court is cognizant that the Federal Court may resume proceedings of that earlier case

between the herein parties involving the same acts or omissions as in this case.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, this case is now considered DISMISSED .24

On June 4, 1996, the RTC of General Santos City likewise issued an Order ,25 dismissing DOWs Answerwith Counterclaim.

CHIQUITA, DEL MONTE and SHELL each filed a motion for reconsideration 26 of the RTC Order datedMay 20, 1996, while DOW filed a motion for reconsideration 27 of the RTC Order dated June 4, 1996.Subsequently, DOW and OCCIDENTAL also filed a Joint Motion for Reconsideration 28 of the RTC Orderdated May 20, 1996.

In an Orde r 29 dated July 9, 1996, the RTC of General Santos City declared that it had already lost its jurisdiction over the case as it took into consideration the Manifestation of the counsel of NAVIDA, et al.,which stated that the latter had already filed a petition for review on certiorari before this Court.

CHIQUITA and SHELL filed their motions for reconsideration 30 of the above order.

On July 11, 1996, NAVIDA, et al., filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari in order to assail the RTC Orderdated May 20, 1996, which was docketed as G.R. No. 125078.

The RTC of General Santos City then issued an Orde r 31 dated August 14, 1996, which merely noted theincidents still pending in Civil Case No. 5617 and reiterated that it no longer had any jurisdiction over thecase.

On August 30, 1996, DOW and OCCIDENTAL filed their Petition for Review on Certiorari ,32

challengingthe orders of the RTC of General Santos City dated May 20, 1996, June 4, 1996 and July 9, 1996. Theirpetition was docketed as G.R. No. 125598.

In their petition, DOW and OCCIDENTAL aver that the RTC of General Santos City erred in ruling that ithas no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case as well as the persons of the defendant companies.

In a Resolution 33 dated October 7, 1996, this Court resolved to consolidate G.R. No. 125598 with G.R.No. 125078.

CHIQUITA filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari ,34 which sought the reversal of the RTC Orders datedMay 20, 1996, July 9, 1996 and August 14, 1996. The petition was docketed as G.R. No. 126018. In aResolution 35 dated November 13, 1996, the Court dismissed the aforesaid petition for failure ofCHIQUITA to show that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion. CHIQUITA filed a Motion forReconsideration ,36 but the same was denied through a Resolution 37 dated January 27, 1997.

Civil Case No. 24,251-96 before the RTC of Davao City and G.R. Nos. 126654, 127856, and 128398

Another joint complaint for damages against SHELL, DOW, OCCIDENTAL, DOLE, DEL MONTE, andCHIQUITA was filed before Branch 16 of the RTC of Davao City by 155 plaintiffs from Davao City. Thiscase was docketed as Civil Case No. 24,251-96. These plaintiffs (the petitioners in G.R. No. 126654,hereinafter referred to as ABELLA, et al.) amended their Joint-Complaint on May 21, 1996 .38

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Similar to the complaint of NAVIDA, et al., ABELLA, et al., alleged that, as workers in the bananaplantation and/or as residents near the said plantation, they were made to use and/or were exposed tonematocides, which contained the chemical DBCP. According to ABELLA, et al., such exposure resultedin "serious and permanent injuries to their health, including, but not limited to, sterility and severe injuriesto their reproductive capacities. "39 ABELLA, et al., claimed that the defendant companies manufactured,produced, sold, distributed, used, and/or made available in commerce, DBCP without warning the usersof its hazardous effects on health, and without providing instructions on its proper use and application,which the defendant companies knew or ought to have known, had they exercised ordinary care andprudence.

Except for DOW,