City-County Consolidation: Reshaping the Local Government Landscape Suzanne M. Leland Associate Professor University of North Carolina at Charlotte.

City-County Consolidation:Reshaping the Local Government Landscape

Suzanne M. Leland

Associate Professor

University of North Carolina at Charlotte

City-County Consolidation

When a county and the cities within a county merge to form a single government entity

Boundary lines of the jurisdictions become coterminous

Most visible and comprehensive change in the local government landscape

Consolidation Trends: The Exotic, Evergreen issue…Long odds… 100+ attempts since 1970, only 19 passages (total

of 37 governments) Slightly more than 1% of all county governments Political Infeasible? 85% fail rate on referendum Ten cases enacted by the legislature (New

Orleans, UniGov) Twenty-seven by referendum (KCK, Louisville)

Number of Attempts Per County Size Since 1970

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Population in Thousands

Num

ber o

f Atte

mpt

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Number of City-County Referenda by State Since 1970

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

Num

ber o

f Atte

mpt

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City-County Consolidation Attempts Since 1970

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Year

Num

ber o

f Att

empt

s

Repeat City-County Consolidation Attempts Since 1970

0 1 2 3 4 5 6

Albequerque, Bernailillo

Anchorage et al, Greater Anchorage

Ashland & Catlettsburg, Boyd

Athens, C larke

Augusta, Richmond

Chattanooga, Hamilton

C larksville, Montgomery

Des Moines, Polk

Frankfort, Franklin

Gainesville, Alachua

Griffi n, Spalding

Haines, Haines Borough

Kingsport, Sullivan

Knoxville, Knox

Louisville, J eff erson

Macon, Bibb

Missoula, Missoula

Okeechobee, Okeeckobee

Sacremento, Sacremento

Tallahassee, Leon

Tampa, Hillsborough

Wilmington, New Hanover

Number of Attempts

The C3 project

What factors affect the outcome of an effort to consolidate two local governments?

What factors affect the outcome of an effort to consolidate two local governments?

Base Model: Rosenbaum & Kammerer (1974)

C3 Model: Draws from Messinger (1989), Johnson & Feiock (1999), & Feiock& Carr (2000).

Base Model: Rosenbaum & Kammerer

Two-Case Comparative Study Design Jacksonville (passed) vs. Tampa (failed) Rare Sequence of events in Jacksonville

became Rosenbaum and Kammerer (R & K) model

Base Model: Rosenbaum & KammererThe Crisis Climate

Rapid population changes or major demographic shifts Dramatic change in the ethnic or social base/under representation Physical blight in the core city. Decline in the quantity or quality of public services. Economic decline in the city, especially when compared to the suburbs. Rapid infusion of population into unincorporated areas

Demands for Government Response:

Annexation

Economic Development Tax Shifts

Base Model: Rosenbaum & Kammerer Decision

for Public Officials

Effective or Appropriate Response to Demands for Change:AnnexationEconomic DevelopmentTax Shifts

No Consolidation

Power Deflation

Base Model: Rosenbaum & Kammerer

Decision for

Public OfficialsEmergence of

Consolidation Entrepreneurs

Civic ElitesMass MediaChamber of Commerce

Ineffective or Inappropriate Response to Demands for Change

Accelerator Event:Scandal

Lost Leader

Exo-Criticism

Exo-Crisis

Community Emergency

Base Model: Rosenbaum & Kammerer

No Consolidation

Creation of Study Commission

Civic Elites

Mass Media

Chamber of Commerce Decision

for Citizens

City-County Consol.CharterReferendum

RevolutionaryConsolidation

NO!

YES!

C3 Model: Enhanced R & K Model

In s titu t ion a l C o n te xt

L e g a l F ra m e w o rkR e p ea t A tte m p t(s)

S o c io e co n o m ic F a c to rs/R a c ia l D ive rs ityIL A s /U rb an -S u bu rb an M ix

No Consolidation

Decision for Public Officials

The Crisis ClimateRapid population changes or major demographic shiftsDramatic change in the ethnic or social base/underrepresentationPhysical blight in the core city.Decline in the quantity or quality of public services.Economic decline in the city, especially when compared to the suburbs.Rapid infusion of population into unincorporated areas

Emergence of Consolidation Entrepreneurs:Civic ElitesMass MediaChamber of Commerce

Ineffective or Inappropriate Response to Demands for Change

Demands for Government Response:AnnexationEconomic Devt.Tax Shifts

Effective or Appropriate Response to Demands for Change:AnnexationEconomic DevelopmentTax Shifts

Accelerator Event:ScandalLost LeaderExo-CriticismExo-CrisisCommunity Emergency

Creation of Study CommissionCivic ElitesMass MediaChamber of Commerce

Decision for

Citizens

City-County Consolidation Referendum

RevolutionaryConsolidation!

Rosenbaum & Kammerer: Problems

Institutional Context Missing (Leland & Thurmaier 2004)

Elite Role Unclear (Feiok & Carr 2000, & Fleischman 2000)

Discussion of Charter Incomplete (Johnson & Feiock (1999)

Discussion of Charter Campaign Incomplete (Leland & Thurmaier 2004, 2005)

The C3 Model: A Tale of Two Campaigns (Leland & Thurmaier 2004)

Looks at Institutional Context Development and Constitutional Politics Role of Elites The Devilish Details of C3 Charters

Consolidation Case Year Successful Unsuccessful Continuing

Jacksonville/Duval County, FL (1967) X

Columbus/Muscogee, GA (1970) X

Tallahassee/Leon, FL (1976) X X

Sacramento/Sacramento County, CA (1990) X

Athens/Clarke County, GA (1990) X

Lafayette Parish/City of Lafayette, LA (1992) X

Branch/North Branch, MN (1994) X

Des Moines/Polk County, IA (1994) X X

Augusta/Richmond County, GA (1995) X

Wilmington/New Hanover, NC (1995) X X

Knoxville/Knox County, TN (1996) X

Wyandotte County/KCK (1997) X

Louisville/Jefferson County, KY (2001) X

Total of 13 Cases 8 5(15) 2

The C3 Model: A Tale of Two Campaigns

The C3 Model: A Tale of Two CampaignsInstitutional Framework: Does not significantly affect the ability of consolidation proponents to obtain passage

Crisis Climate: No support found for R&K that it is required to obtain passage

Governmental Response for Demand for Change: Difficult to identify the govt. response if there is no evidence of a crisis

Power Deflation: Without a crisis, there is little chance for power deflation (lack of citizen confidence in governing structure).

Accelerator Events: Not required.

What accounts for successful cases? Development and Constitutional Politics Getting a charter commission and charter proposal is

first part of the process Getting to a charter commission is about

development politics—spurred by economic development elites who want streamlined processing, holistic planning, and economies of scale for development.

The C3 Model: A Tale of Two CampaignsDevelopment and Constitutional Politics Proposing a charter and getting it passed is about

constitutional politics The heart of the issue is convincing voters that the

current government structure is broken! Only consolidation can fix it!

Requires a shift in argument from Economic development politics to Constitutional politics: a much higher standard to meet!

The C3 Model: A Tale of Two CampaignsThe Role of Elites Civic elites who have pushed the process to the

point of a consolidation study commission, even to the point of a draft charter, need to shift perspectives to constitutional politics.

Constitutional politics requires a professional political campaign with disciplined campaign message, broad-based support of good government groups and charter members.

Significant opposition from key elites—particularly the sheriff—can spell doom for the referendum effort.

The C3 Model: A Tale of Two CampaignsThe Devilish Details of C3 Charters Taxes Debt Assumption (or not!) Council Structure Chief Executive(s) Minor Municipalities Law Enforcement

The C3 Model: A Tale of Two CampaignsThe Devilish Details of C3 Charters Taxes

Separate districts (urban and rural) common Pledges to freeze (or reduce) tax growth helpful

Debt Avoiding assumption of debt helpful Removing municipal utilities from merger helpful

The C3 Model: A Tale of Two CampaignsThe Devilish Details of C3 Charters Council Structure

Mixed district and at-large helpful Preserving minority representation essential

Chief Executive(s) Chief Elected officer often appoints

chief administrative officer

Issue: how is government professionalization increased?

The C3 Model: A Tale of Two CampaignsThe Devilish Details of C3 Charters Minor Municipalities

Usually exempted from forced consolidation Always able to vote on consolidation referendum (Dual

Majority often) Have yet to know of a minor municipality that opted into a

consolidated government

The C3 Model: A Tale of Two CampaignsThe Devilish Details of C3 Charters Law Enforcement

Single most volatile issue in consolidations Successful cases include situations where

Previous law enforcement consolidation was accepted and comfortable for elected sheriff

Sheriff responsible for court protection and jail administration Unsuccessful cases often have sheriff opposed

Vocal, independent voice capable of opposition leadership Law enforcement unions can rally behind sheriff, with $$

C3 Model Findings(Leland & Thurmaier 2004, 2005) Most consolidations fail, at least on first attempt A crisis climate is a foundation, necessary but

insufficient cause for consolidation Persistence of elites more important than a catalytic

or accelerator event Professional campaign based on constitutional

politics is very important (no poison pills) Law enforcement support or neutrality is essential

Conclusions:

The larger the percentage of the county covered by the major municipality, the more likely consolidation will pass

The smaller the net change in population (over the past ten years) the more likely consolidation will pass

Conclusions:

Exclusion of minor municipalities not significant if dual maj. not required

Having an elected sheriff, not significant—more about power arrangements

Economic decline (Unemployment) not significant

State Delegation Approval Required, not significant

Level of fragmentation within the county, not significant

Predicted Results for Combinations of Consolidation Campaigns

Strength of Pro-consolidation campaign

Strong Arguments(Economic

Development)

Weak Arguments(Efficiency,

equity)

Strength ofAnti-

Consolidation Campaign

Strong opposition

LouisvilleKansas CityJacksonville

Even Odds

Des MoinesWilmington

Fail

Weak opposition

Favorable Odds 

AthensAugusta

ColumbusLafayette

Fail KnoxvilleSacramentoTallahassee

Source: Adapted from Leland and Thurmaier (2004), p. 316 

Common Elements Across Successful Consolidation Referendum:

The ability of civic elites to define the economic development vision for the community and then successfully convince the average voter that the existing political structure was inadequate to support and implement that vision and that the solution lay in consolidation.

Survey of Academics for UniGovConsensus that Consolidation would:

Improve technical efficiency of services Improve economic development for the region Reduce urban-suburban inequalities Encourage uniform service provision Not result in lower taxes Not result in employee dissatisfaction

Academics Surveyed Disagreed on whether consolidation would improve:

Accountability

Diversity of elected officials

Citizen Participation/Involvement

Thank you for your time!

Questions? Comments?