CITIZENS’ CONCEPTIONS OF DEMOCRACY...conceptions of democracy and political behavior we use a combination of political science theories and modified approaches from social psychology.
This document is posted to help you gain knowledge. Please leave a comment to let me know what you think about it! Share it to your friends and learn new things together.
Transcript
CITIZENS’ CONCEPTIONS OF DEMOCRACY
AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN GERMANY
Sergiu Gherghina
Institute of Political Science
Goethe University Frankfurt
Brigitte Geissel
Institute of Political Science
Goethe University Frankfurt
Paper prepared for delivery at the Joint Sessions of Workshops
European Consortium for Political Research
29 March – 2 April 2015, Warsaw,
1
Introduction
The recent spread of representative democratic regimes across the world coincides with an
increase in citizens’ discontent towards representative institutions and actors. Over the last
three decades electoral turnout has been in decline, party membership shrank, and the
amount of loyal voters decreased in many contemporary democracies. A large body of
literature discusses the disaffection of citizens with representative democracy (Dalton &
Wattenberg 2000; Norris 2011). One of the solutions to address this “democratic malaise”
has been the adoption of alternative forms of democracy that give citizen more say in
political will‐formation and decision‐making (Scarrow 2001; Zittel & Fuchs 2007; Geissel &
Newton 2012).
At the same time, studies revealed that citizens’ preferences for different forms of
democracy are not uniform. People have different conceptions regarding (the functioning of)
democracy (Hibbing & Theiss‐Morse 2001; Font & Alarcón 2011; Bengtsson 2012). However,
only isolated studies have paid attention to the connection between citizens’ preferences for
democratic alternatives and their desire to get involved in (new) participatory procedures
(Bengtsson & Christensen 2014). To fill this gap and to advance the understanding of such a
linkage, our paper aims to investigate how preferences of German citizens for types of
democracy influence their retrospective as well as prospective involvement in political will‐
formation and decision‐making. Germany is the appropriate setting to investigate this
linkage for two main reasons. At institutional level, there are provisions for direct and
participatory democracy (at regional and local level) that allow citizens to engage in non‐
electoral forms of participation. At behavioral level, German citizens make use of various
ways to get involved in politics and the public participation reaches significant levels across
events (e.g. Stuttgart 21).
Our study is guided by the following research question: How do citizens’ conceptions
of democracy correlate with their retrospective and prospective political participation? To
provide an answer this paper presents the conceptions of democracy preferred by citizens
living in Germany and discusses the effects produced by these preferences on types of
political participation (voting, protests, referenda, deliberative procedures). In other words,
we investigate the way in which attitudes towards forms of democracy are linked to political
behavior. We seek to explain if people who, for example, prefer citizen‐oriented democracy
over other conceptions of democracy (i.e. representative or expert) are consistently willing
2
to get involved in referenda and deliberation practices. To identify the relation between
conceptions of democracy and political behavior we use a combination of political science
theories and modified approaches from social psychology. In this sense, we apply several
models that have been elaborated with respect to what citizens prefer when it comes to
(alternative) processes for political decision making (representative, citizen‐oriented, expert)
Note: The number of respondents for correlations is between 3,014 and 3,604.
** Significant at p > 0.01, * Significant at p > 0.05
The empirical evidence for people with a conception of expert democracy indicates a
mixture between the representative and the citizen conceptions. More precisely, these
respondents have a similar reaction to those favoring representative democracy in rejecting
the citizen‐oriented forms of participation: ‐0.04 for referendums and protests and ‐0.07 for
deliberations. At the same time, their participatory behavior does not appear to favor voting
16
since the correlation is almost inexistent (0.01, not significant). These mixed attitudes can be
also observed when referring to prospective participation where they are more likely to
participate in voting and some types that involve citizens (referendum, public decision), but
not in others (deliberation, protest). This may be explained by the fact that they consider
elections and referendums to have experts behind the citizens’ actions and citizens do not
have the last word to say about policy. As expected, there is a nuanced negative attitude
towards citizen‐oriented types of participation in the prospective question. In particular, it
must be noted the turn taken by these respondents when asked about previous
participation (negative) and willingness to participate in referendums (positive).
These results provide weak empirical evidence in favor of the hypothesized
relationships. Given the low variation on most types of participation, the coefficients
indicate that there is a consistent relationship between the conceptions of democracy and
types of participation, both retrospective and prospective. On the one hand, respondents
who favor representative democracy engage in voting and reject forms in which citizens
have a word to say (H1). On the other hand, respondents who embrace a citizen conception
of democracy are oriented to participate in direct, deliberative, or protest forms and less in
voting (H2). The respondents favoring expert democracy display mixed attitudes towards
forms of participation (H3) being closer to the representative conception in retrospective
and somewhat closer to citizens in prospective participation.
Let us now include the conceptions of democracy in a regression model next to other
variables.1 The four models in Table 3 present the results of the ordered logistic regression
for the retrospective forms of participation. The values of Pseudo R2 indicate a relatively
weak fit of the model to the presented data with best estimation for voting (also with the
higher number of respondents). The odds‐ratios indicate support for H1: respondents with a
conception of representative democracy are 1.36 times more likely to vote than the other
respondents and 0.63 times, 0.84 times, and 0.57 times less likely to have participated in
referendums, protests, respectively deliberations. The multivariate analysis strengthens the
conclusions of the bivariate relationships and indicates that respondents with a conception
of expert democracy have mixed feelings and there is no effect on voting and protests but
1 We ran a collinearity test among the predictor variables. The results indicate there is no strong correlation between any of the independent variables. In addition, when running the ordered logistic regression we have asked STATA to drop collinear variables during analysis and they were all included.
17
strongly oppose referendums and deliberations (H3). In three out of the four models
presented there is almost no empirical support for H2. The citizen conception of democracy
has no effect on referendums and deliberations – the most obvious forms of citizen
involvement. Instead, these respondents are 1.21 times more likely to engage in protests
compared to the others (not statistically significant) and this contrasts sharply with the
attitudes of respondents with representative democracy.2
Table 3: Ordered Logistic Regression for retrospective political participation
Voting Referendum Protests Deliberations
Representative democracy 1.36*
(0.19)
0.63**
(0.07)
0.84
(0.09)
0.57**
(0.07)
Citizen democracy 1.06
(0.14)
0.98
(0.11)
1.21
(0.14)
1.01
(0.12)
Expert democracy 1.01
(0.13)
0.78*
(0.08)
0.95
(0.10)
0.70**
(0.08)
Civic engagement 1.41**
(0.11)
1.25**
(0.07)
1.71**
(0.09)
1.60**
(0.09)
Interest in politics 2.26**
(0.14)
1.32**
(0.06)
1.55**
(0.07)
1.43**
(0.07)
Media consumption 1.05
(0.04)
1.03
(0.03)
0.93*
(0.03)
0.97
(0.04)
Income 1.40**
(0.07)
1.14**
(0.04)
1.12**
(0.04)
1.07
(0.05)
Age 2.03**
(0.11)
1.21**
(0.05)
1.11*
(0.05)
1.12*
(0.05)
Education 1.75**
(0.12)
0.95
(0.05)
1.39**
(0.07)
0.79**
(0.05)
N 2,920 2,436 2,753 2,486
LR Chi2 777.94 172.72 413.79 211.16
Pseudo R2 0.14 0.02 0.05 0.04
Note: Coefficients are odds‐ratios (standard errors in brackets)
** Significant at p > 0.01, * Significant at p > 0.05
2 In interpreting the results of the ordered logistic regression we refer both to the strength and the statistical significance of coefficients. In spite of arguments in favor of interpretations limited strictly to statistical significance, we consider that the strength of effects provides important insights for our arguments.
18
All other variables – with the exception of media consumption (H6) – have a relatively
strong and consistent effect across all four types of political participation; there is strong
empirical support for the secondary hypotheses H4 and H5. For example, individuals with
interest in politics are 2.26 times more likely to vote, 1.32 times more likely to participate in
referendums, 1.55 times to be engaged in protests, and 1.43 times to participate in
deliberative processes; all coefficients are statistically significant at the 0.01 level. In the
context of this paper it is relevant to note that most of the supplementary and control
variables have a similar effect on the types of participation. As illustrated in the example
above, people who bear interest in politics are more likely to participate, irrespective of the
type. This holds for civically engaged individuals, those with higher income, and older
people. It is true that the strength of effect varies but all effects go in the same direction.3
The consistency of effects across types of political participation increases the value of the
observation related to the conceptions of democracy where effects – although weak –
clearly differ.
The results in Table 4 refer to prospective political participation and tell a similar
story to the one above. There is empirical support for the hypotheses formulated about
conceptions of representative and expert democracy and only partial support when it comes
to citizen democracy. The individuals with such a conception have a consistent positive
attitude towards all types of political participation. While there is strong and statistically
significant at 0.01 on the willingness to participate in referendums and in deliberations, such
a conception of democracy also has positive effects on the likelihood of voting and
protesting (both significant at 0.05).
Similarly to retrospective participation, there is no empirical support for H5 as media
consumption appears to make a small difference only in the case of protests. Instead, there
is strong and robust empirical evidence to support H5 and H6. Income and age do no longer
have a consistent effect across all types of political participation and appear to make no
difference in protests and deliberations. Education is also somewhat different compared
with the retrospective models: it has no effect on deliberations and strong positive effects
on the remaining three types.
3 Education is an outlier and indicates that less educated people are likely to particiate in deliberations, more educated people in voting and protests and has almost no effect in referendums.
19
Table 4: Ordered Logistic Regression for prospective political participation
Voting Referendum Protests Deliberations
Retrospective
Representative democracy 1.74**
(0.23)
0.87
(0.09)
0.87
(0.09)
0.70**
(0.08)
Citizen democracy 1.33*
(0.17)
1.57**
(0.17)
1.29*
(0.14)
1.33**
(1.15)
Expert democracy 1.60**
(0.20)
1.32**
(0.14)
1.02
(0.10)
0.86
(0.09)
Civic engagement 1.30**
(0.10)
1.11*
(0.06)
1.56**
(0.08)
1.45**
(0.08)
Interest in politics 2.00**
(0.12)
1.78**
(0.08)
1.50**
(0.06)
1.62**
(0.07)
Media consumption 0.98
(0.04)
0.99
(0.03)
0.94*
(0.03)
0.94
(0.03)
Income 1.24**
(0.06)
1.09*
(0.04)
1.04
(0.04)
1.01
(0.04)
Age 1.39**
(0.07)
1.15**
(0.05)
0.97
(0.04)
1.02
(0.04)
Education 1.71**
(0.11)
1.50**
(0.08)
1.40**
(0.07)
1.04
(0.05)
N 2,918 2,779 2,774 2,474
LR Chi2 511.28 387.39 346.85 266.99
Pseudo R2 0.09 0.05 0.04 0.03
Note: Coefficients are odds‐ratios (standard errors in brackets)
** Significant at p > 0.01, * Significant at p > 0.05
Conclusions
This paper aimed to identify the way in which preferences of German citizens for types of
democracy influence their retrospective and prospective involvement in politics. Similar to
previous results for the Finish population (Bengtsson & Christensen 2014) we found that
citizens have different ideas about how a democracy should look like. Most citizens prefer a
mixture of representative, citizen‐oriented, and expert democracy with different
prioritizations. More important, there is a correlation between citizens’ perception of
20
democracy and their intentions for political behavior. We found empirical evidence for most
of our (primary) hypotheses. Citizens favoring representative democracy are less inclined to
take part in participatory devices, whereas citizens favoring a citizen‐oriented concept of
democracy are more willing to get involved in them. Those citizens who favor a more expert
oriented democracy, show mixed participation intentions. Looking at our regression analyses
these findings hold. However, not all of our secondary hypotheses and control variables
turned out to be explanatory. The SES was kind of a “mixed bag” and did not show clear
patterns; furthermore, there is no empirical support for the hypothesis about media
consumption. The other two factors (civic engagement and interest in politics) turned out to
have an effect on participation. There is a difference between retrospective and prospective
participation that can be interpreted in the light of availability of tools.
Our findings bear theoretical and empirical implications that move beyond the
investigated single‐case study. First, in the German case, the correlation between
conceptions of democracy and political participation was stronger for prospective intentions
then for retrospective behavior. Respondents favoring citizen‐oriented democracy are more
inclined to participate in the future than they did up to now. Accounting for theoretical
approaches aimed at understanding the relation between normative disposition, intention
and activity, our findings suggest, that availability is an important dimension. If participatory
devices are available citizens use them; if they are not available citizen can just formulate
their intention to apply them. However, this implication is preliminary. Since we have no
information about whether forms of participation were available within the respondents’
areas/municipalities the implication can be more regarded as a hunch. Further research is
necessary to show whether this assumption can be grounded empirically.
The second implication refers to the concept of democracy and the self‐conception of
citizens. In particular, the concept of expert democracy is relevant. Citizens favoring an
expert democracy do not necessarily want to rely on professional experts. Quite on the
contrary and they show an intention to be more involved in political matters at least in the
future. We might conclude that their preference for expert democracy does not necessarily
mean they favor professional experts. At least partly they consider themselves as experts
and want to be taken into account in political will formation and decision making.
Our study has shown that research on the linkage between citizens’ conception of
democracy and participation is fruitful and will probably be even more fruitful in the
21
following period because new models of democracy proliferate around the world with
citizens asking for more say in political will formation and decision making. This development
has to be accompanied by empirical research in at least two directions. On the one hand, it
will be instructive to empirically assess our idea about the importance of availability. To test
our assumption whether the availability of participatory options plays a role for political
involvement and how big this role is, options for political participation and participation at
local level should be correlated. While this is not easy due to scarce data about participation
provisions, research in this field would contribute significantly to our knowledge about
participation and democracy. On the other hand, we need in‐depth research to identify the
determinants of the relationship between conceptions and participation, i.e. a broader
framework with several explanatory factors. While we have shown the existence of a linkage
between normative beliefs and activity, the causal mechanisms require careful investigation.
22
List of references:
Bengtsson, Å., 2012. Citizens’ perceptions of political processes. A Critical evaluation of
preference consistency and survey items. Revista Internacional de Sociología, 70(2),
pp.45–64.
Bengtsson, Å. & Christensen, H., 2014. Ideals and Actions: Do Citizens’ Patterns of Political
Participation Correspond to their Conceptions of Democracy? Government and
Opposition, online first.
Conway, M., 1991. Political Participation in the United States, Washington DC: CQ Press.
Dalton, R.J., 1988. Citizen Politics in Western Democracies, Chatham: Chatham House.
Dalton, R.J. & Wattenberg, M.P., 2000. Unthinkable Democracy. Political Change in
Advanced Industrial Democracies. In R. J. Dalton & M. P. Wattenberg, eds. Parties
Without Partisans. Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, pp. 3–16.
Darley, J.M. & Batson, C.D., 1973. From Jerusalem to Jericho": A Study of Situational and
Dispositional Variables in Helping Behavior. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 27(1), pp.100–108.
Diekmann, A. & Preisendoerfer, P., 1998. Umweltbewußtsein und Umweltverhalten in Low‐
und High‐Cost‐Situationen (Environmental Awareness and Environmental Behavior in
Low‐ and High‐Cost Situations). Zeitschrift fuer Soziologie, 27(6), pp.438–453.
Drew, D. & Weaver, D., 2006. Voter Learning in the 2004 Presidential Election: Did the Media
Matter? Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, 83(1), pp.25–42.
Esaiasson, P., Gilljam, M. & Persson, M., 2012. Which decision‐making arrangements
generate the strongest legitimacy beliefs? Evidence from a randomized field
experiment. European Journal of Political Research, 51(6), pp.785–808.
Font, J. & Alarcón, P., 2011. The role of personality in the explanation of preferences for
democratic processes, Paper presented at the Annual Scientific Meeting of the
International Society of Political Psychology, Istanbul.
Geissel, B., 2008. Democratic Resource or Democratic Threat? Profiles of Critical and
Uncritical Citizens in Comparative Perspective. Comparative Sociology, 7(1), pp.4–27.
Geissel, B. et al., 2014. Partizipation und Demokratie im Wandel ‐ Wie unsere Demokratie
durch neue Verfahren und Kombinationen repräsentativer, deliberativer und direkter
Beteiligung gestärkt wird (Participation and Democracy in Transition ‐ How our
23
democracy is strengthened by n. In Partizipation im Wandel (Participation in
Transition). Guetersloh: Verlag Bertelsmann Stiftung, pp. 489–504.
Geissel, B. & Newton, K. eds., 2012. Evaluating Democratic Innovations: Curing the
Democratic Malaise?, London: Routledge.
De Haan, G. & Kuckartz, U., 1996. Umweltbewusstsein. Denken und Handeln in Umweltkrisen
(Environmental Awareness. Thinking and Acting in Environmental crises), Opladen:
Westdeutscher Verlag.
Hibbing, J.R. & Theiss‐Morse, E., 2001. Process Preferences and American Politics: What the
People Want Government to Be. American Political Science Review, 95(1), pp.145–153.
Leighley, J., 1996. Group Membership and the Mobilization of Political Participation. Journal
of Politics, 58(2), pp.447–463.
McCarty, J.A. & Shrum, L.J., 2000. The Measurement of Personal Values in Survey Research.
A Test of Alternative Rating Procedures. Public Opinion Quarterly, 64(3), pp.271–298.