G.R. No. L-48315 February 27, 1979
ATTY. DOMINADOR B. BORJEpetitioner,vs.HON. COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL, BRANCH II, VIOLETA GALICINAO
MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL WATER DISTRICT, and THE CHAIRMAN OF THE
BOARD,respondents.GUERRERO,J.:
Facts:Petitioner alleged that he is the counsel of the water
consuming public of Ozamiz City who were against the increase of
water rates imposed by Misamis Occidental Water District and who
filed a case against PR (Civil Case No. 0390). After acceptance of
the retainer as counsel plus the consequent representation of the
consumers also in debates and discussions on the air, he allegedly
received water bills from PR without indication of the meter
readings, the number of cubic meters consumed and the amounts to be
paid. So he refused to pay the "blank bills." P's water service was
cut on February 6, 1978.
P filed a case in the resp. court (Civil Case No. OZ-686),
acting as his own counsel, against PR, by reason of these acts of
"harassment" resulting in his "humiliation" as well as unlawful
deprivation of a life's necessity.
CFI issued an order enjoining PRs from disconnecting the water
service of P. Upon learning that the same was already cut, the
Court issued another order to reconnect it immediately.
PR filed a motion to dismiss on two grounds:
a) lack of jurisdiction of respondent Court allegedly because
the "Main thrust of the subject and nature of the action or suit
appearing in the complaint is clearly within the field of special
civil action or suit action or special proceedingand
b) there is another action pending between the same parties for
the same cause, referring to Special Civil Case No. 0390.
P filed an opposition thereto stating that the issues raised are
justiciable and a court of general jurisdiction has the authority
to try the case. He further contended that Special Civil Case No.
0390, which questioned the increased water rates unilaterally
imposed by the MOWD, the constitutionality of P.D. No. 198 and the
selection of the members of the Board of Directors, is entirely
different from Civil Case No. OZ-686, which is an action for
damages due to the harassment committed by private respondents on
petitioner.
Hon. Melecio A. Genato, a temporary judge, dismissed the case
not on the basis of the grounds alleged by PRs in their MtD but on
the grounds that there was no malice or bad faith in the severance
of the water of petitioner and that PR had already reconnected the
same (moot and academic).
P filed an MR where he assailed the said order of dismissal for
having been rendered in violation of Section 1, ROC 36, and for not
being correct because although his water service has been
reconnected, he has suffered damages which could be proved by him
in an impartial proceeding. He also assailed the said order,
denominating it as a "midnight order".
CFI denied MR stating that the P was not singled-out (3 other
peoples water connection were cut) so there was no act of malice on
the part of PR.
Hence, this petition for certiorari and/or mandamus with this
Court.
Issue/Held:
WoN Borjes petition was properly dismissed- NO
Ratio:
P claims that said dismissal cannot be on lack of cause of
action because the complaint alleged sufficient facts to show that
his rights have been seriously violated by private respondents. He
also argues that it cannot be a judgment on the pleadings because
the facts are controverted. He thereby concludes that respondent
Court has committed GAD when it dismissed the case without any
evidence presented by both parties in support of their respective
positions.
The court agrees with P.
First, the said order of dismissal dated March 9, 1978 is not
premised on the grounds alleged by PRs in their motion to dismiss.
It has been held in the case ofMalig, et al. v Bushthat dismissal
of actions on grounds not alleged in the MtD is improper for in so
doing, a court in effect dismisses an actionmotu propriowithout
giving the plaintiffs a chance to argue the point and without
receiving any arguments or evidence on the question.
Unlike in theMalig, case, which based its dismissal on the
ground of prescription under Sec. 1 of ROC 16, the order herein
brought for review is not based on any of them rather, resp. Court
made a decision, based merely on the pleadings filed and without
conducting any hearing.
In the case ofManila Herald Publishing Co., Inc, vs. Ramos, et
al,where neither a MtD nor an answer had been made, the court
stated that the only instance in which, according to the ROC, the
court may dismiss upon the court's own motion on action is, when
the "plaintiff fails to appear at the time of the trial or to
prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time or to
comply with the Rules or any order of the court.
The real cause for concern, though, is not so much the dismissal
of the case for lack of presentation of the requisite motion but
rather the dismissal thereof without affording petitioner an
opportunity to be heard despite the presence of factual issues that
needed to be proved.
In the case at bar, respondents premised their right to cut off
the water service connection on the violation of petitioner's water
service contract, their "Notice to the Publicwhere the water
consumers were likewise informed that upon failure to settle their
bills within the collection period, their water service will be
shut off, and a facsimile copy of the monthly billfurnished each
water consumer wherein it is stated that "service may be
disconnected immediately if payment of the bill is not made to the
field collector after due date.
Indeed, all these empower the private respondents to disconnect
the water service of the consumers upon failure to pay. But the
question posed by petitioner is whether or not there is really
failure to pay on his part. It is his contention that there is no
failure as he was sent water bills that did not indicate the meter
readings, the number of cubic meters consumed and the amount to be
paid.
Inasmuch as private respondents deny these allegations of
petitioner, an issue of fact exists that requires presentation of
proof. If the allegations of petitioner are true: private
respondents are not at all authorized to cut off his water service
as the collection period as to him would not have even started yet.
For an obligation to become due there must be a demand.Default
generally begins from the moment the creditor demands the
performance of the obligation. Without such demand, judicial or
extra-judicial the effects of default will not arise.
PRs also argue that P could have paid his account when the final
noticeto pay was sent him since he was then already certain of the
amount of the bill. This final notice is the notice of
disconnection, served on the day the service was cut off.
P, contends that this was the first time he ever came to know of
the sum due from him and he claims that only the total amount due
for the months of November and December, 1977 was stated. There is
no specification of the amount due for each month, the meter
readings and the number of cubic meters consumed, thus, leaving him
uncertain as to how the amount was arrived at. Assuming the truth
of these allegations, private respondents would not have been
entitled still to cut off petitioner's water supply at the time
they cut if off as the demand did not contain the requisite details
and hence, improper. And even if the sufficiency of the demand is
conceded, petitioner has still thirty days from date of such
knowledge within which to pay the same in accordance with the
contract and the avowed policy of the water district.
Verily, the above discussion shows the need of presentation of
proof for the respective allegations of the parties. For the
respondent Court to make a finding of lack of malice or bad faith
on the part of private respondents from those controverted facts
and then decree the dismissal of the case is, therefore, violative
of due process. In view of the doubtful question of facts presented
herein, respondent court, in the exercise of sound discretion,
should have refused to consider and decide in a summary manner and
should have allowed the parties to present proof in support of
their respective stand. This is because the right to a hearing,
which is the right of the parties interested or affected to present
their respective cases and submit evidence in support thereof, is
one of the primary cardinal rights of litigants.
InConstantine v EstenzocitingGaranciang, et al. v Garanciang, et
alandBotiaga v Soler,this Court held as follows:
... Summary or outright dismissals of actions are not proper
where there are factual matters in dispute which need presentation
and appreciation of evidence. The demands of a fair and wise
administration of justice call for faithful adherence to legal
precepts on procedure which ensure to litigants the opportunity to
present their evidence and secure a ruling on all the issues
presented in their respective pleadings. 'Short cuts in judicial
processes are to be avoided where they impede rather than promote a
judicious dispensation of justice.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and/or mandamus is hereby
GRANTED, the Orders dated March 9,1978 and April 18, 1978
dismissing the complaint of petitioner for damages and denying the
motion for reconsideration thereof, respectively, are set aside for
being null and void, and respondent Court of First Instance of
Misamis Occidental Branch II is hereby ordered to try the case on
the merits after conducting a pre-tried conference.
Andaya v. Abadia
DAR,rep. byREG. DIR. NASER MUSALI, Petitioner, vs. HON. HAKIM
ABDULWAHID, Presiding Judge, RTC,Br.XII ofZamboangaCity,
andYUPANGCO COTTON MILLS, INC., Respondents (2008; CJ Puno; G.R.
No. 163285)
Doctrine: The Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB) is vested with primary and exclusive jurisdiction to
determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters, including all
matters involving the implementation of the agrarian reform
program. Thus, when a case is merely an incident involving the
implementation of theComprehensive Agrarian Reform Program(CARP),
then jurisdiction remains with the DARAB, and not with the regular
courts. **Sorry for the long digest. I included all the cited cases
in the cited case.
FACTS: On Dec, 28, 2000, Yupangco Cotton Mills, Inc. (Yupangco)
filed a complaint forRecovery of Ownership and Possession,
Violations of R.A. Nos. 6657 and 3844, as amended, Cancellation of
Title, Reconveyance and Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining
Orderagainst Buenavista Yupangco Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries
Association, Inc. (BYARBAI), the DAR and the Land Bank of the
Phils.The case was raffled to the RTC, Br. 12 of Zamboanga
City.
OnJan. 26, 2001, the DAR filed a MtD on the ff. grounds: (a)
Yupangcos causes of action were not within the jurisdiction of the
RTC, (b) forum shopping, and (c)litis pendentia.
OnNov. 6, 2001, the RTC DENIED the MtD. RTC: Yupangcos action
was within the jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to Sec. 19, Chap.
II ofBP Blg. 129.
DAR and BYARBAI filed a MR (DENIED for lack of merit.
OnMarch 20, 2002, DAR filed a special civil action
forcertiorariunder Rule 65 with the CA.
DAR: The RTC acted with GAD amounting to lack of jurisdiction
when DARs MtD was denied.
The CA sustained the RTC.
CA: The action falls within the jurisdiction of the regular
courts and not the DARAB because Yupangco primarily sought the
recovery and possession of the subject parcel of land.
Hence this petition for review by certiorari.
DAR: The CA erred when it upheld the jurisdiction of the RTC
purely on the ground that Yupangco primarily seeks the recovery of
ownership and possession of subject parcel of land, jurisdiction
over which is lodged with regional trial courts, not the DARAB.
ISSUE: Who has jurisdiction over the case?
RULING: DARAB. Petition granted.
1. The jurisdiction of a tribunal, including a quasi-judicial
office or government agency, over the nature and subject matter of
a petition or complaint is determined by the material allegations
therein and the character of the relief prayed for, irrespective of
whether the petitioner or complainant is entitled to any or all of
such reliefs. Also, jurisdiction should be determined by
considering not only the status or relationship of the parties but
also the nature of the issues or questions that is the subject of
the controversy. Thus, if the issues between the parties are
intertwined with the resolution of an issue within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the DARAB, such dispute must be addressed and
resolved by the DARAB.
( In this case, Yupangcos complaint seems at first blush to be
within the RTCs jurisdiction, as it has been denominated asRecovery
of Ownership and Possession, Violations of R.A. Nos. 6657 and 3844,
as amended, Cancellation of Title, Reconveyance and Damages with
Prayer for the Issuance of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining Order. But as correctlypointed out by the
DAR, the allegations of the complaintactually impugn the CARP
coverage of the landholding involved and its redistribution to
farmer beneficiaries, and seek to effect a reversion thereof to the
original owner, Yupangco. Thus, the complaint filed by Yupangco
alleged,inter alia, the ff.:
(a) Yupangco was the registered owner of certain parcels of land
primarily devoted to coconut plantation, under the administration
and supervision of plaintiff corporation with several employees and
other persons hired as laborers;
(b) Sometime in 1993, the DAR placed the subject parcels of land
under the CARP of the government pursuant to the provisions of RA
No. 6657, and 4 TCTs over the subject land were subsequently issued
in favor of BYARBAI;
(c)Yupangco vehemently objected to the coverage of the subject
parcels of land by the DAR and the valuation made by LBP, by filing
protest and objection with DAR and LBP;
(d) DAR, through the DAR Reg. Dir., Zamboanga City, issued the 4
questioned TCTs (or Certificates of Land Ownership Awards-- CLOAs)
to BYARBAI pursuant to R.A. No. 6657, without LBP paying Yupangco
the just compensation of the subject parcels of land which
valuation was then being contested before the DAR Adjudication
Board;
(e) Majority of the members of BYARBAI are not employees nor
hired workers of Yupangco, hence, Yupangco alleged that they should
not have been given preference nor be entitled as allocatees in the
subject parcels of land;
(f) Soon after theCLOAs were issued to BYARBAI, the latter took
possession of the subject parcels of land to the prejudice and
damage of Yupangco;
(g) BYARBAIs real motive in having the land distributed to them
(pending resolution of all protests with the DAR and the contested
valuation made by the LBP) was to convert the land into rice
production resulting in the destruction of coffee plantations and
other crops, including the cutting of several hundreds of coconut
trees.This conversion was illegal and in gross violation of RA No.
6657 and RA No. 3844, as amended, and other existing laws and
Administrative Issuances.
Yupangco also alleged in its complaint that other acts were
committedwith the purpose of land speculation, for business or
industrial purpose, for immediate sale thereof for business profits
and not for planting, care and tending of the coconut plantation,
which would defeat the purposes and policies of the Agrarian Reform
Laws and breached the conditions of the questioned award of the
land, rendering the acquisition by or distribution to BYARBAI as
the tenant-tillers of the land null and void, and thus reverting
back the ownership and possession thereof to Yupangco.These
allegations show that Yupangco sought the recovery of the subject
property by disputing its inclusion in the CARP and imputing errors
in the enforcement of the law pertaining to the agrarian reform.
The primal issues raised in the complaint [i.e., protest against
the CARP coverage, alleged breach of conditions of the DAR award
under the CARP by the farmer beneficiaries resulting to forfeiture
of their right as such; nonpayment of rentals by the farmers to the
petitioner under R.A. No. 3844 (Agricultural Land Reform Code)]
gravitate on the alleged manner the implementation of the CARP
under R.A. No. 6657 was carried out.
2. Under Sec. 50 of R.A. No. 6657,all matters involving the
implementation of agrarian reformare within the DARs primary,
exclusive and original jurisdiction, and at the first instance,
only theDARABas the DARs quasi-judicial body, can determine and
adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and matters
or incidents involving the implementation of the CARP under R.A.
No. 6657, E.O. Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A, R.A. No. 3844 as amended by
R.A. 6389, P.D. No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their
implementing rules and regulations.
( Ultimately, the complaint seeks for the RTC to cancel CLOAs
issued to the beneficiaries and the TCTs issued pursuant thereto.
These are reliefs which the RTC cannot grant, since the complaint
essentially prays for the annulment of the coverage of the disputed
property within the CARP, which is but an incident involving the
implementation of the CARP.These are matters relating to terms and
conditions of transfer of ownership from landlord to agrarian
reform beneficiaries over which DARABhas primary and exclusive
original jurisdiction, pursuant to Sec. 1(f), Rule II, DARAB New
Rules of Procedure.
3. The ruling in SSS vs DAR is apropos. In this case,the former
landowner, SSS, made a similar attempt to circumvent the
jurisdiction of the DARAB by filing a complaint for recovery of
possession with the RTC (San Mateo, Rizal). When the RTC dismissed
the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, the SSS came to the SC for
recourse.
In the SSS case, the SC made the ff. pronouncements:
A.) The TCTs sought to be annulled by the SSS originated from
the CLOAs issued by the DAR in pursuance of, and in accordance
with, the provisions of RA No. 6657, the CARP. Specifically, the
SSS in its Complaint implored the trial court "to restrain the DAR
from implementing RA No. 6657 and the defendants,
farmers-beneficiaries from occupying/tilling, cultivating/disposing
the properties."
Sec. 1, Rule II, 2002 DARAB Rules of Procedure: Primary And
Exclusive Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. The board shall have
primary and exclusive jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to
determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes involving the
implementation of the CARP... Specifically, such jurisdiction shall
include but not be limited to cases involving the ff.:
a) The rights and obligations of persons, whether natural or
juridical engaged in the management, cultivation and use of all
agricultural lands covered by the CARP and other agrarian laws.
xxxxxxxxx
Specifically, such jurisdiction shall extend over but not
limited to the ff:
xxxxxxxxx
f)Cases involving the issuance of Certificate of Land Transfer
(CLT), Certificate of landownership Award (CLOA) and Emancipation
Patent (EP) and the administrative correction thereof;
Thus, Centeno v. Centeno validated the jurisdiction of the DARAB
over cases involving issuance of CLOAs, and went on further: Under
Sec. 50 of R.A. No. 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of
1988), the DAR is vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and
adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have the exclusive
jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of the
agrarian reform program. The rule is that the DARAB has
jurisdiction to try and decide any agrarian dispute or any incident
involving the implementation of the CARP.
Sec. 1, Rule II of the Revised Rules of Procedure of the DARAB:
Primary, Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. The Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board shall have primary jurisdiction, both original
and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes,
cases, controversies, and matters or incidents involving the
implementation of the CARPB.) In Rivera v. Del Rosario, the SC
reiterated that: The DARAB has exclusive original jurisdiction over
cases involving the rights and obligations of persons engaged in
the management, cultivation and use of all agricultural lands
covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.C.) InDavid v.
Rivera, this Court pointed out that the jurisdiction over agrarian
reform matters is now expressly vested in the DAR through the
DARAB. The SC said: Sec. 50 of R.A. No. 6657 confers on the DAR
quasi-judicial powers to adjudicate agrarian reform matters. In the
process of reorganizing the DAR, EO No. 129-A created the DARAB to
assume the powers and functions with respect to the adjudication of
agrarian reform cases.
D.) In an earlier ruling rendered in the case ofVda. de Tangub
v. CA, reiterated inMorta, Sr. v. OccidentalandHeirs of the late
Herman ReySantosv. CA, the SC decreed:
Sec. 17 of EO No. 229 1) vested the DAR with quasi-judicial
powers to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters, and2)
granted it jurisdiction over all matters involving implementation
of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the DENR and the Dept. of Agriculture, as
well as powers to punish for contempt and to issue subpoena,
subpoena duces tecum and writs to enforce its orders or
decisions.
E.) InNuesa v. CA,the SC puts emphasis on the extent of the
coverage of the term "agrarian dispute," thus: Under Sec. 3(d) of
R.A. No. 6657, "agrarian dispute" is defined to include "(d) any
controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold,
tenancy, stewardship or otherwise over lands devoted to
agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers associations
or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining,
changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial
arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to compensation
of lands acquired under this Act and other terms and conditions of
transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and
other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand
in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary,
landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee."
REPUBLIC (represented by AMLC) v GLASGOW CREDIT AND COLLECTION
SERVICES and CITYSTATE SAVINGS BANK INC
2008 || Corona, J.
FACTS
On July 18, 2003, the Republic filed a complaint in the RTC
Manila for civil forfeiture of assets (with urgent plea for TRO)
against the bank deposits maintained by Glasgow in CSBI. Pursuant
to RA 9160 (the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001). RTC Manila
issued a 72-hour TRO dated July 21, 2003. Raffled to Branch 47 and
Presiding Judge Balisi-Umali issued an order granting the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction. The injunctive writ was issued
on August 8, 2003.Summons to Glasgow returned "unserved" as it
could no longer be found at its last known address. October 8,
2003, P filed a verified omnibus motion for (a) issuance
ofaliassummons and (b) leave of court to serve summons by
publication. RTC directed the issuance ofaliassummons. No mention
of summons by publication. January 30, 2004, RTC archived the case
for P's failure to serve thealiassummons. P filed anex parteomnibus
motion to (a) reinstate the case and (b) resolve its pending motion
for leave of court to serve summons by publication.
May 31, 2004, RTC ordered reinstatement and directed P to serve
thealiassummons within 15 days. However, it did not resolve motion
for leave of court to serve summons by publication declaring that
until and unless a return is made on the alias summons, any action
on the motion for leave of court to serve summons by publication
would be untenable if not premature.
July 12, 2004, OSG received a copy of the sheriffs return dated
June 30, 2004 stating that thealiassummons was returned "unserved"
as Glasgow was no longer holding office at the given address since
July 2002 and left no forwarding address. August 11, 2005, P filed
a manifestation andex partemotion to resolve its motion for leave
of court to serve summons by publication.
August 12, 2005, OSG received a copy of Glasgows "Motion to
Dismiss (By Way of Special Appearance)" dated August 11, 2005. It
alleged that (1) the court had no jurisdiction over its person as
summons had not yet been served on it; (2) the complaint was
premature and stated no cause of action as there was still no
conviction for estafa or other criminal violations implicating
Glasgow and (3) there was failure to prosecute on the part of the
Republic.
P opposed M2D because suit was an actionquasi in remwhere
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant was not a
prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court. It asserted that
prior conviction for unlawful activity was not a precondition to
the filing of a civil forfeiture case and that its complaint
alleged ultimate facts sufficient to establish a cause of action.
It denied that it failed to prosecute the case.
RTC dismissed the case on the following grounds: (1) improper
venue as it should have been filed in the RTC of Pasig where CSBI,
the depository bank of the account sought to be forfeited, was
located; (2) insufficiency of the complaint in form and substance
and (3) failure to prosecute. ISSUE
WON case was properly dismissed NO RULING (sinama ko na lahat,
kasi yung iba past lesson, but lesson-relevant portion is last
heading)Complaint was filed in proper venue
On November 15, 2005, SC issued A.M. No. 05-11-04-SC, the Rule
of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture under RA 9160. Glasgow
itself judicially admitted that the Rule of Procedure in Cases of
Civil Forfeiture is "applicable to the instant case."
Sec. 3.Venue of cases cognizable by the regional trial court. A
petition for civil forfeiture shall be filedin any regional trial
court of the judicial region where the monetary instrument,
property or proceeds representing, involving, or relating to an
unlawful activity or to a money laundering offense are located;
Clearly, the complaint for civil forfeiture of the account may
be filed in any RTC of the NCJR. Since the RTC Manila is one of the
RTCs of the NCJR.Complaint Suffificient in Form and SubstanceThe
test of the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint is
whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the court could render
a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer of the
complaint. Under the Rule on Procedure in Civil Forfeiture, it was
enough that:The verified complaint of the Republic contained the
following allegations:
(a) the name and address of the primary defendant therein,
Glasgow
(b) a description of the proceeds of Glasgows unlawful
activities with particularity, as well as the location thereof,
account no. CA-005-10-000121-5 in the amount ofP21,301,430.28
maintained with CSBI;
(c) the acts prohibited by and the specific provisions of RA
9160, as amended, constituting the grounds for the forfeiture of
the said proceeds. In particular, suspicious transaction reports
showed that Glasgow engaged in unlawful activities of estafa and
violation of the Securities Regulation Code (under Section 3(i)(9)
and (13), RA 9160, as amended); the proceeds of the unlawful
activities were transacted and deposited with CSBI in account no.
CA-005-10-000121-5 thereby making them appear to have originated
from legitimate sources; as such, Glasgow engaged in money
laundering (under Section 4, RA 9160, as amended); and the AMLC
subjected the account to freeze order and
(d) the reliefs prayed for, namely, the issuance of a TRO or
writ of preliminary injunction and the forfeiture of the account in
favor of the government as well as other reliefs just and equitable
under the premises.
Sec 12 of RA 9160, as amended, and its implementing rules and
regulations lay down two conditions when applying for civil
forfeiture:
(1) when there is a suspicious transaction report or a covered
transaction report deemed suspicious after investigation by the
AMLC and
(2) the court has, in a petition filed for the purpose, ordered
the seizure of any monetary instrument or property, in whole or in
part, directly or indirectly, related to said report.
Since account no. CA-005-10-000121-5 of Glasgow in CSBI was (1)
covered by several suspicious transaction reports and (2) placed
under the control of the trial court upon the issuance of the writ
of preliminary injunction, the conditions were satisfied. P
properly instituted the complaint for civil forfeiture. A criminal
conviction for an unlawful activity is not a prerequisite for the
institution of a civil forfeiture proceeding.
No failure to prosecuteApart from all the actions stated in the
facts, P continued to exert efforts to obtain information from
other government agencies on the whereabouts or current status of
respondent Glasgow if only to save on expenses of publication of
summons. Its efforts, however, proved futile. The records on file
with the Securities and Exchange Commission provided no
information. Other inquiries yielded negative results. That
Glasgows whereabouts could not be ascertained was not only beyond
the Republics control, it was also attributable to Glasgow which
left its principal office address without informing the Securities
and Exchange Commission or any official regulatory body (like the
Bureau of Internal Revenue or the Department of Trade and Industry)
of its new address. Moreover, as early as October 8, 2003, the
Republic was already seeking leave of court to serve summons by
publication.
Summons may be by publication (eto na most important)InRepublic
v. Sandiganbayan,SC declared that forfeiture proceedings are
actionsin rem. In actionsin remorquasi in rem, jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to conferring
jurisdiction on the court, provided that the court acquires
jurisdiction over theres. Nonetheless, summons must be served upon
the defendant in order to satisfy the requirements of due
process.For this purpose, service may be made by publication as
such mode of service is allowed in actionsin remandquasi in
rem.
Section 8, Title II of the Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil
Forfeiture provides:
(a) The respondent shall be given notice of the petition in the
same manner as service of summons under Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court and the following rules:
1. The notice shall be served on respondent personally, or by
any other means prescribed in Rule 14 of the Rules of Court;
2. The notice shall contain: (i) the title of the case; (ii) the
docket number; (iii) the cause of action; and (iv) the relief
prayed for; and
3. The notice shall likewise contain a proviso that, if no
comment or opposition is filed within the reglementary period, the
court shall hear the caseex parteand render such judgment as may be
warranted by the facts alleged in the petition and its supporting
evidence.
(b) Where the respondent is designated as an unknown owner
orwhenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by
diligent inquiry, service may, by leave of court, be effected upon
him by publication of the notice of the petition in a newspaper of
general circulation in such places and for such time as the court
may order. In the event that the cost of publication exceeds the
value or amount of the property to be forfeited by ten percent,
publication shall not be required. (emphasis supplied)NEMENCIO C.
EVANGELISTA, et al., petitioners, vs. CARMELINO M. SANTIAGO,
respondent.
[G.R. No. 157447. April 29, 2005]
FACTS:
Petitioners alleged that they occupied and possessed parcels of
land, located in Sitio Panayawan, Barangay San Rafael, Montalban
(now Rodriquez), Province of Rizal (Subject Property), by virtue of
several Deeds of Assignment, dated 15 April 1994 and 02 June 1994,
executed by a certain Ismael Favila y Rodriguez. According to the
Deeds of Assignment, the Subject Property was part of a vast tract
of land called Hacienda Quibiga, which extended to Paraaque, Las
Pias, Muntinlupa, Cavite, Batangas, Pasay, Taguig, Makati, Pasig,
Mandaluyong, Quezon City, Caloocan, Bulacan, and Rizal; awarded to
Don Hermogenes Rodriguez by the Queen of Spain and evidenced by a
Spanish title. Ismael Favila claimed to be one of the heirs and
successors-in-interest of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez. Acting as
Attorney-in-Fact pursuant to a Special Power of Attorney executed
by his mga kapatid on 25 February 1965, Ismael Favila signed the
aforementioned Deeds of Assignment, assigning portions of the
Subject Property to the petitioners, each portion measuring around
500 to 1,000 square meters, in exchange for the labor and work done
on the Subject Property by the petitioners and their
predecessors.
Petitioners came by information that respondent was planning to
evict them from the Subject Property. Two of the petitioners had
actually received notices to vacate. Their investigations revealed
that the Subject Property was included in Transfer Certificates of
Titles (TCTs), all originating from OCT No. 670, which was issued
to respondents mother pursuant to a decree arising from a case in
the Court of Land Registration. The mother, Isabel, executed a Deed
of Donation transferring the property to her son, who subsequently
registered such properties in his own name.
Petitioners filed with the trial court, an action for
declaration of nullity of respondents certificates of title on the
basis that OCT No. 670 was fake and spurious. As an affirmative
defense, respondent claimed that the petitioners had no legal
capacity to file the Complaint, and thus, the Complaint stated no
cause of action. Since OCT No. 670 was genuine and authentic on its
face, then OCT No. 670 and all of respondents land titles derived
therefrom, are incontrovertible, indefeasible and conclusive
against the petitioners and the whole world.
Respondent also raised the affirmative defense of prescription.
He pointed out that any action against his certificates of title
already prescribed, especially with regard to OCT No. 670, which
was issued in 1913 or more than 83 years prior to the filing of the
Complaint by the petitioners. At the very least, respondent
contended, it must be presumed that the questioned land titles were
issued by the public officials concerned in the performance of
their regular duties and functions pursuant to the law.
Lastly, respondent denied knowing the petitioners, much less,
threatening to evict them. In fact, petitioners were not included
as defendants in Civil Case No. 783 entitled, Carmelino M. Santiago
v. Remigio San Pascual, et al., which respondent instituted before
the same trial court against squatters occupying the Subject
Property.
During said hearing, petitioners presented their lone witness,
Engineer Placido Naval, a supposed expert on land registration
laws. In response to questions from Honorable Judge Francisco C.
Rodriguez of the trial court, Engineer Naval answered that a parcel
of land titled illegally would revert to the State if the Torrens
title was cancelled, and that it was the State, through the Office
of the Solicitor General, that should file for the annulment or
cancellation of the title. Respondent, on the other hand, did not
present any evidence but relied on all the pleadings and documents
he had so far submitted to the trial court.
RTC denied petitioners petition. CA affirmed.
ISSUE: WON petitioners had legal capacity to sue
HELD: NO. But for a different reason.
Before anything else, it should be clarified that the plaintiff
has no legal capacity to sue and the pleading asserting the claim
states no cause of action are two different grounds for a motion to
dismiss or are two different affirmative defenses.
Lack of legal capacity to sue means that the plaintiff is not in
the exercise of his civil rights, or does not have the necessary
qualification to appear in the case, or does not have the character
or representation he claims. On the other hand, a case is
dismissible for lack of personality to sue upon proof that the
plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest, hence grounded on
failure to state a cause of action. The term "lack of capacity to
sue" should not be confused with the term "lack of personality to
sue." While the former refers to a plaintiffs general disability to
sue, such as on account of minority, insanity, incompetence, lack
of juridical personality or any other general disqualifications of
a party, the latter refers to the fact that the plaintiff is not
the real party- in-interest. Correspondingly, the first can be a
ground for a motion to dismiss based on the ground of lack of legal
capacity to sue; whereas the second can be used as a ground for a
motion to dismiss based on the fact that the complaint, on the face
thereof, evidently states no cause of action.
In resolving whether or not the Complaint in the present case
stated a cause of action, the trial court should have limited
itself to examining the sufficiency of the allegations in the
Complaint. It was proscribed from inquiring into the truth of the
allegations in the Complaint or the authenticity of any of the
documents referred or attached to the Complaint, since these are
deemed hypothetically admitted by the respondent. The trial court
evidently erred in making findings as to the authenticity of the
Deeds of Assignment executed by Ismael Favila in favor of
petitioners on 15 April 1994 and 02 June 1994; and questioning the
existence and execution of the Special Power of Attorney in favor
of said Ismael Favila by his siblings on 25 February 1965. These
matters may only be resolved after a proper trial on the
merits.
In their Complaint, petitioners never alleged that the Subject
Property was part of the public domain. On the contrary,
petitioners asserted title over the Subject Property by virtue of
their actual, physical, open, continuous and adverse possession
thereof, in the concept of owners, by themselves and through their
predecessors-in-interest, since time immemorial. The Deeds of
Assignment executed in their favor and attached to their Complaint
referred to a Spanish title granted by the Queen of Spain to their
predecessor-in-interest, Don Hermogenes Rodriguez. Clearly,
petitioners are asserting private title over the Subject Property,
and consequently, their action could not be one for reversion.
In their instant Petition, petitioners further averred that
rather than an action for nullity of respondents certificates of
title, theirs was more appropriately an action to remove a cloud on
or to quiet their title over the Subject Property. Even as this
Court agrees with the petitioners that their action was one for
removal of a cloud on or quieting of title, it does arrive at the
same conclusion as the trial court and the Court of Appeals that
petitioners had no personality to file the said action, not being
the parties-in-interest, and their Complaint should be dismissed
for not stating a cause of action. According to Article 477 of the
Civil Code, the plaintiff, in an action to remove a cloud on or to
quiet title, must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in,
the real property which is the subject matter of the action.[32]
Petitioners failed to establish in their Complaint that they had
any legal or equitable title to, or legitimate interest in, the
Subject Property so as to justify their right to file an action to
remove a cloud on or to quiet title.
In their Complaint, petitioners claimed title to the Subject
Property by virtue of their actual and continuous possession of the
same since time immemorial, by themselves and through their
predecessors-in-interest. Yet, the Deeds of Assignment executed by
Ismael Favila in their favor, attached to and an integral part of
their Complaint, revealed that petitioners predecessors-in-interest
based their right to the Subject Property on the Spanish title
awarded to Don Hermogenes Rodriguez.
There existed a contradiction when petitioners based their claim
of title to the Subject Property on their possession thereof since
time immemorial, and at the same time, on the Spanish title granted
to Don Hermogenes Rodriguez. Possession since time immemorial
carried the presumption that the land had never been part of the
public domain or that it had been private property even before the
Spanish conquest. If the Subject Property was already private
property before the Spanish conquest, then it would have been
beyond the power of the Queen of Spain to award or grant to
anyone.
The title to and possession of the Subject Property by
petitioners predecessors-in-interest could be traced only as far
back as the Spanish title of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez. Petitioners,
having acquired portions of the Subject Property by assignment,
could acquire no better title to the said portions than their
predecessors-in-interest, and hence, their title can only be based
on the same Spanish title.
Therefore, without legal or equitable title to the Subject
Property, the petitioners lacked the personality to file an action
for removal of a cloud on, or quieting of, title and their
Complaint was properly dismissed for failing to state a cause of
action. In view of the dismissal of the case on this ground, it is
already unnecessary for this Court to address the issue of
prescription of the action.
PABLO ARCEO vs. JOSE OLIVEROS and RUFINA CABANGON
G.R. No. L-38251 | January 3, 1985 | CUEVAS,J.
Facts: Pablo and Sixta Arceo are siblings who inherited a parcel
of land from their father. Sixta Arceo sold her undivided share to
Oliveros & Cabangon without Pablos consent. However, there was
an extrajudicial settlement between Sixta and Pablo wherein Sixta
renounced her right over the disputed lot in favor of the latter. A
TCT was then issued to Pablo covering the lot.2 cases filed:
A. Civil Case No. 435-G:
Plaintiffs Oliveros & Cabangon: Seeked to enforce the Deed
of Absolute Sale, impugn the extrajudicial settlement between Sixta
and Pablo, and annul the TCT issued to Pablo
Defendant Pablo Arceo: Sets up by way of counterclaim his right
of compulsory redemption over the same lot pursuant to Sec. 119 of
the Public Land Act, claiming further that the property has never
been partitioned between him and her sister Sixta.B. Civil Case No.
C-105 (case at bar):Plaintiff Pablo Arceo: Being a co-owner and
co-heir of said Sixta Arceo, he should be allowed to redeem and
repurchase the property.
Defendants Oliveros & Cabangon: MTD OTG of litis pendentia
(dismissed initially, asked to file an answer, but eventually, MTD
was granted)
On appeal, Arceo averred that the first case is to enforce the
alleged sale, while the second is to redeem legally the
controverted property. If the first litigation does not prosper and
the disputed sale is voided, then this same case will become
useless and moot, but in the contrary result, whereby the same sale
is upheld, then the legal redemption sought in this subsequent case
may lie. Hence, no litis pendentia.
Issue: W/N there is litis pendentia - YES
Ruling: Pendency of another suit between the same parties to be
a ground for dismissal requires: 1) Identity of parties or at least
such as representing the same interest in both actions; 2) Identity
of rights asserted and prayed for, the relief being founded on the
same facts; and 3) the Identity in both cases is such that the
judgment which may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of
which party is successful, would amount tores judicatain the other
case.Civil Case No. 435-G involves the same parcel of land and
similar issues as those in Civil Case No. C-105. In both cases, the
parties herein are litigating over the same subject matter (the lot
inherited by the Arceos from their father) and on the same
issuesvalidity of the sale made by Sixta Arceo to the Oliveros
spouses; and Pablo Arceo's right of compulsory redemption under
Section 119 of the Public Land Act as a co-heir of his sister
Sixta. The only difference being, that in Civil Case No. C-105,
Pablo Arceo asserts this right of compulsory redemption as a cause
of action in his complaint; whereas, in Case No. 435-G he asserts
said claim by way of counterclaim, which makes no difference
anyway. For whilelis pendensis normally interposed as a defense
when another case is pending upon the same cause of action between
the same parties in two complaints, it may also be interposed even
if said claim is set forth by way of a counterclaim since the
latter partakes the nature of a complaint by the defendant against
the plaintiff.Hence, it has been held that to interpose a cause of
action in a counterclaim and again advanced the same in a complaint
against the same party, as in the case at bar, would be violative
of the rule against splitting a single cause of action which is
prohibited by the Rules of Court.Arceos contention that "if the
first litigation does not prosper and the disputed sale is voided,
then this second case will become useless and moot, but in the
contrary result whereby the same sale is upheld, then the legal
redemption sought in the subsequent case may lie" is mistaken. For
even on the assumption that the sale by Sixta in favor of the
Oliveros spouses is upheld, the second case, Civil Case No. C-105,
will still be useless because he is not deprived of litigating
against the Oliveros on the issue of his claimed compulsory
counterclaim in Civil Case No. 435-G by reason of having set it up
in his counterclaim in the said case.
Appellant cites Hongkong & Shanghai Bank vs. Aldecoa &
Co. Such reliance is, however, misplaced. That case involved two
actions: one for annulment of mortgage; and the other, for
foreclosure of mortgage.
The right to foreclose not having been set-up or pleaded as a
counterclaim in the first case, no adjudication may be had thereon,
hence this pronouncement
The former suit is one to annul the mortgages. The present suit
is one for the foreclosure of the mortgage. It may be conceded that
if the final judgment in the former action is that the mortgages be
annulled, such an adjudication will deny the right of the bank to
foreclose the mortgages. But will a decree holding them valid
prevent the bank from foreclosing them? Most certainly not. In such
an event, the judgment would not be a bar to the prosecution of the
present action. The rule is not predicated upon such a contingency.
It is applicable, between the same parties, only when the judgment
to be rendered in the action first instituted will be such that,
regardless of which party is successful it will amount tores
judicataagainst the second action. . . .
In the instant case, however, the right of compulsory redemption
and the validity of the sale by a co-heir are in issue not only in
Civil Case No. 435-G but also in Civil Case No. C105, and both
suits are between the same parties asserting Identical rights,
praying similar reliefs premised essentially on the same facts.
ROSALINA BUAN, RODOLFO TOLENTINO, TOMAS MERCADO, CECILIA
MORALES, LIZA OCAMPO, Quiapo Church Vendors, for themselves and all
others similarly situated as themselves, v. OFFICER-IN-CHARGE
GEMILIANO C. LOPEZ, JR., OFFICE OF THE MAYOR OF MANILA
13 October 1986 | J. Narvasa
FACTS: Ps are five of about 130 licensed and duly authorized
vendors of religious articles, medicine herbs & plants around
the Quiapo church bringing suit for themselves and all others
similarly situated. They allege that their licenses were revoked or
cancelled by R Mayor Lopez for reasons unknown to them which is
tantamount to deprivation of property without due process of laws,
that the revocation of their licenses was beyond R Mayors
competence, since Section 171 (n) of the Local Government Code
(B.P. Blg. 337) authorizes the same only for violation of the law
or ordinances or conditions upon which they have been granted and
no such violation had been committed by them; but this
notwithstanding, respondent Mayor had given (them) an ultimatum of
7:00 up to 12:00 o'clock in the afternoon of 5 August 1986 to
vacate the premises where their respective stalls are situated or
suffer physical demolition thereof. They instituted this special
civil action for prohibition to the end that R Mayor Gemilliano
Lopez, Jr. be perpetually prohibited from arbitrarily, whimsically
and capriciously revoking or cancelling ... their licenses or
permits (as hawkers or street vendors) and threatening the physical
demolition of their respective business stalls in the places
specified in such licenses or permits. They also sought a temporary
restraining order in view of Mayor Lopez' actual threats of
physical demolition of their respective small business
establishment at 12:00 noon, which the Court granted on the same
day.
It appears that a special civil action of prohibition with
preliminary injunction was filed in RTC Manila against Acting
Manila City Mayor Gemilliano Lopez, Jr. by Samahang Kapatiran sa
Hanapbuhay ng Bagong Lipunan, Inc, which was composed of some 300
individual owners & operators of separate business stalls,
mostly at the periphery beyond the fence of Quiapo Church. Rosalina
Buan is the president of Samahan, while Liza Ocampo is its Press
Relations Officer. The three petitioners also appear to be Samahan
members.
ISSUE: W/N the special civil action before the SC should be
dismissed
HELD: YES. The action must in the first place be abated on the
ground of lis pendens, or more correctly, auter action pendant or
pendency of another action between the same parties for the same
cause. The two petitions are grounded on the same facts. There
exists identity of parties, or at least such parties are represent
the same interests in both actions, as well as identity of rights
asserted and relief prayed for (being founded on the same facts),
such that any judgment rendered in the other action will,
regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in
the action under consideration: all the requisites of auter action
pendant.
Citing E. Razon, Inc., et al. vs. Philippine Port Authority, et
al, G.R. No. 75197, Resolution, July 31, 1986:
The acts of petitioners constitute a clear case of forum
shopping, an act of malpractice that is proscribed and condemned as
trifling with the courts and abusing their processes. It is
improper conduct that tends to degrade the administration of
justice. The rule has been formalized in Section 17 of the Interim
Rules and Guidelines issued by this Court on January 11, 1983 in
connection with the implementation of the Judiciary Reorganization
Act, specifically with the grant in Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129 of
equal original jurisdiction to the Intermediate Appellate Court to
issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, etc., and auxiliary writs or
processes, whether or not in aid Of its appellate jurisdiction.
Thus, the cited Rule provides that no such petition may be filed in
the Intermediate Appellate Court 'if another similar petition has
been filed or is still pending in the Supreme Court' and
vice-versa. The Rule orders that "A violation of the rule shall
constitute contempt of court and shall be a cause for the summary
dismissal of both petitions, without prejudice to the taking of
appropriate action against the counsel or party concerned." The
rule applies with equal force where the party having filed an
action in the Supreme Court shops for the same remedy of
prohibition and a restraining order or injunction in the regional
trial court (or vice-versa).
As already observed, there is between the action at bar and RTC
Case No. 86-36563, an Identity as regards parties, or interests
represented, rights asserted and relief sought, as well as basis
thereof, to a degree sufficient to give rise to the ground for
dismissal known as auter action pendant or lis pendens. That same
Identity puts into operation the sanction Of twin dismissals just
mentioned. The application of this sanction will prevent any
further delay in the settlement of the controversy which might
ensue from attempts to seek reconsideration of or to appeal from
the Order of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 86-36563
promulgated on July 15, 1986, which dismissed the petition upon
grounds which appear persuasive.
June 29, 1988
INVESTORS' FINANCE CORPORATION vs.ROMEO EBARLE, HON. JOSE L.
CASTIGADOR, Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. XXII, Pagadian City, The
Deputy Provincial Sheriff of Zamboanga Del Sur, and the
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURTFacts:Flaviano Fucoy Jr. executed a
promissory note in favor of Lido Motor Sales Ozamis in the amount
of P56,976.00 which he promised to pay in 48 equal, successive,
monthly installments. Jose Mariano O. Tan signed the promissory
note as a co-maker. On the same day, to guarantee the payment of
the promissory note in accordance with its terms, the promissors
executed a chattel mortgage over the purchased car in favor of the
promissee. Also, on the same date, mortgagee Lido Motor Sales
Ozamis executed a Deed of Assignment of all its title, rights,
equities, and interests arising out of the Deed of Chattel Mortgage
with promissory note, in favor of Investors' Finance Corporation,
the herein petitioner.For non-payment of 4 monthly installments the
petitioner corporation, as mortgagee, filed a verified Complaint
For Replevin With Damages in the then CFI Misamis Oriental (note:
it is now known as RTC Cagayan de Oro, but I used Misamis for
consistency) against Flaviano Fucoy Jr., Jose Mariano Tan, and a
John Doe, docketed as CIVIL CASE No. 8782, with a prayer for the
issuance of a writ of replevin for the seizure of the car "for the
purpose of foreclosure and/or disposal in accordance with law to
satisfy defendants obligation the plaintiff." The plaintiff filed a
bond in the amount of P25,146.34.CFI issued the writ of replevin.
The writ could not be implemented because the car was not in the
possession of the mortgagors-defendants. It was only more than a
year later that the car was found in the possession of the herein
PR, Romeo Ebarle. Due to the difficulty of getting the car from him
because of his bodyguards, Romeo Ebarle being the son of the former
Provincial Governor, the petitioner filed a Motion To Deputize A
Military Personnel To Serve The Alias Writ Of Replevin And Alias
Summons. The trial court appointed technical Sergeant (TSgt.)
Ibonia.TSgt Ibonia later seized the car and placed it in the
custody of the military authorities at Lanao del Norte for
safekeeping. On the following day, as a result of a written
agreement between the lawyers of the petitioner and the private
respondent, stipulating payment by the latter of the balance of the
mortgage indebtedness incurred originally by Flaviano Fucoy Jr. and
Jose Mariano Tan, the car was returned to PR.Evidently, mortgagors
Flaviano Fucoy Jr. and Jose Mariano Tan transferred the possession
of the car to PR Romeo Ebarle without the consent of the
petitioner. Thus the car remained registered in the name Flaviano
Fucoy Jr., even when it was seized by Special Deputy Sheriff
Ibonia.In the second week of November, 1983, the petitioner sent to
PR a computation of the unpaid balance due from the mortgagors,
which turned out to be higher than the computation at Tubod Lanao
del Norte. Thus, PR filed suit for Damages and Discharge of Chattel
Mortgage with Preliminary Injunction in RTC, Pagadian City,
docketed as Civil Case No. 2312, against the petitioner, Investors'
Finance Corporation, and Special Deputy Sheriff Antonio lbonia, who
enforced the writ of replevin.PR alleged that he was a well-known
personality in Pagadian City, that he had paid his obligations to
the petitioner but it refused to issue a receipt; and that he was
humiliated and embarrassed by the seizure of his car. He prayed
"(T)hat pending hearing of the main case a writ of preliminary
injunction be issued against the defendants' (herein petitioner and
Special Deputy Sheriff lbonia), that "the chattel mortgage of the
car be discharged," and for moral and corrective damages,
attorney's fees.The petitioner, one of the two defendants in Civil
Case No. 2312, prayed for the dismissal of the case. Invoking
Section 5 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, it moved that a
preliminary hearing be had as if a MtD had been filed and prayed
for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of litis pendentia
provided in Section 1(e) of the same Rule 16. RTC issued a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction requiring the petitioner to return
the car even while its motion to dismiss had not yet been resolved.
IAC dismissed P's appeal: With respect to the "motion to dismiss",
We find no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the respondent Judge for having denied the same: firstly, Civil
Cases No. 2312, includes a contempt charge, one not found in Civil
Case No. 8782; secondly, there is a defendant in Civil Case No.
2312, Antonio Ibonia, who is not a party in the other case. Certain
requisites of litis pendentia are therefore absent. Issue: WoN IAC
committed a reversible error in denying the application of the
principle of lis pendens duly invoked by the petitioner.Held: Yes.
An action is dismissable on the ground that there is another action
pending between the same parties for the same cause, if the
following requisites concur:a)identity of parties, or at least such
as representing the same interests in both actions;b)identity of
rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on
the same facts; andc)the identity in the two cases should be such
that the judgment that may be rendered in one would, regardless of
which party is successful amount to res judicata in the other.
Corollary to Section 1(e) of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court is the
prohibition against splitting a single cause of action. Thus, under
Section 4, Rule 2, ("I)f two or more complaints are brought for
different parts of a single cause of action, the filing of the
first may be pleaded in abatement of the other or others, in
accordance with Section 1(e) of Rule 16, and a judgment upon the
merits in any one is available as a bar in the others." The former
is the principle of litis pendentia or lis pendens, while the
latter is that of res judicata.The doctrine of res judicata
requires, among others, identity of parties as an indispensable
condition. However, this Identity does not mean total identity of
all parties. The inclusion of new parties in the second action does
not remove the case from the operation of the doctrine of res
judicata if the party against whom the judgment is offered in
evidence was also the party in the first action. This rule would
ward off the possibility of renewing the litigation between the
same parties by the mere expedient of bringing in new parties in
the second action.Like res judicata as a doctrine, litis pendentia
as a principle is also a sanction of the public policy against
multiplicity of suits. This being so, the inclusion of another
party does not by itself preclude the application of section 1(e)
Rule 16 assuming that all the requisites are present. Otherwise
stated, the inclusion of new parties in the second action does not
remove the case from the operation of the rule of litis pendentia
as long as the primary litigants are also parties in the first
action. A different rule would render illusory the principle of
litis pendentia. In Civil Case No. 8782 before the then CFI of
Misamis Oriental, the plaintiff is the petitioner corporation and
the defendants are Flaviano Fucoy Jr., Jose Mariano Tan, and a John
Doe. John Doe, later, turned out to be PR Romeo Ebarle who was the
unauthorized transferee but in actual possession of the car. In
Civil Case No. 2312 before the RTC Pagadian City, the plaintiff is
the same PR Romeo Ebarle while the defendants are the petitioner
corporation and Antonio Ibonia the Special Deputy Sheriff who
enforced the writ of replevin in compliance with the order of the
then CFI of Misamis Oriental. It is clear that lbonia is not a real
party in interest in the Pagadian case. There, the real parties in
interest, the principal protagonists are Investors' Finance
Corporation and Romeo Ebarle. They are the same Identical real
parties in interest, the principal protagonists in the Cagayan de
Oro case. This concurrence suffices to satisfy the requirement of
Identity of parties in the principle of litis pendentia.We also
find identity of the rights asserted in both cases.The true subject
matter of the controversy is the car (Corolla, 4-door de luxe
Sedan). The primary objective of the plaintiff, the petitioner
herein, in the Misamis Oriental case is the enforcement of the
chattel mortgage due to non-payment of the balance of the purchase
price of the said car. On the other hand, the plaintiff, the
private respondent herein, in the Pagadian case, seeks as his
primordial relief, the discharge of the chattel mortgage over the
same car due to alleged full payment of all the installments on the
price of the same. By way of initial reliefs, the plaintiff in the
Misamis case (defendant in the Pagadian case and petitioner herein)
prayed for the issuance of a writ of replevin to take possession of
the car in order to foreclose the chattel mortgage thereon as the
plaintiff in the Pagadian case (defendant in the Misamis case and
private respondent herein) sought an injunction to restrain the
taking of the same car. The denial of the motion to dismiss filed
by the herein petitioner before the Pagadian court, resulted to a
chaotic as well as a ridiculous situation for the parties. To all
legal intents and purposes, the Pagadian court issued a second writ
of replevin to counteract and to annul the writ of replevin validly
issued seven and a half months earlier by a coordinate and co-equal
tribunal the Misamis court, which has already taken jurisdiction.
Worse, the Pagadian court practically dismissed the case pending in
the Misamis court, pronouncing that "the replevin case, Civil Case
No. 8782, to all practical intents and purposes to have been
terminated." SC cannot countenance the spectacle of two co-equal
courts racing with each other to pre-empt judgment over the same
subject matter of the two pending actions. The resulting confusion
in the event that the decisions, orders, or resolutions of the two
courts contradict and conflict with each other would do great
damage to the administration of justice.An action for damages
against the person obtaining the writ of replevin and the sheriff
who enforced the writ of replevin, assuming that the seizure of the
property was unlawful, should be litigated in the replevin suit and
not by independent action. The doctrine is undisputed that no court
has the power to interfere by injunction with the judgment or
orders of another court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction
having power to grant the relief sought by injunction. We take note
that the filing of Civil Case No. 2312 before the Pagadian Court
was a "specie of forum-shopping" considering that the private
respondent is an influential person in the locality. WHEREFORE, the
Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the then Intermediate
Appellate Court is REVERSED and Civil Case No. 2312 of the Regional
Trial Court, 9th Judicial District, Branch XXII. Pagadian City is
hereby ordered DISMISSED without prejudice to the prosecution of
the claim for damages for wrongful replevin in Civil Case No. 8782
of the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch XVII,
Cagayan de Oro City.Oropeza v. Allied Banking Corp
There are 2 Civil Cases involved in this case: 1st CIVIL CASE
(CV No. 19325-88): Collection Suit with application of Writ of
Preliminary Attachment (Docketed in CA as CA-GR. CV No. 419986)
Parties: Allied Bank (plaintiff) v. Oropeza Mktg (OMC) and Spouses
Oropeza (defendants) 2nd CIVIL CASE (CV No. 19634-89): Annulment of
Deed of Sale with Assumption of mortgage Parties: Allied Bank
(plaintiff) v. Spouses Oropeza (only defendant) Allied Bank (Bank)
extended loan (P780,000) to OMC and Spouses Oropeza. As security,
the spouses executed a Promissory Note, Continuing
Guaranty/Comprehensive Surety Agreement and a Real Estate Mortage
over their properties. The Spouses defaulted in their obligation.
Hence, the Bank instituted the 1st Civil Case. While the
application for a write was pending, the Bank discovered that the
Spouses executed an Absoulte Deed of Sale with Assumption of
Mortgage in favor of a third party (Soild Gold Corpo), hence, then
filed the 2nd Civil Case. Rulings on 2nd Civil Case RTC Davao:
Ruled in favor of Spouses Oropeza declaring that the spouses have
fully settled their debts (with their deposits and receivables) and
the deed of sale was valid. CA: On appeal by the Bank dismissed the
Banks complaint and affirmed RTC decision. Rulings on 1st Civil
Case RTC Davao: dismissed the Banks Complaint CA: On appeal by the
Bank, reversed and set aside the RTC decision. Issue/Held: Whether
or not the decision of the CA in the 1st Civil Case constitute res
judicata in so far as the 2nd Civil Case is concerned -
(YES)Ratio:
Res judicata literally means a matter adjudged; a thing
judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by
judgment. Res judicata lays the rule that an existing final
judgment or decree rendered on the merits, and without fraud or
collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon any matter
within its jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the parties
or their privies, in all other actions or suits in the same or any
other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction on the points
and matters in issue in the first suit. The principle of res
judicata has two aspects, namely: (a) bar by prior judgment as
enunciated in Rule 39, Section 49 (b) of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure; and (b) conclusiveness of judgment which is contained in
Rule 39, Section 47 (c). (a) bar by prior judgment: There is bar by
prior judgment when, as between the first case where the judgment
was rendered and the second case that is sought to be barred, there
is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action.
Otherwise put, the judgment or decree of the court of competent
jurisdiction on the merits concludes the litigation between the
parties, as well as their privies, and constitutes a bar to a new
action or suit involving the same cause of action before the same
or any other tribunal. (b) conclusiveness of judgment: But where
there is identity of parties in the first and second cases, but no
identity of causes of action, the first judgment is conclusive only
as to those matters actually and directly controverted and
determined and not as to matters merely involved therein. Stated
differently, any right, fact, or matter in issue directly
adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an
action before a competent court in which judgment is rendered on
the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and
cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies
whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of the
two actions is the same. The elements of res judicata are:
(1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final;
(2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
(3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment on the
merits; and
(4) there must be as between the first and second action,
identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action.
The existence here of the first three requisites is not
disputed. With respect to the fourth element, however, the parties
disagree. Should identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of
action be shown in the two cases, then res judicata in its aspect
as a bar by prior judgment would apply. If as between the two
cases, only identity of parties can be shown, but not identical
causes of action, then res judicata as conclusiveness of judgment
applies. IDENTITY OF PARTIES IS PRESENT: The operation of the final
judgment or order in a previous case is not altered by the fact
that somebody who was not a party in the first action has been
impleaded in the second case. Otherwise, litigants can always renew
any litigation by the mere expediency of including new parties.
Hence, the fact that , the fact that OMC was not a party in 2nd
civil case (RTC and CA) does not nullify the effect of the
judgments issued in these cases on the other case, (1st Civil
Case). The rule on identity of parties does not require an
absolute, but only a susbstantial identity of parties. IDENTITY OF
CAUSES OF ACTION NOT PRESENT: With respect to identity of subject
matter, this is included in identity of causes of action. When
there is identity of the cause or causes of action, there is
necessarily identity of subject matter. But the converse is not
true, for different causes of action may exist regarding the same
subject matter, in which case, the conclusiveness of judgment shall
be only with regard to the questions directly and actually put in
issue and decided in the first case. The legal rights asserted by
the Bank in the 2 cases differ: 1st Civil Case was for the
collection of the P780,000.00 loan, secured by a promissory note,
which respondent Allied Bank insists remained unpaid by the
spouses. In other words, it is the alleged failure of petitioners
to liquidate their obligation to respondent bank, which caused
Allied Banks cause of action in 1st civil case to accrue. The
situation is different in the other case, 2nd case, where
respondent bank asserts its right as a mortgagee to the subject
property by virtue of the real estate mortgage executed by
petitioner spouses in its favor. Another test to determine the
identity of causes of action is to consider whether the same
evidence would sustain both causes of action. We find that in 1st
Civil Case, Allied Bank will have to present evidence showing the
existence of the loan and petitioners failure to comply with their
bounden duty to pay such loan in accordance with the terms of the
promissory note executed by petitioners. However, in 2nd civil
case, respondents evidence must establish and prove its allegations
to the effect that: (a) petitioners secured a loan from it; (b)
said loan was secured by a promissory note and a mortgage over
properties owned by the Oropezas; (c) petitioners failed to pay
their debt; and (d) petitioners sold the mortgaged properties wit.
The evidence to support Allied Banks cause of action in 1st case is
included in and forms part of the evidence needed by respondent
bank to support its cause of action in 2nd case. The converse,
however, not true. The evidence needed in 2nd case does not
necessarily form part of the evidence needed by respondent in 1st
case. Accordingly, we find that the evidence to sustain the
respective causes of action in the two cases is not exactly the
same. There being substantial identity of parties but no identity
of causes of action, the applicable aspect of res judicata is
conclusiveness of judgment. There is conclusiveness of judgment
only as to the matters actually determined by the trial court in
2nd civil case, as affirmed by the CA. These include the findings
that: (1) the promissory note relied upon by respondent bank is
spurious; and (2) that the loan obligation of the Oropeza spouses
has been settled and paid. Res judicata is founded on the principle
that parties ought not to be permitted to litigate the same issue
more than once. Hence, when a right or fact has been judicially
tried and established by a court of competent jurisdiction, or an
opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment of the
court - - so long as it remains unreversed - - is conclusive upon
the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate. It
having been determined with finality in CA of the 2nd civil case
that the debt of the Oropezas has been settled, Allied Banks cause
of action in 1st civil case must be deemed extinguishedILUMINADA
CARANDANG, EDEN CARANDANG, SWANIE CARANDANG and MARILO
CARANDANG,petitioners,vs.POMPOSA G. VENTURANZA, and GREGORIO
VENTURANZA ,respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioners are the surviving heirs of the late
ProtacioCarandang who, during his lifetime, owned and possessed
together with his spouse Iluminada, a parcel of land.
A case was filed against spouses Carandang by the relatives of
Protacio, allegedly co-heirs to certain hereditary shares on the
land. The Carandangs sought the help of respondent Gregorio
Venturanzaa long-time neighbor, lawyer and friend, who was then a
Municipal Judge of Victoria, Oriental Mindoro.
Pursuant to the advice and assistance of the judge, the spouses
Carandang subscribed to a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of
respondent spouses Pomposa G. Venturanza and Gregorio Venturanza
(their judge friend) allegedly with the specific understanding that
after the relatives' claims shall have been fully settled, title to
the subject land would be given back to ProtacioCarandang. Because
of this, the TCT was cancelled and a new one in favor of the
Venturanzas was issued.
Because of this, the relatives of Protacio filed a case in the
CFI of Calapan, Oriental Mindoro for the declaration of nullity of
the Deed of Sale. CFI Calapan ruled that the Deed of Sale was valid
and that the Sps. Venturanza are the lawful owners and entitled to
the possession of the land described in the TCT.
CA: Denied the appeal and affirmed the ruling of the CFI
Calapan.
The Venturanzas refused to honor their alleged understanding
with the heirs. Later on, the petitioners discovered that the land
was subdivided and a new TCT was issued in the name of Pomposa. A
complaint was then filed by the heirs of Protacio against
respondent spouses before the CFI of Oriental Mindoro.
A motion to dismiss was interposed by the spouses Venturanza on
the ground of res judicata or bar by the prior judge judgment of
the same Court of First Instance in Civil Case No. 2149. The
respondent court sustained the motion to dismiss.
ISSUE: WON res judicata applies in the case at bar?
HELD:
The doctrine of res judicata is an old axiom of law, dictated by
wisdom and sanctified by age, and is founded on the broad principle
that it is to the interest of the public that there should be an
end to litigation by the same parties and their privies over a
subject once fully and fairly adjudicated.
For res judicata to apply: (a) the former judgment must be
final; (b) it must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties; (c) it must
be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be, between the
first and second actions identity of parties, of subject matter,
and of cause of action.
The existence of the first three requisites in the case at bar
is not disputed. However, Anent the criterion of identity of
parties, a situation obtains whereby the parties ProtacioCarandang
and the spouses Venturanza, formerly co-defendants in a case
brought against them, now find themselves protagonists in opposite
camps. Because of such adverse relationship, the question arises
whether or not the judgment in the first case in which both parties
were defendants is conclusive in a subsequent litigation between
the two.
We have laid down the rule in the case ofValdez v. Mendoza(89
Phil. 83) to wit:
In the United States where our theories on res judicata have
originated, a judgment in favor of two or more defendants is
conclusive on plaintiff as against them. "The estoppel however is
raised only between those who were adverse parties in the former
suit, and the judgment therein ordinarily settles nothing as to the
relative rights or liabilities of the co-plaintiffs or
co-defendants inter sese, unless their hostile or conflicting claim
were actually brought in issue." *** "by cross-petition or separate
and adverse answers" (50 C.J.S. pp. 372, 373 citing many cases)
(See also 30 Am. Jur. 233).
Based on the above ruling, there can be no identity of parties
between the first and second cases as to bar the latter case.
Moreover the qualifications to the above rule are, themselves,
not applicable.
In the above-cited case, where this Court laid down the
foregoing rule, we held that estoppel does not work against
co-parties in a prior case "unless their hostile or conflicting
claims were actually brought in issue" ... "by cross-petition or
separate and adverse answers (50 C.J.S. 372, 373; 30 AM. Jur.
233)." No such thing appears in the records so as to bring the
present case under the above qualification to the rule. The
petitioners' present claims have never been set forth in Civil Case
No. R-2149, nor were they litigated therein. Only insofar as the
decision of the respondent court in the earlier case declares the
Deed of Sale between deceased ProtacioCarandang and the spouses
Venturanza valid and subsisting between them will the rule ofres
judicataapply. But even if the judgment rendered upon the validity
of the deed of sale between the parties in Civil Case No. 2149 is
conclusive between the same parties in the subsequent action, Civil
Case No. 2480 involving the same deed of sale, the petitioners'
case is not anchored on this issue. This brings us to the question
of identity of causes of action.
Respondents allege that the main issue in both cases is the
question of ownership. They state that this question has been
adjuged in their favor and they may no longer be sued by
petitioners on the same cause. At first blush, the validity of such
an argument appears convincing. However, a more careful study of
the respective contentions of the parties inclines us to uphold the
contrary. The present cause of action is not a basis for a finding
of res judicata.
A comparison alone of the complaints in both cases reveals a
difference in objectives. Civil Case No. R-2149 brought by Trinidad
Moreno and others against the parties herein had for its purpose
the annulment of the sale of the property under litigation and the
recovery of hereditary rights. On the other hand, Civil Case No.
R-2480 brought by the petitioners against the spouses Venturanza
seeks the reconveyance of property or recovery of ownership on the
basis of a trust agreement between the parties. Petitioners do not
seek the annulment of the Deed of Sale which they had executed in
favor of the respondents nor do they question the respondents'
ownership of the property by virtue of the deed. Rather, the
petitioners pray for the enforcement of the trust agreement between
the parties under Article 1453 of the Civil Code to wit:
When a property is conveyed to a person in reliance upon his
declared intention to hold it for, or transfer it to another or the
grantor, there is an implied trust in favor of the person whose
benefit is contemplated.
Thus, though the ownership of the respondents by virtue of the
deed of sale executed in their favor by petitioners may have been
established, the question of ownership on the basis of the trust
agreement between the same parties was not adjudicated by the court
in Civil Case No. R-2149. Therefore, the judgment in the earlier
case cannot bar the petitioners' present cause of action which is
founded on facts and law different from those of the previous case
involving them. As held inHeirs of Roxas v. Galindo, et. al(108
Phil. 582) andViray v. Marinas(49 SCRA 44) "where the second action
between the same parties is upon a different claim or demand, the
judgment in the prior action operates as an estoppel only as to
those matters in issue or points controverted upon which the
finding or judgment was rendered. In fine, the previous judgment is
conclusive in the second case, only as to those matters actually
and directly controverted and determined and not as to matters
merely involved therein." This is the rule on conclusiveness of
judgment embodied in Subdivision c, Section 49, Rule 39 of the
Revised Rules of Court, which must be interpreted and its
applicability ascertained in the case at bar and not the doctrine
of res judicata, which respondent spouses invoke to bar the
petitioners' claims.MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner, vs. COURT
OF APPEALS and PEDRO J. VELASCO, respondents.
G.R. No. L-33794 | May 31, 1982
FACTS: (This is the Petition for Review of the Nuisance case in
Property Casis; remember the buzzing sound from Meralco site.)
Respondent Velasco purchased 3 lots located at the corner of the
then South D and South 6 Streets of Quezon City from PHHC. These
lots are to be used for residential purposes only. He sold two lots
to petitioner Manila Electric Company. MERALCO established a
substation within the property.
Velasco wrote a letter to MERALCO stating that he and his family
tried to tolerate it for a while, but the severe noise and the
electrification of the ground, especially that in which the
artesian well of the undersigned is located, made life of the whole
family unbearable.
Thereafter, Velasco filed a complaint (the NUISANCE CASE) before
the CFI praying that Meralco be ordered "to remove and abate the
nuisances herein complained against," with damages. The Trial Court
dismissed the complaint but, on appeal to this Court (our long
property case!), the dismissal was set aside and Meralco was
ordered to either transfer its sub-station or take appropriate
measures to reduce its noise at the property line between the
defendant company's compound and that of the plaintiff-appellant to
an average of 40 to 50 decibels within 90 days from finality of the
decision.
Meanwhile, Velasco instituted another complaint (the
CANCELLATION CASE) for the rescission of the sale of the property
to Meralco and to collect rentals for the use and occupation of the
property while in the latter's possession. The complaint was
dismissed by the Trial Court on the ground that two cases split
Velascos cause of action such that the CANCELLATION CASE was
precluded from being instituted.
CA reversed TC considering that abatement of nuisance was
distinct and separate from rescission of the contract of sale.
ISSUE: Whether or not the two cases split a single cause of
action
HELD: No, CA was correct in that there was no splitting of a
single cause of action because the cause of action for abatement of
nuisance is different from a cause of action for cancellation of
contract. HOWEVER, it does not mean that a judicial proceeding
cannot be barred by a previous case involving another cause of
action. The principle applicable would be estoppel by judgment or,
more specifically, "collateral estoppel by judgment". [Hoag v. New
Jersey] A common statement of the rule of collateral estoppel is
that "where a question of fact essential to the judgment is
actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment,
the determination is conclusive between the parties in a subsequent
action on a different cause of action". As an aspect of the broader
doctrine of res judicata, collateral estoppel is designed to
eliminate the expense, vexation, waste, and possible inconsistent
results of duplicatory litigation.
[Cromwell vs. Sac Country] It is a finality as to the claim or
demand in controversy, concluding parties and those in privity with
them, not only as to every matter which was offered and received to
sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other
admissible matter which might have been offered for that
purpose.
When VELASCO instituted the NUISANCE CASE, he conceded, which he
is now estopped to deny, that MERALCO had the right to establish
the sub-station within the PROPERTY without violation of the
restriction to "residential purposes". What he subsequently
alleged, after the sub-station had become operative, was that the
sub-station, because of the generated noise, had become a nuisance
which should be abated. Although the propriety of the establishment
of the sub-station was not a controverted matter in the NUISANCE
CASE, it was a tacit admission on the part of VELASCO, which can
form part of an estoppel within the NUISANCE CASE. It would not be
good law to allow him now to take the position, even if he had the
right of action, that the construction of the sub-station violated
the restriction provided for by PHHC. If the present standpoint of
VELASCO should be upheld, then the procedurally wrong result would
be that, after this Court had decided that the sub-station can
remain within the PROPERTY with reduction of the noise, the
Appellate Tribunal, a subordinate tribunal, can subsequently
nullify the decision of this Court and order the removal of the
sub-station from the PROPERTY.
EXTRA ISSUES:
THE RIGHT OF ACTION.- The contract of sale between PHHC
(original owner) and VELASCO provided that only constructions
exclusively for "residential purposes" shall be built on the
PROPERTY. That requirement, naturally, was binding on VELASCO
himself, as it is also binding on MERALCO as his assignee. Be that
as it may, that contract implies that it is PHHC itself which has
the right of action against any assignee of VELASCO. Cancellation
of the title to the PROPERTY would be by virtue of the condition
imposed in the PHHC-VELASCO contract, and not by virtue of the
contract between VELASCO and MERALCO.
RESIDENTIAL PURPOSES. From the PHHC, or community, point of
view, the construction of an electric sub-station by the local
electric public service company within the subdivision can be
deemed encompassed within "residential purposes" for the simple
reason that residences are expected to be furnished with electrical
connection. If there is no electric current because of the lack of
a sub- station, the residences within the entire subdivision area
could be valueless for residential purposes.
Moreover, the authorities of Quezon City granted a permit for
the construction of the sub-station, thereby conceding that a
sub-station is not necessarily non-residential.
CONTRACTUAL ESTOPPEL.- Even if the requirement for "residential
purposes" were a condition imposed by VELASCO himself in the
contract of sale between VELASCO and MERALCO, the former can no
longer cancel the contract on the alleged violation of the
condition. When MERALCO erected the sub-station in September, 1953,
VELASCO did not object to its construction as such. Actually, what
was ultimately objected to by VELASCO was the noise of the
sub-station; but there was no original and timely objection to the
establishment itself of the sub-station as being not for
residential purposes. If there had been no noise whatsoever from
the sub-station, no controversy would have arisen.
VIRGINIA AVISADO AND JOCELYN AVISADO GARGARITA,petitioners,
vs.AMOR RUMBAUA, VICTORIA C. RUMBAUA and COURT OF
APPEALS,respondents.
Facts:
Respondents Abelardo Amor Rumbaua and Victoria Consengco-Rumbaua
(hereafter Amor and Victoria) are husband and wife, Filipinos,
residents of Jacksonville, Florida, U.S.A. On July 1, 1971,
Victoria became the registered owner of a parcel of land located on
Maayusin St., U.P. Village, Diliman, Quezon City. On June 28, 1971,
respondents Rafael and Aurora Consengco (hereafter Rafael and
Aurora) became the registered owners ofthe lot adjacent to Amor and
Victorias lot.Amor, Victoria, Rafael and Aurora contend that on or
about the second week ofFebruary 1973, they discovered that
Abelardo and petitioner Virginia Avisado (hereafter the Avisados)
were occupying both parcels of land and had built thereon a
bungalow made of strong materials.Respondents demanded that the
Avisados vacate the lots, to no avail.On December 3, 1977, Victoria
executed a special power of attorney authorizing Rafael to:
...ask, demand, sue for, recover, extrajudicially and/or
judicially, that certain real property located at Maayusin St.,
Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines, covered by and described in
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 166065 of the Register of Deeds
of Quezon City, belonging to me solely and exclusively, my title,
my title thereto being evidenced by said Transfer of Certificate
Title No. 166065, in connection thereto, to represent me in the
pre-trial and trial of that case which he will have to institute
and file for that purpose, with full power and authority to enter
into any compromise agreement with anybody under any terms and
conditions which he may deem just, proper and equitable under the
premises.
On November 17, 1978, Amor and Victoria, represented by Rafael
(and in his own capacity as co-plaintiff) and Aurora filed with the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch 16, Quezon City, a
complaint for recovery of possession of realty with damages against
the Avisados.On April 15, 1980, Rafael (in his own capacity), Amor
and Victoria (through Rafael), and Aurora entered into a compromise
agreement with the Avisados, stating:First, the Avisados (vendees)
shall pay Amor and Victoria (vendors) the amount of seventy
thousand pesos (P70,0