Citizenship orientations in a divided society: A comparison of three groups of Israeli junior-high students—secular Jews, religious Jews, and Israeli Arabs

Education, Citizenship andSocial Justice

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DOI: 10.1177/1746197913497662esj.sagepub.com

ecsjCitizenship orientations in a divided society: A comparison of three groups of Israeli junior-high students—secular Jews, religious Jews, and Israeli Arabs

Clara SabbaghUniversity of Haifa, Israel

Nura ReshHebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel

AbstractThis study identifies major preferences for combinations of rights and duties (henceforth, citizenship orientations), as reflected in the political worldview of Israeli junior-high school students. Two distinct orientations were found, termed here as ‘liberal’ and ‘ethno-republican’. In order to contextualize the examination of citizenship orientations in the deeply divided Israeli society, the study compares three educational sectors that represent these rifts. Findings suggest that citizenship orientations are context-bound, in the sense that they depend upon the educational sector. As expected, ethno-republican orientations were more salient among religious Jewish students than among either secular Jewish or Israeli Arab students. Secular Jewish and Israeli Arab students tend more strongly to endorse the liberal orientation, a propensity that is especially manifest among Arab adolescents. This trend supports the perception that Israeli-Jewish population is bifurcated.

KeywordsCitizenship, social justice, Israel, adolescence, Jews, Arabs

In a society, the notion of citizenship is manifested in legal and governmental provisions to ensure individuals’ full membership as citizens (Shafir and Peled, 2002). Thus, the relations between individuals, groups, and the State are defined by a set of criteria which determine the allocation of rights and duties across social spheres. Rights, whether social, civil, or political, are usually defined as normative rules stipulated by a social or legal system that dictate what is bestowed on, or denied

Corresponding author:Clara Sabbagh, Department of Leadership & Policy in Education, University of Haifa, Mount Carmel, Haifa 31905, Israel.Email: [email protected]

497662 ESJ0010.1177/1746197913497662Education, Citizenship and Social JusticeSabbagh and Resh2013

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to, people; duties are obligations that people are expected to fulfill to ensure the durability of the existing polity (Callan, 2004; Marshall, 1964). In this study, we focus on civil (liberal) rights—which are preconditions for individual freedom—such as the freedom of speech, thought and per-suasion, and on the limitations of these rights, which constitute citizens’ duties to the state aimed to promote its welfare. These normative concepts to a large extent demarcate membership in Israeli society, which is the object of our study.

Our choice of young population for the purposes of this research rests on the assumption that notions of citizenship are inculcated into the young generation by different socialization agen-cies, such as families, schools, mass media, the army, and the government (Galston, 2001; Sapiro, 2004), and are therefore at the core of civic education (Arieli, 2009; Callan, 2004; Mulhall and Swift, 1992). Recent studies of citizenship and its implications for education have extensively investigated the various institutional and normative aspects of this notion (Ginsburg and Kamat, 2009; Peterson, 2011; Pike, 2000; Torres, 2002). It has often been assumed that citi-zenship in general, and individuals’ citizenship orientations (COs) in particular, is cast as a uni-formly constituted body comprising a number of mutually compatible orientations pivoting on a single, unified notion of citizenship (Ichilov, 1995; Kerr et al., 2002). It has been observed, however, that individuals may simultaneously espouse different rights and duties and assign each of them a different weight. Such a pattern results in a variety of CO profiles, each represent-ing a particular conception of political justice (Law, 2006; Soysal, 1994). Accordingly, we defined CO as the relative weight assigned by an individual to the various rights and duties entailed by his or her membership in a state (e.g. Myers and Zaman, 2009; Theiss-Morse, 1993). As mentioned above, individuals typically vary in their preferences in this regard, and the vari-ous combinations of priorities in terms of rights and duties yield different profiles of CO. For instance, some may strongly support personal liberty and downplay or even deny the importance of state censorship, others may abide by the state censorship but willingly dispense with a meas-ure of personal liberty, yet others may embrace both notions. Thus, we assume that the combina-tions of differently weighted rights and duties, that is, COs, may vary across democratic nation-states as well as between groups within a single state.

In light of these possible scenarios, this study has two primary goals. The first is to identify major profiles of CO, as reflected in the political worldview of Israeli junior-high school students. The second is to contextualize the examination of COs in Israel, insofar as Israeli society is char-acterized by deep ethnic and class divisions. To the extent that the major divides in Israeli society are represented by educational sectors, we will attempt to examine the variation of COs across three such sectors, namely, secular Jewish, religious Jewish, and Israeli Arab. In the following sec-tion, we outline the approach to COs followed in this study, and then elaborate on specific aspects of these conceptions in the Israeli context.

Theoretical background

Two models of citizenship: liberal versus republican

As indicated above, in Western democracies, the notion of citizenship revolves around the alloca-tion of various rights and duties (Marshall, 1964). By and large, two major contrasting citizenship conceptions (or discourses) have been identified: the liberal and the republican (Hope, 2008; Mulhall and Swift, 1992). Although, from an analytical perspective, these discourses represent contrasting views of citizenship, possibly stemming from different perceptions regarding the iden-tity of a given nation-state, we assume that they may coexist in a society, reflecting social and/or political cleavages (Peterson, 2011).

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The liberal conception of citizenship, which is more characteristic of Anglo-American nations, involves an unequivocal commitment to the individual and to his or her civil rights. Personal liberty is considered the most important signifier of morality (Parekh, 1993), and indi-viduals are given ontological precedence over the collective (society). This priority is expressed in the protection of rights such as the freedom of speech, conscience, and religion; the freedom of movement inside and outside the country; free exchange of ideas; the right of association; and other individual rights that are necessary to secure popular control over the process of collective decision making (Beetham, 1993; Hanasz, 2006). Liberal rights also entail that the State avoids excessive use of power and coercion, for example, torture, that abuses basic human rights (Brooks, 2008).

The role of the State, which is perceived as essentially a coercive and compulsory institution, is confined to the protection of the universal right to freedom (Parekh, 1993). The guiding principle of this approach is that the scope of the government’s intervention policies and control over a wide range of social domains should be limited. Moreover, the protection of individual freedom is achieved in the polis demos through granting political equality, which in turn guarantees that peo-ple can exercise freedom and sovereignty over their common affairs (Held, 1993a). Thus, under the liberal conception of citizenship, the individual’s role as a bearer of a set of rights is, politically, rather passive (e.g. private interests are conserved) (Beiner, 1995).

The republican approach in this regard is fundamentally different. According to it, individual liberty and self-fulfillment, is possible only in and through a commonwealth (polis res publica), where individuals live together and safeguard a secure and self-governing res publica (Hanasz, 2006; Pettit, 1997). In other words, the claims of the republic (i.e. the State) are assigned priority over those of the individual citizen and individual rights (Hanasz, 2006; Held, 1993b). Citizenship, in accordance with this ideal, is conceived as a political commitment whereby citizens are engaged in public service and actively participate in the shaping of collective life (promoting the common good) as well as the duties associated with it. Thus, civic activity, which is perceived as fulfilling one’s duties and abiding by the laws of the country (Hanasz, 2006), is both an expression and a condition of citizenship (Peled, 1992).

As elaborated in the following section, our article focuses on a specific form of republicanism known as ethno-republicanism or ethno-nationalism (hereafter, ethno-republican) (Peled, 2008; Shafir and Peled, 2002), which in Israeli society is represented by a major discourse centered on citizenship. As discussed above, republicanism emphasizes the importance of the collective as an arena for demonstrating one’s civic virtue, which is conceived of as ones’ path to liberation and political self-fulfillment. Under ethno-republicanism, an individual’s participation in the collective is first and foremost based on his or her ethnic origin and only after that on his political and social contribution (for other approaches to republicanism, see Peterson, 2011). This is so because one’s contribution to society, along with other signifiers of civic virtues, becomes an instrument for moral and material screening of (ethnic) groups, which in turn lays the foundation for a cultural hierarchy. That is, these virtues uncover a referential structure that characterizes different (ethnic) groups by the degree of their contribution to society and corresponding rewards (Berger et al., 1983). Thus, in the cultural hierarchy, a higher status value is assigned to certain (ethnic) groups because they are perceived as contributing more to achieving collective goals. To the extent that ethno-republicanism is premised on ethnic-based contribution to the advancement of the collective endeavor, it is bound to encourage and promote political inequality: higher status (ethnic) groups which are perceived as contributing more to the collective good than lower status (ethnic) groups will receive greater rewards in the form of recognition and influence. We can now formulate our first hypothesis.


Hypothesis 1. Respondents who endorse the liberal conception of citizenship will prefer politi-cal equality over inequality; conversely, proponents of the ethno-republican citizenship concep-tion will prefer political inequality over equality.

The Israeli case

The influence of Jewish history and religion on the State of Israel (founded in 1948) has resulted in ambivalent liberal and ethno-republican conceptions of citizenship among the Israeli citizens. The ensuing tension is expressed in a large number of mutually conflicting ‘citizenship discourses’ (Shafir and Peled, 2002) that reflect Israeli society’s dual identity as a state that is both Jewish and democratic (Cohen, 1989; Smooha, 1978; Yiftachel, 2006). Drawn from social and Western liberal ideologies, the Israeli conception of citizenship is essentially liberal, professing the granting of civil, political, and social rights to all citizens regardless of religion, race, or gender. While not anchored in a constitution, this liberal conception of equal civil rights is explicitly laid down in the Declaration of Independence.

At the time the State of Israel was established, the clause of the Declaration that guarantees freedom of religion, consciousness, language, education, and culture targeted primarily the sizea-ble Arab population (a minority of about 20%), which had lived in this land for generations. Thus, this liberal conception expressed a commitment to universal citizenship that is applied to all citi-zens (Kimmerling, 1985). However, as will be shown below, from the inception of the State of Israel, this ideology has existed side by side with the ethno-republican notion of citizenship, and the relative importance of each has fluctuated depending on the historical period.

Until the late 1970s, the ethno-republican conception of citizenship predominated (Peled, 1992). This conception can be traced to the Zionist Labor movement and its hegemonic nation-building ethos (Eisenstadt, 1967). The Labor movement was composed mainly of Ashkenazi (i.e. Jews of European descent) pioneer immigrants and their offspring, who were the ruling elite for almost 30 years after the establishment of the State (Horowitz and Lissak, 1978; Shalev, 1992). Rooted in ideological sources of Zionism, but also in Jewish religion, the ethno-republican worldview assumed that a Jewish (ethnic) descent is a necessary and sufficient condition for belonging to the collectivity. This particularistic commitment is expressed in the Law of Return, which grants auto-matic and full citizenship to any Jew who immigrates to Israel (Horowitz and Lissak, 1978). In addition, Jewish citizens were expected to actively contribute to the Jewish-Zionist national redemption and to generally protect and enhance the common good in any possible way (Peled, 1992). This ethno-republican conception of citizenship was epitomized in the Zionist hegemonic ethos of halutziut (Jewish pioneering), which aimed at establishing a distinctive Jewish national life according to Zionist secular ideology and stressed that citizens are expected to invest in national goals, sacrifice personal comfort, and play down personal achievement and material gratification (see also Kimmerling, 1985; Roniger and Feige, 1992).

In other words, this ethos assigned the greatest weight to the State and nation-building, thus giving priority to the collective. A major signifier of this Jewish pioneering ethos has been mili-tary service. As Israeli society has regulated individual commitments to nation-building under conditions of belligerency with neighboring Arab countries, the notion of struggle for survival has been central in the consolidation of society and its pioneering virtue (Lomsky-Feder and Ben-Ari, 1999). Military service, particularly in combatant roles, can therefore be seen as a ‘rite of affirmation’ in which Israeli-Jews (primarily men) mark their engagement in redemptive activities of contribution. As a result, the army is a powerful institution in Israeli society that has a strong impact on the collective management of the State, on policy decisions, and on the

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personal life cycles of individuals (Kimmerling, 1993). Moreover, the almost universal army service is a central experience for (Jewish) Israeli youngsters, a powerful mechanism in defining the boundaries of collective ‘belonging’, and for many, it symbolizes the essence of ‘Israeliness’ (Helman, 1997; Sasson-Levy, 2006).

This Israeli version of the republican conception is characterized by an exclusionary ethno-national bent (see also Hanasz, 2006). Specifically, it created a hierarchical structure of national and ethnic groups according to their societal contributions, thereby exacerbating the divide between the Jews and the Israeli Arabs (Peled, 2008; Smooha, 1993; Yiftachel, 2006). This pattern has endured until today: on the one hand, the Israeli Arab minority is part of the demos and thus for-mally enjoys basic liberal rights similar to the Jewish majority (Arieli, 2009; Peled and Shafir, 1996), while on the non-Jews, that is, Arab citizens are not expected, or even allowed, to take part in the Zionist pioneering enterprise of nation-building. It can thus be asserted that, in Israeli soci-ety, the Arabs have been marginalized on the basis of ethnic origin (Yonah and Shenhav, 2000).

The hold of the ethno-republican conception on the Israeli public began to weaken in the late 1970s (Doron and Kramer, 1991; Shafir and Peled, 2002). The recurrent wars (the Six-Day War in 1967, the Yom Kippur War in 1973 and the Lebanon War in 1982), coupled with the economic crisis, gradually eroded the citizens’ trust in the political and military institutions. The liberaliza-tion of economy and its concomitant integration into globalization processes in the 1990s resulted in far-reaching transformations, which have been specifically linked to the 1985 Emergency Stabilization Plan designed to deal with hyperinflation and to restore economic stability (Levi-Faur, 2000; Ram, 2000; Shafir and Peled, 2000). The plan included the implementation of policies for the liberalization of the capital market and the opening of the local market to international trade and economic deregulation. It also facilitated foreign investment by instituting free and competi-tive global trade (Hirschl, 2000; Ram, 2008; Shafir and Peled, 2002).

The so-called Constitutional Revolution of the 1990s put special emphasis on the protection of individual rights. Two constitutional laws were passed during that period: the Human Dignity and Liberty law and the Freedom of Occupation law, the latter strengthening employers’ standing vis-à-vis employees (Hirschl, 2000). These trends were accompanied by a serious retrenchment of the welfare state and weakening of social citizenship rights such as education, welfare benefits, and so on (Marshall, 1964; Shafir and Peled, 2000).

In light of these developments, Shafir and Peled (2000, 2002), as well as other scholars, have suggested that, as of the mid-1980s, the trends promoting economic and legal liberalization have gradually pushed out the ethno-republican conception of citizenship (Adres et al., 2011; Hazan, 2001; Ram, 2008). This has also been evident in an erosion of the centrality of the army and of the importance attributed to military service as a major contribution to Israeli society—especially in the wake of the 1982 Lebanon war (Levy et al., 2007).

It can be argued, however, that in the highly heterogeneous Israeli society, both the liberal and the ethno-republican conception have survived but are endorsed to a various extent by the three major population groups: secular Jews, national-religious Jews, and Israeli Arabs1 (Lomsky-Feder, 2011; Ram, 2008). Furthermore, the two Jewish groups are bifurcated in terms of their civic identi-ties and socioeconomic position.

The secular Jewish sector, comprising to a greater proportion of well-to-do Ashkenazi (Jews of European-American descent), typically residents of large and affluent cities in the central areas of the country, is a group that benefited the most from the increasing Israeli legal and economic lib-eralization trends (Ram, 2008). Unsurprisingly, it endorses more strongly than other sectors the liberal conception of citizenship, which gives precedence to individualized lifestyles over the ethno-republican values (Ram, 2008).


The national-orthodox sector (religious Jews), which includes a greater proportion of Mizrahi (Jews of Middle-East and North-African descent) groups, were part of the Zionist movement and since the establishment of the state joined all political coalitions. The goal of the national-orthodox has been to merge religious Jewish lifestyle with secular principles of the Zionist national movement. However, following the Six-Day War (1967), in which Israel occu-pied Palestinian territories in the West Bank, Gaza, and the Golan heights, the national-orthodox sector has emphasized a utopian and messianic dimension of the hegemonic ethno-republican pioneering ethos, proclaiming that making a contribution to the Jewish collective is tantamount to fulfilling the religious commandment to settle in these newly occupied territories (Rapoport et al., 1994). They have also manifested a great zeal for the army service, seeing it as the epit-ome of ethno-republican virtue (Levy et al., 2007). To the extent that this sector adheres to a fundamentalist version of the ethno-republican conception of citizenship, it has been desig-nated ‘Neo-Zionist’ (Ram, 2008).

It is worth noting that the religious Jewish group is divided to two subgroups: The national (Zionist) religious and the (growing) ultra-orthodox groups, which in recent decades are learning in separate educational sectors. The ultra-orthodox sector challenges the Zionist underpinning of the Israeli State. Unlike the nationalist-religious sector, the ultra-orthodox refrain from serving in the army. It enjoys a considerable autonomy and does not follow state core curriculum in its schools. Investigations are usually not allowed in this sector, so we did not include students from these schools in the present research.

Formally, the Israeli Arabs enjoy full citizenship rights but are nevertheless the most disadvan-taged sector among the Israeli population, as ever since the establishment of state, it has been marginalized politically and discriminated against economically. The discrimination is in line with the ethno-republican conception, which negates the idea that Arabs can be full members of Israeli society. This state of affairs is sustained by the ongoing conflict with neighboring Arab states, which puts Israeli Arabs under constant suspicion, as well as by their geographical segregation in separate communities. Arabs are discriminated against in governmental resource allocation, includ-ing in the educational system, denied access to many positions in the labor market, and excluded socially. As a response to their marginality—and in light of the increasing salience of the liberal outlook in the Israeli public discourse—the Israeli Arabs have called for transforming Israel into ‘a state for all its citizens’ (Ichilov, 2005). This demand can be perceived as a struggle for maximizing equal political standing of the Arabs within society. It should be noted, however, that similar to the political bifurcation within the Israeli-Jewish population, the Arab minority exhibits political diversity and diverse ethno-national identities. Some groups within this minority endorse the lib-eral ideas of political equality, and call for enactment of equal citizenship rights, while others chal-lenge these ideas and adopt instead political identities that strive to achieve recognition of their indigenous collective identity (see discussion below) (Yiftachel, 2006).

In our study, we focus on COs of early adolescents—junior-high school students in the State school system. Hence, in the following section, we outline the general characteristics of the Israeli school system and its three main sectors which represent the major divides specified above.

The Israeli school system: a public system characterized by sectorial division

Formal education in Israel is almost entirely public; primary and secondary schools are funded and administered by a relatively centralized Ministry of Education. Free and compulsory schooling spans 13 years: 1 year of kindergarten and 12 years of primary (grades 1–6), middle or lower-secondary (grades 7–9), and senior-secondary (grades 10–12) schooling.

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Under the umbrella of a unified national educational public system are three major semi-autonomous sectors, differentiated along national-ethnic (Jews/Arabs) and religious (secular Jews/religious-nationalist Jews) lines. Historically, these sectors evolved to meet group-specific cultural and linguistic needs, which are currently manifested in sector-specific curricular guide-lines. In light of today’s political realities, and contrary to the ethno-republican rhetoric of Statism, which emphasized the enhancement of general societal well-being and the implementation of a uniform state curriculum, these educational sectors continue to vary in terms of provision of actual curriculum, textbooks and pedagogy that are being taught (Pinson, 2004), the quantity and quality of resources allocated to them, and degree of autonomy or close supervision applied by the central administration. In other words, existing divides within Israeli society differently infil-trate schools’ overt and hidden curriculum and are noticeable in students’ COs (Ichilov, 2005; Resh and Benavot, 2009).

In the past, the ethno-republican conception was embedded in the centralized school curriculum and passed on to students by means of formal and informal educational practices (Bar-Tal and Teichman, 2005; Firer, 1985; Lemish, 2003; Pinson, 2004). In correspondence with global liberal trends, however, in the last two decades, greater emphasis with regard to educational goals and curriculum has been put on the fostering of individualized academic achievement than on collec-tive values of mutual solidarity (Pinson, 2004; Soysal and Wong, 2007). Moreover, with the increasing centrality of individual freedom, a call has been made for decentralization of govern-mental control and for greater school autonomy. This demand has resulted in the implementation, though partial, of the so-called controlled school choice policy, according to which parents are entitled to ‘freely’ choose a school for their child (for an overview, see Kashti, 1998; Shapira et al., 1991), which implies also a greater autonomy in the school curriculum.

Notwithstanding these general trends, which admittedly are conducive to a fragmentation of values, we assume that the measure of both formal and—importantly—informal autonomy given to the educational sectors has encouraged the development of a community-specific identity. The latter, in turn, has affected the curriculum and pedagogical practices, and has thereby helped to construct students’ perceptions of civic identity and values (Lemish, 2003; Pinson, 2004), creating different conceptions of citizenship, that is, different citizen orientations. We argue that students’ conceptions of citizenship in the three educational sectors reflect the mutually exclusive notions of citizenship among the three major groups of society at large (Lemish, 2003; Myers and Zaman, 2009; Pinson, 2004).

Secular Jewish educational sector. Although highly heterogeneous, the student population in the secular Jewish sector consists to a greater degree of more affluent Ashkenazi young people who live in big cities and more prestigious communities than their peers in the religious and Israeli Arab sectors. They have been described as carriers of globalized culture and ideologies (Hazan, 2001), as they are especially competent in wielding globalization-related technology (e.g. Inter-net, email, chat rooms, Facebook, and so on) and are engaged in transnational consumerism (music, movies, and cable television) (Adres et al., 2011; Lemish et al., 1998). Moreover, an analysis of both formal and informal contemporary education practices in this sector suggests that a move has occurred from the hegemonic and exclusionary Zionist citizenship discourse toward a more liberal and individualized discourse (Lomsky-Feder, 2011). This change has brought into focus and raised students’ awareness of individual rights, emphasizing tolerance toward ‘other’ ethnic and national groupings (Ichilov et al., 2005; Pinson, 2004). This sector is also characterized by a tendency to assign secular national and historical meanings to Jewish culture and tradition (Ichilov, 2005).


Jewish-national-religious educational sector. The religious-Jewish-nationalist educational sector, which represents to a greater extent a relatively disadvantaged, mostly Mizrahi (Jews of Orien-tal descent) population of students (Feniger, 2008), enjoys a relatively high degree of auton-omy. Indeed, it has become a separate unit within the Ministry of Education and has been accorded full charge of all administrative matters: it has its own school inspectors, runs sepa-rate teachers’ training programs, and has full control over the curricula and textbooks (Feniger, 2008; Pinson, 2004).

In terms of time allocation and the choice of subjects, the curriculum in the religious Jewish schools puts strong emphasis on religious Jewish and other value-oriented subjects concerned with the sacredness of the land of Israel and the redemption of the Jewish people, all too often at expense of ‘secular’ disciplines such as sciences or world history (Lemish, 2003; Pinson, 2004; Resh and Benavot, 2009). The relative autonomy of that sector, and especially the curriculum taught in its schools, facilitates the inculcation of ethno-republican orientations and discourages liberal values.

Israeli Arab educational sector. As already mentioned, the Arab minority in Israel is politically marginal and, moreover, is under an ever-present shadow of suspicion regarding their loyalty to the State. The overwhelming majority of Israeli Arabs reside in separate geographical localities (e.g. villages or towns) or in segregated neighborhoods of ethnically mixed cities (Gonen, 1996). Arab schools are almost entirely dependent on the central administration for their resources and are discriminated against in resource allocation. These factors contribute to, and facilitate, the tighter control of the Jewish hegemony over Israeli Arab schools and their cur-riculum (Al-Haj, 1995; Mazawi, 1999; Sarsur, 1985). The official curriculum of the Arab sector is very similar to that taught in secular Jewish schools, focusing on general subjects such as mathematics, science, and English. Recent decades, however, have been marked by a growing recognition of this sector’s distinctive cultural heritage and right to educate toward its own national identity (Ghanem, 2002). Although limited, these newly obtained freedoms have paved the way for a more critical view of Israeli society among Israeli Arabs. Under the cross-pres-sures of discrimination, strong Jewish control, and the nascent unique cultural identity, students may opt to discard the exclusionary ethno-republican conception in favor of the more liberal narratives, which are anchored in universal human rights and carry the promise of greater equality.

Hence, our second hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2. In comparison to the Israeli secular Jewish respondents, (1) the Israeli reli-gious Jewish respondents will favor more strongly the ethno-republican over the liberal CO, while (2) the Israeli Arab respondents will tend to favor the liberal over the ethno-republican CO.

Method

Sample

The data were collected during the 2010–2011 school year, in the framework of a comprehensive study that examines the association between different aspects of students’ justice perceptions and their civic attitudes and behavior. The sample includes a total of 5084 students in a national sample of 48 junior-high schools (grades 7–9), which in Israel are nonselective. The schools were sampled

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country-wide so as to represent the level of school composition (disadvantage index) and regions (center-periphery, correlated with socioeconomic status (SES)) across the country. Within each school, four classes were randomly selected, two from the eight and two from the ninth grade level. If classes within a given school were differentiated hierarchically (by ability or other similar indi-ces), the two classes selected from each level represented this structure (one was the ‘stronger’, while the other the ‘weaker’).2 Altogether, the secular Jewish sector was represented by 2542 stu-dents from 24 schools, the religious Jewish sector by 826 students from 9 schools, and the Israeli Arab sector by 1716 students from 15 schools.

Instrument

Students were asked to fill out an anonymous questionnaire that comprised items gauging different aspects of their civic orientations and behavior.

Dependent variable: CO cluster (or profile)

Students were asked to evaluate nine items pertaining to (1) civic individual rights such as free-doms of speech and of media, as well as equality in access to resources (e.g. in the workplace or in politics) and (2) the degree to which such civil rights should be limited for the sake of the State’s welfare (see Appendix 1). Items in group 1 denote the liberal conception of citizenship, which assign priority to personal and political freedom over state control, while items in group 2 denote the ethno-republican conception of citizenship, whereby state control impinges on individual free-dom. Respondents evaluated these nine items on a scale of 1 = ‘definitely disagree’ to 7 = ‘defi-nitely agree’.

The categorization of these two groups of items was corroborated by factor analysis, with reli-ability for the liberal factor (α = .51) and for the ethno-republican factor (α =.64). While validating the a priori classification of the groups as aligned with the liberal versus ethno-republican CO, factor analysis has the disadvantage of focusing on average scores and thus not taking into account the possibility that individual respondents might weigh the nine items differently and combine them together in different ways, or in other words, display different profiles of CO.

To overcome this limitation, we conducted cluster analysis on the nine items (for a detailed description, see the rubric ‘Cluster analysis’ in the ‘Results’ section below) (Everitt et al., 2001; Lewis-Beck, 1994). This technique reduces the multidimensionality of the students’ evaluations to a minimal number of distinct k clusters (or profiles), using an algorithm that partitions observations into clusters that maximize between-cluster variation and minimize within-cluster variation while preserving the relative weight assigned to each of the nine CO items tested. By condensing the nine responses to a minimal number of CO clusters rather than considering each response separately, such an analysis allows a parsimonious comparison of students’ COs.

Applied to our data, the cluster analysis revealed that, when more than two clusters (profiles) were specified (k > 2), no clear distinctions emerged between students’ COs. For instance, in the case of k = 3 and k = 4, no ambivalent clusters of COs were obtained (i.e. clusters that ascribe simi-lar weight to both the liberal and the ethno-republican orientations) nor did we obtain clusters that fell into neither of the two orientation patterns. Accordingly, and in keeping with our theoretical assumptions, we set down the number of clusters at k = 2. Based on the outcome of this analysis, a binary categorical variable was constructed representing two main CO clusters (profiles), coded as 0 = liberal (where the liberal items have a greater weight than the ethno-republican items) and 1 = ethno-republican (were the ethno-republican items have a greater weight than the liberal items).


Independent variables

In as much as background variables, such as gender, SES, and area of residence, had been found to affect CO (Cohen et al., 2001; Ichilov, 2005; Kerr et al., 2002), we included these determinants as control variables.

Personal background

1. Gender. It was coded as 0 = male and 1 = female (M = 0.45; standard deviation (SD) = 0.50).

2. Parents’ educational level. It was computed as the mean of father’s and mother’s educa-tional level. Educational level was coded as 1 = primary school, 2 = high school without matriculation, 3 = high school with matriculation, 4 = nonacademic higher education, and 5 = academic education (Spearman = .62; p < .000; M = 3.56, SD = 1.06).

3. Self-evaluation as a student. Respondents were asked to evaluate themselves as students in comparison to other students in their class, in the following range: 1 = very bad student, 2 = not so good, 3 = fair, 4 = good, 5 = very good, and 6 = excellent (M = 4.56; SD = 1.12).

4. Preference for resource-specific inequality. Following Sabbagh (2003), preference for resource-specific inequality is defined as respondent evaluations of the relative importance that should be assigned to differentiating rules in distributing four different resources: pres-tige, power, educational opportunities, and money. These four variables range from −4 to +4. Negative scores on this scale indicate negative preference for inequality (i.e. equality/need distribution rules are preferred over equity rules such as effort, contribution to society and talent). In contrast, positive scores on this scale indicated positive preference for ine-quality (i.e. equity distribution rules, such as contribution and effort, are preferred over equality/need). A zero value stands for neutral preference for inequality (i.e. equality/need and equity rules are equally preferred).

Structural background

5. Region. 0 = periphery, 1 = center (M = 0.57; SD = 0.49). Category 0 included students liv-ing in the northern and southern regions of the country, while category 1 included students living in the central region and in major Israeli cities—Haifa, Tel-Aviv, and Jerusalem.

6. Educational sector. This categorical variable was coded into two dummy variables (Hardy and Carlo, 2005): (1) Religious Jew and (2) Israeli Arab. The secular Jewish sector was used as a comparison point.

This variable was defined based on the assumption that students’ frequent interaction and shared curriculum within each sector may prompt them to adopt collective views, thereby creating shared norms and identities. To justify using the sector as a group variable for examining COs, it was important to demonstrate high within-sector agreement. A value of Rwg = .70 or above was taken to indicate ‘adequate’ within-group interrater agreement (James et al., 1993). In our case, CO scales for each of sectors yielded a value of Rwg > .89.

Results

We will begin with a descriptive account that gives an overall picture of student evaluations of the items listed in Appendix 1. Next, we will present cluster analysis, which formed the basis for the

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construction of a parsimonious binary variable of COs. Finally, hierarchical logistic regressions will be used to test our main hypotheses.

COs

Descriptive analysis of COs. Table 1 displays the average scores assigned by students to the nine items, as well as the occurrence frequencies of the latter in percentages. It is evident that the respondents favored the liberal (M = 4.58) over the ethno-republican orientation (M = 4.36). The highest scores were assigned to items related to open access to jobs regardless of nationality (M = 5.57, SD = 1.96) and to the normative statement that citizens ought to express criticism toward government policies and actions (M = 5.61, SD = 1.63). The lowest scores were assigned to items reflecting the ethno-republican ideology, for example, statements legitimizing citizens’ detention without trial in order to guarantee the State’s welfare (M = 3.14, SD = 2.09), firing teachers for criticizing the government (M = 3.80, SD = 2.31), and reserving key jobs for Jews (M = 3.80, SD = 2.31). A closer look at the score distribution (Table 1) reveals that the liberal items were assigned high scores (6–7) by the majority of the respondents (>50%) and low scores (1–2) by only a few (<15%) of them. In contrast, about 60%–70% of students gave relatively low scores (1–3) to the ethno-republican items, while about 30%–40% rated them in the higher range (4–7).

Table 1 presents a unified measure for assessing the relation between liberal and ethno-republican orientations. Based on a previous study (Sabbagh, 2003), this measure was defined as the mean value of liberal orientations minus the mean value of ethno-republican orientations. The average score was 1.47 (SD = 2.06), which points to a moderate preference for the liberal over the ethno-republican orientation.

While the above descriptive analysis of average scores assigned by students to various items affords insights into the possible considerations behind their decisions, it does not take into account the possibility that students might combine their preferences in different ways. To test for this effect, we applied Cluster Analysis.

Clusters of COs (or profiles). As mentioned above, Cluster Analysis yielded two clusters (or profiles) of COs: (1) the liberal CO cluster and (2) the ethno-republican CO cluster. To gauge the differences between these two clusters, a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted, with the nine CO items as dependent variables and the two clusters as independent variables. As indi-cated in Table 2, findings show significant differences between the two clusters as predictors of the CO items (Hotelling’s Trace value = 1.17, F(10, 1823) = 216.63, p < .000, η2 = .55).

Table 2 displays the two CO clusters, together with the standardized mean scores for each CO item. These findings are also presented in Figure 1, in graphic form. As per Table 2, the liberal CO cluster was slightly more dominant: out of 4795 respondents, it was favored by 2566 (54%). Within the liberal-orientation profile, students assigned the strongest weight to such ideas as ‘jobs should be open to everyone equally’ (M = 0.57) and ‘individual rights should be protected’ (M = 0.57), a lesser weight to ‘citizens are expected to express criticism’ (M = 0.24) and ‘freedom of media should be guaranteed’ (M = 0.24), and a negative weight to the remaining ethno-republican items (5 through 9)—least of all to ‘key positions must be reserved for Jews’ (M = 0.50).

The ethno-republican orientation cluster was favored by 2229 respondents (46%). Of these, item 8, ‘key jobs must be reserved for Jews’, was favored by the largest number of respondents (M = −0.50). The next most popular statements were ‘restriction of freedom guarantees the State’s welfare’ (M = −0.33), followed by ‘teachers who criticize the government should be fired’ (M = −0.31). The lowest weights were assigned to ‘torture should be legitimized to prevent


Tab

le 1

. D

escr

iptiv

e va

lues

for

citiz

ensh

ip-o

rien

tatio

n ite

ms

and

thei

r di

stri

butio

n fr

eque

ncie

s (%

).

Libe

ral

Ethn

o-re

publ

ican

Citi

zens

hip

orie

ntat

ion

Citi

zens

sh

ould

ex

pres

s cr

itici

sm

Indi

vidu

al

righ

ts s

houl

d be

pro

tect

ed

Free

dom

of

med

ia

shou

ld b

e gu

aran

teed

Jobs

sho

uld

be o

pen

to a

ll

Res

tric

tion

of fr

eedo

m

guar

ante

es

Stat

e’s

wel

fare

Stro

ng

lead

ers

bene

fit

the

Stat

e

Tea

cher

s w

ho

criti

cize

the

go

vern

men

t sh

ould

be

fired

Key

po

sitio

ns

mus

t be

re

serv

ed

for

Jew

s

Tor

ture

is

a le

gitim

ate

mea

ns t

o pr

even

t te

rror

ism

Libe

ral o

r R

epub

lican

Item

num

ber

12

34

56

78

9

Mea

n5.

615.

474.

585.

573.

144.

443.

83.

84.

361.

47SD

−1.

63−

1.94

−2.

13−

1.96

−2.

09−

2.11

−2.

31−

2.31

−2.

33−

2.06

Item

freq

uenc

y

1 =

def

inite

ly

do n

ot a

gree

8.7

1013

.99.

939

.318

.634

.530

.422

.4

2

5.7

5.2

94.

212

.89.

813

.410

.47.

7

3

7.2

7.1

9.8

5.1

9.4

10.4

10.3

8.8

8.4

413

.710

.111

.88.

312

.614

.912

.610

.510

.8

5

13.8

10.7

11.3

8.4

9.4

13.1

8.5

9.7

10.5

613

.713

.513

.612

.46.

911

.76.

310

.210

.9

7

= s

tron

gly

agre

e37

.243

.530

.651

.79.

621

.414

.420

29.2

Tot

al10

0%10

0%10

0%10

0%10

0%10

0%10

0%10

0%10

0%

n40

1741

2741

1143

2538

2738

5537

2038

5137

48

SD: s

tand

ard

devi

atio

n.

Sabbagh and Resh 13

Tab

le 2

. D

istr

ibut

ion

of c

itize

nshi

p or

ient

atio

n cl

uste

rs a

nd s

tand

ardi

zed

mea

n sc

ores

per

citi

zens

hip-

item

.

Citi

zens

hip-

orie

ntat

ion

clus

ter

Cod

en

%St

anda

rdiz

ed m

ean

scor

es o

f the

nin

e ci

tizen

ship

ori

enta

tion

item

s

C

itize

ns

are

expe

cted

to

exp

ress

cr

itici

sm

Indi

vidu

al

righ

ts

shou

ld b

e pr

otec

ted

Free

dom

of

med

ia

shou

ld b

e gu

aran

teed

Jobs

sho

uld

be o

pen

to a

ll

Res

tric

tion

of fr

eedo

m

guar

ante

es

Stat

e’s

wel

fare

Stro

ng

lead

ers

bene

fit t

he

Stat

e

Tea

cher

s w

ho

criti

cize

the

go

vern

men

t sh

ould

be

fired

Key

jobs

m

ust

be

rese

rved

fo

r Je

ws

Tor

ture

is

a le

gitim

ate

mea

ns t

o pr

even

t te

rror

ism

Item

num

ber

12

34

56

78

9

Libe

ral

025

660.

540.

250.

420.

240.

57−

0.33

−0.

15−

0.31

−0.

5−

0.2

Ethn

o-re

publ

ican

122

290.

46−

0.27

−0.

49−

0.28

−0.

690.

370.

170.

350.

550.

21t

289.

29**

*10

74.1

8***

299.

70**

*27

95.3

6***

543.

16**

*98

.37*

**44

9.92

***

1478

.33*

**”

160.

40**

*

*p <

.05;

**p

< .0

1; *

**p

< .0

01.


terrorism’ (M = −0.20) and ‘strong leaders benefit the State’ (M = −0.15). In Figure 1, items 1–4 load positively, while items 5–9 load negatively on the liberal-orientation cluster. Conversely, on the republican orientation cluster, items 5–9 load positively, while items 1–4 load negatively.

Explaining COs clusters (profiles)

To test our hypotheses, we carried out a hierarchical binary logistic regression: the control varia-bles of gender, parents’ education, and self-evaluation as a student were entered as the first step (Model 1), while preference for resource-specific inequality, followed by educational sector and region, were entered as the second (Model 2) and the third (Model 3) step, respectively.

Findings presented in Table 3 (Model 1) indicate that the control variables have a significant effect on the CO style: gender (χ2 = 65.21, p < .000), parents’ education (χ2 = 10.88, p < .000), and self-evaluation as a student (χ2 = 15.31, p < .000). The results for these variables yielded the fol-lowing odds ratio (which reflects the effect size in a binary logistic regression): (1) males are 1.66 (B = .51, p < .000) times more likely than females to adopt the ethno-republican CO style, (2) students with educated parents are 0.91 (B = −.10, p < .000) times less likely to adopt the ethno-republican CO profile (i.e. they tend to be more liberal), and (3) students who evaluate themselves as academically strong are 0.89 (B = −.11, p < .000) times less likely to adopt the ethno-republican CO profile.

In Model 2, four measures of preference for resource-specific inequality were added to the equation. Of these, preference for inequality in prestige (χ2 = 18.09, p < .000), power (χ2 = 17.49, p < .000), and learning opportunities (χ2 = 18.07, p < .000) had a positive significant effect on the CO clusters, while economic inequality did not (χ2 = 1.79, p > .05). Specifically, the results for these measures yielded the following odds ratio: respondents with a stronger preference for

Figure 1. Standardized means scores of citizenship items (see Appendix 1) according to orientation cluster.

Sabbagh and Resh 15

Tab

le 3

. H

iera

rchi

cal b

inar

y lo

gist

ic r

egre

ssio

n of

bac

kgro

und

vari

able

s, r

esou

rce-

spec

ific

pref

eren

ce fo

r di

ffere

ntia

tion

and

stru

ctur

al v

aria

bles

on

citiz

ensh

ip o

rien

tatio

n cl

uste

rs.

Mod

el 1

Mod

el 2

Mod

el 3

B

SEO

dds

ratio

BSE

Odd

s ra

tioB

SEO

dds

ratio

Step

1: b

ackg

roun

d va

riab

les

G

ende

r0.

51**

*0.

061.

660.

39**

*0.

071.

470.

47**

*0.

071.

6

Pare

nts’

edu

catio

n−

0.10

**0.

030.

91−

0.09

**0.

030.

92−

0.20

***

0.04

0.82

Se

lf−ev

alua

tion

as a

stu

dent

−0.

11**

*0.

030.

89−

0.13

***

0.03

0.88

−0.

08**

0.03

0.92

Step

2: p

refe

renc

e fo

r re

sour

ce−

spec

ific

diffe

rent

iatio

n

Pres

tige

0.10

***

0.02

1.1

0.11

***

0.03

1.12

Po

wer

0.12

***

0.03

1.12

0.15

***

0.03

1.16

Le

arni

ng o

ppor

tuni

ties

0.13

***

0.03

1.14

0.12

***

0.03

1.13

M

oney

0.03

0.03

1.04

0.04

0.03

1.04

Step

3: s

truc

tura

l var

iabl

es

Reg

ion

−0.

020.

070.

98

Rel

igio

us Je

w0.

93**

*0.

092.

54

Isra

eli A

rab

−0.

33**

*0.

090.

76N

agel

kerk

e R2

.03

.07

.11

*p <

.05;

**p

< .0

1; *

**p

< .0

01.


prestige, power, and learning opportunities inequality are more likely to endorse the ethno-republican CO cluster (odds ratios for prestige, power, and learning opportunities are 1.11, B = .10, p < .000; 1.12, B = .12, p < .000; and 1.14, B = .13, p < .000, respectively). These findings support Hypothesis 1.

Finally, in Model 3, we added the region (center/periphery) and the educational sector. The effect of the former variable was insignificant (χ2 = 0.11, p > .05). With respect to the latter varia-ble, however, the findings indicate a relatively strong direct effect for the religious educational sector (χ2 = 104.38, p < .000), and a weaker, though significant, opposite effect for the Israeli Arab sector (χ2 = 13.27, p < .000). These findings show that students in the religious Jewish sector are 2.54 (B = .93, p < .000) times more likely to adopt the ethno-republican CO profile as compared to students in the secular Jewish sector. Moreover, the Israeli Arab respondents are 0.76 (B = −.33, p < .000) times less likely to adopt the ethno-republican orientation profile than their secular Jewish counterparts (i.e. Israeli Arabs tend to adopt a more liberal orientation). These findings support Hypothesis 2.

Discussion

Drawing on Shafir and Peled’s (2002) neo-institutional perspective which conceptualizes citizen-ship in terms of coexisting regimes where individuals and groups are incorporated into the State and society, this study explores ways in which these discourses are empirically accommodated at the individual level. Specifically, it examines the COs of three different groups of junior-high stu-dents in Israel: secular Jews, religious Jews, and Israeli Arabs. The study examines the students’ orientations by identifying their preferences for two distinct conceptions of citizenship which pre-dominate in Israeli society: liberal and ethno-republican. The findings partially support Shafir and Peled’s (2002) view (see also Theiss-Morse, 1993). Specifically, two binary profiles of COs emerged: respondents who endorse the liberal conception tend to eschew ethno-republican values, while those who endorse the ethno-republican conception tend to discount the liberal ones. In order to validate these findings, we examined the association of these profiles with preference for resource-specific inequality. As expected, the liberal-orientation profile was found to be positively associated with a preference for political equality, while the ethno-republican orientation was asso-ciated with preference for political inequality. This equality–inequality distinction appears also with regard to prestige and educational opportunities, but not in relation to the economic sphere. Taken together, these findings may suggest that citizenship is perceived as an autonomous sphere, whereby economic considerations are put aside. They may also indicate that economic neoliberal tendencies have proliferated all of society’s sectors to the same degree (Ram, 2008).

Furthermore, at least with regard to endorsement of human rights, findings point to a slightly greater popularity of the liberal as compared to the ethno-republican orientation among the Israeli students, indicating that the Israeli hegemonic (ethno-national) citizenship conceptions are cur-rently being challenged (Arnot, 2009; Myers and Zaman, 2009; Soysal and Wong, 2007). Moreover, by demonstrating high within-sector agreement, we ascertained that a CO profile was contingent on the educational sector. Specifically, in line with our expectations, the ethno-republican orienta-tion style was more salient among religious Jewish students than among either secular Jewish or Israeli Arab students (see also Ben-Sira, 1995). Secular Jewish and Israeli Arab students tend more strongly to endorse the liberal orientation, a propensity that appears to be even more salient among Arab adolescents. One possible explanation for this phenomenon is the integration of Israel—and in particular its secular sector—into global trends, which commenced in the 1980s, and the result-ing shift in the views of individual freedom among the Israeli public (Adres et al., 2011; Hazan,

Sabbagh and Resh 17

2001; Lemish et al., 1998; Ram, 2008). Regarding a stronger preference for the liberal over the ethno-republican profile among Israeli Arab students, as compared to the dominant group, which typically endorses national affiliations, one may also assert that marginalized minority adolescent groups in general tend to endorse egalitarian citizenship conceptions—admittedly because the lat-ter are perceived to reinforce their standing in society (Myers and Zaman, 2009). Thus, the more liberal CO and accompanied egalitarian conceptions among secular Jewish and, even more so, among Arab students may stem from different reasons: the former are mainly affected by globali-zation processes that forward the universalistic individual rights orientation, while the latter are endorsing this orientation as a mean to enhance their equal citizenship rights.

This is not to say, however, that the liberal and ethno-republican orientations cannot or do not coexist within a single framework. On the institutional level, for instance, the ‘secular’ segment of the governing Likud party (and to a large extent also the Yisrael Beitienu party) promotes both a neoliberal (economic) agenda and a political ethno-republican (neo-national) agenda whereby the legal status of a citizen is granted to individuals who display ‘loyalty’ to the nation. In the religious sector, one can observe neo-national attitudes along with consumption of global technology and participation in the free market competition.

Finally, notwithstanding the liberal preferences exhibited by the Arab students, in recent years, the Arab minority in Israel has become increasingly nationalistic and religious, processes that are reflected, inter alia, in their demand to be recognized as an indigenous national collective, and which point to an ethno-republican component in this group’s orientation (Ichilov, 2005). It is worth noting that in the context of societal tensions between the Arab minority and the dominant Jewish majority, these processes, which imply the promotion of indigenous Arab political narra-tives and identities, are often carried out within schools, especially through informal messages. Thus, also in this sector, liberal and indigenous ethno-republican views may coexist. In this regard, a methodological reservation is in place: our findings are based on items that focus on the human rights perspective which is one dimension of CO. The items pertaining to ethno-republicanism specifically seek those who support the (Jewish) state authority while disregarding the evaluation of Arab indigenous forms of collective political identity. The endorsement of liberal COs among the Israeli Arabs respondents may reflect a sort of repulsion toward the Jewish ethno-republicanism rather than an attraction to the purely liberal stand. Inclusion of items referring to indigenous aspects of Israeli Arab political collective identity (e.g. Arab solidarity) may have elicited different findings and provide a more comprehensive view of COs in this sector.

Future research may capture more nuances in citizens’ orientations within Israeli society. While the evaluation of COs in this study has provided tools for a parsimonious analysis, understanding and description of the various notions of citizenship in Israel, some of the variables, such as the Arab indigenous forms of political identity, may have been disregarded. If so, they should be iden-tified and taken into account in future research, which will thereby refine measurements of CO. Furthermore, a more accurate specification of rights and duties is in order across social spheres such as welfare, as well as various political and economic spheres (Feixa et al., 2009; Marshall, 1964). An examination which focuses simultaneously on multiple rights and duties in various spheres of life may reveal the existence of a variety of individual CO profiles rather than a binary division that emerged in this study (Pinson, 2004). A multiplicity of more subtle and ambivalent COs may be also unveiled by conducting a qualitative research that would require the respondents to elaborate their political worldviews in greater depth (e.g. Hochschild, 2006). Finally, a cross-national research of young people’s COs would indicate whether the two major profiles obtained in this study are universal or culture specific, and whether and to what extent other profiles are salient in other countries.


Acknowledgment

We thank Nina Luskin for her editorial assistance.

Funding

This study was supported by the Israel Science Foundation, Grant No. 568/09.

Notes

1. As a very heterogeneous society, one can suggest many extra ‘within’ groups, but those three groups represent the major societal divides that are reflected also in a sectorial division in the public educational system.

2. In the 2010–2011 school year, a total of 263,891 students studied in Israeli state junior-high schools (7–9 grades, which is the target population of this research), out of which 56.3%, 14.6%, and 29.1% studied in the secular Jewish, religious Jewish, and Israeli Arab sectors, respectively.

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Appendix 1Support of democratic orientation items

To what extent do you agree with the following statements?

1. Citizens ought to express criticism toward government policies and actions2. Individual rights should be protected, even when one’s opinions diverge from the mainstream3. The media must be allowed to publish all the news, even if it contains severe criticism of the

government and the State4. A person must be hired if he or she is qualified for the position, regardless of whether he or she is a

Jew or an ArabEthno-republican orientations5. In order to guarantee the State’s welfare, it may be necessary to detain citizens without trial and to

prohibit demonstrations6. Strong leaders are of more benefit to the State than policy discussions or legislation7. Teachers who criticize the government should be fired8. Key jobs (e.g. in Parliament) must be reserved only for Jewish citizens9. Torture is a legitimate means to prevent terrorism

Citizenship orientations in a divided society: A comparison of three groups of Israeli junior-high students—secular Jews, religious Jews, and Israeli Arabs

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