Civil Conflict PUBLG 080 External Factors & Civil Conflict Lecturer M. Rodwan Abouharb Ph.D. Dept. of Political Science.

Civil Conflict PUBLG 080

External Factors & Civil Conflict Lecturer M. Rodwan Abouharb Ph.D.

Dept. of Political Science

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Contribution

• Joint Impact of Human Rights Consequences of World Bank & IMF Conditionality Programs on Civil Conflict

• Conditionality Programs Worsen Violence Through– Negotiations Effects– Short Term Implementation Effects– Longer Term Cumulative Effects

• Importance of Selection Effects

• Higher levels of civil conflict one of the major predictors of human rights violations as government respond to anti-government violence with repression.

• Part of a Larger Research Project

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The Question

• Do World Bank & IMF Conditionality Programs increase or reduce levels of civil conflict?

In Particular:• Anti government protest• Riots and • Rebellion

Negotiation Effects of World Bank & IMF Conditionality Programs on Civil Conflict

• The act of going to the World Bank or IMF in need of a programme is a mark of particular government weakness

• Governments in economic difficulty more likely to seek programme.

• Opposition groups will use this signal of weakness as an opportune time to engage in politically motivated rebellion.

• Example: Nigeria, going to the IMF was viewed by the public with ‘vehement popular antipathy’ (Callagy 1990: 269) resulting in a military coup when the government entered into a conditionality programme with the IMF.

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Implementation of Conditionality Programmes on Civil Conflict • Short Term

– Policy Changes mandated by the Bank & Fund increase peoples uncertainty about economic future – leading to more protest and low levels of violence as opposition parties utilize widespread opposition for

their own political gain.

• Longer Term– Cumulative failure of these programmes to promote broad based economic growth generate feelings of

relative deprivation and grievance towards government increasing likelihood of civil conflict.

• Civil Conflict Consequences of Structural Adjustment Programmes – Neo-Liberal Perspective: SAPs promote– Economic growth wealth generation domestic peace less repression

– Critical Perspective: SAPs worsen – Harsh policies cutbacks and lower economic growth worsen situation for most protest more repression

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The Need for a Selection Model in Implementation Arguments

• Systemic Relationship: – World Bank & IMF Conditionality Programmes are Non-

Random.– The Determinants and Consequences of Conditionality

Programmes are Linked.– May be that the underlying factors that increase the

likelihood of receiving an Conditionality Programmes such as poverty economic difficulty also change likelihood of civil conflict

Hypotheses

• Negotiations Effects– H1: The successful negotiation of an Conditionality

Programmes increases the probability of rebellion onset.

• Implementation Effects – H2: Short Term implementation effects of Conditionality

Programmes increases the likelihood of Civil Conflict– H3: The cumulative implementation effects of Conditionality

Programmes have a ‘u’ shaped impact on the likelihood of Civil Conflict

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Results: Negotiation Effects of Conditionality Programmes on Civil Conflict

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Table 4 The Effects of Entering into Structural Adjustment Agreements on the Probability of Rebellioni & the Short-term Implementation Effects on the Prevalence of Anti-government Demonstrations and Riotsii 1981-2003, All Developing Countries

Negotiation Effects Short-term Implementation Effects Column I Column II Column III Column IV Column V Column VI

Rebellion Rebellion,

Selection Not Accounted

Demonstrations Demonstration, Selection Not Accounted

Riots Riots, Selection Not Accounted

Entering/ Short-term Implementation of SAA

0.361̂ (0.249)

0.393* (0.236)

0.322** (0.136)

0.277* (0.144)

0.368* (0.194)

0.307* (0.180)

World Bank & IMF Selection Effects

1.134̂ (0.835) — 0.183

(0.477) — 0.827̂ (0.554) —

Physical Integrity Rights Index -0.363*** (0.084)

-0.325*** (0.080)

-0.119*** (0.035)

-0.144*** (0.036)

-0.104** (0.043)

-0.156*** (0.049)

Physical Quality of Life Index -0.023* (0.011)

-0.007 (0.01)

0.032*** (0.007)

0.033*** (0.007)

0.021** (0.009)

0.020** (0.007)

GDP per capita -2.84E-7 (9.29E-5)

-8.37E-5̂ (6.03E-5)

-4.31E-5 (3.94E-5)

-2.48E-5̂ (1.66E-5)

-1.32E-4* (7.96E-5)

-5.84E-5** (2.23E-5)

Population Density -1.41E-8 (5.32E-7)

-1.08E-7 (4.84E-7)

6.20E-7* (2.70E-7)

4.56E-7** (1.75E-7)

4.88E-7** (1.95E-7)

6.33E-7* (3.03E-7)

Anocracy 0.388 (0.428)

0.460̂ (0.304)

0.368* (0.218)

0.466* (0.202)

0.180 (0.245)

-0.014 (0.238)

Ethnic Heterogeneity 0.011* (0.005)

0.011** (0.004)

-0.0004 (0.002)

0.001 (0.002)

0.001 (0.002)

0.003 (0.003)

Regime Durability 0.004 (0.010)

-0.002 (0.0085)

-0.008̂ (0.005)

0.0006 (0.003)

-0.001 (0.005)

0.008̂ (0.005)

Trade 0.007* (0.004)

0.003 (0.004)

-0.007** (0.003)

-0.008*** (0.002)

-0.004̂ (0.003)

-0.004 (0.003)

Log of Primary Commodity Exports

-0.449* (0.211)

-0.423* (0.186) — — -0.366***

(0.117) -0.327* (0.146)

Log of Fuel Exports 0.016*** (0.005)

0.014*** (0.004)

-0.001 (0.003)

-0.006* (0.003)

0.013*** (0.003)

0.008* (0.004)

Log of Mountainous States 0.041 (0.097)

0.004 (0.095) — — — —

Lagged Dependent Variable — — 0.250*** (0.030)

0.266*** (0.031)

0.262*** (0.059)

0.299*** (0.058)

Constant -3.488** (1.216)

-3.370*** (1.039)

-5.311*** (0.537)

-5.294*** (0.519)

-6.591*** (0.621)

-6.162*** (0.688)

(Pseudo) R2 0.144 0.144 — — — — N 1644 2039 1461 2203 1453 2193 Note: All significance tests are one-tailed: ̂ p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. Estimated with robust standard errors clustered on country.

Results: Cumulative Effects of Conditionality Programmes on Civil Conflict

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Table 5 The Cumulative Effect of Structural Adjustment Agreements on the Prevalence of Civil Conflict 1981-2003, All Developing Countriesi

Rebellion

Rebellion, Selection

Not Accounted

Demonstrations Demonstrations, Selection Not Accounted

Riots Riots

Selection Not Accounted

Proportion of Time spent under a World Bank or IMF SAA

-3.46E-5 (7.89E-4)

-0.001* (0.0006)

-0.006 (0.007)

-0.004 (0.005)

-0.008* (0.004)

-0.006* (0.003)

Proportion of Time spent under a World Bank or IMF SAA²

2.15E-6 (9.57E-6

-1.44E-5* (7.85E-6)

7.87E-5 (8.87E-5)

4.16E-5 (6.54E-5)

0.0001* (0.0001)

7.46E-5* (4.49E-5)

Control Variables

World Bank & IMF Selection Effects 0.012 (0.032) — 0.428

(0.376) — 0.187 (0.182) —

Respect for Physical Integrity Rights Index

-0.006* (0.004)

-0.005* (0.003)

-0.057* (0.029)

-0.054** (0.020)

0.010 (0.013)

-0.006 (0.013)

Physical Quality of Life Index -0.0003 (0.0004)

-0.001** (0.0003)

0.007** (0.002)

0.008*** (0.002)

-0.0008 (0.001)

-0.001 (0.001)

GDP per capita 2.86E-6̂ (2.19E-6)

5.17E-6*** (9.74E-7)

-5.85E-6 (1.81E-5)

-1.28E-5** (5.34E-6)

5.00E-6 (7.99E-6)

1.34E-8 (6.20E-6)

Population Density -1.33E-8 (1.40E-8)

-1.48E-9 (1.32E-8)

-1.42E-7 (1.17E-7)

8.10E-8 (7.57E-8)

-5.31E-8 (7.01E-8)

-1.63E-7̂ (1.11E-7)

Anocracy -0.012 (0.017)

-0.005 (0.017)

0.165̂ (0.121)

0.129 (0.107)

-0.035 (0.041)

0.025 (0.036)

Regime Durability 4.55E-5 (2.67E-4)

-0.0001 (0.0001)

-0.002 (0.003)

0.0004 (0.001)

0.0003 (0.001)

-0.0006 (0.001)

Ethnic Heterogeneity 9.44E-6 (1.21E-4)

-9.47E-5 (1.31E-4)

-0.001 (0.001)

-3.38E-5 (8.19E-4)

-0.001* (0.0005)

-0.0006 (0.0004)

Trade 0.0002 (0.0002)

8.24E-5 (1.40E-4)

-0.001 (0.001)

-0.002* (0.0008)

0.001̂ (0.0006)

0.0004 (0.0004)

Log of Primary Commodity Exports -0.0025 (0.008)

0.005 (0.006) — — -0.015

(0.023) -0.003 (0.017)

Log of Fuel Exports 0.0002 (0.0002)

-4.29E-5 (1.61E-4)

-0.001 (0.001)

-0.002* (0.001)

0.0008 (0.0008)

0.0003 (0.0006)

Log of Mountainous States 0.004 (0.004)

0.005̂ (0.003) — — — —

Lagged Dependent Variable -0.376*** (0.049)

-0.376*** (0.039)

-0.872*** (0.062)

-0.817*** (0.067)

-0.367*** (0.070)

-0.324*** (0.058)

Constant -0.014 (0.040)

0.036 (0.031)

0.144 (0.211)

0.226̂ (0.163)

-0.040 (0.105)

0.128 (0.119)

(Pseudo) R2 0.140 0.140 0.320 0.297 0.144 0.123 N 1583 2417 1398 2105 1390 2095 Note: All significance tests are one-tailed: ̂ p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. Estimated with robust standard errors clustered on country. i Data availability limits the period examined to 2001 for Riots and Demonstrations.

Results Summary

• Negotiation of a Conditionality Programmes + Rebellion (Predicted Probabilities +44% Increase in likelihood of Rebellion

• Short Term Implementation Effects+ Anti Government Demonstrations (+32% likelihood)

+ Riots (+45% likelihood)

• Cumulative Implementation Effects +‘U’ shaped relationship between Conditionality Programmes

implementation and likelihood of rebellion

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Conclusions

• What do we know?• World Bank & IMF Conditionality Programmes increase

likelihood of civil conflict in loan recipient countries.• Links to human rights violations, civil conflict significant

predictor of human rights repression. • International Financial Institutions domestic political effects

in developing countries beyond issues of economic growth or decline.

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Table 3 Logit Equation: Which Governments Enter Into Structural Adjustment Agreements with the World Bank & IMF 1981-2003, All Developing Countries Entering into a Structural Adjustment Agreement

World Bank & IMF SAA Direction of Coefficient

Economic Factors

Debt as a Proportion of GNP 0.081*** (0.013)

GDP Per Capita -2.53E-5 (4.01E-5)

Exchange Rate Value 2.71E-5̂ (1.74E-5)

Average Foreign Currency Reserves -0.048* (0.024)

Extent of International Trade -0.009*** (0.003)

Change in GDP Per Capita -0.025* (0.012)

Human Rights CIRI: Physical Integrity Rights Index 0.111***

(0.032) Level of Respect: Workers Rights -0.070

(0.085) Physical Quality of Life Index 0.007

(0.006) International Political Factors Log of Population 0.11*

(0.060) Cold War -0.073

(0.131) Alliance with United States¹ -0.811

(0.151) Domestic Political Factors Level of Democracy -0.003

(0.018) Conflict Proneness Factors Rebellion 0.082

(0.073) Interstate Conflict -0.069

(0.141) International Financial Institutional Factors Number of Countries under SAAs 0.035***

(0.005) Constant -3.879***

(1.116) N 1914 Pseudo R2 0.143 P>| z .1̂ .05*, .01**, .001*** ¹The model also included previous colonial or dependent relationship with France, Japan, the United Kingdom or the United States. Countries with previously colonial or dependent relationships were more likely to receive a program from either institution at the .01 level of confidence. Models are estimated with robust standard errors, with one-tailed significant tests. Cubic splines were used to control for temporal dependence.